Money – what is it?

The following are good articles to read about what money really is

The supply of money in an energy-scarce world 

2011. Richard Douthwaite.

Summary of this article:

Money has no value unless it can be exchanged for goods and services but these cannot be supplied without the use of some form of energy. Consequently, if less energy is available in future, the existing stock of money can either lose its value gradually through inflation or, if inflation is resisted, be drastically reduced by the collapse of the banking system that created it. Many over-indebted countries face this choice at present — they cannot preserve both their banking systems and their currency’s value. To prevent this conflict in future, money needs to be issued in new, non-debt ways.

Output in today’s economy gets a massive boost from the high level of energy use. If less and less energy is going to be available in future, the average amount each person will be able to produce will decline and real incomes will fall. These shrinking incomes will make debts progressively harder to repay, creating a reluctance both to lend and to borrow. For a few years into the energy decline, the money supply will contract as previous years’ debts are paid off more rapidly than new ones are taken on, destroying the money the old debts created when they were issued. This will make it increasingly difficult for businesses to trade and to pay employees. Firms will also have more problems paying taxes and servicing their debts. Bad debts and bankruptcies will abound and the money economy will break down.

Governments will try to head the breakdown off with the tool they used during the current credit crunch — producing money out of nothing by quantitative easing. So far, the QE money they have released, which could have been distributed debt-free, has been lent to the banks at very low interest rates in the hope that they will resume lending to the real economy.

Moreover, without equitable, locally and regionally controllable monetary alternatives to provide flexibility, the inevitable transition to a lower-energy economy will be extraordinarily painful for thousands of ordinary communities, and millions of ordinary people. Indeed, their transitions will almost certainly come about as a result of a chaotic collapse rather than a managed descent and the levels of energy use that they are able to sustain afterwards will be greatly reduced. Their output will therefore be low and may be insufficient to allow everyone to survive. A total reconstruction of our money-issuing and financing systems is therefore a sine qua non if we are to escape Vesuvius’ flames.

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Twenty (Important) Concepts I Wasn’t Taught in Business School – Part I

Twenty (Important) Concepts I Wasn’t Taught in Business School – Part I

by Nate Hagens  September 20, 2013   theoildrum

This article is full of great writing, charts, graphs, and illustrations, and explains quite well why nature and energy are our true sources of wealth.  Here are some excerpts:

Economic ‘laws’ were created during and based on a non-repeatable period of human history

The economic ‘theories’ underpinning our current society developed exclusively during the [last 100 years when the continents of North and South America, Australia, and other vast regions were barely settled by humans], and when increasing amounts of extraordinarily powerful fossil energy were applied to an expanding global economic system.

Our present culture, our institutions, and all of our assumptions about the future were developed during a long ‘upward sloping’ stretch. Since this straight line period has gone on longer than the average human lifetime… it is difficult to imagine that the underlying truth is something else.

Our true wealth originates from energy, natural resources and ecosystem services, developed over geologic time.

The economy is a subset of the environment, not vice versa

Standard economic and financial texts explain that our natural environment is only a subset of a larger human economy. A  more accurate description is that human economies are only a subset of our natural environment. Though this may seem obvious, anything not influencing market prices remains outside of our economic system…despite a] landmark study in NATURE that showed the total value of ‘ecosystem services’ like: clean air, hydrologic cycles, biodiversity, etc. if translated to dollar terms, were between 100-300% of Global GNP. Yet the market takes them for granted and does not ascribe any value to them at all!!!

Cheap energy, not technology, has been the main driver of wealth and productivity

One barrel of oil, priced at just over $100 boasts 5,700,000 BTUs or work potential of 1700kWhs. At an average of .60 kWh per work day, to generate this amount of ‘labor’, an average human would have to work 2833 days, or 11 working years. At the average hourly US wage rate, this is almost $500,000 of labor can be substituted by the latent energy in one barrel of oil that costs us $100.

Energy is almost everything

In nature, everything runs on energy. The suns rays combine with soil and water and CO2 to grow plants. Animals eat the plants. Other animals eat the animals. At each stage there is an energy input, an energy output and waste heat (2nd law of thermodynamics). But at the bottom is always an energy input. Nothing can live without energy. Similarly, man and his systems are part of nature. Our trajectory from using sources like biomass and draft animals, to wind and water power, to fossil fuels and electricity has enabled large increases in per capita output because of increases in the quantity of fuel available to produce non-energy goods.  The bottom of the human trophic pyramid is energy, about 90% of which is currently in the form of fossil carbon. Every single good, service or transaction that contributes to our GDP requires some energy input as a prerequisite. There are no exceptions. No matter how we choose to make a cup, whether from wood, or coconut, or glass or steel or plastic, energy is required in the process. Without primary energy, there would be no technology, or food, or medicine, or microwaves, or air conditioners, or cars, or internet, or anything.

Energy is special, and non-substitutable

Physics informs us that energy is necessary for economic production and, therefore growth. However, economic texts do not even mention energy as a factor that either constrains or enables economic growth. Standard financial theory (Solows exogenous growth model, Cobb Douglas function) posits that capital and labor combine to create economic products, and that energy is just one generic commodity input into the production function – fully substitutable the way that designer jeans, or earrings or sushi are. The truth is that every single transaction that creates something of value in our global economy requires an energy input first. Capital, labor and conversions are ALL dependent on energy.

Energy has costs in energy terms, which can differ significantly from dollar signals: In nature, animals expend energy (muscle calories) in order to access energy (prey). The return on this ‘investment’ is a central evolutionary process bearing on metabolism, mating, strength and survival. Those organisms that have high energy returns in turn have surplus to withstand the various hurdles found in nature. So it is in the human system where the amount of energy that society has ‘to spend’ is that left over after the energy and resources needed to harvest and distribute that energy are accounted for. Finite resources typically follow a ‘best first’ concept of resource extraction. As we moved from surface exploration based on seeps to seismic surveys showing buried anticlines, to deep-water and subsalt reservoir exploration, and finally to hydro-fracturing of tight oil formations , the return per unit of energy input declined from over 100:1 to something under 10:1. To economists and decision makers only the dollar cost and gross production mattered during this period, as after all, more dollars would ‘create’ more energy. Yet, financial texts continue to view economic activity as a function of infinite money creation rather than a function of capped energy stocks and finite energy flows.

Money/financial instruments are just markers for real capital.

In business school and Wall Street we were taught that stocks going up ~10% a year over the long run was something akin to a natural law. The truth turns out to be something quite different. Stocks and bonds are themselves ‘derivatives’ of primary capital – energy and natural resources – which combine with technology to produce secondary capital – tractors, houses, tools, etc. Money and financial instruments are thus tertiary capital, with no intrinsic value – it’s the social system and what if confers that has value and this system is based on natural, built, social and human capital. And, our current system of ‘claims’ (what people think they own) has largely decoupled from underlying ‘real capital’.

Our money is created by commercial banks out of thin air (deposits and loans are created at same time).  Banks do not lend money, they create it. And this is why the focus on government debt is a red herring. All of our financial claims are debt relative to natural resources.

Debt is a non-neutral intertemporal transfer

Of the broad aggregate money in existence in the US of around $60 trillion, only about $1 trillion is physical currency. The rest can be considered, ‘debt’, a claim of some sort (corporate, household, municipal, government, etc.) If cash is a claim on energy and resources, adding debt (from a position of no debt) becomes a claim on future energy and resources. In financial textbooks, debt is an economically neutral concept, neither bad nor good, but just an exchange of time preference between two parties on when they choose to consume.

Energy measured in energy terms is the cost of capital

The cost of finite natural resources measured in energy terms is our real cost of capital. In the short and intermediate run, dollars function as energy, as we can use them to contract and pay for anything we want, including energy and energy production. They SEEM like the limiters. But in the long run, accelerating credit creation obscures the engine of the whole enterprise – the ‘burning of the energy’. Credit cannot create energy, but it does allow continued energy extraction and much (needed) higher prices than were credit unavailable. At some point in the past 40 years we crossed a threshold of ‘not enough money’ in the system to ‘not enough cheap energy’ in the system, which in turn necessitated even more money.

 

Other articles by or about Nate Hagens

Biegler, P. July 1, 2016. Material world: why we’re wired to consume. Saving the planet means consuming less, but why is it so hard to do? theage.com.au

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William Rees: Culture and behavior: The human nature of unsustainability

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William Rees.  (2011) The Unsustainability Conundrum. Post Carbon Institute

In 1992 the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) issued the following gloomy assessment of the prospects for civilization: We the undersigned, senior members of the world’s scientific community, hereby warn all humanity of what lies ahead:

A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it is required if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated.

Thirteen years of continuing eco-degradation later, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the most comprehensive assessment of the state of the ecosphere ever undertaken, was moved to echo the UCS sentiments:

At the heart of this assessment is a stark warning. Human activity is putting such a strain on the natural functions of the Earth that the ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for granted.

Just what is going on here? The world’s top physicists, ecologists, and climatologists have warned the world repeatedly that current development strategies are undermining global life-support systems, that we have “overshot” long-term global carrying capacity, and that human-induced impacts on global systems threaten catastrophe for billions of people. Yet still the dismal data accumulate with the accelerating loss of ecosystem integrity around the world. Despite decades of rising rhetoric on the risks of global change, no national government, the United Nations, or any other official international organization has seriously begun to contemplate—let alone articulate publicly—the revolutionary policy responses evoked by the scientific evidence.

Humans may pride themselves as being the best evidence for intelligent life on Earth, but an alien observer would record that the (un)sustainability conundrum has the global community floundering in a swamp of cognitive dissonance and collective denial.

Indeed, our alien friend might go so far as to ask why our reasonably intelligent species seems unable to recognize the crisis for what it is and respond accordingly.

To begin answering this question, we need to look beyond conventional explanations—scientific uncertainty, societal inertia, lack of political will, resistance by vested interests, and so on—to what may well be the root cause of the conundrum: human nature itself.

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Society is fragile and vulnerable compared to 1930s, more prone to collapse

Oct 27, 2008. James Wesley, Rawles. The Depression of the 1930s–Why No Societal Collapse? survivalblog.com

There are some substantial differences between our society in the early 21st Century, and America in the 1930s. With these differences, our society is now much more fragile and vulnerable to collapse. Here are a few that come immediately to mind:

Consider the Attributes of America in the 1930s :

  • A largely agrarian and self-sufficient society. (Now, just 1% of the population operating farms and ranches feed the other 99%.)
  • Not heavily dependent on computing and communications, technology, grid power, and petroleum-based fuels.
  • Shorter chains of supply. Most food was grown within 100 miles of where people lived.
  • A very small underclass that was dependent on charity or public welfare.
  • Lower property tax rates and lower (or nonexistent) license fees, vehicle registration fees, et cetera.
  • The majority of workers lived near their work.
  • Most displaced workers were willing to accept lower-paying jobs–even doing hard physical labor.
  • The entire nation was economically self-sufficient and could carry on without many imports.
  • Far greater self-sufficiency at the household level (domestic water wells, windmills, wood burning stoves, home vegetable gardens, home canning, and so forth)
  • A much lower level of indebtedness (public and private). At the outset of the Depression most families had cash savings. (We are now a nation of debtors.)
  • A sound currency, still backed by specie. (Although FDR’s administration seized most privately-held gold in 1933, the currency was at least still fully redeemable in silver coinage until 1964.)
  • Lower percentage of corporate employment–so there were less risk of huge layoffs that would devastate communities
  • A significantly more moral society that still had compunctions and a prevalently law-abiding attitude.
  • A homogeneous population that largely shared common Judeo-Christian values. A much larger portion of society attended church regularly
  • A simpler, less extravagant lifestyle, with tastes in cooking and entertainment that did not require large outlays of cash.
  • Most families owned only one car (with proportionately lower registration and insurance costs), and they lived in smaller homes that were less expensive to heat.

In summary, in the 1930s it cost a lot less to live (as a percentage of income) and people were willing, able, and accustomed to “making do” without. When people lost their jobs, in many cases they didn’t lose their homes because they were paid for. Many folks could simply revert to a self-sufficient lifestyle and earn enough with odd jobs to pay their property taxes. What fraction of

The bottom line: If America were to experience a Second Great Depression, given the high level of debt and systems dependence, there would be enormous rates of dislocation and homelessness. And with modern-day immorality and the prevalent “me first ” attitude, I have no doubt that riots and looting would absolutely explode.

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Money versus Credit or Hyperinflation versus Hyperexpansion

I’ve put in several articles by Nicole Foss here on these topics.

Resurgence of Risk – A Primer on the Develop(ed) Credit Crunch

The Inverted Pyramid – Money versus Credit (or Hyperinflation versus Hyperexpansion)

Money and credit are not the same thing, although people currently use them interchangeably. Money is a physical commodity, while credit is virtual wealth borrowed into existence. Money can be subject to inflation, either by printing currency or by debasing specie (reducing the precious metal content of coins), but does not disappear. Credit, on the other hand, can expand dramatically through financial alchemy, but has no physical existence, although its effects are certainly tangible.

Because credit is used as a money substitute in the financial markets, it acts as an inflationary force in the asset markets (and this spills over into the real world as the imaginary wealth thus created leads to overconsumption and malinvestments), but it is all ephemeral – in the end, it is still credit, not money. As soon as money is needed in lieu of credit, such as has now happened in the CMO and CDO markets, it becomes clear that the money simply isn’t there.”

Weimar Germany or present day Zimbabwe are examples of hyperinflation, but the Roaring Twenties and our situation are instead examples of credit hyperexpansion. Inflation is a chronic scourge, but credit expansions are self-limiting – they proceed until the debt that creates them can no longer be serviced, at which point that debt implodes in a sea of margin calls.

There is actually very little real cash out there relative to credit. The “sudden demand for cash” is in fact the world’s biggest margin call to date.

The value of credit is only as good as the promise that stands behind it, and when that promise cannot be kept, value abruptly disappears.

Let’s suppose that a lender starts with a million dollars and the borrower starts with zero. Upon extending the loan, the borrower possesses the million dollars, yet the lender feels that he still owns the million dollars that he lent out. If anyone asks the lender what he is worth, he says, “a million dollars,” and shows the note to prove it. Because of this conviction, there is, in the minds of the debtor and the creditor combined, two million dollars worth of value where before there was only one. When the lender calls in the debt and the borrower pays it, he gets back his million dollars. If the borrower can’t pay it, the value of the note goes to zero. Either way, the extra value disappears. If the original lender sold his note for cash, then someone else down the line loses. In an actively traded bond market, the result of a sudden default is like a game of “hot potato”: whoever holds it last loses. When the volume of credit is large, investors can perceive vast sums of money and value where in fact there are only repayment contracts, which are financial assets dependent upon consensus valuation and the ability of debtors to pay. IOUs can be issued indefinitely, but they have value only as long as their debtors can live up to them and only to the extent that people believe that they will.

Essentially, the gargantuan edifice of leveraged debt that has been accumulated during the years of credit expansion can be described as an inverted pyramid. Its point rests squarely on those at the bottom – for instance the subprime mortgage holders who’s relatively modest debts have been leveraged into trillions of dollars worth of derivatives. Each dollar of subprime mortgage debt probably underpins at least a hundred dollars of additional debt, and these loans will go into default en masse once the ARMs begin to reset in earnest. The leverage that has magnified gains on the way up, will magnify losses in a debt implosion on the way down.

Until now, his debt was an asset of the fund, and was being used as collateral against loans ten times its value. But the moment that Mr. Jones gave up on the idea of home ownership, the value of his mortgage simply disappeared. The paper asset, which derived its value from Mr. Jones’s promise, was destroyed. This had a cascading effect, since Mr. Jones’s mortgage was being used as collateral to borrow money to buy even more subprime mortgages, many of which were also defaulting. Assets purchased on borrowed money were now worthless. Only the debts remained, and suddenly there was more debt than the original amount that investors had put into the fund. These original funds would be needed repay the debts incurred by the fund. Nothing is left to return to investors.
Liquidity Traps and the Mood of the Market

greed and despair in marketsCentral bankers act as midwives for credit expansion – manipulating the cost of credit in order to encourage borrowing and lending. However, this cannot continue indefinitely as it does not occur in a vacuum. Central bankers have a range of options open to them, but ultimately the financial circumstances, and the mindsets, of both borrowers and lenders are important to whether or not credit expansion can be maintained.

The Fed really only can do two things. They can lower margin requirements for banks, the amount of capital they have to hold to make loans. That it has already driven to basically zero. So the Fed cannot allow banks any more “leeway” than it already has.

They can also perform open market money operations like REPOS and coupon passes. The Fed calls up big banks and buys their government bonds out of their portfolio. But they don’t buy them with real money; they buy them with credit newly created just for that purpose. The big bank can then lend that credit out in a much greater amount because the Fed only requires them to keep a small fraction of that credit to support whatever the bank wants to lend out. This is our wonderful fractional reserve system. If everyone went to the bank to get their “savings” at once they would find that they could get out less than 1%.

But here is the key. The bank must ultimately be willing to lend it and then find some investor to borrow it. This has been no problem whatsoever over the last several years. Now most investors realize that they have too much debt, that their level of income cannot support it. Banks realize this too and have increased their lending requirements. The last borrower is always the most aggressive speculator.

So most market participants are now looking for ways to pay back debt (deflation) just when the Fed is desperate to get investors to borrow more (inflation).

This conundrum is a form of liquidity trap – a shortfall in demand for credit that the policy tools of central bankers have great difficulty influencing. Keynes referred to this type of scenario as “pushing on a piece of string”. We are still in the early stages of this credit crunch and as yet, the Fed has not employed all the tools at its disposal. Most notably, it has not yet cut interest rates, likely due to recent Chinese threats to dump the dollar.

As the dollar should benefit from a flight to quality as credit spreads (the risk premium over treasuries) widen, there should be scope to cut interest rates later in the year. It is likely, however, that this will be less effective than the Fed would hope.

The theory is flawed. Central banks promising new credit to strapped banks only helps them with their current problems. It will not get new credit into a system that can’t take anymore. Banks, given their situation, are reducing drastically their new commitments, as they should. Borrowers can’t afford to borrow more.

The continuation of the credit expansion will remain dependent on a supply of ready, willing and able borrowers and lenders, and those already appear to be in short supply.

A trend of credit expansion has two components: the general willingness to lend and borrow and the general ability of borrowers to pay interest and principal. These components depend respectively upon (1) the trend of people’s confidence, i.e., whether both creditors and debtors think that debtors will be able to pay, and (2) the trend of production, which makes it either easier or harder in actuality for debtors to pay. So as long as confidence and productivity increase, the supply of credit tends to expand. The expansion of credit ends when the desire or ability to sustain the trend can no longer be maintained. As confidence and productivity decrease, the supply of credit contracts.

A significant headwind faced by the central bankers is the dramatic change in the mood of the market in recent weeks. It is said that humans have only two modes – complacency and panic, and markets, being a human construct, are no exception. The current mood of the market is one of fear, and if fear becomes panic, it can remove liquidity from the market far faster than even a central banker can pump it in. Actual cash is in short supply, and the many investors are afraid that the game of musical chairs will end before they can grab one of the very few chairs. If they do manage to find a chair, it will be difficult to convince them to part with it, no matter what the inducement. Risk has made a definitive comeback.

Deflation and the Mother of All Margin Calls

A credit expansion cannot be sustained indefinitely. At some point the burden of debt begins to stifle the ability to produce. The debt industry can take on a parasitic life of it’s own, becoming an integral part of the culture, from the level of the individual, as documented by James Scurlock in Maxed Out, to the level of corporations and government. The attention paid to assessing credit ratings, monitoring credit activity, hounding defaulters, writing off bad debt, juggling minimum payments, thinking of creative ways to exploit leverage, and encouraging every last entity to take on more debt in order that predatory lenders might wring out every last penny of profit, is attention not paid to productive activities of the kind that build successful economies. Eventually, it requires so much energy to maintain that economic performance suffers and extracting sufficient profit to cover interest payments on ever-increasing credit balances becomes impossible. A mood of conservation eventually takes hold, replacing the expansionary fervour, and reducing the velocity of money.

When the burden becomes too great for the economy to support and the trend reverses, reductions in lending, spending and production cause debtors to earn less money with which to pay off their debts, so defaults rise. Default and fear of default exacerbate the new trend in psychology, which in turn causes creditors to reduce lending further. A downward “spiral” begins, feeding on pessimism just as the previous boom fed on optimism. The resulting cascade of debt liquidation is a deflationary crash. Debts are retired by paying them off, “restructuring” or default. In the first case, no value is lost; in the second, some value; in the third, all value. In desperately trying to raise cash to pay off loans, borrowers bring all kinds of assets to market, including stocks, bonds, commodities and real estate, causing their prices to plummet. The process ends only after the supply of credit falls to a level at which it is collateralized acceptably to the surviving creditors.

In such an environment, financial values can disappear very quickly, leaving behind only stranded debt. All it takes for an asset class to be devalued is for as few as two parties among many to agree to a new lower price. The remainder need do nothing, other than refrain from disputing the new valuation, for their net worth to fall. In this way, a few discounted house sales can bring down the value of a neighborhood, and that lost value, which may have been underpinning a hundred times its worth in leveraged debt, is magnified through the inverted debt pyramid. The majority who do nothing end up watching the investment value of their assets plummet, while the owners of debt attempt to call in whatever value they can, from wherever they can, through margin calls.

The United States faces a severe credit crunch as mounting losses on risky forms of debt catch up with the banks and force them to curb lending and call in existing loans, according to a report by Lombard Street Research.

“Excess liquidity in the global system will be slashed,” it said. “Banks’ capital is about to be decimated, which will require calling in a swathe of loans. This is going to aggravate the US hard landing.”

“The complexity of this era of credit liquidation,” as Robert Smitley wrote of the Great Depression in ’30s America, “is far too great for the mob mind to grasp. It is hardly possible for them to see the picture wherein about $700 billion dollars of physical and intangible wealth is attempting to be turned into about $5 billion dollars of money.”

How much intangible debt now needs to be squeezed back into how much real money? It would be easier to find a cheap mortgage – with no ugly ARM once the teaser is finished – than guess at those numbers today.

We are expecting deflation at TAE (TheAutomaticEarth).

Inflation and deflation do not describe rising or falling prices.

Inflation and deflation are monetary phenomena. Inflation = an increase in supply of money and credit relative to available goods and services (deflation a decrease).

Rising prices are often a lagging indicator of an increase in the effective money supply, as falling prices are of a decrease. There is an important distinction to be made between nominal prices and real prices, however. Nominal prices can be misleading as they are not adjusted for changes in the money supply and so do not reflect affordability. Real prices, which are so adjusted, are a far more important measure.

Nominal prices typically rise during inflationary times as there is more money available to support higher prices, but prices need not rise evenly, and some prices may fall, depending on other factors. In real terms the picture would be quite different, as increases would be smaller and decreases would larger. When nominal prices fall despite inflation, it means that the price in real terms is plummeting. For instance, global wage arbitrage allowed the price of imported goods to fall drastically in real terms. In deflationary times, nominal prices typically fall across the board, but prices need not fall in real terms, and, in cases of scarcity, may well rise.

The easy availability of cheap credit has conveyed a considerable amount of price support – price support that will be progressively withdrawn as credit tightens. Prices will fall, but the collapse of credit will cause purchasing power to fall faster than price, leading to the apparent paradox of nominally cheaper goods being less affordable in the future than nominally more expensive goods are today. Moreover, there are likely to be substantial changes in relative prices between essentials and non-essentials. As a much larger percentage of a much smaller money supply will be chasing essentials such as food and energy, there will be relative price support for those items. In other words, while everything is becoming less affordable due to the collapse of purchasing power, essentials such a food and energy will be the least affordable of all, whatever the nominal price. People commonly speak of unaffordable prices as a result of inflation, but do not realize that deflation can have the same effect, only much more abruptly.

Thanks to a credit boom that dates back to at least the early 1980s, and which accelerated rapidly after the millennium, the vast majority of the effective money supply is credit. A credit boom can mimic currency inflation in important ways, as credit acts as a money equivalent during the expansion phase. There are, however, important differences. Whereas currency inflation divides the real wealth pie into smaller and smaller pieces, devaluing each one in a form of forced loss sharing, credit expansion creates multiple and mutually exclusive claims to the same pieces of pie. This generates the appearance of a substantial increase in real wealth through leverage, but is an illusion. The apparent wealth is virtual, and once expansion morphs into contraction, the excess claims are rapidly extinguished in a chaotic real wealth grab. It is this prospect that we are currently facing today, as credit destruction is already well underway, and the destruction of credit is hugely deflationary. As money is the lubricant in the economic engine, a shortage will cause that engine to seize up, as happened in the 1930s. An important point to remember is that demand is not what people want, it is what they are ready, willing and able to pay for. The fall in aggregate demand that characterizes a depression reflects a lack of purchasing power, not a lack of want. With very little money and no access to credit, people can starve amid plenty.

Attempts by governments and central bankers to reinflate the money supply are doomed to fail as debt monetization cannot keep pace with credit destruction, and liquidity injected into the system is being hoarded by nervous banks rather than being used to initiate new lending, as was the stated intent of the various bailout schemes. Bailouts only ever benefit a few insiders. Available credit is already being squeezed across the board, although we are still far closer to the beginning of the contraction than the end of it. Further attempts at reinflation may eventually cause a crisis of confidence among international lenders, which could lead to a serious dislocation in the treasury bond market at some point. If a debt-junkie economy can no longer easily raise funds, then interest rates would rise substantially and spending at home would be drastically cut. This would be the financial equivalent of hitting the ’emergency stop’ button on the economy, as it would cause a far larger rash of defaults than anything we have seen so far. We are not there yet though. Currently the dollar is benefiting from an international flight to safety, and it will probably continue to do so for some time, despite temporary counter-trend pullbacks from time to time.

We have seen a pattern of ebb and flow of market liquidity since February 2007, when the credit crisis arguably began. A constellation of market trends has largely moved in synch with liquidity. As liquidity falls, equities fall, bond yields fall (and prices rise), commodities fall, precious metals fall, real estate falls and the dollar rises, as cash becomes king. When we see market rallies, in contrast, rallies in bond yields, commodities, and metals are also common, and the dollar experiences a pullback. We appear to be beginning a market rally at the moment, which should lead to precisely this set of trend reversals. Such a rally is only temporary relief however. It may last for a couple of months, but then the decline should resume with a vengeance.

We have a very long way to fall, and the deleveraging process is likely to play out over several years. During this time we can expect to be mired in a worse depression than the 1930s, as the excesses that led to our current situation are far worse by every measure than were those of the Roaring Twenties. Unfortunately, we are much less prepared to face such an occurrence than were our grandparents. Our expectations are far higher, our knowledge and skill base is much less appropriate, we are far less self-sufficient and we have a structural dependency on cheap energy. This will be a very painful time. Deflation and depression are mutually reinforcing, leading to a vicious circle of decline that is very difficult to escape. It will be over when the (small amount of) remaining debt is acceptably collateralized to the (few) remaining creditors. At that point trust will begin to rebuild.

 Hyperinflation

Some time ago, Gonzalo Lira wrote a couple of interesting pieces on hyperinflation, and I promised to respond to them. This has taken me a while, as there is much material to go through, many arguments to pick apart, areas of agreement and disagreement, differences in definitions and matters of timing.

The first article, How Hyperinflation Will Happen, is a long, thoughtful and detailed piece that I found interesting. There are many aspects I fundamentally disagree with, however, some for reasons of substance and others for reasons of timing.

Essentially the central proposition is that the US dollar is in danger of imminent demise due to a widespread loss of confidence, and that treasuries will be dumped en masse within a year, leading to hyperinflation, by which Mr Lira means price spikes. I do not see a loss of confidence in the dollar going forward, at least not soon. We have seen a long slide in the value of the dollar coincident with the rally in stocks. This is a reflection of a resurgence of confidence in being invested rather than being liquid, but this confidence is fragile and subject to rapid reversal.

I regard the extremely bearish sentiment regarding the dollar specifically as typical of a bottom. Trends take time to become established as received wisdom, and by the time they come to be generally accepted, they are much closer to an end than a beginning. When everyone is bearish, and has acted upon that sentiment, who is left to carry the trend any further in that direction? Market insiders will be taking the other side of the bet, as they always do at turning points. This is how they make their money – by recognizing and feeding off the sentiment of the herd.

When the market rally tops, I expect people to begin chasing liquidity in earnest – too late for many, as liquidity will get much harder to come by. Only a small minority will be able to cash out at the top. I fully expect the dollar to surge in relation to other currencies when this happens, on a knee-jerk flight to safety into the reserve currency as the least-worst option. At that time, I would not expect the US to have difficulties selling treasuries, because I think they will be regarded as the safest option in a horribly unsafe world. This is not rational, as the US is far past the point of no return on repaying its debt, but rationality is not the point, as herding impulses are never rational.

I would also expect the purchasing power of the remaining dollars (i.e. physical cash, of which there is actually very little) to increase substantially in relation to available goods and services domestically, as dollars will be both scarce and essential once credit virtually ceases to exist. Central authorities cannot print cash to alter this situation, as this would trigger an enormous increase in the risk premium charged by the bond market. Hence, cash will remain scarce, and people will hoard what little there is, compounding the effect of deflation through a fall in the velocity of money. In this regard, my view is diametrically opposed to Mr Lira’s.

I see far more imminent problems ahead for the euro than for the US dollar. I expect the shift from optimism to pessimism, that will define the end of the stock market rally, to lead to a rapid resurgence of fear over sovereign debt default risk in Europe. This can only exacerbate the widening regional disparities, and I think it will widen them to breaking point, for the eurozone and perhaps later for the EU itself.

As I have said before, the austerity measures coming for the whole European periphery are going to be severe enough to amount to political suicide for domestic politicians to implement. I think peripheral countries will choose to leave the euro, however high the cost of doing so, as the cost of staying in the eurozone could be even higher. If this does in fact happen, I think we would see an Argentine scenario, where savings are converted into the local currency (which would probably fall even compared with a falling euro), while debts remain in euros. These unpayable debts would then be defaulted on somewhat later. The level of uncertainty would almost certainly lead to massive capital flight from Europe, to America’s temporary benefit.

Naturally the dollar, like all fiat currencies, will eventually die, but I would argue that the time for that is not now. A dollar rally could be measured in years, although not many by any means. My best guess is that we would see perhaps a year or two of dollar rally in a world going increasingly haywire. After that I expect an end to the system of floating currencies, with all manner of attempts at competitive devaluation, currency pegs established and rapidly blown away, and beggar-thy-neighbour policies all round. The risk of currency reissue will rise over time, and be highly locational. I think the risk of reissue in the US is not imminent, but in Europe it should be a much larger concern, especially in peripheral countries.

I agree with this passage from Mr Lira’s article:

But this Fed policy—call it “money-printing”, call it “liquidity injections”, call it “asset price stabilization”—has been overwhelmed by the credit contraction. Just as the Federal government has been unable to fill in the fall in aggregate demand by way of stimulus, the Fed has expanded its balance sheet from some $900 billion in the Fall of ’08, to about $2.3 trillion today—but that additional $1.4 trillion has been no match for the loss of credit. At best, the Fed has been able to alleviate the worst effects of the deflation—it certainly has not turned the deflationary environment into anything resembling inflation.

Yields are low, unemployment up, CPI numbers are down (and under some metrics, negative)—in short, everything screams “deflation”.
This has been occurring under the most favourable of circumstances – a major rally during which people are prepared to suspend disbelief and give central authorities the benefit of the doubt. In all this time, and with all its efforts, the Fed has only been able to slow deflation. Once we turn the corner, confidence (and therefore liquidity) will evaporate again, and the headwind against the Fed will get very much stronger.

If they could not stop deflation under favourable circumstances, their odds of doing so under unfavourable ones must be extremely low. Periods of intense pessimism are not kind to central authorities. Everything they do is too little and too late. Every time they try and fail they look more desperate, which only acts to confirm people’s pessimism in a self-reinforcing spiral. Deflation has a massive psychological component, which the Fed has no tools to fight.

The second major proposition Mr Lira makes is that commodity prices will spike as a consequence of a meltdown in the treasury market:

At the time of the panic, commodities will be perceived as the only sure store of value, if Treasuries are suddenly anathema to the market—just as Treasuries were perceived as the only sure store of value, once so many of the MBS’s and CMBS’s went sour in 2007 and 2008.

It won’t be commodity ETF’s, or derivatives—those will be dismissed (rightfully) as being even less safe than Treasuries. Unlike before the Fall of ’08, this go-around, people will pay attention to counterparty risk. So the run on commodities will be for actual, feel-it-’cause-it’s-there commodities.

As I do not think such a treasury meltdown is imminent, I do not think such knock-on consequences are imminent either. In contrast, I think we are already seeing evidence of a top in commodities, which typically peak on fear of scarcity. I regard the sentiment indicators as strong evidence of such fear, and am therefore looking for a reversal, roughly coincident with a stock market top and a dollar bottom.

We have already seen significant speculative gains in commodities, similar to 2008, and I think that speculation will go into reverse, probably quite sharply. I would then expect a demand collapse to carry prices further to the downside. As I see a speculative reversal followed by a demand collapse setting up a supply collapse, I can see Mr Lira’s scenario possibly playing out in the future, quite possibly coincident with a bond market dislocation as he suggests. It is difficult to predict the timing for such an event, but I see it as being much further in the future than he does.

Because of my objection to the timing, I disagree with Mr Lira’s next assertion:

People—regular Main Street people—will be crazy to buy up commodities (heating oil, food, gasoline, whatever) and buy them now while they are still more-or-less affordable, rather than later, when that $15 gallon of gas shoots to $30 per gallon.

If everyone decides at roughly the same time to exchange one good—currency—for another good—commodities—what happens to the relative price of one and the relative value of the other? Easy: One soars, the other collapses.

When people freak out and begin panic-buying basic commodities, their ordinary financial assets—equities, bonds, etc.—will collapse: Everyone will be rushing to get cash, so as to turn around and buy commodities….[..]

…..This sell-off of assets in pursuit of commodities will be self-reinforcing: There won’t be anything to stop it. As it spills over into the everyday economy, regular people will panic and start unloading hard assets—durable goods, cars and trucks, houses—in order to get commodities, principally heating oil, gas and foodstuffs. In other words, real-world assets will not appreciate or even hold their value, when the hyperinflation comes.
In my view, by the time we see a commodity price spike, the value of people’s financial assets will already have evaporated, they will already have unloaded hard assets, and the dash for cash will already be in the past. I think at that point we will be well into a state of economic seizure, where credit will have disappeared, unemployment will have spiked, incomes will be very precarious, scarce cash will be being hoarded and it will be exceptionally difficult to connect buyers and sellers. Consequently, I do not see most people being in a position to engage in panic buying.

Some many be able to do this, but I think the resource grab is more likely to be a phenomenon operating at the level of the state than at the level of the individual, as most individuals will already have lost almost all their purchasing power. In my opinion, states will certainly engage in a resource grab, and will take supplies off the market, either by sending the tanks or the bilateral contract negotiators into resource-rich regions. States know perfectly well that oil is liquid hegemonic power, and they will be trying to secure their supply in whatever way they can.

I agree with Mr Lira that almost everything will be very much less affordable than it is now, and that this will happen quickly. I do not agree that prices will rise in nominal terms, or that this is in any way a requirement of a drastic fall in affordability. I expect prices to fall in nominal terms, but for purchasing power to fall much more quickly as credit evaporates. Thus as prices fall in nominal terms, affordability decreases, and the essentials end up being the least affordable of all. They will receive relative price support as a much larger percentage of a much smaller money supply ends up chasing them, hence any fall in their prices should be much smaller than for other goods and services. Thus I agree with Mr Lira that the essentials will be drastically less affordable, but I do not think nominal prices need to rise for this to happen.

When we see the inevitable price spike in the future, once demand collapse has led to supply collapse, we could easily see price increases in nominal terms. Against a backdrop of monetary contraction, this would mean prices were going through the roof in real terms (ie adjusted for changes in the money supply). Being able to obtain essentials will be a huge problem, and I fully expect ordinary people to be priced out of the market for many things at that point.

Their survival may then depend on rationing and bare-minimum level handouts. I think the problem will begin before this though, as a collapse in purchasing power prevents people buying essentials for lack of money long before essentials actually become scarce.

The next point of contention between my view and Mr Lira’s is his discussion of Japan’s fortunes:

That’s right: The parallels with Japan are remarkably similar—except for one key difference. Japanese sovereign debt is infinitely more stable than America’s, because in Japan, the people are savers—they own the Japanese debt. In America, the people are broke, and the Nervous Nelly banks own the debt. That’s why Japanese sovereign debt is solid, whereas American Treasuries are soap-bubble-fragile. 
In my view, we are looking at a Japanese scenario in some ways, but on more of an Argentine timeline. Japan has been mired in a long and drawn out deflation, because they had an enormous pile of money to burn through before having to address their banking problems and also because they had an export-oriented economy at a time when they could exploit the largest consumer boom in global history. We are not so fortunate. We find ourselves in a huge debt hole, and as the economic seizure will be global, we will not be able to export our way out of anything, even if we still had yesterday’s productive capacity, which is in any case long gone thanks to global wage arbitrage.

I do not regard Japanese sovereign debt as solid. In fact I think Japan is very close to the final day of reckoning where the problems of the past must finally be faced head on. I see a banking collapse in their near future, compounded by their extreme dependence on imported resources, which they will not be able to afford if their export markets die for lack of consumers with purchasing power.

The main point of contention I have with Mr Lira centres around the longer-term prospects for the USA:

Instead, after a spell of hyperinflation, America will end up pretty much like it is today—only with a bad hangover. Actually, a hyperinflationist spell might be a good thing: It would finally clean out all the bad debts in the economy, the crap that the Fed and the Federal government refused to clean out when they had the chance in 2007–’09. It would break down and reset asset prices to more realistic levels—no more $12 million one-bedroom co-ops on the UES.

And all in all, a hyperinflationist catastrophe might in the long run be better for the health of the U.S. economy and the morale of the American people, as opposed to a long drawn-out stagnation. Ask the Japanese if they would have preferred a couple-three really bad years, instead of Two Lost Decades, and the answer won’t be surprising.
I do not see this as a transitory problem leading back to business as usual, and I mean NEVER returning to what we would now regard as business as usual, let alone doing so in only a couple of years.

Deflation and depression are mutually reinforcing. This is a persistent dynamic that should last at least as long as the last depression, and likely longer as every parameter is worse going into depression this time. We have more debt, far more structural dependencies (on cheap energy and cheap credit primarily), looming resource limitations, far higher expectations, a much larger population, a far smaller skill base etc.

I think we are looking at an economic catastrophe of unprecedented proportions, not a bump in the road that can be quickly consigned to history, if only we face our problems head on. In my view we are going to have to live through deflationary deleveraging, a long and grinding depression, and then quite possibly hyperinflation once the international debt financing model is broken, and with it the power of the bond market to constrain currency printing.

This could easily take twenty years to play out, and even then the upheaval is very unlikely to be over. The last time a major bubble burst – the South Sea Bubble of the 1720s – the aftermath lasted for several decades and culminated in a series of revolutions. This bubble is much larger, and the aftermath is likely to be proportional to the excesses of the preceding bubble.

Moreover, I do not see a return to what we consider to be business as usual at any point, because our business as usual scenario is critically dependent on cheap energy, and the energy subsidy inherent in fossil fuels has been a once in a planet’s lifetime deal. We are going to be living on an energy income instead of an energy inheritance, and this will mean living a life none of us in the developed world will recognize.

Posted in Inflation or Deflation | Comments Off on Money versus Credit or Hyperinflation versus Hyperexpansion

Coping with Deflation

2008

Yesterday we talked about why we are facing deflation and today I wanted to review and explain the suggestions we have made previously for dealing with a deflationary scenario. In short, this is the list we have run periodically since we started TAE (with one addition at the end):

1) Hold no debt (for most people this means renting)

2) Hold cash and cash equivalents (short term treasuries) under your own control

3) Don’t trust the banking system, deposit insurance or no deposit insurance

4) Sell equities, real estate, most bonds, commodities, collectibles (or short if you can afford to gamble)

One important point to note with regard to commodities is that commodities have already fallen along way since I first published the above list of suggestions. At that time, selling commodities was a very good idea, but now, since commodities are already down a very long way, it may depend on the commodity

5) Gain some control over the necessities of your own existence if you can afford it

6) Be prepared to work with others as that will give you far greater scope for resilience and security

7) If you have done all that and still have spare resources, consider precious metals as an insurance policy

8) Be worth more to your employer than he is paying you

9) Look after your health!

1) The reason that getting rid of debt is priority #1 is that during deflation, real interest rates will be punishingly high even if nominal rates are low. That is because the real rate (adjusted for changes in the money supply) is the nominal rate minus inflation, which can be positive or negative. During inflationary times, this means that the real rate of interest is lower than the nominal rate, and can even be negative as it was during parts of then 1970s and again in the middle of our own decade. People have taken on huge amounts of debt because they were effectively being paid to borrow, but periods of negative real interest rates are a trap. They lure people into too much debt that they may not be able to service if real rates rise even a little. Most people are thoroughly enmeshed in that trap now as real rates are set to rise substantially.

When inflation is negative (i.e. deflation), the real rate of interest is the nominal rate minus negative inflation. In other words, the real rate is higher than the nominal rate, possibly significantly higher. Even if the nominal rate is zero, the real rate can be high enough to stifle economic activity, as Japan discover during their long sojourn in the liquidity trap. Standard money supply measures don’t necessarily capture the scope of the problem as they don’t adequately account for on-going credit destruction, when credit has come to represent such a large percentage of the effective money supply.

The difficulty from the point of view of debtors can be compounded by the risk that nominal interest rates will not stay low for years, as they did in Japan, but may shoot up as the international debt financing model comes under stress. For instance, on-going bailouts may cause international lenders to balk at purchasing long term treasuries for fear of their effect on the value of the dollar, even though those bailouts are not increasing liquidity thanks to hoarding behaviour by banks. We are not there yet, but the probability of this scenario rises as we move forward with current policies. The effect would be to send nominal interest rates into the double digits, and real interest rates would be even higher. The chances of being able to service existing debts under those circumstances are not good, especially as unemployment will be rising very quickly.

There is no safe level of debt to hold, including mortgages. For those who are not able to own a home outright, most would be much better off selling and renting, as real estate becomes illiquid faster than almost anything else in a depression. By the time you realize that you need to sell because you can no longer pay the mortgage, it may be too late. Renting is essentially paying someone else a fee to take the property price risk for you, which is a very good bet during a real estate crash. It would also allow you address point #2 – having access to liquidity.

2) Holding cash and cash equivalents (i.e. short term treasuries) is vital as purchasing power will be in short supply. Cash is king in a deflation. Access to credit is already decreasing and will eventually disappear for ordinary people. Mass access to credit has been a product of an historic credit expansion that expanded the supply of pockets to pick to an unprecedented extent, feeding off widespread debt slavery in the process. As you can’t count on the availability of credit for much longer, you will need savings in liquid form that you can always access.

When interest rates spike, not only will debt become a millstone round your neck, but a debt-junkie government forced to pay very high rates will be in the same position. As a result government spending will have to be cut drastically, withdrawing the social safety net just as it is most needed. In practical terms, this means being on your own in a pay-as-you-go world. You do NOT want to face this eventuality with no money.

3) Keeping the savings you need in the banking system is problematic. The banking system is deeply mired in the crisis in the derivatives market. Huge percentages of their assets are not marked-to-market, but marked-to-make-believe using their own unverifiable models. The market price would be pennies on the dollar for many of these ‘assets’ at this point, and poised to get worse rapidly as the forced assets sales that are coming will lower prices further. The losses will eventually dwarf anything we have seen so far, pushing more institutions into mergers or bankruptcy, and mergers are becoming more difficult as the pool of potential partners shrinks.

If we do see a rash of bank failures, each of which weakens the position of others as the sale of their assets and unwinding of their derivative positions can re-price similar ‘assets’ held by other parties, then deposit insurance will not be worth the paper it’s written on. When everything is guaranteed, nothing is, as the government cannot guarantee value. Savings held in these institutions are at much higher risk than commonly thought due to the systemic threats posed by a derivatives meltdown and spreading crisis of confidence. Fractional reserve banking depends on depositors not wanting their money back all at once, in fact with reserve requirements so whittled away in recent years, it depends on no more than a fraction of 1% of depositors wanting their money back at once. This is a huge vulnerability and the government deposit guarantee is a bluff waiting to be called.

4) The general rule of thumb in a deflation is to sell everything that isn’t nailed down and then sell whatever everything else is nailed to, for the reasons that assets prices will fall further than most people imagine to be possible, and the liquidity gained by selling (hopefully) solves the debt and accessible savings problems (provided you don’t lose the proceeds in a bank run). Asset prices will fall because everywhere people will be trying to cash out, by selling not what they’d like to, but what they can. This means that all manner of assets will be offered for sale at once, and at a time when there are few buyers, this will push prices down to pennies on the dollar for many assets.

For those few who still have liquidity, it will be a time when there are many choices available very cheaply. In other words, if you manage to look after the proceeds from the sale of your former assets, you should be able to buy them back later from much less money. Of course flashing your wealth around at that point could be highly inadvisable from a personal safety perspective, and you may find that you’d rather hang on to your money anyway, since it will be getting harder and harder to earn any more of it. During the Great Depression, some of the best farms in the country were foreclosed up on and received no bids at auction, not because they had no value, but because those few with money were hanging on to it for dear life.

Being entirely liquid has its own risks, which is why I wouldn’t sell assets that insulate you from economic disruption if you didn’t buy them on margin (ie with borrowed money that you may not be able to pay back) and if you have enough liquidity already that you can afford to keep them. For instance, a well equipped homestead owned free and clear is a valuable thing indeed, whatever its nominal price. It is totally different from investment real estate owned on margin, where the point of the exercise is property price speculation at a time when doing so is disastrous.

One important point to note with regard to commodities is that commodities have already fallen along way since I first published the above list of suggestions. At that time, selling commodities was a very good idea, but now, since commodities are already down a very long way, it may depend on the commodity in question. If you only own commodities in paper form then selling is still a good idea in my opinion, as there are generally more paper claims than there are commodities, and excess claims will be extinguished. At some point soon I will write an intro on my view of energy specifically, since energy is the master resource. In short, we are seeing a demand collapse now, but eventually we will see a supply collapse, and it is difficult to predict which will be falling fastest at which times.

5) If you already have no debt and have liquidity on hand, I would strongly suggest that you try to gain some control over the essentials of your own existence. We live in a just-in-time economy with little inventory on hand. Economic disruption, as we are already seeing thanks to the problems with letters of credit for shipments, could therefore result in empty shelves more quickly than you might imagine. Unfortunately, rumors of shortages can cause shortages whether or not the rumor is true, as people tend to panic buy all at once. If you want to stock up, then I suggest you beat the rush and do it while it’s still relatively easy. You need to try to ensure supplies of food and water and the means to keep yourselves warm (or cool as the case may be). Storage of all kinds of basic supplies is a good idea if you can manage it – medicines, first aid supplies, batteries, hand tools, wind-up radios, solar cookers, a Coleman stove and liquid fuel for it, soap etc.

At the moment, there are many things you can obtain with the internet and a credit card, but that will not be the case in the future. Water filters are a good example, as the quality of water available to you is likely to deteriorate. You can buy the kind of filters that aid agencies use oversees for all of about $250, with extra filter elements for a few tens of dollars at sites such as Lehmans Non-Electric Catalogue or the Country Living Grain Mill site.

6) Most people will not be able to get very far down this list on their own, which is why we suggest working with others as much as possible and pooling resources if you can bring yourself to do so. Together you can achieve far greater preparedness than you could hope to do alone, plus you will be building social capital that will stand you in good stead later on.

7) If you have already taken care of the basics, then you may want to put at least some of whatever excess you still have into precious metals (in physical form). Although the price of metals should still have further to fall, since distressed sales have not yet had an effect on price, obtaining them could get more difficult. Buying them now would amount to paying a premium price for an insurance policy, which may make sense for some and not for others. Metals will hold their value over the long term as they have for thousands of years, but you may have to sit on them for a very long time, so don’t by them with money you might need access to over the next few years.

Metal ownership may well be made illegal, as it was during the Great Depression, when gold was confiscated from safety deposit boxes without compensation. That doesn’t stop you owning it, but it does make ownership far more complicated, and makes trading it for anything you might need even more so. You could easily attract the wrong kind of attention and that could have unpleasant consequences. In short, gold is no panacea. Other options may be far more practical and useful, although there is an argument for having a certain amount of portable wealth in concentrated form if you should have to move suddenly.

8) Being worth more to your employer than he is paying you is a good idea at a time when unemployment is set to rise dramatically. This is not the time to push for a raise that would make you an expensive option for a cash-strapped boss, and in fact you may have to accept pay cuts in order to keep your job. During inflationary times, people can suffer cuts to their purchasing power year after year, but they don’t complain because they don’t notice that their wage increases are not keeping up with inflation. However, deflation brings the whole issue into the harsh light of day.

People would have to take pay and benefit cuts for their purchasing power to stay the same, thanks to the increasing value of cash, but keeping people’s purchasing power the same will not be an option for most employers, who will be struggling themselves. In other words, expect large cuts to pay and benefits. As unions will never accept this, for obvious reasons, since their membership has its own fixed costs, there will be war in the labour markets, at great cost to all. You need to reduce your structural dependence on earning anything like the amount of money you earn now, and don’t expect benefits such as pensions to be paid as promised.

9) Your health is the most important thing you can have, and most citizens of developed societies are nowhere near fit and healthy enough. Already medical bills are the most common reason for bankruptcy in the US, and while you can’t protect yourself against every form of medical eventuality, you can at least improve your fitness. You will be be living in a world where hard physical work will be much more prevalent than it is now, and most people are ill-equipped to cope. The solution Ilargi and I have chosen, as we have mentioned before, is the P90X home fitness programme. While it wouldn’t be the right choice for everyone, if I can do it, as I have for 11 months already, then most people can. For others, there are gentler options available, but everyone should consider doing something to make themselves as healthy and robust as possible.

We here at TAE wish you the best of luck at this difficult time. We will all need it.

Posted in Investing advice | Comments Off on Coping with Deflation

Cost of the bailout of the Banksters and Wall Street

Jim Bianco of Bianco Research crunched the inflation adjusted numbers. The bailout has cost more than all of these big budget government expenditures –- combined:

Marshall Plan: Cost: $12.7 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $115.3 billion
Louisiana Purchase : Cost: $15 million, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $217 billion
Race to the Moon: Cost: $36.4 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $237 billion
S&L Crisis: Cost: $153 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $256 billion
Korean War: Cost: $54 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $454 billion
The New Deal: Cost: $32 billion (Est), Inflation Adjusted Cost: $500 billion (Est)
Invasion of Iraq : Cost: $551b, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $597 billion
Vietnam War: Cost: $111 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $698 billion
NASA: Cost: $416.7 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $851.2 billion

TOTAL: $3.92 trillion

Posted in Corporate Welfare | Comments Off on Cost of the bailout of the Banksters and Wall Street

Dailyreckoning

Preface. Bonner & Wiggins at the dailyreckoning called the 2008 housing crash in 2002 and the 2000 dot.com crash in 1999. They’ve got a lot right, a lot wrong, and are always entertaining to read. A few random excerpts are below.

As I realized how much the world depended on energy, not money, I grew less interested in the economy, and on investing, though this knowledge did allow me to invest so well I retired at 50 thanks to the dailyreckoning, the automaticearth and other fringe economic news advice.

But at some point money will be worth nothing, energy everything since our bodies and everything else depends on it. Life itself.  In peak oil circles it was called the money/energy transition. So I stopped reading this and other economic newsletters years ago.  The dailyreckoning was mainly  about trying to talk readers into buying precious metals. Which I might have done if I had grandchildren likely to make it through the bottleneck ahead when everything settles down after collapse, but I don’t, and during collapse the local gangs are likely to raid your house, especially if you spend your silver or gold anywhere during the crisis.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Bill Bonner.  2017. A Gold bug goes bad, volume 4 issue 2.

In monetary terms, Alan Greenspan really was the most important person of this whole bubble era. What I refer to as the “bubble era” is loosely the period since 1971 until the debt bubble blows up (which hasn’t happened yet), and more precisely, the period after Paul Volcker had wrung inflation expectations out of the U.S. economy. Mr. Greenspan, Volcker’s successor, took over at the Fed in August 1987. He left it in January of 2006. During those 19 years, the U.S. economy changed in fundamental ways, some obvious, some not so obvious. In the first category, interest rates fell from 7.4% to 4.5%, using the 10-year Treasury note as a measure. More remarkable was that they were poised to fall even further… down to a low of 1.38% in July of this past year.

That downward trend of yields began in 1980. So it’s been going on now for 37 years. And this is about the fifth time I thought I saw the bottom. But who knows?

If you wanted something – land, slaves, women – you had to take it from someone else. And then you could force him to pay tribute! These were zero-sum exchanges. They had to be; there was very little wealth creation.

Also in the category of the obvious, the stock market rose from Dow 2,680 in January 1986 to 10,865 the day Greenspan left his desk at the Fed. These two things together – stocks and bonds; we won’t even bother with real estate – represented a gain of $37 trillion in capital value to the investment-owning classes.

Everyone considered this a positive development. Dr. Greenspan was celebrated as early as 1999 on the cover of Time magazine as the central figure in the “Committee to Save the World” for his role in protecting this wealth. The following year, famed author Bob Woodward’s book celebrated him as “The Maestro.” And Sebastian Mallaby, another celebrated author, still refers to him as “The Man Who Knew.

But where did the money come from? That $37 trillion of stock and bond wealth? U.S. GDP rose during the same period, from $5 trillion to $10 trillion, but that was only half as fast as the stock market. In other words, the “wealth” represented in the equity and fixed income markets couldn’t have come from new Main Street output. Instead, it must have come from the money system itself, over which Dr. Greenspan presided.

Before the invention of portable, modern money, property rights, and capitalism, the best (and often the only) way to get ahead was by violence.

Here at The Bill Bonner Letter, we hope to be a consistent and coherent critic of the use of force in markets. We don’t know if stocks are going up or down. We don’t know how many people will buy the Tesla. We don’t know when the Chinese “red-bubble” economy will blow up. But we know – from both theory and observation – that trying to control or manage economies doesn’t work. And we are nearly the only people in the world who are free to say so. All depend on cheap money. And all will fight tooth and nail to preserve this debt-financing system… Big corporations, governments, think tanks, Wall Street – all of them depend too heavily on the fake, post-1971 dollar and central bank manipulation. They can’t tell the truth. They’re paid not to see it and, if they catch a glimpse out of the corner of their eye, not to say anything.

An Empire of Debt

We have a pernicious and corrupt financial system. It is used by honest industry and commerce. But it also finances a political system, which has grown much larger and more aggressive in the fake-money era. What we wanted to know from Dr. Greenspan was to what extent the financial system is now hostage to the political system it financed.

Is it still possible today, we asked, for the central bank to navigate us out of this bubble by leading and managing a debt deflation? If not, what happens?

Last year, the empire conducted military operations in 118 different countries. It dropped 26,171 bombs last year.

And when you aggregate the costs of all foreign and security operations, it spent about $1 trillion in the 12-month period. That’s the cost of empire.

In the U.S. alone… the Bush-Obama administrations have exploded the national debt to $20 trillion.

The U.S. spends about $3.50 for every $1 of GDP. And since 2007, the economy has added $10 trillion in debt, and only $4.5 trillion in GDP. This is a formula for disaster. Not necessarily tomorrow. But eventually.

While Alan Greenspan was chairman of the Federal Reserve, total world debt rose from 13% of GDP to 109%. This was the real explanation for the “conundrum” that Greenspan saw in mid-2004 to mid-2006. He raised rates, but U.S. bond yields continued to go down. When asked by Congress about it, the Fed chairman was lost.

But what was really happening, as former IMF consultant Richard Duncan explained to Dr. Greenspan, was that foreign central banks in the trade surplus countries printed trillions worth of their own currencies and used that new money to buy U.S. dollars.

They did this to hold down the value of their currencies in order to protect their low-wage trade advantage. Those central banks then invested the trillions of U.S. dollars that they had acquired into U.S Treasury’s. That pushed up the price of those bonds and drove down their yields, causing the Fed to lose control over U.S. interest rates and over the U.S. economy as a whole, and made it impossible for them to contain the property bubble that imploded in 2007.

Greenspan, and later his successor Bernanke, misidentified the phenomenon as a “glut of savings.” This led them to miss the solution, too… and let the credit bubble get bigger and bigger.

My hypothesis, which I put to Alan Greenspan in question form, is that the Age of “Tall Paul” Volcker… when the Fed could actually still control the monetary beast it had created… is over. Politically, it is not possible to manage a debt deflation. Not when you have three times as much debt as GDP.

Before 1971, our money was asset-based, linked at a fixed rate to gold. Now it’s debt-based, linked only to a promise to pay. With what? More paper, of course.

While Greenspan was helping to create a credit bubble, another kind of bubble was forming. During the Greenspan Fed era, 25,000 pages were added to the Federal Register, and the amount of money spent on lobbying went from an estimated $200 million in 1986 to $2.6 billion in 2006.

Government power was always restrained by real money. Roman emperors had to work the silver mines of Iberia night and day to get the money they needed. Then, when it wasn’t enough, they “clipped the coins” to reduce the silver content. Later the kings of Europe had to rely on moneylenders to get the cash they needed.

And finally, modern democracies had to get their money from the hard work and economies of the voters. Wars were frequent and endemic. Often, they only ceased when the combatants ran out of money. Over the course of the centuries, the lack of money probably spared millions of lives.

By the way, I strongly recommend George Gilder’s The Scandal of Money. Gilder shows that money is more than just, well, money. With it comes a basic sense of fairness. If you work all your life and manage to save a thousand dollars, it is fundamentally unfair for some hot shot in Lower Manhattan to get a thousand dollars for nothing, simply because he is wired into the new money system. It was the voters’ sense of unfairness – not money itself – that got Donald Trump elected.

Phony, debt-backed money is fundamentally unfair and unreliable. It distorts prices, misleads investors, depletes and devalues real savings, redistributes rather than adds wealth, and generally increases waste and mal-investment throughout the economy.

But that limitation was removed in 1971. The new money was different. It didn’t come from the mines or the economy or from savings deposited in banks. And it put money at the beck and call of politics as never before. It enabled a large growth in what former congressional policy analyst Mike Lofgren calls the Deep State… or I call the Parasitocracy… or others know as the Establishment Elite or the permanent government.

From a fair economy where the rewards went primarily to those who added wealth to the system… people who made cars or mattresses or kitchen appliances… the U.S. system was corrupted into a system that rewarded, first and foremost, the people who added more fake money and more debt. people who owned stocks were about seven times richer at the end of Dr. Greenspan’s term than at the beginning of it, an increase of about $17 trillion in capitalization.

But they had not created more wealth. Where did the extra stock market wealth come from? The answer: from the same source as the new credit-backed money – from nowhere.

If you want to blame someone for this, you can blame Alan Greenspan. He didn’t create it. But he yielded to it readily. It was he who began the pattern of supporting stock prices by backstopping the markets with easy money – as early as 1998, when the infamous hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management collapsed in spectacular fashion.

World debt is now approaching $225 trillion, not counting the off-the-books financial obligations of sovereign governments, which would probably add another $200 trillion to the total.

In a 21st-century democracy today, voters would never tolerate sharp swings in the business cycle. Nor would a modern democracy permit the kind of flexibility in labor rates that you would need to allow for downside adjustments. Wages are too sticky to adjust to a deflationary shock. Government budgets, and its payments to the old, the sick, the needy, and the vast elite of the Deep State, are even stickier. Even in a depression, it’s almost impossible to bring them down. In fact, the tendency is to try to raise them up… in some form of countercyclical stimulus.

We’ve seen that centralized control can last a long time. In extreme versions it lasted 30 years in China and 70 years in the Soviet Union. Less extreme versions – that is, with less politics – can presumably last much longer. We’ve seen, too, that these systems can create the kind of stability that Minsky described. But what we haven’t seen is that they can somehow correct or erase the imbalances and excesses that they create.

The idea is that, as much as it might be inefficient from an economic standpoint, we nevertheless live in a world of seat belts, airbags, and safety nets (stability), which the public craves far more than it craves economic progress (liberty).

On this second point, Reagan’s former budget advisor, David Stockman, challenged him. The original Fed authorization was for a central bank that would have the power to step in and buy securities, but only of solvent institutions. That is, it was meant to stop “irrational” runs on the banking system. But the current Fed goes way beyond that, meddling in equity and fixed-income markets on a scale that would have been unimaginable to Carter Glass, who created it.

How does this debt bubble get corrected under the watchful eye of central bankers? Having allowed the debt bubble to expand to such an extraordinary size, are the authorities now going to prick it?

And what will they do when the howls of despair reach them? Will they fill their ears with wax and stay the course through a very painful correction, when stocks get cut in half… and don’t recover? Will they, like Paul Volcker, who received death threats as he fought to bring inflation under control, ignore the political pressure?

If my hypothesis is right, the Volcker role is no longer an option. The authorities can no longer take the kind of action that they’d need to take to correct credit excesses. The debt-money system has put too much money into too many pockets of too many powerful people. The Deep State needs it. It depends on it. It controls it. And it won’t give it up.

What’s more, it has raised the price of a correction far beyond anything the political authorities can afford to pay. In 1978, when Paul Volcker went to Washington to tame inflation, world debt totaled only $3 trillion. Today, it is 70 times as much…

Making a bubble bigger doesn’t make it go away. In a properly functioning economy, corrections come occasionally, like showers during a beach holiday. But, in trying to protect the public from these passing storms, the authorities invite a hurricane.

And isn’t the role of a small panic… with its “irrational” reactions and extraordinary pricing… to immunize investors against a big one? In other words, couldn’t the irrationality central banks aim to guard against actually have a very rational and important purpose?

Without the small, periodic crises – left to run their courses and immunize investors against further risk-taking – big crises develop for which central bankers have no solution. That’s the key point here. Yes, we’ve had several of these small, periodic crises over the last four-plus decades, but the feds haven’t let a single one of them run its natural course.

It is now a political matter. And politics is force, not persuasion. The system of constantly expanding debt has served the Deep State, the people who really control the U.S. government and its financial system. They won’t let it go. They can’t afford to. No Volcker can stand up to them. There are no longer any policy decisions to make. Like real love, a fake-money system has to run its course.

January 25, 2017 A Conversation With “The Maestro

It is certainly true that, ultimately, historically fiat currencies have always ultimately ruined the economies who basically worked with them. I’m sure your colleagues from South America went through enough of 5,000 or 20,000 annual rate inflation, and it disabled society fundamentally. That has never happened in a system which gold was the medium of exchange.

Chris: Do you think that in our democracies the financial authorities are willing to let corrections happen? And if they aren’t willing to let corrections happen, what are the consequences for our societies?

Dr. Greenspan: In the short-term, if you have a breakdown like 2008, the maximum short-term probability of coming through it is to basically buy up the whole system. Since the central bank can print as much as it needs to, there is no limit. So you can stop any crisis cold merely by just buying up everything. The trouble is, what do you do then? If there is that sort of action taken several times, you engender a degree of uncertainty in the marketplace, which essentially destroys the viability of the structure.

Very obviously, in the last eight years, we’ve gone into a stagnation, which incidentally has pretty much been for the last 10 years worldwide. That stagnation has led to an extraordinary collapse in the growth of output per hour, which meant that standards of living were freezing at very low levels.

In all human history, whenever you get a situation where the population feels deprived one way or another and things aren’t going well, it begins to revolt.

The revolt here is Brexit… Scotland… Italy. I can go through a whole series of things, which are just now beginning to brew. The problem I have with democracy is that 51% can legally annihilate the other 49%, so a pure democracy is never what the American system has been. It’s always been a constitutional representation of government. Going evermore from where we are now to more and more democracy is not working for us.

Donald Trump would not have arisen if output per hour instead of being on average half a percent per year for five to eight years. If that didn’t happen, Donald Trump would not be president of the United States.

Jim: I would also argue it wouldn’t have happened if interest rates had been above zero as well. The reason for saying that is that when I look at the results of Brexit and Trump, everybody blames Brexit on immigration in the UK. Yet most of the people who voted for Brexit don’t work. They don’t have a problem with immigrants taking their jobs, but they have a problem with having to save more and more every year in order to eke out an existence.

I really want to ask you about your insight into the thinking of central bankers and the policymaking that’s been going on for the last eight years when we’ve had extraordinary monetary policy… from zero interest rates to negative interest rates… to quantitative easing… to qualitative easing… all of which I call “institutionalized theft.

I want to ask you about institutionalized theft. Do central bankers think about the consequences of their actions for households and consumers who have saved all their life… who have expected a compounding effect in their savings? But they’re now expected to assume no compound interest… no increase in savings. They get to the end of their working days, and what they’re faced with is nothing

Dr. Greenspan: Let me tell you. There’s one thing that bothers me considerably, which nobody makes any mention of: There is in the European Central Bank a mechanism as it exists of necessity where the European Central Bank is made up of the central banks of the euro area, and there’s a thing called TARGET 2.  TARGET 2,at this particular stage, is turning out to be an extraordinarily large transfer from Bundesbank [the German Federal Bank] to essentially Italy and Spain and, most recently, the European Central Bank. That means the Bundesbank is lending money to the European Central Bank, and the question is its big numbers…

We’re talking 700 billion… 800 billion euros. This can’t go on indefinitely because, at some point, somebody’s going to have the courage to move Greece out. Greece is in the ECB [European Central Bank] by accident. They came in under false pretenses, and the government immediately following the government that got Greece fraudulently into the ECB said the numbers were all wrong. If they were actually the numbers used, they would not have been in. But nonetheless, they let them stay. That was a terrible mistake. The Greek personal savings rate right now is minus 20%. You cannot run an economy at minus 20% savings rate.

Something is going to happen there. My view is it’s either going to be Greece or it conceivably could be Italy. The funny part of it is that the second-largest contributor to the net flow in lending to Spain and Italy is Luxembourg. They’ve got some steel, and they’ve got a few other things, and they’ve got some banks, but it is extraordinary what is going on in this system while the total assets of the European Central Bank continue to go straight up. What would happen if there was a default of the euro?

In the United States, if the Federal Reserve went into default, the U.S. Treasury would bail it out. But there is no comparable vehicle to help the European system.

At some point, somebody’s going to say, “I don’t want to accept euros.” that there were five or six recessions between 1870 and 1913. They were all short-lived and they happened because banks got, as you use this great phrase, “over-loaned.” There was a limited supply of gold, the credit expansion stopped, the economy adjusted, and then things moved along. During that period – which you would never know from listening to the debate today – real GDP grew by 4.2% a year for 43 years running. Even if you take all the immigration out, that was 2.6% on a per-capita basis. That compares to 0.4% in the years since 2007 – the reason we have Trump.

David: In other words, I’m saying if it’s too radical to say “abolish the Fed, end the Fed”… why not go back to Carter Glass’ banker’s bank (Carter Glass is a great icon, at least in the modern world, because everybody thinks Glass-Steagall should have been maintained, whether true or not), put the Fed out of the activist money-management targeting, interest rate targeting, yield curve managing of the stock market supporting business, and simply let the market drive, market clear interest rates, which we desperately need? The most important price in capitalism is the cost of money and debt. The whole idea of the Fed is to control the cost of money and debt, so it’s not capitalism. That’s what I learned from your essay, and I’ve been wanting to catch up with you for a long time to find out why I’m wrong for my conclusions.

Dr. Greenspan: The problem, David, today is that you would need a majority of both houses of Congress to get an act which was sufficiently solid to enforce that. Remember that the original Federal Reserve Act had gold requirements for the currency and for other things. The issue is so long as you have this fiat money premium, which I was discussing before, namely human beings are willing to take worthless money in exchange for goods until they learn better.

The basic problems are you get bubbles because human nature is what it is. People get euphoric. We know by experience that fear is a far more formidable force in human activity than euphoria, and as a result, for example, recessions go down far more sharply than recoveries. The stock market behaves exactly the same way so that you’ve got these very odd patterns.

Mike Lofgren: Okay, I’m the odd man out. I’m not an Austrian economist and I have no unrequited love for the barbarous metal, but I did see the sausage factory in Congress. In the late ‘90s, we had a good deal of financial deregulation along with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Commodity Futures Modernization Act, followed by roughly two trillion in tax cuts under the Bush administration. My question is: Trump is proposing tax cuts roughly three times the size and he wants to get rid of Dodd-Frank, which he says is strangling the economy.

Dr. Greenspan: I agree with him on this.

Mike: Are we setting ourselves up for another asset bubble on top and, if not, why aren’t we?

Dr. Greenspan: Because it’s not going to happen that way.  Can you imagine what they’re going to be staring at in February when they start looking at the budget numbers? The issue isn’t going to be “Do you have a big tax cut?” but “Do you have a big tax increase?” None of that is going to happen, but I think the real danger here is the fact that we’ve allowed this issue of a huge amount of entitlements to rise as we age and to keep adding to them. One of the things that the Bush administration did was to have a huge increase in the number in Social Security. No source of revenues.

If you’re going to have this sort of fiscal policy, we’re at the edge of some fairly questionable issues of what happens. This is a non-sustainable outlook. don’t see where we go from here. I’ve listened to the debates. The word “entitlement” never came up once, and the reason is entitlements are the third rail of American politics. If you’re running for office and you mention them, you lose. How are you going to run government on that? I do not know.

 

December 22 2011.   The Great Correction   by Bill Bonner

What if growth itself were being corrected?

What if the entire period from the invention of the steam engine to the invention of the internet were not the normal thing, but the abnormal thing? What if the “lost decade” we have just gone through is actually the mean…the usual…the normal thing? And what if — after nearly 3 centuries — we have just now reverted to it?

Until about two weeks ago, we thought human beings had only existed for 100,000 years. Now, archeologists are guessing that we’ve been around as a species for twice as long.

You know what that means? It means that our mean rate of growth — already negligible — is actually only about half what we thought it was. In other words, it took not 99,700 years for humans to invent the steam engine, but 199,700. And now, what if we are not going on to something new, but back to something old? What if the New Age is really more like the Old Age…where growth and progress were unknown.

Let’s see, the typical person in 1750 lived better than the typical person in say 100,000 BC. The person in 100,000 BC lived in a cave or maybe a wigwam. The typical person in 1750 lived in a hovel. There were some great houses too, of course. By the 18th century, humans had been building with arches and columns…and domes…dressed stone with elaborate decoration…for thousands of years. But most people had no access to those monuments. They lived in whatever they could put together — usually of wood or mud.

They lived on what they could grow…with their own hands, or with the help of domesticated draft animals. They hunted wild animals…or got their calories from their own herds and flocks.

The person from 100,000 BC was a hunter-gatherer. But his life was not all bad. At least he got plenty of fresh air and didn’t get caught in traffic jambs or have to watch television.

But the progress between 200,000 BC, when mankind is now thought to have emerged…to 1765, when Watt produced his first engine…was extremely slow. In any given year, it was nearly negligible…imperceptible. Over thousands of years there was little progress of any sort, which was reflected in static human populations with static levels of well-being.

Then, after 1765, progress took off like a rocket. Over the next 200 years, the lives of people in the developed countries, and the human population, generally, changed completely.

It took 199,700 years for the human population to go from zero to 125 million. But over the next 250 years it added about 6 billion people. Every five years, approximately, it added the equivalent of the entire world’s population in 1750.

“Progress” made it possible. People had much more to eat. Better sanitation. Better transportation (which eliminated famines, by making it possible to ship large quantities of food into areas where crops had failed). The last major famine in Western Europe occurred in the 18th century when crops failed. After that, the famines in the developed world at least have been intentional — caused largely by government policies.

Progress abolished hunger. It permitted huge increases in population. And it brought rising real wages and rising standards of living.

By the late 20th century, people took progress and GDP growth for granted. Governments went into debt, depending on future growth to pull them out. So did corporations and households.

Everyone counted on growth. Spending and tax policies were based on encouraging growth. The enormous growth in government itself was made possible by economic growth. After all, as we’ve seen in our Theory of Government, beyond the essentials, government is either parasitic or superfluous. The richer the host economy, the more government you get.

Today, there is hardly a stock, bond, municipal plan, government budget, student loan, retirement program, housing development, business plan, political campaign, health care program or insurance company that doesn’t rely on growth. Everybody expects growth to resume…after we have put this crisis behind us.

Growth is normal, they believe.

But what if it isn’t normal? What if it was a once-in-a-centi-millenium event, made possible by cheap energy?

 

Bill Bonner on Inflation and Derivatives

Inflation is an increase in the supply of money plus credit relative to available goods and services. In times of speculative mania, when people no longer care what they pay for something on the grounds that someone else will always pay more, and money is being created with abandon in order to satisfy the acquisitive impulse, credit hyper-expansion constitutes inflation on a massive scale.

Expansion is the only reality many of us have known, hence it is no wonder we imagine it can be a permanent condition.

Derivative definition:
Imagine a man who makes his living digging ditches. He may hire himself out at a daily rate of $25. The old capitalists would have paid no attention to him – he is just one of millions of small entrepreneurs getting by in life.

But today’s financial hustlers will spot the opportunity. Let’s take him public, they will say. We’ll raise his daily rate to $30…pay him his $25…and the rest will be our “profit.” We’ll sell shares to the public at a P/E of 20…let’s see, 20 x $5 x 250 days per year = $25,000. All of a sudden, the ditch digger has a capital value of $25,000.

Then, they borrow $20,000 from a hedge fund…and pay it to themselves for structuring the deal. Now, the hustler has $20,000 in his pocket; the hedge fund has a high-yield bond worth $20,000; the shareholders have $25,000 worth of stock; and the poor man is still digging his ditches.

Then, an even more ambitious wheeler-dealer will come along and decide to “roll up” the whole industry – bringing the ditch diggers together into a multi-national consortium. Now they can all do cross-border transactions…including derivatives.

And now ditch-digging is a major business, suitable for large investors…with more investment coverage and a higher P/E ratio. Soon all the world’s banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds have some of the ditch digging paper – debt or equity – and billions in fees and commissions have been squeezed out of ditches by the financial industry.

That, patient reader, is the way (the world-over) that industries and assets are now being bought, sold, refinanced, leveraged, re-jigged and resold. In the old days, companies went to investors or to banks for capital and cultivated a relationship with them that was long and fruitful.

Now, it’s all wham-bam-thank-you-ma’am capitalism. Inquiring capitalists now only want to know one thing – how fast can we do this deal? How many points can we get out of it and how much leverage can we get? And whom can we dump it on, when we’re done?

As John Rubino wrote, credit gains ‘moneyness’ as during periods of ponzi finance, creating excess claims to underlying real wealth:

As the global economy expanded without a hic-up, more and more instruments came to be used as a store of value or medium of exchange or even a standard against which to value other things—in other words, as money.

Thus mortgage-backed bonds and even more exotic things came to be seen as nearly risk-free and infinitely liquid….credit gained “moneyness,” which sent the effective global money supply through the roof.

This in turn allowed the U.S. and its trading partners to keep adding jobs and appearing to grow, despite debt levels that were rising into the stratosphere. For a while there, borrowing actually made the world richer, because both the cash received and the debt created functioned as money.

June 2008 In the war between inflation and deflation, Friday was a bloody day.

It began with a shot from the Labor Department; unemployment registered its biggest increase since 1986 – from 5% to 5.5%. Then, all Hell broke loose.

Immediately, investors figured that there was no way the Bernanke Fed could follow through on its half-promise to give up the fight against deflation and begin fighting inflation, alongside the European Central Bank. Central banks do not increase rates when unemployment is rising. At least, that’s the ways it’s gone for a long time.

The Fed, we remind new readers, has a “dual mandate.” It is supposed to do two contradictory and incompatible things at once – protect the dollar (guard against inflation)…and maintain full employment (guard against deflation). The two are mortal enemies. Generally, lower rates help stimulate employment; but higher rates are the way to protect the dollar. Of course, in the period known as the Great Moderation, it didn’t matter. The feds could stimulate employment all they wanted and not worry about inflation. Meanwhile, the Chinese were protecting the dollar by exporting cheaper and cheaper goods to the United States.

Now, the inflation rate in China is 8.5%…labor costs are rising…energy and raw materials prices are soaring; the poor Chinese have no choice. They’re exporting price increases…not price cuts. All of a sudden, the war is on!

Yesterday, amid the smoke and dust of the battle, in rode the ‘crude oil vigilantes,’ guns blazing. The news from the Labor Department seems to have set them off, but they seemed to be itching for a fight anyway. Soon, they had driven up the price of oil more in one day than ever before. A barrel of crude rose $11. To put that in perspective, that’s about the whole price of oil 10 years ago. At the end of the day, the oil price was at a new record high: $139.

As we’ve been saying, there is no clear winner in the battle between inflation and deflation. There is just a clear loser – the U.S. householder. He gets blasted no matter which way he goes. Higher unemployment means lower earnings. And a higher oil price means higher consumer prices. And don’t forget the falling housing market. His earnings and his major asset go down; his cost of living goes up. Heck, even Ed McMahon says the bank is trying to take his house – and he’s got a lot of company. Aretha Franklin and Michael Jackson are said to be facing foreclosure as well.

Lately, most of the news has been about inflation. The threat of recession was thought to be past. The oil price has been setting records…and we’re getting more and more consumer inflation-sighting reports from all over the world.

“Inflation is biggest threat to global economy,” a Bloomberg poll of business executives discovered.

But last week, according to the Wall Street Journal , “recession fears [were] reignited.”

Adding to deflation’s firepower last week was an announcement by the European Central Bank on Thursday. Unlike the Fed, the ECB only has one job – to protect the euro. And when the inflation numbers in Europe came out higher than hoped – remember, inflation is now a globalized phenomenon – Jean Claude Trichet, head of the ECB, stepped forward to tell the world to get ready for higher rates. This, of course, had the effect you’d expect – the dollar fell, which puts additional pressure on the Bernanke forces, who had hoped to be able to talk the dollar up.

Of course, everyone knows you can’t fight inflation and fight deflation at the same time. And everyone knows that when push comes to shove, the Fed will throw its weight in inflation’s direction. That is, when its back is to the wall, the Fed will lash out at deflation…and let the dollar go whither it wants – down.

How much difference it makes is open to question. Because, when the shooting really starts, the Fed’s policy changes often get lost in the fog of war. Even as the Fed was being pushed towards the wall…so close it could scratch its back on the aluminum siding…investors sold off stocks. You might have thought that the prospect of lower rates would be good for stocks. But now, with the crude oil vigilantes in the saddle, investors know that being soft on inflation is no guarantee of lower rates and a growing economy. Instead, they’ve come to see that higher oil prices…and higher prices generally…shoot so many holes in consumers’ budgets, the economy goes into decline anyway.

*** Stocks sold off on Friday, sending the Dow reeling by 394 points. The banks were hit hard. You’ll recall that everyone thought the banks had seen the worst back in March, after Bear Stearns collapsed. Investors expected the banks to lead the following rally.

But once a bubble pops, the hot air goes elsewhere. Instead of going into the financial sector, now it’s going into prices for oil and commodities. Not only did oil hit a record on Friday, by the way, so did corn – at $6.50 a bushel.

The banks have been almost cut in half since last year’s high. You’ll recall that they were “adding value” by “allocating capital more efficiently” than their predecessors. Well, for some reason, they don’t seem to be allocating capital very efficiently anymore. All the value they added to their own shares, ever since the merger and acquisition boom of the late ’90s, has now been wiped out.

Aren’t there some good bargains in the financial sector, thanks to the collapse of share prices? Yes, almost certainly…just as there were some good buys on the NASDAQ after the collapse of the dotcoms…and good buys in tulip bulbs after the blowup of the bubble in the 17th century. But don’t expect to see the whole sector reflate anytime soon. Now, it’s on to the NEXT bubble…

*** It looks to us as though the next bubble is in oil and commodities.

August 2008

We suggested a possible plot outline yesterday:

Boy meets girl. Boy and girl go on spending spree. Wall Street and Washington collude to cause them to spend more than they could afford and to go much further into debt than they should. Boy and girl can’t pay their debts; they’re losing their houses. The moneybags who lent to them are going bust.

Meredith Whitney, one of the few professional analysts who foresaw the subprime crisis, says that the downturn will be more severe than people yet realize. One in ten households overextended itself in the bubble period, she points out. Bankruptcy, default, and foreclosure rates will inevitably worsen as these Jacks and Jills roll down the hill.

Anyone waiting for the financial industry to return to the glory days of 2006 may have a long wait. As a credit-fueled boom turns into a bubble, it takes more and more lending to produce an additional increment of GDP growth. In the real boom years after WWII, it took about $1.40 worth of credit to produce $1 worth of GDP growth. The ratio rose sharply after the Reagan Revolution…and now stands at about $6 of credit to every extra dollar of GDP. Of course, that is why Wall Street made so much money – it was selling credit. But it’s also why that story is history; that show is over. As the cost of growth – in terms of credit – rises, so does the cost in terms of debt service. Even at 5%, the cost of $6 of credit is 30 cents per year. If it produces $1 of GDP growth, that extra output would need a 30% profit margin to break even. Not very likely.

And the good news just continues to pour in from the housing sector. RealtyTrac reported this morning that bank seizures of U.S. homes have risen 184% since the group began tracking this data in 2005. Banks have repossessed close to 3 times the amount of homes in the United States, when compared to last year’s stats.

One in four houses sold in America today is sold at a loss, says a report on CNNMoney. That totes up to a lot of losses for the whole financial chain…the homeowner, the mortgage company, the builder, the real estate agent, and the investor who bought a mortgage-backed security.

Remember, if big emerging economies can continue to grow, it will keep the pressure on prices for raw materials. This then makes the situation worse for Americans; they pay more for food and fuel…even as their incomes and assets fall in price.

Roubini notes that 72% of GDP is attributable to consumer spending and that the consumer has no money. The feds handed out billions in ‘tax rebates;’ even so, retail sales in June increased only 0.1%. Most of the money was used to pay down debt…or just to keep up with higher-priced food and fuel. Consumer debt was 100% of disposable income in 2000; now it’s 140%. Bankruptcies are up 30%.

And the economy is still, officially, growing! You can imagine what would happen in a real downturn. Today, a severe, drawn-out recession would be devastating for millions of people. They would lose their jobs and their homes. Naturally, they would expect the government to “do something.”

Sep 25, 2008 Daily Reckoning

Here come da judge…

Oh Dear Reader, it may be a cruel, cruel world for some…but it’s a delight to us!

Little by little, gradually, haltingly…the commentators are putting two and two together. In just four days, global stock markets lost more than $3 trillion. Then, the fellows who saw no danger at all – Greenspan, Bernanke and Paulson – suddenly insisted that if immediate action were not taken the world’s whole financial system would implode! Meltdown! Collapse!

What did that mean, exactly? They didn’t say. But it sounded like big trouble. And people want to avoid trouble at all costs – especially if the costs can be laid on someone else.

“The private market has screwed itself up,” explained Representative Barney Frank “and they need the government to come help them unscrew it.”

(He left out the extenuating circumstance that the U.S. money supply, the shortest term lending rates, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Fed, the Federal Housing Administration, the SEC…and a whole plethora of agencies, commissions and meddlers…as well as one out of every 4 dollars spent…were all under government control all along!)

And so, Bernanke, Paulson, et al took the witness stand yesterday. They clearly had some explaining to do. But the more they explained…the more we didn’t understand. If government were capable of understanding and fixing the problem…how come it didn’t see it coming in the first place? How come it let it happen?

But this morning, we put aside the question of whether the government will unscrew things or screw them up even worse – as it usually does. Instead, we come back to the issue of who will bear the ultimate cost of bailing out Wall Street. No one knows the answer. And no one seems to feel bothered by it – even though the cost will rise to about $2,000 per family. But no one is complaining about the cost.

There’s “bipartisan outrage” in Congress, reports the Washington Post . But it’s not about the money. Instead, some argue that Wall Street fat cats getting away with murder. Others want an even bigger bailout – one for the homeowners, too. And others just want to rant and moan for the benefit of the voters back home.

But here at the Daily Reckoning mobile headquarters, we are like an old detective with a new clue. As to the issue of who will benefit from the bail out, we have no further questions, your honor. We know the answer already – it will be the usual collection of parasites and chiselers with good lobbyists in Washington. As to the question of who will pay for it, we want a lab report on the blood samples…and a fingerprint match.

The measure includes a provision in which the public debt is raised to over $11 trillion. This will put it at about 85% of US GDP. We recall from a couple weeks ago that Louis 16th lost his head after France’s debt rose to about 80% of GDP. The problem is, when you get to that level of debt, lenders balk and the borrower runs room to maneuver. In the modern world, that probably means higher interest rates…and what was once unthinkable, a downgrade of America’s debt rating from AAA to something less than that – and possibly junk.

This would be accompanied by a sell-off in the dollar too. In this regard, here comes an insight from the democratically elected president of Iran:

“The world,” explained Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, “no longer has the capacity to absorb fake U.S. dollars.”

Of course, that is exactly what we’re about to find out. Mr. Ahmadinejad has rushed to judgment. We’ll let the court take its time. But we have a feeling that the Iranian president is right about the ultimate verdict.

“If the U.S. government were a publicly traded stock,” writes expert witness Chris Mayer, “the dollar would be its shares and the value of the dollar its share price…. And this huge increase in money supply is like a massive offering of stock, which dilutes the value of the shares everyone else holds. (Assets stay the same, just a lot more claims on them).

“The bailout tab so far could top $1.6 trillion – assuming the new $700 bill happens. Consider that M1 money supply – cash in circulation – only totals $1.39 trillion… Consider that M2 – including certificate of deposits and such – is only $7.72 trillion.”

Economists will tell you that this increase in the supply of “money” is just what the world needs. Deflation is acting like the hair dryer from Hell – liquidity is evaporating fast. The feds are trying to put it back.

The feds giveth; the markets taketh. Hallelujah. Hallelujah. Currently, the markets are taking away more than the feds are putting back. But as to who is going to prevail…who will pay court costs…and who’s going to jail…the jury is still out.

 

Daily Reckoning Sep 26, 2008

Garrison Keillor:

“[T]hat’s why we need government regulators. Gimlet-eyed men with steel-rim glasses and crepe-soled shoes who check the numbers and have the power to say, ‘This is a scam and a hustle and you either cease and desist or you spend a few years in a minimum-security federal facility playing backgammon.’”

Out on the prairie, one can imagine all sorts of things. But it’s not as if there were no bureaucrats on the job between 2000 and 2007. How does one imagine that these same regulators, who missed the biggest bamboozle in market history, are now going to be able to clean it up?

How does a bureaucrat – charged with protecting the public’s money – recognize a scam more readily than an investor whose own money is on the line? What information does he have that is not available to the public? What theory does he follow that is unknown to investors? What meat does he eat…what wine does he drink…that prevents him from falling prey to from the delusions and temptations to which all flesh is heir?

This is what Hayek termed the “fatal conceit,” that public officials – armed with the power to force people do to what they say – will do a better job of running things than people can do for themselves.

Apparently, neither the masters of the universe on Wall Street, nor the geniuses at the rating agencies, nor the saints at the SEC…and certainly not the poor lumpeninvestor… understood what was going on. None had gimlet eyes. Instead, all their eyes bulged with admiration at the financial engineers’ handiwork…and with greed at how much money they could make.

And now we find, on page one of today’s International Herald Tribune , the bureaucrats’ practical challenge. “What’s this stuff worth?” The Paulson plan puts $700 billion in the hand of GS14s, clerks, hacks and appointees. What are they supposed to do with it? Buy “assets” that Wall Street wants to dump.

How are they supposed to know what it is worth? If they pay too much, the government takes a big loss. If they pay too little, at least according to the dim light coming from the Christmas treers, it won’t bail out Wall Street enough and the economy is likely to sink into recession.

“The reality is that we are not going to know what the right price is for years,” the IHT quotes a portfolio manager.

Isn’t it amazing how fast things change, dear reader? Only a few months ago every portfolio manager in the world would have deferred to the market. What’s something worth? Exactly what willing buyers will pay for it! Not a penny more. Not a penny less.

But now we have a whole new theory…that the value of a financial asset is somehow unknowable…it is like the face of God…or the meaning of “is” – it floats in the ether; it plays cards with Jimmy Hoffa. According to this theory, the value of an asset is determined not by what willing buyers will pay for it…there is no such thing as a ‘market price.’ Instead, values are metaphysical…determined by what willing buyers MIGHT pay for years from now…if everything goes to plan.

Henry Paulson says that the government might even make a profit. How might this occur? Well, the bureaucrats might turn out to be shrewder than the Wall Street pros. Prices set by bureaucrats (with money that doesn’t belong to them) will be better than those set by willing buyers and sellers!

According to this new theory, the sellers don’t know what gems they are tossing out. You’ve heard of casting pearls before swine. According to the new theory, the pigs on Wall Street are casting out the pearls! And those canny bureaucrats are grabbing them up!

Now, get this… “the recent turmoil on Wall Street may be followed by a $900 billion aftershock as bank debt comes due next year…”

Oh happy day for the public sector…that great untapped reserve of investment wisdom…. Here comes more opportunity to buy up those pearls that the swine on Wall Street don’t want.

Now things are going to get interesting. Add another trillion-dollar bill to Christmas tree…only months after they Christmas treed the last one. Turn on lights! We can hardly wait to see what this new Christmas treed-up world looks like.

*** At least one person had something smart to say this week. Would you believe it, George W. Bush must have picked up the wrong speech on his way out of the door to the Capital. When he spoke on the debt crisis, his speechwriter actually seemed to know what he was talking about:

“First, how did our economy reach this point?

“Well, most economists agree that the problems we are witnessing today developed over a long period of time. For more than a decade, a massive amount of money flowed into the United States from investors abroad, because our country is an attractive and secure place to do business. This large influx of money to U.S. banks and financial institutions – along with low interest rates – made it easier for Americans to get credit. These developments allowed more families to borrow money for cars and homes and college tuition – some for the first time. They allowed more entrepreneurs to get loans to start new businesses and create jobs.

“Unfortunately, there were also some serious negative consequences, particularly in the housing market. Easy credit – combined with the faulty assumption that home values would continue to rise – led to excesses and bad decisions. Many mortgage lenders approved loans for borrowers without carefully examining their ability to pay. Many borrowers took out loans larger than they could afford, assuming that they could sell or refinance their homes at a higher price later on.

“Optimism about housing values also led to a boom in home construction. Eventually the number of new houses exceeded the number of people willing to buy them. And with supply exceeding demand, housing prices fell. And this created a problem: Borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages who had been planning to sell or refinance their homes at a higher price were stuck with homes worth less than expected – along with mortgage payments they could not afford. As a result, many mortgage holders began to default.

“These widespread defaults had effects far beyond the housing market. See, in today’s mortgage industry, home loans are often packaged together, and converted into financial products called “mortgage-backed securities.” These securities were sold to investors around the world. Many investors assumed these securities were trustworthy, and asked few questions about their actual value. Two of the leading purchasers of mortgage-backed securities were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Because these companies were chartered by Congress, many believed they were guaranteed by the federal government. This allowed them to borrow enormous sums of money, fuel the market for questionable investments, and put our financial system at risk.

“The decline in the housing market set off a domino effect across our economy…”

Our president was on solid ground. He sounded as though he had been reading The Daily Reckoning , commented colleague Dan Denning. But then he stepped into the mush, claiming – along with everyone else – that a bailout is needed to put the economy back on its feet.

 

Sep 24 Rude Awakening A Violation of Public Trust
By Tim McCormack, A professional investor from Santa Barbara, CA

There is nothing wrong with Government coming to the rescue of financial institutions where mismanagement has caused risk of failure in a way that jeopardizes the stability of the entire financial system.   What is wrong, and is both a violation of public trust and a display of professional incompetence, is to contribute taxpayer money in a way that enriches management and the owners of these mismanaged companies rather than the taxpayers.

Additionally, it is also a violation of public trust when government officials deliberately manipulate markets on behalf of certain market participants at the expense of others.  The recent market manipulation executed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission by banning short selling of financial stocks is all the more outrageous due to that fact that it was specifically designed to enrich the very individuals who mismanaged their companies into near bankruptcy, and who are the underlying root cause of the larger systemic financial crisis by manufacturing, distributing, and inventorying toxic debt.

It is now well known that these financial firms manufactured, distributed, and inventoried near-fraudulent debt (financial widgets) at 30:1 leverage.  Investors do not want these widgets at the current offer price, and if the widgets were priced and offered at a realistic market clearing price, it would likely bankrupt the vendors.

Hank Paulson (in concert with Ben Bernanke and Christopher Cox) has just orchestrated a plan that provides huge sums of taxpayer money to his old colleagues and buddies at Goldman Sachs, along with various others, including Morgan Stanley, to purchase the  unwanted widgets in a manner that directly enriches the management and shareholders of these nearly bankrupt companies.  Rather than demanding that taxpayers be rewarded with any profits of the rescue, as just occurred with AIG, this latest proposal appears deliberately struck to stick taxpayers with the downside, while management, creditors and shareholders of these firms instantly reap tens of billions in stock and bond appreciation.

Such actions cross the line not only into the arena of professional incompetence and negligence, but steps right up to the line where an open society stares official tyranny in the face.

These government officials could have rescued the financial system in a way aligned with their core responsibilities to the American taxpayer.  If they had done so, as they did with AIG, they would deserve a pat on the back.  They chose a different path. Rather than rescue the financial system in a responsible way, they have rescued their rich buddies that created the mess and left the taxpayer holding the bag.  The American people deserve better.

Additionally, the same Gang of Three government officials simultaneously executed a massive market manipulation specifically designed to further enrich their Wall Street cronies — the very same individuals who mismanaged and nearly bankrupted these firms — by banning the short selling of financial stocks.

The management of these mismanaged companies — including John Mack, of Morgan Stanley, Richard Fuld, of Lehman Bros, and before them senior executives of Bear Stearns — have loudly spread rumors that the decline in their stock was caused by rumor-mongering and improper short-selling without offering an iota of evidence.  Zero evidence has been presented to back up these allegations.

The market manipulation executed by Cox last week occurred without offering a single shred of evidence of the alleged improprieties. This behavior is eerily similar to the allegations of WMD in Iraq made by others in the Bush administration while absent of evidence.  The administration at least went to the trouble of manufacturing evidence to support its claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Worse, was their professional incompetence in responding to the impending Lehman and AIG bankruptcies over the weekend of Sep. 13-14, and on Monday, Sep. 15.  Their behavior and public announcements greatly intensified the crisis, and seriously elevated the systemic risk in global financial markets.

Some background on this issue is helpful.  Financial professionals have always feared the “domino effect” of the failure of one large financial firm taking down many others through counterparty exposures.   Since the failure of Bear Stearns and Northern Rock, market participants have had the clear impression that Government officials in the US and UK were not going to let this happen.

On Sept 13-15, the Gang of Three sent dramatically different signals into the market.  Their abandonment of Lehman and AIG had dramatic negative consequences. At a press conference on Sep. 15, Paulson clearly said, in paraphrase, that “while the Government is concerned about the health and stability of the markets, it would not act to save these firms.”

This news changed the landscape. Now, the domino effect not only seemed possible, it appeared imminent and all eyes were on the insurance giant AIG.  Global stock markets reacted instantly, and rationally, as investors fled financial stocks generally, and the stocks of riskier financial firms (like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs) in particular.

Rather than pouring water on the fire, Paulson pumped gasoline in a move that will now cost the US taxpayer several hundred billion dollars more than if proper actions had been taken in a timely fashion.  Yet, after the dramatic global selloff, the AIG fire was doused in government water, but the global fire had become an inferno.

Rather than admitting to this blunder and learning from it, those who committed the blunder are now attempting to divert blame and attention to short sellers. Credit should be given where credit is due. The SEC is now complicit in falsely pointing the blame for the near-demise of these financial institutions at short sellers (a convenient scapegoat) in what appears to be a blatant attempt to divert attention from:

1.             The real cause of the demise of these firms: mismanagement, in applying 30:1 leverage  to volatile illiquid mortgage assets that these firms manufactured, distributed, and inventoried;

2.             The failure of regulatory oversight, in allowing these firms to use 30:1 leverage on collateral known to occasionally suffer 30% to 50% downside fluctuations (real estate);

3.             The failure to respond properly to the fires at Lehman and AIG; and

4.             The real reason for the SEC market manipulation: to artificially inflate the share prices of distressed companies in a way that enriches management and shareholders, and simultaneously strengthens the company balance sheet (the new riches coming at the direct expense of innocent market participants, at the direct expense their financial competitors who were prudent in avoiding overexposure to leveraged toxic debt, and at the expense of free market principles).

Absent evidence of wrong-doing, the SEC is complicit in spreading lies and rumors, and engaging in market manipulation on behalf of their wealthy buddies.  To date, rather than asking pointed questions, the press has bought the story and is guilty of rebroadcasting it rather than questioning its validity. With no evidence of improper short selling the most rational explanation for stock price declines is that natural investors (from mutual funds, pension funds, retail investors, etc) were selling or hedging long positions due to lack of confidence in these firms, and due to the new risks that sprang into existence by the reversal of position taken by US regulators.

While the SEC says that it is opposed to market manipulation, it has just engaged in market manipulation of the highest order on behalf of John Mack at Morgan Stanley and the gang at Goldman Sachs.  This market manipulation has instantly resulted in the management and owners of these two firms receiving tens of billions of upside stock profits (and hundreds of billions among the 799 financial stocks) in just two days.

The SEC should be held accountable to defend its WMD claim with evidence that was in its possession at the time it manipulated these markets.  It should not be allowed to manufacture an after-the-fact witch-hunt.  Key questions are: What evidence was in the hands of the SEC regarding both mismanagement and short-selling at the time that this market manipulation occurred?  Also:  Were government officials at the SEC, Treasury and/or the Federal Reserve (specifically Cox, Paulson, and Bernanke) speaking with market participants who would be enriched by the market manipulation just prior to the manipulation? If so, what was the nature of these communications?

When small businesses take risks that don’t work out, they fail.  Farmers, bakers and widget-makers are not enriched by government for their failure.

Goldman Sachs is known as one of the most opportunistic and predatory firms on the street.  When Goldman identifies companies in distress it has a long history of rushing in and providing assets in return for majority equity stakes, rightly earning the upside for this risk ahead of the existing management or owners.  Hank Paulson was the direct recipient of this behavior while CEO at Goldman and it is important to note that he was able to sell more than $500 million in Goldman stock, tax-free, when he accepted the job as Secretary of the Treasury.  Now that Goldman is in distress (and Paulson is employed by US taxpayers), Paulson wants to hand Goldman taxpayer money without demanding a controlling equity stake from Goldman Sachs in return.  Who does Paulson work for?  This is not rocket science.

No private company or public company would stand for similar behavior of their directors risking shareholder assets in ways that deliberately benefited others at shareholder expense.  Such behavior would be rewarded with immediate dismissal for dereliction of duty and personal lawsuits seeking damages for negligent behavior.

Rather than getting an honest explanation about what has just occurred, the American people are now being sold a story manufactured by government officials who have been complicit in this irresponsible behavior.  The open question remains: Are the American people gullible enough to buy it?

 

November 2008

Yes, the financial hotshots did all these things.  And more.  They sold the world on ‘finance,’ rather than making and selling things.  Then, it was off to the races.  Everybody wanted to bet.  Perfecta, place bets, odds-on…double or nothing.  Of course, investors would have been better off at the race track.  The track takes about 20%.  In the financial races, Wall Street took 50% to 80% of all the profits.

Before 1987, only about one of every 10 dollars of corporate profits made its way to the financial industry – in payment for arranging financing, banking and other services.  By the end of the bubble years, the cost of ‘finance’ had grown to more than 3 out of every 10 dollars.  Total profits in the United States reached about $6 trillion last year; about $2 trillion was Wall Street’s share.  What happened to this money?  Other industries use profits to build factors and create jobs.  But the financial industry paid it out in salaries and bonuses – as much as $10 trillion during the whole Bubble Period.  And now that the sector finds itself a few trillion short, it waits for the government to open its purse.

But Wall Street’s critics have missed the point.  Yes, the financial industry exaggerates.  But so does the whole financial world.  Both coming and going.  It’s madness on the way up; madness on the way down.  Investors pay too much for “finance” when the going is good.  And then, when the going isn’t so good, they regret it.  This regret doesn’t mean the system is in need of repair; instead, it means it is working.

The financial industry was just doing what it always does – separating fools from their money.  What was extraordinary about the Bubble Years was that there were so many of them.  There is always smart money in a marketplace…and dumb money.  But in 2007 there were trillions of dollars so retarded they practically cried out for court-ordered sterilization.   What other kind of money would pay Alan Fishman $19 million for 3 weeks work helping Washington Mutual go bust?

Whence cometh this dumb money?  And here we find more worthy villains.  For here we find the theoreticians, the ideologues…and the regulators, themselves, who now offer to save capitalism from itself.  Here is where we find the bogus statistics, the claptrap theories and the swindle science.  Here is where we find  the former head of the Princeton economics department, too, Ben Bernanke… and both Hank Paulson and his replacement, Tim Geithner.  Here, we find the intellectuals and the regulators – notably, the SEC – who told the world that the playing field was level…when everyone could see that it was an uphill slog for the private investor.

“Six Nobel prizes were handed out to people whose work was nothing but BS,” says Nassim Taleb, author of The Black Swan.  “They convinced the financial world that it had nothing to fear.”

All the BS followed from two frauds.  First, that economic man had a brain but not a heart.  He was supposed to always act logically and never emotionally.  But there’s the rub, right there; they had the wrong guy.  The second was that you could predict the future simply by looking at the recent past.    If the geniuses had looked back to the fall of Rome, they would have seen property prices in decline for the next 1000 years.  If they had looked back 700 or even 100 years…they would have seen wars, plagues, famines, bankruptcies, hyperinflation, crashes, and depressions galore.  Instead, they looked back only a few years and found nothing not to like.

If they had just looked back 10 years, says Taleb, they would have seen that their “value at risk” models didn’t work.  The math was put to the test in the LongTerm Capital Management crisis…and failed.  Their models went sour faster than milk.  Things they said wouldn’t happen in a trillion years actually happened while Bill Clinton was in still in office.

In the real world, Taleb explains, things are stable for a long time.  Then, they blow up.  Then, all the theories and regulators prove worthless. These blow ups are inevitable, but unpredictable…and too rare to be modeled or predicted statistically.  “And they are almost always much worse than you expect.”

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Why is oil production peak the problem and not when the oil runs out?

First, a little history

The exponential growth of population from 1 billion to 7 billion in less than 200 years was fueled by fossil fuels, especially oil, which does the actual work of a society and is as necessary as food itself: oil grows, cooks, distributes, and refrigerates our food, and is the basis of 97% of all transportation.

Our financial system has also become dependent on oil.  It is entirely structured around credit being lent out and debt paid back.  But debt can only be paid back if the business or salary of the borrower grows, and for the past two centuries that has been true because we have exponentially extracted oil, coal, and natural gas to make billions of combustion engines, roads, bridges, sewage systems, dams, medicine, plastic, ships, trucks, cars and everything else you see around you.  We industrialized agriculture to mine topsoil to grow enough crops to feed 7 billion people to the point where the soil will be exhausted within 200 years.  Previous civilizations without enormously destructive tractors were physically incapable of doing that, but even they depleted their soil over an average of 1,500 years by using the so-called waste as feed for their animals, to burn to cook with, and thatch for their roofs.

We’ve grown so used to that we forget that for the previous two million years homo sapiens lived in a steady state economy.  If you ate all the fish, shot all the game with arrows or spears, drank the last fresh water from a pool in the desert, your tribe died. When agriculture arrived, there wasn’t a single region that didn’t periodically suffer famines from one or more years of bad crops.  People had no choice but to live within the boundaries the natural world had set for them.

Okay, so it’s peaked, we’ll just drive a bit less  

Half the oil is left after all.

But it’s expensive.  If the financial system fails, how will the super-expensive projects to get at oil under miles of ocean be financed?   There are many reasons the financial system could fail.  A high-speed trading flash crash, the corruption and greed, 1 quadrillion in derivatives unwinding, a natural disaster like an earthquake in Tokyo or Los Angeles, cyber warfare taking out part or all of our electric grid for a year or two, and so on.

The remaining oil is remote and inaccessible.

We’re consuming more oil than we’re finding.  The few discoveries are few and very small compared to the giant fields that have provided 80% of our oil for decades.

The remaining oil is nasty, gunky, sour, full of impurities and comes out slowly like tar instead of quickly like the sweet light oil we’ve been pumping so far.   Before you could get $500 a day out of your checking account at the ATM.  But from now on you can get less every day, eventually not enough to pay the rent, pay for the utilities, and buy food.  The money is there, but you can’t get it out…

Nicole Foss on the intersection of oil and the financial system, December 7, 2008

“One might imagine that as an essential resource becomes scarcer, it’s price would move in one direction only – up – and for a while it appeared that would be the case. However, our energy supply system is set in the context of our existing economic and financial structures. The extreme and increasing stress that these structures are under will interact with future energy scarcity with devastating effect, effectively placing a hard limit on any eventual recovery. Energy is the master resource without which no activity, economic or otherwise, is possible.

The effect of easy credit was to flood commodity exchanges with liquidity, as liquidity fleeing risky securitized assets searched for a safe haven. This pushed up the prices of all commodities beyond what could be justified, sending premature signals of scarcity that attracted even more speculative investment. In this way a bubble was formed, but bubbles always burst, and when they do, the speculative money disappears very quickly, taking price support with it. The price collapse we have seen since is partly a result of speculation in reverse, as speculators go short, and partly a result of falling demand, and that fall in demand has only just begun.

The consequence of that price plunge is a severe impact on the viability of continued fossil fuel exploration and development, and also a similarly significant impact on the viability of energy alternatives such as renewables and efficiency investments. Ilargi has long referred to this as the Law of Receding Horizons, meaning that each time alternatives appear to be reaching the threshold of viability, the combination of the price of conventional energy and the cost structure for the alternative is such that the threshold is never quite reached. Once again, energy prices are falling as costs for alternative have remained high, so that the hoped for developments will again be put on hold.

We are seeing the beginning of a global demand collapse, as the credit crunch takes an ever increasing toll on global economic activity and international trade. Already we are seeing the dire effects on shipping in the Baltic Dry index, thanks to the difficulty in obtaining letters of credit for shipments. Consumers in developed countries are tapped out and trying to repair their tattered balance sheets by cutting back, as are companies and banks. Consumption is therefore falling, which will hit exporting economies very hard indeed. They have spent vast sums, and used huge amounts of raw materials, to build what will now be shown to be an enormous excess of productive capacity. Their demand for raw materials will not recover any time soon, as there will be no demand for their products for a very long time.

For the time being, the on-going demand collapse, which has very much further to go, is causing the price of commodities, and particularly energy, to drop like a stone. This may well continue for a period of time, but the danger is that the demand collapse will lead to a supply collapse, and at that point prices will find a floor and begin to climb again. This price bottom could happen earlier in the coming Depression than would be the case for other goods and services.  Exactly when we might see the impact on supply is not clear. Already there are many projects with high cost structures which are no longer viable. These are the projects that could have cushioned the down slope of Hubbert’s curve (the decline from peak production of oil), but will not now come on line. Although they could in theory be developed at a later date, increasing capital constraints will make financing almost impossible, hence development will be unlikely for a very long time. We will therefore continue to make do with the fields already in production, but many of those are depleting very quickly – Ghawar in Saudi Arabia, Cantarell in Mexico, Burgan in Kuwait and many others.

For a while it will be enough to sustain the much lower level of economic activity that we are headed for, but not for all that much longer, especially since there will be many other ‘above ground factors’ to consider. For instance, production infrastructure requires expensive maintenance that will be increasingly difficult to perform, separatist movements in producing countries will seek to control resources for their own benefit, productive capacity being fought over will be damaged or destroyed, sabotage by the disaffected with nothing left to lose will increasingly become a factor, and piracy will make delivery much more challenging. Living off our fossil fuel legacy will therefore become progressively more difficult.

Many governments around the world, including those of all the major powers, are well aware of peak oil. In a very real sense in a modern world, oil IS power, as there is no comparable source of concentrated, transportable and flexible fuel. Securing access to it is therefore of the utmost strategic importance. Some governments, like the Anglo-Saxon economies, have so far appeared to place their trust in the global markets and their own perceived ability to outbid the competition. Others, notably China, have been quietly arranging long term bilateral supply contracts directly with producers, thereby taking production off the market.

China’s strategy is likely to prove far superior in difficult times when international trade is drying up, the fungibility of oil comes under threat and no one can be sure of being able to outbid the competition. By the time others realize that trusting the market to provide is essentially a modern day cargo cult, they may have been completely out maneuvered. In my opinion, this will be the foundation of the coming shift in hegemonic power towards the Far East, but it will not be a peaceful transition. Resource wars are a given under these circumstances.”

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SEC charges pair of brokers, investment advisory firm, others with $80M variable annuity scam

SEC charges pair of brokers, investment advisory firm, others with $80M variable annuity scam

Mar 13, 2014 Darla Mercado

The Securities and Exchange Commission Thursday filed charges against a group of brokers in a scheme wherein wealthy investors used variable annuities with death benefits to wager on the lives of the terminally ill.

The complaint targeted brokers Michael A. Horowitz of Los Angeles and Moshe Marc Cohen of Brooklyn, N.Y., slapping both with a cease-and-desist order and allegations of fraud.

The plan — which involved the sale of more than $80 million in variable annuities — ran its course from July 2007 to February 2008. Mr. Horowitz was allegedly the “architect” of a scheme to profit from the death of terminally ill hospice and nursing home patients, according to the SEC’s complaint.

Mr. Horowitz allegedly obtained the personal health and identification data of the dying patients through fraud, marking them as annuitants on variable annuity contracts that he had marketed to wealthy clients, according to the SEC’s complaint. He allegedly recruited Mr. Cohen to help facilitate the sale of these “stranger-owned annuities.” Under false pretenses, both men allegedly received their broker-dealers’ approval to sell the annuities. The brokers reaped a windfall in commissions from their sale, the SEC claimed, with Mr. Horowitz obtaining more than $300,000 and Mr. Cohen snagging more than $700,000.

“This was a calculated fraud exploiting terminally ill patients,” Julie M. Riewe, co-chief of the SEC’s Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit, said in a news release.

(See also: SEC says investors need to know more about fees)

At the heart of the matter is the fact that variable annuities don’t require proof of insurable interest or a physical examination of the annuitant — the person whose demise would trigger the payout of the annuity’s death benefits.

Mr. Horowitz allegedly told the contract owners — the wealthy investors funding the variable annuities — to invest aggressively to help drive up the value of the account, according to the complaint. His alleged argument was that there was no way to lose: If the value of the annuity contract climbed, the client would receive it as the death benefit payout following the demise of the terminally ill annuitant. If the value fell, then clients received a death benefit that guaranteed a payout equal to the premiums paid minus any withdrawals, according to the SEC’s complaint.

At least 16 terminally ill people were designated the annuitants in some 50 variable annuity contracts that were allegedly sold by Mr. Horowitz, Mr. Cohen or other associates, according to the SEC. All of the patients lived in southern California or Chicago.

The SEC also singled out three individuals for their role in allegedly identifying sickly patients to be annuitants: Harold Ten of Los Angeles, Menachem “Mark” Berger of Chicago and Debra Flowers of Chicago.

In order to obtain identification information, Mr. Ten allegedly started up a business that purported to provide charitable aid to people in hospice care, according to the complaint. Mr. Berger, meanwhile, is the executive director of a firm that owns and operates nursing homes in Chicago and the owner of a firm that supposedly provided financial aid to the terminally ill. Ms. Flowers, meanwhile, had worked for Mr. Berger as an admissions and marketing director for the nursing homes he oversaw, according to the SEC.

In fall 2007, Mr. Horowitz allegedly sought to expand his variable annuities scheme beyond retail clients and tap institutional investors. He allegedly met with the principals of two affiliated hedge funds in New York, which led to the establishment of an affiliate called BDL Group, advised by BDL Manager, according to the suit.

The principals of the hedge fund allegedly retained commodities trader Howard A. Feder of Woodmere, N.Y. to operate BDL Group and BDL Manager, according to the SEC. The supposed investment strategy here was to obtain guaranteed short-term gains by exploiting the annuity contract’s bonus credit and enhanced death benefit provisions, seeking terminally ill people to be annuitants, aggressively invest the premiums and then roll the death benefits into new stranger-owned annuity deals, according to the complaint.

Finally, the SEC filed a complaint against former registered representatives Richard Mark Horowitz and Marc Steven Firestone, both of Los Angeles, for negligently permitting point-of-sale forms for a dozen annuities in this scheme to be submitted to their broker-dealer, NFP Securities Inc.

The sales took place between mid-November and mid-December 2007, according to the SEC. Mr. Firestone allegedly signed off on the variable annuities — supposedly with the knowledge of Richard Horowitz, his supervisor — and submitted them to NFP with incorrect information on the investors’ time horizons, the SEC alleged.

NFP is not a named defendant in the SEC’s case. Emily Deissler, a spokeswoman for NFP, said the firm declined to comment.

Though the litigation with Mr. Horowitz and Mr. Cohen is still continuing, the SEC also obtained some $4.5 million in settlements from other parties in the elaborate grift.

Mr. Ten agreed to pay a disgorgement of $181,147, plus prejudgment interest of $20,858 and a penalty of $90,000. Mr. Berger agreed to pay $119,000 in disgorgement, plus $11,579 in prejudgment interest and a penalty of $100,000.

Ms. Flowers, meanwhile, submitted a sworn statement of financial condition last May and a sworn declaration in October 2013, asserting her inability to pay the penalties and disgorgement.

Mr. Feder will pay a penalty of $130,000. BDL Manager will pay a disgorgement of $1.5 million, prejudgment interest of $196,608 and a penalty of $1.5 million.

Finally, Mr. Horowitz will pay a disgorgement of $292,767, plus prejudgment interest of $36,512 and a penalty of $40,800. Mr. Firestone will pay $127,853 in disgorgement, prejudgment interest of $17,140 and a penalty of $40,800.

Attorney Eliot Lauer of Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle is representing Mr. Feder and BDL Manager. He had no comment on the SEC’s case. Attorneys for the other defendants did not immediately return calls.

As elaborate as this latest “stranger-owned annuities” caper is, it’s hardly the first such scheme. Cranston, R.I.-based estate planning attorney Joseph Caramadre captured the attention of regulators, compliance professionals and the media more than four years ago when he was the subject of civil suits filed by life insurers for allegedly soliciting terminally ill people to be annuitants on variable annuity contracts with death benefits.

Litigation flew: The issuing insurers sued the broker-dealers and registered reps who allegedly sold the annuities. In turn, the broker-dealers countersued the life insurers.

Federal authorities filed conspiracy and wire fraud charges against Mr. Caramadre in relation to the scheme. He was sentenced to six years in prison last December.

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