Mass Destruction from Derivatives HuffingtonPost

The Armageddon Looting Machine: The Looming Mass Destruction From Derivatives

Sep 18, 2013. Ellen Brown.

Increased regulation and low interest rates are driving lending from the regulated commercial banking system into the unregulated shadow banking system. The shadow banks, although free of government regulation, are propped up by a hidden government guarantee in the form of safe harbor status under the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act pushed through by Wall Street. The result is to create perverse incentives for the financial system to self-destruct.

Five years after the financial collapse precipitated by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the risk of another full-blown financial panic is still looming large, despite the Dodd-Frank legislation designed to contain it. As noted in a recent Reuters article, the risk has just moved into the shadows:

[B]anks are pulling back their balance sheets from the fringes of the credit markets, with more and more risk being driven to unregulated lenders that comprise the $60 trillion “shadow-banking” sector.

Increased regulation and low interest rates have made lending to homeowners and small businesses less attractive than before 2008. The easy subprime scams of yesteryear are no more. The void is being filled by the shadow banking system. Shadow banking comes in many forms, but the big money today is in repos and derivatives. The notional (or hypothetical) value of the derivatives market has been estimated to be as high as $1.2 quadrillion, or 20 times the GDP of all the countries of the world combined.

According to Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, investment banks as well as commercial banks may conduct much of their business in the shadow banking system (SBS), although most are not generally classed as SBS institutions themselves. At least one financial regulatory expert has said that regulated banking organizations are the largest shadow banks.

The Hidden Government Guarantee That Props Up the Shadow Banking System

According to Dutch economist Enrico Perotti, banks are able to fund their loans much more cheaply than any other industry because they offer “liquidity on demand.” The promise that the depositor can get his money out at any time is made credible by government-backed deposit insurance and access to central bank funding. But what guarantee underwrites the shadow banks? Why would financial institutions feel confident lending cheaply in the shadow market, when it is not protected by deposit insurance or government bailouts?

Perotti says that liquidity-on-demand is guaranteed in the SBS through another, lesser-known form of government guarantee: “safe harbor” status in bankruptcy. Repos and derivatives, the stock in trade of shadow banks, have “superpriority” over all other claims. Perotti writes:

Security pledging grants access to cheap funding thanks to the steady expansion in the EU and US of “safe harbor status”. Also called bankruptcy privileges, this ensures lenders secured on financial collateral immediate access to their pledged securities…
Safe harbor status grants the privilege of being excluded from mandatory stay, and basically all other restrictions. Safe harbor lenders, which at present include repos and derivative margins, can immediately repossess and resell pledged collateral.

This gives repos and derivatives extraordinary super-priority over all other claims, including tax and wage claims, deposits, real secured credit and insurance claims. Critically, it ensures immediacy (liquidity) for their holders. Unfortunately, it does so by undermining orderly liquidation.

When orderly liquidation is undermined, there is a rush to get the collateral, which can actually propel the debtor into bankruptcy.

The amendment to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 that created this favored status for repos and derivatives was pushed through by the banking lobby with few questions asked. In a December 2011 article titled “Plan B – How to Loot Nations and Their Banks Legally,” documentary film-maker David Malone wrote:

This amendment which was touted as necessary to reduce systemic risk in financial bankruptcies… allowed a whole range of far riskier assets to be used… The size of the repo market hugely increased and riskier assets were gladly accepted as collateral because traders saw that if the person they had lent to went down they could get [their] money back before anyone else and no one could stop them.

Burning Down the Barn to Get the Insurance

Safe harbor status creates the sort of perverse incentives that make derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction,” as Warren Buffett famously branded them. It is the equivalent of burning down the barn to collect the insurance. Says Malone:

All other creditors — bond holders — risk losing some of their money in a bankruptcy. So they have a reason to want to avoid bankruptcy of a trading partner. Not so the repo and derivatives partners. They would now be best served by looting the company — perfectly legally — as soon as trouble seemed likely. In fact the repo and derivatives traders could push a bank that owed them money over into bankruptcy when it most suited them as creditors. When, for example, they might be in need of a bit of cash themselves to meet a few pressing creditors of their own.
The collapse of… Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG were all directly because repo and derivatives partners of those institutions suddenly stopped trading and ‘looted’ them instead.

The global credit collapse was triggered, it seems, not by wild subprime lending but by the rush to grab collateral by players with congressionally-approved safe harbor status for their repos and derivatives.

Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were strictly investment banks, but now we have giant depository banks gambling in derivatives as well; and with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act that separated depository and investment banking, they are allowed to commingle their deposits and investments. The risk to the depositors was made glaringly obvious when MF Global went bankrupt in October 2011. Malone wrote:

When MF Global went down it did so because its repo, derivative and hypothecation partners essentially foreclosed on it. And when they did so they then ‘looted’ the company. And because of the co-mingling of clients money in the hypothecation deals the ‘looters’ also seized clients money as well. . . JPMorgan allegedly has MF Global money while other people’s lawyers can only argue about it.

MF Global was followed by the Cyprus “bail-in” — the confiscation of depositor funds to recapitalize the country’s failed banks. This was followed by the coordinated appearance of bail-in templates worldwide, mandated by the Financial Stability Board, the global banking regulator in Switzerland.

The Auto-Destruct Trip Wire on the Banking System

Bail-in policies are being necessitated by the fact that governments are balking at further bank bailouts. In the U.S., the Dodd-Frank Act (Section 716) now bans taxpayer bailouts of most speculative derivative activities. That means the next time we have a Lehman-style event, the banking system could simply collapse into a black hole of derivative looting. Malone writes:

… The bankruptcy laws allow a mechanism for banks to disembowel each other. The strongest lend to the weaker and loot them when the moment of crisis approaches. The plan allows the biggest banks, those who happen to be burdened with massive holdings of dodgy euro area bonds, to leap out of the bond crisis and instead profit from a bankruptcy which might otherwise have killed them. All that is required is to know the import of the bankruptcy law and do as much repo, hypothecation and derivative trading with the weaker banks as you can…. I think this means that some of the biggest banks, themselves, have already constructed and greatly enlarged a now truly massive trip wired auto-destruct on the banking system.

The weaker banks may be the victims, but it is we the people who will wind up holding the bag. Malone observes:

For the last four years who has been putting money in to the banks? And who has become a massive bond holder in all the banks? We have. First via our national banks and now via the Fed, ECB and various tax payer funded bail out funds. We are the bond holders who would be shafted by the Plan B looting. We would be the people waiting in line for the money the banks would have already made off with…. … [T]he banks have created a financial Armageddon looting machine. Their Plan B is a mechanism to loot not just the more vulnerable banks in weaker nations, but those nations themselves. And the looting will not take months, not even days. It could happen in hours if not minutes.

Crisis and Opportunity: Building a Better Mousetrap

There is no way to regulate away this sort of risk. If both the conventional banking system and the shadow banking system are being maintained by government guarantees, then we the people are bearing the risk. We should be directing where the credit goes and collecting the interest. Banking and the creation of money-as-credit need to be made public utilities, owned by the public and having a mandate to serve the public. Public banks do not engage in derivatives.

Today, virtually the entire circulating money supply (M1, M2 and M3) consists of privately-created “bank credit” — money created on the books of banks in the form of loans. If this private credit system implodes, we will be without a money supply. One option would be to return to the system of government-issued money that was devised by the American colonists, revived by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and used by other countries at various times and places around the world. Another option would be a system of publicly-owned state banks on the model of the Bank of North Dakota, leveraging the capital of the state backed by the revenues of the into public bank credit for the use of the local economy.

Change happens historically in times of crisis, and we may be there again today.

Posted in Crash Coming Soon, Derivatives | Tagged , , | 1 Comment

Why cash is better than gold

Why people buy gold

To protect against inflation

That’s a good reason, but the next crash will be deflationary like the 2008 crash, when stocks, homes, oil, gold, and everything else plummeted in value. Trillions of dollars vanished overnight.  The bailout has kicked the can down the road and will make the next crash even worse.

CASH is KING in a deflationary financial crash.

Deflation is too big a topic to go into it in depth.  But here are just a few reasons why inflation isn’t likely:

  • You can’t have inflation until $673 trillion (Angelides 2011) of outstanding debt are wiped out and settled (i.e. Detroit bankruptcy).
  • The electronic bits representing $16 trillion of federal-level debt is not PRINTED, and even if it were, is a meaningless speck of dust in the black hole of the unfunded liabilities / $205 Trillion fiscal gap.
  • You can’t create inflation because we have a credit/debit system. We do not have a PRINTED MONEY system like Zimbabwe, where billion-dollar bills were carted around in wheelbarrows.  In a credit/debit system, money is created when a bank makes a loan, and extinguished when the loan is paid back.
  • In America’s banking system, for ever dollar of capital reserve backed by collateral (real goods, like subprime mortgages), 9 imaginary electronic dollars are lent.
  • At the height of the financial crisis it was discovered that many banks were leveraged by a factor of 40 imaginary dollars with collateral of subprime mortgages and other questionable assets.
  • Half of Americans would have a hard time getting their hands on $2,000 in 30 days.  You can’t have inflation if no one has money.  The only way you could make it happen is government helicopters dropping cash over poor neighborhoods, or most people working for unions who could demand higher pay despite the high unemployment and illegal immigrants.

In a deflation, there might be 100 people who think they own a given ‘dollar’, but only one of them does.  Look at Detroit: some debtors get 80 cents, others 20 cents, and many just pennies on the dollar — and some won’t get any money at all.

Remember how in the 2008 crash half of the wealth JUST VANISHED as stocks, homes, precious metals, and anything else that wasn’t cash dropped in value? Why would it be different this time?  There’s been no reform of the financial system.

The goal now is not to make money, but to hang on to what you have.

Nicole Foss on Cash and deflation

If you want to know more about deflation, see these Nicole Foss posts “40 ways to lose your future” and “Bigger picture“.

“Stock market bubbles (and housing bubbles etc) are Ponzi schemes. As with all ponzi schemes, only a few manage to cash out, and the majority are those who do so early. Those who do not cash out become the designated empty bag holders, but that empty bag can look awfully attractive at a market top. Trying to catch the top tick, and wring every last ounce of profit out of a collapsing system, is foolish. Most investors who play that game are likely to lose badly.

We have lived through the largest credit expansion in human history. Credit expansions create excess claims to underlying real wealth through Ponzi finance. When the debt created can no longer be serviced, the bubble will implode and the excess claims will be messily extinguished. This is deflation, and it is inevitable once a bubble has developed. The aftermath of a bubble implosion is generally proportionate to the scale of the excesses that preceded it, hence we can expect the impact to be extremely severe.

They may be convinced that they are clever and quick enough to get out before the rest, but the odds are not good. Also, the rules of the game are likely to be changed along the way, so that one would have to be both right and lucky in order to profit. For instance, shorting is likely to be banned at some point, and speculators demonized. There will be opportunities to make a killing, but many more ‘opportunities’ to lose your shirt.

Capital preservation is essential in a deflation, and the best way to preserve capital at this point is to be liquid. Cash constitutes uncommitted choices, and in a world of uncertainty, one needs to be flexible. There will be plenty of opportunities over the next few years (both to improve circumstances and avoid disaster) that will only be available to the few who still have the options cash provides. It isn’t necessary to have a fortune. Even a small amount of cash can go a long way as deflation causes prices to fall.

Those without any cash, or the means to earn some (in what will be a very difficult earning environment), will be at the mercy of whatever the world has to throw at them. Most of us are accustomed to far more choice and self-determination than most people have had in human history, and there would be nothing harder to lose. Nothing is as addictive as freedom.

Also, it’s important to understand that in a deflation, the prices of essential goods, like food and energy, can go up and this is not inflation.  It means that an essential item is scarce, and in a deflation as people have less and less money to spend, especially cruel and creates great hardship.

The herd is always fully invested at tops and fully liquid at bottoms, meaning that they are never in a position to take advantage of opportunities. They typically buy high and sell low. Naturally insiders do the opposite, behaving as any predator would.

Being grounded in positive feedback, deflation builds momentum relatively slowly at first, but later at an increasing pace. When credit contraction reaches a ‘critical mass’ it can unfold with terrifying speed, and for this reason extreme caution is warranted. It is well possible for the global banking system to seize up in a matter of hours, as it came very close to doing in September 2008.

Mortgage interest resets will continue until 2012, helping to drive sky-high inventory levels that will depress housing prices drastically for years, and have knock-on consequences for individuals and for the banking system (as we have repeatedly pointed out).

Approximately one in seven Americans is on food stamps already. The number one cause of personal bankruptcy in the US, even among people who have health insurance, is healthcare emergencies, as the co-pays are so high. More and more people are falling off the edge all the time. Their plight is ignored higher up the financial food chain, but it cannot be ignored forever. The middle class is dying, and the already poor are being driven into destitution. Eventually the ruined will reach a critical mass, and people who have nothing left to lose, lose it. This is a recipe for a degree of social unrest that will threaten the fabric of society.

There will definitely be hard choices to be made, as we have collectively invested so much in a way of life that cannot continue, and extracting oneself from the resulting structural dependencies can be both difficult and time consuming. Trying to live with a foot in two different worlds during the transition to a more resilient life can initially mean all the work of both, without the many of the benefits of either. This is not an easy path to walk. We wish all our readers the very best of luck in walking it.”

To have something of value to trade after a financial crash, sovereign default, during a war, or after a major natural disaster

Barter doesn’t work because it’s too hard for people trading goods to find one other.

When a currency failed in the past, either a local currency was created or goods like cigarettes, alcohol, and flour became the new “cash”.  Not gold or silver. Other goods traded that I found in various history books: butter, coffee, chocolate, gum, wood, oranges, bullets, razor blades, soap, over-the-counter & prescription drugs, razor blades, rechargeable batteries, shampoo, eggs, potatoes, and even candy bars — at one  Rainbow Festival, where money isn’t allowed, Snickers bars became the currency.

A 1-ounce gold coin, or even 1/10 is too valuable to trade for most goods.

Farmer’s don’t trust money, they’ll only take useful goods, and in a really serious crisis farmers become quite wealthy from the black market.

If a disaster is serious enough to create social chaos, using gold is too dangerous.  The local mafia, thieves, gangs, and roving militias will stop by your house and take your gold and whatever else you’ve got hoarded away.

 

Because after the next financial crash we’ll go back to the gold standard

The global system will NOT be recapitalized with physical gold reserves, because of the sheer momentum of the existing system of fiat currency and the debt mechanisms are too entrenched.

Also, there isn’t enough physical gold. Nor can we mine enough new gold to create enough gold reserves to back up paper currencies, because we’re at Peak Gold.

And if we had a gold backed currency, so what?   Banks would go back to their usual fraudulent practice of issuing too much paper currency against the gold reserves and create more financial crashes.

 

The USA controls the world with a currency that is backed by oil

We went off the gold standard, but the dollar is backed by something far more valuable: oil. That’s how America maintains its empire and controls oil markets.

Also, the world is flooded with dollar-denominated debt, which gives the USA huge leverage when there is very little cash to go around.

Better than gold OR cash: land, real estate, tools — real goods

Cash is KING in a deflation.  Real, physical cash.  But not for long, perhaps for only a few years if peak energy — peak everything really — strikes.

For the next two to ten years, the best way to protect yourself is to buy hard goods.

First, stockpile grains and beans, a grain mill with manual attachment, and enough food for every member of your family to survive for a year.  There are many food storage calculators on the web.

Second, buy long shelf-life goods that will be “currency” if times get really hard.

Finally, if you can afford it, buy a modest home in a town surrounded by agriculture.

The case for buying gold

Gold could be of use in a crisis to escape to a stable area.  For example, many Jewish parents got their children out of Nazi Germany using gold coins to pay their passage to safer places.

Gold makes a savings vehicle that cannot be defaulted upon or devalued by a government, and more importantly, is mobile wealth unlike real estate or stocks, giving a rich person the option to leave WITH a portion of their wealth if they want to.

We’re at the end of the stagflation stage on the verge of the crisis phase, which lasts about 20 years (Turchin).  Gold or better yet, silver, will be good to have when stability returns.  If you want to buy precious metals for your children or grandchildren, wait until after the next economic meltdown.  And you’d better have physical cash to purchase the gold with, because your bank may be insolvent, and the FDIC is in the red  and won’t be able to sort out the mess for a few years, let alone pay you back.

Gold will always be worth SOMETHING, and we appear to be at Peak Gold now, and as energy grows scarcer, mines will be forced to close.

Cash is not going to be king forever!  And if you have it, just like with gold, local mafias will try to get it out of you, and the government will tax real estate and stocks to death, as well as any other traceable wealth to avoid sovereign default. Cash might be hard to hide if it’s marked and traced electronically to fight “the war on drugs” or “the war on terror” (pick your excuse).

Short-term treasury bills are not going to be safe for long.  If you didn’t save enough to buy real estate, and you don’t have any family or friends to pool money with to do so, and you couldn’t afford even a half acre of arable land (with no home on it — much cheaper), and you’ve bought all the real goods you need, you’ve got to put your cash somewhere before cash too becomes worthless, which it definitely will at some point.  So gold could be a place, though silver would be better if you’re that poor probably.

Bottom line: real goods have priority over gold.  You can’t eat gold…  but if you’re really wealthy and want to leave something to your grandchildren, or have just a little to get through roadblocks, or the price is low because others have sold their gold to get cash and the USA is on the verge of default or changing the currency, or taxing your savings — there are reasons to buy gold.

And as far as safety – there is NOTHING safe, not even a home, though if you buy a modest home without more land than average you’re more likely to escape the notice of who ever is in power or roaming gangs/militias.

——————-

WHAT WILL YOU DO WITH YOUR GOLD?  Feb 2, 2008. Gary North

[This is an excerpt from a very long article about gold that starts out with a discussion of German Hyperinflation, which is not going to happen in America because we have a credit/debit system, not a monetary system based on actual printed cash. But you might find it of interest since we will enter a crisis period where food, coal, and other goods matter more than cash or gold — in both hyperinflation or deflation real goods are what matter].

Gold and foreign currencies kept families alive. It did not make them rich.  Who won? The great winners were farmers. They easily paid off their pre-War debts. Even before 1923, a farmer could pay off his all of debts by the money generated by the sale of a single egg.  What counted most in 1923 was your ability to keep your job. What made jobs desirable were products to sell that everyone wanted: basic foodstuffs, coal, and liquor. People in cities sold off their prized possessions and heirlooms in order to get food. The flow of grand pianos to German farmers never again reached such a rate.

There was almost no way to get rich in cities. There was no asset, other than stored food and coal, that could have made someone rich. But rich as measured in what? The greatest urban wealth was food and coal. Holders refused to sell.

Almost no one gets rich in a crack-up boom. The few who do generally go bankrupt after the currency reform, when economic conditions return to normal.

THEN WHAT GOOD IS GOLD?

Gold serves as a valuable asset in the time leading up to the crack-up boom. Its price rises faster than the prices of most other assets.

In the crack-up boom, gold serves as an insurance policy against a catastrophe. You can buy your way out of circumstances that bankrupt others. You preserve much of your lifestyle by selling off a widely sought-after asset: gold. But understand: this is not a way to get rich. It is a way not to become totally impoverished.

After the currency reform, gold is more likely than any other crack-up boom asset to retain its purchasing power. This means that gold is a good investment in three phases: in the years before the crack-up boom, during the boom, and in the reconstruction phase after the boom.

Other assets require trading in and out. They require almost perfect timing. Gold doesn’t. You buy it before the boom is expected (e.g., 2001), hold it through the boom phase and the crack-up phase, and then re-enter the capital markets as the owner of an asset that has universal desirability as an investment.

You don’t get rich as a holder of gold during a time of serious inflation. Yet get rich as an investor with capital to invest after the crack-up boom has ended.

CONCLUSION

People do not see gold in this way. They see it as a way to get rich in a time of inflation. They do not understand this principle of economics:

The division of labor through invested capital is what makes people rich, slowly. The crack-up boom destroys the division of labor. Most people get poor in the crack-up boom, except those who (1) operate successfully in a low division of labor environment (think “Amish”) and (2) debtors who live outside urban areas, who pay of their debts with depreciated money.

The Amish don’t pay much attention to their wealth, except maybe to buy better horses. Debtors who learn how to play the pyramiding game in the boom phase generally go bankrupt after the monetary stabilization takes place.

So, don’t expect to get rich in an age of inflation by owning gold. That’s because you would have to sell it to get rich. Your timing had better be perfect.

References

Angelides, Phil. 2011. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. Final Report of the national Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States.

Bonner, Will. 2007. Mobs, Messiahs, and Markets: Surviving the Public Spectacle in Finance and Politics

Kerr, R. 2 March 2012. Is the World Tottering on the Precipice of Peak Gold? Science Vol. 335 no. 6072 pp. 1038-1039

Krassimir Petrov, PhD. 4 Apr 2007. The Proposed Iranian oil bourse will accelerate the fall of the US Empire.  The Guardian.

MacDonogh, Giles.  2007. After the Reich. The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation

MacKay, Charles. 2013. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and The Madness of Crowds

Martenson, Chris. 2008. How Safe is My FDIC-Insured Bank Account?  marketoracle.co.uk

Orlov, Dmitry. 2005. Post-Soviet Lessons for a Post-American Century.

Pandurangi, A. June 25, 2011.  The Future of Physical Gold, An Imperfect World in The End

Puplava, Jim. Confederation, Nationalization & the New Oil Order.  Financialsense. The BIG Picture Transcript February 24, 2007

Turchin, P. “Secular Cycles” and “War & Peace & War”.

Vaughan, L. Feb 28, 2014. Gold Fix Study Shows Signs of Decade of Bank Manipulation. Bloomberg

Wall Street Journal. Aug 21, 2008. FDIC Faces Balancing Act in Replenishing Its Coffers

This just in: the gold bugs were right, the price of gold was being manipulated

Bloomberg News has a story captioned “Gold Fix Study Shows Signs of Decade of Bank Manipulation” (Vaughan). Since 2004 there have been times when the banks united to manipulate the price of gold DOWNWARDS.

Probably manipulation has been going on longer than that, but this is the best evidence I’ve seen for who and how it was done.

So the people most likely to make money are the banksters, not you..

Posted in Gold & Silver, Inflation or Deflation, Money, Ponzi Schemes | Comments Off on Why cash is better than gold

Book review of Murderers in Mausoleums. Riding the back roads of empire between Moscow and Beijing

Book review of Murderers in Mausoleums. Riding the back roads of empire between Moscow and Beijing. Jeffrey Tayler. 2009.

This was a very timely book to read while the crisis is unfolding now in the Ukraine.

One of the reasons this area is a powder keg are the natural resources.

“..energy resources and their conveyance to markets dominate the new Great Game unfolding in Central Asia. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan recently announced plans to build a gas pipeline connecting with Russia’s network, for subsequent re-export to Europe, thwarting a U.S. project for a pipeline that would bypass Russia; in fact, Russia now controls all of Central Asia’s westward-flowing gas exports.  Gazprom will soon be able to exert powerful political pressure over countries such as Ukraine… Central Asian oil will also strengthen Russia’s hand” especialy Kazakhstan which has the world’s largest oil field discovered in the past 30 years, and where 40% of the people are slavic and mostly Russian.

Tayler suggests that China and Russia are natural allies: “China needs energy land and water, all of which Russia has in surplus.  Might the two countries form an alliance?” He concludes that “One has to ask, Why shouldn’t Russia, China, and the countries in between form an anti-American alliance? What has the west offered them, besides criticism of their deficient human rights records, the expansion of a military alliance around their borders, and the prospect of facing ever-more-sophisticated weapons systems? Why shouldn’t Russia sell its fuel to China or use it to intimidate its rivals? What else does it have?”  This is one of the many themes in the book.

Just as America has Mexicans and other immigrants doing the dirty work, Russia has millions of immigrant laborers, many from Central Asia, a “pervasive, mostly illegal underclass that Russians do not want to see yet without which no yard stays clean, few food markets can function, and little trade accomplished….These days public opinion is not tolerant. Central Asians are viewed as uncivilized Muslims, beggars, melon vendors, petty crooks, and fafiozy.  Facing daily threats of extrotion and even assault from the police during spot document checks, they lay low, making the enws only when attacked by growing numbers of skinhead gangs whose slogan is “Russia for the Russians”.  It is predicted that by the end of the century, the migrants will become a majority and turn Russia into a mainly Muslim country.

We ignore the central asian countries these migrants come from, these downtrodden people between Moscow and Beijing.  The only country that can threaten the USA militarily is Russia (nuclear arsenal), the only economic power that could sing the USA is Ghina.  But we ignore the impoverished, mostly Muslim hinterlands on whose stability will affect Russia and China, if these nations can unite, they present the biggest threat to American and Western global dominance.

Tayler travels across many countries and discovers a lot of ethnic hatred — this is a potential powder keg of hate, that seems vulnerable to endless civil wars and genocides if instability were to ever gain the upper hand.

Other items of interest

description of Russians: “Social engineering, now almost 2 decades discontinued, produced a New Soviet Human possessing traits favoring survival under direst duress: ingrained distrust of the government and the media; disbelief in justice as embodied in laws 9written of course to serve the elite), and consequently, a willingness to flout the law to get ahead; cynicism toward government officials (regarded as ever on the take); the spurning of piety, probity, and honesty as the attributes of naifs; and finally, the exaltatoin of deceit, the lionization of crooks, for only through cleverness could one succeed.  The Soviet system, in sum, created a populace of survivors who would excel in stealth and criminality and yet be unwilling to confront their governments and demand what is owed them”.

“Russia’s Hobbesian human jungles hone ruthless talents of survival, and its poverty anneals the masses to discomfort; whereas Westerners are spoiled, fragile, and spineless.  A predatory government forces Russians to develop tactics of evasion and subterfuge, while Westerners indulge their fancies in law-bound societies that permit frivolous pursuits and childish dissent.  these are gross generalizations, but in some ways they hold up; Russia is much stronger than it looks. Certainly the Nazis had underestimated Russia (weakened by Stalin beyond the point of no return they thought) and met their end here as a result”.

A conversation with a Russian on a train:

“She returned to her seat and upended her wine cup. “I hear Condoleezza talking about democracy and that retard Bush telling us how to live, and I say, ‘America, shove your democracy up your ass and stop lecturing us!’  You meddle in other countries and f**k them up and then scold us about human rights. Shove it! I once thought Americans were a great people. But what kind of great people elects a f**king retard twice as president? You can tell by the look on his face that he’s a moron, a brainless cretin, but you elect him anyway!  Bush rigged the votes, so what? I know all that. But you didn’t protest, you didn’t fight back. Look, I’ll tell yo one thing and you’d better listen.  Russia is getting stronger, Russia is rising, and you’re just going to have to get used to it. we’ve got thousands of clever people in this country, brilliant people, scientists and schemers, and make no mistake about it: they’re out-and-out bastards. We live like sh*t, sure, but we don’t give a damn.  Like it or not, we’re getting stronger, and we’re no f**kng pansies. The Yeltsin days are over. We’re not taking any more orders from Bush or anyone else.”

Tayler comments on this with: “Many now express views like hers, and not only in Russia. But in Russia, where strength and cleverness are revered above all else, they mattered.  Disdain for an America perceived as weak and stuipid would embolden Putin in his confrontation with the West.

This is also a travel book that will take you places you’re very unlikely to go to.  I used google images as I read the book to get a better picture of places which I highly recommend.

Posted in Travel | Comments Off on Book review of Murderers in Mausoleums. Riding the back roads of empire between Moscow and Beijing

Bloomberg: Dream of U.S. Oil Independence Slams Against Shale Costs

Dream of U.S. Oil Independence Slams Against Shale Costs

By Asjylyn Loder – Feb 26, 2014

The path toward U.S. energy independence, made possible by a boom in shale oil, will be much harder than it seems.

Just a few of the roadblocks: Independent producers will spend $1.50 drilling this year for every dollar they get back. Shale output drops faster than production from conventional methods. It will take 2,500 new wells a year just to sustain output of 1 million barrels a day in North Dakota’s Bakken shale, according to the Paris-based International Energy Agency. Iraq could do the same with 60.

Consider Sanchez Energy Corp. The Houston-based company plans to spend as much as $600 million this year, almost double its estimated 2013 revenue, on the Eagle Ford shale formation in south Texas, which along with North Dakota is one of the hotbeds of a drilling frenzy that’s pushed U.S. crude output to the highest in almost 26 years. Its Sante North 1H oil well pumped five times more water than crude, Sanchez Energy said in a Feb. 17 regulatory filing. Shares sank 7 percent.

Related:

“We are beginning to live in a different world where getting more oil takes more energy, more effort and will be more expensive,” said Tad Patzek, chairman of the Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin.

Drillers are pushing to maintain the pace of the unprecedented 39 percent gain in U.S. oil production since the end of 2011. Yet achieving U.S. energy self-sufficiency depends on easy credit and oil prices high enough to cover well costs. Even with crude above $100 a barrel, shale producers are spending money faster than they make it.

Missed Forecasts

Companies are showing the strain. Chesapeake Energy Corp., the Oklahoma City-based company founded by Aubrey McClendon, reported profit yesterday that missed analysts’ forecasts by the widest margin in almost two years. Shares declined 4.9 percent. Fort Worth, Texas-based Range Resources Corp. fell 2.3 percent after announcing Feb. 25 that fourth-quarter profit dropped 47 percent. QEP Resources Inc., a Denver-based driller, slid 10 percent after fourth-quarter earnings reported Feb. 25 fell short of analysts’ predictions.

Rethinking the Ban on Exporting U.S. Oil

The U.S. oil industry must sprint simply to stay in place. U.S. drillers are expected to spend more than $2.8 trillion by 2035 even though production will peak a decade earlier, the IEA said. The Middle East will spend less than a third of that for three times more crude.

Bulls Crow

Shale wells can vary in price. Chesapeake will spend an average of $6.4 million each this year, according an investor presentation last updated yesterday. Houston-based Goodrich Petroleum Corp. will spend up to $13 million on some of its wells, Robert Turnham, president and chief operating officer, said in a Feb. 20 earnings call.

Bullish analysts and oil executives have reason to crow. While drilling in Iraq could break even at about $20 a barrel, output will be limited by political risks, Ed Morse, global head of commodities research at Citigroup Inc. in New York, said in a January report. By contrast, the break-even price in U.S. shale is estimated at $60 to $80 a barrel, according to the IEA. The price of a barrel hasn’t dipped below $80 since 2012 and has stayed above $90 since May. Costs in the U.S. will continue to fall as drillers get faster and improve results, Morse said.

Crude Exports

“The U.S. oil and natural gas renaissance is receiving significant investment because return on investment is good and competitive with other opportunities,” Rick Bott, president and chief operating officer of Oklahoma City-based Continental Resources Inc., a pioneer of shale drilling, said in an e-mail. “We’re confident that continued technological advancements will keep the Bakken and other plays at the forefront of investment for the foreseeable future.”

Harold Hamm, the chairman and chief executive officer of Continental Resources who became a billionaire drilling in North Dakota, told U.S. lawmakers Jan. 30 that the country, which U.S. Energy Information Administration data show supplied 86 percent of its own energy last year, can drill its way to energy independence by 2020. Hamm is leading an effort to get Congress to allow crude exports for the first time since the 1970s.

U.S. oil production will average 9.2 million barrels a day in 2015, up from 7.4 million last year, according to the EIA, the statistical arm of the U.S. Energy Department. Colorado boosted output by 11 percent in the first 11 months of last year, Wyoming was up 12 percent and Oklahomaadded 24 percent.

“I don’t see the shale boom coming to an end,” said Andy Lipow, president of Lipow Oil Associates, an energy consulting firm in Houston. “We’re just getting started in places like Colorado, Wyoming and Oklahoma.”

Horizontal Wells

Sanchez Energy said in a Feb. 19 statement that Sante North 1H isn’t yet finished and the well will produce more oil than the early report suggested. The company said it has 120,000 acres in the Eagle Ford and plans to spend 90 percent of its exploration budget there this year. The company’s shares have risen 63 percent in the past year.

Traditional wells are bored straight down, like straws stuck into large deposits of crude. Shale is tapped by steering the drill horizontally through layers of oil-rich rock, sometimes for a mile or more. The formation is blasted apart with a high-pressure jet of water, sand and chemicals, a practice called hydraulic fracturing or fracking, to open up cracks that free pockets of trapped fuel. The complexity and materials needed to drill horizontally and blast the rock add to the cost.

Yield Little

The boom’s boosters have given rise to the misconception that wringing oil and gas from shale can be easily replicated throughout the country, Patzek said. That isn’t the case, he said. Every rock is different. The Bakken shale, along with the neighboring Three Forks formation, covers an area larger than France, according to the IEA. An oil-bearing formation that’s 400 feet (122 meters) thick in one spot may taper off to nothing just a mile away, Patzek said. What works for one well may yield little in a neighboring county.

The output of shale wells drops faster, too, falling by 60 to 70 percent in the first year alone, according to Austin, Texas-based Drillinginfo Inc. Traditional wells take two years to fall by about 55 percent before flattening out. That forces companies to keep drilling new wells to make up for lost productivity.

“You keep having to drill more and you keep having to spend more,” said Mark Young, an analyst with London-based Evaluate Energy, which tracks production and its costs.

Sweet Spots

A prolonged slide in prices below $85 a barrel may put pressure on operators that have struggled to contain costs or that don’t own acreage in the prolific “sweet spots” of the oil fields, said Leonardo Maugeri, a former manager at Rome-based energy company Eni SpA who’s researching the geopolitics of energy at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Companies have boosted well productivity and will continue to whittle down the break-even price, he said. While the boom could survive a brief dip in oil prices, a long slump could slow drilling and cause production to fall swiftly, Maugeri said.

“To sustain in the short term, the U.S. needs prices at $65 a barrel,” Maugeri said. “That’s a critical level. Below that level, many opportunities will vanish.”

The U.S. benchmark oil contract for West Texas Intermediate crude for delivery in April 2016 is trading at about $85 a barrel, almost $18 a barrel less than today and still $20 above Maugeri’s threshold.

Net Debt

Even with crude prices above $100 a barrel, U.S. independent producers will spend $1.50 drilling this year for every dollar they get back from selling oil and gas and will carry debt that is twice as much as annual earnings, said Ryan Oatman, an energy analyst with SunTrust Robinson Humphrey Inc., an investment bank in Houston.

By contrast, the net debt of Exxon Mobil Corp., the world’s largest energy explorer by market value, is less than half of the cash earned from operations last year. The company will spend 68 cents for every dollar it gets back this year, according to company records and analyst forecasts compiled by Bloomberg.

So far, oil prices have been high enough to keep investors interested in the potential profits to be made in shale, Oatman said.

“There is a point at which investors become worried about debt levels and how that spending is going to be financed,” Oatman said. “How do you accelerate and drill without making investors worried about the balance sheet? That’s the key tension in this industry.”

To contact the reporter on this story: Asjylyn Loder in New York at aloder@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Bob Ivry at bivry@bloomberg.net

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Wall Street Journal FDIC Faces Balancing Act in Replenishing Its Coffers

FDIC Faces Balancing Act in Replenishing Its Coffers

August 21, 2008.  Wall Street Journal.

As financial institutions continue to fail, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is under pressure to decide how to replenish the fund that insures consumer deposits.

The fund is stocked mostly by fees levied on U.S. banks. If the FDIC raises the fees, that would siphon more money from already cash-strapped financial institutions. It could also deplete funds that banks would otherwise use to make loans. ‘

But if the FDIC moves too cautiously, the fund could run dry at a crucial time. That could hurt public confidence in the banking system and force the government to use taxpayer dollars to restock the fund.

The agency could split the difference by raising premiums faster than most banks would like but slow enough so that the rebuilding of the fund takes years, not months. The FDIC is likely to unveil its intentions in October. The fund’s $52.8 billion at the end of the first quarter was considered low by historical standards, covering 1.19% of all insured deposits.

Two bank failures in the second quarter are estimated to have cost the fund $216 million, and the four bank failures so far in the third quarter could have cost another $9 billion. The failure of IndyMac Bank in July may have wiped out more than 10% of the fund. Such losses could easily push the fund below a 1.15% level, triggering a requirement that the FDIC come up with an action plan within 90 days to bolster the fund.

“Congress gave the FDIC the mandate to replenish the fund through higher premiums on the industry,” said Art Murton, the FDIC’s director of insurance and research. “The FDIC has some flexibility in setting premiums, which will require striking a balance between building the fund quickly and ensuring that banks have sufficient funds to support the credit needs of the economy.”

The premiums charged by the FDIC may seem small, but they can be significant for struggling banks. The government has the discretion to levy higher fees on higher-risk banks, but those are the institutions that often can least afford it. Most banks now pay the FDIC five cents for every $100 of insured deposits. Higher-risk banks are paying as much as 43 cents to insure $100 in deposits.

“To slam an eight-, 10- or 15-cent premium, that’s going to cripple a lot of banks,” said Camden Fine, chief executive officer of the Independent Community Bankers of America, a trade group. Some analysts expect the FDIC to move aggressively despite such complaints.

“They don’t want headlines suggesting the deposit fund is shrinking and inadequate,” said Jaret Seiberg, a Washington analyst for the Stanford Group, a diversified financial-services company. “They need a fortress deposit-insurance fund.” Mr. Seiberg said the agency could raise premiums on healthy banks to 15 to 20 cents for every $100 of insured deposits.

Government officials have gambled wrong before. In response to the Great Depression, Congress created the FDIC in 1933 and a separate agency called the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. in 1934. The FDIC insured deposits at banks, while the FSLIC backed deposits at savings and loans.

The savings-and-loan crisis in the late 1980s, which led to the closing of thousands of banks and thrifts, bankrupted the FSLIC, costing roughly $150 billion in mostly taxpayer funds to clean up the mess. The FSLIC was subsequently abolished and its funds brought under the FDIC’s control.

The FDIC was created to instill confidence in the banking system and to prevent customers from panicking and rushing to withdraw money. Depositors are covered for as much as $100,000 on most accounts. The FDIC is ramping up its public-awareness campaign to assuage fears about the safety of deposits, partly in response to the hysteria that came after the failure of IndyMac.

In the 75 years that deposit-insurance funds have existed in some form, their combined balances have ended the year with less than 1.15% of the nation’s deposits only 10 times, from 1986 to 1995. Under a rule of thumb, raising premiums by one percentage point would bring in $700 million to the fund per year. Raising premiums 10 percentage points would generate $7 billion.

The FDIC has other options it has reviewed with Treasury Department officials, but these are seen as less desirable. For example, the FDIC could borrow as much as $30 billion from Treasury, an existing credit line that has never been tapped. It could also borrow short-term cash from Treasury to cover payouts if banks fail, which could become necessary if the FDIC is bogged down with billions of assets from failed banks that are hard to liquidate.

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Your Money is not Safe in an FDIC Insured Bank Account

Below are 3 articles about why the FDIC can’t actually protect your money at banks

Ellen Brown. July 5, 2013 Think Your Money is Safe in an Insured Bank Account? Think Again.

A trend to shift responsibility for bank losses onto blameless depositors lets banks gamble away your money.

The EU can mandate that governments arrange for deposit insurance, but if funding is inadequate to cover a systemic collapse, taxpayers will again be on the hook; and if they are unwilling or unable to cover the losses (as occurred in Cyprus and Iceland), we’re back to the unprotected deposits and routine bank failures and bank runs of the 19th century.

In the US, deposit insurance faces similar funding problems.

As of June 30, 2011, the FDIC deposit insurance fund had a balance of only $3.9 billion to provide loss protection on $6.54 trillion of insured deposits. That means every $10,000 in deposits was protected by only $6 in reserves.

The FDIC fund could borrow from the Treasury, but the Dodd-Frank Act (Section 716) now bans taxpayer bailouts of most speculative derivatives activities; and these would be the likely trigger of a 2008-style collapse.

Derivatives claims have “super-priority” in bankruptcy, meaning they take before all other claims. In the event of a major derivatives bust at JPMorgan Chase or Bank of America, both of which hold derivatives with notional values exceeding $70 trillion, the collateral is liable to be gone before either the FDIC or the other “secured” depositors (including state and local governments) get to the front of the line. (See here and here.)

Who Should Pay

Who should bear the loss in the event of systemic collapse? The choices currently on the table are limited to taxpayers and bank creditors, including the largest class of creditor, the depositors. Imposing the losses on the profligate banks themselves would be more equitable, but if they have gambled away the money, they simply won’t have the funds. The rules need to be changed so that they cannot gamble the money away.

With high-paid lobbyists contesting every proposed regulation, it is increasingly clear that big banks can never be effectively controlled as private businesses.  If an enterprise (or five of them) is so large and so concentrated that competition and regulation are impossible, the most market-friendly step is to nationalize its functions.

The Nationalization Option

Nationalization of bankrupt, systemically-important banks is not a new idea. It was done very successfully, for example, in Norway and Sweden in the 1990s. But having the government clean up the books and then sell the bank back to the private sector is an inadequate solution. Economist Michael Hudson maintains:

Real nationalization occurs when governments act in the public interest to take over private property. . . . Nationalizing the banks along these lines would mean that the government would supply the nation’s credit needs. The Treasury would become the source of new money, replacing commercial bank credit. Presumably this credit would be lent out for economically and socially productive purposes, not merely to inflate asset prices while loading down households and business with debt as has occurred under today’s commercial bank lending policies.

Anne Sibert proposes another solution along those lines. Rather than imposing losses on either the taxpayers or the depositors, they could be absorbed by the central bank, which would have the power to simply write them off. As lender of last resort, the central bank (the ECB or the Federal Reserve) can create money with computer entries, without drawing it from elsewhere or paying it back to anyone.

That solution would allow the depositors to keep their deposits and would save the taxpayers from having to pay for a banking crisis they did not create. But there would remain the problem of “moral hazard” – the temptation of banks to take even greater risks when they know they can dodge responsibility for them. That problem could be avoided, however, by making the banks public utilities, mandated to operate in the public interest. And if they had been public utilities in the first place, the problems of bail-outs, bail-ins, and banking crises might have been averted altogether.

How Safe is My FDIC-Insured Bank Account?

2008. Chris Martenson.  marketoracle.co.uk

Your bank account may not be as safe as you think. Taking a deeper look at the legal details and the financial depth of the FDIC reveals several troubling details that call into question how the FDIC would fare during a true banking crisis. Bur first we probably should understand bit more about the FDIC.

What is the FDIC?   Wikipedia on the FDIC :  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a United States government corporation created by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The vast number of bank failures in the Great Depression spurred the United States Congress into creating an institution which would guarantee deposits held by commercial banks, inspired by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its Depositors Insurance Fund (DIF). The FDIC provides deposit insurance which currently guarantees checking and savings deposits in member banks up to $100,000 per depositor.

Accounts at different banks are insured separately. One person could keep $100,000 in accounts at two separate banks and be insured for a total of $200,000. Also, accounts in different ownerships (such as beneficial ownership, trusts, and joint accounts) can be considered separately for the $100,000 insurance limit. The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act raised the amount of insurance for an Individual Retirement Account to $250,000.

The two most common methods employed by FDIC in cases of insolvency or illiquidity are the:

Payoff Method in which insured deposits are paid by the FDIC, which attempts to recover its payments by liquidating the receivership estate of the failed bank.

Purchase and Assumption Method in which all deposits (liabilities) are assumed by an open bank, which also purchases some or all of the failed bank’s loans (assets).

If your bank gets in trouble, the FDIC will ride in and either pay off your account (up to $100k), or sell your bank off to another bank. Under normal circumstances, a bank failure should not impact you in the least. But these are not normal times. We might reasonably ask how the FDIC would respond during a major banking crisis. After all, this is our money we’re talking about. Faith and hope are great at weddings and sporting events, but they should not form the basis of our strategy for handling our finances.

How many bank failures could the FDIC handle at once?

When we take a look at the financials of the FDIC there is a line item called “Fund as a Percentage of Insured Deposits (Reserve Ratio) of 1.22%.  

The 1.22% Reserve Ratio means that for every dollar in your bank account, the FDIC has 1.22 cents “in reserve” ready to cover your potential losses.

My note: Where will the other 98.78 cents come from?

Consider the collapse of Bear Stearns. In order to assume that bank, JP Morgan asked for, and received, a special waiver from the Federal Reserve to keep $400 billion of suspect of Bear Stearn’s assets off the books of JPM. While JPM may have been padding the books a little bit here, due to the uncertainty of how bad the wreckage might turn out to be, $400 billion dwarfs the $52 billion reserves of the FDIC.

If one medium-large bank collapse could wipe out the FDIC by a factor of nearly 8, what do you suppose would happen if there were multiple, simultaneous bank failures? At this point, my guess would be that Congress would be sorely tempted to borrow additional funds to remedy the situation, but I worry that hardship and losses might result while the laws were amended and sufficient funding avenues identified. So how many bank failures could the FDIC endure? The data suggests slightly fewer than one big one.

I thought the FDIC has full faith and credit backing by the US treasury?

Actually, no, it does not. The language in Section 14 of the FDIC Act is clear and unambiguous (emphasis mine):

(a) BORROWING FROM TREASURY.– The Corporation is authorized to borrow from the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to loan to the Corporation on such terms as may be fixed by the Corporation and the Secretary, such funds as in the judgment of the Board of Directors of the Corporation are from time to time required for insurance purposes, not exceeding in the aggregate $30,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury: Provided, That the rate of interest to be charged in connection with any loan made pursuant to this subsection shall not be less than an amount determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration current market yields on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities.

Now that’s pretty interesting. First,  any additional money from the federal government is not a guarantee, but rather a loan, which will only be made subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. Further, that the loan is to be made at “current market yields.” What do you suppose would happen to US Treasury yields during a true emergency? I can imagine a few scenarios where they might skyrocket, and this would serve to compound the difficulty of keeping the FDIC fund solvent.

How long does the FDIC have to repay me if things go bad?

Here things get murky. We turn to Section 11 of the act and find this (emphasis mine):

(f) PAYMENT OF INSURED DEPOSITS.– (1) IN GENERAL.–In case of the liquidation of, or other closing or winding up of the affairs of, any insured depository institution, payment of the insured deposits in such institution shall be made by the Corporation as soon as possible , subject to the provisions of subsection (g), either by cash or by making available to each depositor a transferred deposit in a new insured depository institution in the same community or in another insured depository institution in an amount equal to the insured deposit of such depositor.

That only says “as soon as possible” and sets absolutely no time limit or maximum. Taken to the extreme, it might be impossible for the FDIC to ever make depositors whole again, and this is one of dozens of such “outs” that exist in the document. Remember, this act was written in 1933 when money was gold, times were uncertain, and government lawyers were exceedingly careful to avoid locking the government into any possible financial black holes.

And the FDIC Act is very clear to spell out that the only insurance funds available to depositors are those that exist within the fund itself:  (f)(1)(A) all payments made pursuant to this section on account of a closed Bank Insurance Fund member shall be made only from the Bank Insurance Fund 

So, if the fund runs dry, there isn’t another possible source of funds that can be legally tapped without changing this wording. And that would take – wait for it – an act of Congress.

Surely Congress would appropriate the necessary funds to keep the FDIC solvent?

Here your guess is as good as mine. I would personally expect the US Congress to do everything in its power to the keep the FDIC well funded, especially during an emergency. I would not fault their desire here. But I can also think of a few scenarios or circumstances under which their ability could be taken away. For example:

  • If the banking crisis came at the same time as an interest rate spike and general funding emergency
  • If we were at war with Iran and things were not going well
  • If China suddenly started dumping their Treasury holdings in the opening gambit of an economic war

Other articles about the solvency of the FDIC

Rolfe Winkler. March 2, 2009  FDIC: $19 billion now backs over $4.8 trillion

 

Ellen Brown.  April 9, 2013. Winner Takes All: The Super-priority Status of Derivatives

Most people would be surprised to learn that they are legally considered “creditors” of their banks rather than customers who have trusted the bank with their money for safekeeping, but that seems to be the case. According to Wikipedia:

In most legal systems, . . . the funds deposited are no longer the property of the customer. The funds become the property of the bank, and the customer in turn receives an asset called a deposit account (a checking or savings account). That deposit account is a liability of the bank on the bank’s books and on its balance sheet.  Because the bank is authorized by law to make loans up to a multiple of its reserves, the bank’s reserves on hand to satisfy payment of deposit liabilities amounts to only a fraction of the total which the bank is obligated to pay in satisfaction of its demand deposits.

The bank gets the money. The depositor becomes only a creditor with an IOU. The bank is not required to keep the deposits available for withdrawal but can lend them out, keeping only a “fraction” on reserve, following accepted fractional reserve banking principles. When too many creditors come for their money at once, the result can be a run on the banks and bank failure.

The New Zealand OBR said the creditors had all enjoyed a return on their investments and had freely accepted the risk, but most people would be surprised to learn that too. What return do you get from a bank on a deposit account these days? And isn’t your deposit protected against risk by FDIC deposit insurance?

That situation could be looming even now in the United States.  As Gretchen Morgenson warned in a recent article on the 307-page Senate report detailing last year’s $6.2 billion trading fiasco at JPMorganChase: “Be afraid.”  The report resoundingly disproves the premise that the Dodd-Frank legislation has made our system safe from the reckless banking activities that brought the economy to its knees in 2008. Writes Morgenson:

JPMorgan . . . Is the largest derivatives dealer in the world. Trillions of dollars in such instruments sit on its and other big banks’ balance sheets. The ease with which the bank hid losses and fiddled with valuations should be a major concern to investors.

Pam Martens observed in a March 18th article that JPMorgan was gambling in the stock market with depositor funds. She writes, “trading stocks with customers’ savings deposits – that truly has the ring of the excesses of 1929 . . . .”

The large institutional banks not only could fail; they are likely to fail.  When the derivative scheme collapses and the US government refuses a bailout, JPMorgan could be giving its depositors’ accounts sizeable “haircuts” along guidelines established by the BIS and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.

Why Derivatives Threaten Your Bank Account

The big risk behind all this is the massive $230 trillion derivatives boondoggle managed by US banks. Derivatives are sold as a kind of insurance for managing profits and risk; but as Satyajit Das points out in Extreme Money, they actually increase risk to the system as a whole.

In the US after the Glass-Steagall Act was implemented in 1933, a bank could not gamble with depositor funds for its own account; but in 1999, that barrier was removed. Recent congressional investigations have revealed that in the biggest derivative banks, JPMorgan and Bank of America, massive commingling has occurred between their depository arms and their unregulated and highly vulnerable derivatives arms. Under both the Dodd Frank Act and the 2005 Bankruptcy Act, derivative claims have super-priority over all other claims, secured and unsecured, insured and uninsured. In a major derivatives fiasco, derivative claimants could well grab all the collateral, leaving other claimants, public and private, holding the bag.

The tab for the 2008 bailout was $700 billion in taxpayer funds, and that was just to start. Another $700 billion disaster could easily wipe out all the money in the FDIC insurance fund, which has only about $25 billion in it.  Both JPMorgan and Bank of America have over $1 trillion in deposits, and total deposits covered by FDIC insurance are about $9 trillion. According to an article on Bloomberg in November 2011, Bank of America’s holding company then had almost $75 trillion in derivatives, and 71% were held in its depository arm; while J.P. Morgan had $79 trillion in derivatives, and 99% were in its depository arm. Those whole mega-sums are not actually at risk, but the cash calculated to be at risk from derivatives from all sources is at least $12 trillion; and JPM is the biggest player, with 30% of the market.

It used to be that the government would backstop the FDIC if it ran out of money. But section 716 of the Dodd Frank Act now precludes the payment of further taxpayer funds to bail out a bank from a bad derivatives gamble. As summarized in a letter from Americans for Financial Reform quoted by Yves Smith:

Section 716 bans taxpayer bailouts of a broad range of derivatives dealing and speculative derivatives activities. Section 716 does not in any way limit the swaps activities which banks or other financial institutions may engage in. It simply prohibits public support for such activities.

There will be no more $700 billion taxpayer bailouts. So where will the banks get the money in the next crisis? It seems the plan has just been revealed in the new bail-in policies.

All Depositors, Secured and Unsecured, May Be at Risk

The bail-in policy for the US and UK is set forth in a document put out jointly by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Bank of England (BOE) in December 2012, titled Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions.

In an April 4th article in Financial Sense, John Butler points out that the directive does not explicitly refer to “depositors.”  It refers only to “unsecured creditors.”  But the effective meaning of the term, says Butler, is belied by the fact that the FDIC has been put on the job. The FDIC has direct responsibility only for depositors, not for the bondholders who are wholesale non-depositor sources of bank credit. Butler comments:

Do you see the sleight-of-hand at work here? Under the guise of protecting taxpayers, depositors of failing institutions are to be arbitrarily, de-facto subordinated to interbank claims, when in fact they are legally senior to those claims!

. . . [C]onsider the brutal, unjust irony of the entire proposal. Remember, its stated purpose is to solve the problem revealed in 2008, namely the existence of insolvent TBTF institutions that were “highly leveraged and complex, with numerous and dispersed financial operations, extensive off-balance-sheet activities, and opaque financial statements.” Yet what is being proposed is a framework sacrificing depositors in order to maintain precisely this complex, opaque, leverage-laden financial edifice!

If you believe that what has happened recently in Cyprus is unlikely to happen elsewhere, think again. Economic policy officials in the US, UK and other countries are preparing for it. Remember, someone has to pay. Will it be you? If you are a depositor, the answer is yes.

The FDIC was set up to ensure the safety of deposits. Now it, it seems, its function will be the confiscation of deposits to save Wall Street. In the only mention of “depositors” in the FDIC-BOE directive as it pertains to US policy, paragraph 47 says that “the authorities recognize the need for effective communication to depositors, making it clear that their deposits will be protected.” But protected with what? As with MF Global, the pot will already have been gambled away. From whom will the bank get it back? Not the derivatives claimants, who are first in line to be paid; not the taxpayers, since Congress has sealed the vault; not the FDIC insurance fund, which has a paltry $25 billion in it. As long as the derivatives counterparties have super-priority status, the claims of all other parties are in jeopardy.

That could mean not just the “unsecured creditors” but the “secured creditors,” including state and local governments. Local governments keep a significant portion of their revenues in Wall Street banks because smaller local banks lack the capacity to handle their complex business. In the US, banks taking deposits of public funds are required to pledge collateral against any funds exceeding the deposit insurance limit of $250,000. But derivative claims are also secured with collateral, and they have super-priority over all other claimants, including other secured creditors. The vault may be empty by the time local government officials get to the teller’s window. Main Street will again have been plundered by Wall Street.

Super-priority Status for Derivatives Increases Rather than Decreases Risk 

Harvard Law Professor Mark Row maintains that the super-priority status of derivatives needs to be repealed. He writes:

. . . [D]erivatives counterparties, . . . unlike most other secured creditors, can seize and immediately liquidate collateral, readily net out gains and losses in their dealings with the bankrupt, terminate their contracts with the bankrupt, and keep both preferential eve-of-bankruptcy payments and fraudulent conveyances they obtained from the debtor, all in ways that favor them over the bankrupt’s other creditors.

. . . [W]hen we subsidize derivatives and similar financial activity via bankruptcy benefits unavailable to other creditors, we get more of the activity than we otherwise would. Repeal would induce these burgeoning financial markets to better recognize the risks of counterparty financial failure, which in turn should dampen the possibility of another AIG-, Bear Stearns-, or Lehman Brothers-style financial meltdown, thereby helping to maintain systemic financial stability.

In The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences, David Skeel agrees. He calls the Dodd-Frank policy approach “corporatism” – a partnership between government and corporations. Congress has made no attempt in the legislation to reduce the size of the big banks or to undermine the implicit subsidy provided by the knowledge that they will be bailed out in the event of trouble.

Undergirding this approach is what Skeel calls “the Lehman myth,” which blames the 2008 banking collapse on the decision to allow Lehman Brothers to fail. Skeel counters that the Lehman bankruptcy was actually orderly, and the derivatives were unwound relatively quickly. Rather than preventing the Lehman collapse, the bankruptcy exemption for derivatives may have helped precipitate it.  When the bank appeared to be on shaky ground, the derivatives players all rushed to put in their claims, in a run on the collateral before it ran out. Skeel says the problem could be resolved by eliminating the derivatives exemption from the stay of proceedings that a bankruptcy court applies to other contracts to prevent this sort of run.

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Deflation : The meltdown was far more like the crash of 1873 than the 1929 Great Depression

The Real Great Depression. The depression of 1929 is the wrong model for the current economic crisis.

10-17-2008. Scott Nelson.   The Chronicle of Higher Education.

As a historian who works on the 19th century, I have been reading my newspaper with a considerable sense of dread. While many commentators on the recent mortgage and banking crisis have drawn parallels to the Great Depression of 1929, that comparison is not particularly apt. Two years ago, I began research on the Panic of 1873, an event of some interest to my colleagues in American business and labor history but probably unknown to everyone else. But as I turn the crank on the microfilm reader, I have been hearing weird echoes of recent events.

When commentators invoke 1929, I am dubious. According to most historians and economists, that depression had more to do with overlarge factory inventories, a stock-market crash, and Germany’s inability to pay back war debts, which then led to continuing strain on British gold reserves. None of those factors is really an issue now. Contemporary industries have very sensitive controls for trimming production as consumption declines; our current stock-market dip followed bank problems that emerged more than a year ago; and there are no serious international problems with gold reserves, simply because banks no longer peg their lending to them.

In fact, the current economic woes look a lot like what my 96-year-old grandmother still calls “the real Great Depression.” She pinched pennies in the 1930s, but she says that times were not nearly so bad as the depression her grandparents went through. That crash came in 1873 and lasted more than four years. It looks much more like our current crisis. The problems had emerged around 1870, starting in Europe. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, formed in 1867, in the states unified by Prussia into the German empire, and in France, the emperors supported a flowering of new lending institutions that issued mortgages for municipal and residential construction, especially in the capitals of Vienna, Berlin, and Paris.

Mortgages were easier to obtain than before, and a building boom commenced. Land values seemed to climb and climb; borrowers ravenously assumed more and more credit, using unbuilt or half-built houses as collateral. The most marvelous spots for sightseers in the three cities today are the magisterial buildings erected in the so-called founder period.

But the economic fundamentals were shaky. Wheat exporters from Russia and Central Europe faced a new international competitor who drastically undersold them. The 19th-century version of containers manufactured in China and bound for Wal-Mart consisted of produce from farmers in the American Midwest. They used grain elevators, conveyer belts, and massive steam ships to export trainloads of wheat to abroad. Britain, the biggest importer of wheat, shifted to the cheap stuff quite suddenly around 1871.

By 1872 kerosene and manufactured food were rocketing out of America’s heartland, undermining rapeseed, flour, and beef prices. The crash came in Central Europe in May 1873, as it became clear that the region’s assumptions about continual economic growth were too optimistic. Europeans faced what they came to call the American Commercial Invasion. A new industrial superpower had arrived, one whose low costs threatened European trade and a European way of life.

As continental banks tumbled, British banks held back their capital, unsure of which institutions were most involved in the mortgage crisis.

The cost to borrow money from another bank — the interbank lending rate — reached impossibly high rates.

This banking crisis hit the United States in the fall of 1873. Railroad companies tumbled first. They had crafted complex financial instruments that promised a fixed return, though few understood the underlying object that was guaranteed to investors in case of default. (Answer: nothing). The bonds had sold well at first, but they had tumbled after 1871 as investors began to doubt their value, prices weakened, and many railroads took on short-term bank loans to continue laying track.

Then, as short-term lending rates skyrocketed across the Atlantic in 1873, the railroads were in trouble.

When the railroad financier Jay Cooke proved unable to pay off his debts, the stock market crashed in September, closing hundreds of banks over the next three years. The panic continued for more than four years in the United States and for nearly six years in Europe.

The long-term effects of the Panic of 1873 were perverse. For the largest manufacturing companies in the United States — those with guaranteed contracts and the ability to make rebate deals with the railroads — the Panic years were golden. Andrew Carnegie, Cyrus McCormick, and John D. Rockefeller had enough capital reserves to finance their own continuing growth.

For smaller industrial firms that relied on seasonal demand and outside capital, the situation was dire. As capital reserves dried up, so did their industries.

Carnegie and Rockefeller bought out their competitors at fire-sale prices [my note: this is why cash is king in a deflation, very few people have money]. The Gilded Age in the United States, as far as industrial concentration was concerned, had begun.

As the panic deepened, ordinary Americans suffered terribly. A cigar maker named Samuel Gompers who was young in 1873 later recalled that with the panic, “economic organization crumbled with some primeval upheaval.” Between 1873 and 1877, as many smaller factories and workshops shuttered their doors, tens of thousands of workers — many former Civil War soldiers — became transients. The terms “tramp” and “bum,” both indirect references to former soldiers, became commonplace American terms.

Relief rolls exploded in major cities, with 25% unemployment (100,000 workers) in New York City alone. Unemployed workers demonstrated in Boston, Chicago, and New York in the winter of 1873-74 demanding public work. In New York’s Tompkins Square in 1874, police entered the crowd with clubs and beat up thousands of men and women. The most violent strikes in American history followed the panic, including by the secret labor group known as the Molly Maguires in Pennsylvania’s coal fields in 1875, when masked workmen exchanged gunfire with the “Coal and Iron Police,” a private force commissioned by the state. A nationwide railroad strike followed in 1877, in which mobs destroyed railway hubs in Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Cumberland, Md.

In Central and Eastern Europe, times were even harder. Many political analysts blamed the crisis on a combination of foreign banks and Jews. Nationalistic political leaders (or agents of the Russian czar) embraced a new, sophisticated brand of anti-Semitism that proved appealing to thousands who had lost their livelihoods in the panic. Anti-Jewish pogroms followed in the 1880s, particularly in Russia and Ukraine. Heartland communities large and small had found a scapegoat: aliens in their own midst. The echoes of the past in the current problems with residential mortgages trouble me. Loans after about 2001 were issued to first-time homebuyers who signed up for adjustablerate mortgages they could likely never pay off, even in the best of times.

2007: Real-estate speculators, hoping to flip properties, overextended themselves, assuming that home prices would keep climbing. Those debts were wrapped in complex securities that mortgage companies and other entrepreneurial banks then sold to other banks; concerned about the stability of those securities, banks then bought a kind of insurance policy called a credit-derivative swap, which risk managers imagined would protect their investments. More than two million foreclosure filings — default notices, auction-sale notices, and bank repossessions — were reported in 2007. By then trillions of dollars were already invested in this credit-derivative market. Were those new financial instruments resilient enough to cover all the risk? (Answer: no.)

As in 1873, a complex financial pyramid rested on a pinhead. Banks are hoarding cash. Banks that hoard cash do not make short-term loans. Businesses large and small now face a potential dearth of short-term credit to buy raw materials, ship their products, and keep goods on shelves. If there are lessons from 1873, they are different from those of 1929. Most important, when banks fall on Wall Street, they stop all the traffic on Main Street — for a very long time. The protracted reconstruction of banks in the United States and Europe created widespread unemployment. Unions (previously illegal in much of the world) flourished but were then destroyed by corporate institutions that learned to operate on the edge of the law. In Europe, politicians found their scapegoats in Jews, on the fringes of the economy. (Americans, on the other hand, mostly blamed themselves; many began to embrace what would later be called fundamentalist religion.)

The post-panic winners, even after the bailout, might be those firms — financial and otherwise — that have substantial cash reserves. A widespread consolidation of industries may be on the horizon, along with a nationalistic response of high tariff barriers, a decline in international trade, and scapegoating of immigrant competitors for scarce jobs. The failure in July of the World Trade Organization talks begun in Doha seven years ago suggests a new wave of protectionism may be on the way. In the end, the Panic of 1873 demonstrated that the center of gravity for the world’s credit had shifted west — from Central Europe toward the United States. The current panic suggests a further shift — from the United States to China and India. Beyond that I would not hazard a guess. I still have microfilm to read.

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James Howard Kunstler 2007 Predictions: many came true

Kunstler (and many others) saw the immense corruption on Wall Street and the housing bubble years before it popped.  He is also one of the few who saw it would be deflationary and understands how the financial system and energy crisis are linked.  Above all, he is a hoot to read. I’ve shortened the 3 pieces below, to read the full articles, select the links (and then scroll down).

Kunstler, James Howard. Jan 1, 2007. Forecast For the Year Ahead. Kunstler.com

Finance has been trending away from economic reality since the Ronald Reagan era on an accelerating basis. By this I mean the role of finance no longer represents sets of mechanisms and institutions designed to raise legitimate capital for investment in legitimate productive activities. Finance is now an end in itself, essentially a racket. The capital is no longer capital, i.e. genuine wealth accumulated from previous productive activities. Now it is jive-capital: notional “wealth” spun out of activities that are fundamentally not productive — for instance, sub-prime mortgages bundled into tradable securities. In reality, the mortgages backing these securities are contracts for repayment of huge loans made on hazardous terms by shifty means to people with poor prospects for making their payments for assets (suburban houses made of vinyl and glue) that are, in any case, fated to lose much of their nominal value, becoming worth less than the obligations yet due on them, and rapidly so.

The sub-prime loans were made in the first place because the contracting institutions (banks) could pass off the risks associated with these jive contracts by off-loading them to larger institutions such as the government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) which are largely exempt from regulatory oversight and hence could buy up whatever cockamamie paper contracts they felt like buying and convert them into bonds, certificates said to represent future earnings. (Not.)

These mortgage backed securities were only one species of engineered abstract financial “instruments” among many orders of incomprehensibly abstract mutant financial “products” (derivatives, credit default swaps) and procedures (carry trade, leveraged buyouts,) based on the fundamental unreality that it is possible to get something for nothing.

The inertia part of the story is that this collective hallucination (that jive-capital was real) was sustained through 2006 by the sheer massive weight and flow of jive capital and its ability to elude scrutiny by countless chimerical conversions from one abstruse form to another — from loan, to bond, to bet, to position, to Christmas bonus. . . . The final result, though, was a nation with an increasingly impoverished middle class, a bankrupt public treasury, and all remaining wealth (notional or residual) creamed off by a racketeering upper crust of logrolling insiders who, for the moment, could convert their dollars into multiple mansions, private jet planes, and sky boxes at the gladiatorial combats du jour.

The rest of the US economy was increasingly composed of a suburban development hyper-boom that amounted to little more overall than a colossal mis-investment in a living arrangement with no future (and the irreparable destruction of the remaining US landscape). The building-and-selling of suburban houses and the ancillary accessorizing of them with collector highways, strip malls, and big box stores, fast food huts, and all the jobs associated with constructing, lending, evaluating, selling, servicing, and staffing these things, along with additional rackets like home equity withdrawal refinancing to keep the cash registers ringing in the Wal-Marts and Home Depots — these were the activities supposedly keeping the “regular” (i.e. lumpenprole) economy chugging along. If you subtracted all this “housing bubble” activity from the rest of this economy since 2001 there was very little left besides, hair-styling, fried chicken, and open heart surgery.

Yet, marvelous to relate, the whole toxic, entropy-laden, creaking, reeking cargo of shit-and-deceit that comprised this system just managed to keep rolling along for another year without collapsing under its own stinking, fantastically stupid weight.

But it brings us to a crucial final angle on the story-as-a-whole, which is that the stresses, distortions, and perversities we see in the financial markets and the economy are largely attributable to the peculiar circumstances of Peak Oil, namely, a grinding background reality that this point of the world’s highest-ever petroleum production represents the final blow off of an economy that really has no future, an economy in which typical industrial growth is no longer possible. And if this growth, this ceaseless expansion of everything is no longer possible, if instead we enter a wholesale global contraction of available energy, of industrial activity, and expectation of future activity, why then the markers used to signify the expectation of growth (at least the retention of wealth) — currencies, stock certificates, bonds, derivative contracts, mortgages — all these things lose their legitimacy and finally their value. That is the fundamental underlying reality in Peak Oil’s relation to our modern economies in general and to the finance sector that is supposed to serve it.

Looking Ahead

I will be so bold to say that I called the housing crash correctly last year, though the worst symptoms are slow to present for technical reasons. There’s no question that the action on the real estate scene changed drastically in mid-year. The implosion of this mighty structure of fraud, folly, and misinvestment so far has taken place in such breathtaking slow-motion that its victims have not really felt the pain from the falling bricks yet. By late summer, buyers started evaporating. Real estate signs planted in lawns last June are still sitting there on New Years. Prices have come down a bit in many markets, including most of the hotties such as Florida, Phoenix, Las Vegas, San Diego, and Boston. But the buyers are still not bidding. Meanwhile, the sellers have dug in, determined to get something at least close to their wished-for inflated prices, egged on by their representatives, the realtors. This mutually reinforcing psychology cannot hold indefinitely. Many of these sellers don’t have the luxury to wait around forever. Some have had to move to other houses in other places because of job changes, and are stuck paying two mortgages. Many are stuck with “creative” mortgages that all the evil ingenuity of the human mind conjured in recent years to enable the feckless to live above their means — adjustable rate, payment optional, no money down contracts that suckered buyers into booby-trapped obligations whose initial low-interest terms lured them in and are now set to blow up in their faces as terms automatically re-set upwards to higher rates and “optional” deferred payments get backloaded onto the principal, putting the mortgage holders so far underwater on their contracts that a tour of the Titanic would feel like a day at the beach.

The trouble is, when both the sellers and their agents decide to get with the reality program and lower their prices, they will only stimulate a massive death spiral of house price deflation as buyers see the numbers go lower and hold out longer in the expectation that prices will go down even further. That would, of course, put more sellers into gross distress and lead them either to dump their properties or enter the cold waters of default and foreclosure.  

Add to this that the late stages of the hyper-boom caused so much “product” to be brought onto the market by the “production home builders” that there now exists an unprecedented oversupply of exactly the kind of crappy suburban houses (in all price ranges) that are bound to lose value going just a little bit forward. Foreclosures will only add more to the oversupply. In the subprime mortgage niche, defaults are officially reported to be running at 20 percent. Foreclosures are trailing because the process is so awkward, and many have not yet shown up in the housing markets

As the music stops in the lending rackets, liquidity in the form of mortgage backed securities and other sources of hallucinated “money” will dry up, and will start to make itself felt in all the other arenas and regions that “money” has been migrating to. Jobs associated with house-building and all those ancillary enterprises — big box shopping, chain restaurant revenues, car sales — will disappear and incomes with them. Many home sales in past decade were made to people benefiting directly from the housing bubble. (The sheer number of real estate agents in America more than doubled since 2001.) This evaporation of both credit and incomes will impact the so-called “consumer economy”, said to make up 70% of the total US economy. In other words, the term “depression” might be applicable as this economy lurches into actual contraction of more than a few percentage points.

This scenario suggests that earnings in corporations listed on the public stock exchanges — the companies that elude acquisition by “private equity” — would necessarily see severe drops in earnings, and therefore in stock value. While many commentators view the rise in the Dow as just another symptom of inflation — asset inflation — the activity in these assets — companies making, doing, and selling things — must be reported on a quarterly basis. And if that activity is trending strongly downward, then stock prices will trend down.

The Energy Predicament

Oil ended 2006 roughly where it began, at just over $60 a barrel. This reassured the public that all talk about Peak Oil was hysterical blather from a lunatic fringe. It was reinforced by publication of the mendacious Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) report issued this fall — a tragic document put out by a giant public relations firm representing the oil industry — with the mission of staving off windfall profits taxes and other regulatory moves that a true resource emergency might recommend.

But beyond this debate, in the background, another ominous trend can account for the stalling of oil prices in 2006 — totally unrecognized by the public and ignored by the news media: prices on the oil futures market leveled off because the Third World has effectively dropped out of bidding for it — and using it. They cannot afford it at $60-a-barrel. The Third World has entered an era of energy destitution and it is manifesting in symptoms such as local resource wars, genocides, falling life expectancies, and in many places a near-total unraveling of the sociopolitical order. American mall-walkers and theme park visitors are oblivious to this tragic process, but it is perhaps the major reason why we are not now suffering from $100-per-barrel (or greater) oil prices (with the consequent unraveling of our sociopolitical and economic order).

The major trend on the oil scene the past 12 months is the apparent inability of the world to lift total production above 85 million barrels a day — with demand now rising above that line. It is unclear how much more demand destruction will come out of the Third World before bidding intensifies between the developed nations. One commentator in particular, Dallas geologist Jeffrey Brown –a frequent contributor on the web’s best oil debate site, TheOilDrum.com — is advancing the idea that we are entering an oil export crisis that will presage a more general permanent world-wide oil emergency. Brown holds that the major oil exporting nations are using so much of their own product, because of rising populations, that their net exports are falling at an alarming rate, perhaps as much as 9 percent annually. This trend combines with general depletion rates now said to be around 3 percent a year.

The question of total oil reserves around the world remains somewhat murky, but Brown, Kenneth Deffeyes of Princeton, and others using a straightforward mathematical model, have stated that the world is roughly at the same point in all-time production as the Lower-48 United States was at in 1970, when America passed its all-time production peak. We know for certain that three of the four super giant oil fields (Daqing in China; Cantarell in Mexico; Burgan in Kuwait) are past peak and there is plenty of evidence that the greatest of them all, 50-year-old Ghawar in Saudi Arabia is not only past peak but perhaps “crashing” into a super-steep decline.

Discovery of new oil to replace the production from declining fields remains paltry. Chevron announced it’s “Jack” discovery in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico with great fanfare this year, but neither conclusively demonstrated that all the wished-for oil was down there (between 3 and 15 billion barrels, Chevron said) or that they could get it out of there in a way that made sense economically, since the oil was extraordinarily deep and difficult to lift up.

Meanwhile, companies developing tar sand production in Alberta announced that their costs of production were rising substantially, while a reckoning lay ahead as to how much of Canada’s fast-disappearing natural gas reserves will be squandered in melting tar. The oil shale project is going nowhere. American corporate farmers have entered into a racket with congress to subsidize ethanol production from corn and biodiesel fuel from soybeans. The American public remains ignorant of the tragic futility of this project, which depends on oil-and-gas “inputs” to keep the crop yields up and ultimately is a net energy “loser.” As the world crosses into the uncharted territory of “The Long Emergency,” Americans will find themselves having to choose between eating food and making fuel to keep the car engines running.

The signal failure of public debate in this country is embodied in our obsession with this particular theme — how to keep the cars running by other means at all costs. Everybody from the greenest enviros to the hoariest neoliberal free market pimps believe that this is the only thing we need to worry about or talk about. The truth, of course, is that we have to make other arrangements for virtually all the major activities of everyday life — farming, commerce, transport, settlement patterns — but we are so over-invested in our suburban infrastructure that we cannot face this reality.

The bottom line for oil in 2007: expect the bidding on the futures markets to regain intensity between the US, China, Europe, and Japan. A contracting US economy could take some demand out of the picture, but the sad truth is that we burn up most of the oil we use in cars, and American life is now so hopelessly based on incessant motoring that citizens cannot even go down to the unemployment office without driving. Geopolitical events can only make the oil supply situation worse and probably will. (See ahead.)

We are probably also in the early stages of a natural gas crisis in the US. [My comment: fracking delayed the gas crisis, but it’s clear from Bill Powers 2013 “Cold, Hungry, and In the Dark : Exploding the Natural Gas Myth” and Richard Heinberg’s “Snake Oil : How Fracking’s False Promise of Plenty Imperils Our Future” that the fracking bubble is likely to end as early as 2015 and as late as 2018].

Over the next decade, the gap between US demand for natural gas and dwindling supply may amount to one-and-a-half times the current equivalent of our oil imports. This is a staggering deficit. Natural gas is used for heating in more than half the houses in the US and accounts for just under 20% of our total electricity production. Domestic supply is crashing. We are drilling as fast as we can, with more and more rigs each year, just to keep up. To make matters worse, the means of gas delivery — through a vast web of pipeline networks around the nation — makes “just-in-time” delivery the norm and, tragically, also makes “just-in-time” pricing normal, too. Thus, gas prices are responding only to the shortest-term signals — for instance, unusually mild winter weather — rather than to the catastrophic long-term reserve picture. Finally, we are unlikely to solve our natural gas problems with imports for technical reasons having to do with the cost and difficulty of moving the stuff by means other than pipelines and for geopolitical reasons, namely that most of the remaining gas in the world is in Asia. Bottom line: we could enter a home heating and electricity production crisis anytime. Massive price increases are likely to be required in order to reduce demand to the level of available supplies. This will be one of the major factors in the disabling of suburbia — which is to say, normal American life.

Geopolitics

The Iraq misadventure has turned self-evidently into a fiasco and the American public is understandably losing the will to persevere there. Ditto Afghanistan. The overall trend is for dwindling American influence over events in the Middle East. Whether this is a good thing or a bad thing in the long run is not as important as the sheer fact that it is happening.

Iran has benefited from every American misstep and sign of weakness and is seeking to become the regional hegemon. Is it worth it to them just to be the Big Cheese in the region? Or is this just a sort of booby prize in a contest between religious sects? Iran’s current momentum is favorable toward this goal in the short term, but in the longer term Iran is faced with steeply depleting oil reserves and an exploding population that is growing restless under a now ossified regime of mullahs. Iran’s natural gas reserves are impressive, but they cannot rely on them indefinitely for both export income and running their own electrical grid. While their pursuit of atomic weapons may be for real, it is also a fact that Iran must make plans for producing electricity without using up absolutely all of its fossil fuel — and so their pursuit of atomic energy is not without practical necessity.

Shia influence, led by Iran, appears ascendant in the Middle East for the moment. Iraq is under Shia control (though Iraqi Shia are ethnically not Persian). Hezbollah is taking over Lebanon by degrees. Shia populations in Saudi Arabia are concentrated in the oil-producing area along the Persian Gulf. Iran and its Shia proxies appear avid to challenge Saudi Arabia’s leadership — and Arabia is, after all, the birthplace of Islam and the owner of its holiest shrines. What this boils down to is a collision between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However this plays out, in proxy wars or in direct conflict, it can only play havoc with Middle East oil production and export.

The players involved have the means to make enormous mischief if they want to. Any of them could take out a major oil installation with a jet plane and a suicide pilot, or missiles, or even with common small arms in a well-orchestrated operation. Doing so, of course, would so grievously damage the major importing nations that the global economy would seize up and effectively bring down the curtain on the industrial era. Other players currently lurking off-stage could make dramatic entrances in the year ahead — for instance, Pakistan, perhaps the most dangerous nation in the world, a country held together with scotch tape and baling wire, with the world’s biggest supply of angry Islamic maniacs and an arsenal of about twenty atomic bombs.

In short, the Middle East is rigged like a gargantuan booby trap, the biggest IED the world has ever seen. There are too many things that can go wrong, and countless possible combinations for Murphy’s Law to come into play. As bloody and horrible as events have been in the Islamic world through 2006 — including everything from the genocide in Darfur to the daily violence in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Hezbollah-Israel fight — things can obviously get worse. At the bottom of all this are the exploding populations in a part of the world that has historically possessed only meager resources for human existence. Now that the most special resource of all — abundant oil — is heading into depletion all that remains on the horizon is a long, grinding competition among more people for less of every other resource. My guess is that the Middle East will shut down politically before it shuts down geologically. The process is underway. The populations aren’t shrinking and the pressures are only getting worse. So I would predict greater disorder in the Middle East through 2007. The US may suffer a “double Dien Bien Phu” event of having to vacate both Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time.

Europe and Japan have been lurking quietly on the sidelines since the US was lured into the “War on Terror” in 2001. Japan imports 95% of its oil and gas. If those lifelines are severed, Japan is simply toast. The only question is whether they will take it lying down, or revisit other options like military adventure. Given their energy disadvantages, military adventuring seems unlikely this time around. Perhaps they just go medieval again and retreat into the comfortable romance of a Neo-Shogun island culture.

Europe has been coasting along letting America take all the heat in the Middle East. Europe’s own energy supply (the North Sea) is crashing. Only Russia has substantial supplies — though it, too, is past peak — and will probably continue making moves to use its oil leverage for political advantage. Britain has been the most feckless European nation, utterly ignoring its own energy crisis as North Sea oil and gas dwindles down to nothing. France can take a little comfort in getting 70% of its electric power from nukes — and the nations that maintain electric service will be the nations that remain civilized. Germany, Italy, and Spain are now at the mercy of their oil importers. They didn’t behave as foolishly as the US did; they didn’t destroy their public transit or their city centers or their local agriculture. But they still face great difficulties in reorganizing daily life to fit the requirements of the post-oil age.

China faces difficulties at least as awesome as the United States. They have zilch left for oil. Their ecological problems are worse, their political stability depends on an export economy that could fall apart in 2007 as WalMart shoppers spend fewer and less valuable dollars on things made in China’s factories. A hundred million unemployed factory workers might make things hairy for a central government that enjoys little true legitimacy. And there is always the chance that Chinese internal politics will return to the psychotic state of the mid-1960s if the stress is too great. What I wonder is when China might begin to go adventuring into former Soviet lands such as Kazakhstan in search of oil. Perhaps 2007 is the year that China turns aggressive.

US Politics

Elation ran through the body politic in November when the Republicans lost control of congress and the senate, and many state governments as well. But the Democrats have not shown any better understanding of the nation’s economic and energy predicaments than the Republicans have. The Democrats are equally lost in fantasies about running WalMart and the interstate highway system on corn instead of petroleum. The Democrats are every bit as invested in our suburban gross liabilities as the Republicans have been. One way or another, we will either have to get some revolution in party ideology or the American political system is going to fail. Unfortunately, instead of ideas and agendas for facing our real problems, the public remains lost in a political personality showcase that is just one facet of our absurd celebrity culture.

My prediction for 2007 is that American politics will become more delusional, more based on false hopes for salvaging our tragic misinvestments, and more disappointing.

I have stated many times on this blog that America faces a political readjustment of the kind not seen since the Civil War — though not with the same plot and themes. I also believe that the feckless complacency of our current behavior could lead to a situation here in which Americans will beg an authoritarian leadership to tell them what to do. Winston Churchill famously remarked that Americans could always be relied upon to do the right thing — after they had exhausted all the other possibilities. I hope we are not heading in that direction, but we are already romancing the “other possibilities” (like running WalMart on corn) instead of taking intelligent steps like fixing the railroads, or ending subsidies and incentives for suburban development, or slapping realistic taxes on gasoline.

===========================

Jan 14, 2008  DISARRAY  by James Howard Kunstler

The dark tunnel that the U.S. economy has entered began to look more and more like a black hole recently, sucking in lives, fortunes, and prospects behind a Potemkin facade of orderly retreat put up by anyone in authority with a story to tell or an interest to protect – Fed chairman Bernanke, CNBC, The New York Times , the Bank of America… Events are now moving ahead of anything that personalities can do to control them.

The “housing bubble” implosion is broadly misunderstood. It’s not just the collapse of a market for a particular kind of commodity, it’s the end of the suburban pattern itself, the way of life it represents, and the entire economy connected with it. It’s the crack up of the system that America has invested most of its wealth in since 1950. It’s perhaps most tragic that the mis-investments only accelerated as the system reached its end, but it seems to be nature’s way that waves crest just before they break.

This wave is breaking into a sea-wall of disbelief. Nobody gets it. The psychological investment in what we think of as American reality is too great. The mainstream media doesn’t get it, and they can’t report it coherently. None of the candidates for president has begun to articulate an understanding of what we face: the suburban living arrangement is an experiment that has entered failure mode.

I maintain that all the “players” – from the bankers to the politicians to the editors to the ordinary citizens – will continue to not get it as the disarray accelerates and families and communities are blown apart by economic loss. Instead of beginning the tough process of making new arrangements for everyday life, we’ll take up a campaign to sustain the unsustainable old way of life at all costs.

A reader sent me a passel of recent clippings last week from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution . It contained one story after another about the perceived need to build more highways in order to maintain “economic growth” (and incidentally about the “foolishness” of public transit). I understood that to mean the need to keep the suburban development system going, since that has been the real main source of the Sunbelt’s prosperity the past 60-odd years. They cannot imagine an economy that is based on anything besides new subdivisions, freeway extensions, new car sales, and NASCAR spectacles. The Sunbelt, therefore, will be ground-zero for all the disappointment emanating from this cultural disaster, and probably also ground-zero for the political mischief that will ensue from lost fortunes and crushed hopes.

From time-to-time, I feel it’s necessary to remind readers what we can actually do in the face of this long emergency. Voters and candidates in the primary season have been hollering about “change” but I’m afraid the dirty secret of this campaign is that the American public doesn’t want to change its behavior at all. What it really wants is someone to promise them they can keep on doing what they’re used to doing: buying more stuff they can’t afford, eating more bad food that will kill them, and driving more miles than circumstances will allow.

We need to prepare for the end of the global economic relations that have characterized the final blow-off of the cheap energy era. The world is about to become wider again as nations get desperate over energy resources. This desperation is certain to generate conflict. We’ll have to make things in this country again, or we won’t have the most rudimentary household products.

Prepare psychologically for the destruction of a lot of fictitious “wealth” – and allow instruments and institutions based on fictitious wealth to fail, instead of attempting to keep them propped up on credit life-support. Like any other thing in our national life, finance has to return to a scale that is consistent with our circumstances – i.e., what reality will allow. That process is underway, anyway, whether the public is prepared for it or not. We will soon hear the sound of banks crashing all over the place. Get out of their way, if you can.

*** Prepare psychologically for a sociopolitical climate of anger, grievance, and resentment. A lot of individual citizens will find themselves short of resources in the years ahead. They will be very ticked off and seek to scapegoat and punish others. The United States is one of the few nations on earth that did not undergo a sociopolitical convulsion in the past hundred years. But despite what we tell ourselves about our specialness, we’re not immune to the forces that have driven other societies to extremes. The rise of the Nazis, the Soviet terror, the “cultural revolution,” the holocausts and genocides – these are all things that can happen to any people driven to desperation. ****
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May 5, 2008 The Risk Economy

As the West’s industrial regime sputters toward a cheap-energy-crackup conclusion, there have been attempts to recast what our economy is actually about, how to account for whatever wealth we manage to produce, and project what our society will actually be organized to do in the years ahead.

For a while in the 1990s, the idea was a “service economy,” kind of like the old fable of the town whose inhabitants made a living by taking in each other’s laundry — only in our case it was selling hamburgers to tourists on vacation from their jobs making hamburgers elsewhere, or something like that.

Then came the idea of the “information economy” in which making things of value would no longer matter, only the processing and deployment of information (sometimes misidentified as “knowledge”). This model seemed to suggest a yin-yang of software engineers who made up games like “Grand Theft Auto” serving the opposite cohort of people who bought and played the game. If nothing else, it certainly explained how lifetimes could be frittered away on stupid activities.

That illusion yielded to the housing bubble economy, which actually did produce a lot of things, but not necessarily of value — for instance, houses made of particle board and vinyl 38 miles outside of Sacramento. It was a tragic and manifold waste of resources, as well as an insult to the landscape. But the darker side of the housing bubble lay in the world of finance, where a vast empire of swindles was constructed to support the Potemkin facade of production homebuilding.

Now we are in a strange period when those swindles are unwinding. The people who run the finance sector — the Wall Street investment banks, hedge funds and ratings agencies, the Federal Reserve, and the US Dept of the Treasury — in desperately trying to prevent the unwind, have rapidly ramped up another new economy based entirely on the buying and selling of risk. Risk, as a pure abstraction unconnected to any real capital activity, is all that’s left to buy and sell after all other plausibly practical vehicles for finance have failed.

While a lack of transparency in the individual risk vehicles has been an object of complaint over the past year, the system as whole is transparently absurd. The system is also abstruse enough to prevent most mortals (including many employed in the system) from understanding its operations.

But the general public and the news media are virtually helpless to intervene in this last gasp racket, so the probability increases that it will do tremendous damage to whatever remains of the US economy. One feature of the risk economy is the Federal Reserve’s new willingness to absorb any sort of crap collateral in exchange for massive cheap loans to insolvent companies and institutions. The Fed has, in effect, made itself the world’s largest financial shit-magnet. It has already taken in a few hundred billion in securities based on non-performing real estate loans, and has now opened the window to securities based on non-performing credit card debt, car loans, and other miscellaneous IOUs still drifting un-hedged in the banking ether.

It’s a mark of our collective desperation to avoid the consequences of so much reckless behavior that no credible authorities have stepped up to denounce this racket — no Fed governor, no politician of standing (including the candidates for president), no newspaper-of-record. The Attorney-general of New York, Andrew Cuomo, may be quietly cooking up some cases in the deep background, but the SEC and the federal banking regulators hung up their “out-to-lunch” signs on this long ago.

Meanwhile, the basic situation is this: the world is awash with bad investment paper. The standard of living in the US can’t be supported on debt anymore. The people of the US don’t produce enough real value to service their debts. Institutions can no longer be supported on debt gone bad. Something’s got to give — meaning something has to bring the US standard of living down to a level consistent with our declining actual wealth.

Everything else going on right now is a dodge. The Fed maneuvers, the “coordinated actions” of the western central banks, the postponements of default, the non-disclosure of contents in bank portfolios, the pretense that risk alone is a kind of fungible resource that can be endlessly traded to generate fees — all this fucking nonsense will only make the eventual unwinding much worse.

Personally, I doubt that it can go on more than a few more months. The velocity of everything is going up past the “red line” where things really fly apart. The increased velocity of non-performing mortgages and deadbeat credit card accounts is one thing that can’t be hidden or escaped. America will feel and see very vividly when the repossession teams rush families from their homes, when the pickup truck is taken away, and when the pink slip appears in the pay envelope.

 

 

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Civil Asset Forfeiture: across the nation authorities confiscate cash & homes of innocent people

Source: Ironside AM (2016) New report finds civil asset forfeiture most heavily burdens minorities and low-income communities. Civil Rights Law & Policy Blog.

Preface. Basically if you’re poor, your cash, car, home, and other property can be confiscated for no reason, with no proof of guilt, and you’ll never get it back.

I predict that the high level of corruption in the U.S. (and elsewhere) will make collapse faster and harsher than societies that are more community oriented.  I hope future historians look at this as a factor in how nations handled the energy crisis.

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The repo market was a key reason the meltdown happened

NY Fed’s Dudley Warns that “Firesales” Could Trigger Another Financial Crisis.  Still Broken Five Years Later

by Mike Whitney. Feb 21-23, 2014. Counterpunch.
“The repo market wasn’t just a part of the meltdown. It was the meltdown.”  – David Weidner, Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2013.

Ask your average guy-on-the-street ‘what caused the financial crisis’, and you’ll get a blank stare or a brusque “The housing bubble”. Even people who follow the news closely are usually sketchy on the details. They might add something about subprime mortgages or Lehman Brothers, but not much more.

Very few seem to know that the crisis began in a shadowy part of the financial system called repo, which is short for repurchase agreement.  In 2008, repo was ground zero, the epicenter of the meltdown. That’s where the bank run took place that froze the credit markets and sent the financial system into free fall.

Nothing has been done to fix the problems in repo, which means that we’re just as vulnerable today as we were five years ago when Lehman imploded and all hell broke loose.

Repo is a critical part of today’s financial architecture. It allows the banks to fund their long-term securities cheaply while giving lenders, like money markets, a place where they can park their money overnight and get a small return.  The entire repo market is roughly $4.5 trillion, although the more volatile tri-party repo market is around $1.6 trillion. (Note: That’s $1.6 trillion that’s rolled over every day.)

Repo works a lot like a pawn shop. You bring your rusty bike to E-Z-Pawn, and the guy behind the counter gives you 15 bucks.  That’s how repo works too, the only difference is that repo is a loan. The banks post collateral –mostly pools of mortgages (MBS) or US Treasuries– and get overnight loans from a cash-heavy lenders, like money markets, insurance companies or pension funds. Borrowers repay the loan with interest added to the original sum.

The problem that arose in 2008, and that will crop up again, was that the value of the underlying collateral (subprime MBS) was downgraded, forcing banks to take steep haircuts. (which means they couldn’t borrow as much on their collateral)

The bigger the haircuts, the less money the banks had to fund their securities, which forced them to sell assets to make up the difference.

THIS IS DEFLATIONARY: When banks and other financial institutions deleverage quickly, asset prices plunge and capital is wiped out, forcing the Fed to step in and backstop the system to prevent a full-blown meltdown.

And that’s exactly what the Fed did in 2008. It slashed rates to zero, set up myriad lending facilities and provided unlimited backing for both regulated and unregulated financial institutions. It was the biggest financial rescue operation of all time and it cost somewhere in the neighborhood of 12 to 13 trillion dollars in loans and other guarantees. Under the provisions of the Dodd Frank financial reforms, the Fed is forbidden from carrying out a similar bailout in the future, although you can bet-your-bippy that Yellen and Co. will bend the rules if there’s another catastrophe.

Fixing repo is not a left-right issue.

Among the people who follow these things, there is general agreement about what needs to be done to make the system safer. Even New York Fed President William C. Dudley –who’s no “liberal” by any stretch–admits that the system is broken.  In October, 2013, at a bank conference  Dudley opined, “Current reforms do not address the risk that a dealer’s loss of access to tri-party repo funding could precipitate destabilizing asset fire sales, whether by the dealer itself, or by the dealer’s creditors following a default.”  In other words, the chances of another 5-alarm fire sometime in the future are pretty darn good.

Dudley’s description of what happened during the acute phase of the crisis is also worth reviewing. He said:

“Higher margins on repo and increased collateral calls due to credit ratings downgrades reduced the quantity of assets that could be financed in repo markets and elsewhere, prompting further asset sales. As wholesale investors started to exit, this set in motion a bad dynamic—a fire sale of assets that cut into earnings and capital. This just increased the incentives of investors to run and for banks to hoard liquidity against the risk that they could themselves face a run. This downward spiral of fire sales and funding runs was a key feature of the financial crisis …”

And, that, dear reader, is a first-rate account of what happened in 2008 when panic gripped the markets and the dominoes started to tumble. Former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke’s version of events is also worth a look if only because he describes the crash in terms of what it really was, a modern day bank run. Here’s what he said:

“What was different about this crisis was that the institutional structure was different. It wasn’t banks and depositors. It was broker-dealers and repo markets. It was money market funds and commercial paper.”

While most analysts agree about the origins of the crisis and the type of changes that are needed to avoid a repeat,  the banks have blocked all attempts at reforming the system.

Why? Because the reforms would cost the banks more money, and they don’t want that. They’d rather put the entire system at risk, then cough up a little more dough to make repo safer. Here’s how the New York Fed summed it up in a paper titled “Shadow Bank Monitoring”:

“One clear motivation for inter-mediation outside of the traditional banking system is for private actors to evade regulation and taxes. … Regulation typically forces private actors to do something which they would otherwise not do: pay taxes to the official sector, disclose additional information to investors, or hold more capital against financial exposures. Financial activity which has been re-structured to avoid taxes, disclosure, and/or capital requirements, is referred to as arbitrage activity.” (“Shadow Bank Monitoring”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, September, 2013)

That says it all, doesn’t it? They don’t want to pay taxes, they don’t want to hold capital against their collateral, and they want to continue to run their businesses in the shadows so nosy shareholders and regulators can’t see what the heck they’re up to. So, what else is new? The banks are running a crooked, black box operation, and they aim to keep it that way come hell or high water.

The banks can’t be reasoned with, that’s obvious from the position they’ve taken. They’ve put profits above everything, even the viability of the system. How can you reason with people like that?  Just get a load of what the New York Fed said on the matter:

“Intermediaries create liquidity in the shadow banking system by levering up the collateral value of their assets. However, the liquidity creation comes at the cost of financial fragility as fluctuations in uncertainty cause a flight to quality from shadow liabilities to safe assets. The collapse of shadow banking liquidity has real effects via the pricing of credit and generates prolonged slumps after adverse shocks.”

This sounds more complicated than it is. What the Fed is saying is: “Hey, guys, you’re creating all this fake money (credit) by loading up on leverage (borrowing), and that’s pushing us closer to another crisis.  Once the money markets figure out that all those nifty subprime CDOs you’ve been trading for overnight loans aren’t worth Jack-crap, then they’re going to cut you off at the knees and move into risk-free assets like US Treasuries. So why don’t you wise-the-hell-up, and start playing by the rules like everyone else so we don’t have to deal with another big, freaking meltdown.  Okay?”

The only way to fix repo is by backstopping collateral with more capital,  forcing all trading onto central clearing platforms (where regulators can see what’s going on), and regulating shadow banks like traditional, commercial banks.   The editors at Bloomberg said it best nearly a year ago. They said: ” If an entity engages in banking activity… it must register as a bank, with all the backstops and capital requirements that entails.”

If we’re not going to nationalize the banks and turn them into public utilities, which is what we should have done in 2009 when we had the chance, then we need to put safeguards in place to keep them from crashing the system every few years.

Regulate, Regulate, Regulate. That’s the ticket.

Stricter regulations could have prevented the last crisis, and stricter regulations can prevent the next one. It’s just a matter of finding the political will to get the job done.

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