Society is fragile and vulnerable compared to 1930s, more prone to collapse

Oct 27, 2008. James Wesley, Rawles. The Depression of the 1930s–Why No Societal Collapse? survivalblog.com

There are some substantial differences between our society in the early 21st Century, and America in the 1930s. With these differences, our society is now much more fragile and vulnerable to collapse. Here are a few that come immediately to mind:

Consider the Attributes of America in the 1930s :

  • A largely agrarian and self-sufficient society. (Now, just 1% of the population operating farms and ranches feed the other 99%.)
  • Not heavily dependent on computing and communications, technology, grid power, and petroleum-based fuels.
  • Shorter chains of supply. Most food was grown within 100 miles of where people lived.
  • A very small underclass that was dependent on charity or public welfare.
  • Lower property tax rates and lower (or nonexistent) license fees, vehicle registration fees, et cetera.
  • The majority of workers lived near their work.
  • Most displaced workers were willing to accept lower-paying jobs–even doing hard physical labor.
  • The entire nation was economically self-sufficient and could carry on without many imports.
  • Far greater self-sufficiency at the household level (domestic water wells, windmills, wood burning stoves, home vegetable gardens, home canning, and so forth)
  • A much lower level of indebtedness (public and private). At the outset of the Depression most families had cash savings. (We are now a nation of debtors.)
  • A sound currency, still backed by specie. (Although FDR’s administration seized most privately-held gold in 1933, the currency was at least still fully redeemable in silver coinage until 1964.)
  • Lower percentage of corporate employment–so there were less risk of huge layoffs that would devastate communities
  • A significantly more moral society that still had compunctions and a prevalently law-abiding attitude.
  • A homogeneous population that largely shared common Judeo-Christian values. A much larger portion of society attended church regularly
  • A simpler, less extravagant lifestyle, with tastes in cooking and entertainment that did not require large outlays of cash.
  • Most families owned only one car (with proportionately lower registration and insurance costs), and they lived in smaller homes that were less expensive to heat.

In summary, in the 1930s it cost a lot less to live (as a percentage of income) and people were willing, able, and accustomed to “making do” without. When people lost their jobs, in many cases they didn’t lose their homes because they were paid for. Many folks could simply revert to a self-sufficient lifestyle and earn enough with odd jobs to pay their property taxes. What fraction of

The bottom line: If America were to experience a Second Great Depression, given the high level of debt and systems dependence, there would be enormous rates of dislocation and homelessness. And with modern-day immorality and the prevalent “me first ” attitude, I have no doubt that riots and looting would absolutely explode.

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Money versus Credit or Hyperinflation versus Hyperexpansion

I’ve put in several articles by Nicole Foss here on these topics.

Resurgence of Risk – A Primer on the Develop(ed) Credit Crunch

The Inverted Pyramid – Money versus Credit (or Hyperinflation versus Hyperexpansion)

Money and credit are not the same thing, although people currently use them interchangeably. Money is a physical commodity, while credit is virtual wealth borrowed into existence. Money can be subject to inflation, either by printing currency or by debasing specie (reducing the precious metal content of coins), but does not disappear. Credit, on the other hand, can expand dramatically through financial alchemy, but has no physical existence, although its effects are certainly tangible.

Because credit is used as a money substitute in the financial markets, it acts as an inflationary force in the asset markets (and this spills over into the real world as the imaginary wealth thus created leads to overconsumption and malinvestments), but it is all ephemeral – in the end, it is still credit, not money. As soon as money is needed in lieu of credit, such as has now happened in the CMO and CDO markets, it becomes clear that the money simply isn’t there.”

Weimar Germany or present day Zimbabwe are examples of hyperinflation, but the Roaring Twenties and our situation are instead examples of credit hyperexpansion. Inflation is a chronic scourge, but credit expansions are self-limiting – they proceed until the debt that creates them can no longer be serviced, at which point that debt implodes in a sea of margin calls.

There is actually very little real cash out there relative to credit. The “sudden demand for cash” is in fact the world’s biggest margin call to date.

The value of credit is only as good as the promise that stands behind it, and when that promise cannot be kept, value abruptly disappears.

Let’s suppose that a lender starts with a million dollars and the borrower starts with zero. Upon extending the loan, the borrower possesses the million dollars, yet the lender feels that he still owns the million dollars that he lent out. If anyone asks the lender what he is worth, he says, “a million dollars,” and shows the note to prove it. Because of this conviction, there is, in the minds of the debtor and the creditor combined, two million dollars worth of value where before there was only one. When the lender calls in the debt and the borrower pays it, he gets back his million dollars. If the borrower can’t pay it, the value of the note goes to zero. Either way, the extra value disappears. If the original lender sold his note for cash, then someone else down the line loses. In an actively traded bond market, the result of a sudden default is like a game of “hot potato”: whoever holds it last loses. When the volume of credit is large, investors can perceive vast sums of money and value where in fact there are only repayment contracts, which are financial assets dependent upon consensus valuation and the ability of debtors to pay. IOUs can be issued indefinitely, but they have value only as long as their debtors can live up to them and only to the extent that people believe that they will.

Essentially, the gargantuan edifice of leveraged debt that has been accumulated during the years of credit expansion can be described as an inverted pyramid. Its point rests squarely on those at the bottom – for instance the subprime mortgage holders who’s relatively modest debts have been leveraged into trillions of dollars worth of derivatives. Each dollar of subprime mortgage debt probably underpins at least a hundred dollars of additional debt, and these loans will go into default en masse once the ARMs begin to reset in earnest. The leverage that has magnified gains on the way up, will magnify losses in a debt implosion on the way down.

Until now, his debt was an asset of the fund, and was being used as collateral against loans ten times its value. But the moment that Mr. Jones gave up on the idea of home ownership, the value of his mortgage simply disappeared. The paper asset, which derived its value from Mr. Jones’s promise, was destroyed. This had a cascading effect, since Mr. Jones’s mortgage was being used as collateral to borrow money to buy even more subprime mortgages, many of which were also defaulting. Assets purchased on borrowed money were now worthless. Only the debts remained, and suddenly there was more debt than the original amount that investors had put into the fund. These original funds would be needed repay the debts incurred by the fund. Nothing is left to return to investors.
Liquidity Traps and the Mood of the Market

greed and despair in marketsCentral bankers act as midwives for credit expansion – manipulating the cost of credit in order to encourage borrowing and lending. However, this cannot continue indefinitely as it does not occur in a vacuum. Central bankers have a range of options open to them, but ultimately the financial circumstances, and the mindsets, of both borrowers and lenders are important to whether or not credit expansion can be maintained.

The Fed really only can do two things. They can lower margin requirements for banks, the amount of capital they have to hold to make loans. That it has already driven to basically zero. So the Fed cannot allow banks any more “leeway” than it already has.

They can also perform open market money operations like REPOS and coupon passes. The Fed calls up big banks and buys their government bonds out of their portfolio. But they don’t buy them with real money; they buy them with credit newly created just for that purpose. The big bank can then lend that credit out in a much greater amount because the Fed only requires them to keep a small fraction of that credit to support whatever the bank wants to lend out. This is our wonderful fractional reserve system. If everyone went to the bank to get their “savings” at once they would find that they could get out less than 1%.

But here is the key. The bank must ultimately be willing to lend it and then find some investor to borrow it. This has been no problem whatsoever over the last several years. Now most investors realize that they have too much debt, that their level of income cannot support it. Banks realize this too and have increased their lending requirements. The last borrower is always the most aggressive speculator.

So most market participants are now looking for ways to pay back debt (deflation) just when the Fed is desperate to get investors to borrow more (inflation).

This conundrum is a form of liquidity trap – a shortfall in demand for credit that the policy tools of central bankers have great difficulty influencing. Keynes referred to this type of scenario as “pushing on a piece of string”. We are still in the early stages of this credit crunch and as yet, the Fed has not employed all the tools at its disposal. Most notably, it has not yet cut interest rates, likely due to recent Chinese threats to dump the dollar.

As the dollar should benefit from a flight to quality as credit spreads (the risk premium over treasuries) widen, there should be scope to cut interest rates later in the year. It is likely, however, that this will be less effective than the Fed would hope.

The theory is flawed. Central banks promising new credit to strapped banks only helps them with their current problems. It will not get new credit into a system that can’t take anymore. Banks, given their situation, are reducing drastically their new commitments, as they should. Borrowers can’t afford to borrow more.

The continuation of the credit expansion will remain dependent on a supply of ready, willing and able borrowers and lenders, and those already appear to be in short supply.

A trend of credit expansion has two components: the general willingness to lend and borrow and the general ability of borrowers to pay interest and principal. These components depend respectively upon (1) the trend of people’s confidence, i.e., whether both creditors and debtors think that debtors will be able to pay, and (2) the trend of production, which makes it either easier or harder in actuality for debtors to pay. So as long as confidence and productivity increase, the supply of credit tends to expand. The expansion of credit ends when the desire or ability to sustain the trend can no longer be maintained. As confidence and productivity decrease, the supply of credit contracts.

A significant headwind faced by the central bankers is the dramatic change in the mood of the market in recent weeks. It is said that humans have only two modes – complacency and panic, and markets, being a human construct, are no exception. The current mood of the market is one of fear, and if fear becomes panic, it can remove liquidity from the market far faster than even a central banker can pump it in. Actual cash is in short supply, and the many investors are afraid that the game of musical chairs will end before they can grab one of the very few chairs. If they do manage to find a chair, it will be difficult to convince them to part with it, no matter what the inducement. Risk has made a definitive comeback.

Deflation and the Mother of All Margin Calls

A credit expansion cannot be sustained indefinitely. At some point the burden of debt begins to stifle the ability to produce. The debt industry can take on a parasitic life of it’s own, becoming an integral part of the culture, from the level of the individual, as documented by James Scurlock in Maxed Out, to the level of corporations and government. The attention paid to assessing credit ratings, monitoring credit activity, hounding defaulters, writing off bad debt, juggling minimum payments, thinking of creative ways to exploit leverage, and encouraging every last entity to take on more debt in order that predatory lenders might wring out every last penny of profit, is attention not paid to productive activities of the kind that build successful economies. Eventually, it requires so much energy to maintain that economic performance suffers and extracting sufficient profit to cover interest payments on ever-increasing credit balances becomes impossible. A mood of conservation eventually takes hold, replacing the expansionary fervour, and reducing the velocity of money.

When the burden becomes too great for the economy to support and the trend reverses, reductions in lending, spending and production cause debtors to earn less money with which to pay off their debts, so defaults rise. Default and fear of default exacerbate the new trend in psychology, which in turn causes creditors to reduce lending further. A downward “spiral” begins, feeding on pessimism just as the previous boom fed on optimism. The resulting cascade of debt liquidation is a deflationary crash. Debts are retired by paying them off, “restructuring” or default. In the first case, no value is lost; in the second, some value; in the third, all value. In desperately trying to raise cash to pay off loans, borrowers bring all kinds of assets to market, including stocks, bonds, commodities and real estate, causing their prices to plummet. The process ends only after the supply of credit falls to a level at which it is collateralized acceptably to the surviving creditors.

In such an environment, financial values can disappear very quickly, leaving behind only stranded debt. All it takes for an asset class to be devalued is for as few as two parties among many to agree to a new lower price. The remainder need do nothing, other than refrain from disputing the new valuation, for their net worth to fall. In this way, a few discounted house sales can bring down the value of a neighborhood, and that lost value, which may have been underpinning a hundred times its worth in leveraged debt, is magnified through the inverted debt pyramid. The majority who do nothing end up watching the investment value of their assets plummet, while the owners of debt attempt to call in whatever value they can, from wherever they can, through margin calls.

The United States faces a severe credit crunch as mounting losses on risky forms of debt catch up with the banks and force them to curb lending and call in existing loans, according to a report by Lombard Street Research.

“Excess liquidity in the global system will be slashed,” it said. “Banks’ capital is about to be decimated, which will require calling in a swathe of loans. This is going to aggravate the US hard landing.”

“The complexity of this era of credit liquidation,” as Robert Smitley wrote of the Great Depression in ’30s America, “is far too great for the mob mind to grasp. It is hardly possible for them to see the picture wherein about $700 billion dollars of physical and intangible wealth is attempting to be turned into about $5 billion dollars of money.”

How much intangible debt now needs to be squeezed back into how much real money? It would be easier to find a cheap mortgage – with no ugly ARM once the teaser is finished – than guess at those numbers today.

We are expecting deflation at TAE (TheAutomaticEarth).

Inflation and deflation do not describe rising or falling prices.

Inflation and deflation are monetary phenomena. Inflation = an increase in supply of money and credit relative to available goods and services (deflation a decrease).

Rising prices are often a lagging indicator of an increase in the effective money supply, as falling prices are of a decrease. There is an important distinction to be made between nominal prices and real prices, however. Nominal prices can be misleading as they are not adjusted for changes in the money supply and so do not reflect affordability. Real prices, which are so adjusted, are a far more important measure.

Nominal prices typically rise during inflationary times as there is more money available to support higher prices, but prices need not rise evenly, and some prices may fall, depending on other factors. In real terms the picture would be quite different, as increases would be smaller and decreases would larger. When nominal prices fall despite inflation, it means that the price in real terms is plummeting. For instance, global wage arbitrage allowed the price of imported goods to fall drastically in real terms. In deflationary times, nominal prices typically fall across the board, but prices need not fall in real terms, and, in cases of scarcity, may well rise.

The easy availability of cheap credit has conveyed a considerable amount of price support – price support that will be progressively withdrawn as credit tightens. Prices will fall, but the collapse of credit will cause purchasing power to fall faster than price, leading to the apparent paradox of nominally cheaper goods being less affordable in the future than nominally more expensive goods are today. Moreover, there are likely to be substantial changes in relative prices between essentials and non-essentials. As a much larger percentage of a much smaller money supply will be chasing essentials such as food and energy, there will be relative price support for those items. In other words, while everything is becoming less affordable due to the collapse of purchasing power, essentials such a food and energy will be the least affordable of all, whatever the nominal price. People commonly speak of unaffordable prices as a result of inflation, but do not realize that deflation can have the same effect, only much more abruptly.

Thanks to a credit boom that dates back to at least the early 1980s, and which accelerated rapidly after the millennium, the vast majority of the effective money supply is credit. A credit boom can mimic currency inflation in important ways, as credit acts as a money equivalent during the expansion phase. There are, however, important differences. Whereas currency inflation divides the real wealth pie into smaller and smaller pieces, devaluing each one in a form of forced loss sharing, credit expansion creates multiple and mutually exclusive claims to the same pieces of pie. This generates the appearance of a substantial increase in real wealth through leverage, but is an illusion. The apparent wealth is virtual, and once expansion morphs into contraction, the excess claims are rapidly extinguished in a chaotic real wealth grab. It is this prospect that we are currently facing today, as credit destruction is already well underway, and the destruction of credit is hugely deflationary. As money is the lubricant in the economic engine, a shortage will cause that engine to seize up, as happened in the 1930s. An important point to remember is that demand is not what people want, it is what they are ready, willing and able to pay for. The fall in aggregate demand that characterizes a depression reflects a lack of purchasing power, not a lack of want. With very little money and no access to credit, people can starve amid plenty.

Attempts by governments and central bankers to reinflate the money supply are doomed to fail as debt monetization cannot keep pace with credit destruction, and liquidity injected into the system is being hoarded by nervous banks rather than being used to initiate new lending, as was the stated intent of the various bailout schemes. Bailouts only ever benefit a few insiders. Available credit is already being squeezed across the board, although we are still far closer to the beginning of the contraction than the end of it. Further attempts at reinflation may eventually cause a crisis of confidence among international lenders, which could lead to a serious dislocation in the treasury bond market at some point. If a debt-junkie economy can no longer easily raise funds, then interest rates would rise substantially and spending at home would be drastically cut. This would be the financial equivalent of hitting the ’emergency stop’ button on the economy, as it would cause a far larger rash of defaults than anything we have seen so far. We are not there yet though. Currently the dollar is benefiting from an international flight to safety, and it will probably continue to do so for some time, despite temporary counter-trend pullbacks from time to time.

We have seen a pattern of ebb and flow of market liquidity since February 2007, when the credit crisis arguably began. A constellation of market trends has largely moved in synch with liquidity. As liquidity falls, equities fall, bond yields fall (and prices rise), commodities fall, precious metals fall, real estate falls and the dollar rises, as cash becomes king. When we see market rallies, in contrast, rallies in bond yields, commodities, and metals are also common, and the dollar experiences a pullback. We appear to be beginning a market rally at the moment, which should lead to precisely this set of trend reversals. Such a rally is only temporary relief however. It may last for a couple of months, but then the decline should resume with a vengeance.

We have a very long way to fall, and the deleveraging process is likely to play out over several years. During this time we can expect to be mired in a worse depression than the 1930s, as the excesses that led to our current situation are far worse by every measure than were those of the Roaring Twenties. Unfortunately, we are much less prepared to face such an occurrence than were our grandparents. Our expectations are far higher, our knowledge and skill base is much less appropriate, we are far less self-sufficient and we have a structural dependency on cheap energy. This will be a very painful time. Deflation and depression are mutually reinforcing, leading to a vicious circle of decline that is very difficult to escape. It will be over when the (small amount of) remaining debt is acceptably collateralized to the (few) remaining creditors. At that point trust will begin to rebuild.

 Hyperinflation

Some time ago, Gonzalo Lira wrote a couple of interesting pieces on hyperinflation, and I promised to respond to them. This has taken me a while, as there is much material to go through, many arguments to pick apart, areas of agreement and disagreement, differences in definitions and matters of timing.

The first article, How Hyperinflation Will Happen, is a long, thoughtful and detailed piece that I found interesting. There are many aspects I fundamentally disagree with, however, some for reasons of substance and others for reasons of timing.

Essentially the central proposition is that the US dollar is in danger of imminent demise due to a widespread loss of confidence, and that treasuries will be dumped en masse within a year, leading to hyperinflation, by which Mr Lira means price spikes. I do not see a loss of confidence in the dollar going forward, at least not soon. We have seen a long slide in the value of the dollar coincident with the rally in stocks. This is a reflection of a resurgence of confidence in being invested rather than being liquid, but this confidence is fragile and subject to rapid reversal.

I regard the extremely bearish sentiment regarding the dollar specifically as typical of a bottom. Trends take time to become established as received wisdom, and by the time they come to be generally accepted, they are much closer to an end than a beginning. When everyone is bearish, and has acted upon that sentiment, who is left to carry the trend any further in that direction? Market insiders will be taking the other side of the bet, as they always do at turning points. This is how they make their money – by recognizing and feeding off the sentiment of the herd.

When the market rally tops, I expect people to begin chasing liquidity in earnest – too late for many, as liquidity will get much harder to come by. Only a small minority will be able to cash out at the top. I fully expect the dollar to surge in relation to other currencies when this happens, on a knee-jerk flight to safety into the reserve currency as the least-worst option. At that time, I would not expect the US to have difficulties selling treasuries, because I think they will be regarded as the safest option in a horribly unsafe world. This is not rational, as the US is far past the point of no return on repaying its debt, but rationality is not the point, as herding impulses are never rational.

I would also expect the purchasing power of the remaining dollars (i.e. physical cash, of which there is actually very little) to increase substantially in relation to available goods and services domestically, as dollars will be both scarce and essential once credit virtually ceases to exist. Central authorities cannot print cash to alter this situation, as this would trigger an enormous increase in the risk premium charged by the bond market. Hence, cash will remain scarce, and people will hoard what little there is, compounding the effect of deflation through a fall in the velocity of money. In this regard, my view is diametrically opposed to Mr Lira’s.

I see far more imminent problems ahead for the euro than for the US dollar. I expect the shift from optimism to pessimism, that will define the end of the stock market rally, to lead to a rapid resurgence of fear over sovereign debt default risk in Europe. This can only exacerbate the widening regional disparities, and I think it will widen them to breaking point, for the eurozone and perhaps later for the EU itself.

As I have said before, the austerity measures coming for the whole European periphery are going to be severe enough to amount to political suicide for domestic politicians to implement. I think peripheral countries will choose to leave the euro, however high the cost of doing so, as the cost of staying in the eurozone could be even higher. If this does in fact happen, I think we would see an Argentine scenario, where savings are converted into the local currency (which would probably fall even compared with a falling euro), while debts remain in euros. These unpayable debts would then be defaulted on somewhat later. The level of uncertainty would almost certainly lead to massive capital flight from Europe, to America’s temporary benefit.

Naturally the dollar, like all fiat currencies, will eventually die, but I would argue that the time for that is not now. A dollar rally could be measured in years, although not many by any means. My best guess is that we would see perhaps a year or two of dollar rally in a world going increasingly haywire. After that I expect an end to the system of floating currencies, with all manner of attempts at competitive devaluation, currency pegs established and rapidly blown away, and beggar-thy-neighbour policies all round. The risk of currency reissue will rise over time, and be highly locational. I think the risk of reissue in the US is not imminent, but in Europe it should be a much larger concern, especially in peripheral countries.

I agree with this passage from Mr Lira’s article:

But this Fed policy—call it “money-printing”, call it “liquidity injections”, call it “asset price stabilization”—has been overwhelmed by the credit contraction. Just as the Federal government has been unable to fill in the fall in aggregate demand by way of stimulus, the Fed has expanded its balance sheet from some $900 billion in the Fall of ’08, to about $2.3 trillion today—but that additional $1.4 trillion has been no match for the loss of credit. At best, the Fed has been able to alleviate the worst effects of the deflation—it certainly has not turned the deflationary environment into anything resembling inflation.

Yields are low, unemployment up, CPI numbers are down (and under some metrics, negative)—in short, everything screams “deflation”.
This has been occurring under the most favourable of circumstances – a major rally during which people are prepared to suspend disbelief and give central authorities the benefit of the doubt. In all this time, and with all its efforts, the Fed has only been able to slow deflation. Once we turn the corner, confidence (and therefore liquidity) will evaporate again, and the headwind against the Fed will get very much stronger.

If they could not stop deflation under favourable circumstances, their odds of doing so under unfavourable ones must be extremely low. Periods of intense pessimism are not kind to central authorities. Everything they do is too little and too late. Every time they try and fail they look more desperate, which only acts to confirm people’s pessimism in a self-reinforcing spiral. Deflation has a massive psychological component, which the Fed has no tools to fight.

The second major proposition Mr Lira makes is that commodity prices will spike as a consequence of a meltdown in the treasury market:

At the time of the panic, commodities will be perceived as the only sure store of value, if Treasuries are suddenly anathema to the market—just as Treasuries were perceived as the only sure store of value, once so many of the MBS’s and CMBS’s went sour in 2007 and 2008.

It won’t be commodity ETF’s, or derivatives—those will be dismissed (rightfully) as being even less safe than Treasuries. Unlike before the Fall of ’08, this go-around, people will pay attention to counterparty risk. So the run on commodities will be for actual, feel-it-’cause-it’s-there commodities.

As I do not think such a treasury meltdown is imminent, I do not think such knock-on consequences are imminent either. In contrast, I think we are already seeing evidence of a top in commodities, which typically peak on fear of scarcity. I regard the sentiment indicators as strong evidence of such fear, and am therefore looking for a reversal, roughly coincident with a stock market top and a dollar bottom.

We have already seen significant speculative gains in commodities, similar to 2008, and I think that speculation will go into reverse, probably quite sharply. I would then expect a demand collapse to carry prices further to the downside. As I see a speculative reversal followed by a demand collapse setting up a supply collapse, I can see Mr Lira’s scenario possibly playing out in the future, quite possibly coincident with a bond market dislocation as he suggests. It is difficult to predict the timing for such an event, but I see it as being much further in the future than he does.

Because of my objection to the timing, I disagree with Mr Lira’s next assertion:

People—regular Main Street people—will be crazy to buy up commodities (heating oil, food, gasoline, whatever) and buy them now while they are still more-or-less affordable, rather than later, when that $15 gallon of gas shoots to $30 per gallon.

If everyone decides at roughly the same time to exchange one good—currency—for another good—commodities—what happens to the relative price of one and the relative value of the other? Easy: One soars, the other collapses.

When people freak out and begin panic-buying basic commodities, their ordinary financial assets—equities, bonds, etc.—will collapse: Everyone will be rushing to get cash, so as to turn around and buy commodities….[..]

…..This sell-off of assets in pursuit of commodities will be self-reinforcing: There won’t be anything to stop it. As it spills over into the everyday economy, regular people will panic and start unloading hard assets—durable goods, cars and trucks, houses—in order to get commodities, principally heating oil, gas and foodstuffs. In other words, real-world assets will not appreciate or even hold their value, when the hyperinflation comes.
In my view, by the time we see a commodity price spike, the value of people’s financial assets will already have evaporated, they will already have unloaded hard assets, and the dash for cash will already be in the past. I think at that point we will be well into a state of economic seizure, where credit will have disappeared, unemployment will have spiked, incomes will be very precarious, scarce cash will be being hoarded and it will be exceptionally difficult to connect buyers and sellers. Consequently, I do not see most people being in a position to engage in panic buying.

Some many be able to do this, but I think the resource grab is more likely to be a phenomenon operating at the level of the state than at the level of the individual, as most individuals will already have lost almost all their purchasing power. In my opinion, states will certainly engage in a resource grab, and will take supplies off the market, either by sending the tanks or the bilateral contract negotiators into resource-rich regions. States know perfectly well that oil is liquid hegemonic power, and they will be trying to secure their supply in whatever way they can.

I agree with Mr Lira that almost everything will be very much less affordable than it is now, and that this will happen quickly. I do not agree that prices will rise in nominal terms, or that this is in any way a requirement of a drastic fall in affordability. I expect prices to fall in nominal terms, but for purchasing power to fall much more quickly as credit evaporates. Thus as prices fall in nominal terms, affordability decreases, and the essentials end up being the least affordable of all. They will receive relative price support as a much larger percentage of a much smaller money supply ends up chasing them, hence any fall in their prices should be much smaller than for other goods and services. Thus I agree with Mr Lira that the essentials will be drastically less affordable, but I do not think nominal prices need to rise for this to happen.

When we see the inevitable price spike in the future, once demand collapse has led to supply collapse, we could easily see price increases in nominal terms. Against a backdrop of monetary contraction, this would mean prices were going through the roof in real terms (ie adjusted for changes in the money supply). Being able to obtain essentials will be a huge problem, and I fully expect ordinary people to be priced out of the market for many things at that point.

Their survival may then depend on rationing and bare-minimum level handouts. I think the problem will begin before this though, as a collapse in purchasing power prevents people buying essentials for lack of money long before essentials actually become scarce.

The next point of contention between my view and Mr Lira’s is his discussion of Japan’s fortunes:

That’s right: The parallels with Japan are remarkably similar—except for one key difference. Japanese sovereign debt is infinitely more stable than America’s, because in Japan, the people are savers—they own the Japanese debt. In America, the people are broke, and the Nervous Nelly banks own the debt. That’s why Japanese sovereign debt is solid, whereas American Treasuries are soap-bubble-fragile. 
In my view, we are looking at a Japanese scenario in some ways, but on more of an Argentine timeline. Japan has been mired in a long and drawn out deflation, because they had an enormous pile of money to burn through before having to address their banking problems and also because they had an export-oriented economy at a time when they could exploit the largest consumer boom in global history. We are not so fortunate. We find ourselves in a huge debt hole, and as the economic seizure will be global, we will not be able to export our way out of anything, even if we still had yesterday’s productive capacity, which is in any case long gone thanks to global wage arbitrage.

I do not regard Japanese sovereign debt as solid. In fact I think Japan is very close to the final day of reckoning where the problems of the past must finally be faced head on. I see a banking collapse in their near future, compounded by their extreme dependence on imported resources, which they will not be able to afford if their export markets die for lack of consumers with purchasing power.

The main point of contention I have with Mr Lira centres around the longer-term prospects for the USA:

Instead, after a spell of hyperinflation, America will end up pretty much like it is today—only with a bad hangover. Actually, a hyperinflationist spell might be a good thing: It would finally clean out all the bad debts in the economy, the crap that the Fed and the Federal government refused to clean out when they had the chance in 2007–’09. It would break down and reset asset prices to more realistic levels—no more $12 million one-bedroom co-ops on the UES.

And all in all, a hyperinflationist catastrophe might in the long run be better for the health of the U.S. economy and the morale of the American people, as opposed to a long drawn-out stagnation. Ask the Japanese if they would have preferred a couple-three really bad years, instead of Two Lost Decades, and the answer won’t be surprising.
I do not see this as a transitory problem leading back to business as usual, and I mean NEVER returning to what we would now regard as business as usual, let alone doing so in only a couple of years.

Deflation and depression are mutually reinforcing. This is a persistent dynamic that should last at least as long as the last depression, and likely longer as every parameter is worse going into depression this time. We have more debt, far more structural dependencies (on cheap energy and cheap credit primarily), looming resource limitations, far higher expectations, a much larger population, a far smaller skill base etc.

I think we are looking at an economic catastrophe of unprecedented proportions, not a bump in the road that can be quickly consigned to history, if only we face our problems head on. In my view we are going to have to live through deflationary deleveraging, a long and grinding depression, and then quite possibly hyperinflation once the international debt financing model is broken, and with it the power of the bond market to constrain currency printing.

This could easily take twenty years to play out, and even then the upheaval is very unlikely to be over. The last time a major bubble burst – the South Sea Bubble of the 1720s – the aftermath lasted for several decades and culminated in a series of revolutions. This bubble is much larger, and the aftermath is likely to be proportional to the excesses of the preceding bubble.

Moreover, I do not see a return to what we consider to be business as usual at any point, because our business as usual scenario is critically dependent on cheap energy, and the energy subsidy inherent in fossil fuels has been a once in a planet’s lifetime deal. We are going to be living on an energy income instead of an energy inheritance, and this will mean living a life none of us in the developed world will recognize.

Posted in Inflation or Deflation | Comments Off on Money versus Credit or Hyperinflation versus Hyperexpansion

Coping with Deflation

2008

Yesterday we talked about why we are facing deflation and today I wanted to review and explain the suggestions we have made previously for dealing with a deflationary scenario. In short, this is the list we have run periodically since we started TAE (with one addition at the end):

1) Hold no debt (for most people this means renting)

2) Hold cash and cash equivalents (short term treasuries) under your own control

3) Don’t trust the banking system, deposit insurance or no deposit insurance

4) Sell equities, real estate, most bonds, commodities, collectibles (or short if you can afford to gamble)

One important point to note with regard to commodities is that commodities have already fallen along way since I first published the above list of suggestions. At that time, selling commodities was a very good idea, but now, since commodities are already down a very long way, it may depend on the commodity

5) Gain some control over the necessities of your own existence if you can afford it

6) Be prepared to work with others as that will give you far greater scope for resilience and security

7) If you have done all that and still have spare resources, consider precious metals as an insurance policy

8) Be worth more to your employer than he is paying you

9) Look after your health!

1) The reason that getting rid of debt is priority #1 is that during deflation, real interest rates will be punishingly high even if nominal rates are low. That is because the real rate (adjusted for changes in the money supply) is the nominal rate minus inflation, which can be positive or negative. During inflationary times, this means that the real rate of interest is lower than the nominal rate, and can even be negative as it was during parts of then 1970s and again in the middle of our own decade. People have taken on huge amounts of debt because they were effectively being paid to borrow, but periods of negative real interest rates are a trap. They lure people into too much debt that they may not be able to service if real rates rise even a little. Most people are thoroughly enmeshed in that trap now as real rates are set to rise substantially.

When inflation is negative (i.e. deflation), the real rate of interest is the nominal rate minus negative inflation. In other words, the real rate is higher than the nominal rate, possibly significantly higher. Even if the nominal rate is zero, the real rate can be high enough to stifle economic activity, as Japan discover during their long sojourn in the liquidity trap. Standard money supply measures don’t necessarily capture the scope of the problem as they don’t adequately account for on-going credit destruction, when credit has come to represent such a large percentage of the effective money supply.

The difficulty from the point of view of debtors can be compounded by the risk that nominal interest rates will not stay low for years, as they did in Japan, but may shoot up as the international debt financing model comes under stress. For instance, on-going bailouts may cause international lenders to balk at purchasing long term treasuries for fear of their effect on the value of the dollar, even though those bailouts are not increasing liquidity thanks to hoarding behaviour by banks. We are not there yet, but the probability of this scenario rises as we move forward with current policies. The effect would be to send nominal interest rates into the double digits, and real interest rates would be even higher. The chances of being able to service existing debts under those circumstances are not good, especially as unemployment will be rising very quickly.

There is no safe level of debt to hold, including mortgages. For those who are not able to own a home outright, most would be much better off selling and renting, as real estate becomes illiquid faster than almost anything else in a depression. By the time you realize that you need to sell because you can no longer pay the mortgage, it may be too late. Renting is essentially paying someone else a fee to take the property price risk for you, which is a very good bet during a real estate crash. It would also allow you address point #2 – having access to liquidity.

2) Holding cash and cash equivalents (i.e. short term treasuries) is vital as purchasing power will be in short supply. Cash is king in a deflation. Access to credit is already decreasing and will eventually disappear for ordinary people. Mass access to credit has been a product of an historic credit expansion that expanded the supply of pockets to pick to an unprecedented extent, feeding off widespread debt slavery in the process. As you can’t count on the availability of credit for much longer, you will need savings in liquid form that you can always access.

When interest rates spike, not only will debt become a millstone round your neck, but a debt-junkie government forced to pay very high rates will be in the same position. As a result government spending will have to be cut drastically, withdrawing the social safety net just as it is most needed. In practical terms, this means being on your own in a pay-as-you-go world. You do NOT want to face this eventuality with no money.

3) Keeping the savings you need in the banking system is problematic. The banking system is deeply mired in the crisis in the derivatives market. Huge percentages of their assets are not marked-to-market, but marked-to-make-believe using their own unverifiable models. The market price would be pennies on the dollar for many of these ‘assets’ at this point, and poised to get worse rapidly as the forced assets sales that are coming will lower prices further. The losses will eventually dwarf anything we have seen so far, pushing more institutions into mergers or bankruptcy, and mergers are becoming more difficult as the pool of potential partners shrinks.

If we do see a rash of bank failures, each of which weakens the position of others as the sale of their assets and unwinding of their derivative positions can re-price similar ‘assets’ held by other parties, then deposit insurance will not be worth the paper it’s written on. When everything is guaranteed, nothing is, as the government cannot guarantee value. Savings held in these institutions are at much higher risk than commonly thought due to the systemic threats posed by a derivatives meltdown and spreading crisis of confidence. Fractional reserve banking depends on depositors not wanting their money back all at once, in fact with reserve requirements so whittled away in recent years, it depends on no more than a fraction of 1% of depositors wanting their money back at once. This is a huge vulnerability and the government deposit guarantee is a bluff waiting to be called.

4) The general rule of thumb in a deflation is to sell everything that isn’t nailed down and then sell whatever everything else is nailed to, for the reasons that assets prices will fall further than most people imagine to be possible, and the liquidity gained by selling (hopefully) solves the debt and accessible savings problems (provided you don’t lose the proceeds in a bank run). Asset prices will fall because everywhere people will be trying to cash out, by selling not what they’d like to, but what they can. This means that all manner of assets will be offered for sale at once, and at a time when there are few buyers, this will push prices down to pennies on the dollar for many assets.

For those few who still have liquidity, it will be a time when there are many choices available very cheaply. In other words, if you manage to look after the proceeds from the sale of your former assets, you should be able to buy them back later from much less money. Of course flashing your wealth around at that point could be highly inadvisable from a personal safety perspective, and you may find that you’d rather hang on to your money anyway, since it will be getting harder and harder to earn any more of it. During the Great Depression, some of the best farms in the country were foreclosed up on and received no bids at auction, not because they had no value, but because those few with money were hanging on to it for dear life.

Being entirely liquid has its own risks, which is why I wouldn’t sell assets that insulate you from economic disruption if you didn’t buy them on margin (ie with borrowed money that you may not be able to pay back) and if you have enough liquidity already that you can afford to keep them. For instance, a well equipped homestead owned free and clear is a valuable thing indeed, whatever its nominal price. It is totally different from investment real estate owned on margin, where the point of the exercise is property price speculation at a time when doing so is disastrous.

One important point to note with regard to commodities is that commodities have already fallen along way since I first published the above list of suggestions. At that time, selling commodities was a very good idea, but now, since commodities are already down a very long way, it may depend on the commodity in question. If you only own commodities in paper form then selling is still a good idea in my opinion, as there are generally more paper claims than there are commodities, and excess claims will be extinguished. At some point soon I will write an intro on my view of energy specifically, since energy is the master resource. In short, we are seeing a demand collapse now, but eventually we will see a supply collapse, and it is difficult to predict which will be falling fastest at which times.

5) If you already have no debt and have liquidity on hand, I would strongly suggest that you try to gain some control over the essentials of your own existence. We live in a just-in-time economy with little inventory on hand. Economic disruption, as we are already seeing thanks to the problems with letters of credit for shipments, could therefore result in empty shelves more quickly than you might imagine. Unfortunately, rumors of shortages can cause shortages whether or not the rumor is true, as people tend to panic buy all at once. If you want to stock up, then I suggest you beat the rush and do it while it’s still relatively easy. You need to try to ensure supplies of food and water and the means to keep yourselves warm (or cool as the case may be). Storage of all kinds of basic supplies is a good idea if you can manage it – medicines, first aid supplies, batteries, hand tools, wind-up radios, solar cookers, a Coleman stove and liquid fuel for it, soap etc.

At the moment, there are many things you can obtain with the internet and a credit card, but that will not be the case in the future. Water filters are a good example, as the quality of water available to you is likely to deteriorate. You can buy the kind of filters that aid agencies use oversees for all of about $250, with extra filter elements for a few tens of dollars at sites such as Lehmans Non-Electric Catalogue or the Country Living Grain Mill site.

6) Most people will not be able to get very far down this list on their own, which is why we suggest working with others as much as possible and pooling resources if you can bring yourself to do so. Together you can achieve far greater preparedness than you could hope to do alone, plus you will be building social capital that will stand you in good stead later on.

7) If you have already taken care of the basics, then you may want to put at least some of whatever excess you still have into precious metals (in physical form). Although the price of metals should still have further to fall, since distressed sales have not yet had an effect on price, obtaining them could get more difficult. Buying them now would amount to paying a premium price for an insurance policy, which may make sense for some and not for others. Metals will hold their value over the long term as they have for thousands of years, but you may have to sit on them for a very long time, so don’t by them with money you might need access to over the next few years.

Metal ownership may well be made illegal, as it was during the Great Depression, when gold was confiscated from safety deposit boxes without compensation. That doesn’t stop you owning it, but it does make ownership far more complicated, and makes trading it for anything you might need even more so. You could easily attract the wrong kind of attention and that could have unpleasant consequences. In short, gold is no panacea. Other options may be far more practical and useful, although there is an argument for having a certain amount of portable wealth in concentrated form if you should have to move suddenly.

8) Being worth more to your employer than he is paying you is a good idea at a time when unemployment is set to rise dramatically. This is not the time to push for a raise that would make you an expensive option for a cash-strapped boss, and in fact you may have to accept pay cuts in order to keep your job. During inflationary times, people can suffer cuts to their purchasing power year after year, but they don’t complain because they don’t notice that their wage increases are not keeping up with inflation. However, deflation brings the whole issue into the harsh light of day.

People would have to take pay and benefit cuts for their purchasing power to stay the same, thanks to the increasing value of cash, but keeping people’s purchasing power the same will not be an option for most employers, who will be struggling themselves. In other words, expect large cuts to pay and benefits. As unions will never accept this, for obvious reasons, since their membership has its own fixed costs, there will be war in the labour markets, at great cost to all. You need to reduce your structural dependence on earning anything like the amount of money you earn now, and don’t expect benefits such as pensions to be paid as promised.

9) Your health is the most important thing you can have, and most citizens of developed societies are nowhere near fit and healthy enough. Already medical bills are the most common reason for bankruptcy in the US, and while you can’t protect yourself against every form of medical eventuality, you can at least improve your fitness. You will be be living in a world where hard physical work will be much more prevalent than it is now, and most people are ill-equipped to cope. The solution Ilargi and I have chosen, as we have mentioned before, is the P90X home fitness programme. While it wouldn’t be the right choice for everyone, if I can do it, as I have for 11 months already, then most people can. For others, there are gentler options available, but everyone should consider doing something to make themselves as healthy and robust as possible.

We here at TAE wish you the best of luck at this difficult time. We will all need it.

Posted in Investing advice | Comments Off on Coping with Deflation

Cost of the bailout of the Banksters and Wall Street

Jim Bianco of Bianco Research crunched the inflation adjusted numbers. The bailout has cost more than all of these big budget government expenditures –- combined:

Marshall Plan: Cost: $12.7 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $115.3 billion
Louisiana Purchase : Cost: $15 million, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $217 billion
Race to the Moon: Cost: $36.4 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $237 billion
S&L Crisis: Cost: $153 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $256 billion
Korean War: Cost: $54 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $454 billion
The New Deal: Cost: $32 billion (Est), Inflation Adjusted Cost: $500 billion (Est)
Invasion of Iraq : Cost: $551b, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $597 billion
Vietnam War: Cost: $111 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $698 billion
NASA: Cost: $416.7 billion, Inflation Adjusted Cost: $851.2 billion

TOTAL: $3.92 trillion

Posted in Corporate Welfare | Comments Off on Cost of the bailout of the Banksters and Wall Street

Dailyreckoning

Preface. Bonner & Wiggins at the dailyreckoning called the 2008 housing crash in 2002 and the 2000 dot.com crash in 1999. They’ve got a lot right, a lot wrong, and are always entertaining to read. A few random excerpts are below.

As I realized how much the world depended on energy, not money, I grew less interested in the economy, and on investing, though this knowledge did allow me to invest so well I retired at 50 thanks to the dailyreckoning, the automaticearth and other fringe economic news advice.

But at some point money will be worth nothing, energy everything since our bodies and everything else depends on it. Life itself.  In peak oil circles it was called the money/energy transition. So I stopped reading this and other economic newsletters years ago.  The dailyreckoning was mainly  about trying to talk readers into buying precious metals. Which I might have done if I had grandchildren likely to make it through the bottleneck ahead when everything settles down after collapse, but I don’t, and during collapse the local gangs are likely to raid your house, especially if you spend your silver or gold anywhere during the crisis.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Bill Bonner.  2017. A Gold bug goes bad, volume 4 issue 2.

In monetary terms, Alan Greenspan really was the most important person of this whole bubble era. What I refer to as the “bubble era” is loosely the period since 1971 until the debt bubble blows up (which hasn’t happened yet), and more precisely, the period after Paul Volcker had wrung inflation expectations out of the U.S. economy. Mr. Greenspan, Volcker’s successor, took over at the Fed in August 1987. He left it in January of 2006. During those 19 years, the U.S. economy changed in fundamental ways, some obvious, some not so obvious. In the first category, interest rates fell from 7.4% to 4.5%, using the 10-year Treasury note as a measure. More remarkable was that they were poised to fall even further… down to a low of 1.38% in July of this past year.

That downward trend of yields began in 1980. So it’s been going on now for 37 years. And this is about the fifth time I thought I saw the bottom. But who knows?

If you wanted something – land, slaves, women – you had to take it from someone else. And then you could force him to pay tribute! These were zero-sum exchanges. They had to be; there was very little wealth creation.

Also in the category of the obvious, the stock market rose from Dow 2,680 in January 1986 to 10,865 the day Greenspan left his desk at the Fed. These two things together – stocks and bonds; we won’t even bother with real estate – represented a gain of $37 trillion in capital value to the investment-owning classes.

Everyone considered this a positive development. Dr. Greenspan was celebrated as early as 1999 on the cover of Time magazine as the central figure in the “Committee to Save the World” for his role in protecting this wealth. The following year, famed author Bob Woodward’s book celebrated him as “The Maestro.” And Sebastian Mallaby, another celebrated author, still refers to him as “The Man Who Knew.

But where did the money come from? That $37 trillion of stock and bond wealth? U.S. GDP rose during the same period, from $5 trillion to $10 trillion, but that was only half as fast as the stock market. In other words, the “wealth” represented in the equity and fixed income markets couldn’t have come from new Main Street output. Instead, it must have come from the money system itself, over which Dr. Greenspan presided.

Before the invention of portable, modern money, property rights, and capitalism, the best (and often the only) way to get ahead was by violence.

Here at The Bill Bonner Letter, we hope to be a consistent and coherent critic of the use of force in markets. We don’t know if stocks are going up or down. We don’t know how many people will buy the Tesla. We don’t know when the Chinese “red-bubble” economy will blow up. But we know – from both theory and observation – that trying to control or manage economies doesn’t work. And we are nearly the only people in the world who are free to say so. All depend on cheap money. And all will fight tooth and nail to preserve this debt-financing system… Big corporations, governments, think tanks, Wall Street – all of them depend too heavily on the fake, post-1971 dollar and central bank manipulation. They can’t tell the truth. They’re paid not to see it and, if they catch a glimpse out of the corner of their eye, not to say anything.

An Empire of Debt

We have a pernicious and corrupt financial system. It is used by honest industry and commerce. But it also finances a political system, which has grown much larger and more aggressive in the fake-money era. What we wanted to know from Dr. Greenspan was to what extent the financial system is now hostage to the political system it financed.

Is it still possible today, we asked, for the central bank to navigate us out of this bubble by leading and managing a debt deflation? If not, what happens?

Last year, the empire conducted military operations in 118 different countries. It dropped 26,171 bombs last year.

And when you aggregate the costs of all foreign and security operations, it spent about $1 trillion in the 12-month period. That’s the cost of empire.

In the U.S. alone… the Bush-Obama administrations have exploded the national debt to $20 trillion.

The U.S. spends about $3.50 for every $1 of GDP. And since 2007, the economy has added $10 trillion in debt, and only $4.5 trillion in GDP. This is a formula for disaster. Not necessarily tomorrow. But eventually.

While Alan Greenspan was chairman of the Federal Reserve, total world debt rose from 13% of GDP to 109%. This was the real explanation for the “conundrum” that Greenspan saw in mid-2004 to mid-2006. He raised rates, but U.S. bond yields continued to go down. When asked by Congress about it, the Fed chairman was lost.

But what was really happening, as former IMF consultant Richard Duncan explained to Dr. Greenspan, was that foreign central banks in the trade surplus countries printed trillions worth of their own currencies and used that new money to buy U.S. dollars.

They did this to hold down the value of their currencies in order to protect their low-wage trade advantage. Those central banks then invested the trillions of U.S. dollars that they had acquired into U.S Treasury’s. That pushed up the price of those bonds and drove down their yields, causing the Fed to lose control over U.S. interest rates and over the U.S. economy as a whole, and made it impossible for them to contain the property bubble that imploded in 2007.

Greenspan, and later his successor Bernanke, misidentified the phenomenon as a “glut of savings.” This led them to miss the solution, too… and let the credit bubble get bigger and bigger.

My hypothesis, which I put to Alan Greenspan in question form, is that the Age of “Tall Paul” Volcker… when the Fed could actually still control the monetary beast it had created… is over. Politically, it is not possible to manage a debt deflation. Not when you have three times as much debt as GDP.

Before 1971, our money was asset-based, linked at a fixed rate to gold. Now it’s debt-based, linked only to a promise to pay. With what? More paper, of course.

While Greenspan was helping to create a credit bubble, another kind of bubble was forming. During the Greenspan Fed era, 25,000 pages were added to the Federal Register, and the amount of money spent on lobbying went from an estimated $200 million in 1986 to $2.6 billion in 2006.

Government power was always restrained by real money. Roman emperors had to work the silver mines of Iberia night and day to get the money they needed. Then, when it wasn’t enough, they “clipped the coins” to reduce the silver content. Later the kings of Europe had to rely on moneylenders to get the cash they needed.

And finally, modern democracies had to get their money from the hard work and economies of the voters. Wars were frequent and endemic. Often, they only ceased when the combatants ran out of money. Over the course of the centuries, the lack of money probably spared millions of lives.

By the way, I strongly recommend George Gilder’s The Scandal of Money. Gilder shows that money is more than just, well, money. With it comes a basic sense of fairness. If you work all your life and manage to save a thousand dollars, it is fundamentally unfair for some hot shot in Lower Manhattan to get a thousand dollars for nothing, simply because he is wired into the new money system. It was the voters’ sense of unfairness – not money itself – that got Donald Trump elected.

Phony, debt-backed money is fundamentally unfair and unreliable. It distorts prices, misleads investors, depletes and devalues real savings, redistributes rather than adds wealth, and generally increases waste and mal-investment throughout the economy.

But that limitation was removed in 1971. The new money was different. It didn’t come from the mines or the economy or from savings deposited in banks. And it put money at the beck and call of politics as never before. It enabled a large growth in what former congressional policy analyst Mike Lofgren calls the Deep State… or I call the Parasitocracy… or others know as the Establishment Elite or the permanent government.

From a fair economy where the rewards went primarily to those who added wealth to the system… people who made cars or mattresses or kitchen appliances… the U.S. system was corrupted into a system that rewarded, first and foremost, the people who added more fake money and more debt. people who owned stocks were about seven times richer at the end of Dr. Greenspan’s term than at the beginning of it, an increase of about $17 trillion in capitalization.

But they had not created more wealth. Where did the extra stock market wealth come from? The answer: from the same source as the new credit-backed money – from nowhere.

If you want to blame someone for this, you can blame Alan Greenspan. He didn’t create it. But he yielded to it readily. It was he who began the pattern of supporting stock prices by backstopping the markets with easy money – as early as 1998, when the infamous hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management collapsed in spectacular fashion.

World debt is now approaching $225 trillion, not counting the off-the-books financial obligations of sovereign governments, which would probably add another $200 trillion to the total.

In a 21st-century democracy today, voters would never tolerate sharp swings in the business cycle. Nor would a modern democracy permit the kind of flexibility in labor rates that you would need to allow for downside adjustments. Wages are too sticky to adjust to a deflationary shock. Government budgets, and its payments to the old, the sick, the needy, and the vast elite of the Deep State, are even stickier. Even in a depression, it’s almost impossible to bring them down. In fact, the tendency is to try to raise them up… in some form of countercyclical stimulus.

We’ve seen that centralized control can last a long time. In extreme versions it lasted 30 years in China and 70 years in the Soviet Union. Less extreme versions – that is, with less politics – can presumably last much longer. We’ve seen, too, that these systems can create the kind of stability that Minsky described. But what we haven’t seen is that they can somehow correct or erase the imbalances and excesses that they create.

The idea is that, as much as it might be inefficient from an economic standpoint, we nevertheless live in a world of seat belts, airbags, and safety nets (stability), which the public craves far more than it craves economic progress (liberty).

On this second point, Reagan’s former budget advisor, David Stockman, challenged him. The original Fed authorization was for a central bank that would have the power to step in and buy securities, but only of solvent institutions. That is, it was meant to stop “irrational” runs on the banking system. But the current Fed goes way beyond that, meddling in equity and fixed-income markets on a scale that would have been unimaginable to Carter Glass, who created it.

How does this debt bubble get corrected under the watchful eye of central bankers? Having allowed the debt bubble to expand to such an extraordinary size, are the authorities now going to prick it?

And what will they do when the howls of despair reach them? Will they fill their ears with wax and stay the course through a very painful correction, when stocks get cut in half… and don’t recover? Will they, like Paul Volcker, who received death threats as he fought to bring inflation under control, ignore the political pressure?

If my hypothesis is right, the Volcker role is no longer an option. The authorities can no longer take the kind of action that they’d need to take to correct credit excesses. The debt-money system has put too much money into too many pockets of too many powerful people. The Deep State needs it. It depends on it. It controls it. And it won’t give it up.

What’s more, it has raised the price of a correction far beyond anything the political authorities can afford to pay. In 1978, when Paul Volcker went to Washington to tame inflation, world debt totaled only $3 trillion. Today, it is 70 times as much…

Making a bubble bigger doesn’t make it go away. In a properly functioning economy, corrections come occasionally, like showers during a beach holiday. But, in trying to protect the public from these passing storms, the authorities invite a hurricane.

And isn’t the role of a small panic… with its “irrational” reactions and extraordinary pricing… to immunize investors against a big one? In other words, couldn’t the irrationality central banks aim to guard against actually have a very rational and important purpose?

Without the small, periodic crises – left to run their courses and immunize investors against further risk-taking – big crises develop for which central bankers have no solution. That’s the key point here. Yes, we’ve had several of these small, periodic crises over the last four-plus decades, but the feds haven’t let a single one of them run its natural course.

It is now a political matter. And politics is force, not persuasion. The system of constantly expanding debt has served the Deep State, the people who really control the U.S. government and its financial system. They won’t let it go. They can’t afford to. No Volcker can stand up to them. There are no longer any policy decisions to make. Like real love, a fake-money system has to run its course.

January 25, 2017 A Conversation With “The Maestro

It is certainly true that, ultimately, historically fiat currencies have always ultimately ruined the economies who basically worked with them. I’m sure your colleagues from South America went through enough of 5,000 or 20,000 annual rate inflation, and it disabled society fundamentally. That has never happened in a system which gold was the medium of exchange.

Chris: Do you think that in our democracies the financial authorities are willing to let corrections happen? And if they aren’t willing to let corrections happen, what are the consequences for our societies?

Dr. Greenspan: In the short-term, if you have a breakdown like 2008, the maximum short-term probability of coming through it is to basically buy up the whole system. Since the central bank can print as much as it needs to, there is no limit. So you can stop any crisis cold merely by just buying up everything. The trouble is, what do you do then? If there is that sort of action taken several times, you engender a degree of uncertainty in the marketplace, which essentially destroys the viability of the structure.

Very obviously, in the last eight years, we’ve gone into a stagnation, which incidentally has pretty much been for the last 10 years worldwide. That stagnation has led to an extraordinary collapse in the growth of output per hour, which meant that standards of living were freezing at very low levels.

In all human history, whenever you get a situation where the population feels deprived one way or another and things aren’t going well, it begins to revolt.

The revolt here is Brexit… Scotland… Italy. I can go through a whole series of things, which are just now beginning to brew. The problem I have with democracy is that 51% can legally annihilate the other 49%, so a pure democracy is never what the American system has been. It’s always been a constitutional representation of government. Going evermore from where we are now to more and more democracy is not working for us.

Donald Trump would not have arisen if output per hour instead of being on average half a percent per year for five to eight years. If that didn’t happen, Donald Trump would not be president of the United States.

Jim: I would also argue it wouldn’t have happened if interest rates had been above zero as well. The reason for saying that is that when I look at the results of Brexit and Trump, everybody blames Brexit on immigration in the UK. Yet most of the people who voted for Brexit don’t work. They don’t have a problem with immigrants taking their jobs, but they have a problem with having to save more and more every year in order to eke out an existence.

I really want to ask you about your insight into the thinking of central bankers and the policymaking that’s been going on for the last eight years when we’ve had extraordinary monetary policy… from zero interest rates to negative interest rates… to quantitative easing… to qualitative easing… all of which I call “institutionalized theft.

I want to ask you about institutionalized theft. Do central bankers think about the consequences of their actions for households and consumers who have saved all their life… who have expected a compounding effect in their savings? But they’re now expected to assume no compound interest… no increase in savings. They get to the end of their working days, and what they’re faced with is nothing

Dr. Greenspan: Let me tell you. There’s one thing that bothers me considerably, which nobody makes any mention of: There is in the European Central Bank a mechanism as it exists of necessity where the European Central Bank is made up of the central banks of the euro area, and there’s a thing called TARGET 2.  TARGET 2,at this particular stage, is turning out to be an extraordinarily large transfer from Bundesbank [the German Federal Bank] to essentially Italy and Spain and, most recently, the European Central Bank. That means the Bundesbank is lending money to the European Central Bank, and the question is its big numbers…

We’re talking 700 billion… 800 billion euros. This can’t go on indefinitely because, at some point, somebody’s going to have the courage to move Greece out. Greece is in the ECB [European Central Bank] by accident. They came in under false pretenses, and the government immediately following the government that got Greece fraudulently into the ECB said the numbers were all wrong. If they were actually the numbers used, they would not have been in. But nonetheless, they let them stay. That was a terrible mistake. The Greek personal savings rate right now is minus 20%. You cannot run an economy at minus 20% savings rate.

Something is going to happen there. My view is it’s either going to be Greece or it conceivably could be Italy. The funny part of it is that the second-largest contributor to the net flow in lending to Spain and Italy is Luxembourg. They’ve got some steel, and they’ve got a few other things, and they’ve got some banks, but it is extraordinary what is going on in this system while the total assets of the European Central Bank continue to go straight up. What would happen if there was a default of the euro?

In the United States, if the Federal Reserve went into default, the U.S. Treasury would bail it out. But there is no comparable vehicle to help the European system.

At some point, somebody’s going to say, “I don’t want to accept euros.” that there were five or six recessions between 1870 and 1913. They were all short-lived and they happened because banks got, as you use this great phrase, “over-loaned.” There was a limited supply of gold, the credit expansion stopped, the economy adjusted, and then things moved along. During that period – which you would never know from listening to the debate today – real GDP grew by 4.2% a year for 43 years running. Even if you take all the immigration out, that was 2.6% on a per-capita basis. That compares to 0.4% in the years since 2007 – the reason we have Trump.

David: In other words, I’m saying if it’s too radical to say “abolish the Fed, end the Fed”… why not go back to Carter Glass’ banker’s bank (Carter Glass is a great icon, at least in the modern world, because everybody thinks Glass-Steagall should have been maintained, whether true or not), put the Fed out of the activist money-management targeting, interest rate targeting, yield curve managing of the stock market supporting business, and simply let the market drive, market clear interest rates, which we desperately need? The most important price in capitalism is the cost of money and debt. The whole idea of the Fed is to control the cost of money and debt, so it’s not capitalism. That’s what I learned from your essay, and I’ve been wanting to catch up with you for a long time to find out why I’m wrong for my conclusions.

Dr. Greenspan: The problem, David, today is that you would need a majority of both houses of Congress to get an act which was sufficiently solid to enforce that. Remember that the original Federal Reserve Act had gold requirements for the currency and for other things. The issue is so long as you have this fiat money premium, which I was discussing before, namely human beings are willing to take worthless money in exchange for goods until they learn better.

The basic problems are you get bubbles because human nature is what it is. People get euphoric. We know by experience that fear is a far more formidable force in human activity than euphoria, and as a result, for example, recessions go down far more sharply than recoveries. The stock market behaves exactly the same way so that you’ve got these very odd patterns.

Mike Lofgren: Okay, I’m the odd man out. I’m not an Austrian economist and I have no unrequited love for the barbarous metal, but I did see the sausage factory in Congress. In the late ‘90s, we had a good deal of financial deregulation along with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Commodity Futures Modernization Act, followed by roughly two trillion in tax cuts under the Bush administration. My question is: Trump is proposing tax cuts roughly three times the size and he wants to get rid of Dodd-Frank, which he says is strangling the economy.

Dr. Greenspan: I agree with him on this.

Mike: Are we setting ourselves up for another asset bubble on top and, if not, why aren’t we?

Dr. Greenspan: Because it’s not going to happen that way.  Can you imagine what they’re going to be staring at in February when they start looking at the budget numbers? The issue isn’t going to be “Do you have a big tax cut?” but “Do you have a big tax increase?” None of that is going to happen, but I think the real danger here is the fact that we’ve allowed this issue of a huge amount of entitlements to rise as we age and to keep adding to them. One of the things that the Bush administration did was to have a huge increase in the number in Social Security. No source of revenues.

If you’re going to have this sort of fiscal policy, we’re at the edge of some fairly questionable issues of what happens. This is a non-sustainable outlook. don’t see where we go from here. I’ve listened to the debates. The word “entitlement” never came up once, and the reason is entitlements are the third rail of American politics. If you’re running for office and you mention them, you lose. How are you going to run government on that? I do not know.

 

December 22 2011.   The Great Correction   by Bill Bonner

What if growth itself were being corrected?

What if the entire period from the invention of the steam engine to the invention of the internet were not the normal thing, but the abnormal thing? What if the “lost decade” we have just gone through is actually the mean…the usual…the normal thing? And what if — after nearly 3 centuries — we have just now reverted to it?

Until about two weeks ago, we thought human beings had only existed for 100,000 years. Now, archeologists are guessing that we’ve been around as a species for twice as long.

You know what that means? It means that our mean rate of growth — already negligible — is actually only about half what we thought it was. In other words, it took not 99,700 years for humans to invent the steam engine, but 199,700. And now, what if we are not going on to something new, but back to something old? What if the New Age is really more like the Old Age…where growth and progress were unknown.

Let’s see, the typical person in 1750 lived better than the typical person in say 100,000 BC. The person in 100,000 BC lived in a cave or maybe a wigwam. The typical person in 1750 lived in a hovel. There were some great houses too, of course. By the 18th century, humans had been building with arches and columns…and domes…dressed stone with elaborate decoration…for thousands of years. But most people had no access to those monuments. They lived in whatever they could put together — usually of wood or mud.

They lived on what they could grow…with their own hands, or with the help of domesticated draft animals. They hunted wild animals…or got their calories from their own herds and flocks.

The person from 100,000 BC was a hunter-gatherer. But his life was not all bad. At least he got plenty of fresh air and didn’t get caught in traffic jambs or have to watch television.

But the progress between 200,000 BC, when mankind is now thought to have emerged…to 1765, when Watt produced his first engine…was extremely slow. In any given year, it was nearly negligible…imperceptible. Over thousands of years there was little progress of any sort, which was reflected in static human populations with static levels of well-being.

Then, after 1765, progress took off like a rocket. Over the next 200 years, the lives of people in the developed countries, and the human population, generally, changed completely.

It took 199,700 years for the human population to go from zero to 125 million. But over the next 250 years it added about 6 billion people. Every five years, approximately, it added the equivalent of the entire world’s population in 1750.

“Progress” made it possible. People had much more to eat. Better sanitation. Better transportation (which eliminated famines, by making it possible to ship large quantities of food into areas where crops had failed). The last major famine in Western Europe occurred in the 18th century when crops failed. After that, the famines in the developed world at least have been intentional — caused largely by government policies.

Progress abolished hunger. It permitted huge increases in population. And it brought rising real wages and rising standards of living.

By the late 20th century, people took progress and GDP growth for granted. Governments went into debt, depending on future growth to pull them out. So did corporations and households.

Everyone counted on growth. Spending and tax policies were based on encouraging growth. The enormous growth in government itself was made possible by economic growth. After all, as we’ve seen in our Theory of Government, beyond the essentials, government is either parasitic or superfluous. The richer the host economy, the more government you get.

Today, there is hardly a stock, bond, municipal plan, government budget, student loan, retirement program, housing development, business plan, political campaign, health care program or insurance company that doesn’t rely on growth. Everybody expects growth to resume…after we have put this crisis behind us.

Growth is normal, they believe.

But what if it isn’t normal? What if it was a once-in-a-centi-millenium event, made possible by cheap energy?

 

Bill Bonner on Inflation and Derivatives

Inflation is an increase in the supply of money plus credit relative to available goods and services. In times of speculative mania, when people no longer care what they pay for something on the grounds that someone else will always pay more, and money is being created with abandon in order to satisfy the acquisitive impulse, credit hyper-expansion constitutes inflation on a massive scale.

Expansion is the only reality many of us have known, hence it is no wonder we imagine it can be a permanent condition.

Derivative definition:
Imagine a man who makes his living digging ditches. He may hire himself out at a daily rate of $25. The old capitalists would have paid no attention to him – he is just one of millions of small entrepreneurs getting by in life.

But today’s financial hustlers will spot the opportunity. Let’s take him public, they will say. We’ll raise his daily rate to $30…pay him his $25…and the rest will be our “profit.” We’ll sell shares to the public at a P/E of 20…let’s see, 20 x $5 x 250 days per year = $25,000. All of a sudden, the ditch digger has a capital value of $25,000.

Then, they borrow $20,000 from a hedge fund…and pay it to themselves for structuring the deal. Now, the hustler has $20,000 in his pocket; the hedge fund has a high-yield bond worth $20,000; the shareholders have $25,000 worth of stock; and the poor man is still digging his ditches.

Then, an even more ambitious wheeler-dealer will come along and decide to “roll up” the whole industry – bringing the ditch diggers together into a multi-national consortium. Now they can all do cross-border transactions…including derivatives.

And now ditch-digging is a major business, suitable for large investors…with more investment coverage and a higher P/E ratio. Soon all the world’s banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds have some of the ditch digging paper – debt or equity – and billions in fees and commissions have been squeezed out of ditches by the financial industry.

That, patient reader, is the way (the world-over) that industries and assets are now being bought, sold, refinanced, leveraged, re-jigged and resold. In the old days, companies went to investors or to banks for capital and cultivated a relationship with them that was long and fruitful.

Now, it’s all wham-bam-thank-you-ma’am capitalism. Inquiring capitalists now only want to know one thing – how fast can we do this deal? How many points can we get out of it and how much leverage can we get? And whom can we dump it on, when we’re done?

As John Rubino wrote, credit gains ‘moneyness’ as during periods of ponzi finance, creating excess claims to underlying real wealth:

As the global economy expanded without a hic-up, more and more instruments came to be used as a store of value or medium of exchange or even a standard against which to value other things—in other words, as money.

Thus mortgage-backed bonds and even more exotic things came to be seen as nearly risk-free and infinitely liquid….credit gained “moneyness,” which sent the effective global money supply through the roof.

This in turn allowed the U.S. and its trading partners to keep adding jobs and appearing to grow, despite debt levels that were rising into the stratosphere. For a while there, borrowing actually made the world richer, because both the cash received and the debt created functioned as money.

June 2008 In the war between inflation and deflation, Friday was a bloody day.

It began with a shot from the Labor Department; unemployment registered its biggest increase since 1986 – from 5% to 5.5%. Then, all Hell broke loose.

Immediately, investors figured that there was no way the Bernanke Fed could follow through on its half-promise to give up the fight against deflation and begin fighting inflation, alongside the European Central Bank. Central banks do not increase rates when unemployment is rising. At least, that’s the ways it’s gone for a long time.

The Fed, we remind new readers, has a “dual mandate.” It is supposed to do two contradictory and incompatible things at once – protect the dollar (guard against inflation)…and maintain full employment (guard against deflation). The two are mortal enemies. Generally, lower rates help stimulate employment; but higher rates are the way to protect the dollar. Of course, in the period known as the Great Moderation, it didn’t matter. The feds could stimulate employment all they wanted and not worry about inflation. Meanwhile, the Chinese were protecting the dollar by exporting cheaper and cheaper goods to the United States.

Now, the inflation rate in China is 8.5%…labor costs are rising…energy and raw materials prices are soaring; the poor Chinese have no choice. They’re exporting price increases…not price cuts. All of a sudden, the war is on!

Yesterday, amid the smoke and dust of the battle, in rode the ‘crude oil vigilantes,’ guns blazing. The news from the Labor Department seems to have set them off, but they seemed to be itching for a fight anyway. Soon, they had driven up the price of oil more in one day than ever before. A barrel of crude rose $11. To put that in perspective, that’s about the whole price of oil 10 years ago. At the end of the day, the oil price was at a new record high: $139.

As we’ve been saying, there is no clear winner in the battle between inflation and deflation. There is just a clear loser – the U.S. householder. He gets blasted no matter which way he goes. Higher unemployment means lower earnings. And a higher oil price means higher consumer prices. And don’t forget the falling housing market. His earnings and his major asset go down; his cost of living goes up. Heck, even Ed McMahon says the bank is trying to take his house – and he’s got a lot of company. Aretha Franklin and Michael Jackson are said to be facing foreclosure as well.

Lately, most of the news has been about inflation. The threat of recession was thought to be past. The oil price has been setting records…and we’re getting more and more consumer inflation-sighting reports from all over the world.

“Inflation is biggest threat to global economy,” a Bloomberg poll of business executives discovered.

But last week, according to the Wall Street Journal , “recession fears [were] reignited.”

Adding to deflation’s firepower last week was an announcement by the European Central Bank on Thursday. Unlike the Fed, the ECB only has one job – to protect the euro. And when the inflation numbers in Europe came out higher than hoped – remember, inflation is now a globalized phenomenon – Jean Claude Trichet, head of the ECB, stepped forward to tell the world to get ready for higher rates. This, of course, had the effect you’d expect – the dollar fell, which puts additional pressure on the Bernanke forces, who had hoped to be able to talk the dollar up.

Of course, everyone knows you can’t fight inflation and fight deflation at the same time. And everyone knows that when push comes to shove, the Fed will throw its weight in inflation’s direction. That is, when its back is to the wall, the Fed will lash out at deflation…and let the dollar go whither it wants – down.

How much difference it makes is open to question. Because, when the shooting really starts, the Fed’s policy changes often get lost in the fog of war. Even as the Fed was being pushed towards the wall…so close it could scratch its back on the aluminum siding…investors sold off stocks. You might have thought that the prospect of lower rates would be good for stocks. But now, with the crude oil vigilantes in the saddle, investors know that being soft on inflation is no guarantee of lower rates and a growing economy. Instead, they’ve come to see that higher oil prices…and higher prices generally…shoot so many holes in consumers’ budgets, the economy goes into decline anyway.

*** Stocks sold off on Friday, sending the Dow reeling by 394 points. The banks were hit hard. You’ll recall that everyone thought the banks had seen the worst back in March, after Bear Stearns collapsed. Investors expected the banks to lead the following rally.

But once a bubble pops, the hot air goes elsewhere. Instead of going into the financial sector, now it’s going into prices for oil and commodities. Not only did oil hit a record on Friday, by the way, so did corn – at $6.50 a bushel.

The banks have been almost cut in half since last year’s high. You’ll recall that they were “adding value” by “allocating capital more efficiently” than their predecessors. Well, for some reason, they don’t seem to be allocating capital very efficiently anymore. All the value they added to their own shares, ever since the merger and acquisition boom of the late ’90s, has now been wiped out.

Aren’t there some good bargains in the financial sector, thanks to the collapse of share prices? Yes, almost certainly…just as there were some good buys on the NASDAQ after the collapse of the dotcoms…and good buys in tulip bulbs after the blowup of the bubble in the 17th century. But don’t expect to see the whole sector reflate anytime soon. Now, it’s on to the NEXT bubble…

*** It looks to us as though the next bubble is in oil and commodities.

August 2008

We suggested a possible plot outline yesterday:

Boy meets girl. Boy and girl go on spending spree. Wall Street and Washington collude to cause them to spend more than they could afford and to go much further into debt than they should. Boy and girl can’t pay their debts; they’re losing their houses. The moneybags who lent to them are going bust.

Meredith Whitney, one of the few professional analysts who foresaw the subprime crisis, says that the downturn will be more severe than people yet realize. One in ten households overextended itself in the bubble period, she points out. Bankruptcy, default, and foreclosure rates will inevitably worsen as these Jacks and Jills roll down the hill.

Anyone waiting for the financial industry to return to the glory days of 2006 may have a long wait. As a credit-fueled boom turns into a bubble, it takes more and more lending to produce an additional increment of GDP growth. In the real boom years after WWII, it took about $1.40 worth of credit to produce $1 worth of GDP growth. The ratio rose sharply after the Reagan Revolution…and now stands at about $6 of credit to every extra dollar of GDP. Of course, that is why Wall Street made so much money – it was selling credit. But it’s also why that story is history; that show is over. As the cost of growth – in terms of credit – rises, so does the cost in terms of debt service. Even at 5%, the cost of $6 of credit is 30 cents per year. If it produces $1 of GDP growth, that extra output would need a 30% profit margin to break even. Not very likely.

And the good news just continues to pour in from the housing sector. RealtyTrac reported this morning that bank seizures of U.S. homes have risen 184% since the group began tracking this data in 2005. Banks have repossessed close to 3 times the amount of homes in the United States, when compared to last year’s stats.

One in four houses sold in America today is sold at a loss, says a report on CNNMoney. That totes up to a lot of losses for the whole financial chain…the homeowner, the mortgage company, the builder, the real estate agent, and the investor who bought a mortgage-backed security.

Remember, if big emerging economies can continue to grow, it will keep the pressure on prices for raw materials. This then makes the situation worse for Americans; they pay more for food and fuel…even as their incomes and assets fall in price.

Roubini notes that 72% of GDP is attributable to consumer spending and that the consumer has no money. The feds handed out billions in ‘tax rebates;’ even so, retail sales in June increased only 0.1%. Most of the money was used to pay down debt…or just to keep up with higher-priced food and fuel. Consumer debt was 100% of disposable income in 2000; now it’s 140%. Bankruptcies are up 30%.

And the economy is still, officially, growing! You can imagine what would happen in a real downturn. Today, a severe, drawn-out recession would be devastating for millions of people. They would lose their jobs and their homes. Naturally, they would expect the government to “do something.”

Sep 25, 2008 Daily Reckoning

Here come da judge…

Oh Dear Reader, it may be a cruel, cruel world for some…but it’s a delight to us!

Little by little, gradually, haltingly…the commentators are putting two and two together. In just four days, global stock markets lost more than $3 trillion. Then, the fellows who saw no danger at all – Greenspan, Bernanke and Paulson – suddenly insisted that if immediate action were not taken the world’s whole financial system would implode! Meltdown! Collapse!

What did that mean, exactly? They didn’t say. But it sounded like big trouble. And people want to avoid trouble at all costs – especially if the costs can be laid on someone else.

“The private market has screwed itself up,” explained Representative Barney Frank “and they need the government to come help them unscrew it.”

(He left out the extenuating circumstance that the U.S. money supply, the shortest term lending rates, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Fed, the Federal Housing Administration, the SEC…and a whole plethora of agencies, commissions and meddlers…as well as one out of every 4 dollars spent…were all under government control all along!)

And so, Bernanke, Paulson, et al took the witness stand yesterday. They clearly had some explaining to do. But the more they explained…the more we didn’t understand. If government were capable of understanding and fixing the problem…how come it didn’t see it coming in the first place? How come it let it happen?

But this morning, we put aside the question of whether the government will unscrew things or screw them up even worse – as it usually does. Instead, we come back to the issue of who will bear the ultimate cost of bailing out Wall Street. No one knows the answer. And no one seems to feel bothered by it – even though the cost will rise to about $2,000 per family. But no one is complaining about the cost.

There’s “bipartisan outrage” in Congress, reports the Washington Post . But it’s not about the money. Instead, some argue that Wall Street fat cats getting away with murder. Others want an even bigger bailout – one for the homeowners, too. And others just want to rant and moan for the benefit of the voters back home.

But here at the Daily Reckoning mobile headquarters, we are like an old detective with a new clue. As to the issue of who will benefit from the bail out, we have no further questions, your honor. We know the answer already – it will be the usual collection of parasites and chiselers with good lobbyists in Washington. As to the question of who will pay for it, we want a lab report on the blood samples…and a fingerprint match.

The measure includes a provision in which the public debt is raised to over $11 trillion. This will put it at about 85% of US GDP. We recall from a couple weeks ago that Louis 16th lost his head after France’s debt rose to about 80% of GDP. The problem is, when you get to that level of debt, lenders balk and the borrower runs room to maneuver. In the modern world, that probably means higher interest rates…and what was once unthinkable, a downgrade of America’s debt rating from AAA to something less than that – and possibly junk.

This would be accompanied by a sell-off in the dollar too. In this regard, here comes an insight from the democratically elected president of Iran:

“The world,” explained Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, “no longer has the capacity to absorb fake U.S. dollars.”

Of course, that is exactly what we’re about to find out. Mr. Ahmadinejad has rushed to judgment. We’ll let the court take its time. But we have a feeling that the Iranian president is right about the ultimate verdict.

“If the U.S. government were a publicly traded stock,” writes expert witness Chris Mayer, “the dollar would be its shares and the value of the dollar its share price…. And this huge increase in money supply is like a massive offering of stock, which dilutes the value of the shares everyone else holds. (Assets stay the same, just a lot more claims on them).

“The bailout tab so far could top $1.6 trillion – assuming the new $700 bill happens. Consider that M1 money supply – cash in circulation – only totals $1.39 trillion… Consider that M2 – including certificate of deposits and such – is only $7.72 trillion.”

Economists will tell you that this increase in the supply of “money” is just what the world needs. Deflation is acting like the hair dryer from Hell – liquidity is evaporating fast. The feds are trying to put it back.

The feds giveth; the markets taketh. Hallelujah. Hallelujah. Currently, the markets are taking away more than the feds are putting back. But as to who is going to prevail…who will pay court costs…and who’s going to jail…the jury is still out.

 

Daily Reckoning Sep 26, 2008

Garrison Keillor:

“[T]hat’s why we need government regulators. Gimlet-eyed men with steel-rim glasses and crepe-soled shoes who check the numbers and have the power to say, ‘This is a scam and a hustle and you either cease and desist or you spend a few years in a minimum-security federal facility playing backgammon.’”

Out on the prairie, one can imagine all sorts of things. But it’s not as if there were no bureaucrats on the job between 2000 and 2007. How does one imagine that these same regulators, who missed the biggest bamboozle in market history, are now going to be able to clean it up?

How does a bureaucrat – charged with protecting the public’s money – recognize a scam more readily than an investor whose own money is on the line? What information does he have that is not available to the public? What theory does he follow that is unknown to investors? What meat does he eat…what wine does he drink…that prevents him from falling prey to from the delusions and temptations to which all flesh is heir?

This is what Hayek termed the “fatal conceit,” that public officials – armed with the power to force people do to what they say – will do a better job of running things than people can do for themselves.

Apparently, neither the masters of the universe on Wall Street, nor the geniuses at the rating agencies, nor the saints at the SEC…and certainly not the poor lumpeninvestor… understood what was going on. None had gimlet eyes. Instead, all their eyes bulged with admiration at the financial engineers’ handiwork…and with greed at how much money they could make.

And now we find, on page one of today’s International Herald Tribune , the bureaucrats’ practical challenge. “What’s this stuff worth?” The Paulson plan puts $700 billion in the hand of GS14s, clerks, hacks and appointees. What are they supposed to do with it? Buy “assets” that Wall Street wants to dump.

How are they supposed to know what it is worth? If they pay too much, the government takes a big loss. If they pay too little, at least according to the dim light coming from the Christmas treers, it won’t bail out Wall Street enough and the economy is likely to sink into recession.

“The reality is that we are not going to know what the right price is for years,” the IHT quotes a portfolio manager.

Isn’t it amazing how fast things change, dear reader? Only a few months ago every portfolio manager in the world would have deferred to the market. What’s something worth? Exactly what willing buyers will pay for it! Not a penny more. Not a penny less.

But now we have a whole new theory…that the value of a financial asset is somehow unknowable…it is like the face of God…or the meaning of “is” – it floats in the ether; it plays cards with Jimmy Hoffa. According to this theory, the value of an asset is determined not by what willing buyers will pay for it…there is no such thing as a ‘market price.’ Instead, values are metaphysical…determined by what willing buyers MIGHT pay for years from now…if everything goes to plan.

Henry Paulson says that the government might even make a profit. How might this occur? Well, the bureaucrats might turn out to be shrewder than the Wall Street pros. Prices set by bureaucrats (with money that doesn’t belong to them) will be better than those set by willing buyers and sellers!

According to this new theory, the sellers don’t know what gems they are tossing out. You’ve heard of casting pearls before swine. According to the new theory, the pigs on Wall Street are casting out the pearls! And those canny bureaucrats are grabbing them up!

Now, get this… “the recent turmoil on Wall Street may be followed by a $900 billion aftershock as bank debt comes due next year…”

Oh happy day for the public sector…that great untapped reserve of investment wisdom…. Here comes more opportunity to buy up those pearls that the swine on Wall Street don’t want.

Now things are going to get interesting. Add another trillion-dollar bill to Christmas tree…only months after they Christmas treed the last one. Turn on lights! We can hardly wait to see what this new Christmas treed-up world looks like.

*** At least one person had something smart to say this week. Would you believe it, George W. Bush must have picked up the wrong speech on his way out of the door to the Capital. When he spoke on the debt crisis, his speechwriter actually seemed to know what he was talking about:

“First, how did our economy reach this point?

“Well, most economists agree that the problems we are witnessing today developed over a long period of time. For more than a decade, a massive amount of money flowed into the United States from investors abroad, because our country is an attractive and secure place to do business. This large influx of money to U.S. banks and financial institutions – along with low interest rates – made it easier for Americans to get credit. These developments allowed more families to borrow money for cars and homes and college tuition – some for the first time. They allowed more entrepreneurs to get loans to start new businesses and create jobs.

“Unfortunately, there were also some serious negative consequences, particularly in the housing market. Easy credit – combined with the faulty assumption that home values would continue to rise – led to excesses and bad decisions. Many mortgage lenders approved loans for borrowers without carefully examining their ability to pay. Many borrowers took out loans larger than they could afford, assuming that they could sell or refinance their homes at a higher price later on.

“Optimism about housing values also led to a boom in home construction. Eventually the number of new houses exceeded the number of people willing to buy them. And with supply exceeding demand, housing prices fell. And this created a problem: Borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages who had been planning to sell or refinance their homes at a higher price were stuck with homes worth less than expected – along with mortgage payments they could not afford. As a result, many mortgage holders began to default.

“These widespread defaults had effects far beyond the housing market. See, in today’s mortgage industry, home loans are often packaged together, and converted into financial products called “mortgage-backed securities.” These securities were sold to investors around the world. Many investors assumed these securities were trustworthy, and asked few questions about their actual value. Two of the leading purchasers of mortgage-backed securities were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Because these companies were chartered by Congress, many believed they were guaranteed by the federal government. This allowed them to borrow enormous sums of money, fuel the market for questionable investments, and put our financial system at risk.

“The decline in the housing market set off a domino effect across our economy…”

Our president was on solid ground. He sounded as though he had been reading The Daily Reckoning , commented colleague Dan Denning. But then he stepped into the mush, claiming – along with everyone else – that a bailout is needed to put the economy back on its feet.

 

Sep 24 Rude Awakening A Violation of Public Trust
By Tim McCormack, A professional investor from Santa Barbara, CA

There is nothing wrong with Government coming to the rescue of financial institutions where mismanagement has caused risk of failure in a way that jeopardizes the stability of the entire financial system.   What is wrong, and is both a violation of public trust and a display of professional incompetence, is to contribute taxpayer money in a way that enriches management and the owners of these mismanaged companies rather than the taxpayers.

Additionally, it is also a violation of public trust when government officials deliberately manipulate markets on behalf of certain market participants at the expense of others.  The recent market manipulation executed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission by banning short selling of financial stocks is all the more outrageous due to that fact that it was specifically designed to enrich the very individuals who mismanaged their companies into near bankruptcy, and who are the underlying root cause of the larger systemic financial crisis by manufacturing, distributing, and inventorying toxic debt.

It is now well known that these financial firms manufactured, distributed, and inventoried near-fraudulent debt (financial widgets) at 30:1 leverage.  Investors do not want these widgets at the current offer price, and if the widgets were priced and offered at a realistic market clearing price, it would likely bankrupt the vendors.

Hank Paulson (in concert with Ben Bernanke and Christopher Cox) has just orchestrated a plan that provides huge sums of taxpayer money to his old colleagues and buddies at Goldman Sachs, along with various others, including Morgan Stanley, to purchase the  unwanted widgets in a manner that directly enriches the management and shareholders of these nearly bankrupt companies.  Rather than demanding that taxpayers be rewarded with any profits of the rescue, as just occurred with AIG, this latest proposal appears deliberately struck to stick taxpayers with the downside, while management, creditors and shareholders of these firms instantly reap tens of billions in stock and bond appreciation.

Such actions cross the line not only into the arena of professional incompetence and negligence, but steps right up to the line where an open society stares official tyranny in the face.

These government officials could have rescued the financial system in a way aligned with their core responsibilities to the American taxpayer.  If they had done so, as they did with AIG, they would deserve a pat on the back.  They chose a different path. Rather than rescue the financial system in a responsible way, they have rescued their rich buddies that created the mess and left the taxpayer holding the bag.  The American people deserve better.

Additionally, the same Gang of Three government officials simultaneously executed a massive market manipulation specifically designed to further enrich their Wall Street cronies — the very same individuals who mismanaged and nearly bankrupted these firms — by banning the short selling of financial stocks.

The management of these mismanaged companies — including John Mack, of Morgan Stanley, Richard Fuld, of Lehman Bros, and before them senior executives of Bear Stearns — have loudly spread rumors that the decline in their stock was caused by rumor-mongering and improper short-selling without offering an iota of evidence.  Zero evidence has been presented to back up these allegations.

The market manipulation executed by Cox last week occurred without offering a single shred of evidence of the alleged improprieties. This behavior is eerily similar to the allegations of WMD in Iraq made by others in the Bush administration while absent of evidence.  The administration at least went to the trouble of manufacturing evidence to support its claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Worse, was their professional incompetence in responding to the impending Lehman and AIG bankruptcies over the weekend of Sep. 13-14, and on Monday, Sep. 15.  Their behavior and public announcements greatly intensified the crisis, and seriously elevated the systemic risk in global financial markets.

Some background on this issue is helpful.  Financial professionals have always feared the “domino effect” of the failure of one large financial firm taking down many others through counterparty exposures.   Since the failure of Bear Stearns and Northern Rock, market participants have had the clear impression that Government officials in the US and UK were not going to let this happen.

On Sept 13-15, the Gang of Three sent dramatically different signals into the market.  Their abandonment of Lehman and AIG had dramatic negative consequences. At a press conference on Sep. 15, Paulson clearly said, in paraphrase, that “while the Government is concerned about the health and stability of the markets, it would not act to save these firms.”

This news changed the landscape. Now, the domino effect not only seemed possible, it appeared imminent and all eyes were on the insurance giant AIG.  Global stock markets reacted instantly, and rationally, as investors fled financial stocks generally, and the stocks of riskier financial firms (like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs) in particular.

Rather than pouring water on the fire, Paulson pumped gasoline in a move that will now cost the US taxpayer several hundred billion dollars more than if proper actions had been taken in a timely fashion.  Yet, after the dramatic global selloff, the AIG fire was doused in government water, but the global fire had become an inferno.

Rather than admitting to this blunder and learning from it, those who committed the blunder are now attempting to divert blame and attention to short sellers. Credit should be given where credit is due. The SEC is now complicit in falsely pointing the blame for the near-demise of these financial institutions at short sellers (a convenient scapegoat) in what appears to be a blatant attempt to divert attention from:

1.             The real cause of the demise of these firms: mismanagement, in applying 30:1 leverage  to volatile illiquid mortgage assets that these firms manufactured, distributed, and inventoried;

2.             The failure of regulatory oversight, in allowing these firms to use 30:1 leverage on collateral known to occasionally suffer 30% to 50% downside fluctuations (real estate);

3.             The failure to respond properly to the fires at Lehman and AIG; and

4.             The real reason for the SEC market manipulation: to artificially inflate the share prices of distressed companies in a way that enriches management and shareholders, and simultaneously strengthens the company balance sheet (the new riches coming at the direct expense of innocent market participants, at the direct expense their financial competitors who were prudent in avoiding overexposure to leveraged toxic debt, and at the expense of free market principles).

Absent evidence of wrong-doing, the SEC is complicit in spreading lies and rumors, and engaging in market manipulation on behalf of their wealthy buddies.  To date, rather than asking pointed questions, the press has bought the story and is guilty of rebroadcasting it rather than questioning its validity. With no evidence of improper short selling the most rational explanation for stock price declines is that natural investors (from mutual funds, pension funds, retail investors, etc) were selling or hedging long positions due to lack of confidence in these firms, and due to the new risks that sprang into existence by the reversal of position taken by US regulators.

While the SEC says that it is opposed to market manipulation, it has just engaged in market manipulation of the highest order on behalf of John Mack at Morgan Stanley and the gang at Goldman Sachs.  This market manipulation has instantly resulted in the management and owners of these two firms receiving tens of billions of upside stock profits (and hundreds of billions among the 799 financial stocks) in just two days.

The SEC should be held accountable to defend its WMD claim with evidence that was in its possession at the time it manipulated these markets.  It should not be allowed to manufacture an after-the-fact witch-hunt.  Key questions are: What evidence was in the hands of the SEC regarding both mismanagement and short-selling at the time that this market manipulation occurred?  Also:  Were government officials at the SEC, Treasury and/or the Federal Reserve (specifically Cox, Paulson, and Bernanke) speaking with market participants who would be enriched by the market manipulation just prior to the manipulation? If so, what was the nature of these communications?

When small businesses take risks that don’t work out, they fail.  Farmers, bakers and widget-makers are not enriched by government for their failure.

Goldman Sachs is known as one of the most opportunistic and predatory firms on the street.  When Goldman identifies companies in distress it has a long history of rushing in and providing assets in return for majority equity stakes, rightly earning the upside for this risk ahead of the existing management or owners.  Hank Paulson was the direct recipient of this behavior while CEO at Goldman and it is important to note that he was able to sell more than $500 million in Goldman stock, tax-free, when he accepted the job as Secretary of the Treasury.  Now that Goldman is in distress (and Paulson is employed by US taxpayers), Paulson wants to hand Goldman taxpayer money without demanding a controlling equity stake from Goldman Sachs in return.  Who does Paulson work for?  This is not rocket science.

No private company or public company would stand for similar behavior of their directors risking shareholder assets in ways that deliberately benefited others at shareholder expense.  Such behavior would be rewarded with immediate dismissal for dereliction of duty and personal lawsuits seeking damages for negligent behavior.

Rather than getting an honest explanation about what has just occurred, the American people are now being sold a story manufactured by government officials who have been complicit in this irresponsible behavior.  The open question remains: Are the American people gullible enough to buy it?

 

November 2008

Yes, the financial hotshots did all these things.  And more.  They sold the world on ‘finance,’ rather than making and selling things.  Then, it was off to the races.  Everybody wanted to bet.  Perfecta, place bets, odds-on…double or nothing.  Of course, investors would have been better off at the race track.  The track takes about 20%.  In the financial races, Wall Street took 50% to 80% of all the profits.

Before 1987, only about one of every 10 dollars of corporate profits made its way to the financial industry – in payment for arranging financing, banking and other services.  By the end of the bubble years, the cost of ‘finance’ had grown to more than 3 out of every 10 dollars.  Total profits in the United States reached about $6 trillion last year; about $2 trillion was Wall Street’s share.  What happened to this money?  Other industries use profits to build factors and create jobs.  But the financial industry paid it out in salaries and bonuses – as much as $10 trillion during the whole Bubble Period.  And now that the sector finds itself a few trillion short, it waits for the government to open its purse.

But Wall Street’s critics have missed the point.  Yes, the financial industry exaggerates.  But so does the whole financial world.  Both coming and going.  It’s madness on the way up; madness on the way down.  Investors pay too much for “finance” when the going is good.  And then, when the going isn’t so good, they regret it.  This regret doesn’t mean the system is in need of repair; instead, it means it is working.

The financial industry was just doing what it always does – separating fools from their money.  What was extraordinary about the Bubble Years was that there were so many of them.  There is always smart money in a marketplace…and dumb money.  But in 2007 there were trillions of dollars so retarded they practically cried out for court-ordered sterilization.   What other kind of money would pay Alan Fishman $19 million for 3 weeks work helping Washington Mutual go bust?

Whence cometh this dumb money?  And here we find more worthy villains.  For here we find the theoreticians, the ideologues…and the regulators, themselves, who now offer to save capitalism from itself.  Here is where we find the bogus statistics, the claptrap theories and the swindle science.  Here is where we find  the former head of the Princeton economics department, too, Ben Bernanke… and both Hank Paulson and his replacement, Tim Geithner.  Here, we find the intellectuals and the regulators – notably, the SEC – who told the world that the playing field was level…when everyone could see that it was an uphill slog for the private investor.

“Six Nobel prizes were handed out to people whose work was nothing but BS,” says Nassim Taleb, author of The Black Swan.  “They convinced the financial world that it had nothing to fear.”

All the BS followed from two frauds.  First, that economic man had a brain but not a heart.  He was supposed to always act logically and never emotionally.  But there’s the rub, right there; they had the wrong guy.  The second was that you could predict the future simply by looking at the recent past.    If the geniuses had looked back to the fall of Rome, they would have seen property prices in decline for the next 1000 years.  If they had looked back 700 or even 100 years…they would have seen wars, plagues, famines, bankruptcies, hyperinflation, crashes, and depressions galore.  Instead, they looked back only a few years and found nothing not to like.

If they had just looked back 10 years, says Taleb, they would have seen that their “value at risk” models didn’t work.  The math was put to the test in the LongTerm Capital Management crisis…and failed.  Their models went sour faster than milk.  Things they said wouldn’t happen in a trillion years actually happened while Bill Clinton was in still in office.

In the real world, Taleb explains, things are stable for a long time.  Then, they blow up.  Then, all the theories and regulators prove worthless. These blow ups are inevitable, but unpredictable…and too rare to be modeled or predicted statistically.  “And they are almost always much worse than you expect.”

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Why is oil production peak the problem and not when the oil runs out?

First, a little history

The exponential growth of population from 1 billion to 7 billion in less than 200 years was fueled by fossil fuels, especially oil, which does the actual work of a society and is as necessary as food itself: oil grows, cooks, distributes, and refrigerates our food, and is the basis of 97% of all transportation.

Our financial system has also become dependent on oil.  It is entirely structured around credit being lent out and debt paid back.  But debt can only be paid back if the business or salary of the borrower grows, and for the past two centuries that has been true because we have exponentially extracted oil, coal, and natural gas to make billions of combustion engines, roads, bridges, sewage systems, dams, medicine, plastic, ships, trucks, cars and everything else you see around you.  We industrialized agriculture to mine topsoil to grow enough crops to feed 7 billion people to the point where the soil will be exhausted within 200 years.  Previous civilizations without enormously destructive tractors were physically incapable of doing that, but even they depleted their soil over an average of 1,500 years by using the so-called waste as feed for their animals, to burn to cook with, and thatch for their roofs.

We’ve grown so used to that we forget that for the previous two million years homo sapiens lived in a steady state economy.  If you ate all the fish, shot all the game with arrows or spears, drank the last fresh water from a pool in the desert, your tribe died. When agriculture arrived, there wasn’t a single region that didn’t periodically suffer famines from one or more years of bad crops.  People had no choice but to live within the boundaries the natural world had set for them.

Okay, so it’s peaked, we’ll just drive a bit less  

Half the oil is left after all.

But it’s expensive.  If the financial system fails, how will the super-expensive projects to get at oil under miles of ocean be financed?   There are many reasons the financial system could fail.  A high-speed trading flash crash, the corruption and greed, 1 quadrillion in derivatives unwinding, a natural disaster like an earthquake in Tokyo or Los Angeles, cyber warfare taking out part or all of our electric grid for a year or two, and so on.

The remaining oil is remote and inaccessible.

We’re consuming more oil than we’re finding.  The few discoveries are few and very small compared to the giant fields that have provided 80% of our oil for decades.

The remaining oil is nasty, gunky, sour, full of impurities and comes out slowly like tar instead of quickly like the sweet light oil we’ve been pumping so far.   Before you could get $500 a day out of your checking account at the ATM.  But from now on you can get less every day, eventually not enough to pay the rent, pay for the utilities, and buy food.  The money is there, but you can’t get it out…

Nicole Foss on the intersection of oil and the financial system, December 7, 2008

“One might imagine that as an essential resource becomes scarcer, it’s price would move in one direction only – up – and for a while it appeared that would be the case. However, our energy supply system is set in the context of our existing economic and financial structures. The extreme and increasing stress that these structures are under will interact with future energy scarcity with devastating effect, effectively placing a hard limit on any eventual recovery. Energy is the master resource without which no activity, economic or otherwise, is possible.

The effect of easy credit was to flood commodity exchanges with liquidity, as liquidity fleeing risky securitized assets searched for a safe haven. This pushed up the prices of all commodities beyond what could be justified, sending premature signals of scarcity that attracted even more speculative investment. In this way a bubble was formed, but bubbles always burst, and when they do, the speculative money disappears very quickly, taking price support with it. The price collapse we have seen since is partly a result of speculation in reverse, as speculators go short, and partly a result of falling demand, and that fall in demand has only just begun.

The consequence of that price plunge is a severe impact on the viability of continued fossil fuel exploration and development, and also a similarly significant impact on the viability of energy alternatives such as renewables and efficiency investments. Ilargi has long referred to this as the Law of Receding Horizons, meaning that each time alternatives appear to be reaching the threshold of viability, the combination of the price of conventional energy and the cost structure for the alternative is such that the threshold is never quite reached. Once again, energy prices are falling as costs for alternative have remained high, so that the hoped for developments will again be put on hold.

We are seeing the beginning of a global demand collapse, as the credit crunch takes an ever increasing toll on global economic activity and international trade. Already we are seeing the dire effects on shipping in the Baltic Dry index, thanks to the difficulty in obtaining letters of credit for shipments. Consumers in developed countries are tapped out and trying to repair their tattered balance sheets by cutting back, as are companies and banks. Consumption is therefore falling, which will hit exporting economies very hard indeed. They have spent vast sums, and used huge amounts of raw materials, to build what will now be shown to be an enormous excess of productive capacity. Their demand for raw materials will not recover any time soon, as there will be no demand for their products for a very long time.

For the time being, the on-going demand collapse, which has very much further to go, is causing the price of commodities, and particularly energy, to drop like a stone. This may well continue for a period of time, but the danger is that the demand collapse will lead to a supply collapse, and at that point prices will find a floor and begin to climb again. This price bottom could happen earlier in the coming Depression than would be the case for other goods and services.  Exactly when we might see the impact on supply is not clear. Already there are many projects with high cost structures which are no longer viable. These are the projects that could have cushioned the down slope of Hubbert’s curve (the decline from peak production of oil), but will not now come on line. Although they could in theory be developed at a later date, increasing capital constraints will make financing almost impossible, hence development will be unlikely for a very long time. We will therefore continue to make do with the fields already in production, but many of those are depleting very quickly – Ghawar in Saudi Arabia, Cantarell in Mexico, Burgan in Kuwait and many others.

For a while it will be enough to sustain the much lower level of economic activity that we are headed for, but not for all that much longer, especially since there will be many other ‘above ground factors’ to consider. For instance, production infrastructure requires expensive maintenance that will be increasingly difficult to perform, separatist movements in producing countries will seek to control resources for their own benefit, productive capacity being fought over will be damaged or destroyed, sabotage by the disaffected with nothing left to lose will increasingly become a factor, and piracy will make delivery much more challenging. Living off our fossil fuel legacy will therefore become progressively more difficult.

Many governments around the world, including those of all the major powers, are well aware of peak oil. In a very real sense in a modern world, oil IS power, as there is no comparable source of concentrated, transportable and flexible fuel. Securing access to it is therefore of the utmost strategic importance. Some governments, like the Anglo-Saxon economies, have so far appeared to place their trust in the global markets and their own perceived ability to outbid the competition. Others, notably China, have been quietly arranging long term bilateral supply contracts directly with producers, thereby taking production off the market.

China’s strategy is likely to prove far superior in difficult times when international trade is drying up, the fungibility of oil comes under threat and no one can be sure of being able to outbid the competition. By the time others realize that trusting the market to provide is essentially a modern day cargo cult, they may have been completely out maneuvered. In my opinion, this will be the foundation of the coming shift in hegemonic power towards the Far East, but it will not be a peaceful transition. Resource wars are a given under these circumstances.”

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SEC charges pair of brokers, investment advisory firm, others with $80M variable annuity scam

SEC charges pair of brokers, investment advisory firm, others with $80M variable annuity scam

Mar 13, 2014 Darla Mercado

The Securities and Exchange Commission Thursday filed charges against a group of brokers in a scheme wherein wealthy investors used variable annuities with death benefits to wager on the lives of the terminally ill.

The complaint targeted brokers Michael A. Horowitz of Los Angeles and Moshe Marc Cohen of Brooklyn, N.Y., slapping both with a cease-and-desist order and allegations of fraud.

The plan — which involved the sale of more than $80 million in variable annuities — ran its course from July 2007 to February 2008. Mr. Horowitz was allegedly the “architect” of a scheme to profit from the death of terminally ill hospice and nursing home patients, according to the SEC’s complaint.

Mr. Horowitz allegedly obtained the personal health and identification data of the dying patients through fraud, marking them as annuitants on variable annuity contracts that he had marketed to wealthy clients, according to the SEC’s complaint. He allegedly recruited Mr. Cohen to help facilitate the sale of these “stranger-owned annuities.” Under false pretenses, both men allegedly received their broker-dealers’ approval to sell the annuities. The brokers reaped a windfall in commissions from their sale, the SEC claimed, with Mr. Horowitz obtaining more than $300,000 and Mr. Cohen snagging more than $700,000.

“This was a calculated fraud exploiting terminally ill patients,” Julie M. Riewe, co-chief of the SEC’s Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit, said in a news release.

(See also: SEC says investors need to know more about fees)

At the heart of the matter is the fact that variable annuities don’t require proof of insurable interest or a physical examination of the annuitant — the person whose demise would trigger the payout of the annuity’s death benefits.

Mr. Horowitz allegedly told the contract owners — the wealthy investors funding the variable annuities — to invest aggressively to help drive up the value of the account, according to the complaint. His alleged argument was that there was no way to lose: If the value of the annuity contract climbed, the client would receive it as the death benefit payout following the demise of the terminally ill annuitant. If the value fell, then clients received a death benefit that guaranteed a payout equal to the premiums paid minus any withdrawals, according to the SEC’s complaint.

At least 16 terminally ill people were designated the annuitants in some 50 variable annuity contracts that were allegedly sold by Mr. Horowitz, Mr. Cohen or other associates, according to the SEC. All of the patients lived in southern California or Chicago.

The SEC also singled out three individuals for their role in allegedly identifying sickly patients to be annuitants: Harold Ten of Los Angeles, Menachem “Mark” Berger of Chicago and Debra Flowers of Chicago.

In order to obtain identification information, Mr. Ten allegedly started up a business that purported to provide charitable aid to people in hospice care, according to the complaint. Mr. Berger, meanwhile, is the executive director of a firm that owns and operates nursing homes in Chicago and the owner of a firm that supposedly provided financial aid to the terminally ill. Ms. Flowers, meanwhile, had worked for Mr. Berger as an admissions and marketing director for the nursing homes he oversaw, according to the SEC.

In fall 2007, Mr. Horowitz allegedly sought to expand his variable annuities scheme beyond retail clients and tap institutional investors. He allegedly met with the principals of two affiliated hedge funds in New York, which led to the establishment of an affiliate called BDL Group, advised by BDL Manager, according to the suit.

The principals of the hedge fund allegedly retained commodities trader Howard A. Feder of Woodmere, N.Y. to operate BDL Group and BDL Manager, according to the SEC. The supposed investment strategy here was to obtain guaranteed short-term gains by exploiting the annuity contract’s bonus credit and enhanced death benefit provisions, seeking terminally ill people to be annuitants, aggressively invest the premiums and then roll the death benefits into new stranger-owned annuity deals, according to the complaint.

Finally, the SEC filed a complaint against former registered representatives Richard Mark Horowitz and Marc Steven Firestone, both of Los Angeles, for negligently permitting point-of-sale forms for a dozen annuities in this scheme to be submitted to their broker-dealer, NFP Securities Inc.

The sales took place between mid-November and mid-December 2007, according to the SEC. Mr. Firestone allegedly signed off on the variable annuities — supposedly with the knowledge of Richard Horowitz, his supervisor — and submitted them to NFP with incorrect information on the investors’ time horizons, the SEC alleged.

NFP is not a named defendant in the SEC’s case. Emily Deissler, a spokeswoman for NFP, said the firm declined to comment.

Though the litigation with Mr. Horowitz and Mr. Cohen is still continuing, the SEC also obtained some $4.5 million in settlements from other parties in the elaborate grift.

Mr. Ten agreed to pay a disgorgement of $181,147, plus prejudgment interest of $20,858 and a penalty of $90,000. Mr. Berger agreed to pay $119,000 in disgorgement, plus $11,579 in prejudgment interest and a penalty of $100,000.

Ms. Flowers, meanwhile, submitted a sworn statement of financial condition last May and a sworn declaration in October 2013, asserting her inability to pay the penalties and disgorgement.

Mr. Feder will pay a penalty of $130,000. BDL Manager will pay a disgorgement of $1.5 million, prejudgment interest of $196,608 and a penalty of $1.5 million.

Finally, Mr. Horowitz will pay a disgorgement of $292,767, plus prejudgment interest of $36,512 and a penalty of $40,800. Mr. Firestone will pay $127,853 in disgorgement, prejudgment interest of $17,140 and a penalty of $40,800.

Attorney Eliot Lauer of Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle is representing Mr. Feder and BDL Manager. He had no comment on the SEC’s case. Attorneys for the other defendants did not immediately return calls.

As elaborate as this latest “stranger-owned annuities” caper is, it’s hardly the first such scheme. Cranston, R.I.-based estate planning attorney Joseph Caramadre captured the attention of regulators, compliance professionals and the media more than four years ago when he was the subject of civil suits filed by life insurers for allegedly soliciting terminally ill people to be annuitants on variable annuity contracts with death benefits.

Litigation flew: The issuing insurers sued the broker-dealers and registered reps who allegedly sold the annuities. In turn, the broker-dealers countersued the life insurers.

Federal authorities filed conspiracy and wire fraud charges against Mr. Caramadre in relation to the scheme. He was sentenced to six years in prison last December.

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Inside North Korea’s environmental collapse

Red soil in North Korea

The reddish hue of this soil in North Korea comes from lack of organic matter, vital for farming.

Related Posts:

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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McKenna, P. March 6, 2013.  Inside North Korea’s Environmental Collapse.  PBS.

North Korea has been hiding something beyond its prison camps, nuclear facilities, pervasive poverty, aching famine, and lack of energy…something more fundamental than all of these: an environmental collapse so severe it could destabilize the entire country.

Before ecologist Margaret Palmer visited North Korea, she didn’t know what to expect, but what she saw was beyond belief. From river’s edge to the tops of hills, the entire landscape was lifeless and barren. Villages were little more than hastily constructed shantytowns where residents wore camouflage netting, presumably in preparation for a foreign invasion they feared to be imminent. Emaciated looking farmers tilled the earth with plows pulled by oxen and trudged through half-frozen streams to collect nutrient-rich sediments for their fields. “We went to a national park where we saw maybe one or two birds, but other than that you don’t see any wildlife,” Palmer says.

“The landscape is just basically dead,” adds Dutch soil scientist Joris van der Kamp. “It’s a difficult condition to live in, to survive.”

Countryside near Wonsan

Farmers preparing a field for the planting season outside Wonsan, North Korea, in the shadow of a denuded hillside.

Palmer and Van der Kamp were part of an international delegation of scientists invited by the government of North Korea and funded by the American Association for the Advancement of Science to attend a recent conference on ecological restoration in the long-isolated country. Through site visits and presentations by North Korean scientists they witnessed a barren landscape that is teetering on collapse, ravaged by decades of environmental degradation.

“There are no branches of trees on the ground,” Van der Kamp says. “Everything is collected for food or fuel or animal food, almost nothing is left for the soil. We saw people mining clay material from the rivers in areas that had been polished by ice and warming their hands along the roadside by small fires from the small amounts of organic bits they could find.”

Farmers carrying supplies in North Korea

Farmers carrying supplies on foot in North Korea.

The country’s ecological ruin is partially responsible for the disastrous famine in the 1990s, when massive flooding washed away crops and destroyed stored grain. Today, it continues to undermine the country’s economy and threaten national stability.

A Broken Landscape

For Palle Madsen, visiting North Korea was a bit like going back in time 150 years. “At that time the forest was nearly completely gone here in Denmark,” says Madsen, a forester at the Danish Center for Forest Landscape and Planning at the University of Copenhagen. “There wasn’t a totalitarian regime, but we had a similarly over exploited and degraded landscape. It influences the entire microclimate when you remove all of the trees,” Madsen says.

Mountains make up much of the country’s landscape leaving only 15 percent of land available for agriculture. Erosion, lack of nutrients, and acidification of the soil have had a devastating effect on crop yields, according to presentations by members of North Korea’s Academy of Sciences.

A 2004 study by the Korea Environment Institute reports that forest cover in North Korea dropped by 17 percent from the 1970s to the late 1990s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which provided oil to its communist ally at a discounted “friendship price,” oil imports dropped by 60 percent. Unsurprisingly, the use of firewood for heating more than doubled.

North Korean soldiers hauling firewood

North Korean soldiers hauling firewood back to base. Fuel for heating is scarce, so many rely on what wood they can find, including, apparently, the normally well-supplied Korean People’s Army.

What resulted was an increasingly barren landscape. Even saplings are felled for fuel, stripping forests of their ability to regenerate.

“They don’t have trees to hold the soil,” says Jinsuk Byun of Sookmyung Women’s University in Seoul.  “When it rains the soil washes into the river, landslides occur and rivers flood. It triggers a really serious disaster.”

Conditions in North Korea appear to be little better now than during the famine of the 1990s. In Pyongyang, generally considered to be the most well-off city in the country, delegation members saw bonfires burning on apartment balconies at night, presumably lit by residents to keep warm. Other basic utilities were lacking, too. “I saw a woman lifting a bucket of water with a rope up ten stories to her apartment,” Palmer says.

Looming Famine?

Barbara Demick, author of Nothing To Envy, a book about the lives of ordinary North Koreans who later defected says  “Up to 10 percent of the country perished from starvation in the 1990s. It’s a cold mountainous country, and there is very little arable land. North Korea is highly dependent on artificial fertilization and irrigation and when they ran out of electricity, everything spiraled downhill.”

The lack of birds and other small animals noted by the scientists on their recent visit are a direct result of the famine in the 1990s, Demick says. “The frogs disappeared because everyone caught the frogs,” Demick says. “You see many fewer birds and small animals in North Korea than other countries. People living near the sea ate seaweed but that also ran out.” Ongoing food scarcity continues to take its toll.. A United Nations report released in May 2012 estimated that two-thirds of North Korea’s 24 million people continue to suffer from chronic food shortages and malnutrition.

Similar famines occurred throughout Europe in the 1800s due to over-exploitation of the land, says Madsen, the Danish forestry expert. What turned things around in Europe was the development of artificial fertilizers, the capacity to breed better crops, emigration to North America, and above all, land reform. “The feudal system of old Europe was still in existence,” he says. “It’s a different system in North Korea, much worse than the feudal system of Europe, but allowing farmers to own their own land is what changed things here.”

Small-scale land reform has begun in North Korea, but such policy changes may be making matters worse instead of better. In recent years, the government has allowed individual households to cultivate their own private vegetable gardens. But that has lead to the cutting down and cultivation of forested hillsides.

“They are farming every inch of the land,” says delegation member Keith Bowers, president of Biohabitats, an ecological restoration consultancy based in Baltimore, Maryland. “From the rivers to the hillsides, there is no vegetation on this landscape that provides any of the types of ecosystem services in terms of stabilizing soils, filtering air, attenuating flood flows, or controlling against erosion.” Flooding in North Korea left more than 212,000 people homeless last year according to recent news reports. “You have whole towns being buried in mud because they’ve terraced around the town,” Demick says.

Costs of Reunification

North Korean scientists told the delegates that they would like to reforest hillsides with trees, including the Japanese chestnut, black chokeberry, and Korean pine, that could both stabilize the soil and provide edible fruits and seeds. But funding for such reforestation appears tight. During their week-long visit the foreign scientists were taken to a tree nursery that is part of the country’s current reforestation effort. The automated potting machinery was inoperable either due to a lack of fuel or spare parts, delegates report, and its greenhouse stood empty. Even if the nurseries were running at full capacity, North Korea would still have a long road ahead of it. Bowers estimates that reforesting even half the country would cost around $46 billion, an amount that exceeds the nation’s annual gross domestic product by $6 billion.

North Korean farmers are heavily reliant on nitrogen-based fertilizers, which in certain formulations can paradoxically drain the soil of nutrients. “It’s a very unbalanced fertilizer, lacking in magnesium, calcium, potassium, and phosphorus,” says Dutch soil scientist Van der Kamp of the fertilizer predominantly used in North Korea. “When you don’t replace those minerals you basically mine the soil for these other nutrients, so the soils in general are very acidic, with very low organic matter content and low microbial activity.”

 

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Cost of Invasive Species in the United States

[ My note: It’s been 15 years since this paper was written, yet it is so thorough and well-written that it stands up well today and still cited by thousands of other papers as the best estimate of what invasive species cost.  But now the costs and spread of invasive species might need to be doubled or tripled. 

All of the methods used to protect food crops rely on finite fossil fuels, from the airplanes spraying oil-based pesticides, herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides to the combustion-engine driven equipment chemical spraying and weeding equipment.  The point at which the net energy cliff and consequent shortage of fossil fuels prevents the extreme measures being taken now to prevent crop losses will be a major transition point to a lower human population carrying capacity.  

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts:  KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity]

Pimentel, D., et all. June 12, 1999. Environmental and economic costs associated with non-indigenous species in the United States

Invading non-indigenous species in the United States cause major environmental damages and losses adding up to more than $138 billion per year. There are approximately 50,000 foreign species and the number is increasing. About 42% of the species on the Threatened or Endangered species lists are at risk primarily because of non-indigenous species.

In the history of the United States, approximately 50,000 non-indigenous (non-native) species are estimated to have been introduced into the United States. Introduced species, such as corn, wheat, rice, and other food crops, and cattle, poultry, and other livestock, now provide more than 98% of the U.S. food system at a value of approximately $800 billion per year (USBC 1998). Other exotic species have been introduced for landscape restoration, biological pest control, sport, pets, and food processing. Some non-indigenous species, however, have caused major economic losses in agriculture, forestry, and several other segments of the U.S. economy, in addition to harming the environment. One recent study reported approximately $97 billion in damages from 79 exotic species during the period from 1906 to 1991 (OTA 1993).

Estimating the full extent of the environmental damages caused by exotic species and the number of species extinctions they have caused is difficult because little is known about the estimated 750,000 species in the United States, half of which have not even been described (Raven and Johnson 1992). Nonetheless, about 400 of the 958 species that are listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act are considered to be at risk primarily because of competition with and predation by non-indigenous species (Nature Conservancy 1996; Wilcove et al. 1998). In other regions of the world, as many as 80% of the endangered species are threatened due to the pressures of non-native species (Armstrong 1995). Many other species worldwide that are not listed are also negatively affected by alien species and/or ecosystem changes caused by alien species. Estimating the economic impacts associated with non-indigenous species in the United States is also difficult; nevertheless, enough data are available to quantify some of the impacts on agriculture, forestry, and public health. In this article, we assess as much as possible the magnitude of the environmental impacts and economic costs associated with the diverse non-indigenous species that have become established within the United States. Although species translocated within the United States can also have significant impacts, this assessment is limited to non-indigenous species that did not originate within the United States or its territories.

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES AND ASSOCIATED CONTROL COSTS

Most plant and vertebrate animal introductions have been intentional, whereas most invertebrate animal and microbe introductions have been accidental. In the past 40 years, the rate of and risks associated with biotic invaders have increased enormously because of human population growth, rapid movement of people, and alteration of the environment. In addition, more goods and materials are being traded among nations than ever before, thereby creating opportunities for unintentional introductions (Bryan 1996; USBC 1998).

Some of the approximately 50,000 species of plants and animals that have invaded the United States cause many different types of damage to managed and natural ecosystems (Table 1). Some of these damages and control costs are assessed below.

Plants. Most alien plants now established in the United States were introduced for food, fiber, or ornamental purposes. An estimated 5000 introduced plant species have escaped and now exist in U.S. natural ecosystems (Morse et al. 1995), compared with a total of about 17,000 species of native U.S. plants (Morin 1995). In Florida, of the approximately 25,000 alien plant species imported mainly as ornamentals for cultivation, more than 900 have escaped and become established in surrounding natural ecosystems (Frank and McCoy 1995a; Frank et al. 1997; Simberloff et al. 1997). More than 3000 plant species have been introduced into California, and many of these have escaped into the natural ecosystem (Dowell and Krass 1992).

Some of the 5000 non-indigenous plants established in U.S. natural ecosystems have displaced several native plant species (Morse et al. 1995). Non-indigenous weeds are spreading and invading approximately 700,000 ha/yr of the U.S. wildlife habitat (Babbitt 1998). One of these pest weeds is the European purple loosestrife (Lythrum salicaria), which was introduced in the early 19th century as an ornamental plant (Malecki et al. 1993). It has been spreading at a rate of 115,000 ha/yr and is changing the basic structure of most of the wetlands it has invaded (Thompson et al. 1987). Competitive stands of purple loosestrife have reduced the biomass of 44 native plants and endangered wildlife, including the bog turtle (Clemmys muhlenbengil) and several duck species, that depend on these native plants (Gaudet and Keddy 1988). Loosestrife now occurs in 48 states and costs $45 million per year in control costs and forage losses (ATTRA 1997).

Many introduced plant species established in the wild are having an effect on U.S. parks (Hiebert and Stubbendieck 1993). In Great Smoky Mountains National Park, 400 of approximately 1,500 vascular plant species are exotic, and 10 of these are currently displacing and threatening other species in the park (Hiebert and Stubbendieck 1993).

The problem of introduced plants is especially significant in Hawaii. Hawaii has a total of 2690 plant species, 946 of which are non-indigenous species (Eldredge and Miller 1997). About 800 native species are currently endangered (Vitousek 1988).

Sometimes one non-indigenous plant species competitively overruns an entire ecosystem. For example, in California, yellow star thistle (Centaurea solstitalis) now dominates more that 4 million ha of northern California grassland, resulting in the total loss of this once productive grassland (Campbell 1994).

Similarly, European cheatgrass (Bromus tectorum) is dramatically changing the vegetation and fauna of many natural ecosystems. This annual grass has invaded and spread throughout the shrub-steppe habitat of the Great Basin in Idaho and Utah, predisposing the invaded habitat to fires (Kurdila 1995; Vitousek et al. 1996; Vitousek et al. 1997). Before the invasion of cheatgrass, fire burned once every 60 – 110 years, and shrubs had a chance to become well established. Now, fires occur about every 3 – 5 years; shrubs and other vegetation are diminished, and competitive monocultures of cheatgrass now exist on 5 million ha in Idaho and Utah (Whisenant 1990). The animals dependent on the shrubs and other original vegetation have been reduced or eliminated.

An estimated 138 non-indigenous tree and shrub species have invaded native U.S. forest and shrub ecosystems (Campbell 1998). Introduced trees include salt cedar (Tamarix pendantra), eucalyptus (Eucalyptus spp.), Brazilian pepper (Schinus terebinthifolius), and Australian melaleuca (Melaleuca quenquenervia) (OTA 1993; Miller 1995; Randall 1996). Some of these trees have displaced native trees, shrubs, and other vegetation types, and populations of some associated native animal species have been reduced in turn (OTA 1993). For example, the melaleuca tree is competitively spreading at a rate of 11,000 ha/yr throughout the vast forest and grassland ecosystems of the Florida Everglades (Campbell 1994), where it damages the natural vegetation and wildlife (OTA 1993).

Exotic aquatic weeds are also a significant problem in the United States. For example, in the Hudson River basin of New York, there are 53 exotic aquatic weed species (Mills et al. 1997). In Florida, exotic aquatic plants, such as hydrilla (Hydrilla verticillata), water hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes), and water lettuce (Pistia straiotes), are altering fish and other aquatic animal species, choking waterways, altering nutrient cycles, and reducing recreational use of rivers and lakes. Active control measures of the aquatic weeds have become necessary (OTA 1993). For instance, Florida spends about $14.5 million each year on hydrilla control (Center et al. 1997). Nevertheless, hydrilla infestations in just 2 Florida lakes have caused an estimated $10 million in recreational losses in the lakes annually (Center et al. 1997). In the United States as a whole, a total of $100 million is invested annually in non-indigenous species aquatic weed control (OTA 1993).

Mammals. About 20 species of mammals have been introduced into the United States; these include dogs, cats, horses, burros, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, and deer (Layne 1997). Several of these species have escaped or were released into the wild; many have become pests by preying on native animals, grazing on vegetation, or intensifying soil erosion. For example, goats (Capra hirus) introduced on San Clemente Island, California, are responsible for the extinction of 8 endemic plant species as well as the endangerment of 8 other native plant species (Kurdila 1995).

Many small mammals have also been introduced into the United States. These species include a number of rodents, (the European [black or tree] rat [Rattus rattus)], Asiatic [Norway or brown] rat [Rattus norvegicus], house mouse [Mus musculus], and European rabbit [Oryctolagus cuniculus] (Layne 1997).

Some introduced rodents have become serious pests on farms, in industries, and in homes (Layne 1997). Rats and mice are particularly abundant and destructive on farms. On poultry farms, there is approximately 1 rat per 5 chickens (D. Pimentel, unpublished, 1951; Smith 1984). Using this ratio, the total rat population on U. S. poultry farms may easily number more than 1.4 billion (USDA 1998). Assuming that the number of rats per chicken has declined because of improved rat control since these observations were made, we estimate that the number of rats on poultry and other farms is approximately 1 billion. With an estimated additional 1 rat per person in homes and related areas (Wachtel and McNeely 1985), there are an estimated 250 million rats in the United States (USBC 1998).

If we assume, conservatively, that each adult rat consumes and/or destroys stored grains (Chopra 1992; Ahmed et al. 1995) and other materials valued at $15/yr, then the total cost of destruction by introduced rats in the United States is more than $19 billion per year. In addition, rats cause fires by gnawing electric wires, pollute foodstuffs, and act as vectors of several diseases, including salmonellosis and leptospirosis, and, to a lesser degree, plague and murine typhus (Richards 1989). They also prey on some native invertebrate and vertebrate species like birds and bird eggs (Amarasekare 1993).

One of the first cases of the failure of biological control is the use of the Indian mongoose (Herpestes auropunctatus). It was first introduced into Jamaica in 1872 for biological control of rats in sugarcane (Pimentel 1955). It was subsequently introduced to the territory of Puerto Rico, other West Indian Islands, and Hawaii for the same purpose. The mongoose controlled the Asiatic rat but not the European rat, and it preyed heavily on native ground nesting birds (Pimentel 1955; Vilella and Zwank 1993). It also preyed on beneficial native amphibians and reptiles, causing at least 7 amphibian and reptile extinctions in Puerto Rico and other islands of the West Indies (Henderson 1992). In addition, the mongoose emerged as the major vector and reservoir of rabies and leptospirosis in Puerto Rico and other islands (Everard and Everard 1992). Based on public health damages, killing of poultry in Puerto Rico and Hawaii, extinctions of amphibians and reptiles, and destruction of native birds, we estimate that the mongoose is causing approximately $50 million in damages each year in Puerto Rico and the Hawaiian Islands.

Introduced cats have also become a serious threat to some native birds and other animals. There are an estimated 63 million pet cats in the United States (Nassar and Mosier 1991), plus as many as 30 million feral cats (Luoma 1997). Cats prey on native birds (Fitzgerald 1990), plus small native mammals, amphibians, and reptiles (Dunn and Tessaglia 1994). Estimates are that feral cats in Wisconsin and Virginia kill more than 3 million birds in each state per year (Luoma 1997). Based on the Wisconsin and Virginia data, we assume that 5 birds are killed per feral cat/year; McKay (1996) reports that pet cats kill a similar number of birds as feral cats. Thus, about 465 million birds are killed by cats per year in the nation. Each adult bird can be valued at $30. This cost per bird is based on the literature that reports that a bird watcher spends $0.40 per bird observed, a hunter spends $216 per bird shot, and specialists spend $800 per bird reared for release; in addition, note that EPA fines polluters $10 per fish killed, including small, immature fish (Pimentel and Greiner 1997). Therefore, the total damage to U.S. bird population is approximately $14 billion/yr. This figure does not include small mammals, amphibians, and reptiles that are killed by feral and pet cats (Dunn and Tessaglia 1994).

Like cats, most dogs introduced into the United States were introduced for domestic purposes, but some have escaped into the wild. Many of these wild dogs run in packs and kill deer, rabbits, and domestic cattle, sheep, and goats. Carter (1990) reported that feral dog packs in Texas cause more than $5 million in livestock losses each year. Dog packs have also become a serious problem in Florida (Layne 1997). In addition to the damages caused by dogs in Texas, and conservatively assuming $5 million for all damages for the other 49 states combined, total losses in livestock kills by dogs per year would be approximately $10 million per year.

Moreover, an estimated 4.7 million people are bitten by feral and pet dogs annually, with 800,000 cases requiring medical treatment (Sacks et al. 1996). Centers for Disease Control estimates medical treatment for dog bites costs $165 million/yr, and the indirect costs, such as lost work, increase the total costs of dog bites to $250 million/yr (Colburn 1999; Quinlan and Sacks, 1999). In addition, dog attacks cause between 11 and 14 deaths per year, and 80% of the victims are small children (CDC 1997).

Birds. Approximately 97 of the 1,000 bird species in the United States are exotic (Temple 1992). Of the approximately 97 introduced bird species, only 5%, including chickens, are considered beneficial. Most (56%), though, are considered pests (Temple 1992). Pest species include the pigeon, which was introduced into the United States for agricultural purposes.

Introduced bird species are an expecially severe problem in Hawaii. A total of 35 of the 69 non-indigenous bird species introduced between 1850 and 1984 in Hawaii are still extant on the islands (Moulton and Pimm 1983; Pimm 1991). One such species, the common myna (Acridotheres tristis), was introduced to help control pest cutworms and armyworms in sugarcane (Kurdila 1995). However, it became the major disperser of seeds of an introduced serious weed, Lantana camara. In the continental United States, the English or house sparrow (Passer domesticus) was introduced in 1853 to control the canker worm (Laycock 1966; Roots 1976). By 1900, the had become pests because they damage plants around homes and public buildings and consume wheat, corn, and the buds of fruit trees (Laycock 1966). Furthermore, English sparrows harass native birds, including robins, Baltimore orioles, yellow-billed cuckoos, and black-billed cuckoos, and displace native bluebirds, wrens, purple martins, and cliff swallows from their nesting sites (Laycock 1966; Roots 1976; Long 1981). They are also associated with the spread of about 29 human and livestock diseases (Weber 1979).

The single-most serious pest bird in the United States is the exotic common pigeon (Columba livia) that exists in most cities of the world, including those in the United States (Robbins 1995). Pigeons are considered a nuisance because they foul buildings, statues, cars, and sometimes people, and feed on grain (Long 1981; Smith, 1992). The control costs of pigeons are at least $9 per pigeon per year (Haag-Wackernagel 1995). Assuming 1 pigeon per ha in urban areas (Johnston and Janiga 1995) or approximately 0.5 pigeons per person, and using potential control costs as a surrogate for losses, pigeons cause an estimated $1.1 billion/yr in damages. These control costs do not include the environmental damages associated with pigeons, which serve as reservoirs and vectors for over 50 human and livestock diseases, including parrot fever, ornithosis, histoplasmosis, and encephalitis (Weber 1979; Long 1981).

Amphibians and Reptiles. Amphibians and reptiles introduced into the United States number about 53 species. All these non-indigenous species occur in relatively warm states — Florida is now host to 30 species and Hawaii to 12 (McCoid and Kleberg 1995; Lafferty and Page 1997). The negative ecological impacts of several of these exotic species have been enormous .

The brown tree snake (Boiga irregularis) was accidentally introduced to the snake-free U.S. territory of Guam immediately after World War II, when military equipment was moved onto Guam (Fritts and Rodda 1995). Soon the snake population reached densities of 100 per ha, and dramatically reduced native bird, mammal, and lizard populations. Of the 13 species of native forest birds originally found on Guam, only 3 still exist (Rodda et al. 1997); of the 12 native species of lizards, only 3 have survived (Rodda et al.1997). The snake eats chickens, eggs, and caged birds, causing major problems to small farmers and pet owners. It also crawls up trees and utility poles and has caused power outages on the island. One island-wide power outage caused by the snake cost the power utility more than $250,000 (Teodosio 1987). Local outages that affect businesses are estimated to cost from $2,000 to $10,000 per commercial customer (Coulehan 1987). With about 86 outages per year (BTSCP 1996), our estimate of the cost of snake-related power outages is conservatively $1 million/yr.

In addition, the brown tree snake is slightly venomous, and has caused public health problems, especially when it has bitten children. At one hospital emergency room, about 26 people per year are treated for snake bites (OTA 1993). Some bitten infants require hospitalization and intensive care, at an estimated total cost of $25,000 per year.

The total costs of endangered species recovery efforts, environmental planning related to snake containment on Guam and other programs directly stemming from the snake’s invasion of Guam reach more than $1 million per year; in addition, up to $2 million per year is invested in research to control this serious pest. The brown tree snake has also invaded Hawaii but thus far has been exterminated. Hawaii’s concern about the snake, though, has prompted the federal government to invest $1.6 million per year in brown tree snake control (Holt 1997-1998). The total cost associated with the snake is therefore more than $5.6 million/yr.

Fish. A total of 138 non-indigenous fish species has been introduced into the United States (Courtenay et al. 1991; Courtenay 1993, 1997). Most of these introduced fish have been established in states with mild climates, such as Florida (50 species) (Courtenay 1997) and California (56 species) (Dill and Cordone 1997). In Hawaii, 33 non-indigenous freshwater fish species have become established (Maciolek 1984). Forty-four native species of fish are threatened or endangered in the United States by non-indigenous fish species (Wilcove and Bean 1994). An additional 27 native fish species are also negatively affected by introductions (Wilcove and Bean 1994).

Introduced fish species frequently alter the ecology of aquatic ecosystems. For instance, the grass carp (Ctenopharyngodon idella) reduces natural aquatic vegetation, while the common carp (Cyprinus carpio) reduces water quality by increasing turbidity. These changes have caused the extinctions of some native fish species (Taylor et al. 1984).

Although some native fish species are reduced in numbers, are driven to extinction, or hybridized by non-indigenous fish species, alien fish do provide some economic benefits in the improvement of sport fishing. Sport fishing contributes $69 billion to the economy of the United States (Bjergo et al. 1995; USBC 1998). However, even taking into account these economic benefits, based on the more than 40 non-indigenous species that have negatively affected native fishes and other aquatic biota, a conservative estimate puts the economic losses due to exotic fish at more than $1 billion annually.

Arthropods and Annelids. Approximately 4,500 arthropod species (2,582 species in Hawaii and more than 2,000 in the continental United States) have been introduced to the United States. Also, 11 earthworm species (Hendrix 1995), and nearly 100 aquatic invertebrate species have been introduced (OTA 1993). About 95% of these introductions were accidental, with many species gaining entrance via plants or through soil and water ballast from ships.

For example, the accidentally-introduced balsam woolly adelgid (Adelges piceae) inflicts severe damage in balsam-fir natural forest ecosystems (Jenkins 1998). According to Alsop and Laughlin (1991), this aphid is destroying the old-growth spruce-fir forest in many regions. Over the last two decades, it has spread throughout the southern Appalachians, where it has destroyed up to 95% of the fraser firs. Alsop and Laughlin (1991) report the loss of 2 native bird species and the invasion by 3 other bird species as a result of adelgid-mediated forest death.

Other introduced insect species have become pests of livestock and wildlife. For example, the red imported fire ant (Solenopsis invicta) kills poultry chicks, lizards, snakes, and ground nesting birds (Vinson 1994). A 34% decrease in swallow nesting success as well as a decline in the northern bobwhite quail populations was reported due to these ants (Allen et al. 1995). The estimated damage to livestock, wildlife, and public health caused by fire ants in Texas is estimated to be $300 million/yr. An additional $200 million is invested in control per year (Vinson 1992; TAES 1998). Assuming similar damages in other infested southern states — such as Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana — the fire ant damages total more than $1 billion/yr. Southern states are also affected by another insect, the Formosan termite (Coptotermes formosanus), which is reported to cause structural damages totalling approximately $1 billion/yr in Southern United States, especially in the New Orleans region (Corn et al. 1999).

The European green crab (Carcinus maenas) has been associated with the demise of the soft shell clam industry in New England and maritime provinces of Canada (Lafferty and Kuris 1996). It also destroys commercial shellfish beds and preys on large numbers of native oysters and crabs (Lafferty and Kuris 1996), with an annual estimated economic impact of $44 million/yr (Lafferty and Kuris 1996).

Mollusks. Eighty-eight species of mollusks have been both intentionally and accidentally introduced and established in U. S. aquatic ecosystems (OTA 1993). Two have become serious pests: the zebra mussel (Dreissena polymorpha) and the Asian clam (Corbicula fluminea).

The zebra mussel was first found in Lake St. Clair after gaining entrance via ballast water released in the Great Lakes from ships that had traveled from Europe (Benson and Boydstun 1995). It has spread into most of the aquatic ecosystems in the eastern United States and is expected to invade most freshwater habitats throughout the nation in approximately 20 years (Benson and Boydstun 1995). Large mussel populations reduce food and oxygen for native fauna. In addition, zebra mussels have been observed completely covering native mussels, clams, and snails, thereby further threatening their survival (Benson and Boydstun 1995; Keniry and Marsden 1995). Mussel densities have reached 700,000/m2 in some locations (Griffiths et al. 1991). Zebra mussels also invade and clog water intake pipes and water filtration and electric generating plants; it is estimated that they will cause $5 billion/yr in damages to these facilities and associated control costs by the year 2000 (Khalanski 1997).

Although the Asian clam grows and disperses less rapidly than the zebra mussel, it too is causing significant fouling problems and is threatening native species. Costs associated with its fouling damage are about $1 billion/yr (Isom 1986; OTA 1993).

Another pest mollusk is the introduced shipworm (Teredo navalis), which was first introduced into the San Francisco Bay. It has caused serious damage since the early 1990s. Currently, damages are estimated to be approximately $200 million/yr (Cohen and Carlton 1995).

CROP, PASTURE, AND FOREST LOSSES & ASSOCIATED CONTROL COSTS

Many weeds, pest insects, and plant pathogens are biological invaders. These non-indigenous species cause several billion dollars worth of losses to crops, pastures, and forests annually in the United States. In addition, several billion dollars are spent on pest control.

Weeds. In crop systems, including forage crops, an estimated 500 introduced plant species have become weed pests; some of these, such as Johnson grass (Sorghum halepense) and Kudzu (Pueraria lobata), were actually introduced as crops and then became pests (Pimentel et al. 1989). Most of these weeds were accidentally introduced with crop seeds, from ship-ballast soil, or from various imported plant materials, among which were yellow rocket (Barbarea vulgaris) and Canada thistle (Cirsium arvense).

In U.S. agriculture, weeds cause an overall reduction of 12% in crop yields. In economic terms, this reduction represents about $33 billion in lost crop production annually, based on the crop potential value of all U.S. crops of more than $267 billion/yr (USBC 1998). Based on the survey that about 73% of the weed species are non-indigenous (Pimentel 1993), it follows that about $24 billion/yr of these crop losses are due to introduced weeds. However, non-indigenous weeds are often more serious pests than native weeds; this estimate of $24 billion/yr is conservative. In addition to direct losses, approximately $4 billion/yr in herbicides are applied to U.S. crops (Pimentel 1997), of which about $3 billion/yr is used for control of non-indigenous weeds. Therefore, the total costs of introduced weeds to the U.S. economy is about $27 billion annually.

In pastures, 45% of weeds are non-indigenous species (Pimentel 1993). U.S. pastures provide about $10 billion in forage crops annually (USDA 1998), and the estimated losses due to weeds are approximately $2 billion (Pimentel 1991). Forage losses due to non-indigenous weeds are nearly $1 billion/yr.

Some introduced weeds are toxic to cattle and wild ungulates, such as leafy spurge (Euphoria esula) (Trammel and Butler 1995). In addition, several non-indigenous thistles have reduced native forage plant species in pastures, rangelands, and forests, thus reducing cattle grazing (Dewey 1991). According to Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt (1998), ranchers spend about $5 billion each year to control invasive non-indigenous weeds in pastures and rangelands. Nevertheless, these weeds continue to spread.

Control of weed species in lawns, gardens, and golf courses is a significant proportion of the total management costs of about $36 billion/yr (USBC 1998). In fact, Templeton et al. (1998) estimated that each year about $1.3 billion of the $36 billion is spent just on residential weed, insect, and disease pest control each year. Because a large proportion of these weeds, such as dandelions (Taraxacum officinale) are exotics, we estimate that $500 million is spent on residential exotic weed control and an additional $1 billion is invested in non-indigenous weed control on golf courses.

Weed trees also have an economic impact, and from $3 to $6 million per year is being spent in efforts to control only the melaleuca tree in Florida.

Vertebrate Pests. Horses (Equus caballus) and burros (Equus asinus), deliberately released in the western United States, have attained wild populations of approximately 50,000 animals (Pogacnik 1995). These animals graze heavily on native vegetation, allowing non-indigenous annuals to displace native perennials (Rosentreter 1994). Burros inhabiting the northwestern United States also diminish the primary food sources of native bighorn sheep and seed-eating birds, thereby reducing the abundance of these native animals (Kurdila 1995). In general, the large populations of introduced wild horses and burros cost the nation an estimated $5 million/yr in forage losses (Pimentel et al. 1999).

Feral pigs (Sus scrofa), native to Eurasia and North Africa, have been introduced into some U.S. parks for hunting, including parks in the California coastal prairie and Hawaiian islands, where they have substantially changed the vegetation in these parks (Kotanen 1995). In Hawaii, more than 80% of the soil is bare in regions inhabited by pigs (Kurdila 1995). This disturbance allows annual plants to invade the overturned soil and intensifies soil erosion. Pig control per park in Hawaii (~1500 pigs/park) (Stone et al. 1992) costs about $150,000/yr . Assuming that the 3 parks in Hawaii have similar pig control problems, the total is $450,000/yr (P. C., R. Zuniga, Cornell University, 1999).

Feral pigs have also become a serious problem in Florida, where their population has risen to more than 500,000 (Layne 1997); similarly, in Texas their number ranges from 1 to 1.5 million. In Florida, Texas, and elsewhere, pigs damage grain, peanut, soybean, cotton, hay, and various vegetable crops, and the environment (Rollins 1998). Pigs also transmit and are reservoirs for serious human and livestock diseases, including brucellosis, pseudobrucellosis, and trichinosis (Davis 1998).

Nationwide, there are an estimated 4 million feral pigs. Based on environmental and crop damages of about $200 per pig annually (one pig can cause up to $1000 of damages to crops in one night), and assuming that 4 million feral pigs inhabit the United States, the yearly damage amounts to about $800 million/yr. This estimate is conservative because pigs cause significant environmental damages and diseases that cannot be easily translated into dollar values.

Other animals that threaten crop production include birds. European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) are serious pests and are estimated to occur at densities of more than 1 per ha in agricultural regions (Moore 1980). Starlings are capable of destroying as much as $2,000 worth of cherries per hectare (Feare 1980). In grain fields, starlings consume about $6/ha of grain (Feare 1980). Conservatively assuming $5/ha for all damages to many crops in the United States, the total loss due to starlings would be approximately $800 million/yr. In addition, these aggressive birds have displaced numerous native birds (Laycock 1966). Starlings have also been implicated in the transmission of 25 diseases, including parrot fever and other diseases of humans (Laycock 1966; Weber 1979).

Insect and Mite Pests. Approximately 500 non-indigenous insect and mite species are pests in crops in the United States. Hawaii has 5,246 identified native insect species, and an additional 2,582 introduced insect species (Howarth 1990; Frank and McCoy 1995a; Eldredge and Miller 1997). Introduced insects account for 98% of the crop pest insects in the state (Beardsley 1991). In addition to Florida’s 11,500 native insect species, 949 introduced species have, mostly accidentally, invaded the state (42 species were intentionally introduced for biological control; Frank and McCoy 1995b). In California, the 600 introduced species are responsible for 67% of all crop losses (Dowell and Krass 1992).

Each year, pest insects destroy about 13% of potential crop production representing a value of about $33 billion in U.S. crops (USBC 1998). Considering that about 40% of the pests were introduced (Pimentel 1993), we estimate that introduced pests cause about $13 billion in crop losses each year. In addition, about $1.2 billion in pesticides are applied for all insect control each year (Pimentel 1997). The portion applied against introduced pest insects is approximately $500 million/yr. Therefore, the total cost for introduced non-indigenous insect pests is approximately $13.5 billion/yr. In addition, based on the analysis of management costs of lawns, gardens, and golf courses, we estimate the control costs of pest insects and mites in lawns, gardens, and golf courses to be at least $1.5 billion/yr.

In addition to crops, about 360 non-indigenous insect species have become established in American forests (Liebold et al. 1995), of which approximately 30% of these are now serious pests. Insects cause the loss of approximately 9% of forest products, amounting to a cost of $7 billion per year (Hall and Moody 1994; USBC 1998). Because 30% of the pests are non-indigenous, annual losses attributed to non-indigenous species is about $2.1 billion per year.

The gypsy moth (Lymantria dispar), intentionally introduced into Massachusetts in the 1800s for possible silk production, has developed into a major pest of U.S. forest and ornamental trees, especially oaks (Campbell and Schlarbaum 1994). The U.S. Forest Service currently spends about $11 million annually on gypsy moth control (Campbell and Schlarbaum 1994).

Plant Pathogens. There are an estimated 50,000 parasitic and non-parasite diseases of plants in the United States, most of which are caused by fungae species (USDA 1960). In addition more than 1300 species of viruses are plant pests in the United States (USDA 1960). Many of these microbes are non-native and were introduced inadvertently with seeds and other parts of host plants and have become major crop pests in the United States (Pimentel 1993). Including the introduced plant pathogens plus other soil microbes, we estimate conservatively that more than 20,000 species of microbes have invaded the United States.

U.S. crop losses to all plant pathogens total approximately $33 billion per year (Pimentel 1997; USBC 1998). Approximately 65% (Pimentel 1993), or an estimated $21 billion per year of losses are attributable to non-indigenous plant pathogens. In addition, $0.72 billion is spent in total annually for fungicides (Pimentel 1997), with approximately $0.5 billion/yr for only the control of non-indigenous plant pathogen. This brings the costs of damage and control of non-indigenous plant pathogens to about $21.5 billion/yr. In addition, based on the earlier discussion of pests in lawns, gardens, and golf courses, we estimate the control costs of plant pathogens in lawns, gardens, and golf courses to be at least $2 billion/yr.

In forests, more than 20 non-indigenous species of plant pathogens attack woody plants (Liebold et al. 1995). Two of the most serious plant pathogens are the chestnut blight fungus (Cryphonectria parasitica) and Dutch elm disease (Ophiostoma ulmi). Before the accidental introduction of chestnut blight, approximately 25% of eastern U.S. deciduous forest consisted of American chestnut trees (Campbell 1994). Now chestnut trees have all but disappeared. Removal of elm trees devastated by O. ulmi costs about $100 million/yr (Campbell and Schlarbaum 1994).

In addition, plant pathogens of forest plants cause the loss of approximately 9%, or $7 billion, of forest products each year (Hall and Moody 1994; USBC 1998). The proportion of introduced plant pathogens in forests is similar to that of introduced insects (about 30%), thus, approximately $2.1 billion in forest products are lost each year to non-indigenous plant pathogens in the United States.

LIVESTOCK PESTS

Similar to crops, exotic microbes (e.g., calf diarrhea rotavirus) and parasites (e.g., face flies, Musca autumnalis) were introduced along with livestock brought into the United States (Drummond et al., 1981; Morgan, 1981). In addition to the hundreds of pest microbes and parasites that have already been introduced, more than 60 microbes and parasites could invade and become serious pests to U.S. livestock (USAHA 1984). A conservative estimate of the losses to U.S. livestock from exotic microbes and parasites was reported to be approximately $3 billion/yr in 1980 (Drummond et al. 1981; Morgan 1981). Current livestock losses to pests are estimated to be approximately $9 billion/year.

HUMAN DISEASES

The non-indigenous diseases now having the greatest impact on humans are Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), syphilis, and influenza (Newton-John 1985; Pimentel et al. 1999). In 1993, there were 103,533 cases of AIDS with 37,267 deaths (CDC 1996). The total U.S. health care cost for the treatment of AIDS averages about $6 billion per year (USPHS 1994).

New influenza strains originating in the Far East spread quickly to the United States. Influenza causes 540 deaths in the United States each year (USBC 1998). Costs of hospitalizations for a single outbreak of influenza, like type A, can exceed $300 million/yr (Chapman et al., 1992).

In addition, each year there are approximately 53,000 cases of syphilis in the United States; to treat only newborn children infected with syphilis costs $18.4 million/yr (Bateman et al. 1997).

In total, AIDS and influenza take the lives of more than 40,000 people each year in the United States, and treatment costs for these diseases total approximately $6.5 billion/yr. The costs of treating other exotic diseases pushes this total much higher. An increasing threat of exotic diseases exists because of rapid transportation, encroachment of civilization into new ecosystems, and growing environmental degradation.

THE NON-INDIGENOUS SPECIES THREAT

With more than 50,000 non-indigenous species in the United States, the fraction that is harmful does not have to be large to inflict significant damage to natural and managed ecosystems and cause public health problems. A suite of ecological factors may cause non-indigenous species to become abundant and persistent. These include the lack of controlling natural enemies (e.g., purple loosestrife and imported fire ant); the development of new associations between alien parasite and host (e.g., AIDS virus in humans and gypsy moth in U.S. oaks); effective predators in a new ecosystem (e.g., brown tree snake and feral cats); artificial and/or disturbed habitats that provide favorable invasive ecosystems for the aliens (e.g., weeds in crop and lawn habitats); and invasion by some highly adaptable and successful species (e.g., water hyacinth and zebra mussel).

Our study reveals that economic damages associated with non-indigenous species effects and their control amount to approximately $138 billion/yr. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA 1993) reported average costs of $1.1 billion/yr ($97 billion over 85 years) for 79 species. The reason for our higher estimate is that we included more than 10 times the number of species in our assessment and found higher costs reported in the literature than OTA (1993) for some of the same species. For example, for the zebra mussel, OTA reported damages and control costs of slightly more that $300, 000 per year; we used an estimate of $5 billion/yr (Khalanski 1997).

Although we reported total economic damages and associated control costs to be $138 billion/yr, precise economic costs associated with some of the most ecologically damaging exotic species are not available. The brown tree snake, for example, has been responsible for the extinction of dozens of bird and lizard species on Guam. Yet for this snake, only minimal cost data are known. In other cases, such as the zebra mussel and feral pigs, only combined damage and control cost data are available. The damage and control costs are considered low when compared with the extensive environmental damages these species cause. If we had been able to assign monetary values to species extinctions and losses in biodiversity, ecosystem services, and aesthetics, the costs of destructive non-indigenous species would undoubtedly be several times higher than $138 billion/yr. Yet even this understated economic loss indicates that non-indigenous species are exacting a significant toll.

We recognize that nearly all of our crop and livestock species are non-indigenous and have proven essential to the viability the U.S. agriculture and economy. However, the fact that certain non-indigenous crops (e.g., corn and wheat) are vital to agriculture and the U.S. food system does not diminish the enormous negative impacts of other non-indigenous species (e.g, zebra mussel and exotic weeds).

The true challenge lies not in determining the precise costs of the impacts of exotic species, but in preventing further damage to natural and managed ecosystems caused by non-indigenous species. Formulation of sound prevention policies needs to take into account the means through which non-indigenous species gain access to and become established in the United States. Since the modes of invasion vary widely, a variety of preventative strategies will be needed. For example, public education, sanitation, and effective screening and searches at airports, seaports, and other ports of entry will help reduce the chances for biological invaders becoming established in the United States.

Fortunately, the problem is gaining the attention of policy makers. On February 2, 1999, President Clinton issued an Executive Order allocating $28 million to combat alien species invasions and creating an Interagency Invasive Species Council to produce a plan within 18 months to mobilize the federal government to defend again non-indigenous species invasions. In addition, a Federal Interagency Weed Committee has been formed to help combat non-indigenous plant species invasions (FIWC 1999). The objective of this interagency committee is education, formation of partnerships among concerned groups, and stimulation of research on the biological invader problem. Secretary Bruce Babbitt (1999) has also established an Invasive Weed Awareness Coalition to combat the invasion and spread of non-native plants, such as knapweed (Centaurea spp.) and St. Johnswort (Hypericum perforatum).

While these policies and practices may help prevent accidental and intentional introduction of potentially harmful exotic species, we have a long way to go before the resources devoted to the problem are in proportion to the risks. We hope that this environmental and economic assessment will advance the argument that investments made now to prevent future introductions will be returned many times over in the preservation of natural ecosystems, diminished losses to agriculture and forestry, and lessened threats to public health.

Table 1. Estimated annual costs associated with some non-indigenous species introduction in the United States (see text for details and sources) (x millions of dollars).

Category

Non-Indigenous Species

Losses and Damages

Control Costs

Total

PLANTS

25,000

Purple loosestrife

$45

Aquatic weeds

$10

$100

110

Mealeuca tree

NA

3-6

3

Crop weeds

24,000

3,000

27,000

Weeds in pastures

1,000

5,000

6,000

Weeds in lawns, gardens, golf courses

NA

1,500

1,500

MAMMALS

20

Wild horses and burros

5

NA

5

Feral Pigs

800

0.5

800.5

Mongooses

50

NA

50

Rats

19,000

NA

19,000

Cats

14,000

NA

14,000

Dogs

250

NA

250

BIRDS

97

Pigeons

1,100

NA

1,100

Starlings

800

NA

800

REPTILES & AMPHIBIANS

53

Brown tree snake

1

4.6

5.6

FISH

138

1,000

NA

1,000

ARTHROPODS

4,500

Imported fire ant

600

400

1,000

Formosan termite

1,000

NA

1,000

Green crab

44

NA

44

Gypsy moth

NA

11

11

Crop pests

13,000

500

13,500

Pests in lawns, gardens, golf courses

NA

1,500

1,500

Forest pests

2,100

NA

2,100

MOLLUSKS

88

Zebra mussel

5,000

Asian clam

1,000

NA

1,000

Shipworm

205

NA

205

MICROBES

20,000

Crop plant pathogens

21,000

500

21,500

Plant pathogens in lawns, gardens, golf courses

NA

2,000

2,000

Forest plant pathogens

2,100

NA

2,100

Dutch elm disease

NA

100

100

LIVESTOCK DISEASES

9,000

NA

9,000

HUMAN DISEASES

NA

6,500

6,500

TOTAL

$138,229.1

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Garrett Hardin: POPULATION: BIGGER IS LESS FREE

Recently the BIB school of population pundits— “Bigger is Better” — has become noisier. That bigger is not always better is known to everyone with eyes and a memory.

An expanding population erodes individual freedom. The freedom  people had to drive their automobiles wherever they wanted to in 1920 has been greatly reduced since then. Timed traffic signals now tell us when we can move and how fast. Parking meters tell us where we can leave our cars, and for how long.

When our population gets still larger, we will lose more liberty of movement. At some level of population, only an elite few will be able to have personal cars. The rest will have to be satisfied with mass transit.

Liberty of location is also lost with population growth. When a population is small, businesses, homes and farms can locate on flatland. The increase in real estate prices that comes with population growth squeezes out first the farms, then the homes. Deep topsoil is paved over, and farms are relocated on slopes where the soil is thinner and erosion is greater. Not an intelligent arrangement

Anticipating higher populations, a society that was willing to restrict freedom of location could save the best farmland for farms. Businesses and homes could use hilly land, where the costs of building is greater but the view is better.

Without such anticipation and rational action, what is called “normal development” produces such abominations as Silicon Valley where fruit trees should be growing. Future food production is constricted.

The free growth of cities progressively produces loss of freedom. Every city is a monument of hope that we can get more people together is a small space without losing anything significant.

The hope is thwarted. People working in the third dimension of a skyscraper must come down at rush hours to be squeezed into the two dimensions of the streets below. The modern city should be called “Bottleneck City.”

The costs to freedom of Bottleneck City are many: traffic jams; waste of travel times; sacrifice of space-demanding amenities like street trees and city parks; loss of clean air from automobile pollution; crowding of pedestrians; more hectic psychological pace; and greater per capita cost of security forces.

The Bigger Is Better population  pundits seem unaware of a major principle of all science: the Scale Effect. Growth in size always causes change in properties. There is no way that a hummingbird can be scaled up to 30 pounds in weight and still be a hummingbird: It becomes something like a slow flying vulture.

Likewise there is no way that a nation of our size … can be governed by a Town Meeting; we have to settle for a representative democracy. Group decisions become ever more difficult.

A growing population loses one freedom after another. We have passed the level of economies of scale. From here on out, bigger is not better: Bigger is less free.

The enduring problem for the nation is this: Which freedoms should we prize most? Can we agree to restrict certain lesser freedoms in order to preserve the greater ones? Unless we can find ways to bring population growth to a halt, we surely shall have to give up one freedom after another.

If we choose the freedoms to be renounced, we maybe able to preserve the more important freedoms.

Garrett Hardin, Professor Emeritus of Human Ecology, University of California-Santa Barbara, is the author of a dozen books and more than 200 articles, essays, and reviews on a variety of social issues.

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