Solar Thermal ESOI (Energy Stored on Invested)

Barton, N. April 17, 2013. ESOI for solar thermal.

http://sunoba.blogspot.com/2013/04/esoi-for-solar-thermal.html

Published information is available to evaluate the ESOI score for the most common solar thermal storage technology – a molten 60-40 mixture of sodium and potassium nitrates, commonly known as solar salt.

Burkhardt, Heath and Turchi [2] made a life cycle assessment of a hypothetical 100 MW parabolic trough concentrating solar plant at Daggett, California. The storage envisaged is 62,000 tons of solar salt, capable of storing 1,988 MWh of thermal energy, which can be converted into an electrical equivalent by multiplying by the thermal-electric efficiency of the plant.

Many individual items were taken into account by Burkhardt et al. to calculate the embodied energy of the storage component of the plant; these included obvious items like steel, concrete, pumps, heat exchangers, insulation and solar salt. However the biggest single item is the energy required to keep the salt molten and stirred for daily operations.

It’s noteworthy that the embodied energy of solar salt is low if it mined (as assumed to be the case in [2]), but high if it produced synthetically. In the latter case, which Burkhardt et al. say applies to slightly more than half of all installations, the manufacturing process involves pre-production of ammonia, for which there is a natural gas requirement.

I have also made an as-yet unpublished estimate for the ESOI score for thermal storage in air-blown pebble beds. This estimate is in the context of a new concept for solar thermal power generation entitled BRRIMS, denoting Brayton-cycle, Re-heated, Recuperated, Integrated, Modular and Storage-equipped. Here what needs to be considered is the embodied energy in hardware such as steel tanks, ducts, concrete footings, insulation and pebbles. Heat exchangers, pumps and fans are not required.

Results of Barnhart & Benson can now be extended as follows, with the new data highlighted. This is a fair comparison (“apples with apples”) between storage technologies since the new figures represent electrical energy that would be produced from the underlying thermal storage.

Technology ESOI
compressed air energy storage 240
pumped hydro storage 210
pebble bed thermal, BRRIMS 62
solar salt, parabolic trough [2] 47
Li-ion battery 10
Sodium-Sulphur battery 6
Vanadium redox battery 3
Zinc-Bromine battery 3
Lead-acid battery 2

The simple conclusion from the ESOI metric is that geologic storage is excellent, thermal storage is good, whilst electrochemical storage is poor.

That is not the whole story however. Geological storage is not particularly cheap, and its applicability is limited by the availability of suitable sites. My estimates show that thermal storage is the cheapest option, and I propose to present details of this work at the World Renewable Energy Congress in July.

References
[1] C J Barnhart and S M Benson, “On the importance of reducing the energetic and material demands of electrical energy storage”, Energy Environ. Sci., 6 (2013), 1083.

[2] J J Burkhardt III, G A Heath and C S. Turchi, “Life cycle assessment of a parabolic trough concentrating solar power plant and the impacts of key design alternatives”, Environ. Sci. Technol. 45 (2011), 2457–2464.

 

 

 

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Integrating renewable power research

Below are intermittent energy integration posts, workshops, and other research.

Andrew Dodson. 2014. Issues Integrating Renewables.

This is a fairly technical podcast, this link cites some of the most interesting points made, here are a couple of them:

  • “There is not a single transmission expansion project in this country that is not currently being challenged by land owners.” – Pat Hoffman, Assistant secretary of DOE office of electricity Delivery and energy reliability
  • Dodson says that $10 trillion would be needed to rebuild the electric grid to integrate solar and wind on a large scale

Savage, W. 2012. The Full Cost of Renewables: Managing Wind Integration Costs in California. Pomona Senior Theses. Paper 57.

[This 71-page paper has some great explanations of how hard it already is to operate the electric grid and issues with wind integration]

The costs of building and operating a renewable power generator do not paint a complete picture. Due to their unpredictable and variable generation profiles, renewable sources of energy such as wind impose a unique burden on the rest of the electric power system. In order to accommodate this less reliable renewable power, the remaining conventional generation units must deviate from their optimal operating profiles, increasing their costs and potentially releasing additional GHG. Although this burden is conceptually understood, it is not explicitly valued in the market today. Thus, when analysts and policymakers discuss the cost-effectiveness of renewable energy as a GHG-reduction strategy, a key element is missing from the cost side of the equation, known as wind integration costs.

Wind integration costs will only increase with time. Thanks to a diverse resource mix, California should see modest integration costs for the time being. However, as policymakers consider moving beyond the 33% RPS standard to even more ambitious goals, they are more likely to encounter the non-linearities found in most studies. Furthermore, if California truly wants to be a national leader, it needs to demonstrate that its solutions can be replicated at the national scale, not just in areas whose wind resources are balanced by significant solar, geothermal and hydroelectric potential.

The cost of integrating renewable power can be generally defined as the cost of all actions taken to maintain the reliability of the electric grid in response to the uncertainty and variability of renewable power. This chapter will explain, from a physical operations perspective, exactly what those actions are.

Traditional System Operations. The day-to-day job of electric system operators is organized around one central goal: maintaining the reliable flow of electricity to customers, or more colloquially, “keeping the lights on”. In order to do this, groups known as balancing authorities maintain careful control over the electric grid at all times. Each such organization is responsible for maintaining reliability within a certain geographic region; for example, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) is responsible for maintaining the reliable supply of power to most of California. In order to maintain reliability, each balancing authority much match the supply and demand for power within its territory at all times. The demand for power is known as “load”, and represents the sum of electricity being drawn by residential, commercial and industrial customers. This power is supplied by electric generation from power plants, such as coal-fired steam power plants, nuclear generation stations, hydroelectric dams or wind turbines. Power can also be imported or exported from one balancing authority to another.

One crucial feature of electric power is that, generally speaking, it cannot be stored. Most consumer goods are produced, put into inventory, and then sold whenever a customer wants to buy them. Electricity has no such “shelf life”. When electricity is generated at a power plant, it must be consumed instantly. Therefore, balancing authorities must make sure that the amount of power being generated is equal to load, not just in the aggregate, but at any given instant.

If generation exceeds load, it will increase the frequency of the alternating current power that flows through transmission lines, and vice versa. By convention, electric devices in the United States are designed to operate using an alternating current at a constant, 60-hertz frequency. Even small deviations to this frequency can cause serious damage to electrical equipment, and can trigger generator trips or load shedding to avoid a system emergency. Even without intermittent renewable technologies, the task of instantaneously balancing load and generation is a significant challenge for system operators.

As a general rule, system operators cannot control the amount of load that customers demand at any given time. Therefore, they must forecast the expected load, and then plan ahead so that enough generation will be available to meet demand. For example, on any given morning, the CAISO will estimate the hourly load profile for the next day. The ISO might estimate a load of 16,000 MW for the hour of 12am to 1am, a load of 15,000 MW for the hour of 1am to 2am, and so forth. Then, power plants can submit bids to provide this energy. The ISO will accept as many bids as necessary to meet projected demand, starting with the lowest-cost bids and moving up the cost curve. Based on the results of this bidding process, the ISO will produce an energy schedule, which specifies which power plants will generate power, when they will generate power, how much power they will produce, and how much they will be paid. It also issues daily unit commitment instructions, so that power plants with long start-up times can turn on or off (CAISO, 2010a). However, this process is imperfect. The actual load drawn by consumers does not follow the neat forecast assumed during the planning process. For example, the forecast of 16,000 MW for 12am to 1am is almost certainly wrong. Specifically, three types of errors are possible. First, the estimate of load could be biased. For example, during the first hour of the day, customers could use more total energy than expected. Second, the load could rise or fall during the hour, giving it an intra-hour load shape. For example, customers might use 17,000 MW at 12am, and decrease their usage to 15,000 MW by 1 am. Third, the load could fluctuate randomly about the average of 16,000 MW, creating a sawtooth pattern. All three of these possibilities are both realistic and common in normal grid operations.

In addition to load uncertainty, there is also a possibility that expected generation will be unavailable. For example, a fire might damage a transmission line scheduled to provide power from a distant source, or a mechanical failure could force a natural gas plant to shut down. While it is impossible to prepare for every possible contingency, grid operators include the possibility of these unexpected events in their planning process.

In short, “irrespective of current and future levels of wind generation, power systems are already required to cope with significant variability and intermittency concerns” (Fox et. al, 2007). The issues of uncertainty and variability, so often associated with renewable power, already exist in electric systems. Operators manage these issues using “ancillary services”, which are used to match generation and load at a more granular level.

A power plant is said to provide ancillary services if a certain portion of its capacity is set aside to be flexible. In addition to simply providing energy, power plants can choose sell the ability to accommodate changes in demand on short notice. For example, a 100-MW gas-fired power plant might provide 80 MW of steady power, and also offer the ability to increase or decrease its generation by up to 20 MW. The capacity set aside for the purpose is known as the operating reserve. Power plants can offer several different types of operating reserves, differentiated primarily based on how fast they can respond to a dispatch order requiring them to increase or decrease generation.

Unfortunately, there is no single set of ancillary service definitions; the names and exact technical specifications vary among different balancing authorities and countries, largely as a matter of convention. However, there are a few common categories. Almost all balancing authorities will have some kind of fast-responding ancillary service, variously known as frequency regulation or primary control. Regulation service is designed to respond on the order of seconds, and is controlled by an Automated Generation Control (AGC) system. This allows generation to automatically adjust to small fluctuations in load (Rebours et. al, 2007).

Balancing authorities also have ancillary services that allow manual adjustments to generation, which are generally slower in response time and larger in magnitude.

Generally speaking, there will be different types of operating reserves for load following, imbalance energy and contingencies. Load following refers to the ability to track the shape of the day’s load profile at a greater granularity than hourly schedules, and generally operates on the order of minutes. Imbalance reserves help to compensate for net schedule bias, and contingency reserves are in place to replace generation that could be lost in a system emergency, such as the loss of a major transmission line (Dragoon, 2010).

It would be economically infeasible – to say nothing of physically impractical – to have enough operating reserves to respond to every imaginable contingency. Instead, balancing authorities select a reasonable operating margin to provide a satisfactory level of reliability. The size of this operating margin is based on several factors, including the largest possible single contingency event, the availability of power plants connected to the system, and the expected error in demand forecasts (Ferris and Infield, 2008).

Greater operating reserve requirements to maintain grid reliability impose a cost that is ultimately paid by electric ratepayers. These ancillary services are the means through which system operators manage uncertainty and variability. Currently, that operating challenge is driven by the characteristics of load. The addition of variable energy sources, such as wind power, will increase the magnitude of this operating challenge; however, the challenge remains conceptually the same.

Understanding Wind Power’s Impact. Therefore, our first task in evaluating the cost of wind integration is to assess the extent to which wind power increases the requirement for balancing reserves. To do so, it is helpful to think of wind as “negative load”. Since wind power can generally not be controlled, its behavior is more similar to load than generation. By subtracting the amount of wind generation from load, one creates a new “net load” profile.

Then, balancing authorities must operate traditional power plants so that their generation matches net load, as opposed to raw load. Due to the inclusion of wind power, net load will be more unpredictable and more variable than raw load. However, the techniques used to balance net load are the same ancillary services that are provided in traditional systems. Kirby and Milligan (2008) note that wind has many similar characteristics to load, and that the differences in managing the two are “more of degree than kind,” as wind “add[s] to aggregate variability.”

The crucial question is how much of each type of ancillary service is required, and then how much will it cost. In order to determine the impact of wind power on the reserve requirements for net load, it is important to first understand the characteristics of wind power generation.

The power generated by a turbine is a function of wind speed, and has 4 distinct regions. Light winds will not generate any power at all; the minimum level of wind required to generate electricity is known as the cut-in speed, often around 4 m/s. From there, the wind power increases as a cubic function of wind speed, until the turbine reaches its maximum rated power output. Within this region, the output can change dramatically in response to even small changes in the wind. Once the rated power is reached, usually at 13-14 m/s, the wind speed can continue to increase but output will remain constant. However, if the wind reaches too high of a speed, often at 25 m/s, the turbines must shut down, or “cut off”, to avoid damaging the equipment. The sudden drop-off of power is another potential source of power variability (Laughton, 2007).

Incremental Reserve Requirements. These trends of variability and uncertainty help determine the incremental reserve requirements; in other words, how much more balancing capacity is required to maintain reliability on a grid with wind than one without wind? One common misconception is to assume that all variability and uncertainty associated with wind power must be counter-balanced by a dedicated flexible power plant. This is simply not true. Kirby and Milligan (2008) describe how “the power system does not need respond to the variability of each individual turbine”; instead, the system must “meet the North American Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards and balance aggregate load-net wind with aggregate generation.

Fortunately, wind and load tend to be uncorrelated, so they do not add linearly, greatly reducing the net flexibility required from conventional generation.” Reliability standards are typically proportional to the standard deviation of the differences between actual load and scheduled load, or the load errors. For example, NERC standards require balancing authorities to maintain sufficient reserves such that 10-minute errors can be contained within certain limits 90% of the time in each month (Dragoon, 2010). In other words, the required balancing reserves depend on magnitude of the 90th percentile error, which is directly proportional to the standard deviation for approximately normal distributions. As more wind is added to the grid, the standard deviation of net load errors will increase, requiring more incremental reserves. However, as Kirby and Milligan explain above, the standard deviation of net load error is not simply the sum of the standard deviations of load error and wind error.

With a wind penetration level of 20% scheduled using persistence forecasts, the grid would require 7% of wind capacity to be set aside as operating reserves.

Millborrow (2007) estimates that if wind supplies 10% of electricity, the incremental reserve requirements would equal 3-6% of the wind’s rated capacity; that number grows to 4-8% at 20% penetration levels.

Milligan (2003) estimates that with 17% of energy coming from wind, incremental reserve requirements equal 6-11% of rated wind capacity, depending largely on forecast quality.

Gross et al. (2006) find similar results in a review of several studies, with 5-10% reserve requirements at 20% wind. Most studies find that reliability can be achieved by procuring balancing reserves of approximately three times the standard deviation of net load error (Holttinen et. al, 2008).

Second, the studies confirmed that costs of additional ultra-fast regulation reserves were minimal. This is consistent with the idea that, aggregated across an entire system, very large swings in power output simply do not happen within seconds, or even a few minutes.

Third, many studies find that costs of integration increase non-linearly as a function of wind penetration level. There are several intuitive reasons for this result. First, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, there are increasing marginal quantities of balancing reserves required to deal with increasing levels of wind. At low levels of wind, the variability of net load only increases by a small fraction of the variability in wind alone. At higher levels of wind, the variability of net load increases at an almost 1:1 rate with the variability of wind alone. Second, the marginal costs of providing these balancing reserves also increase as more wind is added to the grid. In well-functioning markets, economic dispatch systems are used to find the most cost effective way to balance wind power. This means that highly flexible units that can easily provide ancillary services are used first, and more expensive balancing services come later. Third, earlier projects are likely to use the geographic areas with the highest wind speeds and capacity factors, which tend to have a more stable energy output. The addition of inferior project sites can cause integration costs to rise.

Many studies find a key point of inflection in wind integration costs to be on the order of 20% penetration.

Millborrow (2007) reviews several more theoretical studies on high wind penetrations, and finds that double-digit integration costs are likely to begin when wind reaches 20-30% of electric generation on a standard system.

Although California has an aggressive RPS, its current and projected mix of renewable projects is relatively well balanced. Forecasts for the year 2020 shown below suggest that wind will only comprise approximately 30% of California’s RPS goals; solar power will comprise another 35%, geothermal another 20%, and the remaining 15% will come from biomass, biogas and small hydro (CPUC). The existence of legacy contracts in geothermal power from the days of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act and excellent solar resources have helped achieve this balance. Generally speaking, geothermal provides baseload power, and solar’s fluctuations are independent of wind. Therefore, it seems that for the time being, wind’s penetration within the entire electric grid will remain below 15%, sparing California from the significantly higher integration costs that seem to begin at around 20%.

California’s on-shore wind resources are clustered in three main areas: Altamont Pass which is east of San Francisco, Tehachapi Pass which is south of Bakersfield, and San Gorgonio Pass outside of Palm Springs; together, these three areas produce over 95% of California’s wind power from over 13,000 turbines (California Energy Commission). Within each area, geographic diversity is limited, as the best resources are tightly clustered. However, the fact that all three areas work under the same ISO is good for costs, because they are far enough apart to achieve low cross-correlations. Another relevant factor to integration costs is overall grid flexibility, which is influenced by the type and cost of other generating units available to provide balancing services.

In 2010, just over 70% of energy was generated inside of California, as opposed to imports; in-state generation is generally used for renewables integration. Of in state generation, over half comes from natural gas, which is a decently flexible resource. Combined-cycle gas turbines that are already on, as well as gas turbines, provide an important source of flexibility for the grid. Approximately 20% of energy comes from “baseload” sources, such as coal, geothermal and nuclear power, which have difficulty with fast cycling. Hydroelectric power, which is physically the most flexible resource when not subject to policy constraints, provides 15% of in-state generation, and the remainder comes from variable renewable sources (CEC 2010).

The physical flexibility of California’s resources is quite good, especially the mix of natural gas and hydroelectric power. This, along with the geographic distance between major wind farms and the fact that wind levels are relatively low, indicates that integration costs have the potential to be comparatively low in California.

California’s Market Design. It is worth understanding the conventions, terminology and market processes used in California’s electric markets to avoid potential confusion. While most modern electric system operators follow the same principles, specific details vary from region to region. Within California, CAISO is responsible for making sure that generation and load are always equal, and it does so in several stages. The first stage is the day-ahead market (DAM), also known as the integrated forward market (IFM), and is the “first cut” at scheduling energy generation to match demand. The process to schedule energy for any given operating day begins with the submissions of energy bids. Generating units submit bid curves for each operating hour, containing several important characteristics. All generators have minimum and maximum physical operating levels; for example, a gas-fired plant may be able to operate between 20 MW and 100 MW. Then, bids may include a portion of capacity that is “self-scheduled”, meaning that the generator is willing to supply that quantity regardless of price. The bid curve then includes minimum prices that the generator is willing to accept for various quantities of energy. Continuing in the example, the gas generator may be willing to supply between 20 and 40 MW at any price, so it would submit a self-schedule bid up to 40 MW. Then, it might offer to provide between 40 MW and 70 MW for a minimum price of $20 / MWh, and up to 100 MW for a minimum price of $30 / MWh. Generators may use up to 10 different price-quantity combinations in their bid curves, and may submit different bids for different operating hours.

Finally, every bid contains operational details, including the cost and time required to startup the plant, information about whether the plant is already online, and how quickly the plant can move (“ramp”) from one power level to another. Bids may come from generators within the CAISO or anyone wishing to import power from a neighboring balancing authority. Simultaneously, generation units may also submit bids to provide ancillary services. Specifically, the ISO explicitly procures four types of ancillary services: regulation up, regulation down, spinning reserves, and non-spinning reserves. (Load-following services are not an explicit ancillary service in CAISO, and will be discussed shortly). Regulation up and down are the capacity to adjust output in response to an automatic signal on a near-instantaneous basis, while spinning and non-spinning reserves are reserves that can provide power within 10 minutes in the event of a system contingency. Generators wishing to participate must include, for each hour, the quantity of each ancillary service they wish to provide, their minimum price for doing so, and operational information about their ramp rates. These generators may submit mutually exclusive bids for energy and ancillary services. Thirdly, in the DAM, load-serving entities submit bids to purchase energy. Similar to supply bids, demand bids can either come as self-schedules (i.e. willing to buy a certain quantity of energy at any price) or as price-quantity curves. These demand bids can be used to serve load within CAISO or to export power to a neighboring balancing authority. Finally, based on these load forecasts, CAISO will determine the desired quantity of ancillary services to meet its reliability obligations. The DAM closes at 10:00 AM on the day before any given operating day. For each operating hour, CAISO uses a co-optimization model to take the energy supply bids, energy demand bids, ancillary service supply bids, ancillary service demand requirements, and any available information such as transmission constraints, and find the least-cost way to dispatch generation units to meet load and ancillary service requirements. Later in the afternoon, the results are published, and generation units can see their schedules for the next day. This DAM process is where the bulk of the work happens: the bulk of energy, non-spinning reserves and spinning reserves are scheduled through the DAM, and all regulation reserves are procured in this time.

The HASP market is where the bulk of wind scheduling comes into play. Currently, California uses a program known as PIRP, the Participating Intermittent Resource Program. Under PIRP, CAISO contracts with an external vendor to create generation forecasts for all wind farms under the program. These forecasts are released 105 minutes prior to the start of each operating hour, and participating generators use that forecast as a self-scheduled supply bid quantity during the HASP. Using the officially sanctioned forecast has economic benefits for wind forecasters that will be discussed later. New bids and adjustments for the HASP market must be submitted by no later than 75 minutes prior to the start of any given operating hour. CAISO re-runs its optimization software, and publishes the results no later than 45 minutes before the start of the operating hour. By this point, the “baseline” hourly energy schedule is fixed, the energy schedules on the interties between CAISO and other balancing authorities are fixed, and the quantities of available ancillary services are fixed. The third and final stage involves real-time operations. This stage uses two tools, real time economic dispatch and regulation reserve, to match generation to the intra-hour variations in load. Real-time economic dispatch (RTED) is how the CAISO provides load-following (LF) services. Suppose that the final hourly energy schedule was 5,000 MW, but load quickly increased to 5,100 MW. In this situation, CAISO would look back at the economic energy supply bids it had received, and award an additional 100 MW to the cheapest available generation, subject to operational and locational constraints. Alternatively, if fell to be 4,900 MW, the CAISO would reduce the most expensive 100 MW of generation that could feasibly make that adjustment. In real-time, CAISO makes these adjustments to its economic dispatch every 5 minutes to provide load-following. The other tool, regulation reserve, is automatically dispatched minutes to provide load-following. The other tool, regulation reserve, is automatically dispatched minute period, CAISO uses its real-time economic dispatch to compensate for the net change that has occurred since the last adjustment. This way, regulation reserves can be “reset” to their base point, so that this ultra-fast capacity will be fully available in the next 5-minute period.

Wind integration costs come in several forms: from energy imbalance met by load following, from increased requirements for regulation reserve, and from less efficient use of conventional plants.

One commonly mentioned solution to the integration challenge is dedicated energy storage technologies. Proponents argue that energy storage devices, such as large battery arrays, can store excess energy when the wind is producing large amounts of power, and discharge that energy to the grid when the wind stops blowing. Popular media often portrays storage technologies as a “silver bullet” solution, and technology vendors are not shy about echoing that idea. For example, A123 Systems, a manufacturer of lithium ion batteries, published a white paper that showcases how the company’s technology can manage fluctuations in renewable energy, help reduce CO2 emissions, and promote grid reliability (Vartanian).

Despite the appeal of energy storage, the economics simply do not add up for its use in renewables integration. Rittershausen and McDonagh (2010) examine the use of energy storage for intermittent energy smoothing and shaping, an application that could potentially reduce load following requirements, and find that costs exceed benefits by two orders of magnitude. Other potential uses of energy storage, such as providing ancillary services or shifting load from off-peak to on-peak are (1) also not cost effective, and (2) are not linked to renewables integration nearly as directly as industry insiders would argue. However, there are other ways to induce a negative correlation between changes in load and wind generation, apart from dedicated energy storage devices. Demand-side management (DSM) uses devices that are already deployed on the grid, and as a result, can achieve many of the same benefits of storage at considerably lower cost.

Giant energy storage projects are not cost-effective, and CAISO can not simply “spread out” wind generators.

The inherent flexibility of generating resources is largely fixed, and policymakers have only limited control over the mix of renewable technologies.

 

CEC. 2008. Transmission technology research for renewable integration. Calilfornia Inst. for Energy & Env for California Energy Commission. CEC-500-2014-059. 123 pages.

From a transmission operational dynamics perspective, geothermal and biomass energy are similar to traditional power generators, especially base-load, and therefore do not pose much concern about their operational behavior within the power grid, though some biomass resources vary seasonally.

Some types of renewable generation, however, are “fueled” by variable, or intermittent, energy sources like wind and sunshine, i.e., insolation, which are controlled by weather and rotation of the earth. These intermittent renewables can create renewable energy power plant behaviors for which the grid was not designed and that are quite unfamiliar to grid operators and outside their control. To achieve a 20% renewable energy content will require a projected renewable nameplate capacity of over 14,000 MW with more than 60% of that capacity coming from the intermittent renewable forms of wind and solar. To achieve 33% would require 26,000 MW of renewable nameplate capacity.

Relatively small penetrations of intermittent renewables are expected to have “operational implications significant but manageable” (“California Independent System Operator Integration of Renewable Resources,” David Hawkins & Clyde Loutan, Cal ISO, November 2007). For greater penetration levels, however, transmission infrastructure expansion, improved wind and solar forecasting, increased ancillary services for the grid, and new technologies for a smarter grid will likely be required. Energy storage might also be deployed to mitigate some of the effects of intermittency.

The overall situation is complicated by the current and projected status of the grid over the next few years, even without considering the addition of renewables. Much equipment is aging and planned to be retired during the next 10 years. Prospective once-through cooling regulations may accelerate this trend. Operating margins have been steadily shrinking as transmission investment has not kept pace with increases in demand. Dynamic operating constraints have emerged which prevent major transmission lines from operating at the levels for which they were designed. Increasing levels of imported power have led to a substantially larger, more interconnected regional grid than envisioned when much of the infrastructure was planned.

Excess Total Generation – To achieve the increasing percentages of renewables, a rapid addition of renewable power plants will be required. The needed rate of addition is considerably higher than the growth of demand and is projected to be higher than the sum of demand growth and the retirement of existing equipment. In other words, the addition of the renewable plants may force the retirement or lowered use of some existing thermal plants, even though they are still viable. Cal ISO forecasts 13% less non-renewable generation in 2020 than in 2008.

Congestion Costs – Once connected to the grid, remotely located resources must be brought into major load centers. Lines which currently have adequate capacity are likely to experience increased periods of congestion.

Stability – Over wide areas, the grid can exhibit unstable behavior if power flows exceed dynamic limits. If not controlled, this can trigger large scale outages. This dynamic grid stability, even without the addition of renewable resources, is a critical issue. To maintain reliability, potential instabilities must be sensed and responded to quickly. While transmission lines have a designed power handling capacity based on thermal limits, instabilities frequently limit maximum transmitted power to levels significantly less. In particular, this limits both the amount of power which can be imported from out of state and amounts which can be transferred from one part of the state to another. The addition of significant remote generating facilities, much of it with low inertia, may have undesirable effects.

Local Area Limitations – Within the state, it appears that much of the new renewable energy will be generated in remote areas, while most of the consumption will be concentrated in the population centers such as the Los Angeles Basin. Five load centers comprise 87% of the total load in California. Power flow transmitted into these areas is channeled through key substations called gateways. Many of these gateways are already operating at their limits, which is typically in the range of 50% of the locally consumed power. If the gateways to an area are limited to 50% of the consumed power, then the balance of the power must be generated within the local area. As a result, even if there is abundant renewable power generated within the state and connected to the transmission system, many existing parts of the system will need significant increases in capacity.

Limited Bulk Storage – Existing large storage facilities, which could act to shift loads from day to night, are extremely limited and may be constrained by transmission limits. The Helms Pumping Facility, one of the largest in the state, with a maximum pumping capability of 900 MW from 3 pumps, operated at this level less than 250 hours in 2005, primarily due to transmission constraints. New pumping facilities require 10 – 12 years to implement.

Intermittent power sources generally complicate the problem of managing  the grid.

Extreme Events can be described as system disturbances characterized by multiple failures of transmission system components, resulting in widespread system collapse through cascading outages. Such large-scale events have always been difficult to analyze, plan for, and manage, but the potential severity of such events has grown with the interconnectedness of the grid, and is likely to grow more with the increasing integration of intermittent renewables in the system. Operators in adjoining systems generally don’t have good visibility of each other’s systems, hindering both the detection of impending or initiating extreme events, and effective countermeasures once an operator becomes aware an extreme event is propagating. Existing tools for operators have not been adequate to respond to these events. Currently there is significant effort focused on real-time system awareness and online analytical tools utilizing phasor measurements; additional areas of potentially beneficial research include advanced planning to better identify critical transmission paths, adaptive protection systems, and strategies for automated islanding of the grid.

Because most new renewable power plants will be located in areas rich in renewable resources but remote from California electricity customers, electric transmission will be crucial for transporting the renewable electricity to load centers, and thus for meeting the state’s renewable energy goals. Consequently, each new renewable power plant must be successfully integrated with the transmission system. To fulfill this mission, transmission must achieve three broad objectives:

  1. provide physical access for each new power plant,
  2. reliably accommodate any unique renewable generator behaviors, and
  3. increase its power carrying capacity to handle the additional electric power flows.

It is reasonable to assume that modest penetrations of renewable generation, perhaps up to 20%, can be successfully integrated into the grid by traditional system investments, such as building new lines and conventional generation for increased capacity and to maintain reliability. However, as the penetration of renewables grows, to perhaps 33% and beyond, and more transmission infrastructure is added to the system, its complexity will grow along with operational difficulties. It also will likely become increasingly difficult to meet the environmental and economic criteria for siting new infrastructure in a timely manner, further reducing the effectiveness of the “build” approach.

As an alternative, new technologies can be deployed in the transmission system to endow it with expanded or new capabilities that, at a minimum, will make renewable integration easier and less costly, and ultimately at some higher renewable penetration level, will probably be required to achieve California’s renewable energy goals. Some transmission stakeholders have expressed the opinion that we are already at the level of renewable penetration in California where new technologies will be required.

For most new renewable power plants, access to the transmission system can be directly translated into acquiring new right of way (ROW), and building new transmission lines between the power plant and an interconnect point on the transmission grid. The siting process for new transmission project is highly complex and difficult, involves many different stakeholders, and takes many years, typically 10 to 12 years for a major line.

While there are a number of state and national policy changes being pursued to shorten this time, concern remains that it will take longer to build the new transmission extension to a renewable power plant than it will to build the power plant. Two major impediments to timely new ROW approvals are cost/benefit allocation economic debates, and siting challenges, exemplified by, “not in my backyard.”

From a transmission operational dynamics perspective, some renewable energy plants such as geothermal, biomass and perhaps solar thermal with enough thermal storage will benignly operate similar to traditional baseload thermal power generators. Wind and some solar renewable generation, however, are intermittent, and exhibit power plant behaviors unfamiliar to grid operators, and for which the grid was not designed.  time

The Energy Commission Intermittency Analysis Project has projected that meeting the 33% goal by 2020 will result in power production capacity in excess of total demand requirements. Existing conventional plants would need to be closed or operated at lower capacity factors, potentially reducing the availability of system support generation. This situation might be compounded if coastal thermal plants using once through cooling must be shutdown.

Finally, to stimulate the private development of renewable power plants, utility contracts generally include the guaranteed acceptance of power generated.

Any transmission line has physical limits on the amount of power that can be transmitted Which limit is the dominant factor constraining the capacity of a given line at a given time depends on the conditions of that particular line and the broader wide-area transmission grid.

Thermal Limits: The maximum power a particular line can ever handle is its thermal limit. The primary source of heat comes from the interaction between the electrical resistance of the line material and the electric current flowing through it. Above this limit, a line may excessively sag, creating a safety hazard or an outage, or be physically damaged by excessive temperature.

Stability Limits: Poor voltage support, and dynamic and transient instabilities can result in even substantially lower capacity limits below the thermal limits in some situations. It is not unusual for a major interconnection path to be operationally limited by instabilities to half its rated static thermal limit. This effect imposes severe limits on the amount of renewable power which can be imported into California, and into major load centers within the state.

The most common way of transporting bulk electric energy is by means of overhead AC transmission lines, which are typically constructed of stranded, bare aluminum or aluminum/steel cables, suspended by insulators from steel lattice towers or wood poles. At some point, the loading limit is reached, and some method must be used to increase the line’s capacity. One way, of course, is to build another line, either as a parallel line or higher capacity replacement in the same corridor, or in a suitable alternate route. Assuming that the existing corridor is the only feasible one and has no additional space, there are a number of technological approaches available for increasing the power carrying capacity within the constraints of the existing ROW.

4.2.2 New Capabilities Addressed

Access Siting Capability #1: To facilitate environmental and societal deliberations, and enhance acceptability of new transmission lines. The addition of substantial amounts of new renewable generation to the electric system will require that new transmission lines be built between the renewables plants to the existing transmission grid, and also likely require significantly increased power-carrying capacity from the transmission gateways to the loads. These overhead transmission technologies can provide the additional needed capacity with reduced visual and environmental impacts compared to conventional overhead lines, potentially simplifying and easing the permitting process.

Reconductoring involves replacing the stranded conductors in the line with new ones of larger diameter. This is the most common upgrading method, with minimal visual impacts due to the new appearance of the line. Since current-carrying capacity (and by corollary, power transfer capacity) of a conductor is proportional to the cross-sectional area, a conductor of 50% larger diameter can have up to 2.25 times the capacity. This increase in conductor size is not difficult to accommodate; if the tower crossarms do not need strengthening, the only modifications needed are replacement of suspension clamps attach the conductor to the insulator string. Even if towers and crossarms need strengthening, the additional costs will still be reasonable, and visual changes to the line will not be significant. The only other issues are possible upgrades to terminal equipment, such as transformers, relays, switches, etc., to handle the additional current; and stability studies to assess the need for greater remedial action for contingencies at the higher current level. In general, this is a mature and cost-effective technology, and is the first and best option for utilities when additional capacity is needed.

Bundling simply means using two or more conductors per phase. Adding a second conductor identical to the first (the usual practice) doubles the current, which doubles the power transfer. Like reconductoring, this is a mature and cost- effective technology that is one of the first alternatives considered by transmission planners, usually involving simple retrofits of suspension clamps, possible replacement of insulators, and possible upgrades to towers and crossarms. Visual impacts are slightly higher than for reconductoring, which may be an issue in the permitting process.

When it is not feasible to increase the current in a transmission line corridor by reconductoring or bundling conductors, the line can be converted to the next voltage level, e.g., from 115 kV to 230 kV. The increase in power is proportional to the increase in voltage, in this case, by a factor of 2. If the existing conductors are used, the only changes to the line itself are new insulators and possibly some strengthening of the towers and crossarms, so the visual impacts are minimal. However, the terminal equipment, including transformers, circuit breakers, relays switches, etc., must be upgraded, and the costs for this will be significant. This is also a mature technology, the cost parameters of which are well known and included in the transmission planning analysis process.

4.2.4 Gaps Reconductoring, Bundling and Voltage Uprating

These are all mature technologies, well-known to the utility industry, cost-effective, and widely used. Barriers to wider use include issues of cost, cost recovery, and visual and environmental impacts that lead to intervention in the permitting process by various stakeholders.

Conventional underground transmission lines are constructed with copper wires (conductors) encased in an insulating material such as oil-impregnated paper, inside a pipe-type enclosure (conduit), and buried in a trench under special backfill material to dissipate the heat generated in the cables. The inside of the conduit is filled with an insulating oil similar to that used in transformers, or an insulating gas such as SF6, to provide high dielectric strength (insulating ability between the copper conductors and the conduit, which is at ground potential. Newer types use polyethylene sheathing as the dielectric material, and do not use oil or gas insulating media. The public generally views underground lines as having far fewer negative impacts than overhead lines, although there are still several difficult issues to address:

  1. Construction costs for an underground line can be up to 10 times the cost of an overhead line of the same capacity, and construction can take much longer.
  2. Underground lines are impractical in mountainous areas, where drilling through rock is required.
  3. The biggest environmental impact will be ground disturbance to in the immediate vicinity of the trench during construction, which can be significantly disruptive, albeit temporary.   Access to underground lines is more difficult when maintenance is required, which can lengthen outage times.
  4. Underground lines are more susceptible to damage from construction activities, because they are not visible to crews operating equipment.
  5. Joints in the conduit can leak, spilling oil into the surrounding soil, or releasing the insulating gas (SF6 is about 15,000 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than CO2).
  6. Lengths are limited to about 40 miles between substations, because of the high capacitive reactance of transmission cables.
  7. The main barrier to wider use of underground cables is cost: not just the cost of the cables themselves, but also the costs of constructing the trench for the cable. HDPE technology is helping to make the cable cost itself more reasonable over time, but more economical methods for installing the cable are needed.
  8. The environmental effects of current construction and trenching methods are also significant.

4.4 High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) Transmission Technologies

4.4.1 Technology Overview

High-Voltage DC (Conventional) HVDC transmission lines, as they have been typically developed and implemented to date, consist of AC-to-DC converters on the sending end, DC-to-AC converters on the receiving end, and an overhead transmission line or an underground cable system as the transmission path. The converters, which can be considered solid-state transformers, rely on high-voltage, high-power thyristors (semiconductors that are triggered by the AC voltage). Since only two phases are needed for DC, vs. 3 phases for AC, the transmission line, insulators and towers can be more compact and less expensive than AC lines, and less space is needed (and less land needs to be acquired) for the ROW. However, the converter terminals for HVDC are very expensive, being based on high-voltage solid-state electronics and requiring large amounts of AC capacitors at both ends to provide reactive support; thus, intermediate substations for stepping down the voltage add significantly to the cost of HVDC transmission systems. HVDC has traditionally been used when large blocks of power need to be transmitted long distances, and has been used at voltages up to 800 kVDC and several thousand MW of power capability. Historically, the breakeven point for AC-vs.-DC overhead lines has been around 400 miles: HVDC is more economic for transmission distances longer than that (where its lower line costs predominate), and AC is more economic for distances shorter than that (where its lower terminal costs predominate). Underground HVDC cables have an additional advantage over AC cables in that they do not have the problem of AC capacitance; therefore their length is not limited to the 40 miles or so that AC cables are.

The standard HVDC technology as it has been used to date, e.g., in the Pacific HVDC Intertie, the Intermountain Power Project, and many others, is a mature technology that has been continually refined over the last 50+ years, with virtually no research gaps. It is cos- effective for long-distance bulk power transmission when intermediate substations to serve loads along the transmission route are not needed. However, it is likely to be considered too expensive for new line construction for the anticipated power levels of integrating renewables. Conversion of AC lines to DC lines is fairly straightforward, and most utilities are familiar with the technical and cost issues, as well as when it might be considered a feasible alternative. I t has not been done much in the US, for the simple reason that additional ROW and upgraded AC lines have almost always been the feasible alternatives and cheaper than conversion to DC. Now that corridors are getting maxed out, this may be a feasible, albeit more costly, alternative to re-building AC lines or building new ones.

The external barriers to wider use of HVDC technologies are greater than the engineering or technical challenges. Research activities focused purely on technical issues with HVDC technologies are unlikely to make a significant difference in terms of implementing HVDC. The principal stumbling block will continue to be the perceived additional cost per MW of capacity compared to the traditional “least-cost” alternative of overhead AC.

Storage has taken on added importance with the increase of renewables plants, given that the intermittency and variability of renewables increases the complexity of the system operator’s job.

Storage systems have several basic characteristics that can vary depending upon the technology and the desired application: o Power capability: how many kW or MW the storage plant can discharge. This is usually a direct function of the electrical generating mechanism, be it a rotating machine or a solid-state electronics interface.

  • Bulk energy: how many kWh or MWh of energy can be stored.
  • Charge time: the number of hours or minutes required to fully charge the system.
  • Discharge time: the number of hours or minutes the system can supply its rated kW or MW output.
  • Efficiency: the ratio of energy discharged to the energy required for charging. Also called “round-trip” efficiency. Most storage systems fall into the 60-75 percent range.
  • Capital cost: the total cost to build a storage plant; it is usually given in terms of the power capability and bulk energy components.
  • Maintenance costs: consist of both $/kW and $/kWh components.

The use of storage to provide high quality and highly reliable electric service for one or more adjacent facilities. In case of an intermittent or extended grid outage, the storage system provides enough energy for some combination of the following: an orderly shutdown of customer processes, transfer of customer loads to on-site generation resources, or high-quality power needed for sensitive loads.

Pumped hydro is very site‐dependent, and most of the best sites are already developed; therefore, it can’t always be located where it’s needed in the transmission system. 

Batteries : The energy density of chemically-based battery systems is not as high as desired, requiring a fairly large footprint for even modestly sized battery systems for utility applications. Costs in both per-kW and per-kWh terms are relatively high. There are significant maintenance requirements including periodic replacement of internal components, safety issues with the chemicals involved, and life expectancy.

The AC electric power system, by its nature, does not have a high degree of controllability, in terms of system operators being able to designate which transmission paths the power flows on. The electric system is a giant interconnected network of generating sources, loads (customers) and the transmission and distribution lines that provide the connections among them all. To a great extent, the power flows on the system are determined by the customer loads and the generators that are on the system at any given time; the power then flows over the transmission and distribution lines as determined by the impedance of the lines and paths and Kirchhoff’s laws.

Because of the numerous parallel paths that power can flow on, the contract path for power, defined as the line or path over which the contracted power from a generator to a load is meant to flow, is not necessarily the only path over which that power will flow. For example, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) can contract with Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) to send 3,000 MW of power over the 500 kV Pacific Intertie, but in reality about 20% of that power can flow through parallel paths on the eastern side of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) system. This phenomenon, called loop flow or inadvertent flow, frustrates the efficient exchange of power within transmission grids and between utilities, and can result in diseconomies.

For controlling real power, system operators have just a few tools at their disposal. They can adjust the output of generators under their direct control; however, in today’s power markets, this control is diminishing. When lines or paths reach their thermal or stability limits, congestion occurs, and generators are forced to adjust their outputs to relieve the line overloads, with congestion payments both to generators who must curtail and to reliability-must-run generators who must generate in their place. Series capacitors in the transmission lines can be switched in or out to reduce or increase, respectively, the impedance of a line or path, increasing or decreasing the power flowing in that path; this is typically not a real-time control option, as most series capacitors are manually switched, usually on a seasonal basis. Devices called phase-shifting transformers are sometimes used to increase the apparent impedance of a line or path, the objective being to shift power flow from a specific line or transmission path to adjacent circuits or paths. The only other options for controlling real power are to change the configuration of the lines in the system, i.e., switch lines in or out, or to change the bus connection arrangements in the substations; neither of these are generally desirable options, and cannot be done feasibly on a real-time basis.

HVDC transmission lines (see section 4.4 on HVDC Transmission Technologies), in contrast to AC lines, have the ability to control their power flow due to the power electronics in the converter stations at the terminals of the lines. There are currently only a few HVDC lines in the Western grid, whose purpose in mainly to transmit large blocks of inexpensive but remote generation to load centers in Southern California.

Asynchronous HVDC links, also called back- to-back HVDC links, are sometimes used to provide control and isolation between utility control areas: the power transfer between the areas can be precisely controlled, and the system frequencies of the adjoining systems do not have to be in synchronism with each other, and system disturbances do not propagate through the links as they would through AC lines.

Reactive power is much more controllable than real power. Generating plants have the capability to adjust their volt-amps reactive (VAR) outputs automatically to match the reactive demands of the system. Shunt capacitors and inductors can be installed at any substation, and are switched in and out as needed (not always in real time) to control the voltage profile of the system and adjust to the reactive power demands of the loads on a local as well as system level. Series capacitors also help to control voltage levels by reducing the reactive impedance of transmission lines. Devices called synchronous condensers can provide a measure of dynamic voltage control. Synchronous condensers are rotating synchronous generators without prime movers, and appear as reactive power devices only; by adjusting their excitation systems (voltage to the stator coil) they can either produce or consume VARs. Transmission transformers, for the most part, do not have tap changers and can’t control voltage. Distribution transformers (transmission voltage to distribution voltage) can have some measure of voltage control to adjust to the demands of the loads on the distribution side. Other control methods are used in the context of remedial action schemes to control system stability: generator dropping, load dropping, fast reactor insertion, series capacitor switching, and braking resistors, to name the major ones.

While technologies can be used to bring new or enhanced capabilities to the transmission infrastructure for meeting the three major objectives via new hardware measures, technologies can also bring new capabilities for operating the infrastructure in a reliable, economic and integrated fashion. Indeed, given the additional operating uncertainties that renewable generation will likely add, the new operating capabilities will be a necessity, especially those for real time and wide- area systems operations. This class of technology generally consists of sensors for detection and measuring of system conditions; communication systems; data management; analysis for monitoring, diagnosis, prediction and decision support; visualization for human interface; and instructions for automation. Much of this technology platform is enabled by an emerging sensing technology known as synchrophasors, or, more commonly, phasors.

In addition to enhancing grid reliability and avoiding major blackout conditions, the KEMA study identified Disturbance Detection, Diagnosis and Compliance Monitoring as a phasor application that offers the potential to significantly reduce the capacity derating of key transmission pathways that are critically important for 33 percent and greater renewables integration. This would seek to analyze PMU data from various locations within the regional power grid to detect, diagnose and mitigate low frequency oscillations and, through improved operating tools, free up significant underutilized transmission capacity for importing renewable power into the state and into major urban areas.

With the addition of 4,500 Megawatts of new wind generation in Tehachapi in the 2010 timeframe, Cal ISO and other grid operators are likely to experience periods where electricity production from these wind plants will rapidly decline while simultaneously the load is rapidly increasing. Energy ramps as high as 3,000 MW per hour or larger may occur between 7 AM and 10 AM in the morning in the 2010 and larger ramps over the longer term, as progress is made in pursuing the 33% and 50% renewables goals. Fast ramping generation, such as hydro units, will be essential for the Cal ISO to keep up with the fast energy changes.

There will be other periods, particularly in the winter months, where large pacific storms will impact the wind parks and their energy production will rapidly ramp up to full output.   The Cal ISO Renewable Integration study recommends the development of a new ramp- forecasting tool to help system operators anticipate large energy ramps, both up and down, on the system. The longer the lead-time for forecasting a large ramp, the more options the operators have to mitigate the impact of the ramp.   The Cal ISO report also identifies the need for research to analyze the impact of large central station solar power intermittency in producing large energy ramps, within the context of anticipated wind energy ramps as well as load variations and distributed customer-side-of the-meter solar photovoltaic (PV), small wind turbines and other distributed energy resources.

There exists today a wealth of methods for short-term prediction of wind generation. An excellent summary of the state-of-the-art in wind power forecasting, available at the following website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power_forecasting,

Future PHEVs are anticipated to have expanded battery power for extended electric-only operation, and presumably they will largely recharge overnight when minimum loads traditionally occur. This situation creates a potentially synergistic relationship between wind and PHEVs, i.e., coordinating PHEV electric demand with wind generation in a “smart” infrastructure can mitigate impacts to the grid. In the simplest instance, PHEV load could be switched off to counter drops in wind generation (similar to demand response), and switched on as wind generation increases.

Typical protection systems utilize digital relays individually or in combination to protect valuable assets, such as transmission lines or generators. Advanced relays incorporate PMU technology directly into the relay. Transmission lines may incorporate redundant primary relays and back up relays in complex relays designed to insure reliable action. Operation of these systems is programmed based on the expectation of a relatively normal operating configuration.

However, under abnormal conditions, such as can occur during a fault, the relay system may operate, or fail to operate, in a manner which was not intended.   During major cascading blackouts, protective relays have either been implicated in increasing the severity of the blackout or of failing to slow or stop the spread. In the August 14, 2003 blackout on the East Coast and the July 2 and August 10 1996 blackouts in the West, zone 3 impedance relays played a major contributing role as well as many transmission and generation protective relays.

In each of these blackouts, due to an unusual and unanticipated set of circumstances, the EHV transmission grid became configured in highly abnormal operational states that were not anticipated or studied by protection and system operating engineers. These protection systems are almost exclusively local in nature. Wider area protection systems – Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) or Special Protection Schemes (SPS) have been created to provide a variety of system protection actions. As these systems grow in scope and complexity, there is the increasing possibility of unintended consequences. The term “intelligent protection systems” is not precisely defined and can be used to mean any of a variety of related concepts. For this report, the term is used to primarily describe protection systems which use phasor data and are adaptive, i.e. which can monitor conditions in real time, and “intelligently” adapt their operation to reflect actual conditions on the power grid. Ultimately, intelligent wide area protection systems can be seen as “protecting” the system by controlling its operation in such a manner as to prevent faults or instabilities from becoming large scale outages.

Major outages such as described here are sometimes referred to as “Extreme Events,” because of the multiple contingencies that occur, and because they are beyond the ability of planning and operations engineers to foresee, and in many cases, to mitigate once they start. There is research currently underway to develop new methodologies for analyzing extreme events and test the methodologies; first in simple network systems, and next in larger, more complex and realistic network systems, modeling the California grid and its western interconnections.

New Accommodation Dynamic Behavior Capability #3: To operate the grid in response to renewable power plant dynamic behaviors. The increasing penetration of renewables with different types of dynamic behavior increases the risk of serious consequences in response to a transient event. Intelligent protection systems offer the possibility of improved mitigation of the consequences of a fault and reduced likelihood of a fault triggering a cascading blackout.

Traditional utility electric power systems were designed to support a one-way power flow from the point of generation through a transmission system to distribution level loads. These system s were not originally intended to accommodate the back-feed of power from distributed solar photovoltaic, small- scale wind turbines and other distributed energy systems at the distribution level.

Current interconnection requirements for residential net-metered PV systems in California require that the system include a UL 1741 certified inverter (meaning that it has been tested to meet the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers IEEE 929- 2000, recommended practice for safe utility interface of generating systems) that will disconnect from the utility distribution if the voltage decreases or frequency deviation. Disconnect switches must meet the National Electrical Code’s Article 690 on solar photovoltaic systems published by the National Fire Protection Association. When the utility is able to restore electric service on the distribution circuit, the customer is normally responsible for realizing that the distributed energy system has been disconnected from the grid and taking action to restore normal operation.

The IEEE standards for the inverter, along with system design components such as a lockable disconnect switch, are necessary to prevent “Islanding.”

Islanding refers to a situation where the grid power is down and a customer’s generator is still on, creating the potential for power to feed back into the grid. This would cause an unsafe situation for linesmen working on an otherwise non-electrified portion of the power grid. Owners of grid-tied systems should know that their system’s anti-islanding design also prevents them from having power on-site when the grid goes down.

Grid operators are concerned that manual restoration of power production by distributed renewable energy systems may not be workable approach when a significant amount of the customer end-use electricity load is supplied by these distributed systems.

Based on discussions with grid operators and transmission owners there appear to be two interrelated needs:

  1. There is a need for customer-side-of-the-meter interconnection equipment that will permit the automatic restoration of the operation of distributed energy systems if the voltage, frequency and other operating characteristics of the electricity distribution system are within normal operating ranges.
  2. There is a need for reliable information about the operating status of these distributed energy systems to be readily available to grid operators and utilities, within the overall context of customer loads that will be connected when service is restored. These information needs are one of the important evolutionary features of the smart grid.

The current status of this research is available at the following website: http://www.energy.ca.gov/research/integration/demand.html

Load Management Standards Proceeding; more information is available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/load_management/index.html.

DOE is also actively involved in planning and funding research on smart power grid; more information is available at the following DOE website: http://www.oe.energy.gov/smartgrid.htm.

Grid planning and operating decisions rely on simulations of dynamic behavior of the power system. Both technical and commercial segments of the industry must be confident that the simulation models and database are accurate and up to date. If the transfer limits are set using overly optimistic models, a grid operator may unknowingly operate the system beyond its capability, thereby increasing the risk of widespread outages, such as occurred during summer 1996 outages. If the models are pessimistic, a grid operator may be overly conservative and impose unnecessary restrictions on the transfer paths, thereby increasing the risk of power shortages in energy deficient regions. Therefore, having realistic models is very important to ensure reliable and economic power system operation. Because accurate end-use load models and renewable generation models are likely to have a significant impact on the capacity derating of major transmission paths carrying renewable energy into and within California, it is vitally important that these models accurate current conditions as well as future changes over the 2009 to 2030 time frames addressed by the 20 percent, 30 percent and 50 percent renewables goals.

Uncertainty is a persistent theme underlying virtually every aspect of the transmission planning and grid operations. Traditional power system analysis tools do not directly assess the many, inescapable uncertainties that are inherent in all models and in all data they on which they rely. Responsible users of these tools cannot ignore these uncertainties because they routinely have a major influence on the results.   Common

uncertainties in power system analyses used in transmission planning might include estimates of load growth in time, by region and by end-use composition, potential location and generating capacity of wind, solar, other renewable and central station power generation facilities, retirements or upgrades of existing generating facilities, and likelihood that transmission facilities and substations will be approved and constructed in the future. Common uncertainties in analyzing grid operations might include weather impacts on load and renewable generation output, operational status of various transmission pathways, operational status of power generation facilities, possibilities of unplanned outages of generation and transmission equipment, and real-time actions of market players to maximize revenues or reduce costs in generation or utilization of power. This uncertainty has been compounded by the disaggregation of the vertical structured utility, deregulated power markets, and the increased size of the grid interconnections crossing state and national boundaries.

6.2.2 Uncertainty Analysis and Probabilistic Forecasting Tools

Access of Renewable Resources to the Transmission Grid

Meeting 20 percent, 30 percent and 50 percent renewables goals will require a substantial amount of new transmission development, as most large-scale renewable resources are located in remote areas rather than near the state’s major load centers. Energy Commission IAP study concluded that, for the 2010 Tehachapi case, 74 new or upgraded transmission line segments are needed at a first order estimated cost of $1.2 billion plus $161 million for transformer upgrades and unknown costs for land use and right-of-way costs. The 2020 case would require 128 new or upgraded transmission line segments, with just over half (66) needed to serve increasing load requirements. For just the 500 kV and 230 kV additions, a first order estimated cost would be $5.7 billion. In addition, 40 new or improved transformers would be needed at an estimated cost of $655 million (excluding detailed land use and right-of-way costs).

Wind generation output varies significantly during the course of any given day and there is no predictable day-to-day generation pattern.

Daily patterns of wind power which exhibit a high degree of variability and uncertainty will likely cause more serious congestions with greater uncertainty.

The following summarizes one near-term operating scenario of interest to Cal ISO that might be the focus of research on pattern recognition methods applied to real-time grid operations. The Tehachapi Area is expected to have one of the largest installations of wind generation in the State of California. Over 5,600 MW of wind generation consisting of both traditional induction generators as well as the latest modern doubly fed induction generators with power electronics controls are planned for the Tehachapi Area. In addition, the Tehachapi has one of the largest water pumping operations in the world. Through pumping, water is elevated 3,000 feet to over the Tehachapi Mountains to serve the greater Los Angeles Area. The combination of large amounts of wind generation and large pumping operation at the Tehachapi Area is expected to severely tax the power grid in the Southern California area and is therefore selected for analysis in this research. A new 500 kV transmission system is planned for the Tehachapi Area. Through this research, it can be validated how this new transmission facility enhances the statistical distribution of the power grid parameters in the Tehachapi Area.

DOE. September 30, 2014. Summary of Discussion U.S. Department of Energy Workshop on Estimating the Benefits and Costs of Distributed Energy Technologies. Department of Energy.

DOE did a study on 30% penetration of wind that showed $143 billion of additional transmission would be needed to meet the additional wind.

PV generation is relatively predictable but it is not necessarily coincidental with peak usage.

For avoided transmission investment, we need to determine the relative coincidence of distributed PV production with peaks on the transmission system.

The way to look at capacity is through the reliability lens. Once you get high penetration, reliability starts to decline. The system in Hawaii has become less robust against big transient events, so the utility now has to spend millions to enable the grid to respond to transient events as it did before. Adding flexible generation also adds capacity cost. When penetration levels get significant, huge ramp events can occur for which the system was never designed

Enabling high penetration of DETs will increase the cost of the distribution infrastructure.

Germany paid 56 cents per kilowatt-hour to incentivize rooftop installation, and they face a price tag of a trillion dollars.

There are costs for wear on assets used in ways for which they were not designed

Grid operators have addressed ramping through the same mundane approach for decades, but with penetration of RE, the cost of dealing with ramping increases.

With increased penetration of variable generation, frequency regulation becomes more of a challenge at the bulk system level. Primary and secondary costs are straightforward. States are having individual issues. Most reliability activities are trans-state, and two interconnections have seen increased de gradation at the bulk system level. Some of that is from losing inertia. Frequency regulation at the bulk system level is not a resolved issue and will get more complex.

Distribution system impacts are more discrete, which is both good and bad. Extremely granular data are required–an overwhelming level. With “dumb” inverters, there is a risk of voltage violations and losses of 10% to 30%. We can avoid overloaded feeders. Avoided capacity also has a potential impact on extension of service life for system equipment.

Even at low penetration rates, DER can cause reliability issues. Mr. Fine showed a chart with possible effects at 10% penetration levels.

The current business development model for customer solar PV in Hawaii is not sustainable due to economic, policy and grid-related technical challenges associated with high solar penetration levels. Customers must recognize that the recent rapid pace of customer solar PV interconnections is not sustainable when grid infrastructure mitigations need to be developed and deployed.

Commissioner Champley discussed lessons learned from the experiences of Hawaii’s utilities. The state has had high growth of residential and other solar photovoltaic (PV) over the last five years and is poised for a major thrust in the development of utility-scale PV. As a result, the state faces a number of significant economic, policy, and grid-related technical challenges. Electrically speaking, Hawaii is a collection of island electric grids. There is no interconnection between islands; each island has effectively become a laboratory for renewable resource integration. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and NERC have no jurisdiction, so the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission can establish its own rules, within state statutes.

Annual renewable energy output in 2013 ranged from 12% on Oahu the main population center) to 48% on the main island (Hawaii) and renewable energy growth continues. The state leads the nation in penetration of rooftop PV and, as a result, is at the forefront of the integration challenges associated with high distributed PV penetration levels. By 2017, two islands will have over 75% of day-time system load supplied by distributed and utility-scale solar. Solar has seen exponential growth, but the growth has been slowing down in 2014. Hawaii is approaching 50,000 solar customers; over 10% of total residential customers have solar PV. Installed customer solar PV capacity represents roughly 23% of annual system peak load. Average residential customer electricity usage has dropped by about 30% over last ten years due to customer energy efficiency, conservation and distributed generation (but the grid investment did not shrink 30% and in fact, increased during this time). On Kauai Island, solar generation is approaching 50 megawatts (MW), while oil will soon be down to around 10 MW. However, solar resources energy output contributed only 18% of the daily energy used due to limited hours of full solar energy output. Regarding solar penetration at the distribution level, approximately 50% of all distribution circuits for the Hawaiian Electric Companies have greater than 75% solar PV penetration

Exponential growth in renewables was market-driven, but if the consequences are not anticipated and appropriately addressed proactively, such growth will lead to unintended results. Developing renewables makes sense in Hawaii due to its current dependency on oil for electric generation, but with state tax and rate incentives and no penetration level check points, the growth outpaced the utility’s ability to manage interconnection queue and grid integration issues. As a result, the residential PV industry in Hawaii faces a boom-bust cycle. Commissioner Champley noted that there are now emerging substantial integration challenges uniquely associated with incremental additions of utility-scale and distributed solar PV, and that the integration costs of solar may exceed those of other forms of renewables, due to less solar energy output to spread integration fixed costs and due to PV ’s inherent low capacity factor. Other technical issues include:

  • Many issues have arisen that were not initially evident at lower penetration levels.
  • The size of a customer’s PV grid “footprint” matters when excess solar energy is exported.
  • Bulk power system reliability challenges, not distribution circuit issues, have become binding constraints on the island grids.
  • PV inverters are a crucial part of the distributed solar PV integration equation.
  • Inability to curtail customer solar PV output leads to curtailment of utility-scale renewable projects, to the economic detriment of customers without solar PV.
  • Legacy customer and technology issues are an emerging concern.

Most studies indicate that above 10% energy penetration of distributed PV, the capacity credit and capacity value of additional distributed PV is very low.

 

CEC. April 2012. Summary of recent wind integration studies. Experience from 2007-2010. California Wind Enegy Collaborative for California Energy Commission. CEC-500-2013-124.

Transmission studies are often neglected or extremely simplified for current wind integration studies. Detailed transmission studies are necessary for before each additional wind plant is installed. Transmission elements must be designed specifically for wind generation to ensure reliability. This would entail an AC transmission analysis as opposed to the DC analysis which is common to most integration studies. The AC analysis would likely focus on the possible electrical issues such as: inertial response, reactive power support, and transient stability. Another important aspect of a transmission study is a land use study. This study is necessary to ensure that proposed transmission can be built. It would need to consider the arrangement of wind projects to ensure that transmission is appropriately sized and that the connections to the system and made in the most optimal way.

The expected growth of electric vehicles is another aspect to study in relation to wind generation. Electric vehicles are expected to charge at night when demand is low. This could prove beneficial for wind generation because wind generation in many areas will be at its peak at night. It seems as though electric vehicles will be able to absorb wind energy that won’t otherwise be needed. There are several concerns with how this will work in practice. Such as, what happens if the wind dies?

Also, will electric vehicles start charging all at the same time leading to a sudden load spike? Is there a way for the chargers to be responsive to the power grid?

Wind generation is an intermittent, variable and uncertain generating resource. This uncertainty is an important characteristic in that it is in contrast to conventional generation which is available as needed and controllable.

The increase in variability will require system operators to take more and larger control actions to keep the system balanced.

The uncertainty of wind in the power system is the largest concern. The variability introduced is generally manageable but it is made much worse by the uncertainty. Uncertainty will lead to less efficient operation and can lead to reliability problems. The variability and uncertainty of wind generation will cause operators to increase the amount of ancillary services they procure to keep the system balanced.

The regulation reserve is the most affected because it is primarily charged with managed short term fluctuations. The amount of additional regulation that systems will need to procure varies greatly between studies. Regulation needs increase with higher penetrations of wind generation. It is important for system operators to quantify the regulation needs to ensure the system will have the capability to provide it.

There are many possible ways that wind generation can impact the power system costs. It can affect the energy costs, ancillary service costs, unit commitment costs, congestion costs, uplift costs, transmission costs, and so forth.

The third strategy for managing integration is increasing diversity. Diversity can be increased in a number of ways. Building wind generation in different resource areas is one way to increase diversity. Constructing sufficient transmission to ensure wind power can be moved where it is needed is another. Combining control areas is another or increasing the cooperation between areas. Increasing cooperation would involve increased scheduling frequency across inter-ties and sharing of renewable energy data.

The uncertainty of wind in the power system was the largest concern. The variability introduced was generally manageable but it was made worse by the uncertainty. Uncertainty made it much more difficult to plan generation schedules in an optimal way. The variability and uncertainty of wind generation will cause operators to increase the amount of ancillary services they procure to keep the system balanced. Ancillary services are a subset of a group of services that are necessary to maintain operation of the power grid. They are used to maintain short-term balance of the system and to recover from unexpected outages. Ancillary services included operating, contingency, and regulating reserves. The regulation reserve was the most affected because it was primarily charged with managing short-term fluctuations. The amount of additional regulation that systems will need to procure varied greatly between studies. Regulation needs increased with higher penetrations of wind generation. It was important for system operators to quantify the regulation needs to ensure that the system would have the capability to provide it.

Determining the costs of wind integration was one of the main goals of many studies. These studies used a wide range of methods and assumptions to determine costs. There were many possible ways that wind generation could affect power system costs. Wind generation can affect energy costs, ancillary service costs, unit commitment costs, congestion costs, uplift costs, and transmission costs, among others. Direct comparisons of wind integration costs were difficult because different studies chose to include different factors when making cost calculations. Studies found wind can reduce energy cost by displacing more expensive generation. These savings may be offset by higher costs introduced from other elements such as increased ancillary service costs. The extra cost estimates ranged from $0/megawatt hour (MWh) to $9.35/MWh.

Various studies recommended many ways to successfully integrate wind power into the system. The recommendations fell into three basic categories: reducing uncertainty, increasing flexibility, and increasing diversity. Reducing the uncertainty of wind generation was the primary method recommended to facilitate integration. Forecasting for wind generation was the most important strategy for integrating wind into the power grid. Forecasting reduced the uncertainty of wind directly and could potentially result in very large savings for the power system. Forecasts would be designed for each area to fit current operating practices. These forecasts could provide insight into the expected level of generation and variability that wind power will introduce into the system, which will give operators the ability to make adjustments or procure extra capacity as needed. Increasing the flexibility of the power grid was the second strategy for managing wind integration. Increasing the amount of ancillary services, specifically regulation, was a common tactic to increase the system’s flexibility. This would literally increase the amount of capacity that is tasked with following variations between the load and generation. Other methods of increasing flexibility were also suggested but were more dependent on system and operating practices. Increasing diversity was the third strategy for optimally managing integration. Diversity can be increased in a number of ways. Building wind generation in different resource areas was one way to increase diversity. Constructing sufficient transmission to ensure wind power can be moved to where it is needed was another. Combining control areas or increasing the cooperation between areas was another viable strategy. Increasing cooperation would involve increased scheduling frequency across entities and sharing renewable energy data.

Generation is the most controllable element and is relied upon to maintain the balance as the usage changes. If there is too much generation it can cause components to overload or burn out. Too little generation will lead to brown or black outs. Load or generation can change rapidly and unexpectedly, as a result sufficient flexibility must be maintained to quickly rebalance the system. Wind generation with its intermittent and variable nature adds another source of variability to balance with controllable resources. Reliable operation of the power system is critical and maintaining the reliability is the primary focus for the system operators.

There are six reliability regions within the eastern interconnection and one each within the western connection and the ERCOT connection.

Within the reliability regions are balancing areas. There are over 100 balancing areas within the United States. Balancing areas range in size from individual cities, such as Sacramento, to areas that cover several states, such as the PJM4 interconnection. The balancing areas are responsible for controlling the generation within their area and coordinating with neighbors to control their inter-ties.

1.2.1 System Control. Reliable operation and planning in power systems require consideration of a wide range of timescales. Resource adequacy and capacity planning takes place on scales of one year to several years, this includes transmission and generation siting, sizing and construction. On shorter time scales in the range of days to months, maintenance planning is done. Generation and transmission facilities plan scheduled maintenance far in advance and coordinate with other facilities to minimize grid disturbance. In the range of hours to days, the unit commitment and scheduling processes are done, in these processes generation is selected to provide for the forecast load. To adapt to any forecast errors or unplanned events generator dispatch is done on the minutes to hours time scales. Automatic Generator Control (AGC) which dispatches generation automatically to keep the system balanced operates on the seconds’ timescale. A number of other automatic controls including generator governors, automatic voltage regulators, power system stabilizers, special protection and remedial action schemes operate on the milliseconds to seconds’ timescales. Most planning is done on the longer time frames from years to days, while the operations time-frames range from seconds to days.

Committing generation to serve load is a very important process for reliability and to minimize system costs. Generators must be committed in advance of their scheduled operation because it can take many hours for them to start up. If too much generation is committed it is costly, inefficient and in extreme cases can overload system components. If not enough generators are committed in advance other power will have to be procured or blackouts will be risked. The resource pool to procure more generation will be diminished because there is insufficient time for many units to respond. The units capable of responding are likely to be expensive gas turbine units. Both under commitment and over commitment of generation can lead to higher energy costs.

Dispatch of generation is another important part of operating the power system. In dispatch the units that are committed are given schedules to follow. There are three basic categories of generation which determines the extent that they are dispatched: base load, intermediate load and peaking generation. Base loaded typically operates at its forward schedule and is rarely dispatched away from that point. Intermediate generators perform most of the changes in output. They will typically ramp to minimum at night, or shut off, and then ramp up with load the next day. The third type of generation is peaking generation, which is started and used for only extreme conditions. Forward scheduling is done along with the unit commitment process and accounts for the majority of energy schedules. Dispatch of generation away from its forward schedule makes up a small part of the overall energy flows. Dispatch away from the forward schedules to reflect forecast error is usually called load following.

Load following is an important consideration in many studies, because wind provides uncertainty and variability to the system that needs to be balanced. Keeping the power system balanced and reliable requires more than adjusting the supply energy. Reliability-related services are a group of services that are necessary to maintain operation of the power grid.

There are a wide range of reliability related services that vary by region. Reserves, regulation, voltage support, black start capability, are all examples of reliability related services. Ancillary services are a subset of reliability-related services which include operating, contingency, and regulating reserves. Ancillary services are used to maintain short term balance of the system and recover from unexpected outages. Ancillary services provided by generation reduce the amount of energy a generator can supply when it supplies ancillary services. Operating reserves are made up of unloaded generating capacity which is synched to the power grid and capable of responding in a certain amount of time. Operating reserve is a very broad term which includes the ability to provide spinning reserve, regulation, supplemental reserve, and load following. Contingency reserves are power system reserves which can be called to respond to a contingency event, or are interruptible loads which will reduce consumption.

Power systems maintain a few dedicated operating and contingency reserves to meet their reliability needs. They purchase these reserves from generators who reserve that capacity in case they are need. Spinning reserve is a common ancillary service used as an operating and contingency reserve. Systems procure an amount of spinning reserve which is synchronized to the power grid and available within 10 minutes. Non-spinning reserve is another reserve used for contingency reserves. Non-spinning reserve is offline capacity that needs to synchronize and deploy within 10 minutes. The levels of spinning and non-spinning reserves that systems maintain is related to the system size, the largest single contingency, and the makeup of the generation fleet.

The amount of reserves a system maintains depends primarily on the system size. All systems maintain some degree of all the reserves but have a wide variety of mechanisms for procuring and implementing. The power grid must be managed in a way that a single contingency will not affect the security of the grid. NERC has specific requirements for the amount of spinning and non-spinning reserve that must be maintained by a balancing authority. The requirements have to do with system size, contingency size, and type of generator resources. The system must be able to recover from a contingency in a certain amount of time to be prepared for the next one. Spinning reserves and non-spinning reserves are deployed following contingencies, and are not used during normal system operation.

Wind generation is a variable, intermittent, and uncertain resource.

Another important factor to consider with wind generation is the location of the resource.

Intermittency describes the wind’s nature to come and go, to be available to produce electricity sometimes, but be unavailable other times. Most areas have distinct weather patterns for when the wind blows. California tends to have a diurnal wind pattern with the period of strongest wind occurring at night, with the day experiencing lower winds. In addition to the diurnal pattern there are also seasonal patterns for winds with the most productive periods occurring in spring and summer with the fall and winter being less productive. Other areas may have significantly different wind patterns. These wind patterns can be very important if wind power is playing a large role in supplying electricity. Intermittency is in contrast to most conventional generation which has a fuel that can be stored used on demand. The intermittency can affect the system’s resource adequacy calculations. The system operators will need to determine if the wind is likely to be available during the system peaks or if other generation will need to be available.

In addition to this longer term intermittency wind power is also variable in nature. Variability describes the wind’s tendency to change speeds as it is blowing. The variability of the wind can happen in seconds as gust blow through, or in longer time frames as regional weather patterns change. Because wind generation is weather dependent it is sensitive to the fluctuations of the weather. This variability is in contrast to most conventional generation can generally choose its desired generation level and maintain a steady output. Wind variability gives the operators another source of variability to consider other than the load.

Uncertainty of wind generation is caused by the intermittency and variability of wind generation though it can pose a different set of challenges. Uncertainty is related to the unknown future wind conditions. Even with certain repeatable weather patterns, prediction is not an exact science. The output of wind generation is unknown ahead of time, forecast can help bound the problem and often give quite good estimates, but compared with generation that can predictably operate at a certain output wind generation presents a challenge.

The electrical generator characteristics of wind generation also differ from conventional generation. Conventional generators use permanent magnet generators which operate at fixed speeds to produce power. Permanent magnet generators provide inertia for the grid; the electro-mechanical link helps resist changes in system frequency. Wind generation however has used induction generators (IG). The electrical differences of wind generation are primarily a concern for transmission design, which typically isn’t covered in recent wind integration studies.

Location of wind generation is another difference from most conventional generation. With fossil fuel generation it is possible to transport fuel to a generator so the location is not as constrained by resources. Wind resources are often located far from load centers and far from main transmission pathways. While conventional generators can be located much more flexibly on the transmission system, wind generators are limited to where there is sufficient resource. Remote resources often require large transmission upgrades to connect wind to the system. The transmission upgrades for wind will have a set of design considerations specific to wind generation.

Wind generation in the power system is described as having a penetration level. There are several different ways to define the relative amount of wind generation in the power system. The energy penetration is the ratio of energy produced by wind generation to the ratio of total demand over the same time. Typically the energy penetration is expressed on an annual basis. RPS standards are usually defined in terms of energy penetrations.

Capacity penetration is the ratio of the installed capacity of wind generation to the historical peak demand of the system. Finally the instantaneous penetration is the ratio of the wind energy production to the system demand at that time. Instantaneous penetration can also be calculated over short periods of time, for example the hourly time step of a production cost simulation. While penetration is a good way to compare systems of different sizes there are often significant differences between systems which may drive the impacts to be significantly different at similar penetration levels.

With higher penetrations of wind generation unit commitment algorithms take wind forecasts into account to avoid over commitment of generation which could risk over generation conditions. Generator schedules will be affected as more expensive generation is displaced for less expensive wind energy. The load following process will need to adjust for the load and wind together rather than just the load.

Wind is generally the largest contributor but solar, geothermal, and hydro can all factor in.

The size of the system is one of the critical factors. Larger systems often can have easier time incorporating wind. Larger systems take advantage of aggregation. The load variability scales more slowly than the load. Larger systems often tend to have a larger and more diverse generation fleet. The physical infrastructure of the power grid is also an important consideration. The makeup of the generator fleet can also impact the studies. System that are hydro dominated often have many fast moving generators available. Coal, natural gas, and hydro generators have different characteristics and the overall system capabilities will depend on the mixture of generators. The operations of the system are also important, is it a market system, what are the scheduling periods, and so forth. There are also systems that are net importers, or net exporters. The ERCOT system is essentially an islanded system.

Transmission and Reliability. Strong wind resources are often located far from population centers that consume the bulk of the electricity. Transmission is required to move the energy to where it will be used. Transmission can be one of the most expensive components of integrating wind. Older wind integration studies focused a great deal on the transmission design to accommodate wind. The need for transmission analysis in a wind integration study has diminished due to the lessons learned from previous studies and the new technology in wind turbines that eliminates some problems. Transmission is important for wind integration even if it no longer a prominent focus. The primary transmission considerations for wind resources are sizing, voltage regulation, reactive capability, grid disturbances, control, and frequency response.

There are a few reasons that design of transmission facilities takes a different approach when it comes to integrating wind generation. Transmission facilities include not only transmission lines, but also transformers, capacitors and other hardware. The intermittent nature of wind is one concern. Wind generates below its rated power most of the time so lines may not need to be sized for full delivery.

Another issue with transmission design is the location of wind resources. Strong wind resource areas are often located far from load centers in weak areas of the power grid. Transmission lines for wind may be trunk lines that connect radial to the power grid, which would not have alternate routes in case of outage. More recent integration studies haven’t emphasized the transmission component as much as in the past. Assumptions are that transmission will be built or upgraded as necessary to accommodate the new wind generation, and that the changes in operating characteristics are more important to focus on.

Systems with more frequent scheduling will have an easier time adjusting to changes than those with longer scheduling blocks.

The hydro system in California will need to be increased roughly 50% from current practice to accommodate load growth and wind. The study estimates the additional regulation needed to be 20MW on 350MW with 20% renewable generation. … increases in load following capability will be needed, an increase of about 10MW/minute to 130 MW/minute. The load following increase needs to be maintained for 5 minutes.

20% Wind Energy by 2030 – July 2008 Performed by the U.S. Department of Energy, this study takes a broad look at the issues that the country would face if it were to try to supply 20 percent of electric energy demand from wind power by the year 2030. It is very broad and includes sections examining turbine technology, manufacturing processes, materials, resources, and equipment and O&M costs. It is not a typical wind integration study that looks at the operating changes for specific wind scenarios. It gives very good information about all aspects of wind generation and how it may be able to contribute in the future. The study takes a balanced view of wind plant siting and potential environmental effects. The study looks at the impacts wind generation could have on greenhouse gas emissions, water conservation, energy security and stability, and costs. It also considers potential negative environmental costs such as bird kill, and noise. The study looks at the transmission requirements for integrating wind power throughout the U.S. It takes a national view of the best resource locations and the load centers and considers how wind can best be moved around. The study looks at a possible design of 12,650 miles of new transmission at a cost of $60 billion. This study includes analysis of distributed wind as well as off shore wind energy. This study includes a review of wind integration studies from 2006 and earlier, and uses them as a basis for analysis. The study concludes that the US possesses sufficient resources to power 20% of the electricity needs using wind energy by 2030. Doing so would require 300 GW of installed wind capacity, compared to the 11 GW installed by 2006. This would decrease greenhouse gases by 825 metric tons annually, and reduce the electricity sectors water use by 8 percent (4 trillion gallons). The prediction of the cost differential is a modest 2% increase over a conventional generation build out. In real dollars it is still a significant sum of $43 billion. Spread out over the total generation it represents an increase of $0.0006 per kWh.

Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study – January 2010. The Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study (EWITS) study looks at the eastern interconnection in the US. The eastern connection is the largest system considered with a system peak load as studied is 530 GW. The study considers 4 transmission scenarios that are primarily made up of ultra-high voltage lines from Midwest to the Northeast. The four scenarios consider three different 20% penetration build outs and one 30% penetration in the year 2024. The 20% wind scenarios consider different utilizations of resources one considers high capacity factor; another considers local resources, and a third to consider more off shore development. The study uses three base years; 2004 through 2006 for the input data sets. These scenarios are compared to a reference case that includes current development and some near term development.

The results show that 20% and 30% wind energy penetrations are possible in the eastern interconnection but will require significant new transmission. Substantial curtailment of wind would be required without new transmission, so much so that all cases will require some amount of new transmission. The study calculates wind integration costs that include transmission, and wind capital costs as well as operating changes costs. Production costs decline with increased wind penetration, though overall wind integration costs increase with penetration due largely to capital costs of transmission and wind generation. Very high increases in regulation will be needed. The regulation changes are calculated for each of the balancing areas individually, regulation increases of over 1,000 percent in some areas. Integration costs range from $5.00 -6.68/MWh wind production.

The ERCOT study shows that the energy from combined cycle units is offset the most by additional wind generation. Energy from coal is also slightly reduced. It is interesting that energy from gas turbines increases except for the highest penetration of wind generation. This is likely because of the flexibility that gas turbines have they are able to respond quickly to make up for variability and uncertainty. Similar studies have similar results; the resources displaced are largely a factor of the system configuration. Though increased wind generation tends to displace the most expensive units.

EWITS has some very interesting results for how the wind impacts the energy from different sources. The study shows that having different amounts of forecast error can affect the energy from different sources. Increasing forecast error cause energy to shift from less flexible sources such as coal to more flexible sources such as combined cycle and gas turbines. Reductions in coal energy were in the range of 3-4 percent for the cases with forecast versus the perfect forecast cases. Meanwhile combined cycle generation increases roughly 20%, and energy from gas turbines increase 20 to 30% percent. It should be noted that coal energy is roughly 15 times that of combined cycle, while gas turbine energy is roughly 25% of the combined cycle generation.

Reserve Requirements.  Determining proper levels of ancillary service or reserves required with different wind penetrations is also one of the main concerns addressed in each study. There are two concerns with reserves; how much reserves is needed and does the system have the capability to provide them. The system’s ability to provide reserves will also depend on the displacement of other generation. If the uncertainty and variability of wind generation is significant, reserves could increase beyond the system’s ability to provide them. System planning will likely need to take into account the ability to provide reserves as well as energy. Regulation is the most impacted reserve requirement. Regulation is also the most expensive reserve as it is the most flexible. Spinning reserve could be affected if the wind was concentrated and represented a credible contingency. Some systems also carry a replacement reserve product, which could be dispatched either in a contingency or if there are significant schedule deviations. These other reserves can also be affected. Determining regulation reserves requirements varies significantly between the studies. Some studies rely on statistical techniques to estimate the regulation, while others use the operational models.

Both Montana and CAISO employ techniques to measure the regulation requirements based on the expected system needs caused both from the variability of the wind power and from the uncertainty in the short term forecasts. This is in contrast to some of the other studies whose methodologies implicitly assumed perfect forecasts in the short term, and therefore measured only the variability components. The CAISO study estimates that regulation with 7 GW wind capacity would need to increase by 100-500 MW depending on the hour and season to maintain the same performance. California normally maintains 350 MW of regulation. The Montana study estimates a 0-241 MW increase in regulation needs, on up to 1450 MW wind addition. This results in 1-3.84 fold increase in the procurement of regulation.

Load Following and Ramping. Load following is another aspect that is often considered with wind integration. Load following is fairly loosely defined and it can vary quite a bit between different regions. Generally speaking load following is the dispatch of generation necessary to keep the system balanced. Load following is measured as the difference between the forward schedule of generation and the dispatch. It has typically been used to make up for load forecast errors, and for the natural differences that occur when scheduling is done on hourly blocks. Using regulation for these larger and longer term changes is expensive. Ramping is closely related to load following. Most systems will have peak load in the day and minimum load at night. In order to match the load the generation in the system ramps up in the morning as the load rises to the peak. Then it ramps down in the evening towards the minimum load. The magnitude, rate, and duration of these ramps are important to keeping the system balanced. The generation on the system must have sufficient flexibility to meet the demands of the ramps on a system wide basis. Wind generation has the ability to affect the perceived ramp the system sees. Generation must be able to follow the net ramp on the system. In many regions wind has a diurnal pattern that is out of phase with load. Wind generation will peak at night and be at a minimum during the day. This has the effect of increasing the needed ramping as other generation is used to balance the wind. The CAISO study shows lots of analysis relating to the load following and ramping concerns. The study uses both statistical and operational models to address the concerns. The study uses a statistical model to consider the potential impacts of wind generation on the morning and evening ramps. The methodology is designed to look at extreme ramps that may potentially occur. The data is separated into different seasons and the maximum seasonal ramps are calculated for load alone, and for load minus wind. The CAISO does an analysis examining the expected maximum net load ramps during the shoulder hours, or the hours of the morning when load rises rapidly and the hours in the evening when it declines. The CAISO study shows that the maximum net ramp could increase over 30% from the baseline values. Their analysis represents the extreme combination for each season, and is boosted by the consistent diurnal pattern of wind generation which is opposite the load shape. The WWSIS uses a similar analysis and shows that the largest net ramp increases 50% from the baseline at the 30% penetration level. The CAISO load following methodology is an operational model that considers short term dispatch for a simplified system, considering the net load changes and short term forecast error. The load following study estimates that the amount of load following increase roughly 800 MW from a base of 2,200 MW. A sensitivity analysis is performed with a modest decrease in forecast error. The sensitivity shows forecasts improvements can reduce the additional load following requirement by about 50%.

Each new facility when built will be subject to a transmission study, which will determine in detail the needed transmission and the expected impacts. The studies that have included some transmission analysis have shown that new transmission is useful and sometimes necessary. One interesting thing is that extra high voltage transmission lines are often called for in relation to wind. The electrical generator characteristics of wind generation also differ from conventional generation. Conventional generators use permanent magnet generators which operate at fixed speeds to produce power. Permanent magnet generators provide inertia for the grid; the electro-mechanical link helps resist changes in system frequency. Wind generation however has used induction generators (IG). Modern turbines use more advanced doubly fed induction generators (DFIG) instead of standard IGs. DFIGs are variable speed generators allowing the generators to operate more efficiently over a wider range of wind speeds. Also DFIG generators can control the amount reactive power used or supplied much like a traditional generator. Another common generator for a modern turbine is a full conversion system. With a full conversion system the generator generates an AC power which is converted to a DC and then back to grid synchronized AC power. The AC-DC-AC systems have the benefits of the DFIG system over the standard IG and are capable of providing inertial response. These new turbine generator systems have alleviated much of the worry with respect to the electrical connection.

Fault tolerance was another area of concern for wind generation on the transmission system. Older wind turbine generators were not fault tolerant and often dropped off line during grid disturbances. Operators encouraged this performance in the past for small amounts of wind, because the grid would drop a small amount of generation that could be easily replaced. As wind penetrations increase the potential disruptions from all the wind dropping is of large concern. Grid codes in many areas now require wind generation to have low voltage ride

Voltage regulation is another concern for wind generation. The concern is related to the characteristics of IG. In order to generate IG consumes reactive power this affects the local voltage. Wind generation has evolved beyond simple IG to doubly fed induction generation, DFIG, and full AC-DC-AC conversion. These new generators do not use reactive power the way older models did and are able to support voltage; many of these generators can even help support voltage when there is insufficient wind to generate power. Supporting the local voltage is important for generation particularly if there is no other generation in the area.

Frequency response or inertial response is another area of concern when integrating wind in the power system. When a large fault happens the system becomes suddenly imbalanced, the frequency changes as a result. The large amount of rotating mass behind generators helps arrest the frequency changes keeping it in a manageable range as the system is rebalanced. Some wind generators do not provide inertia this way due to the generator types. If large amounts of wind replace conventional generation care will need to be taken to make sure that frequency changes will be manageable. Conventional generator can also have frequency responsive governors, which are able to provide an injection of power if frequency dips suddenly to counteract the change. Since wind generation attempts to make maximum use of the available wind it may not be able to respond to frequency dips. If wind has displaced significant conventional generation, there is concern that a frequency dip may not be arrested, which could cause a cascading blackout as generators shut down to avoid damage that is caused by generating under frequency. This is still an area of investigation as national standards are developing for frequency response initiatives. Modern wind turbines do have some ability to provide inertial response. Modern supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) have also helped improved integration. Modern SCADA systems allow real time detail measurements of wind plants to be visible to operators. Additionally they allow wind plants to control their output, while historically they would be subject only to the weather. SCADA systems combined with improvements in wind generators can help eliminate many of the transmission and reliability concerns associated with large penetrations of wind power.

There are three basic strategies for managing wind integration; reduce uncertainty, increase flexibility, and increase diversity.

Wind forecasting is seen as one of the best ways to reliably accommodate wind power.

Curtailment. Another very common operating practice to manage wind is to curtail the wind generation periodically.

Adjust Scheduling and Dispatch. Scheduling practices vary widely between different balancing areas. The scheduling lead time and time steps are both very important when it comes to integrating wind generation. Many areas do the majority of scheduling well ahead of the operating hour and fix hourly schedules for most units. This puts them at a disadvantage when try to deal with forecast error and variability within an hour. Without a way to change dispatch or adjust schedules within an hour systems must use expensive regulation to keep the system in balance. Having a real time market, or a similar process to adjust schedules within the hour will help prevent flexibility from being stranded, and will reduce the amount of regulation needed. It will allow the flexibility of units to be realized through a more efficient dispatch process. Changing the dispatch process should allow ancillary services, primarily regulation to be reduced. Systems that operate markets on a five or ten minute basis have more flexibility to adjust to wind generation. The Avista study models how the market structure can change the wind integration costs. The study considered adding a 10-minute market on top of the hourly market that exists. The study shows that between 45 and 75 percent of the integration costs are attributable to factors that occur within hour, meaning that most of the costs occur because the system is locked in for an hour. When the 10-minute market is added to the analysis is gives the system more flexibility to respond to conditions. For their system the integration costs are lowered between 40 percent and 60 percent with the addition of the 10-minute market.

Change Ancillary Services. The majority of studies show that the necessary amount of ancillary services will increase. Many studies focus on regulation, and suggest increasing the amount of regulation procured. The estimates of regulation increases vary significantly between the studies. Though there is a considerable range all studies agree that increasing wind generation will increase the amount of ancillary services a region maintains to keep the same reliability level. Regulation is the ancillary service most affected. Ancillary services are usually more expensive than energy and the system tries to keep the cost down. The variation in ancillary services relative needs between balancing areas depends in large part on the scheduling time frames. One way to offset increases in ancillary services is to increase the entities that can provide them. This includes having more generation certified to provide ancillary services, including wind generation.

Encourage Flexible Generation. Operators are concerned about the increased variability in the system, as well as additional need for ancillary services. As a way of managing this operators suggest encouraging the development of more flexible generation. This includes constructing new generation that can meet future needs or retrofitting current generation to operate more flexibly. In order to encourage generators with sufficient flexibility to be constructed operators will need to compensate generators for the extra benefits they provide. One way to do this is to make resource adequacy payments that consider more than available capacity. There are several attributes that system operators consider when thinking about generator flexibility. One way for generation to provide more flexibility

Frequent cycling capability is another desirable feature. Generators that can cycle daily or more frequently are desirable. Faster start and stop capability goes along with frequent cycling. This refers to the amount of time it takes for a generator to turn on or off from when it receives an instruction. This amount of time can be one the order of days so reducing it to hours or less could greatly increase flexibility.

Demand response stands on its own as a way to enhance the power system. Demand response can allow systems to avoid installing expensive peak generation that is rarely used.

Zoning and Aggregation. Many studies have shown there are benefits for increasing diversity of wind resources. Diverse wind resources aggregated together have a smaller amount of variability that one’s close together. If systems can encourage wind generation in many areas they will have to make fewer changes to accommodate the wind.

Another option for aggregation is a larger balancing area. Larger balancing areas reduce the penetration of wind generation which reduces the effects. Additionally larger balancing areas will have larger generation fleets and more flexibility in how they are dispatched.

Grid Codes. Reliability organizations are actively studying renewable energy and revising grid codes to ensure the reliability of the system. LVRT and reactive control are some of the standards that have been introduced. Balancing areas, reliability regions, and NERC will continue to review wind turbine technology and power system performance to assure that there will be the reliable operation of the power grid. Grid codes will ensure that wind won’t harm the power systems reliability.

Telemetry. It is very important for system operators to have quality information on the state of the system. This will enable them to ensure the reliability. Telemetry of the power system elements is crucial to giving system operators the information they need. Telemetry at wind sites should provide both meteorological and power data. Real time measurement of wind plant performance can have a variety of benefits. Power systems have real time monitoring systems which typically measure generation and transmission conditions. System operators continually monitor the conditions of the system and make operating decisions based off the measurements. These systems can be easily adapted to include wind production information as well as local meteorological information for wind farms. This information includes things such as wind speed, wind direction, air temperature, pressure, and humidity. The data can give operators real time information on the generation of wind, its variability, and recent trends. Measurements can also be used by forecasters to help better predict the wind generation. Telemetry for transmission elements should also be increased to monitor the greater system, especially for upgrades to integrate wind generation.

Storage. Storage is often discussed in the integration studies and there are many possibilities for how storage could benefit a system with high penetrations of renewable. Energy storage has the potential to address both the intermittency of wind and the variability depending on characteristics of the storage. There are a wide variety of different storage technologies with a variety of different operating characteristics. The CAISO study describes many of the technologies and properties that they offer. The predominant technologies are pumped storage hydro, compressed air, batteries, flywheels, super capacitors, and hydrogen. The ability of storage to mitigate potential problems will depend on its characteristics. A large storage system would be able to charge during windy conditions if the energy isn’t needed then and could then discharge when it is calm and more electricity is needed.

To shift energy pumped storage hydro is the most practical storage type; many areas already have some pumped storage hydro installed. Smaller storage could be used to manage the variability principally within hour. Under the right conditions storage could contribute to a variety of operations functions. Storage could be used to provide reserves and regulation. It could be used for load following services. It could be used to provide peak power, or add demand in minimum load conditions. Storage could provide reactive support to the system or provide inertial response. While storage has many potential benefits for power systems it is important to understand a few things about it. First, storage needs to make sense from the system perspective compared with other operational strategies. If wind does add variability to the system the systems needs should be evaluated relative to the variability, storage should not be used to return the system to its state before wind is added. Second is the cost and benefit analysis. Storage will be competing with other generation for all those possible functions and the revenue model for storage is often unclear. On the cost issue alone building storage is more expensive than equivalent capacity gas turbines. The EWITS study suggests that in certain situations storage can be used instead of transmission upgrades, though further

Coordination. System operators with a few notable exceptions are not alone in trying to maintain system reliability. Interconnections have dozens of control areas that need to interact to maintain reliability. Current practices typically lock in the flows between control areas in hourly blocks. More flexibility between balancing areas is seen as a way to increase the diversity in the system and mitigate wind generation. There are many ways for areas to coordinate their integration efforts. More frequent scheduling on shared line or connections is one. This allows greater flexibility within the areas if they do not have to maintain fixed flows across their interconnections for a full hour. Data sharing is another way areas can coordinate. Sharing of information about weather conditions can help areas coordinate their wind generation and perhaps get better forecasts. Coordination could mean consolidating balancing areas into large areas with one operator.

Extreme Conditions. Another area that studies often suggest future work is the extreme weather events. Wind studies consider typical operating conditions and historical years, if weather patterns didn’t exist in the input data they won’t be considered in the study even though they may be possible. There are extreme scenarios which could pose problems to the operation of the grid. Studying those cases could determine strategies to successfully handle them if they occur. Sub hourly studies are often necessary to fully consider extreme events or other areas of concern. Extreme events can be based not only on the wind generation behavior, but also on the simultaneous behavior of the power system.

Along with the studies of possible extreme events studies need to be done on how to mitigate them. Extreme events may require special attention and solutions that are not typically used.

 

 

 

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Over 21 essential resources have peaked including fish, milk, eggs, wheat, corn, rice, soy

Nature summary of this article: “The rates at which humans consume multiple resources such as food and wood peaked at roughly the same time, around 2006. This means that resources could be simultaneously depleted, so achieving sustainability might be more challenging than was thought.

Ralf Seppelt … and his colleagues estimated the peak rate of extraction for 27 resources. For 20 of them, mostly renewables such as meat and rice, the peak-rate years occurred between 1960 and 2010, with many clustering around 2006. Only coal, gas, oil, phosphate, farmed fish and renewable energy have yet to peak.

Humans use multiple resources to generate new ones and to meet basic needs, which could explain the synchronicity of peak usage, the authors suggest.

Seppelt, R., et al. 2014. Synchronized peak-rate years of global resources use. Ecology and Society 19(4): 50.

ABSTRACT

Many separate studies have estimated the year of peak, or maximum, rate of using an individual resource such as oil. However, no study has estimated the year of peak rate for multiple resources and investigated the relationships among them. We exploit time series on the appropriation of 27 global renewable and nonrenewable resources. We found 21 resources experienced a peak-rate year, and for 20 resources the peak-rate years occurred between 1960-2010, a narrow time window in the long human history. Whereas 4 of 7 nonrenewable resources show no peak-rate year, conversion to cropland and 18 of the 20 renewable resources have passed their peak rate of appropriation. To test the hypothesis that peak-rate years are synchronized, i.e., occur at approximately the same time, we analyzed 20 statistically independent time series of resources, of which 16 presented a peak-rate year centered on 2006 (1989-2008). We discuss potential causal mechanisms including change in demand, innovation and adaptation, interdependent use of resources, physical limitation, and simultaneous scarcity. The synchrony of peak-rate years of multiple resources poses a greater adaptation challenge for society than previously recognized, suggesting the need for a paradigm shift in resource use toward a sustainable path in the Anthropocene.

INTRODUCTION

Sustainable appropriation of nonrenewable and renewable resources is required for society’s long-term well-being. Four decades ago, Meadows’ limits to growth model reignited the old Malthusian debate about the limits of the world’s resources (Mathus 1798, Bardi 2000, Griggs et al. 2013). Limits to growth of specific resources such as oil (Hallock et al. 2014) or fossil water (Gleick and Palaniappan 2010) have been analyzed separately, by estimating the peak-rate, or maximum, year, defined as the year of maximum resource appropriation rate. For which renewable and nonrenewable resources can a peak-rate year be identified given the most up-to-date time series of human resource appropriation? Exploring the relation among peak-rate years for multiple resources then raises an important second question: are global peak-rate years synchronized, i.e., occurring at approximately the same time in the long history of human civilization? Calculating the appropriation rate of resources allows the detection of the maximum increase year or peak-rate year, which indicates the timing of scarcity or change in demand (Fig. 1). We analyzed peak-rate years for many of the world’s major resources and found synchrony in the peak-rate years of statistically independent resources by a method that is standardized, nonparametric, generalizable, and allows analysis of nonrenewable and renewable resources (Table 1), and we will conclude by giving clear implications for sustainable development goals (Arrow et al. 1995).

We focused on 27 nonrenewable and renewable resources essential for human well-being and daily needs, e.g., energy and food. These resources are also the focus of global policy bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank. Nonrenewables include the fossil fuels, i.e., coal, gas, oil, supplying 87% of the energy consumed by the 50 wealthiest nations (Tollefson and Monastersky 2012). Renewables include staple crops, e.g., cassava, maize, rice, soybeans, and wheat, which the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations identified as providing 45% of global caloric intake (FAO 2013). Combined with data on the consumption of animal products, the main sources of food are included in our analysis. We also evaluated resources with a long history of use, e.g., cropland and domesticated species, and renewable energy sources, which may be increasingly important in the future. Furthermore, we considered two global drivers of resource use, population and economic activity (world GDP). The database consists of time series of 27 global resources, 2 global drivers, and 13 national resources/drivers. The data sources are listed in Table 2. All data is accessible at Figshare http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.929619. The raw data and smoothed times series of the bootstrap resamples (see Methods) are plotted in Figure 2.

METHODS

Peak-rate year estimation

We used a method that is standardized, nonparametric, generalizable, and allows analysis of nonrenewable and renewable resources. Renewable resources regenerate on shorter time scales, i.e., harvest rate and regrowth have comparable time scales, and have a human scale, and annual production is the response variable that was analyzed. Nonrenewables are regenerated on geological time scales, and the response variable is the accumulated amount extracted. This choice of response variables allowed the analysis of all resources with the same mathematical method (Table 1, Fig. 1). To estimate a peak-rate year, the maximum increase rate of the time series must be calculated. It is possible to use a parametric model, e.g., a logistic curve or its derivative. However, nonparametric curve fitting offers advantages regarding the bias and does not require parametric assumptions or that a functional model be postulated, e.g., stationarity of rate of resource appropriation. This means that the different resources and drivers need not follow the same increase process (Gasser et al. 1984). Further, by using a bootstrap resample to estimate the uncertainty of the peak rate year estimate, we avoided distributional assumption. However, no prediction outside the range of the data can be performed.

Time series analysis of peak-rate years and synchrony testing

We do provide a summary of the statistical analysis of the time series. Appendix 1 provides detailed documentation of conducted steps. Figure A1.1 in the appendix provides a graphical overview.

The time series of the 27 global resources, 2 global drivers, and 13 national resources/drivers (with length n = 12 – 112, see Table 2) were subjected to a cubic smoothing spline to find the peak rate of resource appropriation, based on the maximum of the first derivative. This nonparametric method has no distributional assumptions, but does not enable predictions. We performed 5000 bootstrap resamples, and the 50th percentile (2.5 and 97.5th) was taken as the peak-rate year (uncertainty), unless the 50th percentile was equal to the last year in the time series, in which case we concluded the rate of resource appropriation was still increasing.

To test the hypothesis of synchrony, we selected statistically independent time series. We performed ARIMA modelling of the 27 global resource time series and tested the residuals with a Box-Pierce test of white noise. Haugh’s test of dependence on all pairs of resources was performed on cross-correlation coefficient of the white noise residuals (Haugh 1976). We selected 20 statistically independent time series of resource, of which 16 presented a peak-rate year. A peak-rate year from the 5000 bootstrap resamples for each of the 16 resources was randomly selected, and the mode of the resulting smoothed distribution of 16 peak-rate years obtained. This process was repeated 5000 times, and we estimated the synchrony as the median of the 5000 modes. A nonparametric goodness of fit test was performed with a uniform distribution as a null hypothesis, i.e., no mode implies no synchrony, and a critical value obtained by Monte Carle simulation (5000). The statistical tests were performed at a Type I error rate of 0.05.

RESULTS

We observed that for 21 of the 27 global resources and for the 2 global drivers of resource use, there was a peak-rate year. For the 21 resources that had a peak-rate year (Table 3), all but 1 (cropland expansion) lay between 1960 and 2010 (Fig. 3). Given the long human history, this is a very narrow time window. The available data suggest that peak-rate years for several nonrenewable resources, i.e., coal, gas, oil, and phosphorus, have not yet occurred. This implies a continued acceleration of extraction, which is in accordance with earlier analysis for oil (Hallock et al. 2014) and phosphorus (Cordell et al. 2009).

Individual countries have detectable impacts on the global nonrenewable resource extraction rate. For example, in 2011 the rate of coal extraction for China was 7.2% (5.7-7.4), whereas the rate for the world without China was 3.7 % (3.5-3.8). The values for natural gas in 2011 were 10.1% (7.6-10.3) and 4.4% (4.0-4.4) with and without China, respectively. A peak-rate year for renewable energy has not occurred.

Figure 3 shows that the peak rate of earth surface conversion to cropland occurred in 1950 (1920-1960), and the expansion of cropland recently stabilized at the highest recorded levels, about 1.8 x 106 ha (Ramankutty and Foley 1999). We find peak-rate years recently passed for many agricultural products: soybeans in 2009 (1977-2011), milk in 2004 (1982-2009), eggs in 1993 (1992-2006), caught fish in 1988 (1984-1999), and maize in 1985 (1983-2007). Two major factors of agricultural productivity, N-fertilizers and the area of irrigated land, show peak-rate years in 1983 (1978-2010) and 1978 (1976-2003), respectively. Water is a resource that many world policy bodies are concerned with and is largely understood as a renewable resource. But not all water is renewable. ‘Fossil water’ stocks are isolated water resources, which are consumed faster than are naturally renewed. There is currently a lack of time-series data at the global scale on the status of hydrological resources (Fan et al. 2013). As an example of national trends, the greatest rate of groundwater extraction occurred in 1975 in the USA (1975-2005). Water conservation and rationing rules likely reduced the rate of ground water extraction (Gleick and Palaniappan 2010). For maize, rice, wheat, and soybeans, the yield per area is stagnating or collapsing in 24-39% of the world’s growing areas (Ray et al. 2012), which may explain why the peak-rate years have passed at a global level. The peak-rate years of renewable resources collectively suggest challenges to achieving global food security (Foley et al. 2011). We identified a sequence in the peak-rate years of resources associated with food production: 1950 for conversion to cropland, 1978 for conversion to irrigated land, 1983 for fertilizer use. Because all peak-rate years for food resources appeared afterward, we inferred that the strategies to increase food production changed from land expansion to intensification of production. Furthermore, the pattern of peak-rate years occurring in land, food, and not yet for nonrenewable resources suggests that sustained intensification of agricultural production is not limited by energy but rather by land.

Following the observation of an apparently simultaneous pattern of peak-rate years in Figure 3, we tested the hypothesis of synchrony among peak-rate years on 20 statistically independent time series of resources, of which 16 presented a peak-rate year. We found that peak-rate years appeared clustered around 2006 (1989-2008), given the uncertainty surrounding the peak-rate year estimate of each resource (Fig. 4). It is unlikely that the synchrony is a statistical artefact because there is less than a 1 in 1000 chance that the distribution in Figure 4 would have been obtained if it were sampled from a uniform distribution, i.e., null hypothesis of no synchrony is rejected.

DISCUSSION

Why is there a synchrony of peak-rate years? Some explanations follow. The overall hypothesis is that multiple resources become scarce simultaneously, which can be driven by two mechanisms.

First, multiple resources, e.g., land, food, energy, etc., are consumed at the same time to meet different human needs. For example, people require food for nutrition; water for drinking, irrigation, and cleaning; land for housing, recreation, food production, infrastructure; and energy for cooking food, transportation, heating, cooling, etc.

Second, producing one resource requires the use of other resources. For example increasing food production requires more land and water whose scarcity in turn leads to limited food production increases, as the sequence of peak-rate years associated with food production shows (see above). Furthermore, the continued increase in extraction for less accessible resources results in an increased ecological and economic cost per unit extracted (Davidson and Andrews 2013), thus reducing availability of the remaining resources. For example, pollution exacerbates water shortages because polluted water is not suitable. These two mechanisms provide the most parsimonious explanation for simultaneous scarcity leading to synchrony of peak-rate years.

Are there other factors causing synchronized peak-rate years? Besides scarcity, passing an individual peak-rate year may be caused by two possible reasons: availability of substitutes or less demand, e.g. less resource is needed because of more efficient use, taste changes, or institutional and regulatory changes (Fig. 1). It is unlikely that substitution has a substantial influence on synchronization. Strong support for the hypothesis that substitution synchronized the peaks would require that substitution took place for all or most of the resources with synchronized peak-rate years. However, among the 16 resources with synchronized peak-rate years in our database, which contains most of the critical global resources, only a few resources may have substitutes. For instance, contrary to expectation there is little evidence that farmed fish substitutes for caught fish (Asche et al. 2001). In contrast, poultry products serve as a substitute for beef because they are cheaper and better adapted to changing tastes (Eales and Unnevehr 1988). However, evidence suggests that meat as a category is not being substituted by plant protein on a global scale (Daniel et al. 2011). Finally, there is little evidence that renewable energy, which did not show a peak-rate year, substitutes for fossil energy. In the last 50 years, the general global trend was that a unit of energy sourced from nonfossil fuels substituted less than one quarter of a unit of fossil fuel-based energy, possibly as a consequence of economic and social complexity (York 2012).

A global synchronous reduction of demand is also an unlikely driver. Despite a declining global population growth rate, i.e., peak-rate year passed in 1989 in accordance with preceding reports (Lutz and K. C. 2010), the global population continues to grow. In most developed countries, we identified peak-rate years in household intensity, i.e., number of households per 100 people (Table 2). Additionally, the peak rate of meat consumption in the USA occurred in 1955 (1909-1999). Nevertheless, the rate of resource appropriation is not expected to decline because consumption in developing countries increases because of lifestyle changes (Brown 2012, Liu 2014), and the land area used for urban settlements and household numbers continue to increase (Liu et al. 2003, Seto et al. 2011). These shifts in resource-intensive living likely more than offset the declining rate of population growth. Declining demand would have to come from broad scale changes in individual preferences for conservation, which continue to seem unlikely.

Finally, constraints on production may not be alleviated unless there is disruptive innovation. For example, although there is phenotypic plasticity in plants, which is exploited by agronomic research, e.g. breeding, particular biochemical mechanisms were not as of now disrupted or constructed de novo in a commercial setting: nitrogen fixation for cereals remains elusive (Charpentier and Oldroyd 2010) and further increase in photosynthetic efficiency is expected to be hard to achieve (Zhu et al. 2010). Further, a basic constraint on breeding is biological diversity. The rate of domesticating species, the biological foundation of food provisioning, began to slow around 2600 B.C. (3600-1500 B.C.), well before our era.

Synchrony among the peak-rate years suggests that multiple planetary resources have to be managed simultaneously, accounting for resource distribution and utilization (Steffen et al. 2011, Liu et al. 2013). Synchrony does not necessarily imply a tipping point that leads to disastrous outcomes because trade-offs are possible (Seppelt et al. 2013), and adaptation, such as the current increasing rate of renewable energy generation or shifting diets (Foley et al. 2011), potentially can be accelerated. Synchrony also suggests that the debate about whether humans can devise substitutes for individual natural capital needs to be broadened to assess simultaneous substitutability (Barbier et al. 2011). Whether substitution and recycling will alleviate constraints to future economic growth (Neumayer 2002) remains an open question, especially because maintaining the innovation rate requires increasing expenditures on human capital (Huebner 2005, Fenichel and Zhao 2014). Arrow et al. (2012) estimated that the growth rate of human capital in the United States could be as low as 0.35%, which is 15-44% of the growth rate of conventional reproducible capital, e.g., infrastructure, and China’s rate of human capital growth ranges between 1.1% and 2%, but is only 10-17% of the rate of growth in reproducible capital.

The synchronization of peak-rate years of global resource appropriation can be far more disruptive than a peak-rate year for one resource. Peak-rate year synchrony suggests that the relationship among resource appropriation paths needs to be considered when assessing the likelihood of successful adaptation of the global society to physical scarcity.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are grateful to Anna Cord, Jörg Priess, Nina Schwarz, Dagmar Haase, and Burak Guneralp for providing comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. We also thank Karen Seto and Burak Gunneralp for providing access to the urban growth data. The work was funded by grant 01LL0901A “Global Assessment of Land Use Dynamics, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Ecosystem Services – GLUES” (German Ministry of Research and Technology) under the Helmholtz Program “Terrestrial Environmental Research,” U.S. National Science Foundation, and Michigan AgBioResearch. This article contributed to the Global Land Project (www.globallandproject.org).

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Posted in Limits To Growth, Peak Food | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments

Extreme Events. CEC 2011. Variable distributed generation from solar and wind increase the chance of large blackouts

Morgan, M., et al.   (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Electric Power Research Institute, BACV Solutions, Southern Company, CIEE, University of Alaska – Fairbanks, and KEMA). 2011. Extreme Events. California Energy Commission. Publication number: CEC-500- 2013-031.

distributed gen blackout 1

Figure 18: BLACKOUT FREQUENCY and SIZE (figure 19, not shown, similar to above) Increases Greatly With Highly Variable Distributed Generation, decreases with Reliable Distributed Generation 

Summary

This study showed that in some cases, increasing the proportion of variable distributed generation could actually increase the long-term frequency of the largest blackouts. If the decentralized generation is highly variable, as is the case with wind and solar power, the operation of the grid can be severely degraded. This may increase the probability of large blackouts and a higher frequency of failures.

One potentially problematic scenario is that as the early penetration of distributed generation comes on line, it will actually make the system more reliable and robust since it will effectively be adding to the capacity margin. However, as new distributed generation is added, the system could become much less reliable as the demand grows, the fraction of distributed generation grows, and the capacity margin falls back to historical, mandated levels.

Possible trigger events that can lead to a blackout include short circuits due to lightning, tree contacts, or animals, severe weather, earthquakes, operational or planning errors, equipment failure, or vandalism.

The worst case occurs when highly centralized high-variability generation, such as large wind farms, are added without the necessary increase in generation margins.

Large blackouts pose a substantial risk that must be mitigated to maintain the high overall reliability of an electric power grid. As the control of the power grid becomes far more complex with the increasing penetration of new generation sources such as wind and solar power and new electric loads such as electric cars, maintaining high reliability of the electric grid becomes even more critical.

Generator capacity margin or generation variability leveling mechanisms are critical to reducing the degradation that can be caused by the increased penetration of sustainable distributed generation.

The backbone of electric power supply is the high-voltage transmission grid. The grid serving California is part of the larger Western Interconnection, administered by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), which extends from the Mexican border well into Canada and from the Pacific coast to the Rocky Mountains.

The western power grid is an impressively large and complex structure. The full WECC interconnection system comprises 37 balancing authorities (BAs), 14,324 high-and medium-voltage transmission lines, 6,533 transformers, 16,157 buses (8,230 are load buses), and 3,307 generating units. The grid has 62 major transmission paths between different areas.

While the extent of this grid provides it with certain reliability benefits, it also adds vulnerabilities because it provides multiple paths for any local disturbance to propagate. This is the problem of cascading failure; a series of failures occur, each weakening the system further, making subsequent failures more likely.

System cascading failures may occur due to the loss of several important elements, such as multiple generating units within a power plant, parallel transmission lines or transformers and common right-of-way circuit outages. The failure of these elements may widely propagate through the interconnected power network and result in a local or wide-area blackout. These kinds of failures that cause severe consequences are initiating events to a cascading failure.

The electrical transmission system of California, like all interconnected transmission systems, is vulnerable to extreme events in which complicated chains of exceptional events cascade to cause a widespread blackout across the state and beyond.

A reliable transmission grid is essential for enabling transition to renewable energy sources and electric cars, especially as the grid itself evolves toward a “smart” infrastructure.

The high voltage transmission grid for California is part of the larger western power grid, a complicated and intricately coordinated structure with hundreds of thousands of components that support the electrical supply and hence the way of life for California citizens, business, and government.

Although the transmission grid is normally very reliable, extreme events in which disturbances cascade across the grid and cause large blackouts do occasionally occur and result in direct costs to society amounting to billions of dollars.

There is an evident need to expand the list of initiating events to reflect the complexities of modern power systems as well as new factors such as the increasing penetration of variable renewable generation resources, demand-side load management, virtual and actual consolidation of balancing authorities, new performance standards, and other factors.

Excerpts:

These large blackouts always have a substantial impact on citizens, business and government. Although these are rare events, they pose a substantial risk. Much is known about avoiding the first few failures near the beginning of a cascade event series, but there are no established methods for directly analyzing the risks of the subsequent long chains of events. The project objective is to find ways to assess, manage, and reduce the risk of extreme blackout events. Since this is a difficult and complex problem, multiple approaches are pursued, including examining historical blackout data, making detailed models of the grid, processing simulated data from advanced simulations, and developing and testing new ideas and methods. The methods include finding critical elements and system vulnerabilities, modeling and simulation, quantifying cascade propagation, and applying statistical analyses in complex systems. The project team combines leading experts from industry, a national laboratory, and universities.

Although such extreme events are infrequent, statistics show that they will occur. The electric power industry has always worked hard to avoid blackouts, and there are many practical methods to maintain reliability. However, the cascading- failure problem is so complex that there are no established methods that directly analyze the risk of the large blackouts. The overall project objective is to assess the risk of extreme-blackout events and find ways to manage and reduce this risk. Managing the risk of extreme events such as this is particularly important as society moves toward environmental sustainability.

From the area of operations, the researchers found that the average fractional load (the load divided by the limit) of the transmission lines is a good representation for the risk of large failures. If this average is kept below about 50%, the probability of large failures appears to decrease. This in turn has major implications for the ratepayer; operating at less than 50% of line capacity would lead to improved reliability for the users but would probably require investment in both the transmission capacity and demand-side control.

Researchers found that decentralized generation can greatly improve the reliability of the power transmission grid. However, if the decentralized generation is highly variable, as is the case with wind and solar power, the operation of the grid can be severely degraded. This may increase the probability of large blackouts and a higher frequency of failures. The project results suggest that one of the critical factors is the generation margin. If high-variability non-centralized generation is brought on-line as an increase in the generation capacity margin, it is likely to improve the network robustness; however, if over time that margin declines again (as the demand increases) to the standard value, the grid could undergo a distinct decline in reliability characteristics. This suggests a need for care in planning and regulation as this decentralization increases. The worst case occurs when highly centralized high-variability generation, such as large wind farms, are added without the necessary increase in generation margins. Increased use of de-centralized generation in the system has numerous effects on the ratepayer, from decreased electricity costs and increased reliability, if implemented carefully, to decreased reliability and an accompanying increase in costs, if not.

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

On August 10, 1996, a blackout started in the northwestern United States and cascaded to disconnect power to about 7,500,000 customers over the West Coast, including millions of customers in both northern and southern California. Power remained out for as much as 9 hours, snarling traffic, shutting down airports and leaving millions in triple- digit heat. An initially small power-system disturbance, a sagging power line, cascaded into a complicated chain of subsequent failures leading to a widespread blackout. Although such extreme events are infrequent, historical statistics show they will occur. The resulting direct cost is estimated to be in the billions of dollars, not including indirect costs resulting from social and economic disruptions and the propagation of failures into other infrastructures such as transportation, water supply, natural gas, and communications.

Line-Trip Data. The transmission line outage data set consists of 8864 automatic line outages recorded by a WECC utility over a period of ten years. This is an example of the standard utility data reported to NERC for the Transmission Availability Data System (TADS). The data for each transmission line outage include the trip time. More than 96% of the outages are of lines rated 115 k V or above. Processing identified 5227 cascading sequences in the data. Some of these cascades are long sequences of events, but most are short.

CHAPTER 4: Extreme Event Risk. Anatomy of Cascading Failure

Cascading failure can be defined as a sequence of dependent events that successively weakens the power system. The events are often some individual power system component being outaged or damaged or mis-operating, but can also include a device functioning as designed but nevertheless contributing to the cascade, or actions by operators, software, or automatic controls. As shown in Figure 6, cascading failure starts with a trigger event and proceeds with further events. All the events interact with the system state as the cascade proceeds. The occurrence of each event depends on the system state, and the system state is affected by every event that has already occurred, and thus the system state changes throughout the cascade. The progressive weakening of the system as the cascade propagates is characteristic of cascading failure.

Possible trigger events include short circuits due to lightning, tree contacts, or animals, severe weather, earthquakes, operational or planning errors, equipment failure, or vandalism. The system state includes factors such as component loadings, which components are in service, generation margin, hidden failures, situational awareness, and weather.

The triggers and the subsequent propagation of events have different mechanisms, so that different approaches are needed to mitigate the triggers or mitigate the propagation. Moreover, the triggers and the propagation have different effects on the risks of small, medium, and large blackouts, so that managing these risks may require different combinations of mitigations for triggers and/or propagation. Limiting the triggers and initiating events reduces the frequency of all blackouts, but can in some cases actually increase the occurrence of the largest blackouts, whereas limiting the propagation tends to reduce the larger blackouts, but may have no effect on the frequency of the smaller events.

The notions of causes (and blame) often can become murky in complicated cascades. For example, it is possible that automatic or manual control decisions that are advantageous in many standard system operational states and are overall beneficial may occasionally be deleterious.

Probabilistic Approach to Simulation of Rare Events Cascading

Failure in power systems is inherently probabilistic. There are significant uncertainties in the initial state of the power system, in the triggering events, and in the way that the cascading events propagate or stop. The initial state of the power transmission system is always varying and includes factors such as patterns of generation and loading, equipment in service, weather, and situational awareness. Examples of trigger events are lightning, earthquakes, shorts involving trees and animals, equipment failure, and operational errors. The progress of cascading events depends on exact conditions and thresholds, can be very complicated, and can involve combinations drawn from dozens of intricate mechanisms, some of which involve unusual or rare interactions, that span a full range of physical and operation al factors. It is appropriate to understand all these uncertainties probabilistically. Large black outs are particular samples from an astronomically large set of possible but unusual combinations of failures. From a modeling perspective, the underlying probabilistic view is driven by several factors. It is impossible to enumerate all the possible large blackouts because of the combinatorial explosion of possibilities. While some selected mechanisms of cascading failure can be usefully approximated in a simulation, it is well beyond the current state of the art to represent all or even only the physics- based) mechanisms in great detail in one simulation. The full range of power system phenomena involved in cascading failure occur on diverse time-scales, and obtaining the full data (such as fast dynamical data) is difficult for the large-network cases needed to study large cascading blackouts. Most important, such a simulation, even if otherwise feasible, would be too slow.

In WECC, one could consider small blackouts to be less than 100 MW load shed, medium blackouts to be between 100 MW and 1000 MW load shed, and large blackouts to be more than 1000 MW load shed. The historical data implies that large blackouts are rarer than medium blackouts, but that the large blackouts are more risky than the medium blackouts because their cost is so much higher.

Based on these cost assumptions, a rough calculation of large and medium blackout risk can be made. The NERC WECC blackouts are divided into small (<100 MW) medium (100 – 1000 MW) and large blackouts (>1000 MW). The largest recorded blackout is 30,390 MW. Small blackouts are not systematically covered by the reported data and are put aside. According to the data, the large blackouts have about 1/3 the probability of the medium blackouts. The average large blackout is roughly 8 times the size of the average medium blackout, so its cost is roughly 20 times larger. Since risk is probability times cost, the risk of an average large blackout is roughly 7 times the risk of an average medium blackout.

CHAPTER 5: Results, Analysis, and Application to California and the Western Interconnection

Selection of Initiating Events Power

System cascading failures may occur due to the loss of several important elements, such as multiple generating units within a power plant, parallel transmission lines or transformers and common right-of-way circuit outages. The failure of these elements may widely propagate through the interconnected power network and result in a local or wide-area blackout. These kinds of failures that cause severe consequences are initiating events to a cascading failure.

Some of the selected initialing events are in NERC Category D. Such events are not routinely analyzed by system planners and operators due to the complexity of such events. The selection of initiating events is a critical step in accurately simulating and analyzing large-scale cascading failures. Successful identification of initiating events can help effectively identify the most severe disturbances and help system planners propose preemptive system reinforcements that will improve both the security and the reliability of the system.

Analyzing too few initiating events may not be sufficient to reveal critical system problems. At the other extreme, scanning all combinations of initiating events in a bulk power system is computationally impossible. As an example, the Western Interconnection contains approximately 20,000 transmission lines. Screening all combinations of N-2 contingencies requires approximately 199,990,000 simulation runs, which is beyond the capability of available simulation tools; for example, if time per run were 90 seconds, the total run time would be about 570 years.  Currently, only 5-50 contingencies are selected annually to perform extreme event analysis to comply with NERC requirements in the WECC system. The selections of these contingencies are based on the experience of power grid operators and planners, that is, knowing critical elements in their systems. This limited set of events is included in the list created in this study. In this study, eight categories of initiating events were collected for the entire WECC system from multiple sources such as historical disturbance information, known vulnerable system elements, engineering judgment, transmission sensitivity analysis methods and others. A large list with more than 35,000 initiating events was created for the full WECC model. The different types of initiating events are summarized below.

Substation Outage. This type of initiating event considers the complete loss of a substation (bus) in the WECC model. It is used to simulate extreme events that result in a complete outage of all elements within a substation. 8,000 initiating events in this category were generated considering all substations with voltage levels higher than 115 kV.

The Loss of Two Transmission Lines Based on Contingency Sensitivity Study

Parallel Circuits Transmission Line Outage. Many of the higher-kV lines are made of two or more circuits on a common tower to increase their transmission capacity. However, during catastrophic events such as thunderstorms, lightning strikes or tornadoes, all the circuits of a multi- circuit transmission line can be out of service leading to huge power- transfer capacity loss. This contingency list considers all the transmission lines that have two or more parallel circuits originating and ending on the same buses. 996 initiating events in this category were collected.

Common Right of Way and Line Crossings Outage. This outage list contains common corridors or common right-of-way (ROW) lines. Common ROW is defined by WECC as “Contiguous ROW or two parallel ROWs with structure center-line separation less than the longest span of the two transmission circuits at the point of separation or 500 feet, whichever is greatest, between the two circuits” events is very important since the right-of- way lines generally fall within similar geographical areas and any natural calamity can easily cause the outage of these transmission lines.

Flow Gates between Balancing Authorities. The flow gates between various balancing authorities represent important transmission-path gateways transporting large amounts of power. Loss of a flow gate can cause major problems for a balancing authority, especially if the BA is normally a power importer without sufficient local generation to meet demand. 54 initiating events in this category were collected.

Major Transmission Interfaces in the WECC System. This event considers outages of major transmission interfaces or paths between different major load and/or generation areas as identified in WECC power-flow base planning case. These interfaces are the backbone of the WECC power grid, and the loss of any of these paths can have large impact. 62 initiating events in this category were collected

Critical Events Corridors Analysis. Although no two blackouts follow the same sequence of events, similar partial sequences of cascading outages may exist in a particular power system. Partial patterns in which transmission lines, generators or buses are forced out in a certain order can repeatedly appear across a variety of initiating events and system conditions. These patterns can result from multiple different initiating events, and therefore are seen as parts of different cascading processes. Figure 9 illustrates the hypothesis of these “critical event corridors.” Critical-corridor identification can be used to recommend transmission-system enhancements, protection-system modification, and remedial actions to help eliminate these most frequently observed, and therefore most probable, critical sequences that lead to severe consequences.

Selection of optimal locations for high penetration of renewables to minimize effects on system reliability; if location choice is not under control of the BA, results can point out potential extreme events due to the concentration of renewable resources in few locations

Finding Line Clusters That Are Critical During Propagation Finding

The triggers for a large blackout is only the first step. Most large blackouts have 2 distinct parts, the triggers/initiating event followed by the cascading failure. The cascade can be made up of as few as one subsequent stage or as many as dozens or even hundreds of stages. The cascading part of the extreme event is critically dependent on the “state” of the system: how heavily the lines are loaded, how much generation margin exists, and where the generation exists relative to the load. However, during large cascading events there are some lines whose probability of overloading is higher than the others. Statistical studies of blackouts using the OPA code allow the identification of such lines or groups of lines for a given network model, thereby providing a technique for identifying at risk (or critical) clusters. These lines play a critical role in the propagation of large events because they are likely to fail during the propagation of the cascade, making it more likely that the cascade will propagate further and turn into an extreme event. Therefore, it is clearly very important to identify them.

System State Parameters That Correlate With Large Blackouts. In a complex system, extreme events may be triggered by a random event. However, the much- higher-than-Gaussian probability of extreme events (the heavy tail) is a consequence of the correlations induced by operating near the operational limits of the system and has little to do with the triggering events. The result is that the extreme-event distribution is independent of the triggering events. Therefore, trying to control the triggering events does not lead to a change of the power-tail distribution. A careful reduction of triggering events may reduce the frequency of blackouts but will not change the functional form of the size distribution. The process of trying to plan for and mitigate the triggering events can in fact lead to a false sense of security since one might think one is having an effect on risk by doing so when in reality, the unexpected triggers which will certainly occur will lead to the same distribution of blackout sizes.

In these complex systems, an initiating event cannot be identified by just the random trigger event, but by the combination of the triggering event and the state of the system. This “state of the system” can be characterized by different measurements of the parameters of the system. In the case of power systems, for example, the system state includes the distribution and amounts of loads and power flows in the network. A simulation model like OPA is continually changing the network loading and power flows. This, importantly, gives a large sample of initiating events. The statistics of the results reflect many combinations of initial events and system states. It is also important to distinguish between blackout initiating events and general cascade initiating events. In power systems, a cascade, in particular a very short cascade, does not always lead to a blackout. Therefore, those two sets of initiating events are different. Within the OPA simulations, a blackout is defined as any event in which the fraction of load shed is greater than 0.00001. However, for comparison with the reported data we use fraction of load shed being greater than 0.002, which is consistent with the NERC reporting requirements from emergency operations planning standard EOP-004-1.

In calculating the probability of a blackout occurring, good measures include the number of lines overloaded in the first iteration, the average fractional line loading every day, the variance of the fractional line loading every day, and the number of lines with a fractional line loading greater than 0.9. They all show strong positive correlation with the probability of a blackout. When a blackout occurs, the size of the blackout correlates strongly with the number of lines overloaded in the initiating state. This is a very clear correlation. The size also has a positive correlation with the average fractional line loading every day, variance of the fractional line loading every day, and the number of lines with a fractional line loading greater than 0.9 (Figure 16).

Having found a number of system parameters that strongly correlate with blackout probability, and even more importantly with extreme event size, it is possible to consider monitoring these quantities in the real system. The goal there would be to see (1) whether they show variations that are meaningful and the same correlations exist, and (2) if so, whether the noise level is low enough to make any of them useful as a precursor measure- the ultimate objective of the work in this section.

Impact of Distributed Generation

The increased utilization of local, often renewable, power sources coupled with a drive for decentralization, the fraction of electric power generation that is “distributed” is growing and set to grow even faster. It is often held that moving toward more distributed generation would have a generally positive impact on the robustness of the transmission grid. This intuited improvement comes simply from the realization that less power would need to be moved long distances, and the local mismatch between power supply and demand would be reduced.

The project approached the issues of system dynamics and robustness with this intuitive understanding in mind and with the underlying question to be answered, “is there an optimal balance of distributed versus central generation for network robustness?” In the interest of understanding the effects of different factors, the investigation was initiated by intentionally ignoring the differences in the economics of centralized vs. distributed generation and trying to approach the question in a hierarchical manner, starting from the simplest model of distributed generation and then adding more complexity.

Using OPA to investigate the effects of increased distributed generation on the system, it was found that:

  1. Increased distributed generation can greatly improve the overall “reliability and robustness” of the system.
  2. Increased distributed generation with high variability (such as Wind and Solar) can greatly reduce overall “reliability and robustness” of the system, causing increased frequency and size of blackouts.
  3. Generator capacity margin or generation variability leveling mechanisms are critical to reducing the degradation that can be caused by the increased penetration of sustainable distributed generation.

Figure 18 shows the blackout frequency as the degree of distribution (a surrogate for the amount of distributed generation) is increased. It can be clearly seen that with reliable distributed generation (same variability as with central generation) the overall blackout frequency decreases, while Figure 19 shows a concomitant decrease in the load-shed sizes as the degree of distribution increases. However, Figures 18 and 19 show a large increase in both the frequency and size of the blackouts when using distributed generation with realistic variability. In some cases, the distributed generation can make the system less robust, with the risk of a large blackouts becoming larger. It is clear that distributed generation can have a range of effects on the system robustness and reliability, coming from the reliability of the generation (wind, solar, and so forth), the fraction that is distributed and the generation capacity margin.

Figure 18: Blackout Frequency Decreases with Increased Reliable Distributed Generation but Increases Greatly With Increased Highly Variable Distributed Generation

One potentially problematic scenario is that as the early penetration of distributed generation comes online, it will actually make the system more reliable and robust since it will effectively be adding to the capacity margin. However, as new distributed generation is added, the system could become much less reliable as the demand grows, the fraction of distributed generation grows, and the capacity margin falls back to historical, mandated levels.

Predicting Extent of Blackout Triggered by an Earthquake

This section summarizes the project results about the size of blackouts triggered by earthquakes. Chapter 6.5.5 of the Phase 1 report gives details.   If there is a large initial shock to the power system such as from an earthquake, what is the risk of the failure cascading to other regions of the WECC? This is an important question because the time required to restore electric power and other infrastructure in the region that experienced damaging ground motion depends on how far the blackout extends. Long restoration times would multiply the consequences of the direct devastation not only to conventional measures such as load loss but also to restoration of lifeline services. Since earthquakes can produce orders of magnitude more costly damage than a blackout, any prolongation of earthquake restoration due to the blackout cascading beyond the shaken region has a significant effect.

The project made an illustrative calculation of the blackout extent as measured by number of lines tripped as a result of a large shock to the system in which initially 26 lines outaged based on a real earthquake scenario. The calculations assumed and applied the branching-process model and observed propagation. (Figure 22) shows an initial estimate of the distribution of the total number of lines tripped due to the combined effect of the earthquake and subsequent cascading. The most likely extent is about 90 lines tripped, but there is a one-in-ten chance that more than 150 lines would trip. This initial estimate is illustrative of probable outage scenarios. A detailed examination of actual earthquake initiating failures and line-trip propagation data would be required to improve it. Similar calculations would be feasible for other large disturbances such as extreme weather events, wildfires or floods.

Additional Types of Initiating Events. There is an evident need to expand the list of initiating events to reflect the complexities of modern power systems as well as new factors such as the increasing penetration of variable renewable generation resources, demand-side load management, virtual and actual consolidation of balancing authorities, new performance standards, and other factors.

Impact of Distributed Generation. The project studied the impact of increased distributed generation on cascading failure risk with the OPA simulation. The results of this work suggest that a higher fraction of distributed generation with no generation variability improves the system characteristics. However, if the distributed generation has variability in the power produced (and this is typical of distributed generation sources such as wind or solar), the system can become significantly less robust with the risk of a large blackouts becoming much larger. It is possible to find an optimal value of the fraction of distributed generation that maximizes the system robustness. Further investigations with different models of the reduced reliability of the distributed generation power and different distributions of the distributed generation would be worthwhile, as would the extension of this work to the larger WECC models.

Historical Data

North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has made public data for reportable blackouts in North America. Blackouts in the WECC for the 23 years from 1984 to 2006 have been analyzed. The 298 blackouts in the WECC data occur at an average frequency of 13 per year. The main measures of blackout size in the NERC data that are used in the project are load shed (MW) and number of customers affected. Blackout duration information is also available, but the data quality is less certain.

The NERC data follows from government reporting requirements. The thresholds for the report of an incident include uncontrolled loss of 300 MW or more of firm system load for more than 15 minutes from a single incident, load shedding of 100 MW or more implemented under emergency operational policy, loss of electric service to more than 50,000 customers for 1 hour or more, and other criteria detailed in the U.S. Department of Energy forms EIA-417 and OE-417.

 

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Electricity, fuel, and other interdependencies

Freight trucks, trains, ships, airplanes all stop when the electricity is out because the pumps depend on it.  Related: Why you should love trucks and When Trucks Stop

CR. September 4 & 23, 2003. Implications of power blackouts for the nation’s cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection. Congressional Record, House of Representatives. Serial No. 108–23

Paul H. Gilbert, member of the National Academy of Engineering and was Chair of the National Research Council Panel responsible for the Chapter on Energy Systems for the NRC Branscomb-Klausner Report, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism.

Our basic infrastructure systems include our electric power, food, and water supplies, waste disposal, natural gas, communications, transportation, petroleum products, shelter, employment, medical support and emergency services, and facilities to meet all our basic needs. These are a highly integrated, mutually dependent, heavily utilized mix of components that provide us with vitally needed services and life support. While all these elements are essential to our economy and our well-being, only one has the unique impact, if lost, of causing all the others to either be seriously degraded or completely lost. And that, of course, is electric power. Our technically advanced society is literally hard wired to a firm, reliable electric supply.

After a major power blackout, Transportation systems would come to a standstill. Waste water could not be pumped. And so we would soon have public health problems. Natural gas pressure would decline, and some would lose gas altogether, very bad news in the winter. Work, jobs, employment, business and economic activity would be stopped. Our economy would take a major hit. It would not be a very safe place to be either. Martial law would likely follow, along with emergency food and water supply relief.

Several weeks to months would have passed, and the enormous recovery and clean-up would begin.

KENNETH C. WATSON.  President & Chairman of the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security, currently the manager of Cisco Systems’ involvement in critical infrastructure

Interdependence Examples. We all depend on telecommunications—in fact, when recently asked to list their dependence on other sectors, the sector coordinators rated telecommunications as first or second on their list. Nearly equal to telecommunications was electric power. Without electricity, there is no ‘‘e’’ in e-commerce. However, without railroads to deliver coal, the nation loses 60 percent of the fuel used to generate electricity. Without diesel, the railroads will stop running. Without water, there is no firefighting, drinking water, or cracking towers to refine petroleum. Without financial services, transactions enabling all these commodity services cannot be cleared. Yet, these are not just one-way dependencies. When the railroads stopped running after 9/11 to guard hazardous material, it only took the city of Los Angeles two days to demand chlorine or face the threat of no drinking water—the railroads began operating again on the third day. Throughout the Northeast, dependencies on electric power were obvious. Some areas had electric water pumps, and they had to boil their drinking water for days after the blackout.

I am not sure you can point to a single weak link. Over the last 20 years, all of the infrastructures have become more and more dependent on networks, and they have become more and more interconnected. I think the key that we need to study in research and modeling and exercises is interdependency. Each of the sectors is dependent on each of the others and sometimes we don’t even know what these dependencies are without modeling and exercises.

All of our critical infrastructures are interlinked in complex, sometimes little-understood ways. Some dependencies are surprising, contributing to unusual key asset lists.

ROBERT LISCOUSKI, assistant secretary, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, Department of homeland security

While the national focus was primarily on the blackout and its cause, our teams were hard at work assessing the cascading effects into other sectors. Interdependencies among the sectors were again demonstrated by this event. Seven major petroleum refineries suspended operations, many chemical manufacturing plants were shut down, grocery stores lost perishable inventories, air traffic ceased at several major airports, and emergency services capacity was tested. Web sites were shut down. ATMs did not work in the affected areas and the American Stock Exchange did not operate for a period of time. The effect of the blackout highlighted what we already knew at the department. If one infrastructure is affected, many other infrastructures are likely to be impacted as well. Indeed, all the critical infrastructure sectors were affected by this event. Understanding the vulnerabilities and interdependencies associated with cascading events is an area of great importance to the department.

JIM TURNER, TEXAS:  America’s critical infrastructures comprise the backbone of our economy. They are essential to our way of life. In addition to electric power systems, these essential infrastructures include chemical and nuclear plants, water systems, commercial transportation and mass transit. Our country’s infrastructure also includes the extensive computer and information technology systems which we increasingly rely upon to operate and interconnect our many diverse physical assets. There are hundreds of thousands of potential critical infrastructure targets that terrorists could choose to attack.

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, TEXAS: An illustration of the disjunct in our infra and super-structure is the television broadcast of the tens of thousands of New Yorkers who had to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge to end their workday. This is vulnerability. Thousands of riders of underground mass transit systems trapped in cars, frugal in their consumption of oxygen and hopeful that their rescue team was near equates to vulnerability. Because we cannot cast blame for this occurrence on a terrorist group means that we are vulnerable to ourselves first and foremost. The Administration must increase our awareness of the status of the areas that are most open to corruption.

Colonel Michael C. McDaniel

Assistant Adjutant General for Homeland Security for the Michigan National Guard, Homeland Security Advisor to Michigan’s Governor, Jennifer M Granholm.

 

On Thursday, August 14, 2003, at 4:15 p.m., a massive power outage struck the Niagara-Mohawk power grid in the Northeast US and Ontario causing blackouts from New York to Michigan.

 

Within minutes, much of southeast and mid-Michigan was without power, with 60% of Michigan’s population, over 2.2 million households, affected by the outage

The State of Michigan and local governments spent $20.4 million on emergency measures to save lives, protect public health, and prevent damage to public and private property.

The Emergency Management Division of the Michigan State Police began to immediately monitor conditions around the state, including the state’s nuclear power plants.

Within minutes, the state’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was formally activated, and state agencies began to monitor state and national conditions.

 

Some of the major complications from the blackout:

  1. Gas stations were unable to supply peoples’ needs for their cars and portable generators, as without electricity the pumps were inoperable
  2. The Detroit Board of Water and Sewers, oversight board of the nation’s second largest water system, reported that its system was not functioning correctly. It issued a boiled water advisory for its entire service area.
  3. There was no system to notify all of the customers of the boiled water advisory, as notification was dependent on the public media. It became clear, on the morning of August 15, that the largest problem was the lack of potable water. Public and private entities delivered hundreds of thousands of gallons of water to those affected sites, but a boiled water advisory was not lifted until Monday, August 18.
  4. Widespread traffic signals not functioning and limited telephone communications.
  5. Marathon Refinery, Michigan’s largest refining facility, lost power and had to shut down. One unit did not shut down properly and began venting partially processed hydrocarbons. Because of the tank’s location, the city of Melvindale (with the assistance of the Michigan State Police) decided to evacuate 30,000 residents and shut down Interstate 75 for several hours until the situation was controlled. The Marathon Refinery was inoperable as a result of the loss of electricity and water, and out of production for approximately 10 days.
  6. The auto industry shut down operations for three days.
  7. A lot of first responders were relying upon cell phones that did not have an adequate radio system, and a number of cell towers did not have backup systems that worked.
  8. Radio and television stations reported broadcasting difficulties, with several small stations not operating at all.
  9. Many facilities lacked sufficient alternative energy sources. Portable generators were needed at hospitals and other public facilities, including the state mental institution.
  10. The Fermi II nuclear plant in Monroe County was shut down as a precaution. It returned to full power production and was reconnected to the power grid late a week later on August 21
  11. The Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, the busiest commercial landport in the United States with 16,000 tractor-trailers crossing daily, was also affected.
  12. Canadian customs lost their computer datalink, and their ability to verify trucking manifests electronically. As a result they were forced to visually and manually inspect the manifests and, if warranted, the freight itself. This resulted in an approximately four-mile backup of traffic for almost 24 hours on the U.S. side.
  13. Many computer systems were not functioning, including the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN).
  14. The Michigan State Police positioned 50 state troopers on stand-by for mobilization, if needed to maintain order in blackout areas . The Michigan National Guard also had troopers ready on stand-by.
  15. Metropolitan Detroit Airport was closed and all flights canceled until midnight on August 14.
  16. A number of public water issues arose from the blackout. Generators need an automatic activation switches and shouldn’t rely on telephone lines
  17. Almost every type of critical infrastructure that should have a generator did have some sort of generator. But no one had not tested those generators under load, so we had a lot of generators that just didn’t work. They might have fired them up before, but they never tested them under a load and actually had them producing electricity. When they did work, they ran out of fuel. We were starting to get calls from both hospitals and some of the utilities wanting to know if we could help them find kerosene diesel for their generators.
  18. A lot of people did not have old-fashioned phones. Everybody’s phone is portable, a hand-held device which requires electricity these days, or a cell device, and not all of those towers worked. So there were a number of instances where the communication systems were more reliant on electricity than we believed that they would be. Again, even those radio and TV stations that had generators, the generators didn’t work because they had never been tested. So they weren’t ready to work under load. They weren’t the right capacity generator. And then the other problem, as I said, was 24 hours later they were staring to run out of power. Both TV and radio, as well as the telephone companies, were calling as well.
  19. This was a very hot day in the summer where the usage on the Detroit water system was almost a billion gallons a day. The system, even after it came back up on generators, could only handle about 400 million gallons per day. If we had had a method, if we had some sort of warning that this was going to happen, and could have gotten out to decrease your electricity, decrease your water use ahead of time, it probably would have made it easier for the system to come back on.

The NIAC Interdependency and Risk Assessment Working Group report included results of a survey of Sector Coordinators and key infrastructure owners and operators regarding their top dependencies. Respondents were asked to list the top three sectors on which they depend, and the top three sectors that depend on them. In terms of short-term dependencies, the overall top three were 1) telecommunications and IT, 2) electricity, and 3) transportation. However, adding long-term impacts broadens the list of critical dependencies. Without financial services, business comes to a grinding halt in a matter of days. Without safe food, clean drinking water, and available health care, public health also reaches a crisis in days. Without emergency police, fire, and medical services, the ability to respond and contain emergencies is severely impacted. Long-term impacts of transportation failures are far more severe than the short term.

Lively, M. February 14, 2014. Pricing Gasoline When the Pumps Are Running on Backup Electricity Supply

At the February 11, 2014 MIT Club of Washington Seminar Series dinner on the topic of “Modernizing the U.S. Electric Grid,” Michael Chertoff gave a talk on “The Vulnerability of the U.S. Grid.

He said that after a hurricane hit Miami in about 2005, electrical workers couldn’t get to work because they had no gasoline for their cars.  The gas stations had gasoline but no electricity to pump the gasoline. 

Back-up electricity generators would have required an investment of $50,000 which was not justified on the razor thin margins on which most gas stations operate.

The gas station owners thought process was that the sales lost during the blackout would just be gasoline that would be sold after the power came back on.  Investment in a back-up generator would not change the station’s revenue and would just hurt its profitability.

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Solar Photovoltaics (PV) limited by raw materials

This paper (excerpts below) shows that there are limits to growth — there simply aren’t enough minerals in the world that can be produced physically and/or at a reasonable cost for the many of the most common kinds of PV being made now. The authors suggest that research ought to focus on solar PV technologies for which enough cheap, non-toxic physical material in the world is available.

Cheaper materials could be key to low-cost solar cells

By Robert Sanders, Media Relations | 17 February 2009

BERKELEY — Unconventional solar cell materials that are as abundant but much less costly than silicon and other semiconductors in use today could substantially reduce the cost of solar photovoltaics, according to a new study from the Energy and Resources Group and the Department of Chemistry at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL).

These materials, some of which are highly abundant, could expand the potential for solar cells to become a globally significant source of low-carbon energy, the study authors said.

The analysis, which appeared online Feb. 13 in Environmental Science & Technology, examines the two most pressing challenges to large-scale deployment of solar photovoltaics as the world moves toward a carbon neutral future: cost per kilowatt hour and total resource abundance. The UC Berkeley study evaluated 23 promising semiconducting materials and discovered that 12 are abundant enough to meet or exceed annual worldwide energy demand. Of those 12, nine have a significant raw material cost reduction over traditional crystalline silicon (x-Si in chart), the most widely used photovoltaic material in mass production today.

The most popular solar materials in use today are silicon and thin films made of CdTe (cadmium telluride) and CIGS (copper indium gallium selenide). While these materials have helped elevate solar to a major player in renewable energy markets, they are still limited by manufacturing challenges. Silicon is expensive to process and mass produce. Furthermore, it has become increasingly difficult to mine enough silicon to meet ever-growing consumer demand.

Thin films, while significantly less costly than silicon and easier to mass produce, would rapidly deplete our natural resources if these technologies were to scale to terawatt hours of annual manufacturing production. A terawatt hour is a billion kilowatt hours.

Kammen said. “… what we’ve found is that some leading thin films may be difficult to scale as high as global electricity consumption.”
Wadia added “ if our objective is to supply the majority of electricity in this way, we must quickly consider alternative materials that are Earth-abundant, non-toxic and cheap. These are the materials that can get us to our goals more rapidly.”

The team identified a large material extraction cost (cents/watt) gap between leading thin film materials and a number of unconventional solar cell candidates, including iron pyrite, copper sulfide, and copper oxide. They showed that iron pyrite is several orders of magnitude better than any alternative on important metrics of both cost and abundance. In the report, the team referenced some recent advances in nanoscale science to argue that the modest efficiency losses of unconventional solar cell materials would be offset by the potential for scaling up while saving significantly on materials costs.

The availability of some rare elements may limit the growth of some PV technologies. Of particular concern is tellurium used for cadmium telluride, and indium used for copper indium gallium diselenide. Tellurium is primarily extracted as a byproduct of electrolytic copper refining, and global supply is estimated at approximately 630 MT/yr. Tellurium supply is expected to increase over time based on increasing global copper demand. Indium is primarily extracted as a byproduct of zinc refining, and global supply is estimated at about 1,300 MT/yr. Nearly all of the indium supply is used to make transparent conductive oxide coatings, such as those used for flat-panel liquid crystal displays. Global indium supply is projected to increase to meet demand for non-PV applications, and potentially for PV applications as well. Currently, it takes approximately 60–90 MT of tellurium to make 1 GW of cadmium telluride, and approximately 25–50 MT of indium to make 1 GW of copper indium gallium diselenide.  Competition with non-PV applications for rare materials could significantly restrict supply, particularly for indium, and could increase both material prices and price volatilities. Material feedstocks for crystalline silicon PV are virtually unlimited, and supply constraints are not likely to limit growth. However, crystalline silicon cells typically use silver for electrical contacts, which could be subject to price spikes if there are supply shortages.  Source: 2014. Renewable Electricity Futures Study Exploration of High-Penetration Renewable Electricity Futures. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

Wadia, C. et al. 2009. Materials Availability Expands the Opportunity for Large-Scale Photovoltaics Deployment. Environ. Sci. Technol. 43 2072-2077

Our analysis highlights a photovoltaic future that may not be dependent on either silicon technologies or currently popular thin films.

solar PV 1 limited minerals for 17000 TWh

 

FIGURE 1. Annual electricity production potential for 23 inorganic photovoltaic materials. Known economic reserves (also known as Reserve Base) and annual production are taken from the U.S. Geological Survey studies 21 . Total U.S. and worldwide annual electricity consumption are labeled on the figure for comparison.

Forecasts of the future costs of vital materials have a high-profile history. In 1980, Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon made a public wager on the future price change of chrome, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten. Ehrlich and his colleagues waged a total of $1000, or $200/metal. In 1990, as Simon had predicted, the inflation-normalized price of all five metals had dropped to ~$430 because cheaper plastics and ceramics replaced more costly metals, lowering demand and subsequently the price of those metals (14).

Today that basket of 5 metals is now worth over $1500. Continued demands for higher-purity and thus valued materials have been the driver of this reversal of the initial Ehrlich-Simon wager (15–19).

For example, the average quality of copper ore has gone from 2.4% to 1% in the last 100 years.

Indium, a secondary metal byproduct of zinc mining, has shot up 400% the past 5 years due to an increase in demand from the digital display market (20, 21).

We explore the material limits for PV expansion by examining both material supply and least cost per watt for the most promising semiconductors as active photogenerating materials across 23 potential photovoltaic technologies were evaluated. Low-efficiency cell types were not significantly investigated, regardless of cost.

Conclusion

We estimated the electricity contribution and cost impact of material extraction to a finished solar module by calculating the maximum TWh and minimum ¢/W of each of the 23 compounds evaluated (Figures 1 and 2).

solar PV 2 limited minerals cost

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 2. Minimum ¢/W for 23 inorganic photovoltaic materials. Component cost contribution in ¢/W is a strong indicator of value for future deployment. Calculated values for all 23 compounds evaluated are shown. The range of costs are between 0.327¢/W for Ag2S and 0.000002¢/W for FeS2 . While the actual dollar figure per watt for material extraction will appear small compared to the entire cost of an installed PV system, the cost of processing the material for PV grade applications is a larger cost contributor and should be evaluated further.

PV materials that could achieve extraction costs lower than x-Si at 0.039¢/W and demonstrate equal or greater electricity production potential versus x-Si include FeS2, Zn3P2, and a-Si. Iron pyrite (FeS2) is significantly more attractive in both cost and availability than all other compounds, whereas several of the leading thin-film technologies like CdTe are not able to meet the large-scale needs. The two materials PbS and NiS are both promising, but outside of a quantum confined system, they will be hampered by disproportionately higher Balance of system and installation costs due to low power conversion efficiencies. Furthermore, some unusual candidate compounds, like ZnO, have a high abundance but fail to meet an acceptable limit on cost, and some compounds, like CdS, show favorable cost but a low production potential, making them candidate technologies primarily for niche markets.

Silicon Comparison. It is important to compare results of these novel material systems to silicon, the second most abundant element in the earth’s crust at 28% of the lithosphere by mass. Despite its abundance, silicon has an annual production that trails that of copper by 145,000 metric tons and a cost of extraction of ~$1.70/kg, as compared to the $0.03/kg for iron (21). This disparity in costs is traced to the energy input of 24 kWh/kg for useable metallurgical-grade silicon from silica (SiO2) as opposed to the 2 kWh/kg for converting hematite (Fe2O3) to iron (31, 32). While both processes are already quite efficient, the Gibbs free energy of processing silica is a fixed thermodynamic barrier that will always be present. Crystalline silicon is further disadvantaged by a weighted photon flux absorption coefficient two orders of magnitude smaller than that for FeS2, thereby requiring a much larger material input to achieve the same absorption properties.

(14) Tierney, J. Betting on the Planet. The New York Times, 1990.

(15) Solow, R. M. Economics of Resources or Resources of Economics. Am. Econ. Rev. 1974

(16) Slade, M. E. Trends in natural-resource commodity prices – An analysis of the time domain. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 1982

(17) Nordhaus, W. D. Allocation of Energy Resources. Brookings Pap. Econ. Activity 1973 , (3), 529–570.

(18) Hotelling, H. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources (Re- printed from Journal of Political-Economy, Vol 39, Pg 137-175, 1931). Bull. Math. Biol. 1991,53 1-2), 281–312.

(19) Withagen, C. Untested hypotheses in non-renewable resource economics. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1998,11 3-4), 623–634.

(20) Gordon, R. B.; Bertram, M.; Graedel, T. E. Metal stocks and sustainability. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2006, 103 (5), 1209– 1214.

(21) U.S. Geological Survey: Mineral commodity summaries 2007; U.S. Geological Survey: Washington, DC, 2007.

(31) Green, M. A. Solar cells: operating principles, technology, and system applications ; Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982.

(32) Chapman, P. F.; Roberts, F. Metal resources and energy; Butterworths: London, 1983.

Posted in Peak Rare Earth Elements, Photovoltaic Solar | Tagged | Comments Off on Solar Photovoltaics (PV) limited by raw materials

Limits to Growth

cartoon never run out of anything argument

Preface. What follows are a bunch of articles on limits to growth, sometimes just a link, sometimes excerpts. Today Wall Street Journal and other neocapitalists scorn the idea, insisting that human ingenuity and substitution can overcome all obstacles, and they have the bullhorn. So much so that future history books, if they even exist after the overshoot dark age we’re about to plunge into, will blame atheists, liberals, and heaven knows who else.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Climate scientists and others have in the past few years issued a steady stream of analyses showing that without immediate remedial actions, a disastrous future is headed our way. But is it a four-decade-old study that will prove prescient?

That study, issued in the 1972 book The Limits to Growth, forecast that industrial output would decline early in the 21st century, followed quickly by a rise in death rates due to reduced provision of services and food that would lead to a dramatic decline in world population. To be specific, per capita industrial output was forecast to decline “precipitously” starting in about 2015.

Well, here we are. Despite years of stagnation following the worst economic crash since the Great Depression, things have not gotten that bad. At least not yet. Although the original authors of The Limits to Growth, led by Donella Meadows, caution against tying their predictions too tightly to a specific year, the actual trends of the past four decades are not far off from the what was predicted by the study’s models. A recent paper examining the original 1972 study goes so far as to say that the study’s predictions are well on course to being borne out.

That research paper, prepared by a University of Melbourne scientist, Graham Turner, is unambiguously titled “Is Global Collapse Imminent?” As you might guess from the title, Dr. Turner is not terribly optimistic.

He is merely the latest researcher to sound alarm bells. Just last month, a revised paper by 19 climate scientists led by James Hansen demonstrates that continued greenhouse-gas emissions will lead to a sea-level rise of several meters in as few as 50 years, increasingly powerful storms and rapid cooling in Europe. Two other recent papers calculate that humanity has already committed itself to a six-meter rise in sea level and a separate group of 18 scientists demonstrated in their study that Earth is crossing multiple points of no return. All the while, governments cling to the idea that “green capitalism” will magically pull humanity out of the frying pan.

Four decades of ‘business as usual’

At least global warming is acknowledged today, even if the world’s governments prescriptions thus far are woefully inadequate. In 1972, the message of The Limits to Growth was far from welcome and widely ridiculed. Adjusting parameters to test various possibilities, the authors ran a dozen scenarios in a global model of the environment and economy, and found that “overshoot and collapse” was inevitable with continued “business as usual”; that is, without significant changes to economic activity. Needless to say, such changes have not occurred.

In the “business as usual” model, the capital needed to extract harder-to-reach resources becomes sufficiently high that other needs for investment are starved at the same time that resources begin to become depleted. Industrial output would begin to decline about 2015, but pollution would continue to increase and fewer inputs would be available for agriculture, resulting in declining food production. Coupled with declines in services such as health and education due to insufficient capital, the death rate begins to rise in 2020 and world population declines at a rate of about half a billion per decade from 2030. According to Dr. Turner:

“The World3 model simulated a stock of non-renewable as well as renewable resources. The function of renewable resources in World3, such as agricultural land and the trees, could erode as a result of economic activity, but they could also recover their function if deliberate action was taken or harmful activity reduced. The rate of recovery relative to rates of degradation affects when thresholds or limits are exceeded as well as the magnitude of any potential collapse.”

The World3 computer model simulated interactions within and between population, industrial capital, pollution, agricultural systems and non-renewable resources, set up to capture positive and negative feedback loops. Dr. Turner writes that changing parameters merely delays collapse. The current boom in fracking natural gas and the extraction of petroleum products from tar sands weren’t anticipated in the 1970s, but the expansion of new technologies to exploit resources pushes back the collapse “one to two decades” but “when it occurs the speed of decline is even greater.”

Turner collapse chartSo how much stock should we put in a study more than 40 years old? Dr. Turner asserts that actual environmental, economic and population measurements in the intervening years “aligns strongly” to what the Limits to Growth model expected from its “business as usual” run. He writes:

“[T]he observed industrial output per capita illustrates a slowing rate of growth that is consistent with the [business as usual scenario] reaching a peak. In this scenario, the industrial output per capita begins a substantial reversal and decline at about 2015. Observed food per capita is broadly in keeping with the [Limits to Growth business as usual scenario], with food supply increasing only marginally faster than population. Literacy rates show a saturating growth trend, while electricity generation per capita … grows more rapidly and in better agreement with the [Limits to Growth] model.”

Peak oil and difficult economics

Rising energy costs following global peak oil will make much of the remaining stock uneconomical to exploit. This is a critical forcing point in the collapse scenario. And as more energy is required to extract resources that are more difficult to exploit, the net energy from production continues to fall. John Michael Greer, a writer on peak oil, observes that, just as it takes more energy to produce a steel product than it did a century ago due to the lower quality of iron ore today, more energy is required to produce energy today.

Net energy from oil production has vastly shrunken over the years, Mr. Greer writes:

“[T]the sort of shallow wells that built the US oil industry has a net energy of anything up to 200 to 1: in other words, less than a quart out of each 42-gallon barrel of oil goes to paying off the energy cost of extraction, and the rest is pure profit. … As you slide down the grades of hydrocarbon goo, though, that pleasant equation gets replaced by figures considerably less genial. Your average barrel of oil from a conventional US oilfield today has a net energy around 30 to 1. … The surge of new petroleum that hit the oil market just in time to help drive the current crash of oil prices, though, didn’t come from 30-to-1 conventional oil wells. … What produced the surge this time was a mix of tar sands and hydrofractured shales, which are a very, very long way down the goo curve. …

“The real difficulty with the goo you get from tar sands and hydrofractured shales is that you have to put a lot more energy into getting each [barrel of oil equivalent] of energy out of the ground and into usable condition than you do with conventional crude oil. The exact figures are a matter of dispute, and factoring in every energy input is a fiendishly difficult process, but it’s certainly much less than 30 to 1—and credible estimates put the net energy of tar sands and hydrofractured shales well down into single digits. Now ask yourself this: where is the energy that has to be put into the extraction process coming from? The answer, of course, is that it’s coming out of the same global energy supply to which tar sands and hydrofractured shales are supposedly contributing.”

It is that declining energy availability and greater expense that is the tipping point, Dr. Turner argues:

“Contemporary research into the energy required to extract and supply a unit of energy from oil shows that the inputs have increased by almost an order of magnitude. It does not matter how big the resource stock is if it cannot be extracted fast enough or other scarce inputs needed elsewhere in the economy are consumed in the extraction. Oil and gas optimists note that extracting unconventional fuels is only economic above an oil price somewhere in the vicinity of US$70 per barrel. They readily acknowledge that the age of cheap oil is over, without apparently realising that expensive fuels are a sign of constraints on extraction rates and inputs needed. It is these constraints which lead to the collapse in the [Limits to Growth] modelling of the [business as usual] scenario.”

New oil is dirty oil

The current plunge in oil and gas prices will not be permanent. Speculation on why Saudi Arabia, by far the world’s biggest oil exporter, continues to furiously pump out oil as fast as it can despite the collapse in pricing frequently centers on speculation that the Saudis’ pumping costs are lower than elsewhere and thus can sustain low prices while driving out competitors who must operate in the red at such prices.

If this scenario pans out, a shortage of oil will eventually materialize, driving the price up again. But the difficult economics will not have disappeared; all the easy sources of petroleum have long since been tapped. And the sources for the recent boom — tar sands and fracking — are heavy contributors to global warming, another looming danger. The case for catastrophic climate disruption due to global warming is far better understood today than it was in 1972 — and we are already experiencing its effects.

Dr. Turner, noting with understatement that these gigantic global problems “have been met with considerable resistance from powerful societal forces,” concludes:

“A challenging lesson from the [Limits to Growth] scenarios is that global environmental issues are typically intertwined and should not be treated as isolated problems. Another lesson is the importance of taking pre-emptive action well ahead of problems becoming entrenched. Regrettably, the alignment of data trends with the [Limits to Growth] dynamics indicates that the early stages of collapse could occur within a decade, or might even be underway. This suggests, from a rational risk-based perspective, that we have squandered the past decades, and that preparing for a collapsing global system could be even more important than trying to avoid collapse.”

Sobering indeed. Left unsaid (and, as always, there is no criticism intended in noting a research paper not going outside its parameters) is why so little has been done to head off a looming global catastrophe. Free of constraints, it is not difficult to quantify those “powerful societal forces” as the biggest industrialists and financiers in the world capitalist system. As long as we have an economic system that allows private capital to accumulate without limit on a finite planet, and externalize the costs, in a system that requires endless growth, there is no real prospect of making the drastic changes necessary to head off a very painful future.

Just because a study was conducted decades in the past does not mean we can’t learn from it, even with a measure of skepticism toward peak-oil fast-collapse scenarios. If we reach still further back in time, Rosa Luxemburg’s words haunt us still: Socialism or barbarism.

Pete Dolack writes the Systemic Disorder blog and has been an activist with several groups. His book, It’s Not Over: Learning From the Socialist Experiment, is available from Zero Books.

James Howard Kunstler (2015) Twenty-Three Geniuses. Scientists vindicate ‘Limits to Growth’ – urge investment in ‘circular economy’

Turner G (2014) Limits to Growth was right. New research shows we’re nearing collapse.  The Guardian

Research from the University of Melbourne has found the book’s forecasts are accurate, 40 years on. If we continue to track in line with the book’s scenario, expect the early stages of global collapse to start appearing soon.

As the MIT researchers explained in 1972, growing population and demands for material wealth would lead to more industrial output and pollution. Resources are being used up at a rapid rate, pollution is rising, industrial output and food per capita is rising. The population is rising quickly.  So far, Limits to Growth checks out with reality. So what happens next?  According to the book, to feed the continued growth in industrial output there must be ever-increasing use of resources. But resources become more expensive to obtain as they are used up. As more and more capital goes towards resource extraction, industrial output per capita starts to fall – in the book, from about 2015. As pollution mounts and industrial input into agriculture falls, food production per capita falls. Health and education services are cut back, and that combines to bring about a rise in the death rate from about 2020. Global population begins to fall from about 2030, by about half a billion people per decade. Living conditions fall to levels similar to the early 1900s.  It’s essentially resource constraints that bring about global collapse in the book. However, Limits to Growth does factor in the fallout from increasing pollution, including climate change.

The issue of peak oil is critical. Many independent researchers conclude that “easy” conventional oil production has already peaked. Even the conservative International Energy Agency has warned about peak oil. Peak oil could be the catalyst for global collapse. Some see new fossil fuel sources like shale oil, tar sands and coal seam gas as saviors, but the issue is how fast these resources can be extracted, for how long, and at what cost. If they soak up too much capital to extract the fallout would be widespread.

Ahmed N (2014). Exhaustion of cheap mineral resources is terraforming Earth – scientific report.  Soaring costs of resource extraction require transition to post-industrial ‘circular economy’ to avoid collapse. The Guardian.

A new landmark scientific report drawing on the work of the world’s leading mineral experts forecasts that industrial civilisation’s extraction of critical minerals and fossil fuel resources is reaching the limits of economic feasibility, and could lead to a collapse of key infrastructures unless new ways to manage resources are implemented.

The peer-reviewed study – the 33rd Report to the Club of Rome – is authored by Prof Ugo Bardi of the Department of Earth Sciences at the University of Florence, where he teaches physical chemistry. It includes specialist contributions from fifteen senior scientists and experts across the fields of geology, agriculture, energy, physics, economics, geography, transport, ecology, industrial ecology, and biology, among others.

The Club of Rome is a Swiss-based global think tank founded in 1968 consisting of current and former heads of state, UN bureaucrats, government officials, diplomats, scientists, economists and business leaders.

Tverberg (2014) Limits to Growth–At our doorstep, but not recognized

How long can economic growth continue in a finite world? This is the question the 1972 book The Limits to Growth by Donella Meadows sought to answer. The computer models that the team of researchers produced strongly suggested that the world economy would collapse sometime in the first half of the 21st century.

I have been researching what the real situation is with respect to resource limits since 2005. The conclusion I am reaching is that the team of 1972 researchers were indeed correct. In fact, the promised collapse is practically right around the corner, beginning in the next year or two. In fact, many aspects of the collapse appear already to be taking place, such as the 2008-2009 Great Recession and the collapse of the economies of smaller countries such as Greece and Spain. How could collapse be so close, with virtually no warning to the population?

Tverberg (2014) Reaching Limits to Growth: What Should our Response Be?

Oil limits seem to be pushing us toward a permanent downturn, including a crash in credit availability, loss of jobs, and even possible government collapse. In this process, we are likely to lose access to both fossil fuels and grid electricity. Supply chains will likely need to be very short, because of the lack of credit. This will lead to a need for the use of local materials.

Grantham J (2011) Time to Wake Up: Days of Abundant Resources and Falling Prices Are Over Forever  The Oil Drum.

Jeremy Grantham, the Chief Investment Officer of GMO Capital (with over $106 billion in assets under management). Mr. Grantham began his investment career as an economist with Royal Dutch Shell and earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. His essay, reformatted for TOD, is below the fold. (Original, on GMO Website, here)

Hall CAS, Day JW (2009) Revisiting the Limits to Growth After Peak Oil . In the 1970s a rising world population and the finite resources available to support it were hot topics. Interest faded—but it’s time to take another look. American Scientist, Volume 97, pp 230-37.

“Despite our inattention, resource depletion and population growth have been continuing relentlessly. Our general feeling is that few people think about these issues today, but even most of those who do so believe that technology and market economics have resolved the problems. The warning in The Limits to Growth —and even the more general notion of limits to growth—are seen as invalid. Even ecologists have largely shifted their attention away from resources to focus, certainly not inappropriately, on various threats to the biosphere and biodiversity. They rarely mention the basic resource/human numbers equation that was the focal point for earlier ecologists.

Although many continue to dismiss what those researchers in the 1970s wrote, there is growing evidence that the original “Cassandras” were right on the mark in their general assessments.

There is a common perception, even among knowledgeable environmental scientists, that the limits-to-growth model was a colossal failure, since obviously its predictions of extreme pollution and population decline have not come true. But what is not well known is that the original output, based on the computer technology of the time, had a very misleading feature: There were no dates on the graph between the years 1900 and 2100. If one draws a timeline along the bottom of the graph for the halfway point of 2000, then the model results are almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008 (with a few appropriate assumptions). Of course, how well it will perform in the future when the model behavior gets more dynamic is not yet known. Although we do not necessarily advocate that the existing structure of the limits-to-growth model is adequate for the task to which it is put, it is important to recognize that its predictions have not been invalidated and in fact seem quite on target. We are not aware of any model made by economists that is as accurate over such a long time span.

technology does not work for free. As originally pointed out in the early 1970s by Odum and Pimentel, increased agricultural yield is achieved principally through the greater use of fossil fuel for cultivation, fertilizers, pesticides, drying and so on, so that it takes some 10 calories of petroleum to generate each calorie of food that we eat. The fuel used is divided nearly equally between the farm, transport and processing, and preparation. The net effect is that roughly 19 percent of all of the energy used in the United States goes to our food system. Malthus could not have foreseen this enormous increase in food production through petroleum.

Together oil and natural gas supply nearly two-thirds of the energy used in the world, and coal another 20 percent. We do not live in an information age, or a post-industrial age, or (yet) a solar age, but a petroleum age.

Most environmental science textbooks focus far more on the adverse impacts of fossil fuels than on the implications of our overwhelming economic and even nutritional dependence on them. The failure today to bring the potential reality and implications of peak oil, indeed of peak everything, into scientific discourse and teaching is a grave threat to industrial society.

The concept of the possibility of a huge, multifaceted failure of some substantial part of industrial civilization is so completely outside the understanding of our leaders that we are almost totally unprepared for it.

There are virtually no extant forms of transportation, beyond shoe leather and bicycles, that are not based on oil, and even our shoes are now often made of oil. Food production is very energy intensive, clothes and furniture and most pharmaceuticals are made from and with petroleum, and most jobs would cease to exist without petroleum. But on our university campuses one would be hard pressed to have any sense of that beyond complaints about the increasing price of gasoline, even though a situation similar to the 1970s gas shortages seemed to be unfolding in the summer and fall of 2008 in response to three years of flat oil production, assuaged only when the financial collapse decreased demand for oil.

No substitutes for oil have been developed on anything like the scale required, and most are very poor net energy performers. Despite considerable potential, renewable sources (other than hydropower or traditional wood currently provide less than 1 percent of the energy used in both the U.S. and the world, and the annual increase in the use of most fossil fuels is generally much greater than the total production (let alone increase) in electricity from wind turbines and photovoltaics. Our new sources of “green” energy are simply increasing along with (rather than displacing) all of the traditional ones.”

Revisiting The Limits to Growth: Could The Club of Rome Have Been Correct, After All?

October 2000. Matthew R. Simmons

In the early 1970’s, a book was published entitled, The Limits To Growth, a report of the Club of Rome’s project on the predicament of mankind. Its conclusions were stunning. It was ultimately published in 30 languages and sold over 30 million copies. According to a sophisticated MIT computer model, the world would ultimately run out of many key resources. These limits would become the “ultimate” predicament to mankind.

Over the past few years, I have heard various energy economists lambast this “erroneous” work done. Often the book has been portrayed as the literal “poster child” of misinformed “Malthusian” type thinking that misled so many people into believing the world faced a short mania 30 years ago. Obviously, there were no “The Limits To Growth”. The worry that shortages would rule the day as we neared the end of the 20th Century became a bad joke. Instead of shortages, the last two decades of the 20th Century were marked by glut. The world ended up enjoying significant declines in almost all commodity prices. Technology and efficiency won. The Club of Rome and its “nay-saying” disciples clearly lost!

The critics of this flawed work still relish in pointing out how wrong this theory turned out to be. A Foreign Affairs story published this past January, entitled Cheap Oil, forecast two decades of a pending oil glut. In this article, the Club of Rome’s work was scorned as being the source document which led an entire generation of wrong-thinking people to believe that energy supplies would run short. In this Foreign Affairs report, the authors stated, “….the “sky-is-falling school of oil forecasters has been systematically wrong for more than a generation.

What the Limits to Growth Actually Said

After reading The Limits to Growth, I was amazed. Nowhere in the book was there any mention about running out of anything by 2000. Instead, the book’s concern was entirely focused on what the world might look like 100 years later. There was not one sentence or even a single word written about an oil shortage, or limit to any specific resource, by the year 2000.

The group all shared a common concern that mankind faced a future predicament of grave complexity, caused by a series of interrelated problems that traditional institutions and policy would not be able to cope with the issues, let alone come to grips with their full context. A core thesis of their work was that long term exponential growth was easy to overlook. Human nature leads people to innocently presume growth rates are linear. The book then postulated that if a continuation of the exponential growth of the seventies began in the world’s population, its industrial output, agricultural and natural resource consumption and the pollution produced by all of the above, would result in severe constraints on all known global resources by 2050 to 2070.

The first conclusion was a view that if present growth trends continued unchanged, a limit to the growth that our planet has enjoyed would be reached sometime within the next 100 years. This would then result in a sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.

The second key conclusion was that these growth trends could be altered. Moreover, if proper alterations were made, the world could establish a condition of “ecological stability” that would be sustainable far into the future.

The third conclusion was a view that the world could embark on this second path, but the sooner this effort started, the greater the chance would be of achieving this “ecologically stable” success.

 

Brown, J., et al. January 2011. Energetic Limits to Economic Growth. Bioscience Vol 61 no. 1

In just a few thousand years the human population has colonized the entire world and grown to almost 7 billion. Humans now appropriate 20% to 40% of terrestrial annual net primary production, and have transformed the atmo- sphere, water, land, and biodiversity of the planet (Vitousek et al. 1997, Haberl et al. 2007). For centuries some have questioned how long a finite planet can continue to sup- port near-exponential population and economic growth (e.g., Malthus 1798, Ehrlich 1968, Meadows et al. 1972). Recent issues such as climate change, the global decline in population growth rate, the depletion of petroleum reserves and resulting increase in oil prices, and the recent eco- nomic downturn have prompted renewed concerns about whether longstanding trajectories of population and eco- nomic growth can continue (e.g., Arrow et al. 2004).

Economic growth and development require that energy and other resources be extracted from the environment to manufacture goods, provide services, and create capital. The central role of energy is substantiated by both theory and data. Key theoretical underpinnings come from the laws of thermodynamics: first, that energy can be neither created nor destroyed, and second, that some capacity to perform useful work is lost as heat when energy is converted from one form to another. Complex, highly organized systems, including human economies, are maintained in states far from thermodynamic equilibrium by the continual intake and transformation of energy (Soddy 1926, Odum 1971, Georgescu-Roegen 1977, Ruth 1993, Schneider and Kay 1995, Hall et al. 2001, Chen 2005, Smil 2008). Empirically, the central role of energy in modern human economies is demonstrated by the positive relationship between energy use and economic growth (Shafiee and Topal 2008, Smil 2008, Payne 2010).

Increased energy supply. The sources of energy that may be used to support future economic growth include finite stocks of fossil fuels as well as nuclear, renewable, and other proposed but unproven technologies. Fossil fuels currently provide 85% of humankind’s energy needs (figure 5), but they are effectively fixed stores that are being depleted rapidly (Heinberg 2003, IEA 2008, Hall and Day 2009). Conventional nuclear energy currently supplies only about 6% of global energy; fuel supplies are also finite, and future developments are plagued by concerns about safety, waste storage, and disposal (Nel and Cooper 2009). A breakthrough in nuclear fusion, which has remained elusive for the last 50 years, could potentially generate enormous quantities of energy, but would likely produce large and unpredictable socioeconomic and environmental consequences. Solar, hydro, wind, and tidal renewable energy sources are abundant, but environmental impacts and the time, resources, and expenses required to capture their energy limit their potential (Hall and Day 2009). Biofuels may be renewable, but ecological constraints and environmental impacts constrain their contribution (Fargione et al. 2008). More generally, most efforts to develop new sources of energy face economic problems of diminishing returns on energy and monetary investment (Hall et al. 1986, Tainter 1988, Allen et al. 2001, Tainter et al. 2003).

The nonlinear, complex nature of the global economy raises the possibility that energy shortages might trigger massive socioeconomic disruption. Again, consider the analogy to biological metabolism: Gradually reducing an individual’s food supply leads initially to physiological adjustments, but then to death from starvation, well before all food supplies have been exhausted. M ainstream economists historically have dismissed warnings that resource shortages might permanently limit economic growth. Many believe that the capacity for technological innovation to meet the demand for resources is as much a law of human nature as the Malthusian- Darwinian dynamic that creates the demand (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003, Durlauf et al. 2005, Mankiw 2006). However, there is no scientific support for this proposition; it is either an article of faith or based on statistically flawed extrapolations of historical trends. The ruins of Mohenjo Daro, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Rome, the Maya, Angkor, Easter Island, and many other complex civilizations provide incontrovertible evidence that innovation does not always prevent socioeconomic collapse (Tainter 1988, Diamond 2004).

Conclusions

We are by no means the first to write about the limits to economic growth and the fundamental energetic constraints that stem directly from the laws of thermodynamics and the principles of ecology. Beginning with Malthus (1798), both ecologists and economists have called attention to the essential dependence of economies on natural resources and have pointed out that near-exponential growth of the human population and economy cannot be sustained indefinitely in a world of finite resources (e.g., Soddy 1922, Odum 1971, Daly 1977, Georgescu-Roegen 1977, Cleveland et al. 1984, Costanza and Daly 1992, Hall et al. 2001, Arrow et al. 2004, Stern 2004, Nel and van Zyl 2010. Some ecological economists and systems ecologists have made similar theoretical arguments for energetic constraints on economic systems (e.g., Odum 1971, Hall et al. 1986). However, these perspectives have not been incorporated into mainstream economic theory, practice, or pedagogy (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003, Mankiw 2006), and they have been downplayed in consensus statements by influential ecologists (e.g., Lubchenco et al. 1991, Palmer et al. 2004, ESA 2009) and sustainability scientists (e.g., NRC 1999, Kates et al. 2001, ICS 2002, Kates and Parris 2003, Parris and Kates 2003, Clark 2007).

Excerpts from: Carolyn Lochhead. 4 Jan 2014. Critics question desirability of relentless economic growth. San Francisco Chronicle.

“We are approaching the planet’s limitations. So when I see the media barrage about buying more stuff, it’s almost like a science fiction movie where .. we are undermining the very ecological systems which allow life to continue, but no one’s allowed to talk about it.”  Annie Leonard, founder of the Story of Stuff project, a Berkeley-based effort to curb mass consumption.

Ecologists warn that economic growth is strangling the natural systems on which life depends, creating not just wealth, but filth on a planetary scale. Carbon pollution is changing the climate. Water shortages, deforestation, tens of millions of acres of land too polluted to plant, and other global environmental ills are increasingly viewed as strategic risks by governments and corporations around the world.

Stanford University ecologist Gretchen Daily

As the world economy grows relentlessly, ecologists warn that nature’s ability to absorb wastes and regenerate natural resources is being exhausted. “We’re driving natural capital to its lowest levels ever in human history,” Daily said.

The physical pressure that human activities put on the environment can’t possibly be sustained,” said Stanford University ecologist Gretchen Daily, who is at the forefront of efforts across the world to incorporate “natural capital,” the value of such things as water, topsoil and genetic diversity that nature provides, into economic decision-making.

For example, scientists estimate that commercial fishing, if it continues at the present rate, will exhaust fisheries within the lifetime of today’s children. The global “by-catch” of discarded birds, turtles, and other marine animals alone has reached at least 20 million tons a year.

Mainstream economists universally reject the concept of limiting growth.

As Larry Summers, a former adviser to President Obama, once put it, “The idea that we should put limits on growth because of some natural limit is a profound error, and one that, were it ever to prove influential, would have staggering social costs.”

Since World War II, the overarching goal of U.S. policy under both parties has been to keep the economy growing as fast as possible. Growth is seen as the base cure for every social ill, from poverty and unemployment to a shrinking middle class.  Last month, Obama offered a remedy to widening income inequality: “We’ve got to grow the economy even faster.”

U. C. Berkeley’s Energy & Resources Richard Norgaard: We don’t have to have a free-market economy

Economies are not fixed and unchangeable.  The United States had a centrally planned economy in World War II, then a mixed Cold War economy that built the Interstate Highway System and established social welfare programs like Medicare. Today’s more free-market economy took root in the 1980s.

“Economies aren’t natural,” Norgaard said. “We build them to do what we need to do, and we built the economy we have.”

 

Cassandra’s curse: how “The Limits to Growth” was demonized

March 9, 2008, Ugo Bardi

In 1972, the LTG study arrived in a world that had known more than two decades of unabated growth after the end of the Second World War. It was a time of optimism and faith in technological progress that, perhaps, had never been so strong in the history of humankind. With nuclear power on the rise, with no hint that mineral resources were scarce, with population growing fast, it seemed that the limits to growth, if such a thing existed, were so far away in the future that there was no reason to worry. In any case, even if these limits were closer than generally believed, didn’t we have technology to save us? With nuclear energy on the rise, a car in every garage, the Moon just conquered in 1968, the world seemed to be all set for a shiny future. Against that general feeling, the results of LTG were a shock.
The LTG study had everything that was needed to become a major advance in science. It came from a prestigious institution, the MIT; it was sponsored by a group of brilliant and influential intellectuals, the Club of Rome; it used the most modern and advanced computation techniques and, finally, the events that were taking place a few years after publication, the great oil crisis of the 1970s, seemed to confirm the vision of the authors. Yet, the study failed in generating a robust current of academic research and, a couple of decades after the publication, the general opinion about it had completely changed. Far from being considered the scientific revolution of the century, in the 1990s LTG had become everyone’s laughing stock. Little more than the rumination of a group of eccentric (and probably slightly feebleminded) professors who had really thought that the end of the world was near. In short, Chicken Little with a computer.
With time, the debate veered more and more on the political side. In 1997, the Italian economist Giorgio Nebbia, noted that the reaction against the LTG study had arrived from at least four different fronts. One was from those who saw the book as a threat to the growth of their businesses and industries. A second set was that of professional economists, who saw LTG as a threat to their dominance in advising on economic matters. The Catholic world provided further ammunition for the critics, being piqued at the suggestion that overpopulation was one of the major causes of the problems. Then, the political left in the Western World saw the LTG study as a scam of the ruling class, designed to trick workers into believing that the proletarian paradise was not a practical goal. And this by Nebbia is a clearly incomplete list; forgetting religious fundamentalists, the political right, the believers in infinite growth, politicians seeking for easy solutions to all problems and many others. – See more at: http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/3551#sthash.bhJ3H4t4.dpuf
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Inage: calculate storage for short-term wind variation

Inage, S. 2009. Prospects for Large-Scale Energy Storage in Decarbonized Power Grid. International Energy Agency.

This paper limits itself to the issue of frequency stability in systems with increasing shares of variable renewable generation assets (wind power in Western Europe (WEU) goes from 9.8% now to 25.4% in 2050, etc see page 23)

Electric frequency is controlled within a small deviation: for example, in Japan the standard is 0.2-0.3 Hz; in the U.S. it is 0.018-0.0228 Hz; and in the European UCTE it is 0.04-0.06Hz. As renewables increase, the potential for fatal frequency changes grows, since such generators rarely have frequency control systems and can produce large variations in output as weather conditions change.

The need to ensure supply that matches demand under all circumstances poses particular challenges for variable renewable power options such as wind and solar generation, whose supply heavily depends on season, time and weather conditions. Short-term variations are quite random and difficult to forecast.

Existing regional grids with high shares of variable renewable do not always provide a relevant reference for a future power system with high share s of renewables. The reason is that such grids do not operate as islands; rather, they are well connected to other grids that stabilize their operation.

This is the case for Denmark and Northern Germany. In 2001, the demand and supply of wind power corresponded fairly closely. When excess power was available, it could be exported through interconnections with Norway, Sweden and Germany. Conversely, power could be imported in periods of shortfall. Therefore, in Denmark, no counter measure would be needed to mitigate short-term and long-term variations, despite an anticipated greater share of wind power. Interconnectors provide a key short-and medium-term option to deal with the variability of renewable power generation, but will not be sufficient to deal with large grids on a continental scale with high renewables penetration.

This paper looks at what’s needed if wind power and solar power provides 12% and 11% of global electricity generation by 2050.

Variable output renewable technologies such as wind and solar are not dispatchable.

The variability characteristics of solar, wind and impoundment hydro power vary substantially from season to season, day to day, time to time. Wind turbines may be shut off during storm conditions that could last for hours. Wind speeds may fall to zero or very low levels over large areas for days. Solar power is not generated at night, and insolation levels may be significantly reduced in winter, especially at higher latitudes. Solar power may also fluctuate depending on cloud levels and the moisture content of the air. Finally, hydro power may be absent in dry years, depending on the water inflow (glaciers or rainfall). These different variability characteristic require different types of response strategies.

With large shares of these technologies, steps would need to be taken to ensure the continued reliable supply of electricity. While related issues include voltage and frequency variations,  this report focuses on frequency stability. Constant balance of demand and supply is essential to achieve this, and, in the majority of today’s power systems, mid load technologies such as coal and gas and in some cases hydro, play the chief role in this regard.

The main focus of this paper is to investigate the storage growth and total global storage capacity needed between 2010 and 2050, to assist in the balancing of power systems with large shares of variable renewables.

Variable renewable energies are associated with weather-related power output variations, which consist of short term variations on a scale of seconds to several minutes, superimposed on long term variation on the scale of several hours. Frequency change depends on the short-term variation, therefore this report focuses on short–term variations.

Although the output of individual wind or solar plants can vary considerably, wide geographical dispersal of wind power and PV plants reduces the net variation of many plants as seen by the system as a whole. The net output variation of renewables is an important parameter in this analysis. To date, the impact of this smoothing effect varies from region to region. If the outputs of individual wind and PV plants are uncorrelated, the extent of variation decreases with the inverse square root of the overall number of plants. On the other hand, over relatively small areas with large numbers of wind and PV plants, plants may show strong correlation with each other. In such situations a significant net variation will remain.

The extent to which a power system can accommodate variations in supply is governed to a large extent by its flexibility–a measure of how fast and how much the system can quickly increase or decrease supply or demand, to maintain balance at all times. A range of measures exist to increase the flexibility of power systems, and thus the extent to which they can accommodate variable renewables. This paper looks at one of these measures–storage.

Another option is to interconnect among adjacent power systems. For instance, in Western Europe (WEU), interconnected power grid and electricity trading play an important role.

Flexible power plants such as gas and hydro can act as reserves to provide for deficits in wind power generation across the interconnected area, while at the same time the geographic smoothing effect is increased because the total area is larger. At present, in Denmark, where the average share of wind power is approximately 20%, effective balancing of supply and demand is facilitated through electricity trade with other Scandinavian countries.

However, taking for example a cluster of interconnected systems lying under a single weather system, all with a high share of variable renewables, trade of electricity may not be relied upon for fast access to additional electricity during low wind / solar periods, nor to dispose of surpluses, because deficits and surpluses among all such systems will coincide to a large extent. Moreover, reduced flexible power plant capacity over the entire region in 2050, due to partial displacement by renewables and nuclear, may lead to a lack of flexible reserves. To provide for such cases, internal solutions need to be in place. Balance will not be maintained by interconnectors alone, and system designers and operators should look at additional measures such as energy storage.

Simulations of wind power variation levels between 5% and 30% yield estimates of energy storage capacity in the WEU ranging from 0 GW to 90 GW in 2050. The balance between the demand and the supply was calculated for every 0.1 hr (6 minutes). To estimate energy storage worldwide, net variations were assumed as 15% and 30%. Simulations undertaken suggest that a worldwide energy storage capacity ranging from 189 GW to 305 GW would be required.

As mentioned above, as each storage system has different specifications, the optimal arrangement of these systems depends on circumstances in individual countries. In Annex 1, the current technical potential of NaS cells, pumped hydro, redox flow cells, Compress ed Air Energy Storage (CAES), electric double-layer capacitors, Li-ion batteries, Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES) and flywheel systems is reviewed. Reducing costs of such storage technologies may be a key to expanding the use of energy storage technologies to keep pace with the growth of variable renewables.

Grid Operation and Load Curves

Load duration curves can be split into base and peak loads. Base loads are generated by plants whose output is difficult to change; they therefore operate most of the time at full capacity. Base loads are generally served by either high-efficiency fossil-fired or nuclear reactor power plants with low production cost. Peak loads are usually served by natural gas combined-cycle plants, gas turbine generation, or hydropower plants that can change their output in a short time, although with high production cost.

An interesting case of a power system with a high proportion of wind power is found in Spain and Portugal on the Iberian Peninsula. In 2008, there was a day when the share of wind power in the total power supply reached 23% in Spain. This high proportion created power quality problems that have since been resolved through better interconnect ion s within Spain. In addition, Spain has significant pumped hydropower capacity that can mitigate power supply variation s during the operation.

It is preferable that wind power generation resources be distributed to maximize the smoothing effect, which is the key to reducing net variation of the wind power supply. Since the necessarily capacities of energy storage depend on the net variation of wind power, measuring methods and analytical systems should be established by individual countries or groups of countries. Through an accumulation of these efforts , the necessary countermeasures should be determined

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ASPO: Top Ten 2014 News Stories Regarding Oil and the Economy

Andrews, S., Whipple, T. January 6, 2015. Top Ten 2014 News Stories Regarding Oil and the Economy. January 6, 2015.

1. Oil Price Crash

The great price crash of 2014 could well turn out to be one of the defining events of the decade, for it has the potential to bring major changes to the oil markets, not only for the next five years, but even into the 2020s. Between June of 2014 and the end of the year, the price of Brent crude fell from circa $115 a barrel to around $57 by the end of the year.  The cause of the crash was a combination of rapid growth in US shale oil production and weakened demand for oil products largely stemming from the slowing Chinese economy and continuing weakness in Europe, the US, Japan and other countries.  The result was a global oil surplus of 1.5 – 2 million b/d.

The price slide was exacerbated by the reasonable refusal of any of the major oil producers, especially the Gulf Arab members of OPEC, to make significant cuts in crude production. The lack of the traditional OPEC production cuts in times of falling prices has led to accusations that the Gulf Arabs are deliberately keeping production up in order to drive high-cost US shale oil producers from the market or hurt the economies of geopolitical adversaries such as Iran or Russia. By contrast, the Saudis argue that as a low-cost producer, it isn’t necessary for them to cut production nor is it in their interest to do so.

So far there has been little decline in production attributable to the price drop, but numerous high-cost producers of shale oil, tar sands oil, and deep-water oil have announced plans for significant cuts in their drilling and other investments related to oil production during 2015. Some sectors of the oil industry such as those operating nearly depleted stripper wells, which produce some 700,000 b/d in the US, are likely to close down if prices stay low as they would be no longer economical. Those shale oil producers in North Dakota who are not connected to pipelines have seen the wellhead price of their crude fall to nearly $30 a barrel.

While some sections of the oil industry are almost certain to be hurt next year, some are wondering if a collapse of the ruble or wide scale default on the junk bonds that are financing much of the shale oil boom might trigger wider economic problems. For now conventional wisdom is saying that the end of the price drop is not in sight.

2. Continued Growth of US Shale Oil Production

During 2014, the multi-year growth trend in US oil production continued, even accelerated.  From a 38-year low of 5 million b/d in 2008, production during 2014 is estimated to have averaged roughly 8.6 million, well above the 7.45 million b/d averaged during 2013.  EIA’s latest data, for October 2014, showed production reached 9.05 million b/d, with year-over-year production up over 1.3 million.  That means the increase in U.S. crude oil production over the last three years averaged roughly 1 million b/d each year.  That is by far the fastest rate of increase, as well as the largest absolute increase, in US crude oil production history.  It might also be the largest three-year oil production increase in world oil production history, excluding Saudi Arabia’s role as a periodic swing producer.

Production from shale oil is responsible for virtually all the net increase in US production.  The two top shale-oil-producing states—Texas and North Dakota—now account for over 50% of US crude output, with production still growing strongly at the end of 2014.  By comparison, production from the other 48 states combined has remained flat for over four years, totally roughly 4 million b/d. Annual gains were highest from the Eagle Ford shale oil play in Texas, the North Dakota’s Bakken formation, and five formations in the Permian basin (Spraberry, Bone Spring, Wolfcamp, Delaware and Glorieta/Yeso).

Factors which fostered the rapid growth of the shale oil plays included easy access to the most productive portions—the sweet spots—plus technology advances, cheap financing, ability to expand some key infrastructure such as pipelines (esp. in Texas), supportive state governments, high oil prices (until 3rd quarter 2014), and more.

Yet throughout 2014, the year of record growth in the US oil production, warning signs popped up that the record boom might soon enter its inevitable slowdown phase.  Early in the year, several late-comers to the shale boom—oil super-major Shell among others—pulled out of their commitments to shale oil, citing a need to sell marginal and/or expensive projects. Despite efficiencies gained through technological improvements, the cost of drilling and completing wells and building take-away capacity remained high. That drove up oil company debt; a mid-year analysis of 61 shale drillers by Bloomberg News indicated that shale debt doubled over the last four years. Other items around the edges also changed, such as North Dakota’s regulations to limit flared gas associated with oil wells. On Wall Street, share prices of production companies lagged broader market indices.

Throughout the year, a few but growing number of reports by industry analysts questioned how long drilling could not only offset the rapid decline rates of new shale oil wells but continue to increase total production from shale plays.  In particular, retired geologist David Hughes probed the nation’s shale oil well production data and concluded that, based on the limited number of drillable well sites remaining, especially in the productive sweet spots in major plays, the shale oil boom would plateau in the 2016-2017 time frame, then decline more rapidly than most others project. Pile on the oil price crash described above and most agree the boom will lose considerable steam, starting in the second half of 2015.

3. Flat Production of Non-OPEC Countries (excluding North America, EIA data)

For the last several years, media headlines on the US side of the Atlantic have rightfully touted the ongoing and historic oil boom in North America.  But during that same time frame, apart from covering the impact of the “Arab spring,” Syria, and ISIL on oil production in the Middle East and North Africa, the oil supply story from elsewhere around the world generally flies under the radar screen. Perhaps that’s because it has generally been flat, and 2014 was no exception to that trend.

World-wide production of C&C (crude oil and lease condensate—the most versatile, energy-dense and valuable of the petroleum liquids) increased from just under 74 million barrels a day in 2005 to roughly 78 mb/day in 2014. 

Nearly all of that increase (3.6 million b/d) came from North America, and nearly all of that came from expensive unconventional oil—shale oil and tar sands.  Outside of North America, world C&C production has remained relatively flat since 2005.

When it comes to non-OPEC contributions to world oil supply, stories not covering North America tend to focus on new discoveries and upside developments: offshore Brazil and West Africa, on-shore East Africa, the recovery of production in Colombia, a comeback in Oman, Russia’s post-Soviet increases, the potential created by new laws in Mexico, etc.  But offsetting those gains are the sustained declines from formerly large producers (Mexico, Norway, the U.K., Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, etc.) and smaller producers (Australia, Denmark, Vietnam, and others) in the non-OPEC realm.

Two non-OPEC producers, which rank among the world’s top five (#1 Russia at 10.1 million b/d and #4 China at 4.2 million b/d) appear to have hit production plateaus during 2014. If that proves to be true, how long Russia and China remain within a narrow production band on their plateaus is a pair of storylines to follow going forward.

4. Iraq

On June 5th of 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) began a major offensive against Iraqi government forces, overrunning numerous towns and cities in northern Iraq, at one point close getting close to Baghdad. A disappointingly large share of Iraq’s regular army melted away before the offensive leaving the defense of the country largely in the hands of the Kurd’s Peshmerga and reactivated Shiite militia.  The unexpected success of the ISIL offensive combined with their brutality towards prisoners and peoples of different religions, however, soon changed the political, military and oil production landscape in Iraq.

When ISIL forces came close to capturing Iraq’s northern oilfields around Kirkuk, Kurdish forces occupied the fields and sent Iraqi managers home. The brutality of the ISIL towards its captives brought the US and some 60 countries into a coalition against ISIL.  The Iranians joined in too. While the US and other foreign governments, with the exception of Iran, were not willing to risk casualties by directly participating in ground combat against ISIL, several of them including the US began air strikes against ISIL forces and facilities. Many others provided military training and aid mostly to the Kurdish forces.

The outside intervention blunted ISIL’s move towards Baghdad and the southern Iraqi oilfields; gave the Kurds enough air support so they could keep ISIL out of Kurdistan and away from the Kirkuk oilfields; and allowed the Kurds and the Iran-supported Shiite militias to begin offensives to retake ISIL-held territory.  Airpower neutralized the utility to ISIL of the large numbers of vehicles and heavy weapons they had captured from fleeing Iraqi forces in June.

The year’s events brought about several major changes in Iraq’s oil situation. With the government in Baghdad severely weakened by the ISIL offensive and the Kurds robust defense of their homeland, isolated Kurdish villages, and the northern oilfields, Erbil was in a much stronger position in dealing with Baghdad over the distribution of oil revenues. In effect, after the ISIL offensive, the Kurd’s Peshmerga was the most effective and cohesive military force left in the country. This resulted in large quantities of supplies of military equipment and the accompanying training coming to the Kurdish forces.

The return of US airpower and some 3,000 military advisors/trainers ensures that the Iraqi oilfields are unlikely to be captured or closed down by ISIL forces in the immediate future. The Kurd’s newfound political leverage resulted in an agreement with Baghdad, which allows Kurdish oil and oil from the Kirkuk oilfields to be exported via Kurdistan to world markets. Iraq and Erbil now have an agreement on sharing the oil revenue and Baghdad is making large payments to Erbil to support the Kurdish military forces.

A side issue to the Iraqi situation is that Iran, which is severely stressed financially from the sanctions and low oil prices, is now deeply involved helping Shiite-controlled Baghdad fight ISIL – ironically on the same side as the US for a change.  This in turn could have an impact on the Iranian nuclear negotiations, which likely will be coming to a head in 2015. At year’s end it seems that Iraqi oil will continue to be safely exported for the immediate future and there also seem to be good prospects that oil exports will increase next year from northern and southern Iraq plus new wells in Kurdistan.

5. Russia

The geopolitical status of Russia, the world’s largest oil producer, changed dramatically during 2014.  After unrest in Ukraine during late 2013 and early 2014 that led to a leadership change and a lean away from Russia towards Western Europe, Russia surreptitiously invaded and took over the Crimea portion of the Ukraine. After a subsequent supportive vote of the people of Crimea, Russia effectively annexed Crimea.  The reaction from much of the world, including several United Nations resolutions, was swift and highly critical.

Previous tiffs between Russia and Ukraine over payments and prices for gas shipped to Europe were dwarfed as responses to the Crimean takeover unfolded.  Trade restrictions and other sanctions have been imposed on Russia, making it tougher for them to find funds to finance petroleum operations.  They have already announced a postponement of a major drilling effort in the arctic and have rerouted their southstream gas pipeline project to Turkey and away from southern Europe.

During the fourth quarter of 2014, the combination of sanctions plus a near halving in the price of oil dealt a devastating blow to Russia’s economy.  The ruble dropped roughly 50 percent from the start of the year through mid-December but partially recovered later in the month after the central bank intervened.  Since oil and gas make up 70% of Russia’s exports, the dropping ruble and the falling price of oil is slashing Russian revenues from their petroleum trade, pushing them into recession and possibly much worse.

Whether through inspiration or desperation, throughout 2014 Russia steadily developed a closer relationship with China, centered on their energy sector.  Back in May, Russia signed a $400 billion 30-year deal with China; through it, Russia’s Gazprom will ship natural gas to the China National Petroleum Corp.  In December, Russia and China signed a currency swap deal to help facilitate bilateral banking and trade.

What will Russia’s shift towards China mean to world energy trade and supplies?  While it’s too early to tell, odds are that even bigger changes could happen this year: more deals, more shift by Russia away from Europe towards China.

6. Iran Nuclear Situation

The success or failure of the ongoing negotiations with Iran over its capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons could be extremely important to Middle Eastern oil exports in the near future.

Should the talks fail and the Iranians remain free to continue enriching uranium, not only will sanctions remain in place indefinitely, but the Israelis say they will bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities as they have done in Iraq and Syria. Tehran in turn says it will close the Straits of Hormuz thereby shutting down the 17 million b/d day of oil exports through the straits.  This would likely lead to military action against Iran by the world’s oil importers, who would be devastated by the loss of oil from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the smaller Gulf states.

As Iran never tires of saying that it does not want nuclear weapons, but only seeks to build and fuel nuclear power stations, an agreement safeguarding this program should be relatively easy to reach. However, Iran is an old and proud nation, which says it wants no limits on its sovereign powers as demanded by Israel and the West.  Moreover, it is in an endless confrontation with Israel which likely has accumulated enough unacknowledged nuclear weapons to destroy Iran in a matter of minutes. Without the possibility that Iran has at least the handful of nuclear weapons that it would take to destroy Israel there would be no mutual deterrence.

Like so many other things linked to oil prices, Iran is in serious economic difficulties at the minute and would clearly seek to have the Western sanctions lifted by reaching an agreement. Iran’s President Rouhani seems sincere in his efforts to reach an agreement, but he is stymied by the current Iranian theocratic political system, which leaves an Ayatollah as the supreme decision maker and dozens of special interests competing for his ear. In short, an agreement probably depends more on the ebb and flow of politics in Tehran than anything an outside government can offer.

The nuclear talks have already had two extensions, and insiders are hopeful that an agreement can be reached in the coming year.  If the talks should fail, however, and the Israelis decide to take matters into their own hands, the situation could quickly deteriorate into a major threat to global peace and the global economy.

7. Political Instability Still Impacting Exports and Supply in 2014

In a perfect world, at least from the perspective of a few oil exporters, there could conceivably be two or more million additional barrels of oil on world markets today, much of it not needed domestically and thus ready for export.  That’s a rough approximation of how much oil is off the market due to factors such as political instability and violence.  What would it take to return those barrels to the market?  A miraculous peace offensive…. followed by a lot of work and investment.  It won’t all happen; in fact, the status quo is more likely. But, in theory: If the Sudans could get along, another 250,000 b/d might return to the market.  Peace in Yemen could conceivably boost production by a similar 250,000 b/d, back to where it was.

What if the oil thefts and related strife in Nigeria melted away?  We might see another 250,000 return to the market.  Ditto with policy shifts in Venezuela: another 250,000 b/d or so.

Syria’s civil war cut production by roughly 400,000 b/d.  It could be that none of that former production capacity will see the light of day for another decade or more, but it once was there.

If Libya’s civil strife melted away, another 600,000 to 800,000 b/d could be for sale, most of it as exports.

What if Iran and the U.S. finally saw eye to eye on Iran’s nuclear–related projects, opening up the country’s petroleum sector to foreign money and expertise?  Perhaps their production could increase, over the course of several years, by 750,000 b/d or more from their estimated current production of 3.25 million b/d today towards the 4 million they produced before sanctions were imposed.

Finally, while Iraq’s production of well over 3 million b/d today is the highest since 1979, how much higher might it be if sectarian strife and the conflict with ISIL melted away?  Another 1 or 2 million barrels, maybe more?

The bottom line: substantial amounts of former and potential oil production remained sidelined by violence and political disputes during 2014.  Based on trends and realities on the ground at year’s end, the likelihood that any of this sidelined oil will return to the market anytime soon may be less likely than the possibility that more present production will be forcibly removed from world supplies.

8. Major Cutbacks in IOC Capital Spending

The major capital expenditure reductions during 2014 started off in late January with Royal Dutch Shell’s CEO citing the need for “rigorous capital discipline” as they shelved their 2014 plans to drill in the Chukchi Sea off Alaska’s coast.  The year ended with Chevron’s announcement in mid-December that they were “indefinitely postponing” a similar effort for the Arctic—their plan to drill a well out in the Beaufort Sea off the coast of Canada’s Northwest Territories.  Chevron blamed economic uncertainty caused by the large six-month drop in world oil prices.  But while Chevron’s plans mean they eventually lose a mere $100 million spent to lease the drilling location, Shell must stew about the reported $5 billion they’ve spent on their delayed arctic project thus far for leases, equipment, etc.

These two incidents bookend a long string of cutbacks in capital expenditures announced by companies large and small. A surprising number of capital spending cuts were announced, especially by larger companies, during the first half of the year.  For example, back in March Shell took a $1.65 billion loss on their Voyageur upgraded project rather than continue with the investment of an addition $5 billion to complete the project.  Shell also offloaded several billion dollars’ worth of non-prime shale oil acreage, stating that “the financial performance there is frankly not acceptable.

For most corporations, the major driver behind the late-year cuts was the multi-year string of rising development costs vs. flat and then declining revenue, forcing the companies to either take on additional debt or sell assets.  Nearly everyone went the debt route; EIA reported mid-year that in their worldwide study of 127 IOCs, they discovered that as a group the companies’ net debt had ballooned by $106 billion between March 2013 and March 2014.  Later in the year, industry analyst Wood Mackenzie reported that if oil prices stayed near $60, the 40 largest IOCs would need to cut spending by 37%, or $170 billion.

Not surprisingly, announcements about the largest cuts came during November and December, following the oil price crash.  Cuts in capital budgets typically ranged from 20%–the cut which Conoco Phillips announced—on up to a one-third reduction by Canada’s Husky Energy which is slashing its oil sands budget by 45%.  Cuts by deep-water drillers are sufficiently numerous that day rates for drilling rigs dropped substantially as well.

Several corporations such as ExxonMobil, Chevron and Whiting Petroleum are delaying announcement of their 2015 capital spending budgets from December into January or February in hopes that oil prices will stop their declines long enough to give guidance.  But whenever those announcements are made, they will likely point to the largest capital spending budget cuts in many years.

Robin Allan is chairman of the independent explorers’ association Brindex and a director with Premier Oil.  In late December he described the impact of crashed oil prices on the North Sea as a crisis. “It’s close to collapse. In terms of new investments – there will be none. Everyone is retreating; people are being laid off at most companies this week and in the coming weeks. Budgets for 2015 are being cut by everyone.”

9. China’s Economic Slowdown

For the last 30 years the Chinese have accomplished one of the most spectacular economic growth records in recorded history. Since the reforms of 1979, China has been growing at circa 10 percent a year and is now thought to have the world’s largest economy. Much of this growth was fueled by a massive increase in coal production, but China’s oil consumption also has risen from 3 million b/d 20 years ago to circa 11 million b/d this year with over half of it being imported. In 2015 China may become the world’s largest oil importer as US imports slow due to large increases in domestic production.

The Chinese, however, are now facing significant economic problems. The rapid growth over the last 30 years has taken place with minimal concern for the environment so the country is faced with extremely serious air, water, and soil pollution problems. In the last few years, the spectacular rates of growth and increases in oil consumption have eased, so that the rate of economic growth is now about 7% and some economists believe it may be considerably lower.  Consumption of oil is no longer growing as fast as in the past, although efforts to build a strategic reserve at bargain prices is keeping imports strong this year.

For many years, China has been the factory of the world, exporting prodigious quantities of goods and importing massive amounts of raw materials. Now production increases from this gigantic factory are slowing, reducing imports from many nations around the world, which in turn are using less oil to supply China with raw materials.

Beijing has set ambitious goals to cut air and water pollution; the former has become so bad that in some heavily populated cites air pollution is becoming a matter of life or death for many. This transition to cleaner energy will not come cheaply and will slow growth in fossil fuel consumption in coming years. It seems fair to say that a major reason for a slowing of global oil demand this year can be traced to the slowing of the Chinese economy.

10. US Energy Dialogue and Control of Congress

The rapid growth in US oil and natural gas production in recent years has led to much, likely misplaced, optimism about the future of the industry, at least over the long term. Many oil producers would like to sell their oil and gas at world prices, which are higher than those prevailing in the US. Others would like to see the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada built in order to expand what is seen as a nearly inexhaustible supply of tar sands oil from Canada.  Opposed to the efforts to lift the long-standing oil export embargo are those who believe that rapidly increasing oil and gas production from shale deposits is likely to be short-lived and that it is better to keep US oil and resources in the ground for future generations rather than exporting it for short-term profits.

Thus an ideological dispute over energy policy has arisen in the US between those who do not believe climate change is a serious threat and believe future development of boundless US oil and gas resources is being hampered by pointless regulation; and those who believe there are serious problems just ahead. This dispute has entered the political realm with the newly elected Congress determined to eliminate what they consider to be ill-conceived federal regulation that is only holding up US economic progress.

During the next two years the Congress will pass, and President Obama is likely to veto, legislation which directly threatens environmental regulations.  Beyond this the course of oil prices will likely play a major role in legislation.

Finally, as part of the background discussion to the above policy debate during 2014, a number of leading analysts and commentators declared in a loud and definitive voice that “peak oil is dead.”  We beg to differ.  It appears that worldwide production of conventional crude oil peaked in 2005 and has remained relatively flat.  Since 2005, it is primarily the surge in expensive unconventional shale oil production in North America that has sustained an expansion in worldwide crude oil supply.  In the aftermath of last year’s June-December oil price crash of 50%—which may not yet have bottomed—the worldwide oil industry is wobbling in the footsteps of a wobbling world economy.  Beyond 2015, the notion that substantial annual production increases will continue, thanks to massive drilling backed by heavily borrowed money, appears to us to be living on borrowed time.

Bottom Line

Our view is that world oil production is now on a bumpy plateau that could see a modest peak during 2015 or soon thereafter, followed by a struggle to remain on that plateau.  That perspective is based on four assumptions, explored in more depth above:

Drilling continues, but at a slower pace due to the collision between relatively high costs and high debt vs. declining revenues;

Some level of violence in some oil producing countries continues to withhold potential increases from the market;

The world’s economy (outside of North America) will not recover quickly, thus demand for oil may remain soft; this will squeeze high-cost oil producers as well as oil-exporting countries which rely heavily on higher oil prices to balance their budgets.

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What is the life span of a vehicle Lithium-ion Battery?

How long a lithium-ion battery will last depends on many factors

Lithium-ion battery life is defined in studies as beyond its useful life when its capacity falls by 20 percent or more.

Lithium-ion batteries start to degrade as soon as they’re made, and even when you aren’t using them, so drive as many miles as you can in the next 8 years to make the most if it, since not driving reduces the overall mileage you can expect to get.

Even the same model car will vary tremendously depending on how it’s driven

Temperature. This can change battery life by 5 years or more. Ideally a lithium-ion battery should be kept between 14-86 degrees Fahrenheit – above 86 F and the battery can be permanently degraded, so cooling technology is used in Tesla’;s Model S and the Chevy Volt, but not in the Nissan Leaf for protection. Below 14 the battery can’t provide full power.

Driving range (depth of discharge). If you drive long distances before recharging, you may shorten the lifetime to just 300-500 cycles and the battery capacity will drop to 70%. It will last much longer if you drive half or less the maximum range and then recharge, extending cycle life as high as 1,200-1,500 cycles. Fully charging isn’t good either, so the Tesla Roadster and other EV dno’t allow you to recharge more than 95% of the original power or drain the power to less than 2%.

To compensate for capacity loss, EV manufacturers increase the size of the batteries to allow for some degradation within the guaranteed service life, but that increases vehicle weight, battery cost, and lowers the driving range and efficiency.

Be skeptical of “breakthroughs” such as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory battery that retains 90% of capacity after 10,000 cycles but doesn’t mention energy density in “Solid electrolyte: the key for high-voltage lithium batteries,” Advanced Energy Materials (2014). Any advancement in one area almost always results in a loss in other area(s), as explained in Who Killed the Electric Car.

According to Popp et. al. in their 2014 “Lifetime analysis of four different lithium ion batteries for plug-in electric vehicle” for Transport Research Arena, Paris, the commercial Nickel-cobalt oxide version is superior to all other experimental cells in their capacity, energy content, energy density, and series resistance, but have the worst environmental impacts.

We won’t know until 2020 how long EV batteries actually last, when they start to decline in significant numbers.  Newer chemistries implemented meanwhile will keep everyone guessing.

 

 

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