M. G. Salameh on oil wars in the past and future

by-the-wars-one-knows-where-oil-is[ Salameh explains why we will inevitably have oil wars in the future, perhaps wars over Iran’s nuclear program, between the U.S. and china, Iraq and Kurdistan, the UK and Argentina over the Falkland islands oil reserves,  and/or over the disputed South China Sea’s islands.  Salameh also lists 11 past oil wars from 1941 to 2014.  I’ve excerpted less than half of this paper and taken out the footnotes, read the full paper here.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”]

Salameh, M. G. April 2014. Oil Wars. ESCP Europe, research centre for energy management.

Dr Mamdouh G. Salameh, Director International Oil Economist, World Bank Consultant, UNIDO Technical Expert, World Bank Washington DC / Oil Market Consultancy Service

Abstract.  The 20th century was truly the century of oil whilst the 21st century would be the century of peak oil and the resulting oil wars. No other commodity has been so intimately intertwined with national strategies and global politics and power as oil.

The close connection between oil and conflict derives from three essential features of oil:

  1. its vital importance to the economy and military power of nations
  2. its irregular geographic distribution
  3. peak oil

Conventional oil production peaked in 2006. As a result, the world could face an energy gap probably during the first two decades of the 21st century. This gap will have to be filled with unconventional and renewable energy sources. However, it is very doubtful as to whether these resources could bridge the energy gap in time as to be able to create a sustainable future energy supply.

There is no doubt that oil is a leading cause of war. Oil fuels international conflict through four distinct mechanisms:

  1. resource wars, in which states try to acquire oil reserves by force;
  2. the externalization of civil wars in oil-producing nations (Libya as an example);
  3. conflicts triggered by the prospect of oil-market domination such as the United States’ war with Iraq over Kuwait in 1991; and
  4. clashes over control of oil transit routes such as shipping lanes and pipelines (closure of the Strait of Hormuz for example).

Between 1941 and 2014, at least ten wars have been fought over oil, prominent among them the 21st century’s first oil war, the invasion of Iraq in 2003. At present, there are at least five major conflicts that could potentially flare up over oil and gas resources in the next three decades of the twenty-first century. The most dangerous among them are a war over Iran’s nuclear program and a conflict between China and the United States that has the potential to escalate to war over dwindling oil resources or over Taiwan or over the disputed Islands in the South China Sea claimed by both China and Japan with the US coming to the defense of Japan. As in the 20th century, oil will continue in the 21st century to fuel the global struggles for political and economic primacy. Much blood will continue to be spilled in its name. The fierce and sometimes violent quest for oil and for the riches and power it represents will surely continue as long as oil holds a central place in the global economy.

Introduction. Though the modern history of oil begins in the latter half of the 19th century, it is the 20th century that has been completely transformed by the advent of oil. Oil has a unique position in the global economic system. No other commodity has been so intimately intertwined with national strategies and global politics and power as oil. Oil was central to the course and outcome of World War II in both the Far East and Europe. One of the allied powers’ strategic advantages in World War II was that they controlled 86% of the world’s oil reserves.   The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was about oil security. Among Hitler’s most cherished strategic objectives in the invasion of the Soviet Union was the capture of the oilfields in the Caucasus. In the Cold War years, the battle for the control of oil resources between international oil companies and developing countries was a major incentive and inspiration behind the great drama of de-colonization and emergent nationalism.

During the 20th century, oil emerged as an effective instrument of power. The emergence of the United States as the world’s leading power during the 20th century coincided with the discovery of oil in America and the replacement of coal by oil as the main energy source. As the age of coal gave way to oil, Great Britain, the world’s first coal superpower, gave way to the United States, the world’s first oil superpower.

Since its discovery, it has bedeviled the Middle East and the world at large with conflicts and wars. Oil was at the very heart of the first post-Cold War crisis of the 1990s – the Gulf War. The Soviet Union – the world’s second largest oil exporter – squandered its enormous oil earnings in the 1970s and 1980s in a futile military race with the United States. And the United States, once the largest oil producer and still its largest consumer, must import 58% of its oil needs, weakening its overall strategic position and adding greatly to its huge outstanding debts – a precarious position for the only superpower in the world.

Military Significance. Oil is a vital factor in the military strength of nations in that it supplies most of the energy used to power tanks, planes, missiles, ships, armored vehicles and other instruments of war. During the 1991 Gulf war, for example, US and allied forces consumed an average 452,000 barrels of oil a day (b/d) – equivalent to the current daily consumption of Kuwait.  Because oil is so vital to the conduct of warfare, its possession has been termed a “national security” issue by the United States and other countries, meaning something that may require the use of military force to protect.

Oil Geography. The global distribution of oil is another factor. Oil does not occur randomly across the globe but is highly concentrated in a few reservoirs. The largest of these, containing approximately two-thirds of the world’s proven conventional oil, are located in the Gulf region, comprised of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As a result, the center of gravity of world oil is the Gulf region. This has great economic and geopolitical implications because many of these producers are chronically unstable, harbor strong anti-Western sentiments or lie in war-torn neighborhoods.

Peak Oil. Global conventional oil production peaked in 2006 and has been in decline since then. Moreover, nine of the top oil producers in the world have already peaked: USA, Canada, Iran, Indonesia, Russia, UK, Norway, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. Also three of the world’s largest oilfields have already peaked: Kuwait’s Burgan, the world’s second largest (2005), Mexico’s giant Cantarell (2006) and Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar, the world’s largest oilfield (2006). Peak oil is not only a reality but is already impacting on oil prices, the world economy and the global energy security. Moreover, the days of inexpensive, convenient and abundant energy sources are virtually over.

We won’t “run out of oil” because, simply, we’ll never get it all, but peak oil is here, the world’s largest and best reserves are still in the Middle East, and the major powers in the world, which run on oil, know this. For all of these reasons, the risk of armed conflict over valuable oil supplies is likely to grow in the years to come.

Geopolitics in a World of Dwindling Energy Supplies.  As nations compete for currency advantages, they are also eyeing the world’s diminishing resources—fossil fuels, minerals, agricultural land, and water. Resource wars have been fought since the dawn of history, but today the competition is entering a new phase. Nations need increasing amounts of energy and materials to produce economic growth, but the costs of supplying new increments of energy and materials are increasing. In many cases all that remains are lower-quality resources that have high extraction costs. Meanwhile the struggle for the control of resources is re-aligning political power balances throughout the world.

The US as the world’s superpower has the most to lose from a reshuffling of alliances and resource flows. The nation’s leaders continue to play the game of geopolitics by 20th century rules: They are still obsessed with the Carter Doctrine and focused on oil as the world’s foremost resource prize (a situation largely necessitated by the country’s continuing dependence on oil imports.

The United States maintains a globe-spanning network of over 800 military bases that formerly represented tokens of security to regimes throughout the world but that now increasingly only provoke resentment among the locals. This enormous military machine is becoming too expensive for the United States to maintain. Indeed, the nation’s budget deficit largely stems from its trillion-dollar-per-year cost. In short, the United States remains an enormously powerful nation militarily, yet it suffers from declining strategic flexibility.

The European Union, traditionally allied with the US is increasingly mapping its priorities independently, partly because of increased energy dependence on Russia, and partly because of economic rivalries and currency conflicts with America. Germany’s economy is one of the few to have emerged from the 2008 crisis relatively unscathed, but the country is faced with the problem of having to bail out more and more of its neighbors.

China is the rising power of the 21st century with a surging military and lots of cash with which to buy access to resources (oil, coal, minerals, and farmland) around the planet. Its emergence as an economic superpower and competition with the United States for dwindling oil reserves could potentially lead to an oil war in coming years.

Japan, with the world’s third-largest economy, is wary of China and increasingly uncertain of its protector, the US. The country is tentatively rebuilding its military so as to be able to defend its interests independently. Disputes with China over oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea are likely to worsen, as Japan has almost no domestic fossil fuel resources and needs secure access to supplies.

Russia is a resource powerhouse. With a residual military force at the ready, it vies with China and the US for control of Caspian and Central Asian energy and mineral wealth through alliances with former Soviet states. It tends to strike tentative deals with China to counter American interests, but ultimately Beijing may be as much of a rival as Washington. Moscow uses its gas exports as a bargaining chip for influence in Europe.

Africa is an area of fast-growing U.S. investment in oil and other mineral extraction projects as evidenced by the establishment in 2009 of AFRICOM (a military strategic command intended to confront China’s deep involvement in Africa). Proxy conflicts there between and among these powers may intensify in the years ahead in most instances to the sad detriment of African peoples.

The Middle East maintains a vast oil wealth, but is characterized by extreme economic inequality, high population growth rates, political instability, and the need for importation of non-energy resources (including food and water). The revolutions and protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen in early 2011 were interpreted by many observers as a refusal by common people to tolerate sharply rising food, water, and energy prices. As economic conditions worsen, many more nations could become destabilized.

Oil Wars in Recent History.  Prior to the 1990 Gulf War, The American energy company Halliburton’s president and later US vice president Dick Cheney revealed, “We’re there because that part of the world controls the world supply of oil, and whoever controls the supply of oil would have a stranglehold on the world economy.” So there you have it. All this bloodshed is over dwindling oil reserves. Meanwhile, war has become the largest business on Earth, worth trillions of dollars every year.

1-Nazi Germany’s Invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941)

Desperate for fuel, Germany entered North Africa and Russia in 1941 to reach the Middle East oilfields and Baku oilfields in the Caspian. German War Production Minister, Albert Speer, conceded in his post war interrogation that oil “was a prime motive” for these invasions. Predicting victory at Baku, Hitler declared, “Now I have oil! Proceed to India!” But Hitler’s army literally ran out of gas. German supply trucks got half their normal fuel mileage in the road-less, muddy terrain. Rommel abandoned empty, fuel- gobbling tanks in the Egyptian desert west of El Alamein. “We have the bravest men,” he declared, “but they are useless without enough petrol.

Oil proved to be the primary strategic resource during World War II. During the war, the US built the world’s longest pipeline – from Texas to the Atlantic – and produced about 6. 3 billion barrels (bb) of oil. By comparison, Germany produced a mere 200 million barrels, about 3% of US production, much of it from expensive “synthetic oil” produced from coal.

2-The Attack on Pearl Harbour & US Entry into World War II (1941)

Oil has been central to Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor thus bringing the United States into World War II. History might conclude that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor might have been provoked by the oil embargo imposed by the United States on Japan on July 25, 1941 as a result of Japanese military aggression in Asia. Increasingly worried about a cut-off of oil supplies from the United States, Tokyo instituted a policy to try to eliminate dependence on US oil supplies. In 1940-1941, it was energy security that led Japan to occupy the Dutch East Indies and take control of its oilfields. Indeed, the US oil embargo was the pivotal factor leading Japan to attack Pearl Harbor, bringing the United States into World War II.

3-The Biafra – Nigeria Oil War (1967)

Oil was a major issue in the Nigerian civil war forty-seven years ago. Nigeria is a country that was created artificially by British colonialism. It has a complex ethnic mixture of groups, with a division between the North inhabited by Muslim Fulani-Hausas with a rigid feudal system, and the South with its largely Christian population.

In 1966, a group of northern officers headed by a young British-trained officer, General Gowon, staged a coup and took control of the government. Three months after Gowon’s takeover a large scale massacre of Southerners was reported from the Northern region. Southern army officers then decided to lead the South-East to secession and war. On 30 May 1967, they proclaimed the independent Republic of Biafra and declared war on Nigeria. The actual fighting lasted for 24 months and led to the death of 2 million innocent Nigerians who did not know anything about politics nor the oil in their region. A major factor precipitating the war was oil. Biafra sits on huge oilfields. Approximately 30% of these fields lie in Nigeria with the remaining 70% in Biafra.

4-The1973 Arab-Israeli War

Although oil was not directly the cause of the 1973 Arab- Israeli War, using the oil weapon was a central part of the planning for the war. History will judge if the war could have gone ahead without the assurance of the oil weapon and the oil financial resources. On October 17, 1973, eleven days into the Arab Israeli War of the 6th of October, the Arab oil-producing countries wielded the oil weapon and imposed an oil embargo against the United States and other countries friendly to Israel. The embargo led to a quadrupling of crude oil prices and precipitated a severe recession, economies of the industrialized nations. The US gross domestic product (GDP) plunged 6% unemployment doubled to 9%. Japan’s GDP declined by 7% for the first time since the end of World War II and Europe’s by 2.5%.

5-The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

The Iran–Iraq War began when Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980. It followed a long history of border disputes and was motivated by fears that the Iranian Revolution in 1979 would inspire insurgency among Iraq’s Shia population. However, the real factor behind the Iran-Iraq war was a simmering rivalry between these two oil-producing nations underpinned by each one’s aspiration for strategic primacy in the gulf region and supremacy inside OPEC. The war was a precursor for the invasion in Kuwait and the first Gulf War. Started by Iraq in September 1980, the war was marked by indiscriminate ballistic-missile attacks, extensive use of chemical weapons and attacks on third-country oil tankers in the Gulf. The end came in July 20, 1988 with the acceptance by Iran of UN Ceasefire Resolution 598. During the eight years between Iraq’s formal declaration of war on September 22, 1980, and Iran’s acceptance of ceasefire, thousands of troops were killed on both sides and some $500 billion of damage suffered by each of the warring countries (mostly to oil facilities). In addition, economic development stalled and oil exports were disrupted.

6- The Iraq-Kuwait War (1990)

The invasion of Kuwait, also known as the Iraq–Kuwait War, was a major conflict which resulted in the seven-month long Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and subsequently the first Gulf War. In 1990 Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil through slant drilling in the Rumaila oilfield which straddles the borders between the two countries. There were several reasons for the Iraqi move, including Iraq’s inability to pay more than $80 bn that had been borrowed to finance the Iran-Iraq war and Kuwaiti overproduction of oil which kept revenues down for Iraq. The invasion started on 2 August 1990, and within two days of intense combat, most of the Kuwaiti Armed forces were either overrun by the Iraqi Republican Guard or escaped to neighboring Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The state of Kuwait was annexed, and Saddam Hussein announced a few days later that it had become the 19th province of Iraq.

By the time the Iran–Iraq war ended, Iraq was not in a financial position to repay the US$14 billion it borrowed from Kuwait to finance its war with Iran and requested Kuwait to forgive the debt. Iraq argued that the war had thwarted the rise of Iranian influence that could have threatened the Arab Gulf regimes. However, Kuwait’s reluctance to pardon the debt created strains in the relationship between the two Arab countries. During late 1989, several official meetings were held between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi leaders but they were unable to break the deadlock between the two countries. In 1988 Iraq’s Oil Minister, Issam al-Chalabi, requested a further reduction in the crude oil production quota of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members so as to end the 1980s oil glut. 12 Chalabi argued that higher oil prices would help Iraq increase its revenues and pay back its outstanding debts. Instead, Kuwait requested OPEC in 1989 to increase its oil production quota by 50% to 1.35 mbd. Throughout much of the 1980s, Kuwait’s oil production was considerably above its mandatory OPEC quota and this had prevented a further increase in crude oil prices. A lack of consensus among OPEC members undermined Iraq’s efforts to end the oil glut and consequently prevented the recovery of its war-crippled economy. According to former Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, “every $1 drop in the price of a barrel of oil caused a $1 billion drop in Iraq’s annual revenues triggering an acute financial crisis in Baghdad”.  It was estimated that between 1985 and 1989, Iraq lost US$14 billion a year due to Kuwait’s oil price strategy.  Kuwait’s refusal to decrease its oil production was viewed by Iraq as an act of aggression against it. The increasingly tense relations between Iraq and Kuwait were further aggravated when Iraq alleged that Kuwait was slant-drilling across the international border into Iraq’s Rumaila oilfield. During the Iran–Iraq War, Iraqi oil drilling operations in Rumaila declined while Kuwait’s operations increased. In 1989, Iraq accused Kuwait of using “advanced drilling techniques” to exploit oil from its share of the Rumaila field. Iraq estimated that $2.4 billion worth of Iraqi oil was “stolen” by Kuwait and demanded compensation.  Kuwait dismissed the accusations as a false Iraqi ploy to justify military action against it. More than 600 Kuwaiti oil wells were set on fire by withdrawing Iraqi forces causing massive environmental and economic damage to Kuwait.

7-The War on Iraq (2003)

The war on Iraq was undoubtedly about oil. This was the 21st century’s first oil war. The prize was Iraq’s spectacular oil wealth estimated at 330 billion barrels of proven, semi-proven and probable oil reserves. Even Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank for seventeen years, agrees that the Iraq war was largely about oil.  The war cost the US economy an estimated $6.65 trillion in running costs and also in oil price differences. It also cost the global economy (including the US) some $14.13 trillion and was instrumental in precipitating the recent global financial and economic crisis and the economic recession from which the global economy has not yet fully recovered.  It is estimated that the Iraq war may have increased energy costs worldwide by a staggering $6 trillion.  The former US vice president, Dick Cheney made Iraqi’s oil fields a national security priority before 9/11. Five months before 9/11, the United States started calling for the use of force against Iraq to secure control of its oil.

8-The Sudan Oil War

On April 10th 2013 forces from the newly independent state of South Sudan occupied the oil center of Heglig, a town granted to North Sudan as part of a peace settlement that allowed the southerners to secede in 2011. North Sudan then mobilized their own forces and drove the South Sudanese out of Heglig. Fighting has then erupted all along the contested border between the two countries, accompanied by air strikes on towns in South Sudan. Although the fighting has not yet reached the level of a full-scale war, international efforts to negotiate a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution to the dispute have yet to meet with success. The conflict between South Sudan and the North is being fueled by many factors, including economic disparities between the two Sudans and an abiding animosity between the southerners (who are mostly black Africans and Christians) and the northerners (mostly Arabs and Muslims). But oil and the revenues produced by it remain at the heart of the matter.

When Sudan was divided in 2011, most of the oilfields wound up in the south, while the only pipeline capable of transporting the South’s oil to international markets (and thus generating revenue) remained in the hands of the northerners. They have been demanding exceptionally high “transit fees” — $32-$36 per barrel compared to the common rate of $1 per barrel — for the privilege of bringing the South’s oil to market. When the southerners refused to accept such rates, the northerners confiscated money they had already collected from the South’s oil exports, its only significant source of funds. In response, the southerners stopped producing oil altogether and launched their military action against the north. The situation remains explosive. Oil is the main natural resource for the North and South economies. The dispute over oil-rich boundary as well as the overlapping of oil blocks will continue to be a source of tension between both the North and South Sudan.

Sudan has been exporting crude oil since 1999 with oil production rising dramatically to 490, 000 b/d. As mentioned, oil remains crucial to economic development of both the North and South and the basic resource to mitigate the endemic problem of poverty of the whole of Sudan. Oil accounts for 60%-70% of revenue in the North and 98% in the South. Furthermore, about 75% of Sudanese oil is produced in the South. North-South tension is complicated further by the intervention of foreign powers, namely the US and China and their rivalry over African oil. North Sudan and South Sudan could become proxies to these two ‘heavyweights’ and their geopolitical maneuvering in their quest for African oil.

9- Syria’s Civil War

The civil war and the massacres of civilians in Syria since 2011 are being exploited for narrow geopolitical competition to control Mideast oil and gas pipelines. Whatever the case, few recall that US agitation against Syria began long before the civil war with the main objective of weakening Iranian influence across the Middle East. These strategic concerns, motivated by fear of expanding Iranian influence, impacted Syria primarily in relation to pipeline geopolitics. In 2009 President Bashar Assad of Syria refused to sign a proposed agreement with Qatar that would run a pipeline from the latter’s North gasfield, contiguous with Iran’s South Pars field, through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and on to Turkey, with a view to supply European markets thus competing with Russian gas exports to Europe. Assad’s rationale was to protect the interests of his Russian ally, which is Europe’s top supplier of natural gas.

Instead, the following year Assad is said to have pursued negotiations for an alternative $10-billion pipeline with Iran, across Iraq to Syria, that would also potentially allow Iran to export gas from its South Pars field shared with Qatar. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the project was signed in July 2012 – just as Syria’s civil war was spreading – and earlier in 2013 Iraq signed a framework agreement for the construction of the gas pipeline.  The proposed Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline was a “slap in the face” for Qatar’s plans.

Syria’s Assad is being targeted because he is not considered a reliable “player”. Specifically, Turkey and the US want an assured flow of Qatari gas through Syria, and don’t want a Syrian regime which is not unquestionably loyal to those two countries to stand in the way of the pipeline or to demand too big a royalty. So yes, regime change was planned against Syria (as well as Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, and Iran) 20 years ago. And yes, attacking Syria weakens its close allies Iran and Russia allies and indirectly China.

10- The War on Libya in 2011

The war on Libya was portrayed as a humanitarian effort by the US and NATO to protect civilians. Far from it, it was oil they were after. Three underpinning factors were behind the war on Libya: Libya’s future endeavor to replace the US Dollar by the Libyan Dinar for payment for Libyan oil exports, the international oil companies’ unhappiness with the terms Libya was offering them to operate in the country and the fact that Libya was instrumental in creating the African Union’s financial institutions to provide financial independence for African countries. Libya has been one of the last nations in the world that had its own state-run banking system and control over its own money supply. By having this system in place, Libya could demand payment for its oil exports in Libyan Dinar or any other currency instead of the US Dollar thus weakening the American currency.

The attack on Libya is very reminiscent of one of the reasons why the United States attacked Iraq in 2003. Six months before the US moved into Iraq, Saddam Hussein took the decision to accept Euros instead of dollars for oil, and this became a threat to the global dominance of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency and as a petrodollar. The dollar is only strong because everyone uses it. It has been America’s blank check for the past nine decades. It acted as a form of control and still does today. If many countries in the world decide to move away from the dollar as a reserve currency and petrodollar, there could be a glut of dollars in the world resulting in huge loss of its value. All wars have economic motives.

Another underpinning factor for the attack is that international oil companies were not happy with Libya’s terms for operating in Libya. With 48 billion barrels (bb) of proven oil reserves, Libya has the biggest reserves in Africa and the 9th biggest in the world. Interests at stake emerged from an article in the Wall Street Journal entitled: “For West’s Oil Firms, No Love Lost in Libya”. After the lifting of sanctions in 2003, Western oil companies flocked to Libya with high expectations; they have been disappointed by the results. The Libyan government, under a system known as EPSA-4, granted operating licenses to foreign companies that left the Libyan state-run National Oil Corporation of Libya (NOC) with 90% of the extracted oil. “The EPSA-4 contracts contained the toughest terms in the world,” says Bob Fryklund, former president of the U. S.-based ConocoPhillips in Libya.

It is apparent, then, the reason why with an operation decided not in Bengazi, but in Washington, London and Paris, the National Libyan Transitional Council has created the “Libyan Oil Company” to replace the NOC. Its task will be to grant licenses on terms highly favorable to US, British and French companies. On the other hand, companies that before the war were the main producers of oil in Libya: first of all the Italian firm ENI, which in 2007 paid a billion dollars to obtain concessions until 2042, and Germany’s Wintershall which came in second place, will be made to suffer. It would make Chinese and Russian companies suffer even more, those to which on March 14, 2011 Gaddafi promised he would transfer the oil concessions held by European and U.S. companies.

A third reason for the war on Libya was to sink the African Union’s financial institutions, whose birth was made possible largely by Libyan investment. These include the African Investment Bank, based in Tripoli, Libya; the African Central Bank, based in Abuja, Nigeria; the African Monetary Fund, based in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The latter, with a programmed capital of more than 40 billion dollars, could supplant the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Africa. Up to now the IMF has dominated the African economy, paving the way for U.S. and European multinationals and investment banks. By attacking Libya, the US & NATO are trying to sink the bodies that could one day make the financial independence of Africa possible.

11- The Annexation of the Crimea

The annexation of the Crimea signals to the world that oil and natural gas are once again being used as a weapon of war. This isn’t the first time. When the Ukraine refused to pay higher prices for Russian natural gas supplies, Russia cut off gas supplies in 2009 to Ukraine thus affecting supplies to six other European countries in the middle of winter and leaving millions in the cold until they paid Russia’s ransom in the form of higher prices. It was a stark example how vulnerable Europe had become to Russia’s control over energy resources.

Russia is the world’s largest supplier of oil and gas and has thus tremendous power over the market. The European Union (EU) depends on Russian oil and gas supplies for 30% of its needs.

Russia’s intrusion into the Ukraine in February 2014 has been prompted by energy and geopolitical factors. The oil and gas factors are that 50% of Russia’s gas and oil supplies to the EU are piped through the Ukraine. Moreover, revenues from these supplies are extremely important for the Russian economy. It is in Russia’s energy interests to make sure that the gas pipelines transiting the Ukraine are well defended not only against sabotage but also against the Ukraine making use of the gas without paying for it. Ensuring that there is a pro-Russian government in the Ukraine becomes a very important Russian national interest.

There is, however, a geopolitical dimension. The Ukraine has become like a chess pawn in a grand chess game being played by the United States and the EU with Russia. At the heart of the Ukraine-Russia crisis is the EU’s attempts incited and abetted by the United States to draw the Ukraine away from Russia into the EU and eventually into NATO, thus bringing NATO to the borders of Russia. Having failed to achieve their aim, the EU supported by the US instigated internal strife in the Ukraine which ended with the ousting of the legally-elected president and eventually led to the annexation of the Crimea.

Potential Future Oil Wars

At present, there are at least five major conflicts that could potentially flare up over oil and gas resources in the next three decades of the twenty-first century.

1-Conflict over Iran’s Nuclear Program

Oil is at the heart of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran needs nuclear energy to replace the crude oil and natural gas currently being used to generate electricity, thus allowing more oil and gas to be exported. Without nuclear power, Iran could cease to remain a major crude oil exporter and could be relegated to the ranks of small exporters as early as 2015 with catastrophic implications for its economy and also the price of oil.  Iran would doubtless not be averse to possessing nuclear weapons. There is an element of security and also logic involved with Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons. Even direct negotiations between the United States and Iran will not shift Iran an iota from its determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Their logic is that if Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea can defy the world and get away with it, why not Iran.

Neither sanctions nor threat of war against Iran will force it to relinquish its nuclear program and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. If attacked, Iran could plunge the world in the biggest oil crisis in its history. Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons and will face down the United States, the European Union, Israel and the world community and will get away with acquiring nuclear weapons. The US and its allies can do nothing militarily, economically or with sanctions.

The US and its allies including Israel will eventually end up acquiescing to a nuclear Iran and who knows, they might end up forming an unholy alliance made up of the US, Israel and Iran to siphon off the oil and energy resources of the Arab gulf countries, something reminiscent of the US invasion of Iraq.

There is an element of security and also logic involved with Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons. Even direct negotiations between the United States and Iran will not shift Iran an iota from its determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Their logic is that if Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea can defy the world and get away with it, why not Iran. Neither sanctions nor threat of war against Iran will force it to relinquish its nuclear program and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. If attacked, Iran could plunge the world in the biggest oil crisis in its history. Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons and will face down the United States, the European Union, Israel and the world community and will get away with acquiring nuclear weapons. The US and its allies can do nothing militarily, economically or with sanctions. The US and its allies including Israel will eventually end up acquiescing to a nuclear Iran and who knows, they might end up forming an unholy alliance made up of the US, Israel and Iran to siphon off the oil and energy resources of the Arab gulf countries, something reminiscent of the US invasion of Iraq. In

When the Shah started Iran’s nuclear energy program in 1974, nuclear power could not be justified economically as Iran’s population was less than half its present 70 million, oil production was 6 mbd, far more than the present production of 3.20 mbd and energy consumption was less than a quarter of consumption today, and unlike now, Iran’s oil reservoirs were not in decline. The question is: since the United States strongly encouraged the Shah to build nuclear power plants in 1974, why is it objecting now to Iran pursuing a nuclear program? The answer is that in 1974 the Shah of Iran was a great friend of Israel while in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Iran is no longer friendly with Israel. Nuclear power may have an important role in restricting the consumption of hydrocarbons in Iran and allowing more oil and gas to be exported. In 2012, Iran used the equivalent of 610,000 b/d of oil and natural gas to generate electricity. By 2015, Iran will need to use some 770,000 b/d of oil and gas for electricity generation.

Generating nuclear electricity will enable Iran to replace at least 93% of the oil and gas used in electricity generation in 2020, thus adding some 1.00 mbd to its oil and gas exports and earning an extra $46 bn. Based on these figures, Iran’s quest for nuclear energy seems justifiable.

Although the threat of War between the United States and Israel on the one hand and Iran on the other has recently abated, there is nothing to stop a reckless Israeli government from ordering an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations thus precipitating a war between Israel and Iran and bringing the United States into it.

2-Oil War between the United States & China?

The great rivalry between the United States and China will shape the 21st century. It is a truth universally acknowledged that a great power will never voluntarily surrender pride of place to a challenger. The United States is the pre-eminent great power. China is now its potential challenger.

Though a terrifying possibility, a war between the oil titans could be triggered by a race to secure a share of dwindling reserves of oil or over Taiwan or over the disputed Islands in the South China Sea claimed by both China and Japan with the US coming to the defense of Japan. In such conflicts, the United States would try to starve China of oil by blocking any oil supplies from the Middle East passing through the Strait of Hormuz or the Strait of Malacca.

China’s robust economic growth and its emergence as an economic superpower would falter without oil, particularly from the Middle East. China’s global oil diplomacy is, therefore, geared towards ensuring that this never happens.

As Chinese state-owned companies scour the globe for oil and gas to fuel their country’s rapid economic growth, criticism of China for supporting despotic, oil-rich regimes, for driving up U.S. oil prices, and for worsening global warming has grown more strident. Some Washington hard-liners say the United States should prepare for future energy conflict with China by strengthening alliances with key oil producers while denying China access to strategic oil supplies. Such policies would increase Chinese concern about the security of oil supplies, encourage China to lock in oil resources from unsavory regimes, and undermine moderates in Beijing. Hard-line policies on oil could even become a self-fulfilling prophecy, fostering a new Cold War between the United States and China and possibly a hot one.

China’s economic boom, fueled by its massive supply of coal, has begun to overwhelm its domestic energy resources. While coal still meets 68% of China’s primary energy needs, the percentage filled by imported oil is growing. A net oil exporter in 1993, China today is the world’s largest importer and the second-largest consumer of oil. Over the next 15 years, its demand is expected to roughly double. By 2020, China will likely import 70% of the oil it consumes, compared to 65% today. 29 China’s leaders worry that this dependence on imported oil leaves them vulnerable, since long-term global energy “scarcity” that undermines economic growth and increases unemployment could bring social instability.

The growing dependence on oil imports particularly from the Middle East has created an increasing sense of ‘energy insecurity’ among Chinese leaders. Some Chinese analysts even refer to the possibility that the US is practicing an ‘energy containment’ policy toward China, or could implement one in the future. Chinese leaders tend to believe that dependence on imported oil leads to great ‘strategic vulnerability’. The war on Iraq and growing US hegemony in the Middle East have made it even more urgent for China to reduce its dependence on the Arab Gulf. 30 Much of China’s imported oil from the Middle East must pass through a major chokepoint: the Strait of Hormuz which is guarded by the US navy

Another chokepoint is the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, through which 80% of China’s imported oil pass. The channel is 625 miles long, and less than two miles wide at its narrowest point (see Figure 2). With the Indian navy guarding the northern end of the Strait, and the US navy the southern end, China feels sandwiched in and strategically vulnerable. The former president of China, Hu Jintao, has referred a number of times to what he describes as the ‘Malacca dilemma’. 31

3-Conflict between Iraq and Kurdistan

Like in many conflicts around the world, the presence of oil is raising the stakes and the tensions between Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional government (KRG) in Iraqi Kurdistan. Long before the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Kurds have been angling for independence. Baghdad currently disputes KRG control over Iraq’s northern oil fields. The Kurdish security forces are patrolling the loosely defined border, with strict orders from the KRG to block the entrance of Iraqi military forces. The KRG relies heavily on revenue from these oil fields to support its growing autonomy from Baghdad. Earlier this year, a Kurdish truck delivered crude oil to the Turkish port of Mursin, marking the first time the KRG has exported oil directly to world markets. This dispute was exacerbated by the US administration during the Iraq War, which pushed for an independent Kurdish State for the benefit of multinational oil companies.

Iraq considers a Kurdish declaration of independence as part of a plan to dismember Iraq with the support of the United States. Any conflict over Kurdistan could involve Iran, the United States and Turkey. It will amount to creating a new Israel in the Arab Gulf region. Turkey hopes that by expanding its oil transactions with Iraqi Kurdistan, it will eventually be able to settle its own Kurdish question.

War Between the UK & Argentina over Falkland Islands Oil Reserves The next war between the UK and Argentina could be over the Falklands Islands potential oil Reserves If the reserves were significant and proven.

On November 28, 2013, Argentina’s Congress passed a law imposing criminal sanctions on what it described as any “illegal exploration around the Falklands Islands (or as Argentina calls them the Las Malvinas)”. The move by Buenos Aeries is a major ratcheting of the tension in the region and has triggered a furious response by Britain reminding Argentina that the Falklands are British sovereign territory. The UK government unequivocally supports the right of the Falkland Islanders to develop their natural resources for their own economic benefit. While Argentina and the UK have already warred over the Falklands, in 2010 they fell out when the British began drilling for oil off the coast of the island. And tensions are continuing to rise. Argentina which is already burdened by debt and is facing an energy crisis might be raising opposition now not just because it wants to regain sovereignty of the islands, but because it wants access to its oil reserves.

Tensions over the Disputed South China Sea’s Islands

The recent rise in tensions over the disputed South China Sea islands has drawn attention to the possibility that the conflict is really about natural resources. The ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea are really about oil. China has been involved in territorial disputes with Japan and Taiwan over the Senkaku islands, and with Vietnam over the Spratly islands off the coast of Vietnam. China has even ramped up its naval presence in the South China Sea making its neighbors agitated. China’s claims of the islands are based on maps drawn out centuries ago when the Chinese empire laid claim to most of the South China Sea. Growing tensions between Japan and China over the Senkaku islands could escalate into armed conflict and could potentially bring the United States into it. The commander of US Marine Corps Forces in Japan claimed that if the Chinese invaded the Senkaku Islands, the US Navy and Marines could recapture them. China recently attempted to prevent the resupply of Philippines’ armed forces stationed on a disputed shoal in the South China Sea. It is but one example of creeping Chinese coerciveness that so unnerves the region. The Chinese defense minister also stridently asserted that Beijing will never compromise on disputed territory, raising fears that words will increasingly become assertive action.

The United States remains an energy glutton, a country where energy-efficiency and conservation measures result from private-sector reactions to the market rather than from comprehensive public policy.

Dr Mamdouh G. Salameh is an international oil economist, a consultant to the World Bank in Washington DC on oil & energy and a technical expert of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna. He is director of the Oil Market Consultancy Service in the UK and a member of both the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is also a member of the Energy Institute in London.

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Taxpayers are paying for a concentrated solar project — Ivanpah– that doesn’t work

Ivanpah in the news:

Dvorsky, G. May 21, 2016. The World’s Largest Solar Plant Just Torched Itself. Gizmodo (Australia). Misaligned mirrors are being blamed for a fire that broke out yesterday at the world’s largest solar power plant, leaving the high-tech facility crippled for the time being.

David Kreutzer. March 29, 2016. Taxpayers Are Footing Bill for Solar Project That Doesn’t Work. dailysignal.com

The latest example is the $2.2 billion Ivanpah solar thermal plant in California. (Note: Solar thermal, also known as Concentrated Solar Power plants, do not use solar panels to directly convert sunshine to electricity; they use sunshine to boil water that then drives conventional turbines to create electricity.)  Here’s the story so far. Ivanpah:

  • is owned by Google, NRG Energy, and Brightsource, who have a market cap in excess of $500 billion.
  • received $1.6 billion in loan guarantees from the Department of Energy.
  • is paid four to five times as much per megawatt-hour as natural gas-powered plants.
  • is paid two to three times as much per megawatt-hour as other solar power producers.
  • has burned thousands of birds to death.
  • has delayed loan repayments.
  • is seeking over $500 million in grants to help pay off the guaranteed loans.
  • burns natural gas for 4.5 hours each morning to get its mojo going.

Brightsource, which is privately held, is owned by a virtual who’s who of those who don’t need subsidies from taxpayers and ratepayers.

In spite of all this, Ivanpah has fallen woefully short of its production targets. The managers’ explanation for why production came up 32% below expected output is the weather. In addition to raising questions about planning for uncertainty, it is not all that clear how a 9% drop in sunshine causes a 32% drop in production.

More bizarrely, the natural gas used to get the plant all warmed up and ready each day would be enough to generate over one quarter of the power actually produced from the solar energy. 

The problem for Ivanpah’s customers (California power utilities) is that they planned on all those solar watt-hours to meet California’s renewable power mandates, which require that renewables produce a large and rising fraction of California’s electricity. That is why they pay so much more for Ivanpah’s output than for conventionally powered electricity.

Breaching their contracts with these California utilities threatened to shut down Ivanpah.  But this would have been bothersome for Ivanpah’s investors and the Department of Energy’s ridiculous Section 1703 Loan Program, so the California Public Utilities Commission saved the day (for the fat-cat owners, of course, not for actual the electricity consumers) by granting the company an extension to meet the production targets.  The best part of the ruling is the section on the cost—it’s pretty succinct.  Here it is in its entirety:

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

 

 

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Booklist: Limits to Growth, Overpopulation, Collapse, War, Extinction

 More booklists

Limits to Growth

  • Donella Meadows. 2004. The Limits to Growth: The 30 year update      
  • V Smil. Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and the Transformation of World Food Production.
  • K Gever. Beyond Oil: The threat to food & fuel in the coming decades           
  • D. & M. Fisher. 2001. The Nitrogen Bomb.  Discover magazine      
  • William Catton.  Overshoot        
  • M Wackernagel. Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth
  • L Garrett. The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance.
  • G Slade. Made to Break: Technology and Obsolescence in America 
  • Hopfenberg. Human population numbers as a function of food supply

Overpopulation                    

Escape to Mars & Outer Space

Collapse

Collapse, Russia                   

Collapse, North Korea      

Collapse, Venezuela

Collapse, Cuba

Collapse, Roman Empire

Collapse, Civil War, Refugees

D Mikhail. The Beekeeper. Rescuing the Stolen Women of Iraq 

Nuclear War

War

  • SA LeBlanc. Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage.
  • N Ohler. Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich
  • R O’Harrow. The Quartermaster: Montgomery C. Meigs, Lincoln’s General, Master Builder of the Union Army
  • J Weatherford. Genghis Kahn and the Making of the Modern World
  • J Weatherford. Secret History of the Mongol Queens
  • L Kleveman, The New Great Game:  Blood and Oil in Central Asia.
  • M Klare. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict.
  • M MacMillan. War How Conflict Shaped Us   
  • C Johnson. The Sorrows Of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic.  
  • J Matloff. No friends but the mountains: Dispatches from the world’s violent highlands
  • P Coffee. American arsenal. A century of waging war.
  • D Vine. Base Nation: How U.S. Military bases abroad harm America and the World
  • A Rashid.  Taliban. Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.
  • P Turchin. 2 books: Secular Cycles. War and Peace and War. 
  • D Berreby. Us and Them. Understanding Your Tribal Mind. 
  • A Gat. War in Human Civilization. 
  • L Keeley. War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage.
  • J Waller.  Becoming Evil. How ordinary people commit genocide and mass killing. 
  • P Gourevitch. We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. 
  • D Goldhagen. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans & the Holocaust. 1997
  • Wrangham & Peterson. Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence. 1997
  • M Ghiglieri. The Dark Side of Man: Tracing the Origins of Male Violence
  • R Rhodes. Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist.  
  • G MacDonogh. After the Reich. The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation.
  • C. Andrew. Secret world: A history of intelligence.  980 pages
  • M. Matthews. Head strong: how psychology is revolutionizing war
  • A Goldsworthy. Complete Roman Army 

CYBERWAR

What it’s like to be a soldier

  • Guy Sajer. The Forgotten Soldier  
  • K Marlantes. What it is like to go to war.
  • David Finkel. The Good Soldiers      
  • Peter Goldman. Charlie Company: What Vietnam Did to Us 
  • MD Matthews. Head Strong: How Psychology is Revolutionizing War  

Extinction

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts         

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Over and under-cooked oil — tar sands, “fracked” tight oil & gas

This article discusses why it’s so hard and expensive to extract difficult oils like fracked shale oil, Venezuelan and Canadian oil sands.

  • These are at the bottom of the resource pyramid, so there may be a lot of it, but it’s poor quality and expensive to extract.
  • The tar sands in Canada and Venezuela were once super-giant fields of light oil. But over millions of years it’s been “overcooked” — bacteria swallowed most of the hydrogen atoms, degrading and converting the light oil into a nasty tar requiring expensive upgrading 
  • Shale gas and tight oil are in rocks where hydrocarbons may have been overcooked or haven’t made it into porous reservoirs yet.  Robert Skinner says that getting them out “…amounts to giving the rocks an enema” with high pressure water, sand, and chemicals.
  • Kerogen shale is undercooked. Millions of years from now it will turn into oil, but trying to accelerate this process takes too much energy
  • Accelerating or reversing geology to get these difficult oils takes enormous amounts of cash, and energy, which in the end leads to huge amounts of GHG emissions.

2017: The Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) report on tar sands, oil, and gas production states

“2016 was another challenging year for hydrocarbon producers in Alberta. Faced with continued low global crude oil prices and weak natural gas prices, Alberta producers sought additional cost savings and curtailed capital budgets and activity. Capital expenditures fell for a second year. Conventional oil and gas wells placed on production dropped by 37.2% in 2016 relative to 2015, and crude oil production and natural gas production declined as a result. Additionally, wildfires in the area of Fort McMurray disrupted oil sands production in May, with impacts lasting into summer.

Total capital expenditures in the conventional oil and gas and oil sands sectors declined by an estimated 35% between 2015 and 2016 to Cdn$26 billion.1 This was due in part to projects being delayed because of the low oil price environment, as well as to reduced costs for materials and labour. Total capital expenditures are forecast to remain relatively flat in 2017, with capital expenditures forecast to increase in the conventional oil and gas sector but decline in the oil sands sector.”

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

Nikiforuk, A. 22 May 2013. Difficult Truths about ‘Difficult Oil’. As we work down the hydrocarbon pyramid, energy gets messier and much more costly. TheTyee.ca  

As the global economy switches to heavier, messier and costlier hydrocarbons, Robert Skinner is getting a bit worried about the future of his three grandchildren.  It’s all about the story of “difficult oil,” a term the highly respected energy expert and geologist first coined nearly a decade ago.

Now, Skinner, a 67-year energy veteran, has seen it all. He has not only worked extensively for industry and government (Energy Mines & Resources) but even for think tanks such as the prestigious Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. He also served as the policy director for the International Energy Agency in the early 90s as climate change and post-Soviet Europe seized the agency’s attention.

When not writing or thinking about difficult oil, Skinner now advises governments, universities and companies on strategy, whether for research, regulations or investment.

Skinner first saw the oil sands in 1966 as a student geologist. At the time it consisted of just one construction project for the first Suncor mine.

He has returned every decade since, first as a federal energy official, and then as an employee for the French oil giant, Total. In his last stint he served as senior vice president for Statoil Canada.

“I first saw the oil sands as a sideline, out-of-sight activity that governments were reluctant to approve — because it would compete with output from the string of discoveries after Leduc that governments were lobbying the U.S. to import. Today it is a burgeoning boomtown, world-scale industry that governments are again lobbying the U.S. to import.”

But his experiences working with bitumen over the last 45 years confirmed Skinner’s deepest suspicions: difficult oil is, well, difficult and really is a shift from business as usual. It is all about burning money to reverse or speed up geology. Moreover, technological breakthroughs to speed up or slow down geological forces are slow if not ponderous.

Skinner first dug up the important concept of “difficult oil” in 1998.

Difficult hydrocarbons, he explained, generally lie at the bottom of the resource pyramid. They might be massive in volume but high in cost, and often poor in quality.

Difficult oil has either been cooked too much, too little, or not at all. In some cases it has been degraded by bacteria. To accelerate or reverse geology generally requires ungainly amounts of energy along with clouds of GHG emissions.

The right degree of cooking over time, of course, produces light oil, notes Skinner, but much of the world’s conventional sources are now in steep decline.

That leaves over cooking or too much heat, which produces the so-called “wet gas fields,” now being pursued in the Eagle Ford field in western Texas.

How heavy oil got so heavy

The bitumen in Venezuela’s Orinoco basin and northern Alberta also requires massive geological tinkering, says Skinner.

Both heavy oil deposits actually began as super-giant fields of light oil. But over millions of years bacteria chewed up most of the hydrogen atoms degrading the resource into a thick heavy molasses-like tar. This goo can’t be turned into a commercial fuel stock without extensive upgrading to restore the ratio of hydrogen to carbon atoms.

To do so, hydrogen must be added to the bitumen or (more commonly) carbon must be subtracted, by “coking.” Coking creates mountains of petroleum coke, a coal-like substance.

Reversing geology, adds Skinner, “requires huge amounts of energy, labor, water, steel and capital. It’s all about the Second Law of Thermodynamics.”

Shale gas and tight oil, also belong to the difficult camp. They exist in source rocks where hydrocarbons may have been overcooked or not yet migrated up into porous reservoirs. As a consequence it requires some fiddling to wrestle them out of the shale. “To be graphic, it amounts to giving the rocks an enema,” says Skinner.

The cracking of these source rocks with high pressured volumes of water, sand and chemicals, a modern business frenzy, is all about accelerating geology “to speed up the migration” and release of these hydrocarbons.

But to Skinner reversing or accelerating geology ultimately adds up to one reality: spending big piles of cash.

“Difficult oil is by definition costly. And the costs are not coming down all that much.”

Bitumen remains the world’s most capital-intensive hydrocarbon. According to RSK Limited, an independent analysis firm, it takes $8 billion to develop a conventional oil field pumping one million barrels a day in the Middle East, while it takes $45 billion to produce the same result in the tar sands. (Venezuelan heavy oil is about $10 billion cheaper to produce than Canada’s bitumen.)

And that doesn’t include upgrading.

Moreover, the three biggest tight oil producers in the Bakken and Eagle Ford plays “have increased their long-term debt by over 300 per cent in the last three years. We’ve seen this over-leveraged train wreck before,” says Skinner.

The consultant also doesn’t think the capital intensity of difficult hydrocarbons gets enough attention among policy makers.

If interest rates increase and/or the price of oil sags, new production in the shale oil and oil sands becomes uneconomic, explains Skinner.

But as supply drops off, prices eventually increase again making for more volatility. The volatility of difficult oil in turn “compounds the inherent and ever-present instability caused by geopolitical factors.”

Reversing geology is not so easy

Another challenge plaguing difficult oil is the slowness and sheer difficulty of technological innovation. Reversing geology requires great complexity; progress is often incremental and disappointments are common.

“Every company, big and small, attempts to create a mystique around some ‘unique’ or ‘special’ black box or technique in particular or the firm’s technological prowess,” explains Skinner. “They do this to attract investors or to placate their environmental critics, or even to convince themselves that this business is for them.”

While new techniques and technologies, for example using solvents, are being tested, the oil sands is still running on technology several decades old. The steam plants, which boil water to make steam to melt deep underground bitumen, account for half of oil sands production. But the technologies that promised 20 years ago to produce more bitumen with less steam, still hasn’t delivered.

Instead of reducing the volume of steam needed to produce a barrel from 2.5 barrels to one barrel, most projects have increased their steam volumes (an average of 3.2 barrels now) along with energy and water costs due to the increasingly poor quality of deep reservoirs.

Nor is it just about the technology; “it’s the sheer difficulty of moving dozens of megaprojects through an overburdened regulatory process, construction and local infrastructure with an inadequate and ill-trained labor force.”

University of Calgary petroleum engineer Steve Larter has offered the same reality check: “Steam-Oil Ratios have tended to get worse with time as more difficult reservoirs are developed.” Moreover, “revolutionary technologies that lead to major downward shifts of the invested energy (e.g. steam) and emissions versus oil produced have not yet appeared.”

Skinner adds that most industry and government claims about getting cleaner are problematic at the moment: “Any company that claims its technology program will yield efficiency gains/emissions reductions beyond a modest, few percentage points within ten years — and they have yet to put steel in the ground to test their technologies — is simply naive or attempting to mislead someone. It can take more than three years just to get regulatory approval, two to build, one to three to ramp up, monitor and measure, and perhaps a couple more to analyze — and that is only for a pilot, not a full-scale commercial project: that can take another four to six years to produce initial results.”

 

Posted in Oil & Gas Fracked, Oil Shale, Tar Sands (Oil Sands) | Tagged , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Net metering and the death of US rooftop solar

April 22, 2016 by Roger Andrews at euanmearns.com

“Net metering” allows anyone with a solar installation to sell surplus solar power to the grid when the sun is shining and to purchase power back from the grid when it isn’t. Net metering has been described as the lifeblood of solar in America, and it’s probably true to state that without it there would be few, if any domestic rooftop solar installations anywhere in the country. However, the program is now coming under attack, with Hawaii and Nevada recently rolling back net metering benefits and with a number of other states also considering changes. What happens if enough states impose similar rollbacks, or maybe do away with net metering altogether? This post reviews this question and concludes that domestic solar in the US will slowly wither and die.

The Nevada decision

On December 23, 2015, the Nevada State Legislature passed Senate Bill 374, following which the state Public Utilities Commission cut the rate payable to owners of domestic solar installations who sell surplus power to Nevada Energy. The rationale was that intermittent solar power sold to the NV Energy grid “differs from” the dispatchable power the grid sells back and that domestic solar owners were getting paid too much for the former and not paying enough for the latter:

The order separates the prices of energy and related services provided by NV Energy, and the intermittent renewable energy provided to NV Energy by net metering customers. This approach is fair because it recognizes that the energy and suite of energy services provided by NV Energy to net metering customers differs from the intermittent excess energy delivered to NV Energy’s system.

This decision will be welcomed by all who recognize that solar is incapable of providing more than a small fraction of total electricity supply because of prohibitive storage requirements and that it’s presently getting a free ride on the back of grid generation that substitutes for storage. Certainly my rooftop solar panels would be totally uneconomic if I couldn’t use grid power at night and had to use storage batteries instead.

The Nevada solar industry, however, was not amused. Three solar companies – SolarCity, Sunrun and Vivint – announced they would have to cease operations in the state and local installers have been forced to cut staff. Also not amused were Nevada’s 18,000 existing rooftop solar array owners, who thought they were “grandfathered” but found that they weren’t. Their response was to launch a class action lawsuit against NV Energy alleging the utility “conspired to unlawfully reduce incentives” and NV Energy caved in, announcing that it would file a proposal to keep existing customers on the old rates, recognizing the desire for a “stable and predictable cost environment.”

“A potentially worrisome precedent”

But still the outcome in Nevada sets a potentially worrisome precedent for the US solar industry, with roughly half of all U.S. states currently studying or changing their net metering policies. States are taking action now because domestic solar in the US has grown so fast that several of them are now approaching or have already reached their net-metering caps. (A net metering cap is a target set by state authorities and it’s usually related to some fraction of peak demand or to capacity. But each state uses different criteria and some of them are extremely complicated. Details for anyone who might want more information are available here and here).

Two states other than Nevada have already revisited the question of how much intermittent solar power is really worth and how much of it their state can really use. The first was Hawaii, where some of Hawaii Electric Company’s grids were getting swamped by rooftop solar to the point where solar generation exceeded total demand at daytime solar peak. An example is given in Figure 1, which shows “backfeed” conditions between 10.30am and 2pm on August 8, 2013:

Figure 1: Average transformer load showing “backfeed” conditions, Hawaii utilities

Because of growing problems of this type the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission shut the net metering program down for new participants in October last year. As was the case in Nevada this shutdown was also accompanied by weeping, wailing and lawsuits from the local solar industry and rooftop solar owners, but the situation was obviously unsustainable. And it arose with less than 1% overall annual solar penetration in the state, not the 10% commonly assumed. More about this later.

Another state on a collision course with net metering is California, the home of the “Duck Curve”: (The Hawaii curve is known as the “Nessie Curve”, although the resemblance is less obvious.)

Figure 2: The California “Duck Curve”

At expected rates of solar growth California will also have a potential overgeneration problem by 2020, and the ramp rates needed to cover the period between about 5pm and peak load at 9pm reach potentially alarming levels. California’s solution has been to mandate the installation of 1.3GW of storage capacity (again no “h” given) by 2020, but this is just a drop in the bucket by California standards.

Current Status of the US solar industry:

One of the remarkable things about the US solar industry is how insignificant it is. Figure 3 plots percent solar penetration in the 36 states for which solar data are available (estimated as total solar generation divided by total generation using 2015 data from the EIA detailed state generation data base). The average level of penetration in 2015 was only 0.6%, and many states generated effectively no solar at all:

Figure 3: Solar generation by state as a percentage of total generation.

Only California is anywhere close to 10% solar penetration. Solar penetration in Nevada is less than 5% and in Hawaii less than 1%. (I checked this number and found that according to Hawaii Electric Company it’s correct). The implication is that solar may begin to stress grids at levels of penetration much lower than 10%, particularly at the local level.

Discussion

What we are seeing here is a conflict between on the one hand the utilities and grid operators, who view solar as a threat to their bottom line and to grid stability, and on the other the green lobby plus the residential owners, installers and PV panel salesmen who are now benefiting from the proceeds of subsidized solar and the existence of net metering. The surprising thing, however, is that this conflict has broken out even though solar still contributes a negligible percentage of the US generation mix. Why should this be? I think partly because the hundreds of thousands of homeowners who have installed solar arrays are dependent on a continuation of net metering to recoup their investment, partly because 200,000 people are now employed in the US solar industry, partly because solar can in some cases destabilize grids even at low levels of penetration (viz. Hawaii) and partly because of the claims made by some scientific organizations as to the percentage of US electricity generation solar could ultimately fill, such as:

  • US National Renewable Energy Laboratory: 39% with rooftop solar PV alone
  • Stanford University: 38% by 2050
  • US Department of Energy: 27% by 2050
  • International Energy Agency: 36% by 2050 (with solar thermal)

Numbers like this, which assume an approximate sixty-fold expansion of US solar capacity over present levels, can only be described as wishful thinking. Yet in the minds of many they are realistic targets.

But what happens if net metering benefits are rolled back? I picked an example which should be fairly close to reality – a household in Southern Nevada that consumes 11,000 kWh/year, the US average, with a 5kW solar array on the roof. I constructed a crude daily demand curve to show a peak around the breakfast hour and a larger one in the evening when everyone is at home watching large-screen TV or playing computer games and all the lights have been left on. Figure 4A shows hourly consumption and solar generation for the household during an average day (which assumes 12 hours of sunshine and a capacity factor of 19%, which is about right for Southern Nevada.) When the sun isn’t shining the household gets all its power from the grid, but for about 7 hours it gets all its power from the 3kW solar array. And over this period the array generates a healthy surplus that gets fed back to the grid, sending the electricity meter into reverse and causing it to wind rapidly backwards:

Figure 4: Demand, solar generation and consumption for a “typical” Southern Nevada household with net metering in place

Figure 4B shows the cumulative impacts. At the end of the day the household has consumed 30.3kWh, but because of the surplus solar power sent to the grid it gets charged for only 6.7kWh of grid power, which at current Nevada retail rates of $0.11/kWh works out to the princely sum of 74 cents, or an annual bill of about $270. Compared to what the bill would have been without solar (about $1,200) this gives the owner something like a ten-year payback on his or her solar investment after federal and state tax credits, which is not too bad when one considers that the solar array adds value to the house and that the PV panels will, one assumes, continue to generate electricity after payback is reached.

Nevada’s net metering rollback will, however, ultimately reduce the payment homeowners receive for solar electricity sent to the grid by 75% . How much difference will this make? Instead of saving almost $1,000/year on electricity bills the homeowner will now save only about $250/year. Even allowing for federal and state tax credits this will make domestic solar totally uneconomic in Nevada. And if other states follow Nevada’s lead it will eventually become uneconomic in those states as well.

And the problem doesn’t stop there. US utilities, with some justification, are also angling for increased charges to cover the costs of integrating growing amounts of solar power with their grids. (Nevada’s “grid connection charge” is scheduled to triple over the next five years). The end of the net metering road will of course be reached when the grids can’t physically accept any more solar, or no one will be able to afford the grid connection charge, whereupon Figure 4A will look like this:

Figure 5: Demand, solar generation and consumption for a “typical” Southern Nevada household with no net metering in place. The household is capable of powering itself for only about 8 hours.

Yet some believe that net metering rollbacks will provide a new opportunity for US solar. This article (which describes net metering as solar’s “junk food”) proposes a “value-of-solar tariff” where “solar customers are paid for the value of the electricity they produce at the specific time and place they put it on the grid.” This seems fair, but it too would probably kill rooftop solar. The California duck curve shown in Figure 2 shows how. The solar power produced in the middle of the day exceeds grid requirements and would therefore have to be sold at a low price if not wasted altogether, and at the nine o’clock peak, when power is in greatest demand, the sun has set or in in the process of setting. Another article views net metering rollbacks as an opportunity for domestic solar producers to go off-grid entirely and fill demand from energy storage, either in a utility-owned or domestic storage facility. But “to make the storage option appealing to customers … it would need to be offered using a low capital expenditures (CAPEX) business model.” “Energy storage” and “low CAPEX” are, however, mutually-exclusive terms, so that won’t work either.

It therefore appears that the future of domestic US solar depends on how far the states that are currently considering or reconsidering their positions roll back net metering benefits. And they probably wouldn’t have to roll them back very far before rooftop solar becomes uneconomic – unless of course the government jumps in with yet more subsidies. But hope springs eternal, particularly in the breast of the US solar industry.

 

Posted in Other Experts, Photovoltaic Solar | Tagged , , , | 9 Comments

Limited Cognition

Gifford, R. May 2011. The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation and adaptation.  PubMed.

Limited cognition.  Humans are far less rational than once believed. 

1: Ancient brain

Our physical brain hasn’t evolved much in 30,000 years. Back then, we were wandering around the savannah, concerned mainly with our immediate kith and kin, proximate dangers and quickly exploitable resources. Although we have learned to think (a bit!) about other people, distant threats and slowly exploitable resources, our ancient brain tends to fall back into the here and now, which is inconsistent with paying much heed to the gradual and often distant impacts of climate change. This makes us slow to act.

2: Ignorance.  Ignorance is a barrier to action in three ways: not knowing that climate change exists, not knowing what to do about it once you become aware of the problem, and being told wrong information. The first problem is shrinking, although factual knowledge still lags severely: my team recently tested the climate change knowledge of a representative sample of Canadians. We found that, on average, they could only correctly answer 1.5 out of 6 questions. Second comes a lack of knowledge about which actions to take, how to undertake those one is aware of, and the relative climate benefits of different actions. We are getting better at understanding the latter, and in broad terms we know what we should be doing. However, much remains to be learned, partly because the answers aren’t always universal – a best practice in London may not be a best practice in Vancouver, for example. Also, they aren’t always obvious – for instance, lamb raised in New Zealand and eaten in the UK has a smaller carbon footprint than lamb raised and eaten in the UK. And modern products are composed of many ingredients or component parts and have complex life cycles. Third, ignorance also stems from disciplined and deliberate attempts by groups with a vested interest in the production and use of greenhouse gases to cast doubt on climate science.

3: Environmental numbness. This dragon comes in two subspecies. First, every environment is made up of more elements than we can wholly grasp, so we attend to them selectively. Sometimes we attend to salient elements at the expense of less salient but more dangerous ones, which is how accidents happen. Climate change is like that for many: a dangerous phenomenon that isn’t salient because it isn’t causing any immediate personal difficulties. This makes action unlikely. The second form occurs at the other end of the stimulus spectrum. When people see the same advert many times, they get used to it and stop paying attention. Similarly, hearing about climate change too often, particularly if the message isn’t varied, can lead to message numbness and the attenuation of behaviours that would help ameliorate the problem.

4: Uncertainty. Experiments show that uncertainty – both real and perceived – reduces the frequency of pro-environmental behaviour. For example, when asked how many fish they would harvest from a hypothetical ocean, the more uncertain the number of fish left, the more people said they would take. People tend to interpret any sign of uncertainty as sufficient reason to act in self-interest. This happens in the real world too. In its 2007 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change expressed its level of confidence in its predictions very carefully, using phrases such as “likely” or “very likely”. This led many to interpret the report as indicating a lower likelihood than the IPCC intended. Thus, we are left with a perplexing problem: how to present the likelihood of climate outcomes honestly without promoting underestimates of the problem, which of course help to justify inaction.

5: Discounting. One well-known psychological bias is our tendency to undervalue distant and future risks. This is also true of climate change. For example, my colleagues and I found that citizens in 15 of 18 countries believe that environmental conditions are worse in other countries. Although conditions often are objectively worse elsewhere, this tendency occurs even in similar places, such as English villages a few kilometres apart. People also tend to discount environmental risks that will occur in the future. Both types of discounting are a barrier to action against climate change. If conditions are presumed to be worse elsewhere and in the future, people will be less motivated to act.

6: Optimism bias. Optimism is generally a healthy, desirable outlook that can produce useful personal outcomes. However, it can be overdone, to the detriment of well-being. For example, people are overly optimistic about their chances of having a happy marriage or avoiding illness. They are also overly optimistic about environmental risks.

7: Perceived lack of behavioral control. Because climate change is a diffuse and global problem, many people do nothing because they think that their behaviour has little or no impact on the outcome. Closely related to this is fatalism – the sense that nothing can be done, not only by oneself, but even by collective human action.

8: Confirmation bias. We like to be told that we are correct. Therefore, people tend to read and watch media that tells them they are on the right track. Those who have doubts about climate science prefer to read newspapers and watch broadcasts that reinforce their convictions. That, in turn, is a serious barrier to engaging in climate-positive behaviour.

9: Time is money. Studies show that when people view the time they have available in monetary terms, they tend to skip acting in environmentally positive ways. Money is the epitome of self-interest, and so when one’s time becomes associated with it, the environment suffers.

10: Perceived inability. Many pro-climate actions require some extra knowledge, skill or ability. Some people are unable to act because of a physical disability, for example. However, many more are capable of, say, riding a bicycle or changing their diet, but claim to be unable to do so.

2. Ideologies. “When people have a comfortable lifestyle, their tendency to not rock the boat grows”

11: World views. World views are broad swathes of connected attitudes. Some of them include a special place for views on climate change. For example, support for free-enterprise capitalism is especially associated with disbelief in global warming. Capitalism has clearly produced comfortable lifestyles for millions, but some aspects of it, such as a belief in the freedom of the commons – that common resources should be exploitable by anyone – have also led to the devastation of fisheries, forests and landscapes around the world. Having a financial or emotional stake in capitalist organisations isn’t compatible with adopting climate-positive behaviours.

12: Suprahuman powers. Some people take little or no action because they believe that a religious or secular deity will not forsake them, or will do what it wishes anyway. When researchers at the University of Melbourne in Australia interviewed people living on Tuvalu’s main island, Funafuti, which is threatened by rising sea levels, they found that about half weren’t worried, maintaining that God wouldn’t break the biblical promise never to flood Earth again. More commonly, secular people believe Mother Nature will take a course that we mere mortals cannot influence. Climate inaction follows naturally from these beliefs.

13: Technosalvation. Technical innovation has a long and admirable history of improving our standard of living. Clearly, it can be a partner in mitigating climate change: witness the recent drop in the price of solar panels. However, some go further and believe that technology can solve all the problems associated with climate change. Such overconfidence can serve as another barrier to climate-mitigating behaviour.

14: System justification. This is the tendency to defend and justify the status quo. When people have a comfortable lifestyle, the tendency to not rock the boat grows and – more importantly – so does the desire not to let anyone alter the way things are. Climate change will require major adjustments; system justifiers normally won’t adopt them, and will argue against them. On a positive note, if mitigation can be portrayed as part of the system, this can change.

3. Social comparison. Humans are social animals; comparing our own situation to that of others is a deeply ingrained tendency.  

15: Social comparison. People routinely compare their actions with those of others. When we compare ourselves to someone we admire, we gravitate toward their choices; if that someone happens to harbor anti-climate-science views, we are likely to decide that the climate isn’t such a problem.

16: Social norms and networks. Norms are what we see as the proper courses of action. They can be a potent positive force for climate action, but they can also be regressive. Social networks create and informally enforce norms. If the network’s sentiment is toward doubt, a dragon of inaction naturally reigns. But it works both ways. In one US neighborhood, for example, dwelling proximity in the network helped explain why 16% of householders installed photovoltaic panels, far higher than the national average of 1%.

17: Perceived inequity. Perceived inequity is often heard as a reason for inaction: “Why should I change if they won’t change?” Usually other nations or well-known figures are cited as not cooperating, which serves as a convenient justification for one’s own inaction. This is backed up by experiments that show when any inequality, real or perceived, exists, cooperation tends to decline.

4. Sunk Costs

18: Financial investments.  Once we have invested in something, disinvesting in it for climate reasons becomes difficult. The cardinal example here is car ownership. If I have bought a car and am now paying for its insurance and upkeep, why should I sell this cosy portable living room or leave it on the driveway? Similarly, if someone has a financial stake or a job in a fossil fuel industry, believing that burning these fuels damages the environment can lead to cognitive dissonance. It’s often easier to reduce this dissonance by changing your belief (“burning these fuels isn’t causing a problem”) than by changing your behaviour (disposing of the stake).

19: Habit. In 1890, pioneering psychologist William James called habit the “enormous flywheel of society” – that is, a powerful force for keeping things regular and ordered. In the context of climate change, habit can lead to the routine, mindless performance of damaging actions. Of course, climate-positive habits are a potential boon. Habit isn’t a glamorous dragon, but it is one of the most important because many repeated actions are highly resistant to permanent change – think of diet and transportation. Some people use the term “behavioural momentum” instead, because it aptly expresses this resistance to change. The use of cars, for example, has a great deal of behavioural momentum, and therefore is very difficult to change.

20: Conflicting goals, values and aspirations. Everyone has multiple goals in life, and these aren’t all compatible with climate change mitigation. The near-universal aspiration to “get ahead” often means engaging in actions that compete with the goal of reducing climate change, such as buying a larger house, taking exotic holidays or owning a new car. That climate-related goals frequently take a back seat to others is revealed when people are asked to rank climate change against other problems or concerns: they usually assign it a low importance. Polls carried out by the Pew Research Center think tank reveal that 80 per cent of US respondents say climate change is an “important issue”, yet it comes 20th out of 20 when ranked against other issues. Many people favour addressing the economic cost of climate change, as long as it doesn’t come out of their own pockets.

21: Place attachment.  Individuals are more likely to care for places they feel an attachment to. Weak attachment can therefore act as a barrier to climate-positive behavior. However, so can strong place attachment, for example in Nimbyish opposition to nearby wind farms.

5. Discredence. When people think ill of others, they are unlikely to believe what they say or take direction from them. These negative views can take a range of forms.

22: Mistrust. Trust is essential for healthy relationships. When it is absent between citizens and scientists or government officials, resistance in one form or another follows. There is ample evidence that many people mistrust messages that come from scientists or government officials. When trust sours, the probability of positive behaviour change diminishes.

23: Perceived programme inadequacy. Policy-makers have implemented many programs designed to encourage sustainable or climate-friendly behavior. Most of these are voluntary, such as a rebate for buying loft insulation or energy-efficient appliances. Thus, people choose whether to accept the offer, and often they decide it isn’t good enough for their participation.

24: Denial. Uncertainty, mistrust and sunk costs can easily lead to active denial of the problem. This may include denial that climate change is occurring at all or that it is caused by us – something believed by substantial minorities in most countries. Those holding this view tend to be outspoken. One newspaper reader’s comments on an article about research by environmental psychologists is typical of the emotional intensity felt by some deniers: “It figures that a bunch of psychologists need to mess with people’s heads to get them to fall in line with this ‘eco-friendly’ nonsense.”

25: Reactance. Mistrust and denial lead to what psychologists call reactance, the tendency to struggle against whatever appears to threaten one’s freedom. Of course, some circumstances should promote reactance, but climate change isn’t one of them. Reactance is especially problematic when it comes to climate because it may promote actions that go beyond inaction into destructive territory.

6. Perceived risk. Changing one’s behavior is risky.  

26: Functional risk. Will it work? If one purchases, for example, an electric car, it may, as a new technology, have operational problems. The same could be said for many green technologies.

27: Physical risk. Some adaptations may have, or at least be perceived to have, some danger associated with them. Bicycles, for example, produce virtually no greenhouse gases after they are manufactured, but they result in quite a few visits to emergency rooms.

28: Financial risk. Many green solutions require capital outlays or premiums. How long is the payback? If the product becomes a fixed part of a residence, such as solar panels, will I recoup the installation costs or accrue enough energy savings before moving on? Is the premium for that electric car worth it?

29: Social risk. Other people notice many of our choices. This leaves us open to judgement, which could damage our reputation or ego. Will riding a bicycle make me look odd? What about becoming a vegan? Or keeping my old mobile phone?

30: Psychological risk. This risk is perhaps less likely for most people, but can occur. If we are teased, criticized or even bullied for engaging in climate-positive actions, we risk damage to our self-esteem and self-confidence.

31: Temporal risk. Another risk is the potential that the time I spend planning and adopting a climate-friendly course of action might fail to produce the desired results. Many people spend considerable time trying to decide whether to install solar panels, buy an electric car, become a vegetarian or cycle to a destination. Fear that the choice might not result in the desired benefits can lead to inaction: the time spent planning a change may be wasted.

7. Limited behavior. Most of us engage in at least minimal action to help limit the emission of greenhouse gases. However, most of us could do more.  

32: Tokenism. Some climate-related behaviors are easier to adopt than others, but have little or no impact on greenhouse gas emissions. One example is taking your own shopping bags to the supermarket. However, their ease of adoption means these tend to be chosen over higher-cost but more effective actions, such as commuting by bike or public transport, or switching to a vegetarian or vegan diet. Nevertheless, they might be considered a gateway to better things.

33: The rebound effect. Often, after some positive change is made, the gains are diminished or erased by subsequent actions. For example, people who buy a fuel-efficient car may drive further than when they owned a less efficient one. Like reactance, this dragon may go beyond cancelling out the benefits and produce overall negative consequences.

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Missing monsoon crashes Indus Valley Civilization

19 March 2014 Withering monsoon may have doomed past Asian society. NewScientist.

The Indian summer monsoon abruptly weakened 4200 years ago. The ensuing drought may have led to the collapse of the Indus Valley Civilization, which flourished around the Indus river, in what is now Pakistan and north-west India. It was at its height from 2600 BC to 1900 BC, but after that its cities were mysteriously abandoned.

Shifts in the monsoon have also been linked to the fall of China’s Tang dynasty, and of the Mayan civilization in South America, both around AD 900.

Yama Dixit and her colleagues at the University of Cambridge dug up snail shells from Kotla Dahar, a lake near one of the cities. The shells record changes in the lake’s water level in their composition. The team found that the lake was deep from 4500 to 3800 BC. Although it shallowed a little up to 2200 BC, after this time there was a sharp drop in the water level, suggesting the summer monsoon abruptly weakened for 200 years, meaning less rainfall. The Indus valley people relied on the monsoon for crops, says Dixit. “It is inevitable that they were affected.” The dates of the drought don’t match perfectly with the collapse, but Dixit says both are uncertain. The idea is credible because the results agree with data elsewhere, says Supriyo Chakraborty of the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology in Pune.

The journal article:

Dixit, Y., et al. February 24, 2014. Abrupt weakening of the summer monsoon in northwest India ~4100 years ago. Geology.

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Climate change impacts on energy, water, and land use in the U.S.

Hibbard, K., et al. 2014: Ch. 10: Energy, Water, and Land Use. Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program, 257-281.

http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/sectors/energy-water-and-land

[ Excerpts from this 25 page document, charts/tables: best to see original if you have time, this is a placeholder to make you aware it exists and whether you want to read the full article]

The links between and among energy, water, and land sectors mean that they are susceptible to cascading effects from one sector to the next.

An example is found in the drought and heat waves experienced across much of the U.S. during the summers of 2011 and 2012. In 2011, drought spread across the south-central U.S., causing a series of energy, water, and land impacts that demonstrate the connections among these sectors. Texans, for example, experienced the hottest and driest summer on record. Summer average temperatures were 5.2°F higher than normal, and precipitation was lower than previous records set in 1956. The associated heat wave, with temperatures above 100°F for 40 consecutive days, together with drought, strained the region’s energy and water resources.3,4,5 These extreme climate events resulted in cascading effects across energy, water, and land systems.

Extreme climate events result in cascading effects across energy, water, and land systems.

High temperatures caused increased demand for electricity for air conditioning, which corresponded to increased water withdrawal and consumption for electricity generation.

Heat, increased evaporation, drier soils, and lack of rain led to higher irrigation demands, which added stress on water resources required for energy production. At the same time, low-flowing and warmer rivers threatened to suspend power plant production in several locations, reducing the options for dealing with the concurrent increase in electricity demand.

The impacts on land resources and land use were dramatic. Drought reduced crop yields and affected livestock, costing Texas farmers and ranchers more than $5 billion, a 28% loss compared to average revenues of the previous four years.6 With increased feed costs, ranchers were forced to sell livestock at lower profit. Drought increased tree mortality,7 providing more fuel for record wildfires that burned 3.8 million acres (an area about the size of Connecticut) and destroyed 2,763 homes.8

The Texas example shows how energy, land, water, and weather interacted in one region. Extreme weather events may affect other regions differently, because of the relative vulnerability of energy, water, and land resources, linkages, and infrastructure. For example, sustained droughts in the Northwest will affect how water managers release water from reservoirs, which in turn will affect water deliveries for ecosystem services, irrigation, recreation, and hydropower. Further complicating matters, hydropower is increasingly being used to balance variable wind generation in the Northwest, and seasonal hydroelectric restrictions have already created challenges to fulfilling this role.

With electricity demands at all-time highs, water shortages threatened more than 3,000 megawatts of generating capacity – enough power to supply more than one million homes. 9

Competition for water also intensified. More than 16% of electricity production relied on cooling water from sources that shrank to historically low levels,9 and demands for water used to generate electricity competed with simultaneous demands for agriculture and other human activities.

Energy, land, water, and weather interactions are not limited to drought. For instance, 2011 also saw record flooding in the Mississippi basin. Floodwaters surrounded the Fort Calhoun nuclear power plant in Nebraska, shut down substations, and caused a wide range of energy, land, and water impacts (Ch. 3: Water).

GAS FRACKING: A typical shale gas well requires from two to four million gallons of water to drill and fracture (equivalent to the annual water use of 20 to 40 people in the U.S, or three to six Olympic-size swimming pools). The gas extraction industry has begun reusing water in order to lower this demand. However, with current technology, recycling water can require energy-intensive treatment, and becomes more difficult as salts and other contaminants build up in the water with each reuse.30 In regions where climate change leads to drier conditions, hydraulic fracturing could be vulnerable to climate change related reductions in water supply. The competition for water is expected to increase in the future. State and local water managers will need to assess how gas extraction competes with other priorities for water use, including electricity generation, irrigation, municipal supply, industry use, and livestock production, particularly in water-limited regions that are projected to, or become, significantly drier.

Utility-scale photovoltaic systems can require three to ten acres per megawatt (MW) of generating capacity32 and consume as much as five gallons of water per megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity production.

Utility-scale concentrating solar systems can require up to 15 acres per MW33 and consume 1,040 gallons of water per MWh34 using wet cooling (and 97% less water with dry cooling). The U.S. Department of Energy study concluded that 14% of the U.S. demand for electricity could be met with solar power by 2030.34 To generate that amount of solar power would require rooftop installations plus about 0.9 million to 2.7 million acres, equivalent to about 1% to 4% of the land area of Arizona, for utility-scale solar power systems and concentrating solar power (CSP). 34 Recognizing water limitations, most large-scale solar power systems now in planning or development are designed with dry cooling that relies on molten salt or other materials for heat transfer. However, while dry cooling systems reduce the need for water, they have lower plant thermal efficiencies, and therefore reduced production on hot days.35 Overall, as with other generation technologies, plant designs will have to carefully balance cost, operating issues, and water availability.

Biomass-based energy is currently the largest renewable energy source in the U.S., and biofuels from crops, grass, and trees are the fastest growing renewable domestic bioenergy sector.13 In 2011, approximately 40 million acres of cropland in the U.S. were used for ethanol production, roughly 16% of the land planted for the eight major field crops.37 Consumptive water use over the life cycle of corn-grain ethanol varies widely, from 15 gallons of water per gallon of gasoline equivalent for rain-fed corn-based ethanol in Ohio, to 1,500 gallons of water per gallon of gasoline equivalent for irrigated corn- based ethanol in New Mexico. In comparison, producing and refining petroleum-based fuels uses 1.9 to 6.6 gallons of water per gallon of gasoline.38,41

Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) substantially increases the cost of building and operating a power plant, both through up-front costs and additional energy use during operation (referred to as “parasitic loads” or an energy penalty). 46 Substantial amounts of water are also used to separate CO2 from emissions and to generate the required parasitic energy. With current technologies, CCS can increase water consumption 30% to 100%. 48 Gasification technologies, where coal or biomass are converted to gases and CO2 is separated before combustion, reduce the energy penalty and water requirements, but currently at higher capital costs.49

CCS facilities for electric power plants are currently operating at pilot scale. Although the potential opportunities are large, many uncertainties remain, including cost, demonstration at scale, environmental impacts, and what constitutes a safe, long-term geologic repository for sequestering carbon dioxide.51

A few of the many interesting figures to look at in the original:

Figure 10.4. U.S. regions differ in the manner and intensity with which they use, or have available, energy, water, and land. Water bars represent total water withdrawals in billions of gallons per day (except Alaska and Hawai’i, which are in millions of gallons per day); energy bars represent energy production for the region in 2012; and land represents land cover by type (green bars) or number of people (black and green bars). Only water withdrawals, not consumption, are shown (see Ch. 3: Water). Agricultural water withdrawals include irrigation, livestock, and aquaculture uses.

Figure 10.5 The top panel shows water withdrawals for various electricity production methods. Some methods, like most conventional nuclear power plants that use “once-through” cooling systems, require large water withdrawals but return most of that water to the source (usually rivers and streams). For nuclear plants, utilizing cooling ponds can dramatically reduce water withdrawal from streams and rivers, but increases the total amount of water consumed. Beyond large withdrawals, once-through cooling systems also affect the environment by trapping aquatic life in intake structures and by increasing the temperature of streams.18 Alternatively, once-through systems tend to operate at slightly better efficiencies than plants using other cooling systems. The bottom panel shows water consumption for various electricity production methods. Coal-powered plants using recirculating water systems have relatively low requirements for water withdrawals, but consume much more of that water, as it is turned into steam.

Figure 10.6. The figure shows illustrative projections for 2030 of the total land-use intensity associated with various electricity production methods. Estimates consider both the footprint of the power plant as well as land affected by energy extraction. There is a relatively large range in impacts across technologies.

Figure 10.9. In many parts of the country, competing demands for water create stress in local and regional watersheds. Map shows a “water supply stress index”

Figure 10.10. Agriculture is in yellow, forests are shades of green, shrublands are gray, and urban areas are in red. The river is used for hydropower generation,

 

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Clouds may not curb global warming as much as hoped for

The following article, Clouds Play Lesser Role in Curbing Warming, Study Finds, is from climatecentral.org

Analysis of the first seven years of data from a NASA cloud-monitoring mission suggests clouds are doing less to slow the warming of the planet than previously thought, and that temperatures may rise faster than expected as greenhouse gas pollution worsens — perhaps 25 percent faster.

Clouds can play an important role in slowing global warming by reflecting energy back into space. As temperatures rise, clouds contain more liquid water and fewer ice crystals, making them brighter, meaning they reflect more sunlight.

The new research, however, suggests climate models have overestimated how much ice is in clouds, meaning less is available to be converted to liquid as temperatures rise.

“When carbon dioxide concentrations and temperatures rise, then mixed-phase clouds will increase their liquid water content,” said Ivy Tan, a PhD candidate at Yale University who led the research, which investigated common clouds that contain both ice and water. “Many models are overestimating how much ice is in the mixed-phase clouds.”

The repercussions of the findings, which were published Thursday in Science, could make it harder to hold warming to limits set during recent United Nations climate negotiations

The coldest clouds are full of ice; the warmest are full of water. Modeling experiments by Tan and two other scientists focused on inbetweeners — mixed-phase clouds, such as undulating stratiform and fluffy stratocumulus clouds, which are abundant over the vast Southern Ocean and around the Northern Hemisphere north of New York.

For their study, the researchers used the NASA data to guide the modification of a popular earth model. They added more liquid and less ice to the clouds in their model simulations, striving to create more realistic conditions.

Because there was less ice, cloud brightness increased more slowly than it did in the unmodified model, since fewer ice crystals were replaced with reflective liquid as temperatures warmed.

One of climate science’s great quests is to project how much earth warms when carbon dioxide  concentrations double — something known as climate sensitivity. When carbon dioxide levels were doubled in the modified model, temperatures rose by at least a quarter more than they did when the unmodified model was used — to at least 5°C (9°F).

What the findings might actually mean for earth will depend heavily on how much carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases yet gets billowed into the atmosphere, and how quickly. But the discovery suggests impacts from climate change will be worse, and that they will get worse more quickly than earth models had previously indicated.

Isaac Held, a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration climate scientist, said he agreed with the researchers about the “the importance of getting the ice-liquid ratio in mixed-phase clouds right,” but he doesn’t agree that global climate models generally underestimate climate sensitivity.

Based on past observations, Held, who was not involved with the study, said the climate sensitivity of 5°C or more shown by the new research may be implausible.

“Admittedly, it is a rather high estimate, which may reflect the fact that the model used is already on the sensitive side,” said Mark Zelinka, a cloud modeling expert at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory who worked with Tan on the research. But, based on Zelinka’s interpretation of historical data, he said it “seems premature” to dismiss it as implausible.

Tan, meanwhile, said it would be a mistake to focus too closely on the exact number. The sensitivity result from the modeling experiments should be taken “with a grain of salt,” she said.

That’s because the study was based on a single model. A main point in conducting the experiments was to show that climate models contain a bias that could be corrected. The group hopes other scientists will conduct similar experiments using different models to help hone in on a more reliable measure of climate sensitivity.

Michael Mann, a meteorology professor at Penn State who was not involved with the study, said it’s “speculative” but “plausible” that global climate models have been underestimating climate sensitivity by assuming too much cloud glaciation.

“This is one of several recent studies that provide sobering evidence that earth’s climate sensitivity may lie in the upper end of the current uncertainty range,” Mann said in an email. “That means that avoiding dangerous 2°C warming might be an even greater challenge.”

The new findings underscore the urgency of taking steps to slash rates of greenhouse gas pollution, Mann said.

Carbon dioxide levels have risen more than 40 percent to 400 parts per million since before the Industrial Revolution, and they continue to rise at a hastening pace.

The increase in carbon dioxide levels recorded so far has played the most important role in pushing average global temperatures up by 1°C (1.8°F) during the last 200 years. That has worsened heat waves, floods and droughts, leading to record-breaking temperatures in 2014 and then again in 2015.

A U.N. pact negotiated in Paris in December set a goal for limiting warming to well below 2°C. Plans by the world’s biggest polluters to protect the climate, including China, the U.S. and Europe, however, so far fall well short of the measures needed to achieve that goal.

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Promoting soil health in agriculture at U.S. House hearing 2014

Consequences of degraded soils

Consequences of degraded soils

Preface.  At last, many years after I first published “Peak soil: Why biofuels destroy ecosystems and civilizations” in 2007, Congress had a hearing to educate House members on why preserving topsoil is so essential for food production for future generations.  But I see no legislation in 2022 to prepare the younger generations for a transition to smaller organic farms. Quite the opposite, we’re on the way to feudalism in the U.S.

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