
Preface. Below are excerpts from a devastating critique of current farming practices by the National research council who show the myriad ways that industrial farming is harming the land and future food production.

Preface. Below are excerpts from a devastating critique of current farming practices by the National research council who show the myriad ways that industrial farming is harming the land and future food production.
Preface. Congress is aware that an energy crisis looms, though they seldom acknowledge or deal with it. Here are a few excerpts from this U.S. House hearing (2011) The American energy initiative part 6: Challenges & opportunities for alternative transportation fuels and vehicles.
AGADEZ, Niger — The world dismisses them as economic migrants. The law treats them as criminals who show up at a nation’s borders uninvited. Prayers alone protect them on the journey across the merciless Sahara.
But peel back the layers of their stories and you find a complex bundle of trouble and want that prompts the men and boys of West Africa to leave home, endure beatings and bribes, board a smuggler’s pickup truck and try to make a living far, far away.
They do it because the rains have become so fickle, the days measurably hotter, the droughts more frequent and more fierce, making it impossible to grow enough food on their land. Some go to the cities first, only to find jobs are scarce. Some come from countries ruled by dictators, like Gambia, whose longtime ruler recently refused to accept the results of an election he lost. Others come from countries crawling with jihadists, like Mali.
In Agadez, a fabled gateway town of sand and hustle through which hundreds of thousands exit the Sahel on their way abroad, I met dozens of them. One was Bori Bokoum, 21, from a village in the Mopti region of Mali. Fighters for Al Qaeda clash with government forces in the area, one of many reasons making a living had become much harder than in his father’s time.
One bad harvest followed another, he said. Not enough rice and millet could be eked out of the soil. So, as a teenager, he ventured out to sell watches in the nearest market town for a while, then worked on a farm in neighboring Ivory Coast, saving up for this journey. Libya was his destination, then maybe across the Mediterranean Sea, to Italy.
“To try my luck,” was how Mr. Bokoum put it. “I know it’s difficult. But everyone goes. I also have to try.”
This journey has become a rite of passage for West Africans of his generation. The slow burn of climate change makes subsistence farming, already risky business in a hot, arid region, even more of a gamble. Pressures on land and water fuel clashes, big and small. Insurgencies simmer across the region, prompting United States counterterrorism forces to keep watch from a base on the outskirts of Agadez.
This year, more than 311,000 people have passed through Agadez on their way to either Algeria or Libya, and some onward to Europe, according to the International Organization for Migration. The largest numbers are from Niger and its West African neighbors, including Mr. Bokoum’s home, Mali.
Scholars of migration count people like Mr. Bokoum among the millions who could be displaced around the world in coming decades as rising seas, widening deserts and erratic weather threaten traditional livelihoods. For the men who pour through Agadez, these hardships are tangled up with intense economic, political and demographic pressures.
“Climate change on its own doesn’t force people to move but it amplifies pre-existing vulnerabilities,” said Jane McAdam, an Australian law professor who studies the trend. They move when they can no longer imagine a future living off their land — or as she said, “when life becomes increasingly intolerable.
But many of these people fall through the cracks of international law. The United Nations 1951 refugee convention applies only to those fleeing war and persecution, and even that treaty’s obligation to offer protection is increasingly flouted by many countries wary of foreigners.
In such a political climate, policy makers point out, the chances of expanding the law to include those displaced by environmental degradation are slim to none. It explains why the more than 100 countries that have ratified the Paris climate agreement this year acknowledged that environmental changes would spur the movement of people, but kicked the can down the road on what to do about them.
A Barren Outlook
Many migrants pass through Agadez from the villages around Zinder, a city roughly situated between the mouth of the Sahara and Niger’s border with Nigeria. Until 1926, Zinder was Niger’s capital. Then it ran low on water.
Early one gray-yellow morning, I set off from Zinder for a village called Chana, the home of one of the migrants I had met, Habibou Idi. Rows upon rows of millet grew on both sides of the two-lane national highway, punctuated occasionally by a spindly acacia. About an hour outside the city, some boys were raking the soil, yanking out weeds.
An older man sitting to the side said that back when he was a boy, the millet stood so high that you could hardly see workers in the fields. Midway through the growing season, it now barely reaches their knees.
An hour farther out of the city, we veered off the paved road and across a barren, rutted field.
In Chana, there was a steady thud of women pounding beans with wooden pestles. The beans grew along the ground, in the shade of the millet. They were the only crop ready for harvest. And so the people of Chana ate beans, morning and night: beans pounded, boiled, flavored with salt.
As Mr. Idi, 33, led me through his fields, he recalled hearing stories of what Chana looked like before a great drought swept across the Sahel in the 1970s and 1980s. The village was encircled by trees, he was told.
Back then, like most villagers, his father had a cow and plenty of sheep. Their droppings fertilized the land. Today, Mr. Idi said, not a single cow is left in Chana. They were sold to buy food.
Mr. Idi complained that the rains are now hard to predict. Sometimes they come in May, and he rushes out to plant his millet and beans, only to find the clouds closing up and his crops withering. Even when a good rain comes, it just floods. Most of the trees are gone, they were cut for firewood.
Living off the land is no longer an option, so unlike his father or grandfather before him, Mr. Idi has spent the last several years working across the border in Nigeria — hauling goods, watering gardens, whatever he could find.
This summer, for the first time, he boarded a bus to Agadez, and then a truck across the dunes to Algeria. There, he mostly begged.
He lasted only a few months.
The Algerian authorities rounded up hundreds of Nigeriens and deposited them back in Agadez.
That is where I met him, in a line for the bus back to Chana. Sand filled the breast pocket of his tunic. He was bringing home a blanket, a collection of secondhand clothes and 50,000 CFAs (the local currency, pronounced SAY-fas), worth about $100.
That did not last long, either. Mr. Idi arrived home to find that his family had taken out a loan of nearly the same amount in his absence. They had sold four of their five goats, too. There were many mouths to feed: his wife, their four children, plus his late brother’s seven.
Hotter Hots and Unpredictable Rains
Sub-Saharan Africa is in the throes of a population boom, which means that people have to grow more food precisely at a time when climate change is making it all the more difficult. Fertility rates remain higher than in other parts of the world, and Niger has the highest in the entire world: Women bear more than seven children on average.
Once every three years, according to scientists from the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, or FEWS Net, Niger faces food insecurity, or a lack of adequate food to eat. Hunger here is among the worst in the world: About 45 percent of Niger’s children under 5 suffer from chronic malnutrition.
Meanwhile, in what is already one of the hottest places on Earth, it has gotten steadily hotter: by 0.7 degrees Celsius since 1975, Fews Net has found. Other places in the world are warming faster, for sure. But this is the Sahel, where daytime highs often soar well above 45 degrees Celsius (113 Fahrenheit) and growing food in sandy, inhospitable soil is already difficult.
Niger’s neighbors share many of those woes. In Mali, temperatures have gone up by 0.8 degrees Celsius since 1975. Summer rains have increased, but are not at the levels they were before the drought.
In Chad, temperatures have risen by 0.8 degrees Celsius in the same period, according to FEWS Net. The group, which is financed with United States assistance, has warned that cereal production could drop by 30 percent per capita by 2025.
Chad is where FEWS Net’s chief representative for the Sahel, a meteorologist named Alkhalil Adoum, was born in 1957. As a boy, he loved running through the blinding rains of summer, when you couldn’t even see what was ahead of you. He knew a good rain would fill the savanna with wild fruit, and the first green shoots of sorghum would taste as sweet as sugar cane. His family’s cows, once they ate new grass, would give more milk.
“You love the first rains,” Mr. Adoum said. “You know, as a kid, there’s better times ahead.
Those rains don’t come anymore, he said.
There are conflicting scientific models about the effects of climate change on precipitation: some say much of sub-Saharan Africa will be wetter; others drier. The main points of agreement is that the rainy season will be more unpredictable and more intense. On top of that, the hottest parts of the continent will get hotter.
Extreme heat can have grievous consequences on food and disease, the World Food Program found in a survey of scientific studies. Malaria-carrying mosquitoes thrive in it. Pests are more likely to attack crops. Corn and wheat yields decline.
A study, published in December by the International Monitoring Displacement Center, found that in 2015 alone, sudden-onset disaster displaced 1.1 million people in Africa from one part of their country to another.
And then there is the competition over water. Already, it sets off clashes between farmers and herders, often hardened by ethnic divisions. A growing body of research suggests that local droughts, especially in poor, vulnerable countries, heighten the risk of civil conflict.
Risk analysts, including at the London-based firm Verisk Maplecroft, conclude that climate change amplifies the risks of civil unrest across the entire midsection of sub-Saharan Africa, from Mali in the west to Ethiopia in the East.
A grisly example lies in full display just a few hours by road from Mr. Idi’s village. In the southeastern corner of the country, where Niger meets Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, more than 270,000 people huddle for safety from the Boko Haram insurgency. Altogether, across the Lake Chad Basin, 2.4 million people have fled their homes, according to the United Nations.
A City of Dreams
Agadez is a city of mud-brick compounds with high walls and blazing bright metal doors. For centuries, it was filled with traders and nomads. In recent decades, it was a tourist magnet, until ethnic rebellions and then jihadist violence drove people away.
Today, migration is the main industry. Drivers, smugglers, money changers, sex workers, police officers — everyone lives off the men on the move. It is a city of dreams, both budding and broken. It is where the journey across the desert begins for so many young West African men, and it is where the journey ends, when they fail.
The smugglers’ den where I found Mr. Bokoum, the 21-year-old from Mali, was a set of two adjoining courtyards, with two concrete-floored rooms. Upside-down jerrycans served as stools, plastic mats as sofas.
He had been in Agadez for three months, waiting for his mother to send him money. It can cost 350,000 CFAs — about $600 — to get from Agadez to the Libyan border, on the back of a pickup truck.
The smugglers had also started out as migrants, and most of them worked for a while in Libya. Now, they make money off other men’s journeys. None would hint at how much.
Mohamed Diallo, a Senegalese manager of the compound, blamed Western countries for spewing carbon into the atmosphere, and he was skeptical of their leaders’ promises to curb emissions.
“The big powers are polluting and creating problems for us,” he said. He was appalled that Africans trying to go to Europe were treated like criminals, when Europeans in Africa were treated like kings.
Mr. Diallo’s compound, like others in Agadez, has a weekly rhythm.
He instructs those seeking to make the journey to Libya to be inside by Sunday night. Monday morning, he treats them to a feast before the long haul. He roasts a sheep, plays some music, turns on the ceiling fans for a couple of hours.
Just after sundown, a white Toyota pickup pulls up. Monday night is when Nigerien soldiers change shifts, heading out of Agadez and into a desert outpost. The Toyotas follow, stopping briefly at the police checkpoint at the edge of the city before speeding into the dunes. Those who fall off the trucks are left behind.
The journey to the Libyan border, 250 miles in all, takes three days. No one knows how many die along the way.
Those who venture a journey across the Mediterranean take a deadly gamble, too. Among the more than 4,700 people who have died trying to cross the Central Mediterranean so far in 2016, the vast majority cannot be identified. Of those who can, Africans make up the largest share.
“The migrant road,” Mr. Diallo said, “is a road on fire.”
‘I Will Be a Burden to Them’ Those who make it to Libya do not necessarily make it inside Libya. It is a lawless country where some migrants get thrown behind bars — and some, according to human rights groups, are raped and tortured by militias demanding money. Some run out of money, or heart, to continue the journey to Europe.
On the way back, they usually knock on the gates of the International Organization for Migration’s transit center at the edge of Agadez.
There were about 400 boys and men there the week I visited. They lounged on thin rose-print mattresses. They played cards and scrolled through their phones, calling home if they had any credit left. A few attended a class on how to start a business; others rested in the medical ward.
The mix of shame and boredom hung so heavy you could practically smell it. One young man walked around with an open wound on his elbow; he vaguely said he was injured in a brawl in Libya.
When the heat of the day broke, they roused themselves and played soccer.
The migrants from the countryside all had similar stories. Their fathers had never left the land — they all felt they had to. The harvest was not enough; their families had no tractors, just lazy donkeys. Work in nearby towns brought in a fraction of what they figured they could make abroad.
The lure of abroad, Algeria or Libya or beyond, was strong. Facebook posts from friends and neighbors made it seem like a cakewalk.
Ibrahim Diarra said that fickle rains made it too hard to grow peanuts and corn on the family farm in the Tambacounda region of Senegal. He watched the young men of his village leave, each pulled by the stories of those who went before. Then he followed.
Mr. Diarra made his way through Qaeda-riddled northern Mali, then worked construction for six months in Mauritania, before pushing on to Tamanrasset, in Algeria. If he could just get to Morocco, he had heard, he could climb over a fence and be in Spain.
“They told me it’s very easy,” he said.
It wasn’t. He lasted two months in Algeria. Then, he went back to Agadez and asked the migration organization for a bus ticket home. So far this year, 100,000 people have made the same reverse journey.
On a Thursday — departure night for those whose emigration dreams are dashed — bittersweet chaos erupted in the courtyard as two large buses pulled up.
The manager of the transit center, Azaoua Mahamen, sat on the porch with his laptop open, scrolling through the names of those who had been cleared to go home. Migrants need identity papers, and government permission. If they are children, Mr. Mahamen has to make sure they have a family to go back to; a few don’t.
Dozens of young men crowded around him, their eyes like headlights in the dark.
They shouted their names. They waved their identity cards, wrapped in plastic. One group complained that only Guineans were getting out that night. The Ivory Coast contingent started cheering when one of their compatriots was called.
Mr. Diarra listened for his name, though he wasn’t looking forward to facing his parents empty-handed.
“I’m supposed to support my family,” he explained. “Now I have no clothes, nothing. I will be a burden to them.
His father, especially, would be upset. “He’ll ask me how my friends got to Europe and I came back,” he said, shaking his head.
He said he would try the journey again. It would take him a few months to cobble together the money.
[ This is a great introduction to the whole topic of oil, reserves, resources, and so on. It’s very long so I’ve only excerpted bits of it and reworded some of it. I can’t say there’s anything new in here that’s not already in energyskeptic posts, but this article pulls it all together at one of the top scientific institutions in the world. Yes, it’s from 2013, but I like publishing older articles long after to see how good their vision of the future was.
Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]
The core issue for future supply is the extent and the rate of depletion of conventional oil, since this currently provides around 95% of global all-liquids supply. Options for mitigating this depletion include:
Both the extent and rate of depletion and the feasibility and cost of different mitigation options are the subject of intense debate.
Oil production: Global production of all-liquids averaged 85.7 million barrels per day (mb per day) in 2011, or 31.2 billion barrels per year (Gb per year). Global cumulative production amounted to approximately 1248 Gb, with half of this occurring since 1988. Crude oil production is heavily concentrated in a small number of countries and a small number of giant fields, with approximately 100 fields producing one half of global supply, 25 producing one quarter and a single field (Ghawar in Saudi Arabia) producing approximately 7%. Most of these giant fields are relatively old, many are well past their peak of production, most of the rest seem likely to enter decline within the next decade or so and few new giant fields are expected to be found. Future global production is therefore heavily dependent on the future prospects of the giant fields.
PEAK OIL: Crude oil production grew at approximately 1.5% per year between 1995 and 2005, but then plateaued with more recent increases in liquids supply largely deriving from NGLs, oil sands and tight oil (my comment: but most of our oil is conventional and significantly cheaper and energy efficient than NGLs, oil sands, and tight oil). On a per capita basis, annual all-oil production peaked at 5.5 barrels in 1979 and has remained around 4.5 barrels since the mid-1980s. Annual consumption averages approximately 2.5 barrels per person in non-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (82% of the global population) and approximately 14 barrels per person in the OECD, with the USA an outlier at 25 barrels per person.
It’s the size of the tap, not the tank that matters
it is essential to recognize that large quantities of resources within the Earth’s crust provide no guarantee that these can be produced at particular rates and/or at reasonable cost. There are huge variations both within and between resource types in terms of size of accumulation, depth, accessibility, chemical composition, energy content, extraction cost, net energy yield (i.e. the energy obtained from the resource minus the energy required to find, extract and process it), local and global environmental impacts and, most importantly, the feasible rate of extraction—to say nothing of the geopolitics of access. Higher quality resources tend to be found and developed first, and as production shifts down the ‘resource pyramid’, increasing reliance must be placed upon less accessible, poorer quality and more expensive resources that have a progressively lower net energy yield and are increasingly difficult to produce at high rates. Compare, for example, the monetary and energy investment required to produce 100 kb per day from the giant oil fields of the Middle East to that required to achieve comparable rates of production from deep-water oil fields, subarctic resources or the Canadian oil sands. To quote a widely used phrase in this context, it is not so much the size of the tank that matters but the size of the tap.
This is not simply an issue of the steeply rising production costs of poorer quality resources because technical and net energy constraints may make some resources inaccessible and some production rates unachievable regardless of cost. Kerogen oil is especially constrained in rate and net energy terms and may never become economic to produce, yet it accounts for 19% of the IEA estimate of remaining recoverable resources. Hence, a critical evaluation of future supply prospects must go beyond appraisals of aggregate resource size and examine the technical, economic and political feasibility of accessing different resources at different rates over different periods of time.
The production of conventional oil must eventually decline to almost zero, because it is a finite resource.
Decline rates
From a sample of 77 post-peak UK fields, we estimate an average decline rate of approximately 12.5% per year, so the average rate of decline from post-peak fields is a critical determinant of future oil supply. Recent studies of globally representative samples of post-peak crude oil fields find a production-weighted average decline rate of at least 6.5% per year. This is lower than the average decline rate, since larger fields tend to decline more slowly.
Offshore fields decline faster than onshore fields and that newer fields decline faster than older fields. If smaller, younger and offshore fields account for an increasing share of future global production, the average decline rate for conventional oil fields will increase prior to the peak. Greater reliance upon tight oil resources produced using hydraulic fracturing will exacerbate any rising trend in global average decline rates, since these wells have no plateau and decline extremely fast—for example, by 90% or more in the first 5 years.
The production cycle for tight oil resources is driven by a different set of mechanisms since this resource is located in continuous formations rather than discrete fields. Nevertheless, the outcome is similar to that for conventional oil. With exceptionally high decline rates for individual wells, regional tight oil production can only be maintained through the continuous drilling of closely spaced wells. But tight oil plays are heterogeneous, with much higher well productivity in the ‘sweet spots’ than elsewhere. So when the sweet spots become exhausted, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain regional production. Based upon these considerations, Hughes suggests that aggregate US tight oil production is likely to peak around 2.5 mb per day (compared to total US oil production of 6.9 mb per day in 2008) and is likely to decline very rapidly after 2017.
Based upon these considerations, the IEA anticipates crude oil production from existing fields falling from 68.5 mb per day in 2011 to only 26 mb per day in 2035, but hopes for 65.4 due to undiscovered oil fields and additional production from unconventional oil, with no peak before 2035.
This IEA estimate has received much criticism from scientists. For example, Höök et al. argue that production from existing fields could decline more quickly than the IEA assumes, while Aleklett et al.argue that the projections rely upon implausible assumptions about the rate at which fallow and undiscovered fields can be developed and produced. Both studies imply more rapid decline of global crude oil production and hence more difficulty in maintaining aggregate global liquids supply. Furthermore, the IEA projection assumes adequate investment, no geopolitical interruptions and prices that do not significantly constrain global economic growth.
Far more important than predicting the exact date of global peak is how will we cope after it happens. But although mitigation can be achieved through fuel substitution and demand reduction but both will prove challenging owing to the scale of investment required and the associated lead times. For example, a 2008 report for the US Department of Energy argued that large-scale mitigation programmes need to be initiated at least 20 years before a global peak if serious shortfalls in liquid fuels supply are to be avoided. While this report overlooked key options such as electric vehicles and tight oil, it also assumed a relatively modest rate of post-peak crude oil decline (2% per year) and ignored the environmental consequences of expanding the supply of non-conventional resources. Avoiding these would necessarily restrict the range of available options.
NGLS can’t fill in for crude oil: 33% less energy and only 33% can be made into transportation fuel
Many sources anticipate large-scale substitution of NGLs for crude production over the next two decades, owing to expanding gas supply (including shale gas) and/or increases in the average NGL content of that gas. While the IEA states that the latter is expected to remain constant, its projections imply a doubling. But even assuming production grows as anticipated, NGLs cannot fully substitute for crude oil since they contain about a third less energy per unit volume and only about one-third of that volume can be blended into transport fuels. NGLs can substitute for crude oil as a petrochemical feedstock and may partially compensate for increased heavy oil within the refinery input mix, but at some point a rising volume of NGLs will be unable to adequately make up for reduced crude supply.
Oil sands already make an important contribution to global liquids supply and most forecasts anticipate a significant expansion over the next 20 years. But according to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers [68], the Canadian oil sands will deliver only 5 mb per day by 2030, which represents less than 6% of the IEA projection of all-liquids production by that date. Similarly, Söderbergh et al. [69] conclude that a ‘crash programme’ to develop the oil sands could only deliver a comparable amount. Also, this resource is significantly more energy- and carbon-intensive than conventional oil, and surface mining has massive impacts on local and regional environments.
Murphy examines the importance of the energy return on investment(EROI) for liquid fuels production and the implications of declining EROI for the global economy. From a review of the rather limited literature on this topic, Murphy concludes that: the EROI for global oil and gas production is roughly 15 and declining while that for the USA is 11 and declining; the EROI for unconventional oil and biofuels is generally less than 10; there is a negative exponential relationship between oil prices and aggregate EROI which may become nonlinear as the latter falls below 10; and the minimum oil price needed to increase oil supply is consistent with that which has historically triggered economic recessions. Murphy concludes that the declining EROI of liquid fuels will make it increasingly difficult to sustain global economic growth.
[ According to this article: “Shiller’s latest analysis shouldn’t be taken lightly. His forecasting skills were recognized in 2013 when he won the Nobel Prize in Economics. He’s known for predicting both the dot-com bubble and the housing bubble in his book “Irrational Exuberance.” Though like 99% of economists, he doesn’t have a clue of the role energy plays in the system.
Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]
Yale University economics professor Robert Shiller has a warning for investors. The Nobel laureate says low volatility paired with a questionable price-earnings ratio could wipe out a chunk of the stock market’s value. “The price increase just went step-by-step with the earnings increase. I think it’s an overreaction to good earnings,” said Shiller on Wednesday’s “Trading Nation.”
His comments came as the S&P 500, Dow and Nasdaq were hitting fresh all-time highs and the CBOE Volatility Index dropped to a record low.
In a special note to CNBC, Shiller writes that low volatility could be “the quiet before the storm.” It’s a phenomenon which Shiller says is making him “lie awake worrying.” And that’s not the only issue he’s raising.
His Shiller PE Ratio, also known as CAPE, shows the price-earnings ratio based on average inflation-adjusted earnings from the last 10 years is over 30. The number carries significance because the only times it’s been higher was just before the Great Depression in 1929 and mid-1997 to mid-2001.
“I worry that historically earnings have been trend-reverting,” said Shiller. “Admittedly, we do have a president who’s going to ‘make America great again.’ So if he’s right, maybe then we’re launching out in a whole new path. But it would be the first time in American history.”
If Shiller is right and the stock market ultimately goes back to trend, it could create havoc.
“It would definitely be a negative for equities. It would be pretty big. We are at a high valuation. The only time we’ve had a higher valuation than where we are now was around 1929 and around 2000,” Shiller said.
“We could see a major correction,” he said. “This is not a forecast. It’s a worry.”
We will have to wait until the second half of the century for fusion reactors to start generating electricity, experts have announced.
A new version of a European “road map” lays out the technological hurdles to be overcome if the processes powering the Sun are to be harnessed on Earth. The original 2012 version of the road map forecast that a demonstration fusion power plant could be operating in the early 2040s, in order to supply electricity to the grid by 2050. But now the demonstration will be delayed until 2054 caused largely by delays to ITER, a 20 billion Euro reactor being built in the south of France to prove that fusion energy is scientifically and technically feasible.
In fact, according to EUROfusion’s programme manager, nuclear physicist Tony Donné, DEMO’s schedule could slip further, depending on progress both with ITER and a facility to test materials for fusion power plants that has yet to be built.
“2054 is optimistic,” he says.
Fusion involves heating nuclei of light atoms – usually isotopes of hydrogen – to temperatures many times higher than that at the center of the Sun so that they can overcome their mutual repulsion and join together to form a heavier nucleus, giving off huge amounts of energy in the process. In principle, this energy could provide low-carbon “baseload” electricity to the grid using very plentiful raw materials and generating relatively short-lived nuclear waste. But achieving fusion in the laboratory is a daunting task.
Doughnut-shaped reactors known as tokamaks use enormous magnetic fields to hold a hot plasma of nuclei and their dissociated electrons in place for long enough and at a high enough density to permit fusion.
ITER represents the culmination of 60 years of research. The world’s largest ever tokamak, it will weigh 23,000 tonnes and is designed to generate 10 times the power that it consumes. But the project has been beset by delays and cost overruns. Originally foreseen to switch on in 2016 and cost around 5 billion Euros, its price has since roughly quadrupled and its start-up pushed back to 2025. Full-scale experiments are now not foreseen until at least 2035.
ITER is also complex politically, an international project with 7 partners: China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States. As host, Europe is paying the biggest share of the costs – about 45%.
The roadmap sees ITER as the single most important project in realizing fusion but not one that is designed to generate electricity.
DEMO, a tokamak adapted from the ITER design
This will also cost billions of euros, and is intended to produce several hundred megawatts of electricity for the grid. To do so, it must run continuously for hours, days or ideally years at a time, as opposed to ITER, which will operate in bursts lasting just a few minutes. DEMO will also have to generate its own supply of tritium (the radioactive isotope of hydrogen which can help drive fusion) by using neutrons it produces to transform lithium (its other hydrogen isotope, deuterium, can instead be extracted from sea water).
Researchers are already starting to develop conceptual designs for DEMO. But because they need results from ITER to draw up a detailed engineering design, their progress is vulnerable to any further delays in France.
Federici argues it is vital to demonstrate electricity generation from fusion “not too far after the middle of the century”. Otherwise, he says, there may no longer be a nuclear industry able to build the commercial fusion plants that would follow, and the public may lose patience. The subsequent loss of political support, he wrote in the DEMO design report, “would run the risk of delaying fusion electricity well into the 22nd century.”
[ Yet another “crash coming soon” post, if it hasn’t happened already (I scheduled this article and others to appear a year or more later, since crashes always take longer to happen than you expect.
Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]
In several recent reports, energy economist Phil Verleger has laid out the unsettling similarities between the U.S. residential construction bubble and the later surge in oil and gas drilling investment.
We’ll still be arguing decades from now about exactly why we collectively went crazy for Floridian sub-divisions and the like, but cheap and plentiful credit was clearly a big factor.
The same goes for the oil and gas boom.
The face value of energy debt as a proportion of the BofA Merrill Lynch High Yield Index has surged from 6% in 1997 to 16% today.
[ My comment: When oil and gas cause the next financial crash, it will not only be “dumb money” middle class Americans who are plowing their money into high-yield bonds and stocks to make back their money from 2008, but also foreign countries who’ve invested $450 billion in debt securities such as Brazil, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, UAE and Venezuela.
Just as the housing bubble relied on faith in U.S. house prices only going up, so investors’ willingness to buy the energy sector’s bonds (and stocks) rested on a couple of intoxicating assumptions: OPEC would backstop prices and China would never falter (so, about that…)
American exploration and production companies weren’t the only ones on a debt-and-drilling binge. Last month in London, Jaime Caruana of the Bank for International Settlements gave a speech on the interplay of “Credit, commodities, and currencies.” He noted that loans and bonds outstanding for the oil and gas industry had almost tripled between 2006 and 2014 to $3 trillion, including a large slug taken on by firms in emerging markets.
Just as the mortgage pile-up transformed the U.S. housing market, so the legacy of the energy sector’s credit craze will live on in several important — and conflicting — ways, for years to come.
One effect Caruana highlighted is how a high debt burden focuses the mind on generating cash flow to meet interest payments. This surely explains at least some of the sheer resilience of not just U.S. but global oil production in the face of low prices. While banks must eventually pull lines of credit from struggling oil producers, they are no doubt loath to take ownership of leases and rigs in a bankruptcy situation, putting off the day of reckoning.
If that prolongs the market’s pain today, though, it also offers some hope for tomorrow. Going back to Verleger’s chart above, he rightly shows that investment in new oil and gas prospects is set to plummet well below what the International Energy Agency says is needed.
Indeed, earlier this month, the IEA’s head of its Oil Industry and Markets division warned that today’s low oil prices are setting up a potential supply shock in the “not too distant future.” Meanwhile, at Chevron’s analyst day earlier this month, the company essentially drew a line under the multi-billion dollar projects that have turned off shareholders in recent years while simultaneously talking up growth prospects in its Permian shale assets.
This re-balancing of the oil market is exactly what is being delayed by the effect of high debt and ultra-low interest rates. But any spike would have two edges.
The lesson of 2008’s spike for OPEC is that while it may want higher prices, what it really needs are stable prices that aren’t too high. On that basis, rather than hoping to destroy shale with its current policy, OPEC is likely counting on it to act as something like an automatic stabilizer for the oil price in future.
The other wild card here, though, is the Fed’s timing on raising rates further. When this happens eventually, it could have two very negative effects on the debt-laden oil market.
First, cheap financing is helping to keep bulging oil inventories in their tanks. Wednesday’s weekly report from the Energy Information Administration showed, yet again, that stocks are far above normal levels. When oil prices rally, though, this squeezes the profits that can be earned by buying oil and storing it to sell at a future date. The spread between the cash price and the six-month forward contract has more than halved since mid-February
You know what else squeezes a carry trade and could force those millions of barrels back onto the market? The cost of financing the trade going up.
The second impact of rising Fed rates goes back to Caruana’s speech. The explosion of borrowing in emerging markets, especially when denominated in U.S. dollars, is a ticking time bomb for the global economy. When rates start rising, pulling the value of the dollar up with them, the pressure on not just oil companies but all heavy borrowers in developing markets will intensify. And it just so happens that the developing world accounts for all of the projected growth in oil demand over the next five years, based on the IEA’s numbers.
Yellen’s caution, like OPEC’s freeze tease, bolsters the extend-and-pretend oil market. The debt always comes due at some point, though.
One of the biggest risks to the world’s financial system is the $2.5 trillion of debt owed by oil and gas firms. After a year from hell, prices of commodities, and the shares and bonds of the firms that produce them, have bounced in the past month. But the evidence of financial pain is all around. Last week Energy XXI, an explorer with $4 billion of debt, filed for bankruptcy in Houston. And JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo and Bank of America complained of rising energy-sector bad debts in their first-quarter results. Only 5% of global energy debt sits on the balance-sheets of America’s biggest three banks. A further 34% of global energy debt comes in the form of US-listed bonds. The majority of global exposure is hidden in smaller banks or beyond America’s borders. With a Saudi-led attempt to curb oil output ending in failure yesterday, expect more yelps.

What we have is a totally propped-up market based upon debt. Energy isn’t producing positive growth. So instead of having real economic growth, we have inflated economic growth and inflated asset values.
When growth starts to decline, I think we’re going to see the valuations of assets decline considerably. It’s anyone’s guess how quickly they can fall, but according to what I have been looking at, I think we are going to see a 50% decrease in real estate values right off the bat. I am not saying this will happen in a day, but the first wave will be a 30-50% decrease in real estate values when the markets really start to crack. They are already at the edge of the cliff — and I see prices falling down the cliff, struggling to recover, and then falling even further.
I predict within the next 5-10 years, we can easily see a 75% or more reduction in real estate values.
Unfortunately, most precious metals and resource analysts overlook energy. Thus, their analysis is likely flawed because they view the future as a continuation of “business as usual”, once the debts and leverage are taken out of the system. This is an incorrect assumption, because the debt and leverage actually have allowed our financial system and markets to continue to function well beyond its expiration date. Getting rid of the debt and leverage would cause a collapse of the system… one that we will be unable to grow back out of.
I believe it is important to continue focusing on the information and data as it changes. This will provide the investor-public with a guideline as to the timing of the upcoming disintegration of our highly leveraged debt based financial market.

Volumetric versus specific energy density for selected energy carriers. Source: Palmer, G. 2020. Energy storage & civilization: a systems approach. Springer.
Preface. Vaclav Smil writes “The fact that wind, solar, and biomass have incredibly low energy density per square meter means that a fully renewable system to replace the 320 GW of fossil fueled electricity generation and 1.8 TW of coal, oil, and gas with biofuels would take up up to 50% of the America’s territory, 1.81 million square miles (250-470 Mha), since the average power density of biomass is just 0.45 W/m2 to produce liquid biofuels.”
Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com Women in ecology author of 2021 Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy best price here; 2015 When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity
***
If we were to cultivate phytomass at 1 W/m2 to replace today’s 12.5 TW of fossil fuels would require 4,826,275 million square miles (12.5 million square kilometers), roughly the size of the U.S. and India. If all of America’s gasoline demands were derived from ethanol, that would take an area 20% larger than the nation’s total arable land. It would be worse elsewhere — the U.S. produces twice as much corn per acre than the rest of the world.
If the U.S. tried to generate 10% of electricity (405 Twh in 2012) it would require wood chips from forests growing in an area the size of Minnesota (84,950 square miles) since the power density is only 0.6 W/m2.
Currently the area used by fossil fuel production and extraction, hydro power, and nuclear generation takes up only 0.5% of the land (21,235 square miles, 5.5 Mha). The low energy density of biofuels restricts facilities to small areas or the fossil fuel used to transport it to the biorefinery is more than the energy of what’s made (i.e. corn for ethanol needs to be less than 50 miles away)
Power density in watts per square meter
Consumption. Wind, solar, biomass take too much land to support today’s industries and cities, from 500 W/m2 to 1,000 W/m2 at industrial facilities (especially steel mills and refineries), downtown’s in northern cities in the winter, and high-rise buildings.
All About Power Density. A Comparison of Various Energy Sources in Horsepower (and Watts: