Peter Dykstra: Last Tango for Nuclear?

Dykstra, Peter.  Feb 4, 2015. Last Tango for Nuclear? energycollective.

There is some promise for nuclear: Projects in Georgia, South Carolina and Tennessee may yield the first new nuclear plants in decades.  But these new nukes are falling behind schedule and soaring over budget, making an already-jittery Wall Street even more skeptical. Earlier this week the builders of 2 new reactors at Georgia’s Plant Vogtle disclosed additional delays and overruns, potentially making the project over a billion dollars in the hole and three years late.

Wisconsin, California, Florida and Vermont (Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant in Vernon) are closing aging nuclear plants, and some planned new ones have been shelved in Maryland, New York, Texas and Florida.

Closing and decommissioning isn’t cheap — usually a billion dollars or more.

As many as seven reactors in Illinois (the 2-reactor complexes at Quad Cities and Byron, and the Clinton single reactor site), Ohio (Davis-Besse reactor near Toledo) and New York (Ginna plant near Rochester, New York) could close this year if not rescued by ratepayers.

Nukes also have been getting their lunch eaten in the deregulated electricity marketplace, mostly by cheaper natural gas. 

The demise of Yucca Mountain means there’s nowhere for the industry to permanently store its waste. And just when you thought it was safe to atomically boil the water, Fukushima provided the first nuclear mega-disaster since Chernobyl a quarter-century earlier, fairly or unfairly reviving public unease about nuclear energy’s safety in the U.S.

And it didn’t help when the longtime CEO of America’s biggest nuclear player stuck the financial fork in shortly after his retirement.

John Rowe, a longtime nuclear booster and former CEO of Exelon, the Chicago-based offspring of mergers between Commonwealth Edison of Illinois, Philadelphia’s PG&E and Baltimore-based Constellation, oversaw 23 reactors. “I’m the nuclear guy,” Rowe told a gathering at the University of Chicago two weeks after his 2012 retirement. “And you won’t get better results with nuclear. It just isn’t economic, and it’s not economic within a foreseeable time frame.

Rowe was commenting on plans for newly built reactors. But old ones, including up to 6 of Exelon’s fleet, may be on the block.

States to the Rescue

In the 1990s, the federal government and many states moved to deregulate electricity. Leaving every potential power source free to marketplace dynamics, it was reasoned, would serve ratepayers well and promote competition among generators. The biggest boosters of deregulation were heavy industries looking to reduce their enormous power bills, and an up-and-coming energy trader called Enron, which thrived for a few years before collapsing in scandal.

The industry’s embrace of deregulation isn’t universal, though. In at least four states, nuclear utilities have sought state government assistance to benefit nuclear plants, if not keep them alive and running.

Officials at Chicago-based Exelon say the free market may soon kill off several of its nukes. Exelon’s CEO has been outspoken about its opposition to subsidies for its wind industry, but the company is not shy about seeking short-term help for its own financially troubled nuclear plants.

Illinois may be nuclear’s short-term ground zero. Exelon operates nukes at 6 sites in the state and acknowledged that 3e — the two-reactor complexes at Quad Cities and Byron, and the Clinton single reactor site — may have priced themselves out of the market.

While Exelon CEO Chris Crane insists that the company is not seeking a bailout, and Exelon spokesman Adams said that all “energy technologies should compete on their own merits,” Crain’s Chicago Business and other publications have reported that the company is pushing state regulators to restructure power markets in a way that critics say could stack the deck for their beleaguered nukes. Exelon senior vice president Kathleen Barron told the Illinois Commerce Commission last September that the company needs rate increases that would bring in $580 million in additional revenue to keep its nukes afloat. That extra cash would come from ratepayers, particularly at times of peak power usage.

Another Exelon nuke, the Ginna plant near Rochester, New York, is on the brink. Facing a deadline on power purchases from the 45 year-old plant’s biggest buyer, Rochester Gas & Electric, Ginna will close without a rate hike, according to Exelon. The plant’s license doesn’t expire till 2029.

Ohio is considering rate hikes to save  the Davis-Besse reactor near Toledo. FirstEnergy, operator of the trouble-plagued Davis-Besse, calls for an estimated $117 million “power purchase agreement” for its ratepayers. Longtime energy activist Harvey Wasserman called the potential rate hikes a “pillaging” of Ohio.

The utilities have spiced up the battle by resisting efforts to disclose financial data that could shed light on the plants’ financial health, and the need for a rate hike.
A shifting regulatory environment is providing a boost to Florida’s Turkey Point nuclear facility.

Florida also has pitched in to help the industry: In mid-January, Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection drew fire from conservationists when it loosened oversight over hot water discharges from the Turkey Point energy complex south of Miami. Turkey Point’s two reactors and three fossil-fuel plants dump heated water into a four-decade-old network of cooling canals, where algae blooms and rising salinity are believed to threaten to coastal waters, public drinking water wells and Everglades recovery. In writing a new permit for the plant, the DEP cut local water officials out of the regulatory process, leaving the state agency in sole command of the canal field, a radiator-like matrix of 165 miles of waterways extending south from Turkey Point.

Unlike the reactors in Ohio, Illinois and New York, there’s no talk of imminent financial demise at Turkey Point. In fact, Florida Power and Light has state approval to build two more, larger reactors at the site, and is awaiting a green light from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, expected in 2016.

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Robert Hirsch on the Saudis and repercussions of low oil prices

Commentary: Déjà Vu With a Twist? By Robert L. Hirsch, Feb 2, 2015, ASPO USA Peak Oil Review.

The recent world oil supply/price decline situation looks very much like what happened in 1985-86, when the Saudis dramatically increased oil production, causing world oil prices to crater. That Saudi action was the result of their having acted as swing producer in OPEC, which under those circumstances caused a progressive loss of their oil market share. Back then, I was at ARCO and was provided the unwanted “opportunity” of reengineering ARCO’s upstream R & D program – Read, “fire a number of very good people.”

In those years, the Saudis maintained high production, and it took roughly a decade for oil prices to regain their previous levels. Other producers refused to cut production, and it took increasing world oil demand to bring a supply/demand balance that eventually resulted in increasing oil prices.

What motivates the current Saudi action to crater oil prices? Analysts suggest a number of possibilities, including a desire to cripple US light tight oil (shale) production; an effort to hurt Iran with which Saudi is in conflict; and/or a desire to hurt ISIL, Russia, and Syria. Or it could be all of the above.

As in the mid-1980s, it is conceivable that Saudi might maintain high oil production for many years, forcing oil prices to remain around $40-50 per barrel, possibly lower. If that were to happen, the US and world tight light oil enterprise would be decimated, a number of deep-water and expensive frontier projects would be suspended or canceled, and heavy oil production in Canada and Venezuela would falter, to name just some of the obvious. Rigs would be idled and could eventually be scrapped; a large number of service contracts would be canceled; people throughout the industry would be laid off and seek employment outside the industry; and royalties would be lost. US GDP would be negatively impacted, and U.S. oil imports would increase, negatively impacting the U.S. balance of payments.

Outside the US, prolonged low oil prices would significantly damage Iran, Russia, and other oil exporters, possibly even to the point of civil unrest. ISIL and Syria would be impacted but their situation is so complicated that it is uncertain how they might farep.

The current reduced oil price environment is different from the mid-1980s in significant ways. First, the Saudi “neighborhood” is especially unsettled, because of the “Arab Spring,” widespread terrorism, and Iranian adventurism. MENA OPEC countries are under significant, unusual pressure, so meaningful rebellion within OPEC is possible.

Secondly, there is a “twist’ this time. A number of analysts believe that the world is close to the onset of world oil production decline, often called “peaking.” In a worst case scenario, the onset of decline could start after 2015, when U.S. and world high-cost oil production capability will have been significantly degraded, making catch-up much more difficult than it might have been just a year ago.

Finally, that so-called “tax cut” that U.S. consumers are supposed to have received because of lower oil prices would not only evaporate, but a sudden increase in oil prices could cause a recession and immediate inflation.

“May you live in interesting times”!

PS. After this note was drafted, I received the latest issue of World Oil in which Kurt Abraham made the same connection to the mid-1980s situation in an editorial entitled “Numbers help explain Saudi mindset on global production.” January 2015.

PPS. Rarely in human history has one country had the ability to inflict such a large impact on the economies of so many other countries with just the turn of a valve.

PPS. What might happen if the house of Saud is overthrown and unfriendlies take charge of the Saudi oil valve? Before the onset of decline? After the onset of decline?

PPPS. What can we learn from this event to help us understand how Saudi might behave after the onset of world oil production decline?

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Michael Webber on Energy + Water + Food interdependency

Webber, Michael E. February 2015. Our future rides on our ability to integrate Energy + Water + Food. Scientific American.

Michael E. Webber is deputy director of the Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. His Yale University Press book, “Thirst for Power”, examines energy and water use in the modern world (available October 2015).

A few excerpts, some paraphrased, some verbatim, some from other sources:

This nexus of energy, food, and water is a big mess and the entire system is vulnerable to a perturbation in any part:

  • About 80% of the water we consume is for agriculture–our food.
  • Nearly 13% of energy production is used to fetch, clean, deliver, heat, chill, and dispose of our water.
  • Fertilizers made from natural gas, pesticides made from petroleum, and diesel fuel to run tractors and harvesters drive up the amount of energy it takes to produce food.
  • Food factories requiring power-hungry refrigeration produce goods wrapped in plastic made from petrochemicals, and it takes still more energy to get groceries from the store and cook them at home.
  • drought-stricken Texas and New Mexico have restricted or stopped water use for fracking of oil and gas, saving it for farming
  • Increases in corn cultivation for biofuels production, are likely to lead to increases in nitrate concentrations in both surface and groundwater resources in the United States. These increases might trigger the requirement for additional energy consumption for water treatment to remove the nitrates. Such advanced drinking water treatment might require a 2,100% increase in energy requirements for water treatment –an additional 2360 million kWh annually (Twomey) .
  • The mandate in the US to blend ethanol into gasoline will lead to 3,300 billion liters of irrigation water being used in 2005 (2.4% of US 2005 fresh water consumption) for producing fuel for Light Duty Vehicles (LDV = cars and light trucks). With current irrigation practices, fuel processing, and electricity generation, it is estimated that by 2030, approximately 14,000 billion liters of water per year (10.2% of US fresh water consumption) will be consumed and 23,000–27,000 billion liters withdrawn (20% of US fresh water consumption) to produce fuels used in cars. Irrigation for biofuels dominates projected water usage for cars, but other fuels (coal to liquids, oil shale, and electricity via plug-in hybrid vehicles) will also contribute appreciably to future water consumption and withdrawal, especially on a regional basis (King 2010).
  • As the need for alternative transportation fuels increases, it is important to understand the many effects of introducing fuels based upon feedstocks other than petroleum. Water intensity in “gallons of water per mile traveled” is one method to measure these effects on the consumer level.  The lowest water consumptive (<0.15 gal H2O/mile) and withdrawal (<1 gal H2O/mile) rates are for cars using conventional petroleum-based gasoline and diesel etc. Cars running on electricity and hydrogen derived from the aggregate U.S. grid, which is heavily based upon fossil fuel and nuclear steam-electric power generation, withdraw 5-20 times and consume nearly 2-5 times more water than gasoline. The water intensities (gal H2O/mile) of cars using biofuels from irrigated corn is 28 for consumption (187 x more than gas) and 36 for withdrawal (240x more than gas) to make E85 ethanol (E85). For soy-derived biodiesel, the average consumption and withdrawal rates are 8 and 10 gallons (67 times more than gasoline) per H2O/mile (King 2008).

Meeting the world’s energy needs requires $48 trillion dollars by 2035 according to a 2014 International Energy Agency report.

Energy, water and food are the world’s 3 most essential resources. The interdependence of them on each other is not appreciated. Strains on one can cripple the others. This has made our civilization more fragile than we imagine, and we are not prepared for the potential disaster awaiting us.

Energy, water, and food are interconnected. An abundance of one enables an abundance of the others. But a shortage of one can create a shortage of the others.

With infinite energy, we have all the water we need via desalinization plants, deep wells, and ability to move water across continents. With infinite water, we can build more dams to produce energy and irrigate food and energy crops.

Many of earth’s population centers are being hit by serious droughts, reducing energy from hydroelectric power, and rising costs prevent other kinds of energy plants from being built, drought also affects the ability to grow enough food.  This nexus of food, water, and energy is especially a problem in some of the most troubled parts of the world. Riots and revolution in Libya and Syria were provoked by drought or high food prices, toppling governments.

———————

The article begins with the following, which shows another interdependency.  Climate change and associated extreme weather will cause floods that will shorten the lifespan of dams producing hydroelectric power and the water to irrigate crops:

In July 2012 three of India’s regional electric grids failed, triggering the largest blackout on earth. More than 620 million people—9 percent of the world’s population—were left powerless. The cause: the strain of food production from a lack of water. Because of major drought, farmers plugged in more and more electric pumps to draw water from deeper and deeper below ground for irrigation. Those pumps, working furiously under the hot sun, increased the demand on power plants. At the same time, low water levels meant hydroelectric dams were generating less electricity than normal. Making matters worse, runoff from those irrigated farms during floods earlier in the year left piles of silt right behind the dams, reducing the water capacity in the dam reservoirs. Suddenly, a population larger than all of Europe and twice as large as that of the U.S. was plunged into darkness.

Las Vegas faces a similar problem. Lake Mead is so low that the Hoover Dam may have to stop generating power or less of it, and many farms will be parched downstream. Las Vegas is spending a billion dollars to put in a straw coming into the lake from underneath that might not do much good, according to scientists at the Scripps Institution of Oceanograpy in La Jolla, California, because Lake Mead could dry up completely by 2021 if the climate changes as expected and cities and farms dependent on Colorado river water don’t curtail their withdrawals.

California is facing a surprisingly similar confluence of energy, water and food troubled:

  • Reduced snow pack, record-low rainfall and ongoing development in the Colorado River basin have reduced the river water in central California by a third.
  • The state produces half of the country’s fruits, nuts and vegetables and almost a quarter of its milk [but won’t if drought/climate change continue to reduce water and groundwater storage continues to collapse, permanently preventing these areas from being used to store water in the future].  Farmers are pumping groundwater like mad; last summer some areas pumped twice as much water for irrigation as they did the previous year, causing the 400-mile-long central valley to sink.
  • Just when more power is needed, Southern California Edison shut down 2 big nuclear reactors for a lack of cooling water.
  • San Diego’s plan to build a desalination plant along the coast was challenged by activists who opposed the facility on the grounds that it would consume too much energy.

Drought and Blackouts (Webber 2012)

There is another risk as water becomes more scarce. We withdraw more water for the energy sector than for agriculture. Power plants may be forced to shut down, and oil and gas production may be threatened.

Our energy system depends on water. About half of the nation’s water withdrawals every day are just for cooling power plants. In addition, the oil and gas industries use tens of millions of gallons a day, injecting water into aging oil fields to improve production, and to free natural gas in shale formations through hydraulic fracturing.

Population growth will mean over 100 million more people in the United States over the next four decades who will need energy and water to survive and prosper. Economic growth compounds that trend, as per-capita energy and water consumption tend to increase with affluence. Climate-change models also suggest that droughts and heat waves may be more frequent and severe.

[Webber’s solutions are the usual consume less, waste less, and efficiency. He didn’t have the courage to mention birth control, making abortion free and easy to get, or limiting immigration.  Well, it’s probably too late for that, and in a conservative state like Texas, not the best strategy for holding onto your job… Alice Friedemann at energyskeptic.com] 

References

King, C.W. King et al. September 24, 2008. Water Intensity of Transportation. Environmental Science and Technology, 42(21), pp 7866-7872

King, C.W. et al. 2010. The Water Needs for LDV Transportation in the United States. Energy Policy, Vol. 38 (2), pp 1157-1167.

Twomey, K.M. et al. 2010. The Unintended Energy Impacts of Increased Nitrate Contamination from Biofuels Production. Journal of Environmental Monitoring 12.

Webber, M. E. July 23, 2012. Will Drought Cause the Next Blackout? New York Times.

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Richard Heinberg : After the Peak

Richard Heinberg. January 31, 2015. After the Peak. postcarbon.org

Nearly 17 years ago the modern peak oil movement began with the publication of “The End of Cheap Oil” by petroleum geologists Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrère in the March, 1998 issue of Scientific American. Campbell coined the term “peak oil” to describe the inevitable moment when the world petroleum industry would produce oil at its historic maximum rate. From then on, production would decline as the overall quality of available resources deteriorated, and as increasing investments produced diminishing returns. Unless society had dramatically and proactively reduced its reliance on oil, the result would be a series of economic shocks that would devastate industrial societies.

Campbell estimated that global conventional oil production would reach its maximum rate sometime before the year 2010. In later publications, Laherrère added that the peak in conventional oil would cause prices to rise, creating the incentive to develop more unconventional petroleum resources. The result would be a delayed peak for “all liquid fuels,” which he estimated would occur around the year 2015.

Today we may be very nearly at that latter peak. Slightly ahead of forecast, conventional oil production started drifting lower in 2005, resulting in several years of record high prices—which led the industry to develop technology to extract tar sands and tight oil, and also incentivized the US and Brazil to begin producing large quantities of biofuels. But high petroleum prices also gradually weakened the economies of oil-dependent industrial nations, reducing their demand for liquid fuels. The resulting mismatch between growing supply and moderating demand has resulted in a temporary market glut and falling oil prices.

Crashing prices are in turn forcing the industry to cut back on drilling. As a result of idled rigs, global crude production will probably contract in the last half of 2015 through the first half of 2016. Even if prices recover as a result of falling output, production will probably not return to its recent upward trajectory, because the US tight oil boom is set to go bust around 2016 in any case. And banks, once burned in their lavish support for marginally profitable drilling projects, are unlikely to jump back into the unconventionals arena with both feet.

Ironically, just as the rate of the world’s liquid fuels production may be about to crest the curve, we’re hearing that warnings of peak oil were wrongheaded all along. The world is in the midst of a supply glut and prices are declining, tireless resource optimists remind us. Surely this disproves those pessimistic prophets of peril! However, as long-time peakist commentator Ron Patterson notes:

Peak oil will be the point in time when more oil is produced than has ever been produced in the history of the world, or ever will be in the future of the world. It is far more likely that this period will be thought of as a time of an oil glut rather than a time of an oil shortage.

Within a couple of years, those of us who have spent most of the past two decades warning about the approaching peak may see vindication by data, if not by public opinion. So should we prepare to gloat? I don’t plan to. After all, the purpose of the exercise was not to score points, but to warn society. We were seeking to change the industrial system in such a way as to reduce the scale of the coming economic shock. There’s no sign we succeeded in doing that. We spent most of our efforts just battling to be heard; our actual impact on energy policy was minimal.

There’s no cause for shame in that: the deck was stacked against us. The economics profession, which has a stranglehold on government policy, steadfastly continues to insist that energy is a fully substitutable ingredient in the economy, and that resource depletion poses no limit to economic growth. Believing this to be true, policy makers have effectively had their fingers jammed in their ears.

A cynic might conclude that now is a good time for peak oil veterans to declare victory, hunker down, and watch the tragedy unfold. But for serious participants in the discussion this is where the real work commences.

During these past 17 years, as the peak oil debate roiled energy experts, climate change emerged as an issue of ecosystem survival, providing another compelling reason to reduce our reliance not just on oil, but all fossil fuels. However, the world’s response to the climate issue was roughly the same as for peak oil: denial and waffling.

Today, society is about to begin its inevitable, wrenching adaptation to having less energy and mobility, just as the impacts of fossil fuel-driven climate change are starting to hit home. How will those of us who have spent the past years in warning mode contribute to this next crucial chapter in the unfolding human drama?

Despite peakists’ inability to change government policy, our project was far from being a waste of time and effort. The world is better off today than it would have been if we had done nothing—though clearly not as much better as we would have liked. A few million people understood the message, and at least tens of thousands changed their lives and will be better prepared for what’s coming. One could say the same for climate activism.

If our main goal during the past 17 years was to alert the world about looming challenges, now it is to foster adaptation to fundamental shifts that are currently under way. The questions that need exploration now are:

  • How can we help build resilience throughout society, starting locally, assuming we will have little or no access to the reins of national policy?
  • How can we help society adapt to climate change while building a zero-emissions energy infrastructure?
  • How can we help adapt society’s energy consumption to the quantities and qualities of energy that renewable sources will actually be able to provide?

We have to assume that this work will have to be undertaken in the midst of accelerating economic decay, ecological disruption, and periodic crises—far from ideal operating conditions.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that crisis could act in our favor. As their routines and expectations are disturbed, many people may be open to new explanations of their predicament and to new behaviors to help them adapt to energy and monetary poverty. Our challenge will be to frame unfolding events persuasively in ecological terms (energy, habitat, population) rather than conventional political terms (good guys, bad guys), and to offer practical solutions to the burgeoning everyday problems of survival—solutions that reduce ecological strains rather than worsening them. Our goal should not be to preserve industrial societies or middle-class lifestyles as we have known them (that’s impossible anyway), but to offer a “prosperous way down,” as Howard Odum put it, while preserving whatever cultural goods that can be salvaged and that deserve the effort.

As with our recent efforts to warn society about peak oil, there is no guarantee of success. But it’s what needs doing.

 

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Not enough wind, solar, geothermal to replace fossil and nuclear power in the 11 western states of the WECC

California, Oregon, Utah, and Washington have already developed most (if not all) of their prime-quality in-state resources.

You would think that the more wind and solar power is added over a wide area, the more fossil fuel power plants you could finally get rid of. But the more you depend on wind or solar power, the less certain it can be counted on at peak demand times, even over large areas, due to seasonal patterns, large storms, and vast low or high pressure systems (wind more so than solar).

California studied in-state renewables versus importing Wyoming wind power, because California has developed all of its best wind, solar, and geothermal resources, and found it would require adding 957 MW of dispatchable natural gas plants because Wyoming wind doesn’t blow when California demand is highest (NREL 2014).

Furthermore, even if California and the 10 other states in the western region (WECC) completely develop and share their best wind, solar, and geothermal resources (highly unlikely, states prefer to keep their best resources in-state and not pay billions for expensive transmission lines that benefit other states), reserving less productive, more expensive, widely dispersed locations for in-state generation, the potential 148 TWh of prime (*) and 230 TWh of non-prime wind, solar, and geothermal generation don’t add up to the current 481 TWh of fossil and nuclear power production. States prefer to use their in-state prime resources for many reasons and are not likely to build expensive transmission lines to export power (EIA 2012, NREL 2013 below).

(*) “prime-quality renew able resources” means wind areas with estimated annual capacity factors of 40% or better; solar areas with direct normal insolation of 7.5 kWh/m 2 /day or better; and all discovered geothermal resources.

NREL. August 2013. Beyond Renewable Portfolio Standards: An Assessment of Regional Supply and Demand Conditions Affecting the Future of Renewable Energy in the West. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

The West’s largest surpluses of prime-quality utility-scale renewable resource potential will be in Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, and Wyoming (wind power); Idaho (geothermal power); and Nevada (geothermal and solar power). To the extent that future scarcity of untapped prime-quality resources could signal potential demand, the most likely importing states are California, Oregon , Utah, and Washington. We categorize Arizona as a potential exporter of solar power (which the state will most likely have in surplus in 2025) and a potential importer of prime wind and geothermal power.

By the time states meet their Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) new prime-quality renewable resources available for additional development may be scarce. This will require developing resources of lower quality that will tend to cost more.

Whether the timeline for securing PPAs for new renewable projects can provide competitive developers with investment signals that are comparable to what rate base mechanisms provided to regulated utilities when they expanded their baseload capacity [will private companies earn enough money to build renewables & will the transmission lines be there to induce them to do so]

How states balance post-2025 regional renewable energy expansion in the context of other policy objectives such as DG, in-state economic development, and protecting habitat.

The chart below shows the amount of electricity moving across state borders. California’s in-state net generation is less than its in-state retail sales by about one-quarter, making it a net importer. In contrast, about 43 TWh of all the electricity generated in the So uthwest each year is used somewhere other than the state where it was generated.

California, Oregon, Utah, and Washington have already developed most (if not all) of their prime-quality in-state resources.

Their non-prime resources could be of sufficient quantity to meet the balance of their forecasted 2025 requirements, but the cost is likely to be higher than the cost of resources developed prior to 2012.

The western states all together will need between 127 TWh and 149 TWh of renewable energy in 2025 to meet targets stipulated by current state laws. California accounts for about 60% of this demand. Renewable energy projects either existing or under construction in the western United States as of 2012 can supply an estimated 86 TWh.

Colorado, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico each has within its borders more untapped prime-quality renewable resources than it needs to meet the balance of its forecasted requirement for 2025. Wyoming and Idaho have no requirement, but they have large supplies of prime-quality renewable resources. Arizona has sufficient prime and near-prime solar resources to meet the balance of its forecasted requirement for 2025. It has a limited amount of non-solar resources, none of which is prime quality.

All western states with renewable energy targets are making progress toward their goals. Some, however, show signs of reaching the end of their stocks of prime-quality developable resource areas.

Potential technological breakthroughs, such as enhanced geothermal systems or low-speed wind turbines, could improve the viability of resource areas that with current technologies are marginally productive. By 2025, when all current RPS requirements will have matured to their ultimate target levels, the largest untapped surpluses of prime-quality renewables will be in Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, and Nevada.

If RPS compliance using in-state resources is a strong preference for renewable resource planning, then utilities and regulators in California, Oregon, and Washington (and possibly Arizona and Utah) may need to weigh the acceptability of meeting the last increments of their targets with a small amount of high-cost renewables that require no major investment in new transmission . By then, most of their low-cost local resources will likely be in use already.

Table ES -1 ranks the 15 resource- to-market combinations that scored highest in the evaluation methodology used in this study

  • Wyoming wind power delivered to Utah, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona
  • Solar power from Nevada and Arizona delivered to California
  • New Mexico wind power delivered to California, Arizona, and Utah
  • Wind power from Montana delivered to Oregon, Washington, and Utah
  • Geothermal power from Idaho to California. These resource paths have the highest likelihood of being reasonably competitive with natural gas generation in 2025 even if current transmission costs were to double.

An index score less than 1.0 indicates a resource with a delivered cost that is still below the relevant state benchmark even if current transmission costs are double. pages 145-150 have costs if prices go up10% or down 10%

Long- term trends in capital costs are difficult to predict, so this study included a sensitivity analysis to test how a 10% change in a technology’s assumed 2025 cost would affect its relative competitiveness as estimated in this study.

The most pronounced cost sensitivity was for utility- scale solar power from Nevada and Arizona delivered to California. If costs were to fall 10% below the base-case assumptions used in this analysis, solar power from Nevada and Arizona would be close to parity with CCGT in California . The two resource paths would rank third and fourth among the potential paths with the greatest likelihood for value in a post-2025 West. A cost decrease would also favor California’s own solar resources, however, so the net impact on imports would probably be related to siting constraints. Results for wind power did not change significantly under different cost assumptions. Wyoming wind delivered to Utah and California remained below or close to parity with natural gas. Other wind resource paths were slightly less competitive. Paths for geothermal power were sensitive to cost changes. The reduced-cost scenario brought Idaho geothermal to within 10% of competitiveness with natural gas in California. Higher costs, on the other hand, could put geothermal power 30% to 85% above the forecasted cost of a new CCGT in 2025.

Results from this study suggest that geothermal power will likely remain more costly on an all-in, per- MWh basis than equivalent CCGT or other renewable power options in the West out to 2025, barring a significant breakthrough in current technology cost or performance. For wind and solar built in ideal locations, the gap could become small.

1.2 WREZ Phase 1 and Phase 2 : Locating the Best Resources

This study builds on a number of preceding related efforts. In 2007, WGA asked DOE for federal support to identify renewable energy zones in the Western Interconnection. The Western Renewable Energy Zone (WREZ) initiative contemplated several phases, the first of which was a cross-sectional assessment of renewable resources throughout the West. Phase 1 was conducted for WGA by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), under the guidance of a steering committee comprising state and provincial energy officials and with input from a diverse group of stakeholders.

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) did a transmission analysis linking the Phase 1 resource hubs with the interconnection’s largest demand centers. The centerpiece of that work was a tool that stakeholders can use to compare scenarios for delivering renewable resources from selected zones to selected load centers

Utilities are focused on developing renewable resources in or close to their service areas. Among the reasons is that resources close to load may not require new high-voltage transmission and, therefore, are easier to develop in a more incremental manner. Even where transmission capacity is available, the economics of distant, higher-quality resources may be diminished by pancaking of charges— purchasing transmission service separately from each provider whose lines the power crosses to reach loads. In-state resources also are a more obvious nexus with state public interest standards for siting and cost recovery, reducing development timelines, and risk for utilities. “Rate pancaking” is a common term in electricity regulation. The term is used throughout this report to refer to the accumulation of transmission charges between the point of generation and the point of delivery to end-use customers.

Utilities are less interested in resources from [other states] unless transmission already exists or there is a high degree of certainty for the timely completion of transmission.  Two-thirds of the utilities interviewed say state policies or regulations impede development of interstate transmission. Key areas of concern are local siting processes, inconsistent siting standards across borders, and cost recovery risk. Public utilities commissions (PUCs) and provincial energy ministries cited the following hurdles: demonstration for a given state that a line is needed and will serve the public interest, lack of eminent domain authority, multiple uncoordinated approvals required by various levels of government, and cost recovery processes.

Therefore Utilities in a state will prefer using in-state prime resources whenever possible to meet their RPS requirements and Prime out-of- state resources will not be preferred unless there are no more prime in-state resources.

2.2.3.3 Planned Renewable Energy Supply

California’s IOUs plan for future renewable energy needs through their long- term procurement plans. Public utilities and independent power producers plan other facilities. California Energy Commission data indicate that 19 TWh/year of new renewable energy generation is in some stage of planning. While some of these projects might not happen, historical data indicates that 79% of all generation from planned projects seeking contracts has been successfully delivered. The majority (53%) of failed generation has been solar thermal technology; however, solar thermal projects are large, and these contracts were no more likely to fail than other technologies in terms of number of contracts.

California currently has over 3.2 GW of solar capacity under construction (both CSP and utility-scale PV. 63 More than 1 GW of wind and 53 MW of biomass projects are under construction as well.

2.2.3.4 Undeveloped Renewable Energy Supply

The state’s renewable energy zones have an estimated 10 TWh of developable solar resources that have not yet been tapped. Solar projects to date, however, exceed the amount of developable prime and borderline prime resources estimated to exist within California’s zones. 64 This suggests that California’s remaining solar resource areas tend have less solar exposure than what has already been developed and might be less productive. Future opportunities for renewables other than solar appear to be getting tighter. About half of the geothermal potential identified in southern California was developed as of 2012, and what was planned as of early 2013 amounted to an additional 17%. Existing wind development exceeds what was estimated to be in a renewable energy zone, indicating that developers are already looking at areas where the potential is less concentrated and possibly lower in productivity. Data for biomass also suggest future development will be outside a renewable energy zone. Most of the identified potential for small hydro was outside a zone, and as of 2012 about 10% of it had been developed.

In short, while individual project opportunities might exist based on the conditions afecting particular sites, systematic indicators suggest that California overall could be approaching supply constraints if restricted to in-state resources. At some point, options for new in-state renewable energy development might be dominated by areas that are less productive or more environmentally sensitive.

Figure 2-11 Renewable resource potential in California shows the supply curves for the screened solar and non- solar resources identified within California’s renewable energy zones. They indicate the total estimated generating potential, ordered by the estimated cost of delivered power from these resources. The supply curves identify more than 21 TWh per year of generating potential from non- solar renewables. Total developable solar areas have the potential to provide between 41 TWh and 55 TWh, depending on the technology employed. Screened resource areas estimated to exist in renewable energy zones. Costs are based on technical estimates. Curves are for all resource potential regardless of whether developed or undeveloped. Chart for solar potential indicates cost curves for different solar technologies as they apply to the same screened resource areas. Solar development to date amounts to about 20,000 GWh per year for solar and thermal technologies combined

Figure 2-12 Developed resources in California (existing, under construction) shows the resources that have already been developed, also ordered by the estimated cost of their development. 65 Nearly 59 TWh of solar and non- solar renewable energy generation has been developed in California, at costs that have typically ranged from $54/MWh to $133/MWh. 66 Costs for wind, geothermal, and biomass generation are generally lower, with generation from solar technologies generally higher.

Table 2-2. California Resources Estimated to be Available for Future Development. The first two data columns show the identified resource potential after screening out areas that are off-limits to development or are difficult to develop economically due to physical characteristics of the terrain. Screened resources that are part of a geographic concentration are assigned to a zone; the second column shows isolated resources that may be developable but are not part of a renewable energy zone. The last two columns show what has already been developed (or is currently under development) within the state borders up to the end of 2012 and its estimated cost. 68 Most of the biomass and small hydro developed to date— typically small installations that are scattered widely across the state — are outside a renewable energy zone. Most of the geothermal power that has already been developed is at two older projects located in the northern part of the state and outside of a renewable energy zone. The geothermal resources quantified in the WREZ analysis are located in the Imperial Valley of southern California.

The state’s most abundant renewable resource is solar, with more than 37 TWh of potential within the renewable energy zones. More than 16 TWh of solar PV and nearly 11 TWh of solar thermal have been developed within the state. This leaves between 17 TWh and 19 TWh of developable potential, depending on which solar technology is chosen.

Conclusion

Resources within California’s renewable energy zones, combined with what it is already importing from other states, could provide enough generation to meet low demand scenarios to 2025. It might not be enough if demand turns out to be higher, however. In this case, California would need to draw more heavily from in-state renewable resources not located in a concentrated zone or it might need to draw on out-of- state resources. Moving toward a post-2025 environment, California’s undeveloped in-state renewable resources will become scarce, more costly, and more widely dispersed...most of the high-quality renewable resources areas within the state will already have been developed.

Wyoming: Prime, export-quality wind resources that have not yet been developed could provide at least 42.7 TWh annually, almost twice Wyoming’s projected total retail sales in 2025. The state has an additional 1.7 TWh of non-prime wind and biomass resources.

The overwhelming majority (87%) of Wyoming’s electricity is currently produced from coal-fired generating facilities. Conventional hydropower (constructed prior to 2000) supplies approximately 2% of the electricity. The remaining 10% of the electricity produced in Wyoming is generated from wind power. EIA data show no utility-scale solar or biomass facilities currently exist in Wyoming, so almost the entirety of Wyoming’s renewable electricity is generated from wind. One very large baseload plant located in Wyoming is of note: the 2,117- MW coal-and oil-fired Jim Bridger power plant exports more than 11 TWh of power annually out of Wyoming, amounting to over 23% of the total electricity generated in Wyoming.

The best Wyoming wind areas that are likely to remain undeveloped in 2025 have a total energy potential that is more than 2.5 times the amount of electricity produced annually at the Jim Bridger Generating Station, the West’s second-largest coal plant located in the southern part of the state. This includes only those wind resources with an annual capacity factor estimated at 40% or better. About 37.3 TWh could be developed at a busbar cost of $69–$81 /MWh , assuming no financial incentives.

Colorado: Colorado has about 53.5 TWh of unused prime wind energy resources. This is twice what is needed to meet the expected demand for renewable energy in 2025 and is about equal to Colorado’s total retail electricity sales in 2012. This leaves a significant amount of prime-quality wind for potential export to other states. It already exports some wind power besides importing a small amount of wind power from Wyoming. Colorado also has significant quantities of non-prime solar, biomass, and wind resources suitable to meet in-state demand.

Idaho: An analysis of the unused prime resources reveals that 2.1 TWh of prime resources (from geothermal) could be developed for exports to other states. In addition, another 2.8 TWh of non-prime wind and biomass resources could potentially be developed as well.

Montana: Prime, export-quality wind resources that have not yet been developed could provide at least 30.5 TWh annually. The state has an additional 3.3 TWh of non-prime wind and biomass resources that could meet in-state demand.

Nevada: Nevada’s projected 2025 surplus of prime-quality solar potential is between 3 TWh and 6 TWh annually. The amount available for post-2025 development will depend on how much Nevada uses for its own renewable energy goal. Prime, export-quality geothermal and solar resources that have not yet been developed could provide at least 12.7 TWh annually (6.1 TWh prime solar in the south and 6.6 TWh of geothermal further north). The state has an additional 36.8 TWh of non-prime solar, biomass, and wind resources that could meet in-state demand

New Mexico: Prime, export-quality wind resources that have not yet been developed could provide at least at least 3.8 TWh annually. The state has an additional 75 TWh of non-prime wind, solar, and biomass resources that could meet in- state demand.

Arizona: Prime, export-quality solar resources that have not yet been developed could provide at least 2.7 TWh annually. The state has an additional 44 TWh of non-prime solar, biomass, and wind resources that could meet in-state demand

Oregon: Most of Oregon’s renewable energy development to date has been wind power, but much of that is exported to other states and there is limited potential for further expansion. More than half of Oregon’s electricity is produced from conventional hydropower plants constructed prior to 2000 are categorized as conventional generation), with gas and coal plants providing over 32% of the electricity produced. Explored geothermal resources could provide up to 5.7 TWh annually, but little has been developed to date. The state has an estimated 5.3 TWh of biomass and solar potential, also largely undeveloped.

Utah: Utah has already tapped most of its best renewable resources. Existing development exceeds the amount of prime wind resources estimated to be in the state’s renewable energy zones, although some 700 GWh worth of geothermal baseload potential remains untapped. The state already imports a large amount of low-cost wind power from Wyoming. Utah has an estimated 0.7 TWh of undeveloped geothermal resources. Its renewable energy zones also contain about 4.2 TWh of non-prime wind and biomass resources.

Washington: Washington can meet the balance of its current renewable energy targets with in-state resources, but there is likely to be little left for subsequent demand beyond 2025, there is little left in the way of undeveloped prime-quality resources. Power from wind and biomass already flows across the state’s border in both directions, with some exports and some imports. Washington has additional undeveloped wind, biomass, and hydro resources, but little of it is prime quality. Most of these untapped resources are likely to be relatively expensive to develop and are not likely to be competitive in a post 2025 market. Washington will need between 8.4 TWh and 12.2 TWh of renewable energy in 2025 to meet targets stipulated by current state law. • Renewable electricity projects either existing or under development as of 2012 can supply 8.8 TWh annually. About one-third of the state’s current renewable energy generation—primarily wind power—is exported. • Washington has 4.0 TWh of non-prime wind, biomass, and small hydro resources that could meet in-state demand. Wind resources already developed in Washington’s renewable energy zones are more than the amount of prime-quality wind estimated to be in the zones. As with Oregon, this suggests possible supply constraints affecting future wind development in the state. Another 4 TWh of lower-quality wind, biomass, and hydro resources are yet undeveloped and would be competitive to meet in-state demand. Most of these additional resources—2.5 TWh—are hydropower.

This shows the Western Interconnection’s coal and nuclear plants with generating units 500 MW or larger and how power from these stations flows commercially across the region. Most serve demand in more than one state, and most send a share of their output to California.

In the West, proximity to fuel and cooling water had a greater bearing on siting than did proximity to load. The coal gigaplants took advantage of location, maximizing their economic and operational efficiency by siting close to their fuel supplies and to sources of cooling water. For example, th e Navajo Generating Station, the West’s largest coal plant, is located on the Navajo Reservation in northern Arizona just 3 miles from Glen Canyon Reservoir and is only 50 miles from the coal mine on the Navajo and Hopi reservations that provides its fuel. Similarly, the nuclear reactors built to generate electricity had to be located near abundant sources of cooling water. The San Onofre and Diablo Canyon nuclear stations were built near the ocean so they could use seawater for once -through cooling. 197 The Palo Verde plant was designed to use reclaimed wastewater for cooling and was built near Phoenix where wastewater was sufficient and easily accessible.

Renewables: As with baseload gigaplants, renewable energy depends on location for operational efficiency and economies of scale. There are differences, however. An individual unit at a gigaplant was a supersized supercritical steam unit linked to load along a supersized transmission corridor. For renewables, economy of scale means efficiently aggregating many small units of production—for example, hundreds of 2- to 3- MW wind turbines with a common point of interconnection, rather than the same amount of capacity embodied in a single supercritical thermal unit.

The locational factors affecting renewables pertain to the consistency of the energy inputs: wind, sunshine, and underground heat. The quality of the natural resources affects the productivity of the technology used to create electricity, which in turn affects the technology’s economic viability. The WREZ Phase 1 analysis identified a select few areas in the West where wind was consistent enough to yield capacity factors of 40% or better, across contiguous areas capable of accommodating several gigawatts of capacity. High capacity factors mean the same amount of capital investment produces more electricity, with potential economies that can favorably affect customer rates. Economy of scale with respect to transmission is a key point for reducing the cost of future renewable energy development. One 500-kV line is about half the cost of four 230­ kV lines capable of moving the same quantity of power. The large line loses less electricity between the point of generation and the point of delivery to load, and it requires right-of-way along only one corridor rather than four.

EIA. 2012. Data by state. Table 5. Electric Power Industry Generation by Primary Energy Source, 1990-2012. U.S. Energy Information Administration.

NREL. March 2014. California-Wyoming Grid Integration Study Phase 1-Economic Analysis. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

State (a) Electricity Produced TWh Electricity Consumed TWh Prime renew-able export (b) Non-prime renewable (c) Coal Oil Nat Gas Nuclear Hydro Pumped Hydro Storage Bio-mass Wood Geo-thermal Wind
Arizona 111 75 3 44 40 0.04 30.3 31.9 6.7 0.08 0.05 0.16 0 0.53
California 199.5 259.5 0 26 1.4 0.28 119.7 18.5 26.8 0.57 2.5 3.8 12.5 9.8
Colorado 52.3 53.7 54 27 34.5 0.01 10.5 0 1.49 -0.24 0.06 0 0 5.7
Idaho 15.5 23.7 2 3 0.1 0 1.9 0 10.9 0 0.1 0.5 0.1 1.9
Montana 27.8 13.9 31 3 14 0 0.5 0 11.3 0 0 0 0 1.3
Nevada 35.2 35.2 11 37 4.1 0 25.6 0 2.4 0 0 0 2.3 0.1
New Mexico 36.6 23.2 4 75 25 0 8.8 0 0.22 0 0.01 0 0 2.2
Oregon 60.9 46.7 0 5 2.6 0 11.6 0 39.4 0 0.23 0.6 0.03 6.3
Utah 39.4 29.7 0 4 30.8 0.04 6.6 0 0.75 0 0.06 0 0.33 0.7
Washington 116.8 92.3 0 4 3.8 0.03 5.4 9.3 89.5 0.04 0.24 1.4 0 6.6
Wyoming 49.6 17 43 2 43.3 0.05 0.5 0 0.89 0 0 0 0 4.4
Total 744.6 669.9 148 230 199.6 0.5 221.4 59.7 190.35 0.45 3.25 6.46 15.26 39.5
% of Total Prd 26.80 0.06 29.70 8.00 25.60 9.56 0.44 0.87 2.00 5.30
Hydropower 190.8
Renewables 9.6
Table x. Can we build enough renewables by 2050 or ever? All figures are in TWh/year. 744.6 total generation – 190.8 hydropower – 9.6 other renewables is another 544 of renewable generation needed. If all prime (148) is built then the shortage is around 400. It isn’t likely the 230 on non-prime locations will be built without expensive transmission as well as major technical improvements that reduce costs substantially
(a) 2012 Data by state: U.S. (EIA) Table 5. Electric Power Industry Generation by Primary Energy Source, 1990-2012
http://www.eia.gov/state/seds/data.cfm?incfile=/state/seds/sep_fuel/html/fuel_use_es.html&sid=CA
(b) not yet developed, exportable total of wind, solar, geothermal from prime-quality resources
NREL. August 2013. Beyond Renewable Portfolio Standards: An Assessment of Regional Supply and Demand Conditions Affecting the Future of Renewable Energy in the West. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
(c) ibid. Not yet developed non-prime wind, solar, geothermal, and/or biomass.
(e) Electricity profile 2012 Total Retail Sales

 

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Smart Grid Challenges

Wald, M. L. December 5, 2014. Power Savings of Smart Meters Prove Slow to Materialize. New York Times. 

Meter readers were supposed to be phased out by tens of millions of new “smart” meters that talk directly to the electric company. The meters can record use by the hour, changing the price as the market changes and telling the customer — or maybe even the appliances themselves — the best time to buy energy.

But this is not happening. Although the goal is to shift consumption to off-peak hours when cheaper, cleaner electricity is available, experts say it is still many years away, despite billions in federal subsidies that have helped finance the switch to the so-called smart grid.

Analysts say that most customers, and public service commissions, are simply not ready for the change to what is known as dynamic pricing, which is intended to benefit the whole system by reducing demand during peak hours.

The idea is that as prices rise on summer afternoons or fall in the middle of the night, customers will learn to tailor their consumption — like running a dishwasher or washing machine, or charging an electric car — during times of better pricing.  It is a strategy that will become increasingly important as more wind turbines and solar panels are connected, and produce electricity without any relationship to the level of demand.

The dishwashers, air-conditioners, water heaters and other electric appliances that would automatically take signals from the meter are still to come, leaving consumers to manually manage their energy consumption.  “The smart meter giving people real-time access to price information is not going to make them get up in the middle of the night and turn their dishwasher on,” said John P. Hughes, the vice president for technical affairs at the Electricity Consumers Resource Council, a consumer group that represents mostly large industrial users. “Getting the enabling technology to do that is going to take a long time.”

In the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel, which represents customers in public service commission hearings, William F. Fields, a senior assistant, said that the cost-effectiveness of smart meters had yet to be demonstrated.  “I’ve never seen an analysis that shows that shifting my dishwashing, clothes-washing and clothes-drying load is going to make a significant impact on my monthly bill,” he said. “It’s just not that much electricity.”

Meier, A. May 2014. Challenges to the integration of renewable resources at high system penetration. California Energy Commission.

A challenge to “smart grid” coordination is managing unprecedented amounts of data associated with an unprecedented number of decisions and control actions at various levels throughout the grid.

This report outlined substantial challenges on the way to meeting these goals.

More work is required to move from the status quo to a system with 33% of intermittent renewables. The complex nature of the grid and the refining temporal and spatial coordination represented a profound departure from the capabilities of the legacy or baseload system. Any “smart grid” development will require time for learning.

IEEE. September 5, 2014. IEEE Report to DOE Quadrennial Energy Review on Priority Issues. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

A large cost-benefit ratio is by no means assured. Potential benefits may be overestimated; for example some of the expectations for smart meters are being scaled back both in the U.S. and in Europe (19). Germany found that while smart metering would be beneficial for a particular group of customers, the majority of consumers would not benefit from a global installation of smart meters (20).

19 European Commission. June 2014. Benchmarking smart metering deployment in the EU-27 with a focus on electricity.

20 Ernst & Young. July 2013. Cost-benefit analysis for the comprehensive use of smart metering.

National Institute of Standards and Technology.  24 Jan 2014. Electromagnetic Compatibility of Smart Grid Devices and Systems. U.S. Department of Commerce.

The Smart Grid will dramatically increase the dependency of the electric grid on microprocessors, and turn the electric system into a giant computer that will monitor itself, optimize power delivery, remotely control and automate processes, and increase communications between control centers, transformers, switches, substations, homes, and businesses.

Smart Grid devices have the potential of making the electric grid less stable: “Many of these devices must function in harsh electromagnetic environments typical of utility, industrial, and commercial locations. Due to an increasing density of electromagnetic emitters (radiated and conducted, intentional and unintentional), the new equipment must have adequate immunity to function consistently and reliably, be resilient to major disturbances, and coexist with other equipment.”

 

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Doomsday Clock moved closer to midnight

Since 2012 the Doomsday clock has been at 5 minutes to midnight, but on January 22, 2015 the clock moved 2 minutes forward to just 3 minutes short of midnight.

This is because prominent scientists (including Nobel laureates) say that climate change and the danger of nuclear war pose an ever-growing threat to civilization (perhaps they read U.S. House of Representative hearings which state an electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear weapon could kill up to 90 percent of Americans)

The Doomsday Clock has been around since 1947 and changed 18 times since then — from two minutes to midnight in 1953 at worst to 17 minutes before midnight in 1991 at best. The last time it was 3 minutes before midnight was 1983 due to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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Spain Wind Integration

2 articles below, Pedro Prieto and National Renewable Energy Laboratory:

Jan 14, 2015 Pedro Prieto [energyresources] Digest Number 8957 [altered slightly]

In Spain we have this mix, as of the end of 2014:

INSTALLED POWER

MW     %         GWH     %

  • 19893 18.4    43191   16.7     Hydro (incl. Mini/micro)
  •   7866  7.3     57179   22.1     Nuclear
  • 11482 10.6    46264   17.9     Coal
  •   3498  3.2       6620    2.6     Fuel/gas
  • 27206 25.2    25869   10.0     Combined cycle gas fired
  • 23002 21.3    51439   19.9     Wind power
  •   4672  4.3       8211     3.2    Solar PV
  •   2300  2.1       5013     1.9    Concentrated Solar Power (CSP)
  •   8212  7.6     30935   12.0    Thermal renewable & Others

TOTAL 108131 100.0 GENERATION

Pump up hydro & Generation Consupmtion: 12663 -4.9 Exports to neighbors -3543 -1.4, TOTAL 258515 100.0 LOAD FACTOR GROSS % Hydro (incl. Mini/micro) 24.78 Nuclear 82.98 Coal 46.00 Fuel/gas 21.60 Combined cycle gas fired 10.85 Wind power 25.53 Solar PV 20.06 CSP 24.88 Thermal renewable & Others 43.0

Conclusions

  1. Spain has a huge excess of installed power, with daily maximum peaks of hardly 40 GW, averages of 30 GW and a total installed power of 108 GW. This is the consequence, at the end of 90s and early 2000s of belief in infinite growth and preparation to it.
  1. Spain has a reasonably good hydro system, which is an excellent buffer for pumping up to back up the intermittencies of renewables.
  1. The international exchanges (in the balance exports) are basically with France (we have a positive balance), Morocco, through the Gibraltar Strait and Portugal, a country with also some renewables that Spain sometimes helps to balance as well. But at the end, it is basically more an island (with even less connection with Europe that the UK) from the electric point of view, as you can see.
  1. Spain has a huge installed combined cycle gas fired power plants, that were built in the mentioned belief of eternal growth about 10-15 years ago and now are basically backing the renewables, as the second source, if hydro has a bad year. This is very good for the renewable system, but an economic and financial tragedy for operators who invested heavily in combined cycles and are now having a misery of 10% load factor, when they were thought and designed for at least 5,500 hours a year.
  1. CSP has a bigger load factor than solar because the law admits some 15% of gas (classified as renewable energy) to back the plants and thus avoid the molten salt deposits to solidify on cloudy days or during the nights.
  1. Self-consumption is high and pump up (5,403 GWh/year) is not only to back up renewables, but mostly to help nuclear to offload in the nights.
  1. Renewable energies represented in 2014 about 43.7% of the total yearly national demand. Exactly the same percentage of installed power, but the trick is that in Spain, renewables (except big hydro) enter first into the grid by law, so, other sources (except the non-stop nuclear) have to give way to them and besides, regulate when possible (mainly hydro and combined cycles or fuel/gas, which is installed basically in the Canary and Balearic archipelagos) , as coal or nuclear are not good to back up fast variations of renewables.
  1. Last but not least, the Control Center you have mentioned in a previous post, located in Red Eléctrica Española (REE, the responsible entity for transport high voltage power lines in our country) is a world leader in handling and managing intermittent generations. They have a very sophisticated national network of sensors and meteorological devices all around the country and in neighboring countries and sophisticated algorithms connected to the national weather system, so that they can already very accurately predict how much a given wind field or solar field is going to produce every day at almost every hour, with at least six seven hours anticipation, so that they can program the 1-2 hours warm-up or disconnection of the combined cycle plants, which are suffering from much more on/off switches than originally programmed.

Neither wind, or solar in its two modalities in Spain (PV and CSP) has the need to be added or subtracted to balance the network, as they have priority of entrance into the grid by law. So, they deliver as much as they can produce in every instant. Only in very few exceptional circumstances have they had to switch off from the grid for a while. This balancing function is reserved basically to the hydro and to the combined cycle gas fired plants, that are the ones suffering the impact,  today working 870 hours a year (10% load factor), when originally designed to work 5,500 hours/year and suffering from faster degradation in their life cycles because the much increased number of pre-warmings and post-coolings and switching on and off more than originally expected.

There has been a decline in electrical usage in Spain over the last 3 years, obviously due to the international financial and economic crisis that is impacting mainly Southern European countries, but this is not affecting to the renewable generation, but has stopped addition of new power plants.

As for the vastly overbuilt capacity, the big mistake was not only in installing renewables, that everybody knows demand overcapacity and storage or handling to provide a safe and continuous service, but also to believe in Kyoto and to install huge amounts of modern combined cycle gas fired plants (Spain has 7 regasifying ports, first in Europe in handling this gas traffic and besides two gasoducts coming from Algeria). The idea was to burn gas and dismantle coal plants to minimize or avoid penalties (see Germany today and smile). I suggest that those countries and governments believing in 2000 that economic growth could not be sustained forever, while growing like Spain at 3-4% yearly, should raise their hands. No one had foreseen this and Spain was trapped in this belief. Only a handful of people like in this forum knew that growth could not be forever.

Of course, some countries like France (+75% of electricity coming from nuclear) can presume having less installed overcapacity, because the load factors of nuclear and the policy to “warm” the country also with electricity. This may have some other enormous inconveniences in the future. Germany is another case, with plenty of coal plants and still some nuclear plants running, despite of having many more renewables than Spain (but not as high a penetration percentage). The Netherlands can also add a lot of renewables because they have an essential buffer with the neighboring countries, in case no wind/no sun exists or if it goes in excess.

But in general, people have to accept that if they want renewables, they will have to build and install a considerable amount of over-capacity, and also, and most important, a massive energy storage system which will bring costs of the so called “renewables” to prices that will always escape the so called grid parity.

Finally, the very high prices Spanish consumers are paying for the electricity are not only due to the “overbuilt capacity” of renewables, but also and mainly due to a poor, corrupted and politically biased energy policy of the government, always willing to accept what the big electric oligopolies demand to continue with their sick benefits. The well-known and publicized case of former dinosaurs of politics being appointed to the boards of the big electric or energy corporations, with insultingly high salaries, immediately after having regulated them, while in the government, those in favor of them (the so called revolving doors scandal) is a very sensitive and painful issue for the Spaniards. To such an extent that probably the traditional bipartisan system is going to explode. So we are not accepting AT ALL thise perverse system, we are just suffering them and fighting it as much as we can.

 

NREL. 2012. Integrating Variable Renewable Energy in Electric Power Markets: Best Practices from International Experience. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

Appendix F. Case Study: Spain Author: David Pérez Méndez-Castrillón, Ministry of Industry, Energy, and Tourism Coordinated and Integrated Planning Policy and Planning Spain’s energy situation as well as the policies pursued in the last decades are the direct result of certain challenges: a high degree of energy dependence, a lack of sufficient interconnections (as it is almost an isolated electric system), high energy consumption per unit of gross domestic product, and high levels of greenhouse gas emissions (mostly due to a strong growth in electricity generation and to the energy demand in the transport sector).

To face these challenges, energy policy in Spain (and in other European countries) has spun round three axes: security of supply, enhancement of the competitiveness of Spain’s economy and a guarantee of sustainable economic, and social and environmental development. The RE energy policy proposed takes into account that Spain has one of the highest levels of energy dependence in Europe, and that the Iberian Peninsula makes up an electric system that is isolated from Europe.

Energy Demand Coverage: At the end of 2011, RE covered 13.2% of final energy consumption and 33% of the total electricity production in Spain. On November 6, 2011, Spain achieved a new record when wind power provided 59.6% of electricity demand; the previous peak was 54.0%. In 2010, RE covered 11.8% of final energy consumption and 33.3% of the total electricity production in Spain.

The impact of high RE levels in the production required from conventional generation implies that thermal power plants must be able to cope with the variability of RE production. When this is not feasible, the TSO must rely on imports from, and exports to, neighboring systems. However, when the level of interconnection is not enough, as it is the case of Spain, RE curtailment will be the only solution.

A main objective in the planning studies of the TSO in Spain is to propose mechanisms to minimize those RE curtailments. New pumping stations, new interconnections, and new fast response power plants (i.e., those using open-cycle gas turbine or OCGT technology) can be considered and evaluated. From an electric point of view, Spain has one of the lowest interconnection ratios in the European Union.66 This lack of sufficient interconnection capacity has prevented the Spanish system from taking advantage of cross-border exchanges for the integration of RE, as cross-border exchanges enable electricity exports when the surplus of renewable production cannot be properly dispatched in the system, thus diminishing RE curtailments and increasing the overall efficiency.

This means special attention must be paid to coordinating, aggregating, and controlling the overall production that is fed into the grid because a certain volume of non-RE units must also be dispatched to fulfill with security and technical constraints.

That RE plants tend to be far more distributed and dispersed than conventional power plants complicates this task. In response to this challenge, the system operator in Spain established a control center of special regime, the Spanish Control Centre of Renewable Energies (CECRE), whose objective is to monitor and control RE production, maximizing its production while ensuring the safety of electrical system. CECRE was established in June 2006 as wind generation started to become a relevant technology in the Spanish electrical system. It is composed of an operational desk where an operator continuously supervises RE production. Renewable energy control centers collect real-time information and channel to the CECRE. To minimize the number of points of contact dealing with the TSO, the renewable energy control center acts as the only real-time speaker with the TSO. The control center also manages the limitations established by set-points, and they are responsible for assuring than the non-manageable plants comply with them.

The Iberian Peninsula has a very low electricity interconnection capacity compared with the rest of Europe. The existing interconnections between Spain and Portugal under the MIBEL framework do not facilitate the integration of intermittent generation produced in Spain (as Portugal is not interconnected to any other country). For this reason, interconnections between Spain and the rest of Europe through France are essential. The use of information GEMAS was designed taking into account that the operator must be able to create, manage, and activate a plant rapidly as situations may arise in which returning the system to a balanced N-1 secure state as soon as possible might be necessary. Because more than 800 wind parks are installed in the Spanish peninsular system, they must be as managed as automatically as possible. The reliability of the tool is a crucial issue as the failure to deliver limitations to the RE control centers could result in a significant decrease of the security of supply.

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German wind and solar integration

Schiermeier, Q. April 10, 2013. Renewable power: Germany’s energy gamble. An ambitious plan to slash greenhouse-gas emissions must clear some high technical and economic hurdles. Nature 496: 156–158

The rapid rise in wind and solar power has created a nightmare scenario for grid operators, who face power surges when the wind blows and the Sun shines, and shortages when they don’t. In 2011, more than 200,000 blackouts exceeding three minutes were reported — and experts warn of a growing risk of major power failures.

For the Energiewende to succeed, the grid must be able to accommodate millions of extra small solar installations and wind turbines, as well as autonomous sub-grids such as those that connect offshore wind farms, which intermittently send floods of power into the onshore grid.

Some companies have floated plans to build large thermal solar plants in the Sahara Desert, which gets enough sunshine to meet most of Europe’s electricity demand. But this scheme, the multibillion-euro DESERTEC initiative, lost momentum late last year, when two major industry partners — Siemens and Bosch — backed out (see Nature 491, 1617; 2012). Energy analysts, moreover, doubt that Germany or any other European country would be willing to rely on substantial electricity imports from a politically unstable region.

NREL. 2012. Integrating Variable Renewable Energy in Electric Power Markets: Best Practices from International Experience. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

Germany has developed a fund to encourage new fossil-fired power plants to use the most flexible technology available to maximize their ability to ramp to meet the system’s balancing need.

The Greennet study determined that additional balancing costs in Germany, at around 10% penetration, would be around €2.5 ($3.3)/MWh (Holttinen et al. 2009).

Germany’s wind industry association believes an additional 25 GW could be installed on land and at sea by 2020, on top of the 29 GW today (GWEC n.d.). ENTSO-E estimates that in the Nordic region as a whole, meanwhile, wind capacity could rise to approximately 15-20 GW in the same year (ENTSO-E 2010), at which point less than half of Nordic wind capacity would be located within Danish borders. Output throughout this northern region is likely to be highly correlated. This means that competition for flexible resources such as Norwegian hydropower, to balance these largely wind power ambitions, is going to increase. Denmark may need to increase its domestic flexibility.

Denmark is a small system, heavily interconnected with both Scandinavian neighbors in the Nordic power market and Germany to the south, with a transfer capacity equal to approximately 80% of its peak demand. In other words, surpluses and deficits of power production resulting from a large variable RE share can relatively easily be compensated for. Other systems are likely to have a far smaller potential to trade, relative to their size.

Germany must manage very large flows of wind energy into and around its grid area. Until recently, with the scaling up of solar photovoltaic power plants (PV) in the south of the country, almost all variable renewable energy (RE) generation (i.e., wind power) has been in the middle and north if the country. The lack of balance between rural areas with high wind energy shares and principal consumption areas all over Germany has led to transmission congestion between these different areas. The challenge is likely to be compounded by growing flows of variable electricity from outside Germany’s borders. Germany’s immediate neighbor to the north is Denmark, which targets 50% wind power. Moreover, wind penetration is likely to be highest in the Jutland Peninsula, which is part of the same power system as Germany (i.e., the synchronous grid of continental Europe). Instantaneous shares in Jutland can already rise above 100% today. Grid congestion in the border region during times of high wind is likely to increase without reinforcement.

In addition, flows of electricity from Germany to and through Eastern neighbors are already challenging, to the extent that eastern neighbors are considering remedial measures. Finally, fast-growing, distributed solar photovoltaic (PV) installations in the south of the country will increase the complexity of the system operation task, particularly because the distribution grid is managed passively.

The 2010 Energy Concept includes a “Government-Länder Initiative on Wind Energy,” which intends to improve cooperation between federal and state levels in the search for higher quality wind resources on land. This is particularly important as the majority of the best resources may already have been exploited.

Protecting the Revenue of Existing Flexible Resources. As wind and solar PV electricity production increases, and because of their low marginal cost and priority dispatch, less production is needed from existing conventional plants, such as gas and coal, which have higher operating costs (mainly fuel). This is known as the “merit-order effect” (i.e., whereby conventional power plants are pushed down the order in which plants are used). This “missing revenue” problem may adversely affect the economics of those plants to the point that owners no longer consider their continued production to be profitable and retire them from service. If this would occur, it would not only reduce the amount of flexible power on the system able to balance fluctuating variable RE output, it might also undermine the adequacy of the system (i.e., its ability to meet its peak power requirements).

Even if fossil-fueled plants are displaced to some extent by new variable RE output, they will be needed to compensate for the nuclear power plants already retired (nearly 10 GW), alongside imports of electricity from France.

Challenges for Neighboring Countries Polish and Czech system operators are considering blocking action in the face of large wind-based flows into and through their systems. Poland is considering installing devices to enable this (Platts 2011). Austria, for example, buys wind power to fill its pumped-hydropower reservoirs, and 35% of electricity flowing from Germany to Austria passes through the Czech Republic.

The task of TSOs, which manage the high-voltage grid in areas with very large shares of variable RE electricity, is increasingly complex. Very large amounts of data need to be managed and continually updated, while more dynamic management of power plants, such as re-dispatching or using curtailment, requires high-speed decision-making.

Serious delays to essential grid expansion work are also apparent in the increasing need to curtail wind plants in the north of the country. Though an important system management tool, the curtailment of power plants (or “feed-in management”) leads essentially to the waste of what was wanted in the first place (i.e., clean energy) so it should be minimized. Curtailment in 2010 increased by up to 69% over the previous year. Even if it only amounted to 0.2% – 0.4% (72-150 GWh) of total wind electricity, in some northern wind farms as much as 25% of output was curtailed (Ecofys 2011).

Figure D-1. Development of electricity generation from RE in Germany since 1990 Source: BMU 2011a Table 1 shows the average annual share of wind power in total electricity generation increasing from 1% in 1999 to 6% in 2010. Solar PV, from a much later start, reached nearly 2% in 2010. While these figures seem still quite modest, instantaneous shares can be very challenging.

Table D-1. Shares of Wind and Solar Wind Share Solar PV (%) Share (%) Table 2 shows the maximum ratio of solar PV and wind power output to power demand in Germany as a whole and in the four TSO control areas into which it is divided (See Figure 2). Perhaps surprisingly, given the modest annual figures above, penetration reached over 60% on Sunday May 8 at 1:00 p.m., when demand dropped to a low on a quiet, sunny afternoon. At the same time, in the area managed by TenneT, which stretches from the north to the south of the country-picking up power both in the windy north and in the sunny south-penetration reached 160% of the entire demand of the area. Eastern Germany saw similarly little activity at 6:00 a. m. on January 1, 2011, and the system operator (50Hertz) had to manage wind output amounting to 124% of the area’s demand.

It remains to be seen whether the Energy Concept will solve the biggest challenge: rolling out and reinforcing the grid.

Table D-2. Maximum Ratio of Wind and Solar PV to Load, by TSO, in Germany in 2011. The Market Stimulation Program has provided grants since 2000. These initially included the power sector, but they are now exclusively for the heat sector. Another important driver is the public bank, Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW).44 KfW provides long-term, fixed, low interest investment loans, and loan guarantees, to projects, amounting to some €10bn by 2008 (RETD 2008). Recently KfW announced EUR 5 billion ($6.6 billion) of loan guarantees to offshore wind projects up to 2020 (Platts 2011). In 2010 alone, it provided EUR 11 billion ($15.5 billion) “for the construction of facilities using renewable energies,” including heat).

The German Renewable Energy Concept targets are as follows: 18% of energy consumption by 2020; 30% by 2030; 45% by 2040; and 60% by 2050 o 35% electricity consumption by 2020; 50% by 2030; 65% by 2040; and 80% by 2050. These targets are highly ambitious. The Energy Concept was updated in summer 2011 following the government’s decision to phase out nuclear power by 2022, which represented approximately 23% of German capacity in 2011, after the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan in March 2011. The change of policy resulted in additional promotion of renewable electricity as well as conventional options such as coal power. A recent study, which modeled balancing costs in a number of European countries, found that in Germany, additional balancing costs of wind power at approximately 10% penetration of electricity (i.e., more than present penetration) amounted to approximately EUR 2.5 per MWh wind).

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Homeland Security and Dept of Energy: Dams and Energy Sectors Interdependency Study

[Below are excerpts from this 45 page document. Dams not only provide power but also water for agriculture, drinking water, cooling water for thermal power plants, ecosystem health, fisheries, and so on.  All dams have a finite lifespan of 50 to 200 years due to siltation and the limited lifespan of concrete. Within the next 20 years, 85% of U.S. dams that cost taxpayers $2 trillion dollars will have outlived their average 50-year lifespan.]

DOE HS. September 2011. Dams and Energy Sectors Interdependency Study. U.S. Department of Energy and Homeland Security.

Figure 1: Top 10 Hydropower-Generating States and Their Reliance on Hydro Sources for Electricity, 2009, total hydroelectric power generation 273 MWh. These states together produce more than 80% of the Nation‘s total hydroelectric power.

ID 80%           WA 71%         OR 59%          MT 35%          NY 21%          CA 14%

TN 11%           AL 8%            AZ 6%           NC 4%

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collaborated to examine the interdependencies between two critical infrastructure sectors – Dams and Energy. The study highlights the importance of hydroelectric power generation, with a particular emphasis on the variability of weather patterns and competing demands for water which determine the water available for hydropower production. In recent years, various regions of the Nation suffered drought, impacting stakeholders in both the Dams and Energy Sectors. Droughts have the potential to affect the operation of dams and reduce hydropower production, which can result in higher electricity costs to utilities and customers. Conversely, too much water can further complicate the operation of dams in ways that can be detrimental to hydropower production and to the infrastructure of the dams.

The requirements for providing sufficient water for irrigation, environmental protection, transportation, as well as community and industrial uses are already in conflict in many places. Low water conditions (e.g., drought) and high water conditions (e.g., flood) resulting from extreme weather variability can strain the operation of dams.

Although hydroelectric facilities are a type of asset that falls under the auspices of the Dams Sector, they are also an important element to the Energy Sector because the electric power they generate is critical to maintaining the reliability of the Nation‘s electricity supply.

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides an overarching framework for the protection and resilience efforts for the Nation‘s 18 critical infrastructure sectors.

DOE and DHS support and coordinate the protection and resilience activities for the Dams and Energy Sectors‘ critical infrastructure as defined below: Dams Sector assets include dam projects, hydropower generation facilities, navigation locks, levees, dikes, hurricane barriers, mine tailings and other industrial waste impoundments, and other similar water retention and water control facilities. Energy Sector, as delineated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power, except for hydroelectric and commercial nuclear power facilities.

Chief among these concerns is the fact that hydroelectric power generation is affected by extreme fluctuations of water flow, as well as long-term issues surrounding the management and uses of water supply to generate hydroelectricity. In recent years, various regions of the Nation suffered droughts affecting stakeholders in both the Dams and Energy Sectors.6 Although recent drought conditions have not caused a serious problem in terms of electricity supply and reliability, they have the potential to affect the operation of dams by decreasing hydropower production,

The report investigates how different variables might affect the operation of hydroelectric facilities and the supply of hydroelectric power, especially in times of drought and other extreme weather events. Such variables include: The relationship between hydroelectric power generation and the variability of hydrology and weather patterns; Operation of major reservoirs and streamflow regulations at these reservoirs; and Management for flood control, fish habitat protection, and power generation.

Importance of Hydroelectric Dams for Power Generation

Historically, hydroelectric sources have been a vital source of electric power generation that accounted for as much as 40% of the Nation‘s electricity supply in the early 1900s. Although the share of hydropower generation has declined to 7% of the U.S. total electric power generation as production as other types of power plants grew at a faster rate, hydroelectric dams remain an important power source. Hydropower is critical to the national economy and the overall energy reliability.

  • Hydroelectric sources produce 7% of the U.S. total annual electric generation.
  • Hydroelectric generating capacity constitutes 8% of the U.S. total existing generation capacity.
  • The top ten hydropower-generating States produce more than 80% of the U.S. total hydroelectric generation.
  • The 20 largest hydroelectric dams produce almost half of the U.S. total hydroelectric generation.
  • Hydroelectric power generation has declined in most parts of the country during the 2007-2009 period compared to the historical average.

Hydropower is important because it’s:

  1. The least expensive source of electricity, as it does not require fossil fuels for generation;
  2. An emission-free renewable source, accounting for over 65% of the U.S. total annual net renewable generation;
  3. Able to shift loads to provide peaking power (it does not require ramp-up time like combustion technologies); and
  4. Often designated as a black start source that can be used to restore network interconnections in the event of a blackout.

Hydropower serves an essential purpose of enhancing electric grid reliability, and can rapidly adjust output to meet changing real time electricity demands and provide black-start capability to help restore power during a blackout event. Black start capability is defined as the ability to start generation without an outside source of power. Because hydropower plants are the only major generators that can dispatch power to the grid immediately when all other energy sources are inaccessible, they provide essential back-up power during major electricity disruptions such as the 2003 blackout. With black start capability, hydropower facilities can resume operations in isolation without drawing on an outside power source and help restore power to the grid.

Hydroelectric Power Capacity vs. Generation. As seen in figures 2 and 3, hydropower generation capacity has remained steady in the last 20 years, whereas production from hydro sources has fluctuated dramatically year-to-year. According to EIA, hydropower capacity grew at an annual rate of 0.3 percent or a total of 4,600 megawatts (MW) in the past 20 years (1990: 73,925 MW vs. 2009: 78,525 MW).

The interannual variability of hydropower generation in the United States is very high—a drop of 59 million megawatt hours (MWh) (or 21% of the U.S. total hydropower generation) was seen from 2000 to 2001. Sensitivity of hydroelectric power generation to changes in precipitation and river discharge is high; in the range of 1.0+ (a sensitivity level of 1.0 means that one percent change in precipitation results in one percent change in generation). Although it is evident that precipitation is a determining factor in available hydropower generation for a given period of time, the variability of weather patterns impose uncertainty in the operation of hydroelectric facilities. Hydropower operations are also affected indirectly by the changes in air temperatures, humidity, and wind patterns which change water quality and reservoir dynamics. For example, reservoirs with large surface areas (such as Lake Mead in the lower Colorado River) are more likely to experience greater evaporation, which affects the availability of water for all uses including hydropower. In addition, altering snowfall patterns and associated runoff from snowpack melt are a matter of concern, particularly in the Pacific Northwest, where snows are melting earlier and the proportion of precipitation in the form of snow is decreasing.

A 20-year period from 1990 to 2009 was examined to see the changes in hydropower production at the State level. The results indicate that the national annual average of hydroelectric power generation between 2007 and 2009 was 11 percent less than that of the historical average between 1990 and 2006 in the top 10 hydropower generating states, which all experienced a decline, with certain States losing up to 28% of their normal annual hydropower generation.

Largest Hydro Dams. According to the 2010 Dams Sector-Specific Plan, the total number of dams in the United States is estimated to be around 100,000. However, most dams were constructed solely to provide irrigation and flood control, and only about 2% (or 2,000) of the Nation‘s dams produce electricity.

Table 1 provides a list of the 20 largest hydroelectric dams in the United States ranked by summer capacity as of December 2009. These 20 hydroelectric facilities account for 40% of the Nation‘s hydroelectric power capacity; they provided 44% of the hydropower generated in the United States during the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009. The majority of the 20 largest hydroelectric power plants are located in the Columbia River basin in the Pacific Northwest, all of which experienced decreased production in the 2007 to 2009 time span compared to the historical average between 1990 and 2006.

EIA reports that the largest hydroelectric facility in the United States is the Grand Coulee Dam with a summer capacity of 6,765 MW, located in the Columbia River basin. It is also the largest hydropower producer. To compare the magnitude of the Grand Coulee, the next two largest dams, Chief Joseph and Robert Moses Niagara, each have only about a third of Grand Coulee‘s capacity. Note, however, that the capacity factor at hydro plants varies significantly, generally in the range of 30 to 80%, with an average capacity factor of about 40 to 45%. To illustrate this varied capacity factor of hydroelectric plants, the capacity factor of the Grand Coulee Dam is about 36%, whereas the Robert Moses Niagara Dam has a relatively high capacity factor of 71%.

Table 1. 20 Largest Hydroelectric Dams in the United States Plant Name Owner State

Drought can play a significant role in hydropower production—it can decrease upstream flow and require the diversion or retention of water that would otherwise go to produce electricity or to other water purposes during times of scarcity.

The Columbia River basin is the predominant river system in the Pacific Northwest, encompassing 250 reservoirs and about 150 hydroelectric projects. The system spans seven western States: Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, and Utah, as well as British Columbia, Canada.

Today, the Columbia River system operations serve multiple purposes — flood control and mitigation, power production, navigation, recreation, and environmental needs—that are guided by a complex and interrelated set of laws, treaties, agreements, and guidelines. These include the Endangered Species Act, a Federal law that protects threatened or endangered species— protection that can result in setting restrictions on the time and amount of allowed flow and spill—as well as numerous treaties and agreements with Canada dealing with flood control and division of power benefits and obligations.35 Streamflow in the Columbia River system does not follow the region‘s electricity demand pattern in which the peak occurs during winter when the region‘s homes and businesses need heating. Although most of the annual precipitation occurs in the winter from snowfall, most of the natural streamflows occur in the spring and early summer when the snowpack melts. About 60 percent of the natural runoff occurs during May, June, and July (see figure 7). Thus, the objective of reservoir operation is to store snowmelt runoff in the spring and early summer for release in the fall and winter when streamflows are lower and electricity demand is higher.

Hydropower supplies approximately 60 to 70% of the electricity in the Pacific Northwest Region. In the Columbia River system, power generation operations are generally compatible with flood control requirements. However, under the current operating strategy, conflicts between power generation and fish protection are generally resolved in favor of fish protection.

The current strategy requires increased water storage in the fall and winter and increased flows and spill during the spring and summer to benefit migrating juvenile salmon. This approach does not provide an optimal operating strategy for power generation as it results in more water for fish protection, but reduced hydropower generation during the peak demand periods. As a result, BPA is often likely to purchase power frequently during high load periods in the winter and sell surplus power in the spring and summer.

The Pacific Northwest has been affected by widespread temperature-related reductions in snow pack, as well as a changing annual runoff pattern. Recent studies indicate 1) a transition to more rain and less snow and 2) a shifting pattern of snow melt runoff in western North America— contemporary snow melt runoff has been observed 10 to 30 days early in comparison to the period from 1951 to1980. To adapt to these changes, the ability to modify operational rules and water allocations is critical to ensuring the reliability of water and energy supplies, as well as to protecting the environment and critical infrastructure. However, the current set of laws, regulations, and agreements is intricate and creates institutional and legal barriers to such changes in both the short and long term. In 2010, the Pacific Northwest experienced the third driest year in the last 50 years and the fifth lowest water level on record since 1929, causing low runoff in the lower Columbia River. According to BPA‘s 2010 Annual Report, BPA‘s gross purchased 37%, from 2009, mainly due to below normal basin-wide precipitation and stream flows, resulting in insufficient power generation to fulfill load obligations.

Not only droughts, but too much water can also bring challenges to hydropower operation. After a dry winter, spring 2010 river flows were expected to stay fairly low. However, in June 2010, a strong Pacific storm system brought heavy precipitation that almost doubled the stream flows in the Columbia River.45 During the month of June, dam operators faced the challenges of managing flooding and an oversupply of hydropower and, at the same time, complying with Federal regulations for fish protection that restricted the amount of spill allowed. Since water that goes through power turbines does not increase dissolved gas levels, thus maintaining safe conditions for fish, dam operators were forced to produce power for which they could not find a market.46 As a result, BPA disposed of more than 50,000 MWh of electricity for free or for less than the cost of transmission and incurred a total of 745,000 MWh of spill for lack of market in June 2010.47 Figure 10 shows that BPA balancing authority generation significantly exceeded load in early June.

High flows in the Columbia River system are common, resulting from above average snowpack and/or early warming periods that result in rapid snowmelt. However, operating the Columbia River system through those events has become much more complex in recent years due to the following new factors: 1) multiple flow and storage requirements to protect threatened and endangered salmon and steelhead under the Endangered Species Act; 2) changing uses of the transmission system in a deregulated electric power market; and 3) the significant addition of variable, non-dispatchable wind power capacity (3,400 MW as of February 2011) with financial incentives for operation—production tax credits of $21 per MWh and renewable energy credits of $20 per MWh.48

The Colorado River System is considered one of the most legally complex river systems in the world, governed by multiple interstate and international compacts, legal decrees, and prior appropriation allocations, as well as federally-reserved water rights for Native Americans.52 The river basin extends over seven U.S. States— Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming and parts of northwestern Mexico (see figure 11), serving about 25 million people in the Southwest. Its water yield is only 8% of the annual flow of the Columbia River.

In the early 21st century, water use issues intensified as the Colorado River region experienced some of the Nation‘s highest population growth, as well as the start of a long period of drought considered to be the worst drought in the 100-year recorded history (hereinafter referred to as the ?early 21stcentury drought?).  The Colorado River region is of particular concern because of the continuing trend of rising temperatures seen across the region that contributes to increased evaporative losses from snowpack, surface reservoirs, irrigated land, and vegetated surfaces.

Lakes Mead and Powell comprise approximately 80% of the basin‘s entire storage capacity.

In October 2010, Lake Mead stood at 39% capacity or 1,084 feet in elevation, curtailing power generation at the Hoover Dam, the region‘s largest hydro facility. For every foot of elevation lost in Lake Mead, Hoover Dam produces 5.7 MW less power. That is because at lower water levels air bubbles flow through with the water causing the turbines to lose efficiency. As a result, electricity available from Hoover Dam declined 29% since 1980, which meant that local utilities had to buy power on the open market where rates were up to four times higher.

The Tennessee River System territory includes most of Tennessee and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia, serving more than 8.7 million people. TVA manages the Tennessee River and its reservoirs as a whole, regulating the flow of water through the river system for flood control, navigation, power generation, water quality, and recreation. TVA is also the Nation‘s largest public power provider, wholly owned by the U.S. Government; it maintains 29 conventional hydroelectric dams.

On average, the Tennessee Valley gets 51 inches of rain a year, which is more than double the average rainfall in the southwestern United States. Nonetheless, the Tennessee Valley has experienced water shortages during the 2007-2008 droughts that forced communities around the watershed to restrict water withdrawals and take conservation measures. In December 2010, Gary Springston, TVA program manager for water supply, stated that the present situation was still tenuous and ?even systems connected to the Tennessee River system could face conflicts between instream flow needs to support water quality and aquatic life and withdrawals for offstream uses such as public-water supply, industry, thermoelectric power generation, and irrigation. Water supply concerns continue to increase due to population growth and interbasin transfers, especially since the Tennessee River is surrounded by areas that may require more water to accommodate growing needs.

The 2007-2008 droughts in the TVA region were among the worst on record, during which low reservoir water levels caused TVA to lose almost half of its total hydroelectric generation. At the same time, coal prices more than doubled, forcing TVA to rely on additional natural gas purchases to meet electric generation needs while keeping prices as low as possible. Even with the increased reliance on natural gas as opposed to coal, TVA raised rates by 20% in October 2008 to absorb more than $2 billion of increased costs for coal, natural gas, and purchased power costs associated with infrastructure modernization can become an issue. Financial resources to design and implement facility upgrades generally come through public funds and/or power sales for publicly held hydropower infrastructure, and from rate increases approved by public utility commissions for privately held facilities. Although payback periods could be as short as 3-5 years for technology upgrades, securing the initial investment can be challenging. Some owners have received offers from investors and other utility companies to enter into a variety of energy savings performance contracts that would provide the initial investment for modernization in return for a share of the subsequent increased energy production. None of the participants indicated that they were presently involved in such contracts and several raised concerns as to whether they could legally enter into such arrangements.

The potential for technology upgrades at some hydropower infrastructure may also be limited or made more expensive due to the age or physical condition of the facility.

Although operators want to retain as much water as possible in the reservoir for hydropower production, storing it in the reservoir during high water conditions may be hard to manage, as it might impact residences surrounding the reservoir.

Many dams have multiple missions; for some, the requirement for flood control takes precedence over hydropower production. Adherence to this primary mission may require passing high volumes of water through the dam turbines even though there may be low power demand. These increased flows may also require downstream dams to pass through water and not be able to sell the resulting power at a reasonable price. Even if flood control is not a facility mission, owners do their best to avoid or minimize downstream harm when they manage high water conditions. Debris buildup associated with flooding can be dangerous to the facility infrastructure and affect operations. Trees, lumber, sheds, animals, and other debris can be swept into rivers from floods and can build up against dams. The cost and personnel resources required to remove this debris can be significant.

Hydroelectric facilities serve multiple purposes that can include flood control, recreation, industrial and community water supply, irrigation, and transportation. The demands for water for these uses can come into conflict with hydropower production in terms of how much water can be used for nonpower generation and the condition of the water associated with power generation. For multifunction facilities, the combination of existing water rights, treaties, contracts, laws, or court cases determine who gets how much water and when they receive it. Modifying these controlling forces to consider reduced water availability can be difficult because they may involve multiple States and parties, and sometimes, international partners. In addition to these legally binding obligations on water delivery, softer forces, such as providing or storing water to protect recreational uses or the value of residences around the reservoir, can also limit the availability of water for hydropower generation. The condition of the water used in producing hydropower may also be heavily controlled through Federal and State laws and regulations, operating permits and licenses, and court cases related to the protection of natural resources and the environment. These controlling forces may stipulate water conditions such as tail water temperature, streamflow, and dissolved oxygen levels. Operating stipulations are primarily designed to protect species designated as threatened or endangered under Federal or State laws. They may also serve to protect downstream banks, channels, and river branches.

Southern Co. 85 2007 “Georgia Power’s hydroelectric power generation was down 51% in 2007, forcing the company to spend $33.3 million for purchasing coal and oil to replace lost hydropower generation although hydropower sources account for less than two percent of Georgia Power’s generation portfolio.” – Nov. 2007, Atlanta Business

Chronicles Manitoba Hydro86 2003 “A net loss of $436 million was reported in Manitoba Hydro’s 53rd annual report for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2004. The loss was primarily due to the prolonged drought conditions that affected normal electricity production at the utility’s 14 hydroelectric generating stations.” – 2004, Manitoba Hydro

Water is used as the primary coolant in the condensers in both steam and natural gas-fired, combined cycle plants; the amount of water used for cooling in these plants can be significant, depending on the type of cooling system used. Plants that use “once-through” or “open-loop” cooling systems withdraw large amounts of water from nearby surface water sources. This water passes through a condenser as a coolant and, in doing so, transfers heat energy from the hot steam to the coolant water, raising the temperature of the water. After moving through the condenser, the water is released to the original lake, pond, or river source. The increased temperature of the discharge water also increases the rate of evaporation for the body of water. The quantity of water lost from the hydrological system by evaporation caused by elevated temperatures is said to be “consumed.” Closed-loop cooling

Coal Transport by Barge. Transportation on the inland waterways and Great Lakes is an important element of the domestic coal distribution system, carrying approximately 20% of the Nations‘ coal, enough to produce 10% of U.S. electricity annually. Barge transport is often used to transfer coal from the initial source to a railroad, from a railroad to the coal-fired power plant, or the entire distance from the mine to the plant. Barge traffic is particularly important in the Midwestern and Eastern States, with 80% of shipments originating in States along the Ohio River. The amount of waterborne transported coal has remained relatively constant over the last two decades. Barge transport and the amount transported on a single barge are dependent upon the depth of the river on which the barge travels. Reducing the barge load is costly. Losing one foot of draft typically means losing 17 tons of cargo on a single barge and 255 tons on a typical 15-barge tow. In addition, idle tow-boats cost shipping companies $5,000 – $10,000 per day. Droughts have the potential to reduce the rate at which all goods, including coal, can be transported by barge. Some river systems, like the Missouri River, have a system of reservoirs that are used to control river depths. When river levels are low, water is released from the reservoirs to increase river depths and permit barge travel. To mitigate the potential for low water levels to significantly disrupt electric power generation, most coal-burning plants with barge access can also receive coal shipments by rail. However, because barge is the cheapest mode of transportation, utilities pay a higher rate for transportation.

By affecting the availability of cooling water, drought has had an impact on the production of electricity from thermoelectric power plants. The problem for power plants becomes acute when river, lake, or reservoir water levels fall near or below the level of the water intakes used for drawing water for cooling. A related problem occurs when the temperature of the surface water increases to the point where the water can no longer be used for cooling. The Southeast experienced particularly acute drought conditions in August 2007, which forced the shutdown of some nuclear power plants and curtailed operations at others in order to avoid exceeding environmental limits for water temperature. A similar situation occurred in August 2006 along the Mississippi River, as well as at some plants in Illinois and Minnesota.

Thermoelectric freshwater withdrawals accounted for 41% of all freshwater withdrawals in 2005; however, it is important to note that only 3% of the withdrawn water is consumed and the rest is returned to natural flow.

Limitations of the Study. To maintain the focus of the study, this report is limited to issues that specifically relate to electric power generation at hydroelectric dams. Specifically, this study examines issues pertinent to overall management of reservoirs and stream flows at dams that are affected by the variability of weather patterns. In-depth analysis of certain topics considered outside of the scope of the study is omitted from the report. These include: climate change, new hydropower technologies, renewable energy credits, the value of hydropower‘s avoided greenhouse gas emissions, and the effects of reduced hydropower generation on the overall power market. There are three types of hydroelectric power plants: conventional, pumped storage, and diversion facilities. The focus of this report is on the conventional hydroelectric facilities, which are the most common type of hydroelectric power plant. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) defines a conventional hydroelectric power plant as a plant in which all of the power is produced from natural streamflow as regulated by available storage. Most pumped storage units have closed-loop systems in which water can be stored and reused; therefore, electricity production at pumped storage is more resistant to drought or changing weather patterns. For this reason, the discussion of and data on hydroelectric power generation provided in this report excludes generation from pumped storage, unless noted otherwise.

 

 

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