Preface. It is very hard to find anything on the U.S. military or governments awareness of nuclear winter. So far the only other information I’ve found on this is from 2023 Risk Analysis methods for nuclear war & nuclear terrorism. National Academies of Sciences. DOI 10.17226/26609

Many details about the consequences of nuclear explosion–produced soot remain uncertain, but a key point is that, to this committee’s knowledge, this topic has not been extensively studied by the U.S. government, especially regarding the impact on highly interconnected, technologically dependent modern society, as well as on climate.  There is a need to improve the understanding of less-well- understood physical effects of nuclear weapons (such as fires; damage in modern urban environments; electromagnetic pulse effects; and climatic effects, such as nuclear winter), as well as the assessment and estimation of psychological, societal, and political consequences of nuclear weapons use.

Many papers have been published since the original research in 1983 with much better models and data from the effects of wildfire smoke and volcanoes on the climate.  Since up to 5 billion people could die, you would think that the nations with nuclear weapons would all be working together on disarmament or reduction of weapons. But quite the opposite. We are in another cold war nuclear arms race, thanks to the Obama administrations programs to replace and enhance nuclear missiles, nuclear submarines and other nuclear command and control infrastructure that has expanded since then. There is now a $1.5 trillion dollar program to do this. Plus endless talk about how evil China is and that they are The Enemy, which has provoked them into expanding their number of nuclear missiles from 200 (in 2020) to 1500 by 2030.

Below is one of the few articles I could find on why nuclear winter is not being discussed. The psychology of it is depressing. The authors don’t offer a workaround to overcoming the psychology of ignoring nuclear winter either, let’s hope their second paper does: Proper, Megan, Lauren Ice, and James Scouras. Whatever Happened to Nuclear Winter? Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Not available December 2023.

This is a shorter version of their paper by just a few pages and the highlights are mine, you may want to read the original since I took out the footnotes.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Financial Sense, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Scouras J, Ice L, Proper M (2023) Nuclear Winter, Nuclear Strategy, Nuclear Risk. Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2023-05/NuclearWinter-Strategy-Risk-WEB.pdf

Abstract

In this essay, we strive to explain the long-standing practice of intentionally ignoring the potential for nuclear winter in the formulation of US nuclear strategy. To do so, we explore the critical relationships between (1) nuclear winter and (2) nuclear strategy and nuclear risk. We consider the multiple roles of nuclear weapons and how perspectives on nuclear winter affect these roles. We distinguish cases in which neither, only one, or both sides in an adversarial relationship believe nuclear winter would be cataclysmic. Our analysis reveals two primary reasons for ignoring nuclear winter in US nuclear strategy. First, any single nuclear state can only do so much by itself to reduce nuclear winter’s consequences. The second, largely unspoken, reason is that the side believed to be more concerned about the risk of nuclear winter may be at a disadvantage in nuclear crisis management, deterrence, and warfighting. Nevertheless, we argue that prudence dictates we revisit current nuclear strategy. As the risk of nuclear war grows, it is increasingly apparent that we can no longer completely rely on the continued success of deterrence. We must also hedge against its possible failure. The risk of catastrophic nuclear winter must be weighed against the potentially detrimental effects that acknowledging and ameliorating its consequences could have on nuclear strategy.

We are motivated by the disturbing dissonance between those scientists who stridently argue that nuclear winter is a dire threat to humanity and the US government, which has ignored these claims.

We take as a starting point the legitimate scientific uncertainty about the potential severity of a nuclear winter. Much like uncertainty about climate change, which stymied significant policy responses for a considerable time, uncertainty about nuclear winter has also been invoked to justify inaction.

And even now, with a scientific consensus that climate change is real, is anthropogenic, and has dire consequences for the planet, some leaders continue to deny the need for mitigation. Since there is not as solid a scientific consensus about nuclear winter, even some four decades after its discovery, uncertainty remains a significant contributor to complacency in adapting nuclear strategy. However, this is not the whole story or even necessarily the most important part of the story.

While scientific predictions of nuclear winter’s severity still differ across studies, the essential phenomenology is well understood and accepted: nuclear explosions will ignite fires that,

in turn, could—depending on the environs of the burst—create sooty smoke that could—under the right circumstances—loft into the stratosphere where it will remain for extended periods and attenuate sunlight, cooling the earth’s surface, reducing precipitation, and resulting in other climatic and environmental effects. Depending on the character of the nuclear war, this cooling potentially could be extreme (tens of degrees Celsius), threatening modern civilization and numerous species with extinction.4 Even comparatively minor cooling (one to two degrees Celsius) as projected from regional nuclear scenarios of 100 low-yield nuclear detonations, could potentially wreak havoc on food security5 and the marine ecosystems that humanity depends on. The small subset of scientists who continue to conduct nuclear winter research are completely convinced of the validity of this description.

But the devil is in the details; there are many caveats in this narrative. Two particular areas of scientific debate are essential to accurate estimates of the consequences: how much material will burn, and how much sooty smoke will loft up to the stratosphere in the variety of plausible and possible scenarios of nuclear war. The uncertainties associated with these and other questions make the difference between a severe nuclear winter and a more moderate one or between a moderate one and a barely perceptible one. While these differences are important, even a moderate nuclear winter could have profound consequences, resulting in worldwide deaths comparable to or exceeding those caused by the more familiar and direct effects of nuclear war.

While nuclear winter is potentially the most severe consequence of nuclear war, its possibility has had very little—if any—impact on US nuclear strategy. To the extent that military and political leaders even think about nuclear winter, many simply dismiss it as a Cold War hypothesis debunked in the late 1980s.7 Others rationalize the lack of policy response by claiming that nuclear winter helpfully supports deterrence by making the consequences of nuclear war even more unacceptable to all.8

Moreover, assuming the science behind nuclear winter predictions is valid, it is possible that a nuclear winter could be caused by a relatively small number of nuclear detonations.9 It follows that any of the major nuclear powers could, by itself, cause nuclear winter, and that no nuclear power, in isolation, can preclude the possibility of nuclear winter. Rather, the cooperation of all major nuclear powers would be required.

Nuclear weapons are meant to deter nuclear attack against the U.S. and its allies and to intimidate enemies, such as Russia is doing today by reminding the U.S. and NATO that they have nuclear missiles and could escalate the conflict in Ukraine if sufficiently provoked.  Which worked, the U.S. has gone to great lengths to not get directly involved and what military aid has been sent.  

DETERRENCE

Nuclear winter in its more extreme manifestations threatens consequences to the warring parties quite differently from, and possibly even more severe than, the more direct and immediate cataclysmic effects of nuclear weapons. Before publication of the TTAPS study (Turco in 1983),10 Departments of Defense and Energy scientists responsible for understanding the effects of nuclear weapons were completely unaware of this phenomenon. The TTAPS authors and their scientist forbears thus deserve great credit for discovering this risk. One might deduce that by increasing the consequences of nuclear war, nuclear winter, even in its least-severe manifestations, would serve to enhance deterrence. After all, deterrence ultimately relies on the prospect of unacceptable consequences; the more horrific the consequences, the stronger the deterrent. And as a global phenomenon, both sides and much of the rest of the world will suffer the consequences, so the enhancement to deterrence occurs for all sides. However, it’s not as simple as that.

Some argue that nuclear war is already sufficiently horrific that the prospect of nuclear winter, even in the extreme scenarios where billions of additional deaths occur, will have minimal impact on deterrence. At one level, this is, of course, illogical. It matters greatly whether hundreds of millions perish in a nuclear war or billions do. And it’s worth emphasizing that many of those additional billions would be denizens of countries not party to the conflict. It is morally abhorrent and a violation of international law to threaten or execute such a nuclear strategy because its consequences are grossly disproportionate to any conceivable military objective. At another level, to the extent that military planners subscribe to the idea that nuclear winter should have no effect on deterrence, they make themselves by definition correct. As with much of deterrence theory, this is a case of “thinking makes it so” (to paraphrase Shakespeare)

If nuclear winter is taken seriously by national leaders, the effect can undermine the will to execute declaratory policy regarding retaliation. Hesitancy to carry out retaliatory threats undermines deterrence. Thus, for example, the perceived (by our adversaries) acceptance (by the United States) of nuclear winter might, perversely, make a nuclear attack against the United States more likely. But this effect is operative only if just one side is influenced by the possibility of triggering a nuclear winter. Thus, it is in the interest of both sides that the other side, but not itself, be concerned with nuclear winter

WAR FIGHTING

The range of possible nuclear war scenarios creates a corresponding range of possible nuclear winter effects, which might vary from barely perceptible to catastrophic. Many smaller nuclear wars, involving relatively few nuclear weapons, would probably not trigger significant nuclear winter effects. At the same time, any nuclear war, however small its initial phase, has the potential to escalate to ultimately unleash the arsenals of the major nuclear powers and target cities, thereby causing the greatest nuclear winter effects. Thus, only to the extent that one or both sides fear that smaller nuclear wars are likely to lead to large nuclear wars might nuclear winter be a factor in decisions.

The prospect of nuclear winter would presumably make whichever side (or sides, in multilateral scenarios) took it more seriously more hesitant to engage in any form of nuclear warfighting and less willing to engage in escalatory steps that could lead to a full-scale nuclear winter. Many conceivable nuclear wars lie in the middle with respect to their possible creation of nuclear winter effects. This suggests that even limited efforts to ameliorate nuclear winter effects could have important benefits even if they don’t help much in the more extreme scenarios or are unnecessary in the least extreme scenarios.

Nuclear warfighting should be influenced by the prospect of nuclear winter, but it appears that no nuclear state has modified its warfighting plans to account for it. Possible actions to reduce the consequences of nuclear winter include reducing weapon yields, adjusting burst heights to limit the ignition of fires and lofting of soot and smoke, employing earth-penetrating nuclear warheads where feasible, reducing arsenals available for warfighting, and avoiding the targeting of cities and other sites with large amounts of combustible materials in their vicinities. While some of these actions have been taken, notably reducing weapon yields and arsenals available for warfighting, they are more accurately attributed to improvements in weapon accuracy, arms control, and the end of the Cold War than to concerns about nuclear winter.

More extreme policies intended to prevent the physical possibility of nuclear winter have been proposed, starting with Carl Sagan’s call for a “nuclear winter–safe” world. This would require reducing worldwide arsenals to below perhaps a total of some 500 to 2,000 warheads worldwide, compared to the current worldwide arsenals total of about 13,000 warheads and the Cold War peak of approximately 70,000.

It is an understatement to observe that such drastic reductions seem out of reach politically. And, of course, such goals cannot be achieved unilaterally. They would require the cooperation of all nuclear states.

Finally, focus on a nuclear winter–safe world might discourage focus on more achievable goals that reduce the more extreme consequences of nuclear winter even if they do not eliminate all such consequences.

More than a score of nuclear crises arose during the Cold War,16 and at least five have occurred since the end of that era.17 From this experience, it’s clear that no two nuclear crises are the same. And, thus, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to managing such crises. At one extreme is avoiding nuclear crises in the first place, a policy many nuclear states have tried to follow since they acquired nuclear weapons. At the other extreme lies the tactic of brinkmanship. This involves ratcheting up the risk to the other side of continuing or escalating the crisis. Unfortunately, it generally increases the risk for both sides. The thought is that the side unable to bear the ever-increasing level of risk will capitulate.

As with deterrence, if one side believed the other side was more concerned with the possibility of nuclear winter, it could try to exploit that greater concern by engaging in more reckless forms of nuclear brinkmanship than otherwise.

Nuclear Winter Ignored by Both Sides

If nuclear winter is ignored by both sides, which reflects current reality, the likelihood of nuclear war increases to an unknown, but perhaps minor, degree. However, should nuclear war occur—and if the nuclear winter scientists have been correct in their warnings—in the worst-case scenario, billions of additional deaths will occur in the following months and years, the environment will take decades to recover, and civilization will be thrown back centuries. That is the global catastrophic risk we are, by default, accepting by ignoring nuclear winter. And we are imposing that global catastrophic risk on the entire planet.

Nuclear Winter Feared by Both Sides

If nuclear winter is genuinely feared by both sides, and both sides correctly understand that the other side also fears nuclear winter, it would seem that the risk of nuclear Armageddon would be lowered. But perversely, the common fear of nuclear winter might diminish the perceived likelihood of small nuclear wars escalating to large ones, thereby reducing inhibitions against crossing the nuclear threshold in the first place.

Only One Side Fears Nuclear Winter

The situation is more complex when only one side fears nuclear winter because of the possibility that the side that doesn’t fear nuclear winter tries to manipulate the fear on the other side. There also arise complex interactions involving what one side believes, correctly or incorrectly, the other side believes. Consider Soviet attempts to manipulate US fears in the late 1980s.

While the official Soviet perspective on nuclear winter was complete and immediate acceptance of the phenomenon as scientifically valid, it is unlikely this reflected their true beliefs. While we cannot say for certain what the Soviets’ beliefs truly were, it appears that they either rejected the phenomena, were divided, or were content with remaining willfully ignorant on the subject. Given the large uncertainties in early nuclear winter research, it is unlikely the Soviet government would simply accept nuclear winter as scientifically valid with such apparent ease and readiness. Soviet media and officials claimed that Soviet scientists had independently confirmed the possibility of severe nuclear winter effects; however, it appears the research did not “go beyond the minimum necessary to project an image of concern.” While there are many accounts of Soviet government officials publicly stating their acceptance of nuclear winter and chastising those in the West who were skeptical, there is no record they changed or even questioned their own nuclear policy, stockpiles, or strategies.

Rather than genuinely accepting nuclear winter science, it is more plausible that Soviet officials used nuclear winter as propaganda against the West. Publicly stated Soviet views on nuclear winter were clearly crafted to undermine established US/NATO nuclear policy and the Soviets’ broader anti-West agenda. For example, an article published in late 1983 by the Russian News Agency TASS used nuclear winter to criticize the “inhuman aspirations of the US imperialists, who are pushing the world toward nuclear catastrophe.” Western governments’ acceptance of the theory would cast doubt on US willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend ourselves and our allies. And by reaching US audiences with apocalyptic visions, the Soviet Union attempted to weaken public support for US nuclear programs and policies.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Nuclear winter is a global catastrophic risk with potentially extreme consequences beyond those posed by the more immediate and direct effects of nuclear war. The risk of nuclear winter can be decreased by reducing its (worst) consequences or by preventing nuclear war in the first place. The United States, as well as all other nuclear states, has chosen to put all its eggs in the prevention basket, intentionally ignoring the possibility of nuclear winter.

Our analysis reveals two primary reasons. First, there is only so much any single nuclear state can do by itself to reduce nuclear winter’s consequences. Considering the history of Soviet attempts at manipulating US nuclear policy by exploiting fears of nuclear winter, cooperation of all major nuclear powers seems highly unlikely. The most effective options are to greatly reduce the largest nuclear arsenals and modify targeting doctrine to exclude cities from target lists. However, both of these options require formal or at least tacit international cooperation far beyond what appears plausible or prudent in the foreseeable future and are generally unverifiable. Additionally, the risk of nuclear winter could be reduced if we developed nuclear and, especially, nonnuclear retaliation options intended to increase the likelihood of keeping limited nuclear use limited

The second, and largely unspoken, reason for focusing solely on preventing nuclear war is that the side believed to be more concerned about the risk of nuclear winter is at a disadvantage in nuclear deterrence, warfighting, and crisis management. The greater the difference in concerns, the greater the disadvantage. We believe these two reasons go a long way to explaining the indifference the United States has toward nuclear winter.

We also believe it is time to revisit this approach.  After a period of optimism in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, we are now facing a future of increasing nuclear risks as more states acquire nuclear capabilities and international disputes occur. Thus, it would be prudent to carefully consider the possibility of the failure of nuclear deterrence. Among the first issues to address is the prospect of nuclear winter. As discussed in greater detail in our companion paper (not published yet) we advocate that the United States establish a comprehensive scientific program to resolve major scientific uncertainties, with a concomitant program of policy analysis focused on striking a reasonable balance between ameliorating the worst consequences of nuclear winter and maintaining effective deterrence, warfighting, and crisis management strategies.

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