Charles Hugh Smith: How To Find Shelter From The Coming Storms?

How To Find Shelter From The Coming Storms?

by Charles Hugh Smith

Some basic suggestions for those who are seeking shelter from the coming storms of global financial crisis and recession.

Reader Andy recently wrote: “I look forward to your blog each day but am still waiting for your ideas for surviving the coming crisis.” Andy reports that he and his wife have small government and private pensions, are debt-free and have simplified their lifestyle to survive the eventual depreciation of their pensions. They currently split their time between a low-cost site in North America and Mexico. They are considering moving with the goal of establishing roots in a small community of life-minded people.

Though I have covered my own ideas in detail in my various books (Survival+: Structuring Prosperity for Yourself and the Nation, An Unconventional Guide to Investing in Troubled Times, Why Things Are Falling Apart and What We Can Do About It and Get a Job, Build a Real Career and Defy a Bewildering Economy, I am happy to toss a few basic strategies into the ring for your consideration.

Let’s start by applauding Andy for getting so much right.

1. Don’t count on pensions maintaining their current purchasing power as the promises issued in previous eras are not sustainable going forward. I’ve addressed the reasons for this ad nauseam, but we can summarize the whole mess in four basic points:

A. Demographics. Two workers cannot support one retiree’s pensions and healthcare costs (skyrocketing everywhere as costly treatments expand along with the cohort of Baby Boomer retirees). The U.S. is already at a ratio of two full-time workers to one retiree, and this is during a “recovery.” the ratio in some European nations is heading toward 1.5-to-1 and the next global financial meltdown hasn’t even begun.

B. The exhaustion of the debt-based consumption model. The only way you can sustain a debt-based model of ever-expanding consumption is to drop interest rates to zero. But alas, lenders go broke at 0%, so either the system implodes as debtors default or lenders go bankrupt. Take your pick, the end-game of financial crisis and collapse is the same in either case.

C. Printing money out of thin air does not increase wealth, it only increases claims on existing wealth. An honest government will eventually default on its unsustainable promises; a dishonest government (the default setting everywhere) will print money to fund the promises until its currency loses purchasing power as a result of either inflation or some other flavor of currency crisis.

In other words, the dishonest government will still issue pension checks for $2,000 a month but a cup of coffee will cost $500–if anyone will take the currency at all.

D. Pensions funds are assuming absurdly unrealistic returns on their investments. Many large public pension plans are assuming long-term yields of 7.5% even as the yield on “safe” government bonds has declined to 3% or 4%. As a result, the pension fund managers have taken on staggering amounts of systemic risk as they reach for higher yields.

When the whole rotten house of cards (shadow banking, subprime everything, etc.) collapses in a stinking heap, the yields will be negative. As John Hussman has noted, asset bubbles simply bring forward all the returns from future years. Once the bubble pops, yields are substandard/negative for years or even decades.

Pension funds that earn negative yields for a few years will soon burn through their remaining capital paying out unrealistic pensions.

2. Lowering the cost of one’s lifestyle. It’s much easier to cut expenses than it is to earn more money or squeeze more yield out of capital.

3. Establishing roots in a community of like-minded people. Though it’s rarely mentioned in a culture obsessed with financial security, day-to-day security is based more on community than on central-state-issued cash–though this is often lost on those who have surrendered all sense of community in their dependency on the state.

The core of community is reciprocity: before you take, you first have to give or share. Free-riders are soon identified and shunned.

My suggestions are derived from this week’s entries on the inevitable popping of credit bubbles, the unenviable role of tax donkeys in funding corrupt state Castes and the Great Game of Elites acquiring essential resources with unlimited credit issued by central banks, leaving the 99% debt-serfs and/or tax donkeys with neither the income nor the credit to compete with Elites for real resources.

4. Lessen your dependence on anything that requires debt and assets bubbles for its survival. Whatever depends on expanding debt and asset bubbles for its survival will go away when credit/asset bubbles pop, which they always do, despite adamant claims that “this time it’s different.” It never is.

5. Control as many real resources as you can. These include water rights, energy-producing or conserving assets (solar arrays, geothermal heating/cooling systems, etc.), farmland, orchards and gardens, rental housing, and tools that you know how to use to make/repair essential assets such as transport, housing, equipment, etc.

6. It’s easier to conserve/not use something than it is to acquire it or pay for it. As resources rise in price, those who consume little will be far less impacted than those whose lifestyles requires massive consumption of gasoline, heating oil, electricity, water, etc. It’s as simple as this: don’t waste food, or anything else.

7. The easiest way to conserve energy and time is to live close to your work and to essential services/transport hubs. Those who reside in liveable city neighborhoods and towns with public transport and multiple modes of transport who can walk/bike to work, farmers markets, cafes, etc. will need far less fossil fuel than those commuting to everything via vehicle.

8. If you can’t find work/establish a livelihood, move to a locale with a better infrastructure of opportunity. I explain this in Get a Job, Build a Real Career and Defy a Bewildering Economy, but John Kenneth Galbraith made much the same point in his 1979 book The Nature of Mass Poverty.

9. If you buy property, do so in a state with Prop 13-type limits on property tax increases. We have no choice about being tax donkeys, but choose a state where income and consumption (i.e. sales tax) are taxed rather than property tax. You can choose to earn less and buy less, but you can’t choose not to pay rising property taxes.

10. Be useful to others. That way, they’ll want you around and will welcome your presence. There are unlimited ways to be helpful/useful.

11. Trust the network, not the state or corporation. Centralized systems such as the government and global corporations are either bankrupt and don’t yet know it or are bankrupt and are well aware of it but loathe to let the rest of the world catch on.

12. Be trustworthy. Don’t be morally corrupt or work for corrupt/self-serving institutions. Many initially idealistic people think they can retain their integrity while working for morally bankrupt, self-serving bureaucracies, agencies and corporations; they are all eventually brought down to the level of the institution.

Lagniappe suggestion: lead by example. “Setting an example is not the main means of influencing others; it is the only means.” Albert Einstein

Charles Hugh Smith from Of Two Minds

http://www.oftwominds.com/blogjuly14/shelter-storm7-14.html

Posted in Expert Advice | Comments Off on Charles Hugh Smith: How To Find Shelter From The Coming Storms?

David Fleming. 2007. The Lean Guide to Nuclear Energy. A Life-Cycle in Trouble

This is an easy to read 56-page primer on how nuclear reactors work, how ore is mined, nuclear fuel created, why there’s likely to be a supply crunch, and much more. I’ve extracted a small part of this article  and often rephrased some of it. Fleming doesn’t have many (high-quality) citations, so I’ve left out most of what he wrote since I’m not sure if he’s right about various matters (see the discussion at the end of this 2008 theoilddrum article by Fleming)

David Fleming . 2007. The Lean Guide to Nuclear Energy. A Life-Cycle in Trouble. www.theleaneconomyconnection.net  

Nuclear Waste

Nuclear power is a source of high-level waste which has to be sequestered. Every stage in the process produces waste, including the mining and leaching processes, the milling, the enrichment and the decommissioning. It is very expensive.

Deep reductions in travel and transport can be expected to come about rapidly and brutally as the oil market breaks down [from declining oil production, making disposal of the wastes less likely].

Nuclear energy relies on the existence of a fully powered-up grid system into which it can feed its output of electricity – but the grid itself is mainly powered by the electricity from mainly coal and gas-fueled power stations, so if coal or gas supplies were to be interrupted, the grid would (at least partially) close down, along with the nuclear reactors that feed into it;

Nuclear energy inevitably brings a sense of reassurance that, in the end, the technical fix will save us.  Which it can’t [since electricity doesn’t solve the liquid fuels crisis at hand, since mining and long-haul trucks, tractors, harvesters, and billions of other diesel powered equipment can’t be run on fuel cells or batteries].

The nuclear industry should focus on finding solutions to the whole of its waste problem before it becomes too late to do so. And hold it right there, because this is perhaps the moment to think about what “too late” might mean. Despite the emphasis placed on oil depletion in this booklet, it is climate change that may well set the final date for completion of the massive and non-negotiable task of dealing with nuclear waste. Many reactors are in low-lying areas in the path of rising seas; and many of the storage ponds, crowded with high-level waste, are close by. Estimated dates for steep rises in sea levels are constantly being brought forward (as of 2014 the latest projection is 1 meter by 2100 made much worse by storm surges best case, worst case is Antarctic or Greenland ice sheets slip off the land into the ocean).

With an angry climate, and whole populations on the move, it will be hard to find the energy, the funds, the skills and the orderly planning needed for a massive program of waste disposal – or even moving waste out of the way of rising tides. When outages in gas supplies lead to break down in electricity supplies, the electrical-powered cooling systems that cool high-level waste will stop working.

It will also be hard to stop ragged armies, scrambling for somewhere to live, looting spent fuel rods from unguarded dumps, attaching them to conventional explosives, and being prepared to use them. All this will have to be dealt-with, and at speed. There may be no time to wait for reactor cores and high-level wastes to cool down.

The task of making those wastes safe should be an unconditional priority, equal to that of confronting climate change itself. The default-strategy of seeding the world with radioactive time-bombs which will pollute the oceans and detonate at random intervals for thousands of years into the future, whether there are any human beings around to care about it or not, should be recognized as off any scale calibrated in terms other than dementia. Nuclear power is an energy source that causes trouble far beyond the scale of the energy it produces. It is a distraction from the need to face up to the coming energy gap.

How reactors work

Nuclear fission uses Uranium-235, an isotope of uranium that splits in half when struck by a neutron, producing more neutrons resulting in a chain reaction that produces lots of energy. The process is controlled by a moderator consisting of water or graphite, which speeds the reaction up, and by neutron-absorbing boron control rods, which slow it down. Eventually the uranium gets clogged with radioactive impurities such as the barium and krypton from uranium-235 decays, “transuranic” elements such as americium and neptunium, and much of the uranium-235 itself gets used up. It takes a year or two for this to happen, and then the fuel elements have to be removed, and fresh ones inserted. The spent fuel elements are very hot and radioactive (stand nearby for a second and you’re dead). In Europe the spent fuel is sometimes recycled (reprocessed), to extract the remaining uranium and plutonium and use them again, although you don’t get as much fuel back as you started with, the bulk of impurities still has to be disposed of, and other scientists believe this has a negative EROEI. Very few nations have anywhere safe to put it to keep future generations from harming themselves over the next billion years (the half-life of U-238, one of the main items of waste, is about 4.5 billion years).

The steps to get electricity from uranium

1. Mine and mill ore. Although uranium is found all over the world, only a few places have enough concentrated uranium ores (.01-.2%) to mine: Australia, Kazakhstan, Canada, South Africa, Namibia, Brazil, Russia, the USA, and Uzbekistan in mines up to 800 feet deep. Mines are injected and drenched in in tons of sulfuric acid, nitric acid, ammonia, and other chemicals and pumped up again after 3-25 years, yielding about a quarter of the uranium from the treated rocks and depositing unknown amounts of radioactive and toxic metals into the local environment. You need to grind up 1,000 tons of .1% ore to get 1 ton of yellow oxide and 999 tons of waste, both of which are radioactive from uranium-238 and 13 decay products. The waste takes up much more space after it has been mined, where wind and water can take radioactive waste far away. Properly cleaning it up would take 4 times the energy to mine the ore, so it seldom happens.

2. Preparing the fuel. The uranium oxide must now be enriched to concentrate U-235 to 3.5%, resulting in even more nasty, toxic, scary waste that isn’t properly disposed of. One of the wastes from this process is plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear bombs.

3. Generation. The fuel can now be used to produce heat to raise the steam to generate electricity. When the fuel rods are spent they must cool off to allow the isotopes to decay from 10 to 100 years before they can be disposed of elsewhere. The ponds need a reliable electricity supply to keep them stirred and topped up with water to stop the radioactive fuel elements drying out and catching fire. Then robots need to pack the wastes into lead, steel, and pure electrolytic copper, and put into giant geological repositories considered to be stable. There will never be an ideal way to store waste which will be radioactive for a thousand centuries or more and, whatever option is chosen, it will require a lot of energy.

Human Error. The consequences of a serious accident would make nuclear power an un-insurable risk. The nuclear industry has good safety systems but is not immune to accidents. The work is routine, requiring workers to cope with long periods of tedium punctuated by the unexpected, along with “normality-creep” as anomalies become familiar. The hazards were noted in the mid-1990s by a senior nuclear engineer working for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: “I believe in nuclear power but after seeing the NRC in action, I’m convinced a serious accident is not just likely, but inevitable… They’re asleep at the wheel.” The Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimates the probability of meltdown in the U.S. over 20 years is 15 to 45%. The risk never goes away.

4. Reactors last 30-40 years [but are being renewed for another 20 anyhow] but produce electricity at full power for no more than 24 years. During their lifetimes, reactors have to be maintained and (at least once) thoroughly refurbished; eventually, corrosion and intense radioactivity make them impossible to repair. At that point they must be taken apart and disposed of, resulting in at least a thousand cubic meters of high-level waste. After a cooling-off period which may be as much as 50-100 years, the reactor has to be dismantled and cut into small pieces to be packed in containers for final disposal. The total energy required for decommissioning has been estimated at approximately 50 percent more than the energy used in the original construction.

Greenhouse gases

Every stage in the life-cycle of nuclear fission uses energy, and most of this energy is derived from fossil fuels. Since we’re waiting for high-level waste to cool off before dismantling plants, the emissions look better now than they will in the future. And as ores get less concentrated, the carbon dioxide from mining will consume more fossil fuels and emit even more greenhouse gases.

Nuclear power may have a negative EROEI & Peak Uranium

Deposits are often at great depth, requiring the removal of massive overburden, or the development of very deep underground mines, require more energy to mine the resource than is required by the shallower mines now being exploited.

Water problems can reduce EROEI. You can have too little water (it is needed as part of the process of deriving uranium oxide from the ore) or too much (it can cause flooding). Some of the more promising mines have big water problems.

How much uranium with a positive EROEI is left? The Energy Watch group predicts Peak Uranium between 2020-2035. Michael Dittmar at the Institute of Particle Physics predicts Peak Uranium will happen in 2015. The 2005 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggested a 70 year supply at the current price.

Every year 65,000 tons of uranium are consumed in reactors worldwide. About 40,000 tons are supplied from uranium mines (which are declining in output), 10,000 tons comes from Russian nuclear weapons (contract for this expires in 2013), and 15,000 tons comes from inventories which won’t last much longer.

So the only hope to keep enough uranium in production for existing reactors is more mining. Several medium-sized producers have maintained or increased output the past few years in Kazakhstan, Namibia, Niger, Russia, America and Canada.

But the biggest hope for more uranium is from the Cigar Lake mine, but after catastrophic flooding in 2006, and again in 2008, it wasn’t until spring of 2014 that the mine finally started processing uranium ore. The other big hope was the Olympic Dam in Australia, which has the largest known single deposit of uranium in the world (but it’s very low-grade, with an average of .03%, and only economic because uranium is a byproduct of gold, silver, and copper mining.

Fleming predicts that before 2019 some nuclear reactors will have to shut down due to a lack of fuel.

Fleming goes to great lengths to explain why nuclear power won’t end up having a positive net energy in the future, mainly due to the tremendous amount of energy that will be needed to safely store the wastes that have been building up since the industry started back in the 1950s. (I believe it is highly unlikely we will ever store any of this waste because as oil declines, which 99% of transportation is fueled by, people will want to use oil to grow and transport food, pump drinking water, treat sewage, and so on — safely storing nuclear waste will be at the bottom of the list. This is an outrageous crime: we will poison millions of generations of our descendants, and add to the growing pile of dangers that might drive us extinct).

Fleming demolishes Lovelocks’ proposal to use nuclear power to get ourselves out of the energy and climate change mess. First he shows why Lovelock’s idea of getting uranium from granite won’t work – it’s such a low concentration (.0004%) and for a 1 GW plant, you’d need 100 million tons of granite ore requiring 650 petajoules to extract, yet the energy delivered from the uranium would only be 26 petajoules. The same negative energy return true of uranium from sea water.

Lovelock also urges that we have a readily-available stock of fuel in the plutonium that has been accumulated from the reactors that are shortly to be decommissioned. But this won’t work for many reasons, including that it’s never been attempted in reactors like those we have now. If Lovelock means for us to use a breeder reactor, that has huge problems as well (including that we don’t know how to do this safely yet). There are 3 fast-breeder reactors in the world: Beloyarsk-3 in Russia, Monju in Japan and Phénix in France; Monju and Phénix have long been out of operation; Beloyarsk is still operating, but it has never bred. Getting the plutonium to breed involves 3 processes that, like breeder reactors, have never been done at a commercial scale. You end up with many nasty radioactive mixtures that clog up and corrode equipment.   Even if you could figure out how to do build breeder reactors in 30 years and built 80 in 2045, it would take another 40 years for each breeder to produce enough plutonium to replace itself and start up another nuclear plant. By 2085 we will be deep into oil depletion, yet only have 160 breeder reactors. And that is all we will have, because the uranium-235 reactors we have now will be out of fuel by then.

It’s impossible to prevent accidents at a breeder reactor

A meltdown is nothing compared to the explosion of a breeder reactor, which is basically a large nuclear bomb in a major accident. If you designed a system that couldn’t fail, it would be so expensive you’d have to build an enormous breeder reactor to justify the cost, but such a large reactor would have such a huge dome that there is no material to give it enough structural strength to survive a major accident. You could try to make the defense system even more complex, but then the defense system would be more problem-prone than the breeder reactor itself. A study for the nuclear industry in Japan concludes: “A successful commercial breeder reactor must have 3 attributes: it must breed, it must be economical, and it must be safe. Although any one or two of these attributes can be achieved in isolation by proper design, the laws of physics apparently make it impossible to achieve all three simultaneously, no matter how clever the design.”

Phosphates

(A truly ridiculous idea — see Peak Phosphorous).  Phosphate reserves are likely to last at most for 70 years and they are essential for growing food. They’re also a poor source because they have very low concentrations of uranium. Extracting uranium is difficult, and results in greenhouse gases — the solvents used include toxic organophosphate compounds that result in organofluorophosphorus and greenhouse gases in the form of fluorohydrocarbons.

—————

David Fleming has an MA (History) from Oxford, an MBA from Cranfield and an MSc and PhD (Economics) from Birkbeck College, University of London. He has worked in industry, the financial services and environmental consultancy, and is a former Chairman of the Soil Association. He designed the system of Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs), (aka Domestic Tradable Quotas and Personal Carbon Allowances), in 1996, and his booklet about them, Energy and the Common Purpose, now in its third edition in this series, was first published 2005. His Lean Logic: The Book of Environmental Manners is forthcoming.

 

Posted in Nuclear Power Energy | 2 Comments

Michael Klare: Twenty-First-Century Energy Wars

Twenty-First-Century Energy Wars by Michael Klare, originally published by Tomdispatch

Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, South Sudan, Ukraine, the East and South China Seas: wherever you look, the world is aflame with new or intensifying conflicts.  At first glance, these upheavals appear to be independent events, driven by their own unique and idiosyncratic circumstances.  But look more closely and they share several key characteristics — notably, a witch’s brew of ethnic, religious, and national antagonisms that have been stirred to the boiling point by a fixation on energy.

In each of these conflicts, the fighting is driven in large part by the eruption of long-standing historic antagonisms among neighboring (often intermingled) tribes, sects, and peoples.  In Iraq and Syria, it is a clash among Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Turkmen, and others; in Nigeria, among Muslims, Christians, and assorted tribal groupings; in South Sudan, between the Dinka and Nuer; in Ukraine, between Ukrainian loyalists and Russian-speakers aligned with Moscow; in the East and South China Sea, among the Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Filipinos, and others.  It would be easy to attribute all this to age-old hatreds, as suggested by many analysts; but while such hostilities do help drive these conflicts, they are fueled by a most modern impulse as well: the desire to control valuable oil and natural gas assets.  Make no mistake about it, these are twenty-first-century energy wars.

It should surprise no one that energy plays such a significant role in these conflicts.  Oil and gas are, after all, the world’s most important and valuable commodities and constitute a major source of income for the governments and corporations that control their production and distribution.  Indeed, the governments of Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, South Sudan, and Syria derive the great bulk of their revenues from oil sales, while the major energy firms (many state-owned) exercise immense power in these and the other countries involved.  Whoever controls these states, or the oil- and gas-producing areas within them, also controls the collection and allocation of crucial revenues.  Despite the patina of historical enmities, many of these conflicts, then, are really struggles for control over the principal source of national income.

Moreover, we live in an energy-centric world where control over oil and gas resources (and their means of delivery) translates into geopolitical clout for some and economic vulnerability for others.  Because so many countries are dependent on energy imports, nations with surpluses to export — including Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, and South Sudan — often exercise disproportionate influence on the world stage.  What happens in these countries sometimes matters as much to the rest of us as to the people living in them, and so the risk of external involvement in their conflicts — whether in the form of direct intervention, arms transfers, the sending in of military advisers, or economic assistance — is greater than almost anywhere else.

The struggle over energy resources has been a conspicuous factor in many recent conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, the Gulf War of 1990-1991, and the Sudanese Civil War of 1983-2005.  On first glance, the fossil-fuel factor in the most recent outbreaks of tension and fighting may seem less evident.  But look more closely and you’ll see that each of these conflicts is, at heart, an energy war.

Iraq, Syria, and ISIS

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Sunni extremist group that controls large chunks of western Syria and northern Iraq, is a well-armed militia intent on creating an Islamic caliphate in the areas it controls.  In some respects, it is a fanatical, sectarian religious organization, seeking to reproduce the pure, uncorrupted piety of the early Islamic era.  At the same time, it is engaged in a conventional nation-building project, seeking to create a fully functioning state with all its attributes.

As the United States learned to its dismay in Iraq and Afghanistan, nation-building is expensive: institutions must be created and financed, armies recruited and paid, weapons and fuel procured, and infrastructure maintained.  Without oil (or some other lucrative source of income), ISIS could never hope to accomplish its ambitious goals.  However, as it now occupies key oil-producing areas of Syria and oil-refining facilities in Iraq, it is in a unique position to do so.  Oil, then, is absolutely essential to the organization’s grand strategy.

Syria was never a major oil producer, but its prewar production of some 400,000 barrels per day did provide the regime of Bashar al-Assad with a major source of income.  Now, most of the country’s oil fields are under the control of rebel groups, including ISIS, the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, and local Kurdish militias.  Although production from the fields has dropped significantly, enough is being extracted and sold through various clandestine channels to provide the rebels with income and operating funds.  “Syria is an oil country and has resources, but in the past they were all stolen by the regime,” said Abu Nizar, an anti-government activist.  “Now they are being stolen by those who are profiting from the revolution.”

At first, many rebel groups were involved in these extractive activities, but since January, when it assumed control of Raqqa, the capital of the province of that name, ISIS has been the dominant player in the oil fields.  In addition, it has seized fields in neighboring Deir al-Zour Province along the Iraq border.  Indeed, many of the U.S.-supplied weapons it acquired from the fleeing Iraqi army after its recent drive into Mosul and other northern Iraqi cities have been moved into Deir al-Zour to help in the organization’s campaign to take full control of the region.  In Iraq, ISIS is fighting to gain control over Iraq’s largest refinery at Baiji in the central part of the country.

It appears that ISIS sells oil from the fields it controls to shadowy middlemen who in turn arrange for its transport — mostly by tanker trucks — to buyers in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.  These sales are said to provide the organization with the funds needed to pay its troops and acquire its vast stockpiles of arms and ammunition.  Many observers also claim that ISIS is selling oil to the Assad regime in return for immunity from government air strikes of the sort being launched against other rebel groups.  “Many locals in Raqqa accuse ISIS of collaborating with the Syrian regime,” a Kurdish journalist, Sirwan Kajjo, reported in early June.  “Locals say that while other rebel groups in Raqqa have been under attack by regime air strikes on a regular basis, ISIS headquarters have not once been attacked.”

However the present fighting in northern Iraq plays out, it is obvious that there, too, oil is a central factor.  ISIS seeks both to deny petroleum supplies and oil revenue to the Baghdad government and to bolster its own coffers, enhancing its capacity for nation-building and further military advances.  At the same time, the Kurds and various Sunni tribes — some allied with ISIS — want control over oil fields located in the areas under their control and a greater share of the nation’s oil wealth.

Ukraine, the Crimea, and Russia

The present crisis in Ukraine began in November 2013 when President Viktor Yanukovych repudiated an agreement for closer economic and political ties with the European Union (EU), opting instead for closer ties with Russia.  That act touched off fierce anti-government protests in Kiev and eventually led to Yanukovych’s flight from the capital.  With Moscow’s principal ally pushed from the scene and pro-EU forces in control of the capital, Russian President Vladimir Putin moved to seize control of the Crimea and foment a separatist drive in eastern Ukraine.  For both sides, the resulting struggle has been about political legitimacy and national identity — but as in other recent conflicts, it has also been about energy.

Ukraine is not itself a significant energy producer.  It is, however, a major transit route for the delivery of Russian natural gas to Europe.  According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Europe obtained 30% of its gas from Russia in 2013 — most of it from the state-controlled gas giant Gazprom — and approximately half of this was transported by pipelines crossing Ukraine.  As a result, that country plays a critical role in the complex energy relationship between Europe and Russia, one that has proved incredibly lucrative for the shadowy elites and oligarchswho control the flow of gas, whille at the same time provoking intense controversy. Disputes over the price Ukraine pays for its own imports of Russian gas twice provoked a cutoff in deliveries by Gazprom, leading to diminished supplies in Europe as well.

Given this background, it is not surprising that a key objective of the “association agreement” between the EU and Ukraine that was repudiated by Yanukovych (and has now been signed by the new Ukrainian government) calls for the extension of EU energy rules to Ukraine’s energy system — essentially eliminating the cozy deals between Ukrainian elites and Gazprom.  By entering into the agreement, EU officials claim, Ukraine will begin “a process of approximating its energy legislation to the EU norms and standards, thus facilitating internal market reforms.”

Russian leaders have many reasons to despise the association agreement.  For one thing, it will move Ukraine, a country on its border, into a closer political and economic embrace with the West.  Of special concern, however, are the provisions about energy, given Russia’s economic reliance on gas sales to Europe — not to mention the threat they pose to the personal fortunes of well-connected Russian elites.  In late2013 Yanukovych came under immense pressure from Vladimir Putin to turn his back on the EU and agree instead to an economic union with Russia and Belarus, an arrangement that would have protected the privileged status of elites in both countries.  However, by moving in this direction, Yanukovych put a bright spotlight on the crony politics that had long plaguedUkraine’s energy system, thereby triggering protests in Kiev’s Independence Square (the Maidan) — that led to his downfall.

Once the protests began, a cascade of events led to the current standoff, with the Crimea in Russian hands, large parts of the east under the control of pro-Russian separatists, and the rump western areas moving ever closer to the EU.  In this ongoing struggle, identity politics has come to play a prominent role, with leaders on all sides appealing to national and ethnic loyalties.  Energy, nevertheless, remains a major factor in the equation.  Gazprom has repeatedly raised the price it charges Ukraine for its imports of natural gas, and on June 16th cut off its supply entirely, claiming non-payment for past deliveries.  A day later, an explosion damaged one of the main pipelines carrying Russian gas to Ukraine — an event still being investigated.  Negotiations over the gas price remain a major issue in the ongoing negotiations between Ukraine’s newly elected president, Petro Poroshenko, and Vladimir Putin.

Energy also played a key role in Russia’s determination to take the Crimea by military means.  By annexing that region, Russia virtually doubled the offshore territory it controls in the Black Sea, which is thought to house billions of barrels of oil and vast reserves of natural gas.  Prior to the crisis, several Western oil firms, including ExxonMobil, were negotiating with Ukraine for access to those reserves.  Now, they will be negotiating with Moscow.  “It’s a big deal,” said Carol Saivetz, a Eurasian expert at MIT.  “It deprives Ukraine of the possibility of developing these resources and gives them to Russia.”

Nigeria and South Sudan

The conflicts in South Sudan and Nigeria are distinctive in many respects, yet both share a key common factor: widespread anger and distrust towards government officials who have become wealthy, corrupt, and autocratic thanks to access to abundant oil revenues.

In Nigeria, the insurgent group Boko Haram is fighting to overthrow the existing political system and establish a puritanical, Muslim-ruled state.  Although most Nigerians decry the group’s violent methods (including the kidnapping of hundreds of teenage girls from a state-run school), it has drawn strength from disgust in the poverty-stricken northern part of the country with the corruption-riddledcentral government in distant Abuja, the capital.

Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, pumping out some 2.5 million barrels per day.  With oil selling at around $100 per barrel, this represents a potentially staggering source of wealth for the nation, even after the private companies involved in the day-to-day extractive operations take their share.  Were these revenues — estimated in the tens of billions of dollars per year — used to spur development and improve the lot of the population, Nigeria could be a great beacon of hope for Africa.  Instead, much of the money disappears into the pockets (and foreign bank accounts) of Nigeria’s well-connected elites.

In February, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Lamido Sanusi, told a parliamentary investigating committee that the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) had failed to transfer some $20 billion in proceeds from oil sales to the national treasury, as required by law.  It had all evidently been diverted to private accounts.  “A substantial amount of money has gone,” he told the New York Times.  “I wasn’t just talking about numbers.  I showed it was a scam.”

For many Nigerians — a majority of whom subsist on less than $2 per day — the corruption in Abuja, when combined with the wanton brutality of the government’s security forces, is a source of abiding anger and resentment, generating recruits for insurgent groups like Boko Haram and winning them begrudging admiration.  “They know well the frustration that would drive someone to take up arms against the state,” said National Geographic reporter James Verini of people he interviewed in battle-scarred areas of northern Nigeria.  At this stage, the government has displayed zero capacity to overcome the insurgency, while its ineptitude and heavy-handed military tactics have only further alienated ordinary Nigerians.

The conflict in South Sudan has different roots, but shares a common link to energy.  Indeed, the very formation of South Sudan is a product of oil politics.  A civil war in Sudan that lasted from 1955 to 1972 only ended when the Muslim-dominated government in the north agreed to grant more autonomy to the peoples of the southern part of the country, largely practitioners of traditional African religions or Christianity.  However, when oil was discovered in the south, the rulers of northern Sudan repudiated many of their earlier promises and sought to gain control over the oil fields, sparking a second civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 2005.  An estimated two million people lost their lives in this round of fighting.  In the end, the south was granted full autonomy and the right to vote on secession.  Following a January 2011 referendum in which 98.8% of southerners voted to secede, the country became independent on that July 9th.

The new state had barely been established, however, when conflict with the north over its oil resumed.  While South Sudan has a plethora of oil, the only pipeline allowing the country to export its energy stretches across North Sudan to the Red Sea.  This ensured that the south would be dependent on the north for the major source of government revenues.  Furious at the loss of the fields, the northerners charged excessively high rates for transporting the oil, precipitating a cutoff in oil deliveries by the south and sporadic violence along the two countries’ still-disputed border.  Finally, in August 2012, the two sides agreed to a formula for sharing the wealth and the flow of oil resumed. Fighting has, however, continued in certain border areas controlled by the north but populated by groups linked to the south.

With the flow of oil income assured, the leader of South Sudan, President Salva Kiir, sought to consolidate his control over the country and all those oil revenues.  Claiming an imminent coup attempt by his rivals, led by Vice President Riek Machar, he disbanded his multiethnic government on July 24, 2013, and began arresting allies of Machar.  The resulting power struggle quickly turned into an ethnic civil war, with the kin of President Kiir, a Dinka, battling members of the Nuer group, of which Machar is a member.  Despite several attempts to negotiate a cease-fire, fighting has been under way since December, with thousands of people killed and hundreds of thousands forced to flee their homes.

As in Syria and Iraq, much of the fighting in South Sudan has centered around the vital oil fields, with both sides determined to control them and collect the revenues they generate.  As of March, while still under government control, the Paloch field in Upper Nile State was producing some 150,000 barrels a day, worth about $15 million to the government and participating oil companies.  The rebel forces, led by former Vice President Machar, are trying to seize those fields to deny this revenue to the government.  “The presence of forces loyal to Salva Kiir in Paloch, to buy more arms to kill our people… is not acceptable to us,” Machar said in April.  “We want to take control of the oil field.  It’s our oil.”  As of now, the field remains in government hands, with rebel forces reportedly making gains in the vicinity.

The South China Sea

In both the East China and South China seas, China and its neighbors claim assorted atolls and islands that sit astride vast undersea oil and gas reserves.  The waters of both have been the site of recurring naval clashes over the past few years, with the South China Sea recently grabbing the spotlight. 

An energy-rich offshoot of the western Pacific, that sea, long a focus of contention, is rimmed by China, Vietnam, the island of Borneo, and the Philippine Islands.  Tensions peaked in May when the Chinese deployed their largest deep-water drilling rig, the HD-981, in waters claimed by Vietnam.  Once in the drilling area, about 120 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam, the Chinese surrounded the HD-981 with a large flotilla of navy and coast guard ships.  When Vietnamese coast guard vessels attempted to penetrate this defensive ring in an effort to drive off the rig, they were rammed by Chinese ships and pummeled by water cannon.  No lives have yet been lost in these encounters, but anti-Chinese rioting in Vietnam in response to the sea-borne encroachment left several dead and the clashes at sea are expected to continue for several months until the Chinese move the rig to another (possibly equally contested) location.

The riots and clashes sparked by the deployment of HD-981 have been driven in large part by nationalism and resentment over past humiliations.  The Chinese, insisting that various tiny islands in the South China Sea were once ruled by their country, still seek to overcome the territorial losses and humiliations they suffered at the hands the Western powers and Imperial Japan.  The Vietnamese, long accustomed to Chinese invasions, seek to protect what they view as their sovereign territory.  For common citizens in both countries, demonstrating resolve in the dispute is a matter of national pride.

But to view the Chinese drive in the South China Sea as a simple matter of nationalistic impulses would be a mistake.  The owner of HD-981, the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), has conducted extensive seismic testing in the disputed area and evidently believes there is a large reservoir of energy there.  “The South China Sea is estimated to have 23 billion tonsto 30 billion tons of oil and 16 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, accounting for one-third of China’s total oil and gas resources,” the Chinese news agency Xinhua noted.  Moreover, China announced in June that it was deploying a second drilling rig to the contested waters of the South China Sea, this time at the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin.

As the world’s biggest consumer of energy, China is desperate to acquire fresh fossil fuel supplies wherever it can.  Although its leaders are prepared to make increasingly large purchases of African, Russian, and Middle Eastern oil and gas to satisfy the nation’s growing energy requirements, they not surprisingly prefer to develop and exploit domestic supplies.  For them, the South China Sea is not a “foreign” source of energy but a Chinese one, and they appear determined to use whatever means necessary to secure it.  Because other countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, also seek to exploit these oil and gas reserves, further clashes, at increasing levels of violence, seem almost inevitable.

No End to Fighting

As these conflicts and others like them suggest, fighting for control over key energy assets or the distribution of oil revenues is a critical factor in most contemporary warfare.  While ethnic and religious divisions may provide the political and ideological fuel for these battles, it is the potential for mammoth oil profits that keeps the struggles alive.  Without the promise of such resources, many of these conflicts would eventually die out for lack of funds to buy arms and pay troops.  So long as the oil keeps flowing, however, the belligerents have both the means and incentive to keep fighting.

In a fossil-fuel world, control over oil and gas reserves is an essential component of national power.  “Oil fuels more than automobiles and airplanes,” Robert Ebel of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told a State Department audience in 2002.  “Oil fuels military power, national treasuries, and international politics.”  Far more than an ordinary trade commodity, “it is a determinant of well being, of national security, and international power for those who possess this vital resource, and the converse for those who do not.”

If anything, that’s even truer today, and as energy wars expand, the truth of this will only become more evident.  In our present world, if you see a conflict developing, look for the energy.  It’ll be there somewhere on this fossil-fueled planet of ours.

Posted in War | Comments Off on Michael Klare: Twenty-First-Century Energy Wars

David Korowicz: Catastrophic shocks through complex socio-economic systems

David Korowicz. 2013. Catastrophic Shocks through Complex Socio-Economic Systems.

The globalized economy has become more complex (connectivity, interdependence, and speed), delocalized, with increasing concentration within critical systems. This has made us all more vulnerable to systemic shocks. This paper provides an overview of the effect of a major pandemic on the operation of complex socio-economic systems using some simple models. It discusses the links between initial pandemic absenteeism and supply-chain contagion, and the evolution and rate of shock propagation. It discusses systemic collapse and the difficulties of re-booting socio-economic systems.

1. A New Age of Risk

Consider the following scenarios:

  • A highly contagious pandemic outbreak in South-East Asia (of comparable or greater human impact than the 1918 influenza outbreak) .
  • A disorderly break-up of the Eurozone and global financial system implosion.
  • A “perfect storm” during a time of major global financial instability – there are terrorist attacks on North African oil installations (partially driven by social unrest arising from record food prices) & a category 5 hurricane hits a major population/ industrial/ oil producing regions of the US east coast.

These are all examples of potential global shocks, that is hazards that could drive fast and severe cascading impacts mediated through global systems. Global systems include telecommunications networks; financial and banking networks; trade networks; and critical infrastructure networks. These systems are themselves highly interdependent and together form part of the globalized economy.

One of the primary issues for this paper are, given any significant hazard, how does the impact spread through the globalized economy and in what way are we vulnerable to the failure of interconnected systems. To answer this we need to understand how complex societies are connected and how they have changed over time. The globalized economy is an example of a complex adaptive system that dynamically links people, goods, factories, services, institutions and commodities across the globe.

The state is characterized by exponential growth in Gross World Product of about 3.5% per annum over nearly 200 years within a range of several percentage points. This had correlated with emergent and self-organizing growth in socio-economic complexity which is reflected in the growth of the:

  • Number of interacting parts (nodes): This includes exponential population growth; the 50,000+ different items available in Wal-Mart; the 6 billion+ digitally connected devices; the number of cars, factories, power plants, mines and so on.
  • Number of linkages (edges): This includes the 3 billion passengers traveling between 4000 airports on over 50 million flights each year; the 60,000 cargo ships moving between 5000 ports with about a million ship movements a year; the average number of media channels (internet sites, TV channels, twitter feeds) per person times the population; and the billions of daily financial transactions.
  • Levels of interdependence between nodes: The growing number of inputs necessary to make a good, service, livelihood, infrastructural output or the function of society as a whole.
  • The speed of processes (or time compression) :This includes the increasing speed of financial transactions; transportation; digital signaling; and Just-In-Time logistics. If we consider the globalized economy as a form of singular organism, we can understand this process as an increasing metabolic rate.
  • Efficiency: increasing competition and global trade arbitrage driving down inventories; and globalized economies of scale.
  • Concentration: The emergence of ʻhubsʼ within the globalized economy- a small number of very highly connected nodes whose function (or loss of function) have a disproportionate role in the operation of the globalized economy . For example, banks are not connected at random to other banks, rather a very small number of large banks are highly connected with lots of other banks, who have few connections to each other. These arrangements are sometimes known as scale-free networks. We can also see concentration in critical infrastructure, and trade networks.
  • De-localization: The conditions of personal welfare; business or service output; or countryʼs economic output is smeared over the whole globalized economy. The corollary is that if there is a major failure of the systems integration in the globalized economy, a localized community may have extreme difficulties meeting its basic needs.

Economic and complexity growth have in many ways reduced risk. Localized agricultural failure once risked famine in isolated subsistence communities, but now such risk is spread globally. It has made critical infrastructure such as sewage treatment and clean water available and affordable. Global financial markets enable an array of risks, from home insurance and pensions to default risk and export credit insurance, to be dispersed and potential volatility reduced. Indeed, what is remarkable is just how reliable our complex society is given the number of time sensitive inter-connections.

Another way of saying all this is that our society is very resilient, within certain bounds, to a huge range interruptions in the flow of goods and services. Within those bounds our society is self-stabilizing. For example supply-chain shocks from the Japanese tsunami in 2011, the eruption of the Icelandic Eyjafjallajokull volcano in 2010 or the UK fuel blockades in 2000 all had severe localized effects in addition to shutting down some factories across the world as supply-chains were interrupted. However the impacts did not spread and amplify, and normal functioning of the local economy quickly resumed.

But we know from many complex systems in nature and society that a system can rapidly shift from one state to another as a threshold is crossed (Scheffer 2009). One way a state shift can occur is when a shock drives the system out of its stability bounds. The form of those stability bounds can increase or decrease resilience to shocks depending upon whether the system is already stressed prior to the shock.

The commonalities of global integration mean that diverse hazards may lead to common shock consequences. The systems that transmit shocks are also the systems we depend upon for our welfare and the operation of businesses, institutions and society, so to borrow Marshal McLuhanʼs phrase, the medium is the message. One of the primary consequences of a generic shock is an interruption in the flow of goods and services in the economy. This has diverse and profound implications – including food security crises, business shut-downs, critical infrastructure risks and social crises. This can in turn quickly destroy forward looking confidence in an economy with major consequences for financial and monetary stability which depend ultimately on the collateral of real economic production. More generally it can entail multi-network and de-localized cascading failure leading to a collapse in societal complexity.

Previously the dynamics of such a scenario was studied when the initial shock was caused by a systemic banking collapse and monetary shock. This coupled the exchange of goods and services causing financial system supply-chain cross contagion and a re-enforcing cascade of de-localizing multi-system risk (Korowicz 2012). In this paper a similar methodology is used to look at the socio-economic implications of a major pandemic.

2. Socio-economic Impact of a Major Pandemic

We are interested in the socio-economic implications of a major influenza pandemic whose initial impact would be direct absenteeism from illness and death, and absenteeism for family and prophylactic reasons. The pandemic wave (we will only consider one) lasts 10-15 weeks. We assume this causes an absenteeism rate of 20% or 40% over the peak period of 2-4 weeks, and a rate above 20% for 4-8 weeks when the peak is 40%. This represents our initial impact. Our question is then what happens next.

Some key personnel that might not show up for work are in health care, shipping / train / truck drivers, (and I’ve read elsewhere that the electric grid might fail if key workers don’t show up because they’re afraid of catching something at work, and that would bring ALL systems down).

how a health service would manage a pandemic when its own operation is compromised

3. Vulnerability Revealed

One way to understand complex socio-economic systems is to study occasions when there has been some systemic failure. In September 2000 truckers in the United Kingdom, angry at rising diesel duties, blockaded refineries and fuel distribution outlets. Consequences:

a)      The petrol stations reliance on Just-In-Time re-supply meant the impact was rapid. Within 2 days about half of the petrol stations had run out of fuel and supplies to industry and utilities had begun to be severely affected.

b)     People couldn’t get to work and businesses could not be re-supplied.

c)      Supermarkets had begun to run out of food

d)     Large parts of the manufacturing sector were about to shut down

e)      Hospitals began to offer emergency only care

f)       Automatic cash machines could not be re-supplied

g)      The postal service was severely affected.

h)      There was panic buying at supermarkets and petrol stations.

i)        It was estimated that after the first day an average 10% of national output was lost. Surprisingly, at the height of the disruption, commercial truck traffic on the UK road network was only 10-12% below average values. There were clear indications that had the fuel blockades gone on just a few days longer large parts of UK manufacturing including the automotive, defense and steel industries would have had to shut down.

Failure of production or supply from one area can shut down factories on the other side of the world within days of the initial interruption as was seen in the 2010 Icelandic volcano eruption in 2010 and the 2011 Japanese tsunami and Thai flooding.

A report from the think-tank Chatham House on the impacts of the Icelandic volcano and subsequent interviews with businesses about its impact and their preparedness came to the general conclusion: “One week seems to be the maximum tolerance of a Just-In-Time economy”…..before major shut-downs in business and industries would occur, and things would not just return to normal afterwards. … many businesses said that had the disruption continued just a few days longer, it would have taken at least a month for companies to recover” And a quote from a desk study on the impact of a one week long absence of (just) trucks in the UK economy, things would not just return to normal (McKinnon 2006): “..After a week, the country would be plunged into a deep social and economic crisis. It would take several weeks for most production and distribution systems to recover”

The studies do not consider what would happen if the primary disruption were to continue for many weeks.

4. Interdependence, Liebigʼs law, and Cascading

One of the defining features of rising complexity is growing interdependence. Now, the output of a person, service provider, factory, piece of critical infrastructure, etc., depends upon ever more inputs, be they tools, intermediate products, consumables, specialist skills and knowledge or collective societal infrastructures. And those outputs in turn become further inputs through the dispersed networks of the globalized economy.

Some of the least substitutable critical inputs are labeled hubs. Hubs are things like electricity, fuel, water, and financial system functionality – things generally referred to as critical infrastructure. They are societal services and functions upon which all society depends.

A simple but important principle, Liebig ʼs Law of the Minimum, says that the production is constrained by the scarcest critical input. So even if you have ample supplies of all but one critical input, your production fails. That is, production fails on the weakest link.

This explains why the most exposed businesses to supply-chain failure are the most complex businesses. First they have some of the most inputs (making a car can mean assembling up to 15,000 components). Second, they have more inputs are very complex and specialized, and so cannot be easily substituted. Alternative production lines might not be available or take months to re-engineer or specialist skills may be in limited supply. Thus, auto and electronics manufacturers were some of the most affected by the Icelandic volcano, the Japanese tsunami and the Thai flooding in 2011. What Liebig ʼs law shows is that you do not need to lose everything to stop a business, service or function or society – just the right bit. This helps to explain why a loss of only 10-12% of commercial vehicles had such a big impact during the fuel blockades in the U.K. As our economies have become more complex we have been adding more inputs into our lives, goods and services, and the functioning of our societies. More of these are critical with low substitutability.

Let us now apply Liebig’s law to pandemic absenteeism. The people affected by a pandemic are part of the supply of inputs to any systems function. There may be many people contributing to one output of a business, service or function. We assume that most employees are either unnecessary for the period of the pandemic, can telecommute, or are easily substituted. But there is a smaller number of sub-functional roles occupied most likely by those with specialist skills who are critical with low substitutability. If any one of them is unavailable, the sub-functional role fails and with that, the output of the whole organization/ function.

With the loss of this output good or service (especially if it is critical with low substitutability) other businesses and services may be affected potentially causing cascading affects through complex socioeconomic networks as a whole.

5. Time and Cascading Failure

There is always a level of absenteeism and a percentage of goods and services that can’t be delivered for whatever reason. The reason you don’t have supply-chain contagion spreading with every problem is that complex societies are efficient at finding alternative suppliers, and some inventories are carried to help when there is a hiatus. Also, most factories don’t produce very critical things or there is lots of substitutability. One won’t miss a brand of toothpaste in the supermarket when there are 20 brands available.

To initiate a cascading failure:

1)      It has to be large scale, i.e. from a major hub failure or large enough absenteeism.

2)      The function needs to be central, like the electric grid, financial system, or pandemic that keeps people from going to work. All of these are critically connected to other parts of a socio-economic network. Thus the effects of a pandemic or hub failure in a weakly connected country, Mali say, would be unlikely to spread supply-chain failure widely. Thus we can conclude that there might be point above which supply-chain contagion takes off, and below which the society is still operational and recovery can occur. This point depends upon the initial pandemic absenteeism rate and the societies complexity at the epicenter of the pandemic.

A simple model of supply-chain failure can be based upon the idea that the more supply-chains are disrupted or infected, the greater the chance that further supply-chains will be infected

6. External Cross-Network Contagion

Imagine a pandemic outbreak occurs in South-East Asia. The main vectors through which a shock could propagate outside the region are pandemic contagion, financial system contagion, and supply-chain contagion.

We would expect the shock to spread at different rates (banking shock could travel faster than supply-chain contagion because the operational speed of the financial system is greater than the inventory turn-over time).

Some countries’ role in trade is far more important to the globalized economy than others. The more important the initially impacted region is, the greater is the likelihood of spreading supply-chain contagion globally. Kali measured countries’ influence on global trade, not only by trade volumes, but the influence a country has on the global trading system. They used an Importance Index to rank their influence. For example, they find that Thailand, which was at the center of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis ranked 22nd in terms of global trade share, but 11th on their level of importance. In another study, Garas used an epidemic model to look at the potential any country had to spread a crisis. One of their data sets is based upon international trade in 2007. It uses a measure of centrality to identify countries with the power to spread a crisis via their level of trade integration. Like the previous paper, the centrality in the network does not necessarily correspond to those countries with the highest trade volumes. There are 12 inner core countries, which are listed in no particular order are: China, Russia, Japan, Spain, UK, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Belgium-Luxembourg, USA, and France.

Hidalgo used international trade data to look at two things – the diversity of products a country produces, and the exclusivity of what they produce. An exclusive product is something made by few other countries. Most countries in the world are non- diversified and make standard products. The most complex countries are diversified and make more exclusive products. More exclusive products have less substitutability.

Financial system contagion outside the initially impacted region could be through banking networks, the bond market, the shadow banking system, currency volatility and confidence. Again the structure of financial networks and the centrality of the region with respect to financial assets and liabilities would determine the extent of any shock.

More broadly, if an economy was shattered, and its forward looking viability looked both precarious and uncertain one would expect a collapse in the value of a country’s currency. Rather than helping exports (which would be very little because the economy’s productive capacity had collapsed), it would hinder imports of emergency supplies and make debt in external currencies much more difficult to service. The economic damage and reduced economic prospects may then cause tightened credit conditions, spiraling bond yields and systemic bank failure.

There are also issues that are most pertinent for more complex societies. We imagine that after a pandemic wave people are again available for work. But people cannot however become productive immediately because other inputs are also needed. But those inputs are stalled because they rely upon other inputs and so on. More broadly we may define Recursion failure as: “the inability of a complex economy to easily resume production and trade after a significant collapse because in a complex and interdependent economy, production and trade must resume in order for production and trade to resume”.

Further, even if a government wanted to rebuild, it may be too complex to orchestrate resumption from the top down. This is because the economy has evolved by self-organization. Nobody ever put its elements together in the first place. And even if it could be done, the systems of command, control and supply that might do it would be the very systems that had been undermined. Over time entropy would become an issue as engines rust, reagents become contaminated and expected maintenance and repairs left undone. This would all add to the cost and inputs needed for resumption.

The longer a socio-economic system spends in the critical regime, the more likely it is to undergo a complete systemic collapse and loss of basic function. In addition, the longer it spends in this state, the more difficult it may be to ever return to its pre-pandemic state. This is a complex society’s equivalent of a heart attack. When a person has a heart attack, there is a brief period during which CPR can revive the person. But beyond a certain point when there has been cascading failure in co-dependent life support systems, the person cannot be revived. This means that the socioeconomic system could be changed irretrievably and the job of society and government would be to both manage the crisis and plot a fundamentally different path.

To make the systems we depend upon more resilient ideally we would want more redundancy within critical systems and weaker coupling between them.

Localization and de-complexification of basic needs (food, water, waste etc) would provide some societal resilience if systems resilience was lost. We would have more buffering at all levels, that is, larger inventories throughout society. All this is the very opposite of the direction of economic forces.

The reason we have such tight inventories, tight coupling, and concentration in critical infrastructure is they bring efficiency and competitive advantage. But when something goes wrong, this makes recovery harder. For example, during super-storm Sandy, fuel shortages were exacerbated by low inventories that were the direct result of cost cutting arising from the financial crisis.

We are locked into socio-economic processes that are at an increasingly complex that make us ever more vulnerable. Increasing vulnerability coupled with increasing hazard mean that the risk of a major socio-economic collapse is rising.

Because a permanent state shift could occur, planning needs to consider how to deal with non-reversion to pre-shock conditions.

Posted in David Korowicz, Stages of | 1 Comment

From Wood (10,000 BC to 1750) to coal (1750-1920) to Oil, Natural Gas, & Electricity to What?

Cutler J. Cleveland . Energy Quality, Net Energy, and the Coming Energy Transition.  Department of Geography and Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Boston University

The level of health, food security and especially material standard of living that exists today throughout the world is made possible by the expansive use of fossil fuels. While many take this affluence for granted, a long run view illustrates that the fossil fuel era is relatively new and will last for a relatively short period of time. For thousands of years prior to the Industrial Revolution, human societies were powered by the products of photosynthesis, principally fuel wood and charcoal. Widespread use of coal did not develop until the 18th century, oil and gas not until the late 19th century.

In 1800, the nation was fueled by animal feed, which powered the draft animals on farms, and wood — used for domestic heating and cooking and by early industry.

Wood and animal feed rapidly disappeared when coal became the dominant fuel, the latter due to the introduction of the first tractor in 1911.

The Industrial Revolution transformed the nation’s energy picture, substituting coal for wood on a massive scale.

By the time of World War I, coal accounted for nearly 75% of energy use. But coal’s place as the dominant fuel was fleeting as well.

Oil and natural gas quickly replaced coal, just as coal had replaced wood.

By the 1960s, oil and gas together accounted for more than 70% of total energy use; coal had dropped to less than 20%. Primary electricity has played a small but steadily growing role. Primary electricity refers to electricity generated by hydroelectric, nuclear, geothermal, solar, and other so-called “primary sources. The increase in the share of primary electricity towards the end of the period is due to the rise in nuclear generating capacity.

This long run view of energy raises an important question: what guided these transitions in the past, and to what extent can such information inform us about the impending transition from fossil to renewable fuels?

The transition from one major energy system to the next is driven by a combination of energetic, economic, technological and institutional factors. The energy-related forces stem from the tremendous economic and social opportunities that new fuels, and their associated energy converters, offered compared to earlier ones.

Energy plays a critical role in nature.

All organisms must use energy to perform a number of life-sustaining tasks such as growth, reproduction, and defense from predators. The most fundamental task of all is using energy to obtain more energy from the environment. When energy is used to do useful work, energy is degraded from a useful, high quality state to a less useful low quality state. This means that all systems must continuously replace that energy they use, and to do so takes energy.

This fundamental reality means that Energy Returned on Invested (EROI) and net energy are used to explain the foraging behavior of organisms, the distribution and abundance of organisms and the structure and functioning of ecosystems

For the overwhelming majority of their existence, humans obtained energy from the environment by hunting and gathering.

The EROI for food capture is the caloric value of the food capture to the expenditure of energy in the capture or gathering process.

Natural ecosystems produce enough edible food energy to support hunter-gatherers at densities no greater than one person per square kilometer. Traditional agricultural societies support hundreds of people square kilometer, enabling permanent settlements to grow in size and number. The greater surplus released labor from the land, creating the potential for people to move to urban areas and work in manufacturing and industry.

The economic usefulness of an energy converter is determined in part by its power, the rate at which it converts energy to do useful work.

Humans and draft animals convert energy to work at low power outputs. The energetic limits of people and draft animals set very definite economic and social limits.

The Industrial Revolution erased these limits with the introduction of the steam engine, which had a power output that dwarfed that of muscle power.

The higher power output of the steam engine enabled it to deliver a much large energy surplus than human labor or draft animals.

Given the economic advantage offered by heat engines powered by fossil fuels, it is no surprise that labor and draft animals we rapidly replaced by heat engines once they became available.

The United States’ economy illustrates this transition. In 1850, more than 90% of the work done in the economy was accomplished by human labor and draft animals.

Over the next half-century, engines powered by wood and then coal rapidly displaced the animate converters.

By the 1950s, labor and animals had almost been completely displaced. Of the economic changes driven by the new fuels and machines, one of the most dramatic was the effect on labor productivity. In agriculture, for example, the productivity of labor increased more than 100-fold relative to rates possible prior to the Industrial Revolution. This increase in labor productivity reduced the need for farm labor and workers moved to industrial jobs.

How strong is the connection between energy use and economic growth?

One hypothesis is that the link is weak.  This is because it’s assumed that as fossil fuels become scarcer, their price will rise, which in turn will trigger technological changes and substitutions that improve energy efficiency. Indeed, many believe that the price shocks in 1973-74 and 1979-80 led to the adoption of many new energy efficient technologies. Second, the shift to a service-oriented, dot-com economy will de-couple energy use from economic activity. A dollar’s worth of steel requires 93,000 Btu to produce in the United States; a dollar’s worth of financial services uses 9,500 Btu. Thus, it stands to reason that a shift towards less-energy intensive activities will reduce the need for energy.

A second hypothesis is that the connection between energy use and economic output is strong.   The heat equivalent of a fuel is just one of the attributes of the fuel and ignores the context in which the fuel is used, and thus cannot explain, for example, why a thermal equivalent of oil is more useful in many tasks than is a heat equivalent of coal.

Because of the variation in attributes among energy types, the various fuels and electricity are less than perfectly substitutable in production or consumption. For example, a Btu of coal is not perfectly substitutable with a Btu of electricity; since the electricity is cleaner, lighter, and of higher quality, most people are willing to pay a premium price per Btu of electricity.

Consider incoming solar energy. The land area of the lower 48 United States intercepts 500 times of the nation’s annual energy use. But that energy is spread over nearly 3 million square miles of land, so that the energy absorbed per unit area is very small. Plants, on average, capture only about 0.1% of the solar energy reaching the Earth. This means that the actual plant biomass production in the United States is very small (compared to the overall incoming solar energy).

Power density combines two attributes of energy sources: the rate at which energy can be produced from the source and the geographic area covered by the source. A coal mine in China, for example, can produce upwards of 10,000 watts per square meter of the mine. As the above examples indicate most solar technologies have low power densities compared to fossil fuels.

A low energy and power density means that large amounts of capital, labor, energy and materials must be used to collect, concentrate and deliver solar energy to users.

This makes them more expensive than fossil fuels. The difference between solar and fossil energy is best represented but their energy return on investment (EROI). The EROI for fossil fuels tends to be large while that for solar tends to be low. This is the principal reason that humans aggressively developed fossil fuels in the first place. Fossil fuels have allowed us develop lifestyles that also are very energy intensive. The places that we live, work and shop have very high power densities. Supermarkets, office buildings and private residences in industrial nations demand huge amounts of energy. This very energy-intensive way of living, working, and playing have been made possible by fossil fuels sources that are equally as concentrated. Another quality difference between renewable fuels and fossil fuels is their energy density: the quantity of energy contained per unit mass of a fuel. For example, wood contains 15 Mj per kilogram; oil contains up to 44 Mj per kilogram.

Conclusion

Among the countless technologies humans have developed, only two have increased our power over the environment in an essential way.

Georgescu-Roegen called these Promethean technologies. Promethean I was fire, unique because it was a qualitative conversion of energy (chemical to thermal) and because it generates a chain reaction that sustains so long as sufficient fuel is forthcoming. The mastery of fire enabled man not only to keep warm and cook the food, but, above all to smelt and forge metals, and to bake bricks, ceramics, and lime. No wonder that the ancient Greeks attributed to Prometheus (a demigod, not a mortal) the bringing of fire to us.

Promethean II was the heat engine. Like fire, heat engines achieve a qualitative conversion of energy (heat into mechanical work), and they sustain a chain reaction process by supplying surplus energy. Surplus energy or (net energy) is the gross energy extracted less the energy used in the extraction process itself. The Promethean nature of fossil fuels is due to the much larger surplus they deliver compared to muscle energy from draft animals or human labor.

The energy surplus delivered by fossil fuel technologies is the energetic basis of the Industrial Revolution.

 

Posted in Wood | 2 Comments

Increasing population + declining fossil fuels = less population

[ This essay looks at the human footprint on the planet, how it grew so large, the problems it causes, and the consequences.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts:  KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity]

Now that oil, coal, and natural gas are at peak production or will be soon, how can any rational person argue there’s no need for birth control and less immigration with 5 of the 7 billion humans alive due to fossil fuels?

Not only that, we’re driving other species extinct now that we’re using up three-quarters of the Earth’s land:

  • 1%     Urban and infrastructure
  • 11.7%  Cropland
  • 26.8%  Forestry
  • 36%     Livestock grazing. 20% of all animal biomass on the planet (UNFAO 2006).

The 24.5% that we aren’t using is:

  • 12.5%  Rocky, desert, or covered with snow
  • 7.4%    Unproductive arctic and alpine tundra, grasslands
  • 4.6%    pristine forests, including boreal and tropical rainforests
Source: (Erb, 2009 – doesn’t include Greenland or Antarctica)

A Litany of Evils caused by overpopulation and immigration

  • Aquifer depletion, especially northwestern India, northern and western China, northern Mexico, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and Syria
  • Climate change
  • Climate refugees: New Orleans among the first climate refugees – soon those in London, New York, Washington, Miami, Shanghai, Kolkata, Cairo and Tokyo will join them.
  • Storms from higher surface water temperatures in Central America, the Caribbean, the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the USA, East and Southeast Asia, japan, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and Bangladesh.
  • Desertification. Expanding deserts include the Sahara into Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The Sahelian is moving southward into Nigeria. Deserts are forcing migrations in Iran, Brazil, and Mexico. The expansion of deserts in China has accelerated since 1950. 24,000 villages have been abandoned partially or entirely. The Gobi desert grew as much as half of Pennsylvania in just 5 years and is within 150 miles of Beijing. The 1930s dust bowl forced 2 million people to leave Oklahoma, Texas and Kansas. As the Ogalalla aquifer continues to deplete, the conditions for even larger dust bowls grows more likely.
  • Extinction
  • Invasive species
  • Pollution refugees: Love canal, Times Beach Missouri, Chernobyl area, cancer villages in China, Fukushima
  • Rising oceans
  • Water shortages
  • Toxic pollutants in local environments
  • Wildlands lost, wildlife habitat fragmented, converted to farmland, reservoirs, power lines, roads, mines, logging, overgrazing, bottom trawling, urban sprawl

What’s at stake: 5 billion people dying, starvation, disease, Genocide and madness on the scale of the Nazis, Rwandan Hutu-Tutsi, North Korea, Mao, Stalin, nuclear war, chaos, and endless wars.

Feeding the next 3 billion means cutting down the remaining forests, and unprecedented biodiversity destruction as we take over what few bits of wild remain and replace them with soil-eroding, aquifer guzzling, toxic pesticide polluting crops. Most scientists don’t think we can sustain the 7 billion we have now, ten billion is a sick fantasy.

One reason not even 7 billion can survive much longer is that we’re mining topsoil to grow enormous amounts of food now.  This has always been a factor in the fall of civilizations in the past, it just took them longer to destroy their soil in the past (on average 1500 years) because they didn’t have mega-horsepower tractors to compact and till the soil so it could wash and blow away within 100-200 years.  Soil erosion is happening 17 times faster than new soil is being formed on 90% of farmland (IUGS 2013).  Future generations simply won’t be able to grow as much food.

Population growth relentlessly destroys past environmental victories.

A wild river that was once saved gets dammed. A freeway that was once prevented is built, ripping apart the ecosystem and tight-knit neighborhoods.

A million acres of prime farmland in America is paved over by sprawl every year

2.2 million acres if you include wild land.  Who benefits? Developers and businesses that can pay cheap wages.

Overpopulation was caused by coal, oil, and natural gas

Fossil fuels allowed up to agricultural intensification and equally important — the ability to harvest, preserve, and deliver food before it spoiled in myriad ways:

  1. Iron made with coal rather than charcoal is what launched the industrial revolution and made combustion engines, tractors, vehicles, etc., possible
  2. Trains delivering food to inland areas of famine and later trucks that could deliver food and other essential goods anywhere
  3. Up to five times as much food grown with Haber Bosch nitrogen natural-gas fertilizers
  4. Public Health – clean water and food (i.e. sewage and water treatment, etc., raised average lifespans far more than medicine and continues to do so)
  5. Container ships, above all, made globalization possible (Levinson). America now imports half of its food.

Fossil Fuels have allowed us to go way past carrying capacity

Since the 1980s we’ve been using about 1.5 Earths by burning vast troves of oil, coal, and natural gas. This energy allowed us to go way beyond our carrying capacity by intensifying agriculture and using up resources that would have otherwise been preserved for future generations.

There are many other reasons why population went up

  • Wanting children is a biological drive
  • Abortions and birth control were hard to come by
  • Capitalism depends on endless growth
  • Religious leaders depend on endless growth of worshippers to amass power and wealth
  • Before oil-based weapons systems, the largest army was the most likely victor
  • Political, military, business (especially real estate) leaders want more voters, the largest armies, and more consumers which leads to abortions being banned and birth control hard to come by
  • Humans don’t think very well, see my list of “Over 250 cognitive biases, fallacies and more” at energyskeptic, or read Carol Tavris’s book “Mistakes Were Made But Not by Me: Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, & Hurtful Acts”
  • It is taboo to be realistic. Reality-based talk is labeled pessimism and dismissed. Happy endings to Hollywood movies, lack of critical thinking skills and science in schools, and other cultural factors in America have taken this “must always be optimistic” to such a crazy level that “Positive Thinking” ought to be in the DSM-5. Some good books to read: Ehrenreich’s “Bright-sided: How the Relentless Promotion of Positive Thinking Has Undermined America” and Kuntsler’s “Too Much Magic: Wishful Thinking, Technology, and the Fate of the Nation”
  • The business need to make products break so more products could be sold led to a much earlier peak of resources. Read Slade’s “Made to Break Technology and Obsolescence in America”.
  • Even people who were aware of “The State Of The World” had children, hoping that “The Scientists Would Come Up With Something”.
  • We live in the moment. Today. People have a hard time imagining they’ll be hungry tomorrow after a large meal. Even if you could convince people that times would be hard decades ahead, that would not be a strong enough reason to refrain from having kids.

America could have stayed below 200 million

Several systems ecologists have estimated that the carrying capacity of the United States without fossil fuels is somewhere between 100 and 250 million people.  How do we get from over 317 million to 100 million in less than 20-30 years?  It’s already too late for no immigration or one-child per woman to do the trick, but still, both of these would help a bit.

Limiting our population in America would have a huge impact.

Americans consume 5 times as much as the average person, so 317 million Americans is the same as 1.58 billion Chinese.

Exponential Growth: Sustainability Impossible

Above all, if the concept of exponential growth had been taught in schools, or explained by journalists and environmental groups, Americans would be more willing to have fewer children.

Here’s how Albert Bartlett explains it: “The growth in one doubling time is greater than the total growth during all the preceding doubling times”.  For instance, oil production. Over 100 years world oil production grew 7% per year. That’s 10 doublings which means 1970 oil production was a thousand times more than in 1870. So every decade, more oil was produced than in all preceding decades.

Similarly, with each doubling of population, we cause as much destruction as all of the preceding doublings.

It took 5,000 years for population to double from 1 to 2 million people between 20 and 15 thousand years ago at a rate of almost zero growth. But it only took 37 years to go from 2 to 4 billion between 1930 and 1976. Now, 37 years later, we haven’t quite doubled, but we’re close — 7.13 billion. The rate of population growth has gone down very slightly, but the rate is still exponential, and orders of magnitude larger than the almost zero rate for most of human history.

Global population grew at a 1.6% compound rate from 1970 to 2010. So if  there were 15 million people 13,500 years ago, we’d have over a google of people now at a 1.6% compound rate.  A google has 100 zeros.

Once Upon a Time, people understood population mattered

1963 President Johnson told the United Nations that “five dollars invested in population control is worth 100 dollars invested in economic growth” (Erlich 1970)

1968 President Eisenhower: “once as president, I thought and said that birth control was not the business of our Federal Government. The facts changed my mind…I have come to believe that the populatin explosion is the world’s most critical problem.”

1976 Gallup poll: 84% said they didn’t want more people in the United States (Hays). The population was 200 million back then.

The consequences: If journalists and environmental groups had kept population issues and awareness in print we more than half of the American people wouldn’t have to die of starvation, disease, or war in less than a generation (that’s how Mother Nature solves overpopulation).

The consequences: Sprawl and consequent lower carrying capacity

Sprawl is one of the largest environmental problems in America and world-wide. It increases energy and water consumption, air pollution, and destroys wildlife. In the USA between 1982 and 2001 we lost 34,000,000 acres of forest, cropland, and pasture to development, an area the size of Illinois.

Posted in Peak Food, Population | Tagged , , | 2 Comments

Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System. National Academy of Sciences.

Much of what follows is from the National Academy of Science 2012  (for the Department of Homeland Security): “Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System& 2013 “The Resilience of the Electric Power Delivery System in Response to Terrorism and Natural Disasters”

cyberattack electric grid intruder knowledge

Average intruder knowledge and attack sophistication as a function of time. SOURCE: Presented at the workshop by Patricia Hoffman, Department of Energy, February 27, 2013; from Howard Lipson, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Software Engineering Institute CERT®. Copyright 1998-2011.

Introduction

Electricity is ubiquitous, reliable, and taken for granted . . . until the lights go out. Our modern society is almost totally dependent on electrical systems. Electricity is essential to the U.S. economy and way of life. The National Academy of Engineering called the grid the world’s largest integrated machine and a central part of the greatest engineering achievement of the 20th century.

Continue reading

Posted in Electric Grid & EMP Electromagnetic Pulse | 1 Comment

Sandra Postel: Wildfires in the Western U.S. Threaten Drinking Water

Sandra Postel. May 1, 2014. Wildfires in the Western U.S. Are on the Rise, Posing Threats to Drinking Water

When the Las Conchas Fire scorched some 151,000 acres of northern New Mexico in 2011, it wasn’t just the direct fire damage that was cause for worry.
Striking as it did in the midst of a persistent drought, but just before summer “monsoon” rains, the Las Conchas – the largest blaze in New Mexico’s recorded history – set in motion the one-two-three punch of drought, fire and flood that much of the western United States has seen all-too frequently in recent years.
As the intense rains pounded burned-out watersheds, peak floods poured through the Jemez Mountain canyons pushing tree trunks, boulders and tons of blackened soil down to the valleys below.   Soon after, to avoid the high costs of de-clogging equipment and treating sediment-laden river water, the Albuquerque drinking water utility cut its intake from the Rio Grande by half – and tapped more groundwater to make up the deficit.
With new research showing that fires in the western United States are getting larger and more frequent, water managers need to mitigate the impacts of fire in their source watersheds, as well as prepare for the consequences.
In a study published online in the journal Geophysical Research Letters, Philip E. Dennison of the University of Utah and colleagues analyzed a database of large wildfires (those greater than 1,000 acres, or 405 hectares) in the western United States over the period 1984-2011 and found a significant increase in the number of large fires and/or the area covered by such fires.
Specifically, in the region stretching from Nebraska to California, the number of large wildfires increased by a rate of seven per year over the 28 years of study, and the total area burned by these fires increased at a rate of nearly 90,000 acres a year – an area the size of Las Vegas.
“We looked at the probability that increases of this magnitude could be random, and in each case it was less than one percent,” Dennison said.
For their analysis, Dennison and his team used satellite data from the Monitoring Trends in Burn Severity Project, which is supported by the US Forest Service and the US Geological Survey.
The team also found a correlation between increased fire activity and increased drought severity.
Those regions expected to be most affected by climate changes, especially more intense droughts, showed the greatest increase in fire activity, including the Rocky Mountains, the Arizona-New Mexico mountains, the southwestern desert region, and western Texas.

A satellite image of the 2011 Las Conchas Fire in New Mexico

For water managers, the new research is a clarion call to begin action now to safeguard water supplies originating in watersheds prone to fire. 
Fires are natural and beneficial to forested watersheds.  But for many decades, firefighters focused on protecting people and property have squelched even small fires that would do the important work of cleansing the forest floor and thinning trees to healthy densities.
As a result, many forests have accumulated an excess of  “fuel,” so when a fire ignites– whether from a natural cause, such as a lightening strike or a human one, such as a campfire – the forest is primed to burn rapidly, increasing the potential for a mega-fire like Las Conchas.  Drought only adds to the favorable fire conditions.
Partly in response to the damage wildfires have inflicted downstream, a few pioneering water suppliers are taking a proactive approach to addressing wildfires’ costs and risks to drinking water sources.
After the 2002 Hayman Fire, Denver Water faced a reservoir cleanup and infrastructure repair bill upwards of $30 million. Rather than pay such a steep price over and over again, Denver Water is investing $16.5 million to match the Forest Service’s investment in thinning ponderosa pine stands, cutting trees killed by pine beetle infestations, and generally rehabilitating the watershed critical to Denver’s water supply.
Likewise, Santa Fe, New Mexico, has embarked on watershed protection measures to safeguard against wildfires in the Santa Fe National Forest (SFNF).  In partnership with the Nature Conservancy and the US Forest Service, Santa Fe has established a water fund to help pay for restoration efforts in the 17,520 acres of the forested watershed that supplies about 40 percent of the city’s drinking water. (Some 88% of that forestland is in the SFNF, and half of that is located in the Pecos Wilderness, where forest thinning is not allowed.)
Such partnerships between municipalities and the Forest Service would seem to offer great potential to mitigate the risks of fire to downstream water supplies while simultaneously reducing the costs of both fire-fighting and water treatment.
Collectively, the national forests are part of more than 3,000 municipal watersheds that supply 60 million Americans with drinking water.
The Nature Conservancy, building on its watershed protection work in Latin American, has also been instrumental in forming the Rio Grande Water Fund in New Mexico.  The fund aims to generate sustainable financing for a 10-30 year program of large-scale watershed restoration to avoid more impacts like those caused by the Las Conchas Fire.
Recognizing that adequate supplies of clean water are critical to the health of the local economy, a number of businesses – including Lowe’s, PNM (the state’s largest electricity provider) and Wells Fargo – are contributing to the water fund.
With wildfire activity increasing across the western United States, more partnerships like these to proactively improve watershed health are a crucial line of defense to safeguard our drinking water.

Originally published at National Geographic Newswatch.

Posted in Wildfire | Comments Off on Sandra Postel: Wildfires in the Western U.S. Threaten Drinking Water

Richard Duncan : Olduvai Gorge – Civilization ends when Electric Grids Permanently Fail

The Olduvai Theory – Heading into the Gorge

By Richard C. Duncan, Ph.D. Volume 23, Number 2 (Winter 2013)

Summary: The Olduvai Theory is defined as the ratio of world energy production and population. It states that average energy production per capita will decline to its 1930 level by 2030. Collapse will be strongly correlated with an “epidemic” of blackouts around the globe. This warning has come from scientists for more than a century, but it is still disallowed in Washington, D.C. A back-to-the-land movement has emerged and is accelerating.1

In a previous paper for The Social Contract, I focused on the Olduvai Theory.

[See the articles:
The Olduvai Theory
The Olduvai Theory: Terminal Decline Imminent
The Olduvai Theory – Toward Re-Equalizing the World Standard of Living
America: A Frog in the Kettle Slowly Coming to a Boil.]

This raises the following question: Where will the Olduvai die-off occur? Answer: Everywhere.

Large cities will be the most dangerous places to reside when the electric grids permanently fail. Therein millions of people are packed in high-rise buildings, surrounded by acres and acres of blacktop and concrete: no electricity, no work, and no food.

The Olduvai Theory is defined by the ratio of world energy production and population ( e).… It states that energy production per capita will fall to its 1930 value by 2030, thus giving industrial civilization a lifetime of less than or equal to 100 years. The theory projects that the collapse will be strongly correlated with an epidemic of blackouts worldwide.

Urban areas will rapidly depopulate when the power grids die. In fact the danger zones are already mapped out. Specifically: The big cities stand out as brightly lighted areas on NASA’s satellite mosaic, The Earth at Night. These planetary lights blare out “beware,” “warning,” “danger.” The likes of Baltimore-to-Boston, London and Paris, Brussels-to-Berlin, Bombay and Hong Kong and Osaka-to-Tokyo are all unsustainable hot spots.2

Let there be light

All primary sources of energy are essential to modern civilization. The Olduvai Theory however focuses on a secondary source, namely electric power. And visible proof of its global importance is confirmed by NASA’s composite display of Earthlights at Night.2

tsc_23_2_duncan_1.gif

Figure 1. Earthlights at Night: Chicago, New York, etc.The above image shows the lights of Chicago near the upper left corner and those of New York City near the upper right, plus many cities to the south, including Baltimore and Washington, D.C.3

The solar basis

Electromagnetic energy was, is, and always will be fundamental to all life on this or any other planet. Many millions of years ago the incoming solar rays “nourished” microorganisms (protists) whose bodies ultimately morphed into the fossil fuels: coal, petroleum and natural gas. Then about 150 years ago we learned how to turn fossil fuels back into electromagnetic energy. Enter a boy named Tom.

Thomas Alva Edison (1847-1931, USA)

In 1882 Thomas Edison’s Pearl Street Station in New York was the forerunner of global electrification. (3) An artist’s rendition of Edison’s station appears on the Web.4

… Thomas Edison was more responsible than any one else for creating the modern world… No one did more to shape the physical/cultural makeup of present day civilization… Accordingly, he was the most influential figure of the millennium.

The benefits of electric power were immediately obvious:

Electricity was good for more than just light and transit. Cheap, plentiful electricity would attract industries, jobs and prosperity. City Light isn’t just a utility; it’s a “city builder.”5

Henry Adams (1838-1918, USA)

Henry Adams was Chairman of the Department of History at Harvard University for six years and a celebrated resident of Washington, D.C. His lifelong goal was to discover a succinct law of history. It was at the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893 — the campus blazing with electric light — where he hypothesized, “Incandescent lighting and electric power will soon destroy industrial civilization.”

The new American — the child of incalculable coal power, electric power, and radiating energy, as well as of new forces yet undetermined — must be a sort of god compared with any former creation of nature.… The new forces would educate…. The law of acceleration was definite…. No scheme could be suggested to the new American, and no fault needed to be found, or complaint made; but the next great influx of new forces seemed near at hand, and its style of education promised to be violently coercive.… Forces totally new would accelerate society into chaos and ruin.6

Fred Hoyle (1915-2001, UK)Sir Fred Hoyle in 1963 gave a series of lectures wherein he stated:

It has often been said that, if the human species fails to make a go of it here on the Earth, some other species will take over the running. In the sense of developing intelligence this is not correct. We have, or soon will have, exhausted the necessary physical prerequisites so far as the planet is concerned. With coal gone, oil gone, high-grade metallic ores gone, no species however competent can make the long climb from primitive conditions to high-level technology. This is a one-shot affair. If we fail, this planetary system fails so far as intelligence is concerned.… (p. 64)

If the world population is not stabilized… nothing but pain and grief will follow. The future will then indeed be based on our cries of agony. (p. 69)

Roberto Vacca (Italy)

Roberto Vacca is a member of the Club of Rome. His book, The Coming Dark Age, theorizes that industrial nations are increasingly at risk because of their dependence on complex and sensitive systems such as the electric power grids.

Such critical situations as I have described [e.g., blackouts] develop gradually, and are contributory prerequisites of graver crises that will come more precipitately. These are our real interest and concern, for they will be an integral part of that ultimate avalanche of a breakdown, which will initiate a new dark age. (p. 65)

And yet the probability that a crisis is on the way is strong and growing stronger in all great cities where people are densely congregated. … (p. 132)

Urban crisis will not be exclusive to New York; that particular megalopolis serves as our example of what will occur in every great metropolitan city. On the other hand, the vivid events here foreshadowed would not produce The Dark Age overnight; they would be, rather, the germinal beginning, disintegrating agent — of a profound breakdown of society and of civilization itself, as we know it.… (p. 137)7

Jay W. Forrester (USA)

Dr. Jay Forrester in 1971, at the request of The Club of Rome, built a world model “to understand the options available to mankind as societies enter the transition from growth to equilibrium.”

What happens when growth approaches fixed limits and is forced to give way to some form of equilibrium? We need have no fear that population will continue to rise forever.… If man does not take conscious action to limit population and capital investment, the forces inherent in the natural and social system will rise high enough to limit growth.… (p. 68)

Our greatest challenge now [i.e., in 1971] is how to handle the transition from growth into equilibrium. … The folklore and the success stories praise growth and expansion. But that is not the path to the future.… (p. 112)

Dr. Forrester didn’t include the possibility of urban blackouts in the standard run of his model. Nonetheless, even without blackouts, the world population peaked in year 2023 and then declined by 28 percent in 2100. (Fig. 4-1, p. 70). In contrast, with blackouts the world population would likely decline by considerably more than 28 percent in 2100.

Picture the Olduvai Theory

I graphed the Olduvai Theory in 2001 by a steep upside curve, followed by a bumpy “plateau,” then a brief “slide,” and finally a steep “cliff,” reproduced in Figure 3.

tsc_23_2_duncan_3.gif

The curve from 1920 to 1999 is historic data, so that still stands. But the forecast from 2001 to 2011 is wrong because the value of energy per capita rose to 12.83 in 2011. However the Olduvai cliff remains at year 2012 as overpopulation, global warming, national bankruptcies, blackouts, etc. strike wide and deep.8Dennis Meadows (USA)

Dr. Meadows in 1972 was one of the authors of The Limits to Growth. Therein he stated that there is still time for “the transition from growth to global equilibrium.” But now he sees things differently:

In so far as I can tell, people who use the term [sustainability] mean, essentially, that this would be a phase of development where they get to keep what they have but all the poor people can catch up. Or, they get to keep doing what they’ve been doing, but through the magic of technology they are going to cause less damage to the environment and use fewer resources. Either way you use the term, it is just a fantasy.

It has probably been only in the last four or five years that it has become really clear to me that we just haven’t got a chance of dealing with these issues in any kind of orderly way. … Limits to Growth is absolutely focusing on a bubble, a bubble in population and in material and energy consumption. …

Theoretically, resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb shocks and to continue functioning. … I am talking about coping with the permanent loss of cheap energy or the permanent change in our climate and what we can do at the individual, the household, the community, and the national level to ensure that … we will be able to pass through that period still taking care of our basic needs.

Walter Youngquist (USA)

Dr. Youngquist is a geologist who has worked abroad and traveled in more than 70 countries where he studied the vital relationship of Earth resources to nations and populations. In January 2012, he noted:

I think your view of the future of electricity is very prescient — in that the scale of things is beyond what can be coped with — and blackouts are increasingly the mode in the United States, but already evident elsewhere.

The use of electricity defines civilization, as we know it today almost as much as is the use of oil.

Things continue to come apart everywhere —famine in Africa because of too many people for a beaten-up environment to support, government debt rising in Europe and here as all the industrialized countries are living beyond their means. Frugality will arrive whether people like it or not. I see one statement saying that the U.S. standard of living has been in decline for several years. It can only get worse. Also we are making (and importing) people faster than we are making jobs. … The unemployment rate will never get back to the previous 5 percent. So what does government do to handle the unemployed? Spend more money it doesn’t have to support a standard of living that cannot be supported. Social upheavals are ahead for sure.

We just don’t have the resources on this finite Earth to sustain people in the lifestyles they have now — much less for those who would like to achieve that lifestyle.

Chaos is ahead as populations face a future of LESS.

And in May he continued:

Over history austerity has been the NORM. Recent prosperity for a few of us cannot last.

The world in general faces more austere times — a future of less!!! When the Greeks had to face it they rioted — to no avail. Many such social upheavals are to come as more and more people divide up declining and degrading resources. Roots of troubles are ahead as population rockets up to 10 billion—I cannot visualize that world!

Colin J. Campbell (Ireland)

Dr. Campbell is a petroleum geologist and in February he spoke on the past and the future.

We have now passed the first decade of the Twenty-First Century and may again face radical changes. The success of the last Century has severely depleted the resources of the Planet, especially its critical energy supplies, suggesting that the Industrial Age has passed its peak to face contraction…

Looking ahead, it is evident that we enter the Second Half of the Oil Age, when this critical energy supply that fuels the modern world, including its military engagements, declines from natural depletion. Today, some 60 billion barrels of petroleum a year…support a population of 7 billion people, but by 2050 the supply will be sufficient to support no more than about half that number in their present way of life. It speaks of a radical change, with the transition likely to be accompanied by much tension, signs of which have already been seen.

We may see a return to regionalism with the development of local markets, even local currencies, and a new community spirit, as the imperial constructions of the past pass into history. As always, there will be winners and losers, with the winners being those who adapt better to the changing circumstances. The Transition Town Movement had its origins in Kinsale, Ireland but has now spread around the world setting an example of the new strategies to be followed.

Transition towns and doomsday preppers

The World is in terrible shape—including the U.S. The Olduvai Gorge looms.

We are living beyond our means and the Earth’s natural resource credit card is maxxed out. Now what?

More and more people are quickly realizing that the Earth’s resources that we depend upon, such as arable land, potable water, nonrenewable resources, are rapidly decreasing while the human population is rapidly increasing. This predicament has fostered the Transition Movement, the Preppers Network, and others to prepare.

(a) The Transition Movement is bringing together people that now live in nations, provinces, cities, and towns that are readying for whatever the future holds.

The Transition Town [comprises] vibrant, grassroots community initiatives that seek to build community resilience in the face of such challenges as peak oil, climate change and the economic crisis. The Transition Movement differentiates itself from other sustainability and environmental groups by seeking to mitigate these converging crises by engaging their communities in homegrown, citizen-led education, action, and multi-stakeholder planning to increase local self-reliance and resilience.…

  • If we wait for governments, it’ll be too little, too late.
  • If we act as individuals, it’ll be too little.
  • But if we act as communities, it might just be enough, just in time.…

(b) The American Preppers Network is part of a fast-growing international movement organized by nations and regions.

It has formed alliances with independent affiliates such as Pioneer Living Survival Magazine, a homesteading and survival skills website which provides a range of advice for those who want to store extra food in case of a power cut, to those who want to embrace the “off-the-grid” lifestyle of America’s western pioneers….

Today you’re seeing average people taking smart moves and moving in intelligent directions to prepare for the worst. … Growing your own, self sustaining, doing as much as you can to make it as best as you can on your own… And it also means becoming more and more tightly committed to your neighbors, your neighborhood, working together and understanding that we’re all in this together….

The Golden Horde describes the anticipated large mixed horde of refugees and looters that will pour out of the metropolitan regions when a catastrophe strikes. Thus the following dilemma arises.

The Transition Dilemma (TD) states: The more successful a Transition Town, the more danger its inhabitants face from the robbing and looting by the starving people fleeing the urban chaos. Thus to protect itself each Transition Town must have (a) a large part-time police force, (b) communications within each town and between the towns, and (c) guns and ammunition for a long siege.9

Blackouts are increasing because electric power systems are aging and expensive to upgrade and maintain. And if one-city blackouts occur for an extended period of time, this will cause chaos within that city. However, as the news spreads it is likely to cause more blackouts and turmoil in other cities.10

Summary and conclusions

In 1882 Thomas Edison brought electricity and affordable lighting to the world. In 1893 historian Henry Adams theorized that electric power would drive industrial civilization into overshoot and collapse. In 1949 M. King Hubbert published an agrarian-to-industrial-to-agrarian ( A-I-A) scenario. In 1963 Fred Hoyle forewarned that overpopulation would cause “our cries of agony.” In 1971 Roberto Vacca foresaw “a new dark age” and used New York City as his example. In 1971 the standard run of Jay Forrester’s world model showed that growth “is not the path to the future.”

In 2012 three eminent scientists — Dennis Meadows, Walter Youngquist, and Colin Campbell — basically agree: “Chaos looms as the growing population faces a future of less.”

The Transition Movement and the Preppers Network recognize the need to balance the world’s population and the earth’s natural resources.

The transition dilemma ( TD) states that a successful transition town would also be a magnet for desperate and dangerous people. This problem could be solved in each town by a reliable communication network and a strong defense unit.

Several industrial nations are already over the cliff. Ultimately the world’s population will peak and decline.

Endnotes

1. Google has built a colorful [collection of images] about the Olduvai Theory; just google: “images for olduvai theory illustrated guide.” Then click the pictures, graphs, and cartoons to see how they explain the theory.

2. Could it be that the blackout in the Eastern U.S. in 2012 is a preview of things to come?

3. Envision the chaos that would erupt and rapidly spread if one of the world’s largest cities blacked out permanently.

4. Minute amounts of electricity were used in the early nineteenth century for power, e.g., telegraphy and carbon-arc lamps. However, Thomas Edison was the first to make the generation and distribution of electric power commercially viable.

5. If the coming of electricity is a “city builder,” then the going of electricity will be a city destroyer.

6. Henry Adams’ visit to the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893 resulted in the most remarkable forecast I’ve ever seen.

7. Is it a mere coincidence that Roberto Vacca in 1971 chose New York City as an example of ”the germinal beginning…of a profound breakdown of society and civilization itself”?

8. The duration of industrial civilization in the Olduvai Theory is about 100 years (Figure 3) versus M. King Hubbert’s A-I-A scenario of about 3,500 years (Figure 2).

9. A hand-powered telephone system is essential in each transition town to protect it from desperate outsiders.

10. The loss of electric power in an urban area causes many more problems than just the blackout itself. For example, it also causes the lack of food, potable water and fuel and stops sewage transport.

 

References

Duncan, R. C., 2001, World Energy Production, Population Growth, and the Road to the Olduvai Gorge, Population and Environment, v.2; n5, May.

NASA’s composite of earthlights appears on a Google Map. Study the globe and print it out, as desired.

Edison, T. A.

Edison’s Pearl Street Station, 1882;

Biography of Thomas Edison, The Heroes of the Age: Electricity and Man;

Ross. J. D., Superintendent of Seattle City Light, 1911;

The Devil in the White City, The Chicago World’s Fair in 1893;

Nye, D. E., 1990, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 479 pp.

Adams, H., 1907/1918, The Education of Henry Adams, Houghton Mifflin Co.;  Chapters 33 and 34.

Hubbert, M. K., 1949, Energy from Fossil Fuels, Science, v. 109, Fig. 8;

Hoyle, F., 1964, Of Men and Galaxies, Prometheus Books, Great Minds Series, 73 pp.

Vacca, R., 1971/1973, The Coming Dark Age, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, NY, 221 pp.

Forrester, J. W., 1971/1973, World Dynamics, Wright-Allen, 144 pp.

Meadows, D., 2012: Is It Too Late for Sustainable Development? Reported by Megan Gambino, The Smithsonian, April.

Youngquist, W., Letter to R.C.D., 1/23/12.

Youngquist, W., Letter to R.C.D., 5/3/12.

Campbell, C. J., 2012; www.localcampus.com Select: West Cork Previous Issues; Issue 16 – February; Scroll down to page 3, “Mapping The Past & Past & The Future.”

Youngquist, W., Letter to R.C.D., 4/12/12.

Transition USA.

APM.

More on Preppers.

See “G” at Golden Horde.

Richard Duncan is chief author of the Olduvai Theory, a prediction of rapidly declining world energy production. He has an M.S. in Electrical Engineering (1969) and a Ph.D. in Systems Engineering (1973) from the University of Washington. In 1992 he founded the Institute on Energy and Man.

Posted in Where to Be or Not to Be | Comments Off on Richard Duncan : Olduvai Gorge – Civilization ends when Electric Grids Permanently Fail

Earth’s Magnetic Flips May Have Triggered Mass Extinctions

Earth’s Magnetic Flips May Have Triggered Mass Extinctions

At several times in Earth’s history, mass extinctions have come close to wiping life out altogether. The reasons for these catastrophes are still unclear – they’ve been blamed on everything from asteroid impacts to cosmic ray blasts. But a new study has found that our planet itself could have a surprising hand in these disasters.

Research recently published in Earth and Planetary Science Letters suggests that reversals of the Earth’s magnetic field may have sparked mass extinctions in the past by stripping oxygen from the atmosphere.

Field Flips

607968main_geomagnetic-field-orig_fullThe Earth’s natural magnetic field, generated in the liquid outer core, spontaneously changes direction every 500,000 years or so. Known as geomagnetic reversals, these processes cause the field’s north and south poles to swap places.

Normally, the Earth’s magnetic field acts like a shield around the atmosphere, protecting it from the damaging effects of the solar wind (the supersonic stream of charged particles emitted by the sun​). During a geomagnetic reversal, however, the field weakens dramatically, exposing the atmosphere to the full force of the solar wind – and causing oxygen ions to be stripped off into space.

This much was already known. But in the recent study, a team led by Yong Wei of the Chinese Academy of Sciences set out to discover if the oxygen lost during geomagnetic reversals could bring about mass extinctions.

It had long been known that mass extinctions are often accompanied by both an increase in the rate of geomagnetic reversals and a decrease in atmospheric oxygen levels (one of the potential drivers of mass extinctions). The researchers’ goal was to determine if geomagnetic reversals could actually have caused such oxygen loss – and therefore potentially have caused mass extinctions, too.

Oxygen Depletion

Wei and colleagues focused on the “Triassic-Jurassic” mass extinction of 200m years ago, in which up to 84% of all species on Earth perished. Independent studies had already shown that, during this extinction, the geomagnetic reversal rate doubled, and the amount of atmospheric oxygen simultaneously dropped by 9 percent. This oxygen drop is one of the possible reasons for the extinction.

Using a computer model, Wei and his team concluded that geomagetic reversals stripped at least 218 trillion tons of oxygen from the Earth’s atmosphere during the Triassic-Jurassic extinction – or 4.5 percent of the total amount. This indicates that at least half of the 9 percent oxygen drop that occurred during the extinction could have been caused by geomagnetic reversals alone – more than enough, the study’s authors say, to have played a major role in the die-off.

This theory may explain even deadlier mass extinctions. Study coauthor Markus Fraenz of the Max Planck Institute for Solar System Research said that the oxygen loss caused by geomagnetic reversals could also have caused the end-Permian mass extinction (also known as the “Great Dying”), in which up to 97% of all species were wiped out.

Perhaps then, alongside the meteoric collisions, supernovae explosions and volcanic eruptions – which have variously been proposed to explain mass extinctions – it’s time to add another suspect. The invisible fluctuations of a physical field might not be as cinematic, but their consequences throughout history may have been just as dire.

Posted in Extinction | Comments Off on Earth’s Magnetic Flips May Have Triggered Mass Extinctions