Solar Photovoltaics (PV) limited by raw materials

This paper (excerpts below) shows that there are limits to growth — there simply aren’t enough minerals in the world that can be produced physically and/or at a reasonable cost for the many of the most common kinds of PV being made now. The authors suggest that research ought to focus on solar PV technologies for which enough cheap, non-toxic physical material in the world is available.

Cheaper materials could be key to low-cost solar cells

By Robert Sanders, Media Relations | 17 February 2009

BERKELEY — Unconventional solar cell materials that are as abundant but much less costly than silicon and other semiconductors in use today could substantially reduce the cost of solar photovoltaics, according to a new study from the Energy and Resources Group and the Department of Chemistry at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL).

These materials, some of which are highly abundant, could expand the potential for solar cells to become a globally significant source of low-carbon energy, the study authors said.

The analysis, which appeared online Feb. 13 in Environmental Science & Technology, examines the two most pressing challenges to large-scale deployment of solar photovoltaics as the world moves toward a carbon neutral future: cost per kilowatt hour and total resource abundance. The UC Berkeley study evaluated 23 promising semiconducting materials and discovered that 12 are abundant enough to meet or exceed annual worldwide energy demand. Of those 12, nine have a significant raw material cost reduction over traditional crystalline silicon (x-Si in chart), the most widely used photovoltaic material in mass production today.

The most popular solar materials in use today are silicon and thin films made of CdTe (cadmium telluride) and CIGS (copper indium gallium selenide). While these materials have helped elevate solar to a major player in renewable energy markets, they are still limited by manufacturing challenges. Silicon is expensive to process and mass produce. Furthermore, it has become increasingly difficult to mine enough silicon to meet ever-growing consumer demand.

Thin films, while significantly less costly than silicon and easier to mass produce, would rapidly deplete our natural resources if these technologies were to scale to terawatt hours of annual manufacturing production. A terawatt hour is a billion kilowatt hours.

Kammen said. “… what we’ve found is that some leading thin films may be difficult to scale as high as global electricity consumption.”
Wadia added “ if our objective is to supply the majority of electricity in this way, we must quickly consider alternative materials that are Earth-abundant, non-toxic and cheap. These are the materials that can get us to our goals more rapidly.”

The team identified a large material extraction cost (cents/watt) gap between leading thin film materials and a number of unconventional solar cell candidates, including iron pyrite, copper sulfide, and copper oxide. They showed that iron pyrite is several orders of magnitude better than any alternative on important metrics of both cost and abundance. In the report, the team referenced some recent advances in nanoscale science to argue that the modest efficiency losses of unconventional solar cell materials would be offset by the potential for scaling up while saving significantly on materials costs.

The availability of some rare elements may limit the growth of some PV technologies. Of particular concern is tellurium used for cadmium telluride, and indium used for copper indium gallium diselenide. Tellurium is primarily extracted as a byproduct of electrolytic copper refining, and global supply is estimated at approximately 630 MT/yr. Tellurium supply is expected to increase over time based on increasing global copper demand. Indium is primarily extracted as a byproduct of zinc refining, and global supply is estimated at about 1,300 MT/yr. Nearly all of the indium supply is used to make transparent conductive oxide coatings, such as those used for flat-panel liquid crystal displays. Global indium supply is projected to increase to meet demand for non-PV applications, and potentially for PV applications as well. Currently, it takes approximately 60–90 MT of tellurium to make 1 GW of cadmium telluride, and approximately 25–50 MT of indium to make 1 GW of copper indium gallium diselenide.  Competition with non-PV applications for rare materials could significantly restrict supply, particularly for indium, and could increase both material prices and price volatilities. Material feedstocks for crystalline silicon PV are virtually unlimited, and supply constraints are not likely to limit growth. However, crystalline silicon cells typically use silver for electrical contacts, which could be subject to price spikes if there are supply shortages.  Source: 2014. Renewable Electricity Futures Study Exploration of High-Penetration Renewable Electricity Futures. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

Wadia, C. et al. 2009. Materials Availability Expands the Opportunity for Large-Scale Photovoltaics Deployment. Environ. Sci. Technol. 43 2072-2077

Our analysis highlights a photovoltaic future that may not be dependent on either silicon technologies or currently popular thin films.

solar PV 1 limited minerals for 17000 TWh

 

FIGURE 1. Annual electricity production potential for 23 inorganic photovoltaic materials. Known economic reserves (also known as Reserve Base) and annual production are taken from the U.S. Geological Survey studies 21 . Total U.S. and worldwide annual electricity consumption are labeled on the figure for comparison.

Forecasts of the future costs of vital materials have a high-profile history. In 1980, Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon made a public wager on the future price change of chrome, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten. Ehrlich and his colleagues waged a total of $1000, or $200/metal. In 1990, as Simon had predicted, the inflation-normalized price of all five metals had dropped to ~$430 because cheaper plastics and ceramics replaced more costly metals, lowering demand and subsequently the price of those metals (14).

Today that basket of 5 metals is now worth over $1500. Continued demands for higher-purity and thus valued materials have been the driver of this reversal of the initial Ehrlich-Simon wager (15–19).

For example, the average quality of copper ore has gone from 2.4% to 1% in the last 100 years.

Indium, a secondary metal byproduct of zinc mining, has shot up 400% the past 5 years due to an increase in demand from the digital display market (20, 21).

We explore the material limits for PV expansion by examining both material supply and least cost per watt for the most promising semiconductors as active photogenerating materials across 23 potential photovoltaic technologies were evaluated. Low-efficiency cell types were not significantly investigated, regardless of cost.

Conclusion

We estimated the electricity contribution and cost impact of material extraction to a finished solar module by calculating the maximum TWh and minimum ¢/W of each of the 23 compounds evaluated (Figures 1 and 2).

solar PV 2 limited minerals cost

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 2. Minimum ¢/W for 23 inorganic photovoltaic materials. Component cost contribution in ¢/W is a strong indicator of value for future deployment. Calculated values for all 23 compounds evaluated are shown. The range of costs are between 0.327¢/W for Ag2S and 0.000002¢/W for FeS2 . While the actual dollar figure per watt for material extraction will appear small compared to the entire cost of an installed PV system, the cost of processing the material for PV grade applications is a larger cost contributor and should be evaluated further.

PV materials that could achieve extraction costs lower than x-Si at 0.039¢/W and demonstrate equal or greater electricity production potential versus x-Si include FeS2, Zn3P2, and a-Si. Iron pyrite (FeS2) is significantly more attractive in both cost and availability than all other compounds, whereas several of the leading thin-film technologies like CdTe are not able to meet the large-scale needs. The two materials PbS and NiS are both promising, but outside of a quantum confined system, they will be hampered by disproportionately higher Balance of system and installation costs due to low power conversion efficiencies. Furthermore, some unusual candidate compounds, like ZnO, have a high abundance but fail to meet an acceptable limit on cost, and some compounds, like CdS, show favorable cost but a low production potential, making them candidate technologies primarily for niche markets.

Silicon Comparison. It is important to compare results of these novel material systems to silicon, the second most abundant element in the earth’s crust at 28% of the lithosphere by mass. Despite its abundance, silicon has an annual production that trails that of copper by 145,000 metric tons and a cost of extraction of ~$1.70/kg, as compared to the $0.03/kg for iron (21). This disparity in costs is traced to the energy input of 24 kWh/kg for useable metallurgical-grade silicon from silica (SiO2) as opposed to the 2 kWh/kg for converting hematite (Fe2O3) to iron (31, 32). While both processes are already quite efficient, the Gibbs free energy of processing silica is a fixed thermodynamic barrier that will always be present. Crystalline silicon is further disadvantaged by a weighted photon flux absorption coefficient two orders of magnitude smaller than that for FeS2, thereby requiring a much larger material input to achieve the same absorption properties.

(14) Tierney, J. Betting on the Planet. The New York Times, 1990.

(15) Solow, R. M. Economics of Resources or Resources of Economics. Am. Econ. Rev. 1974

(16) Slade, M. E. Trends in natural-resource commodity prices – An analysis of the time domain. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 1982

(17) Nordhaus, W. D. Allocation of Energy Resources. Brookings Pap. Econ. Activity 1973 , (3), 529–570.

(18) Hotelling, H. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources (Re- printed from Journal of Political-Economy, Vol 39, Pg 137-175, 1931). Bull. Math. Biol. 1991,53 1-2), 281–312.

(19) Withagen, C. Untested hypotheses in non-renewable resource economics. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1998,11 3-4), 623–634.

(20) Gordon, R. B.; Bertram, M.; Graedel, T. E. Metal stocks and sustainability. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2006, 103 (5), 1209– 1214.

(21) U.S. Geological Survey: Mineral commodity summaries 2007; U.S. Geological Survey: Washington, DC, 2007.

(31) Green, M. A. Solar cells: operating principles, technology, and system applications ; Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982.

(32) Chapman, P. F.; Roberts, F. Metal resources and energy; Butterworths: London, 1983.

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Limits to Growth

cartoon never run out of anything argument

Preface. What follows are a bunch of articles on limits to growth, sometimes just a link, sometimes excerpts. Today Wall Street Journal and other neocapitalists scorn the idea, insisting that human ingenuity and substitution can overcome all obstacles, and they have the bullhorn. So much so that future history books, if they even exist after the overshoot dark age we’re about to plunge into, will blame atheists, liberals, and heaven knows who else.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Climate scientists and others have in the past few years issued a steady stream of analyses showing that without immediate remedial actions, a disastrous future is headed our way. But is it a four-decade-old study that will prove prescient?

That study, issued in the 1972 book The Limits to Growth, forecast that industrial output would decline early in the 21st century, followed quickly by a rise in death rates due to reduced provision of services and food that would lead to a dramatic decline in world population. To be specific, per capita industrial output was forecast to decline “precipitously” starting in about 2015.

Well, here we are. Despite years of stagnation following the worst economic crash since the Great Depression, things have not gotten that bad. At least not yet. Although the original authors of The Limits to Growth, led by Donella Meadows, caution against tying their predictions too tightly to a specific year, the actual trends of the past four decades are not far off from the what was predicted by the study’s models. A recent paper examining the original 1972 study goes so far as to say that the study’s predictions are well on course to being borne out.

That research paper, prepared by a University of Melbourne scientist, Graham Turner, is unambiguously titled “Is Global Collapse Imminent?” As you might guess from the title, Dr. Turner is not terribly optimistic.

He is merely the latest researcher to sound alarm bells. Just last month, a revised paper by 19 climate scientists led by James Hansen demonstrates that continued greenhouse-gas emissions will lead to a sea-level rise of several meters in as few as 50 years, increasingly powerful storms and rapid cooling in Europe. Two other recent papers calculate that humanity has already committed itself to a six-meter rise in sea level and a separate group of 18 scientists demonstrated in their study that Earth is crossing multiple points of no return. All the while, governments cling to the idea that “green capitalism” will magically pull humanity out of the frying pan.

Four decades of ‘business as usual’

At least global warming is acknowledged today, even if the world’s governments prescriptions thus far are woefully inadequate. In 1972, the message of The Limits to Growth was far from welcome and widely ridiculed. Adjusting parameters to test various possibilities, the authors ran a dozen scenarios in a global model of the environment and economy, and found that “overshoot and collapse” was inevitable with continued “business as usual”; that is, without significant changes to economic activity. Needless to say, such changes have not occurred.

In the “business as usual” model, the capital needed to extract harder-to-reach resources becomes sufficiently high that other needs for investment are starved at the same time that resources begin to become depleted. Industrial output would begin to decline about 2015, but pollution would continue to increase and fewer inputs would be available for agriculture, resulting in declining food production. Coupled with declines in services such as health and education due to insufficient capital, the death rate begins to rise in 2020 and world population declines at a rate of about half a billion per decade from 2030. According to Dr. Turner:

“The World3 model simulated a stock of non-renewable as well as renewable resources. The function of renewable resources in World3, such as agricultural land and the trees, could erode as a result of economic activity, but they could also recover their function if deliberate action was taken or harmful activity reduced. The rate of recovery relative to rates of degradation affects when thresholds or limits are exceeded as well as the magnitude of any potential collapse.”

The World3 computer model simulated interactions within and between population, industrial capital, pollution, agricultural systems and non-renewable resources, set up to capture positive and negative feedback loops. Dr. Turner writes that changing parameters merely delays collapse. The current boom in fracking natural gas and the extraction of petroleum products from tar sands weren’t anticipated in the 1970s, but the expansion of new technologies to exploit resources pushes back the collapse “one to two decades” but “when it occurs the speed of decline is even greater.”

Turner collapse chartSo how much stock should we put in a study more than 40 years old? Dr. Turner asserts that actual environmental, economic and population measurements in the intervening years “aligns strongly” to what the Limits to Growth model expected from its “business as usual” run. He writes:

“[T]he observed industrial output per capita illustrates a slowing rate of growth that is consistent with the [business as usual scenario] reaching a peak. In this scenario, the industrial output per capita begins a substantial reversal and decline at about 2015. Observed food per capita is broadly in keeping with the [Limits to Growth business as usual scenario], with food supply increasing only marginally faster than population. Literacy rates show a saturating growth trend, while electricity generation per capita … grows more rapidly and in better agreement with the [Limits to Growth] model.”

Peak oil and difficult economics

Rising energy costs following global peak oil will make much of the remaining stock uneconomical to exploit. This is a critical forcing point in the collapse scenario. And as more energy is required to extract resources that are more difficult to exploit, the net energy from production continues to fall. John Michael Greer, a writer on peak oil, observes that, just as it takes more energy to produce a steel product than it did a century ago due to the lower quality of iron ore today, more energy is required to produce energy today.

Net energy from oil production has vastly shrunken over the years, Mr. Greer writes:

“[T]the sort of shallow wells that built the US oil industry has a net energy of anything up to 200 to 1: in other words, less than a quart out of each 42-gallon barrel of oil goes to paying off the energy cost of extraction, and the rest is pure profit. … As you slide down the grades of hydrocarbon goo, though, that pleasant equation gets replaced by figures considerably less genial. Your average barrel of oil from a conventional US oilfield today has a net energy around 30 to 1. … The surge of new petroleum that hit the oil market just in time to help drive the current crash of oil prices, though, didn’t come from 30-to-1 conventional oil wells. … What produced the surge this time was a mix of tar sands and hydrofractured shales, which are a very, very long way down the goo curve. …

“The real difficulty with the goo you get from tar sands and hydrofractured shales is that you have to put a lot more energy into getting each [barrel of oil equivalent] of energy out of the ground and into usable condition than you do with conventional crude oil. The exact figures are a matter of dispute, and factoring in every energy input is a fiendishly difficult process, but it’s certainly much less than 30 to 1—and credible estimates put the net energy of tar sands and hydrofractured shales well down into single digits. Now ask yourself this: where is the energy that has to be put into the extraction process coming from? The answer, of course, is that it’s coming out of the same global energy supply to which tar sands and hydrofractured shales are supposedly contributing.”

It is that declining energy availability and greater expense that is the tipping point, Dr. Turner argues:

“Contemporary research into the energy required to extract and supply a unit of energy from oil shows that the inputs have increased by almost an order of magnitude. It does not matter how big the resource stock is if it cannot be extracted fast enough or other scarce inputs needed elsewhere in the economy are consumed in the extraction. Oil and gas optimists note that extracting unconventional fuels is only economic above an oil price somewhere in the vicinity of US$70 per barrel. They readily acknowledge that the age of cheap oil is over, without apparently realising that expensive fuels are a sign of constraints on extraction rates and inputs needed. It is these constraints which lead to the collapse in the [Limits to Growth] modelling of the [business as usual] scenario.”

New oil is dirty oil

The current plunge in oil and gas prices will not be permanent. Speculation on why Saudi Arabia, by far the world’s biggest oil exporter, continues to furiously pump out oil as fast as it can despite the collapse in pricing frequently centers on speculation that the Saudis’ pumping costs are lower than elsewhere and thus can sustain low prices while driving out competitors who must operate in the red at such prices.

If this scenario pans out, a shortage of oil will eventually materialize, driving the price up again. But the difficult economics will not have disappeared; all the easy sources of petroleum have long since been tapped. And the sources for the recent boom — tar sands and fracking — are heavy contributors to global warming, another looming danger. The case for catastrophic climate disruption due to global warming is far better understood today than it was in 1972 — and we are already experiencing its effects.

Dr. Turner, noting with understatement that these gigantic global problems “have been met with considerable resistance from powerful societal forces,” concludes:

“A challenging lesson from the [Limits to Growth] scenarios is that global environmental issues are typically intertwined and should not be treated as isolated problems. Another lesson is the importance of taking pre-emptive action well ahead of problems becoming entrenched. Regrettably, the alignment of data trends with the [Limits to Growth] dynamics indicates that the early stages of collapse could occur within a decade, or might even be underway. This suggests, from a rational risk-based perspective, that we have squandered the past decades, and that preparing for a collapsing global system could be even more important than trying to avoid collapse.”

Sobering indeed. Left unsaid (and, as always, there is no criticism intended in noting a research paper not going outside its parameters) is why so little has been done to head off a looming global catastrophe. Free of constraints, it is not difficult to quantify those “powerful societal forces” as the biggest industrialists and financiers in the world capitalist system. As long as we have an economic system that allows private capital to accumulate without limit on a finite planet, and externalize the costs, in a system that requires endless growth, there is no real prospect of making the drastic changes necessary to head off a very painful future.

Just because a study was conducted decades in the past does not mean we can’t learn from it, even with a measure of skepticism toward peak-oil fast-collapse scenarios. If we reach still further back in time, Rosa Luxemburg’s words haunt us still: Socialism or barbarism.

Pete Dolack writes the Systemic Disorder blog and has been an activist with several groups. His book, It’s Not Over: Learning From the Socialist Experiment, is available from Zero Books.

James Howard Kunstler (2015) Twenty-Three Geniuses. Scientists vindicate ‘Limits to Growth’ – urge investment in ‘circular economy’

Turner G (2014) Limits to Growth was right. New research shows we’re nearing collapse.  The Guardian

Research from the University of Melbourne has found the book’s forecasts are accurate, 40 years on. If we continue to track in line with the book’s scenario, expect the early stages of global collapse to start appearing soon.

As the MIT researchers explained in 1972, growing population and demands for material wealth would lead to more industrial output and pollution. Resources are being used up at a rapid rate, pollution is rising, industrial output and food per capita is rising. The population is rising quickly.  So far, Limits to Growth checks out with reality. So what happens next?  According to the book, to feed the continued growth in industrial output there must be ever-increasing use of resources. But resources become more expensive to obtain as they are used up. As more and more capital goes towards resource extraction, industrial output per capita starts to fall – in the book, from about 2015. As pollution mounts and industrial input into agriculture falls, food production per capita falls. Health and education services are cut back, and that combines to bring about a rise in the death rate from about 2020. Global population begins to fall from about 2030, by about half a billion people per decade. Living conditions fall to levels similar to the early 1900s.  It’s essentially resource constraints that bring about global collapse in the book. However, Limits to Growth does factor in the fallout from increasing pollution, including climate change.

The issue of peak oil is critical. Many independent researchers conclude that “easy” conventional oil production has already peaked. Even the conservative International Energy Agency has warned about peak oil. Peak oil could be the catalyst for global collapse. Some see new fossil fuel sources like shale oil, tar sands and coal seam gas as saviors, but the issue is how fast these resources can be extracted, for how long, and at what cost. If they soak up too much capital to extract the fallout would be widespread.

Ahmed N (2014). Exhaustion of cheap mineral resources is terraforming Earth – scientific report.  Soaring costs of resource extraction require transition to post-industrial ‘circular economy’ to avoid collapse. The Guardian.

A new landmark scientific report drawing on the work of the world’s leading mineral experts forecasts that industrial civilisation’s extraction of critical minerals and fossil fuel resources is reaching the limits of economic feasibility, and could lead to a collapse of key infrastructures unless new ways to manage resources are implemented.

The peer-reviewed study – the 33rd Report to the Club of Rome – is authored by Prof Ugo Bardi of the Department of Earth Sciences at the University of Florence, where he teaches physical chemistry. It includes specialist contributions from fifteen senior scientists and experts across the fields of geology, agriculture, energy, physics, economics, geography, transport, ecology, industrial ecology, and biology, among others.

The Club of Rome is a Swiss-based global think tank founded in 1968 consisting of current and former heads of state, UN bureaucrats, government officials, diplomats, scientists, economists and business leaders.

Tverberg (2014) Limits to Growth–At our doorstep, but not recognized

How long can economic growth continue in a finite world? This is the question the 1972 book The Limits to Growth by Donella Meadows sought to answer. The computer models that the team of researchers produced strongly suggested that the world economy would collapse sometime in the first half of the 21st century.

I have been researching what the real situation is with respect to resource limits since 2005. The conclusion I am reaching is that the team of 1972 researchers were indeed correct. In fact, the promised collapse is practically right around the corner, beginning in the next year or two. In fact, many aspects of the collapse appear already to be taking place, such as the 2008-2009 Great Recession and the collapse of the economies of smaller countries such as Greece and Spain. How could collapse be so close, with virtually no warning to the population?

Tverberg (2014) Reaching Limits to Growth: What Should our Response Be?

Oil limits seem to be pushing us toward a permanent downturn, including a crash in credit availability, loss of jobs, and even possible government collapse. In this process, we are likely to lose access to both fossil fuels and grid electricity. Supply chains will likely need to be very short, because of the lack of credit. This will lead to a need for the use of local materials.

Grantham J (2011) Time to Wake Up: Days of Abundant Resources and Falling Prices Are Over Forever  The Oil Drum.

Jeremy Grantham, the Chief Investment Officer of GMO Capital (with over $106 billion in assets under management). Mr. Grantham began his investment career as an economist with Royal Dutch Shell and earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. His essay, reformatted for TOD, is below the fold. (Original, on GMO Website, here)

Hall CAS, Day JW (2009) Revisiting the Limits to Growth After Peak Oil . In the 1970s a rising world population and the finite resources available to support it were hot topics. Interest faded—but it’s time to take another look. American Scientist, Volume 97, pp 230-37.

“Despite our inattention, resource depletion and population growth have been continuing relentlessly. Our general feeling is that few people think about these issues today, but even most of those who do so believe that technology and market economics have resolved the problems. The warning in The Limits to Growth —and even the more general notion of limits to growth—are seen as invalid. Even ecologists have largely shifted their attention away from resources to focus, certainly not inappropriately, on various threats to the biosphere and biodiversity. They rarely mention the basic resource/human numbers equation that was the focal point for earlier ecologists.

Although many continue to dismiss what those researchers in the 1970s wrote, there is growing evidence that the original “Cassandras” were right on the mark in their general assessments.

There is a common perception, even among knowledgeable environmental scientists, that the limits-to-growth model was a colossal failure, since obviously its predictions of extreme pollution and population decline have not come true. But what is not well known is that the original output, based on the computer technology of the time, had a very misleading feature: There were no dates on the graph between the years 1900 and 2100. If one draws a timeline along the bottom of the graph for the halfway point of 2000, then the model results are almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008 (with a few appropriate assumptions). Of course, how well it will perform in the future when the model behavior gets more dynamic is not yet known. Although we do not necessarily advocate that the existing structure of the limits-to-growth model is adequate for the task to which it is put, it is important to recognize that its predictions have not been invalidated and in fact seem quite on target. We are not aware of any model made by economists that is as accurate over such a long time span.

technology does not work for free. As originally pointed out in the early 1970s by Odum and Pimentel, increased agricultural yield is achieved principally through the greater use of fossil fuel for cultivation, fertilizers, pesticides, drying and so on, so that it takes some 10 calories of petroleum to generate each calorie of food that we eat. The fuel used is divided nearly equally between the farm, transport and processing, and preparation. The net effect is that roughly 19 percent of all of the energy used in the United States goes to our food system. Malthus could not have foreseen this enormous increase in food production through petroleum.

Together oil and natural gas supply nearly two-thirds of the energy used in the world, and coal another 20 percent. We do not live in an information age, or a post-industrial age, or (yet) a solar age, but a petroleum age.

Most environmental science textbooks focus far more on the adverse impacts of fossil fuels than on the implications of our overwhelming economic and even nutritional dependence on them. The failure today to bring the potential reality and implications of peak oil, indeed of peak everything, into scientific discourse and teaching is a grave threat to industrial society.

The concept of the possibility of a huge, multifaceted failure of some substantial part of industrial civilization is so completely outside the understanding of our leaders that we are almost totally unprepared for it.

There are virtually no extant forms of transportation, beyond shoe leather and bicycles, that are not based on oil, and even our shoes are now often made of oil. Food production is very energy intensive, clothes and furniture and most pharmaceuticals are made from and with petroleum, and most jobs would cease to exist without petroleum. But on our university campuses one would be hard pressed to have any sense of that beyond complaints about the increasing price of gasoline, even though a situation similar to the 1970s gas shortages seemed to be unfolding in the summer and fall of 2008 in response to three years of flat oil production, assuaged only when the financial collapse decreased demand for oil.

No substitutes for oil have been developed on anything like the scale required, and most are very poor net energy performers. Despite considerable potential, renewable sources (other than hydropower or traditional wood currently provide less than 1 percent of the energy used in both the U.S. and the world, and the annual increase in the use of most fossil fuels is generally much greater than the total production (let alone increase) in electricity from wind turbines and photovoltaics. Our new sources of “green” energy are simply increasing along with (rather than displacing) all of the traditional ones.”

Revisiting The Limits to Growth: Could The Club of Rome Have Been Correct, After All?

October 2000. Matthew R. Simmons

In the early 1970’s, a book was published entitled, The Limits To Growth, a report of the Club of Rome’s project on the predicament of mankind. Its conclusions were stunning. It was ultimately published in 30 languages and sold over 30 million copies. According to a sophisticated MIT computer model, the world would ultimately run out of many key resources. These limits would become the “ultimate” predicament to mankind.

Over the past few years, I have heard various energy economists lambast this “erroneous” work done. Often the book has been portrayed as the literal “poster child” of misinformed “Malthusian” type thinking that misled so many people into believing the world faced a short mania 30 years ago. Obviously, there were no “The Limits To Growth”. The worry that shortages would rule the day as we neared the end of the 20th Century became a bad joke. Instead of shortages, the last two decades of the 20th Century were marked by glut. The world ended up enjoying significant declines in almost all commodity prices. Technology and efficiency won. The Club of Rome and its “nay-saying” disciples clearly lost!

The critics of this flawed work still relish in pointing out how wrong this theory turned out to be. A Foreign Affairs story published this past January, entitled Cheap Oil, forecast two decades of a pending oil glut. In this article, the Club of Rome’s work was scorned as being the source document which led an entire generation of wrong-thinking people to believe that energy supplies would run short. In this Foreign Affairs report, the authors stated, “….the “sky-is-falling school of oil forecasters has been systematically wrong for more than a generation.

What the Limits to Growth Actually Said

After reading The Limits to Growth, I was amazed. Nowhere in the book was there any mention about running out of anything by 2000. Instead, the book’s concern was entirely focused on what the world might look like 100 years later. There was not one sentence or even a single word written about an oil shortage, or limit to any specific resource, by the year 2000.

The group all shared a common concern that mankind faced a future predicament of grave complexity, caused by a series of interrelated problems that traditional institutions and policy would not be able to cope with the issues, let alone come to grips with their full context. A core thesis of their work was that long term exponential growth was easy to overlook. Human nature leads people to innocently presume growth rates are linear. The book then postulated that if a continuation of the exponential growth of the seventies began in the world’s population, its industrial output, agricultural and natural resource consumption and the pollution produced by all of the above, would result in severe constraints on all known global resources by 2050 to 2070.

The first conclusion was a view that if present growth trends continued unchanged, a limit to the growth that our planet has enjoyed would be reached sometime within the next 100 years. This would then result in a sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.

The second key conclusion was that these growth trends could be altered. Moreover, if proper alterations were made, the world could establish a condition of “ecological stability” that would be sustainable far into the future.

The third conclusion was a view that the world could embark on this second path, but the sooner this effort started, the greater the chance would be of achieving this “ecologically stable” success.

 

Brown, J., et al. January 2011. Energetic Limits to Economic Growth. Bioscience Vol 61 no. 1

In just a few thousand years the human population has colonized the entire world and grown to almost 7 billion. Humans now appropriate 20% to 40% of terrestrial annual net primary production, and have transformed the atmo- sphere, water, land, and biodiversity of the planet (Vitousek et al. 1997, Haberl et al. 2007). For centuries some have questioned how long a finite planet can continue to sup- port near-exponential population and economic growth (e.g., Malthus 1798, Ehrlich 1968, Meadows et al. 1972). Recent issues such as climate change, the global decline in population growth rate, the depletion of petroleum reserves and resulting increase in oil prices, and the recent eco- nomic downturn have prompted renewed concerns about whether longstanding trajectories of population and eco- nomic growth can continue (e.g., Arrow et al. 2004).

Economic growth and development require that energy and other resources be extracted from the environment to manufacture goods, provide services, and create capital. The central role of energy is substantiated by both theory and data. Key theoretical underpinnings come from the laws of thermodynamics: first, that energy can be neither created nor destroyed, and second, that some capacity to perform useful work is lost as heat when energy is converted from one form to another. Complex, highly organized systems, including human economies, are maintained in states far from thermodynamic equilibrium by the continual intake and transformation of energy (Soddy 1926, Odum 1971, Georgescu-Roegen 1977, Ruth 1993, Schneider and Kay 1995, Hall et al. 2001, Chen 2005, Smil 2008). Empirically, the central role of energy in modern human economies is demonstrated by the positive relationship between energy use and economic growth (Shafiee and Topal 2008, Smil 2008, Payne 2010).

Increased energy supply. The sources of energy that may be used to support future economic growth include finite stocks of fossil fuels as well as nuclear, renewable, and other proposed but unproven technologies. Fossil fuels currently provide 85% of humankind’s energy needs (figure 5), but they are effectively fixed stores that are being depleted rapidly (Heinberg 2003, IEA 2008, Hall and Day 2009). Conventional nuclear energy currently supplies only about 6% of global energy; fuel supplies are also finite, and future developments are plagued by concerns about safety, waste storage, and disposal (Nel and Cooper 2009). A breakthrough in nuclear fusion, which has remained elusive for the last 50 years, could potentially generate enormous quantities of energy, but would likely produce large and unpredictable socioeconomic and environmental consequences. Solar, hydro, wind, and tidal renewable energy sources are abundant, but environmental impacts and the time, resources, and expenses required to capture their energy limit their potential (Hall and Day 2009). Biofuels may be renewable, but ecological constraints and environmental impacts constrain their contribution (Fargione et al. 2008). More generally, most efforts to develop new sources of energy face economic problems of diminishing returns on energy and monetary investment (Hall et al. 1986, Tainter 1988, Allen et al. 2001, Tainter et al. 2003).

The nonlinear, complex nature of the global economy raises the possibility that energy shortages might trigger massive socioeconomic disruption. Again, consider the analogy to biological metabolism: Gradually reducing an individual’s food supply leads initially to physiological adjustments, but then to death from starvation, well before all food supplies have been exhausted. M ainstream economists historically have dismissed warnings that resource shortages might permanently limit economic growth. Many believe that the capacity for technological innovation to meet the demand for resources is as much a law of human nature as the Malthusian- Darwinian dynamic that creates the demand (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003, Durlauf et al. 2005, Mankiw 2006). However, there is no scientific support for this proposition; it is either an article of faith or based on statistically flawed extrapolations of historical trends. The ruins of Mohenjo Daro, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Rome, the Maya, Angkor, Easter Island, and many other complex civilizations provide incontrovertible evidence that innovation does not always prevent socioeconomic collapse (Tainter 1988, Diamond 2004).

Conclusions

We are by no means the first to write about the limits to economic growth and the fundamental energetic constraints that stem directly from the laws of thermodynamics and the principles of ecology. Beginning with Malthus (1798), both ecologists and economists have called attention to the essential dependence of economies on natural resources and have pointed out that near-exponential growth of the human population and economy cannot be sustained indefinitely in a world of finite resources (e.g., Soddy 1922, Odum 1971, Daly 1977, Georgescu-Roegen 1977, Cleveland et al. 1984, Costanza and Daly 1992, Hall et al. 2001, Arrow et al. 2004, Stern 2004, Nel and van Zyl 2010. Some ecological economists and systems ecologists have made similar theoretical arguments for energetic constraints on economic systems (e.g., Odum 1971, Hall et al. 1986). However, these perspectives have not been incorporated into mainstream economic theory, practice, or pedagogy (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003, Mankiw 2006), and they have been downplayed in consensus statements by influential ecologists (e.g., Lubchenco et al. 1991, Palmer et al. 2004, ESA 2009) and sustainability scientists (e.g., NRC 1999, Kates et al. 2001, ICS 2002, Kates and Parris 2003, Parris and Kates 2003, Clark 2007).

Excerpts from: Carolyn Lochhead. 4 Jan 2014. Critics question desirability of relentless economic growth. San Francisco Chronicle.

“We are approaching the planet’s limitations. So when I see the media barrage about buying more stuff, it’s almost like a science fiction movie where .. we are undermining the very ecological systems which allow life to continue, but no one’s allowed to talk about it.”  Annie Leonard, founder of the Story of Stuff project, a Berkeley-based effort to curb mass consumption.

Ecologists warn that economic growth is strangling the natural systems on which life depends, creating not just wealth, but filth on a planetary scale. Carbon pollution is changing the climate. Water shortages, deforestation, tens of millions of acres of land too polluted to plant, and other global environmental ills are increasingly viewed as strategic risks by governments and corporations around the world.

Stanford University ecologist Gretchen Daily

As the world economy grows relentlessly, ecologists warn that nature’s ability to absorb wastes and regenerate natural resources is being exhausted. “We’re driving natural capital to its lowest levels ever in human history,” Daily said.

The physical pressure that human activities put on the environment can’t possibly be sustained,” said Stanford University ecologist Gretchen Daily, who is at the forefront of efforts across the world to incorporate “natural capital,” the value of such things as water, topsoil and genetic diversity that nature provides, into economic decision-making.

For example, scientists estimate that commercial fishing, if it continues at the present rate, will exhaust fisheries within the lifetime of today’s children. The global “by-catch” of discarded birds, turtles, and other marine animals alone has reached at least 20 million tons a year.

Mainstream economists universally reject the concept of limiting growth.

As Larry Summers, a former adviser to President Obama, once put it, “The idea that we should put limits on growth because of some natural limit is a profound error, and one that, were it ever to prove influential, would have staggering social costs.”

Since World War II, the overarching goal of U.S. policy under both parties has been to keep the economy growing as fast as possible. Growth is seen as the base cure for every social ill, from poverty and unemployment to a shrinking middle class.  Last month, Obama offered a remedy to widening income inequality: “We’ve got to grow the economy even faster.”

U. C. Berkeley’s Energy & Resources Richard Norgaard: We don’t have to have a free-market economy

Economies are not fixed and unchangeable.  The United States had a centrally planned economy in World War II, then a mixed Cold War economy that built the Interstate Highway System and established social welfare programs like Medicare. Today’s more free-market economy took root in the 1980s.

“Economies aren’t natural,” Norgaard said. “We build them to do what we need to do, and we built the economy we have.”

 

Cassandra’s curse: how “The Limits to Growth” was demonized

March 9, 2008, Ugo Bardi

In 1972, the LTG study arrived in a world that had known more than two decades of unabated growth after the end of the Second World War. It was a time of optimism and faith in technological progress that, perhaps, had never been so strong in the history of humankind. With nuclear power on the rise, with no hint that mineral resources were scarce, with population growing fast, it seemed that the limits to growth, if such a thing existed, were so far away in the future that there was no reason to worry. In any case, even if these limits were closer than generally believed, didn’t we have technology to save us? With nuclear energy on the rise, a car in every garage, the Moon just conquered in 1968, the world seemed to be all set for a shiny future. Against that general feeling, the results of LTG were a shock.
The LTG study had everything that was needed to become a major advance in science. It came from a prestigious institution, the MIT; it was sponsored by a group of brilliant and influential intellectuals, the Club of Rome; it used the most modern and advanced computation techniques and, finally, the events that were taking place a few years after publication, the great oil crisis of the 1970s, seemed to confirm the vision of the authors. Yet, the study failed in generating a robust current of academic research and, a couple of decades after the publication, the general opinion about it had completely changed. Far from being considered the scientific revolution of the century, in the 1990s LTG had become everyone’s laughing stock. Little more than the rumination of a group of eccentric (and probably slightly feebleminded) professors who had really thought that the end of the world was near. In short, Chicken Little with a computer.
With time, the debate veered more and more on the political side. In 1997, the Italian economist Giorgio Nebbia, noted that the reaction against the LTG study had arrived from at least four different fronts. One was from those who saw the book as a threat to the growth of their businesses and industries. A second set was that of professional economists, who saw LTG as a threat to their dominance in advising on economic matters. The Catholic world provided further ammunition for the critics, being piqued at the suggestion that overpopulation was one of the major causes of the problems. Then, the political left in the Western World saw the LTG study as a scam of the ruling class, designed to trick workers into believing that the proletarian paradise was not a practical goal. And this by Nebbia is a clearly incomplete list; forgetting religious fundamentalists, the political right, the believers in infinite growth, politicians seeking for easy solutions to all problems and many others. – See more at: http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/3551#sthash.bhJ3H4t4.dpuf
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Inage: calculate storage for short-term wind variation

Inage, S. 2009. Prospects for Large-Scale Energy Storage in Decarbonized Power Grid. International Energy Agency.

This paper limits itself to the issue of frequency stability in systems with increasing shares of variable renewable generation assets (wind power in Western Europe (WEU) goes from 9.8% now to 25.4% in 2050, etc see page 23)

Electric frequency is controlled within a small deviation: for example, in Japan the standard is 0.2-0.3 Hz; in the U.S. it is 0.018-0.0228 Hz; and in the European UCTE it is 0.04-0.06Hz. As renewables increase, the potential for fatal frequency changes grows, since such generators rarely have frequency control systems and can produce large variations in output as weather conditions change.

The need to ensure supply that matches demand under all circumstances poses particular challenges for variable renewable power options such as wind and solar generation, whose supply heavily depends on season, time and weather conditions. Short-term variations are quite random and difficult to forecast.

Existing regional grids with high shares of variable renewable do not always provide a relevant reference for a future power system with high share s of renewables. The reason is that such grids do not operate as islands; rather, they are well connected to other grids that stabilize their operation.

This is the case for Denmark and Northern Germany. In 2001, the demand and supply of wind power corresponded fairly closely. When excess power was available, it could be exported through interconnections with Norway, Sweden and Germany. Conversely, power could be imported in periods of shortfall. Therefore, in Denmark, no counter measure would be needed to mitigate short-term and long-term variations, despite an anticipated greater share of wind power. Interconnectors provide a key short-and medium-term option to deal with the variability of renewable power generation, but will not be sufficient to deal with large grids on a continental scale with high renewables penetration.

This paper looks at what’s needed if wind power and solar power provides 12% and 11% of global electricity generation by 2050.

Variable output renewable technologies such as wind and solar are not dispatchable.

The variability characteristics of solar, wind and impoundment hydro power vary substantially from season to season, day to day, time to time. Wind turbines may be shut off during storm conditions that could last for hours. Wind speeds may fall to zero or very low levels over large areas for days. Solar power is not generated at night, and insolation levels may be significantly reduced in winter, especially at higher latitudes. Solar power may also fluctuate depending on cloud levels and the moisture content of the air. Finally, hydro power may be absent in dry years, depending on the water inflow (glaciers or rainfall). These different variability characteristic require different types of response strategies.

With large shares of these technologies, steps would need to be taken to ensure the continued reliable supply of electricity. While related issues include voltage and frequency variations,  this report focuses on frequency stability. Constant balance of demand and supply is essential to achieve this, and, in the majority of today’s power systems, mid load technologies such as coal and gas and in some cases hydro, play the chief role in this regard.

The main focus of this paper is to investigate the storage growth and total global storage capacity needed between 2010 and 2050, to assist in the balancing of power systems with large shares of variable renewables.

Variable renewable energies are associated with weather-related power output variations, which consist of short term variations on a scale of seconds to several minutes, superimposed on long term variation on the scale of several hours. Frequency change depends on the short-term variation, therefore this report focuses on short–term variations.

Although the output of individual wind or solar plants can vary considerably, wide geographical dispersal of wind power and PV plants reduces the net variation of many plants as seen by the system as a whole. The net output variation of renewables is an important parameter in this analysis. To date, the impact of this smoothing effect varies from region to region. If the outputs of individual wind and PV plants are uncorrelated, the extent of variation decreases with the inverse square root of the overall number of plants. On the other hand, over relatively small areas with large numbers of wind and PV plants, plants may show strong correlation with each other. In such situations a significant net variation will remain.

The extent to which a power system can accommodate variations in supply is governed to a large extent by its flexibility–a measure of how fast and how much the system can quickly increase or decrease supply or demand, to maintain balance at all times. A range of measures exist to increase the flexibility of power systems, and thus the extent to which they can accommodate variable renewables. This paper looks at one of these measures–storage.

Another option is to interconnect among adjacent power systems. For instance, in Western Europe (WEU), interconnected power grid and electricity trading play an important role.

Flexible power plants such as gas and hydro can act as reserves to provide for deficits in wind power generation across the interconnected area, while at the same time the geographic smoothing effect is increased because the total area is larger. At present, in Denmark, where the average share of wind power is approximately 20%, effective balancing of supply and demand is facilitated through electricity trade with other Scandinavian countries.

However, taking for example a cluster of interconnected systems lying under a single weather system, all with a high share of variable renewables, trade of electricity may not be relied upon for fast access to additional electricity during low wind / solar periods, nor to dispose of surpluses, because deficits and surpluses among all such systems will coincide to a large extent. Moreover, reduced flexible power plant capacity over the entire region in 2050, due to partial displacement by renewables and nuclear, may lead to a lack of flexible reserves. To provide for such cases, internal solutions need to be in place. Balance will not be maintained by interconnectors alone, and system designers and operators should look at additional measures such as energy storage.

Simulations of wind power variation levels between 5% and 30% yield estimates of energy storage capacity in the WEU ranging from 0 GW to 90 GW in 2050. The balance between the demand and the supply was calculated for every 0.1 hr (6 minutes). To estimate energy storage worldwide, net variations were assumed as 15% and 30%. Simulations undertaken suggest that a worldwide energy storage capacity ranging from 189 GW to 305 GW would be required.

As mentioned above, as each storage system has different specifications, the optimal arrangement of these systems depends on circumstances in individual countries. In Annex 1, the current technical potential of NaS cells, pumped hydro, redox flow cells, Compress ed Air Energy Storage (CAES), electric double-layer capacitors, Li-ion batteries, Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES) and flywheel systems is reviewed. Reducing costs of such storage technologies may be a key to expanding the use of energy storage technologies to keep pace with the growth of variable renewables.

Grid Operation and Load Curves

Load duration curves can be split into base and peak loads. Base loads are generated by plants whose output is difficult to change; they therefore operate most of the time at full capacity. Base loads are generally served by either high-efficiency fossil-fired or nuclear reactor power plants with low production cost. Peak loads are usually served by natural gas combined-cycle plants, gas turbine generation, or hydropower plants that can change their output in a short time, although with high production cost.

An interesting case of a power system with a high proportion of wind power is found in Spain and Portugal on the Iberian Peninsula. In 2008, there was a day when the share of wind power in the total power supply reached 23% in Spain. This high proportion created power quality problems that have since been resolved through better interconnect ion s within Spain. In addition, Spain has significant pumped hydropower capacity that can mitigate power supply variation s during the operation.

It is preferable that wind power generation resources be distributed to maximize the smoothing effect, which is the key to reducing net variation of the wind power supply. Since the necessarily capacities of energy storage depend on the net variation of wind power, measuring methods and analytical systems should be established by individual countries or groups of countries. Through an accumulation of these efforts , the necessary countermeasures should be determined

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ASPO: Top Ten 2014 News Stories Regarding Oil and the Economy

Andrews, S., Whipple, T. January 6, 2015. Top Ten 2014 News Stories Regarding Oil and the Economy. January 6, 2015.

1. Oil Price Crash

The great price crash of 2014 could well turn out to be one of the defining events of the decade, for it has the potential to bring major changes to the oil markets, not only for the next five years, but even into the 2020s. Between June of 2014 and the end of the year, the price of Brent crude fell from circa $115 a barrel to around $57 by the end of the year.  The cause of the crash was a combination of rapid growth in US shale oil production and weakened demand for oil products largely stemming from the slowing Chinese economy and continuing weakness in Europe, the US, Japan and other countries.  The result was a global oil surplus of 1.5 – 2 million b/d.

The price slide was exacerbated by the reasonable refusal of any of the major oil producers, especially the Gulf Arab members of OPEC, to make significant cuts in crude production. The lack of the traditional OPEC production cuts in times of falling prices has led to accusations that the Gulf Arabs are deliberately keeping production up in order to drive high-cost US shale oil producers from the market or hurt the economies of geopolitical adversaries such as Iran or Russia. By contrast, the Saudis argue that as a low-cost producer, it isn’t necessary for them to cut production nor is it in their interest to do so.

So far there has been little decline in production attributable to the price drop, but numerous high-cost producers of shale oil, tar sands oil, and deep-water oil have announced plans for significant cuts in their drilling and other investments related to oil production during 2015. Some sectors of the oil industry such as those operating nearly depleted stripper wells, which produce some 700,000 b/d in the US, are likely to close down if prices stay low as they would be no longer economical. Those shale oil producers in North Dakota who are not connected to pipelines have seen the wellhead price of their crude fall to nearly $30 a barrel.

While some sections of the oil industry are almost certain to be hurt next year, some are wondering if a collapse of the ruble or wide scale default on the junk bonds that are financing much of the shale oil boom might trigger wider economic problems. For now conventional wisdom is saying that the end of the price drop is not in sight.

2. Continued Growth of US Shale Oil Production

During 2014, the multi-year growth trend in US oil production continued, even accelerated.  From a 38-year low of 5 million b/d in 2008, production during 2014 is estimated to have averaged roughly 8.6 million, well above the 7.45 million b/d averaged during 2013.  EIA’s latest data, for October 2014, showed production reached 9.05 million b/d, with year-over-year production up over 1.3 million.  That means the increase in U.S. crude oil production over the last three years averaged roughly 1 million b/d each year.  That is by far the fastest rate of increase, as well as the largest absolute increase, in US crude oil production history.  It might also be the largest three-year oil production increase in world oil production history, excluding Saudi Arabia’s role as a periodic swing producer.

Production from shale oil is responsible for virtually all the net increase in US production.  The two top shale-oil-producing states—Texas and North Dakota—now account for over 50% of US crude output, with production still growing strongly at the end of 2014.  By comparison, production from the other 48 states combined has remained flat for over four years, totally roughly 4 million b/d. Annual gains were highest from the Eagle Ford shale oil play in Texas, the North Dakota’s Bakken formation, and five formations in the Permian basin (Spraberry, Bone Spring, Wolfcamp, Delaware and Glorieta/Yeso).

Factors which fostered the rapid growth of the shale oil plays included easy access to the most productive portions—the sweet spots—plus technology advances, cheap financing, ability to expand some key infrastructure such as pipelines (esp. in Texas), supportive state governments, high oil prices (until 3rd quarter 2014), and more.

Yet throughout 2014, the year of record growth in the US oil production, warning signs popped up that the record boom might soon enter its inevitable slowdown phase.  Early in the year, several late-comers to the shale boom—oil super-major Shell among others—pulled out of their commitments to shale oil, citing a need to sell marginal and/or expensive projects. Despite efficiencies gained through technological improvements, the cost of drilling and completing wells and building take-away capacity remained high. That drove up oil company debt; a mid-year analysis of 61 shale drillers by Bloomberg News indicated that shale debt doubled over the last four years. Other items around the edges also changed, such as North Dakota’s regulations to limit flared gas associated with oil wells. On Wall Street, share prices of production companies lagged broader market indices.

Throughout the year, a few but growing number of reports by industry analysts questioned how long drilling could not only offset the rapid decline rates of new shale oil wells but continue to increase total production from shale plays.  In particular, retired geologist David Hughes probed the nation’s shale oil well production data and concluded that, based on the limited number of drillable well sites remaining, especially in the productive sweet spots in major plays, the shale oil boom would plateau in the 2016-2017 time frame, then decline more rapidly than most others project. Pile on the oil price crash described above and most agree the boom will lose considerable steam, starting in the second half of 2015.

3. Flat Production of Non-OPEC Countries (excluding North America, EIA data)

For the last several years, media headlines on the US side of the Atlantic have rightfully touted the ongoing and historic oil boom in North America.  But during that same time frame, apart from covering the impact of the “Arab spring,” Syria, and ISIL on oil production in the Middle East and North Africa, the oil supply story from elsewhere around the world generally flies under the radar screen. Perhaps that’s because it has generally been flat, and 2014 was no exception to that trend.

World-wide production of C&C (crude oil and lease condensate—the most versatile, energy-dense and valuable of the petroleum liquids) increased from just under 74 million barrels a day in 2005 to roughly 78 mb/day in 2014. 

Nearly all of that increase (3.6 million b/d) came from North America, and nearly all of that came from expensive unconventional oil—shale oil and tar sands.  Outside of North America, world C&C production has remained relatively flat since 2005.

When it comes to non-OPEC contributions to world oil supply, stories not covering North America tend to focus on new discoveries and upside developments: offshore Brazil and West Africa, on-shore East Africa, the recovery of production in Colombia, a comeback in Oman, Russia’s post-Soviet increases, the potential created by new laws in Mexico, etc.  But offsetting those gains are the sustained declines from formerly large producers (Mexico, Norway, the U.K., Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, etc.) and smaller producers (Australia, Denmark, Vietnam, and others) in the non-OPEC realm.

Two non-OPEC producers, which rank among the world’s top five (#1 Russia at 10.1 million b/d and #4 China at 4.2 million b/d) appear to have hit production plateaus during 2014. If that proves to be true, how long Russia and China remain within a narrow production band on their plateaus is a pair of storylines to follow going forward.

4. Iraq

On June 5th of 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) began a major offensive against Iraqi government forces, overrunning numerous towns and cities in northern Iraq, at one point close getting close to Baghdad. A disappointingly large share of Iraq’s regular army melted away before the offensive leaving the defense of the country largely in the hands of the Kurd’s Peshmerga and reactivated Shiite militia.  The unexpected success of the ISIL offensive combined with their brutality towards prisoners and peoples of different religions, however, soon changed the political, military and oil production landscape in Iraq.

When ISIL forces came close to capturing Iraq’s northern oilfields around Kirkuk, Kurdish forces occupied the fields and sent Iraqi managers home. The brutality of the ISIL towards its captives brought the US and some 60 countries into a coalition against ISIL.  The Iranians joined in too. While the US and other foreign governments, with the exception of Iran, were not willing to risk casualties by directly participating in ground combat against ISIL, several of them including the US began air strikes against ISIL forces and facilities. Many others provided military training and aid mostly to the Kurdish forces.

The outside intervention blunted ISIL’s move towards Baghdad and the southern Iraqi oilfields; gave the Kurds enough air support so they could keep ISIL out of Kurdistan and away from the Kirkuk oilfields; and allowed the Kurds and the Iran-supported Shiite militias to begin offensives to retake ISIL-held territory.  Airpower neutralized the utility to ISIL of the large numbers of vehicles and heavy weapons they had captured from fleeing Iraqi forces in June.

The year’s events brought about several major changes in Iraq’s oil situation. With the government in Baghdad severely weakened by the ISIL offensive and the Kurds robust defense of their homeland, isolated Kurdish villages, and the northern oilfields, Erbil was in a much stronger position in dealing with Baghdad over the distribution of oil revenues. In effect, after the ISIL offensive, the Kurd’s Peshmerga was the most effective and cohesive military force left in the country. This resulted in large quantities of supplies of military equipment and the accompanying training coming to the Kurdish forces.

The return of US airpower and some 3,000 military advisors/trainers ensures that the Iraqi oilfields are unlikely to be captured or closed down by ISIL forces in the immediate future. The Kurd’s newfound political leverage resulted in an agreement with Baghdad, which allows Kurdish oil and oil from the Kirkuk oilfields to be exported via Kurdistan to world markets. Iraq and Erbil now have an agreement on sharing the oil revenue and Baghdad is making large payments to Erbil to support the Kurdish military forces.

A side issue to the Iraqi situation is that Iran, which is severely stressed financially from the sanctions and low oil prices, is now deeply involved helping Shiite-controlled Baghdad fight ISIL – ironically on the same side as the US for a change.  This in turn could have an impact on the Iranian nuclear negotiations, which likely will be coming to a head in 2015. At year’s end it seems that Iraqi oil will continue to be safely exported for the immediate future and there also seem to be good prospects that oil exports will increase next year from northern and southern Iraq plus new wells in Kurdistan.

5. Russia

The geopolitical status of Russia, the world’s largest oil producer, changed dramatically during 2014.  After unrest in Ukraine during late 2013 and early 2014 that led to a leadership change and a lean away from Russia towards Western Europe, Russia surreptitiously invaded and took over the Crimea portion of the Ukraine. After a subsequent supportive vote of the people of Crimea, Russia effectively annexed Crimea.  The reaction from much of the world, including several United Nations resolutions, was swift and highly critical.

Previous tiffs between Russia and Ukraine over payments and prices for gas shipped to Europe were dwarfed as responses to the Crimean takeover unfolded.  Trade restrictions and other sanctions have been imposed on Russia, making it tougher for them to find funds to finance petroleum operations.  They have already announced a postponement of a major drilling effort in the arctic and have rerouted their southstream gas pipeline project to Turkey and away from southern Europe.

During the fourth quarter of 2014, the combination of sanctions plus a near halving in the price of oil dealt a devastating blow to Russia’s economy.  The ruble dropped roughly 50 percent from the start of the year through mid-December but partially recovered later in the month after the central bank intervened.  Since oil and gas make up 70% of Russia’s exports, the dropping ruble and the falling price of oil is slashing Russian revenues from their petroleum trade, pushing them into recession and possibly much worse.

Whether through inspiration or desperation, throughout 2014 Russia steadily developed a closer relationship with China, centered on their energy sector.  Back in May, Russia signed a $400 billion 30-year deal with China; through it, Russia’s Gazprom will ship natural gas to the China National Petroleum Corp.  In December, Russia and China signed a currency swap deal to help facilitate bilateral banking and trade.

What will Russia’s shift towards China mean to world energy trade and supplies?  While it’s too early to tell, odds are that even bigger changes could happen this year: more deals, more shift by Russia away from Europe towards China.

6. Iran Nuclear Situation

The success or failure of the ongoing negotiations with Iran over its capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons could be extremely important to Middle Eastern oil exports in the near future.

Should the talks fail and the Iranians remain free to continue enriching uranium, not only will sanctions remain in place indefinitely, but the Israelis say they will bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities as they have done in Iraq and Syria. Tehran in turn says it will close the Straits of Hormuz thereby shutting down the 17 million b/d day of oil exports through the straits.  This would likely lead to military action against Iran by the world’s oil importers, who would be devastated by the loss of oil from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the smaller Gulf states.

As Iran never tires of saying that it does not want nuclear weapons, but only seeks to build and fuel nuclear power stations, an agreement safeguarding this program should be relatively easy to reach. However, Iran is an old and proud nation, which says it wants no limits on its sovereign powers as demanded by Israel and the West.  Moreover, it is in an endless confrontation with Israel which likely has accumulated enough unacknowledged nuclear weapons to destroy Iran in a matter of minutes. Without the possibility that Iran has at least the handful of nuclear weapons that it would take to destroy Israel there would be no mutual deterrence.

Like so many other things linked to oil prices, Iran is in serious economic difficulties at the minute and would clearly seek to have the Western sanctions lifted by reaching an agreement. Iran’s President Rouhani seems sincere in his efforts to reach an agreement, but he is stymied by the current Iranian theocratic political system, which leaves an Ayatollah as the supreme decision maker and dozens of special interests competing for his ear. In short, an agreement probably depends more on the ebb and flow of politics in Tehran than anything an outside government can offer.

The nuclear talks have already had two extensions, and insiders are hopeful that an agreement can be reached in the coming year.  If the talks should fail, however, and the Israelis decide to take matters into their own hands, the situation could quickly deteriorate into a major threat to global peace and the global economy.

7. Political Instability Still Impacting Exports and Supply in 2014

In a perfect world, at least from the perspective of a few oil exporters, there could conceivably be two or more million additional barrels of oil on world markets today, much of it not needed domestically and thus ready for export.  That’s a rough approximation of how much oil is off the market due to factors such as political instability and violence.  What would it take to return those barrels to the market?  A miraculous peace offensive…. followed by a lot of work and investment.  It won’t all happen; in fact, the status quo is more likely. But, in theory: If the Sudans could get along, another 250,000 b/d might return to the market.  Peace in Yemen could conceivably boost production by a similar 250,000 b/d, back to where it was.

What if the oil thefts and related strife in Nigeria melted away?  We might see another 250,000 return to the market.  Ditto with policy shifts in Venezuela: another 250,000 b/d or so.

Syria’s civil war cut production by roughly 400,000 b/d.  It could be that none of that former production capacity will see the light of day for another decade or more, but it once was there.

If Libya’s civil strife melted away, another 600,000 to 800,000 b/d could be for sale, most of it as exports.

What if Iran and the U.S. finally saw eye to eye on Iran’s nuclear–related projects, opening up the country’s petroleum sector to foreign money and expertise?  Perhaps their production could increase, over the course of several years, by 750,000 b/d or more from their estimated current production of 3.25 million b/d today towards the 4 million they produced before sanctions were imposed.

Finally, while Iraq’s production of well over 3 million b/d today is the highest since 1979, how much higher might it be if sectarian strife and the conflict with ISIL melted away?  Another 1 or 2 million barrels, maybe more?

The bottom line: substantial amounts of former and potential oil production remained sidelined by violence and political disputes during 2014.  Based on trends and realities on the ground at year’s end, the likelihood that any of this sidelined oil will return to the market anytime soon may be less likely than the possibility that more present production will be forcibly removed from world supplies.

8. Major Cutbacks in IOC Capital Spending

The major capital expenditure reductions during 2014 started off in late January with Royal Dutch Shell’s CEO citing the need for “rigorous capital discipline” as they shelved their 2014 plans to drill in the Chukchi Sea off Alaska’s coast.  The year ended with Chevron’s announcement in mid-December that they were “indefinitely postponing” a similar effort for the Arctic—their plan to drill a well out in the Beaufort Sea off the coast of Canada’s Northwest Territories.  Chevron blamed economic uncertainty caused by the large six-month drop in world oil prices.  But while Chevron’s plans mean they eventually lose a mere $100 million spent to lease the drilling location, Shell must stew about the reported $5 billion they’ve spent on their delayed arctic project thus far for leases, equipment, etc.

These two incidents bookend a long string of cutbacks in capital expenditures announced by companies large and small. A surprising number of capital spending cuts were announced, especially by larger companies, during the first half of the year.  For example, back in March Shell took a $1.65 billion loss on their Voyageur upgraded project rather than continue with the investment of an addition $5 billion to complete the project.  Shell also offloaded several billion dollars’ worth of non-prime shale oil acreage, stating that “the financial performance there is frankly not acceptable.

For most corporations, the major driver behind the late-year cuts was the multi-year string of rising development costs vs. flat and then declining revenue, forcing the companies to either take on additional debt or sell assets.  Nearly everyone went the debt route; EIA reported mid-year that in their worldwide study of 127 IOCs, they discovered that as a group the companies’ net debt had ballooned by $106 billion between March 2013 and March 2014.  Later in the year, industry analyst Wood Mackenzie reported that if oil prices stayed near $60, the 40 largest IOCs would need to cut spending by 37%, or $170 billion.

Not surprisingly, announcements about the largest cuts came during November and December, following the oil price crash.  Cuts in capital budgets typically ranged from 20%–the cut which Conoco Phillips announced—on up to a one-third reduction by Canada’s Husky Energy which is slashing its oil sands budget by 45%.  Cuts by deep-water drillers are sufficiently numerous that day rates for drilling rigs dropped substantially as well.

Several corporations such as ExxonMobil, Chevron and Whiting Petroleum are delaying announcement of their 2015 capital spending budgets from December into January or February in hopes that oil prices will stop their declines long enough to give guidance.  But whenever those announcements are made, they will likely point to the largest capital spending budget cuts in many years.

Robin Allan is chairman of the independent explorers’ association Brindex and a director with Premier Oil.  In late December he described the impact of crashed oil prices on the North Sea as a crisis. “It’s close to collapse. In terms of new investments – there will be none. Everyone is retreating; people are being laid off at most companies this week and in the coming weeks. Budgets for 2015 are being cut by everyone.”

9. China’s Economic Slowdown

For the last 30 years the Chinese have accomplished one of the most spectacular economic growth records in recorded history. Since the reforms of 1979, China has been growing at circa 10 percent a year and is now thought to have the world’s largest economy. Much of this growth was fueled by a massive increase in coal production, but China’s oil consumption also has risen from 3 million b/d 20 years ago to circa 11 million b/d this year with over half of it being imported. In 2015 China may become the world’s largest oil importer as US imports slow due to large increases in domestic production.

The Chinese, however, are now facing significant economic problems. The rapid growth over the last 30 years has taken place with minimal concern for the environment so the country is faced with extremely serious air, water, and soil pollution problems. In the last few years, the spectacular rates of growth and increases in oil consumption have eased, so that the rate of economic growth is now about 7% and some economists believe it may be considerably lower.  Consumption of oil is no longer growing as fast as in the past, although efforts to build a strategic reserve at bargain prices is keeping imports strong this year.

For many years, China has been the factory of the world, exporting prodigious quantities of goods and importing massive amounts of raw materials. Now production increases from this gigantic factory are slowing, reducing imports from many nations around the world, which in turn are using less oil to supply China with raw materials.

Beijing has set ambitious goals to cut air and water pollution; the former has become so bad that in some heavily populated cites air pollution is becoming a matter of life or death for many. This transition to cleaner energy will not come cheaply and will slow growth in fossil fuel consumption in coming years. It seems fair to say that a major reason for a slowing of global oil demand this year can be traced to the slowing of the Chinese economy.

10. US Energy Dialogue and Control of Congress

The rapid growth in US oil and natural gas production in recent years has led to much, likely misplaced, optimism about the future of the industry, at least over the long term. Many oil producers would like to sell their oil and gas at world prices, which are higher than those prevailing in the US. Others would like to see the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada built in order to expand what is seen as a nearly inexhaustible supply of tar sands oil from Canada.  Opposed to the efforts to lift the long-standing oil export embargo are those who believe that rapidly increasing oil and gas production from shale deposits is likely to be short-lived and that it is better to keep US oil and resources in the ground for future generations rather than exporting it for short-term profits.

Thus an ideological dispute over energy policy has arisen in the US between those who do not believe climate change is a serious threat and believe future development of boundless US oil and gas resources is being hampered by pointless regulation; and those who believe there are serious problems just ahead. This dispute has entered the political realm with the newly elected Congress determined to eliminate what they consider to be ill-conceived federal regulation that is only holding up US economic progress.

During the next two years the Congress will pass, and President Obama is likely to veto, legislation which directly threatens environmental regulations.  Beyond this the course of oil prices will likely play a major role in legislation.

Finally, as part of the background discussion to the above policy debate during 2014, a number of leading analysts and commentators declared in a loud and definitive voice that “peak oil is dead.”  We beg to differ.  It appears that worldwide production of conventional crude oil peaked in 2005 and has remained relatively flat.  Since 2005, it is primarily the surge in expensive unconventional shale oil production in North America that has sustained an expansion in worldwide crude oil supply.  In the aftermath of last year’s June-December oil price crash of 50%—which may not yet have bottomed—the worldwide oil industry is wobbling in the footsteps of a wobbling world economy.  Beyond 2015, the notion that substantial annual production increases will continue, thanks to massive drilling backed by heavily borrowed money, appears to us to be living on borrowed time.

Bottom Line

Our view is that world oil production is now on a bumpy plateau that could see a modest peak during 2015 or soon thereafter, followed by a struggle to remain on that plateau.  That perspective is based on four assumptions, explored in more depth above:

Drilling continues, but at a slower pace due to the collision between relatively high costs and high debt vs. declining revenues;

Some level of violence in some oil producing countries continues to withhold potential increases from the market;

The world’s economy (outside of North America) will not recover quickly, thus demand for oil may remain soft; this will squeeze high-cost oil producers as well as oil-exporting countries which rely heavily on higher oil prices to balance their budgets.

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What is the life span of a vehicle Lithium-ion Battery?

How long a lithium-ion battery will last depends on many factors

Lithium-ion battery life is defined in studies as beyond its useful life when its capacity falls by 20 percent or more.

Lithium-ion batteries start to degrade as soon as they’re made, and even when you aren’t using them, so drive as many miles as you can in the next 8 years to make the most if it, since not driving reduces the overall mileage you can expect to get.

Even the same model car will vary tremendously depending on how it’s driven

Temperature. This can change battery life by 5 years or more. Ideally a lithium-ion battery should be kept between 14-86 degrees Fahrenheit – above 86 F and the battery can be permanently degraded, so cooling technology is used in Tesla’;s Model S and the Chevy Volt, but not in the Nissan Leaf for protection. Below 14 the battery can’t provide full power.

Driving range (depth of discharge). If you drive long distances before recharging, you may shorten the lifetime to just 300-500 cycles and the battery capacity will drop to 70%. It will last much longer if you drive half or less the maximum range and then recharge, extending cycle life as high as 1,200-1,500 cycles. Fully charging isn’t good either, so the Tesla Roadster and other EV dno’t allow you to recharge more than 95% of the original power or drain the power to less than 2%.

To compensate for capacity loss, EV manufacturers increase the size of the batteries to allow for some degradation within the guaranteed service life, but that increases vehicle weight, battery cost, and lowers the driving range and efficiency.

Be skeptical of “breakthroughs” such as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory battery that retains 90% of capacity after 10,000 cycles but doesn’t mention energy density in “Solid electrolyte: the key for high-voltage lithium batteries,” Advanced Energy Materials (2014). Any advancement in one area almost always results in a loss in other area(s), as explained in Who Killed the Electric Car.

According to Popp et. al. in their 2014 “Lifetime analysis of four different lithium ion batteries for plug-in electric vehicle” for Transport Research Arena, Paris, the commercial Nickel-cobalt oxide version is superior to all other experimental cells in their capacity, energy content, energy density, and series resistance, but have the worst environmental impacts.

We won’t know until 2020 how long EV batteries actually last, when they start to decline in significant numbers.  Newer chemistries implemented meanwhile will keep everyone guessing.

 

 

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1177 B.C. The year civilization collapsed

[ These are my notes that are disjointed but can give you an idea of how fast our fossil-fueled civilization could collapse.  We are far more interdependent on much longer global supply chains (a wind turbine has 8,000 parts). We are far more vulnerable to asymmetric threats, EMP, cyberwar, nuclear war, a steep net energy cliff, and other topics discussed in 3) Fast Crash.  Another good article on this is Ugo Bardi’s “The fall of the Mediterranean society during the bronze age: why we still don’t understand civilization collapse” at  http://cassandralegacy.blogspot.com

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

Eric H. Cline. 2014. 1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed: Turning Points in Ancient History. Princeton University Press.

Summary: “In 1177 B.C., marauding groups known only as the “Sea Peoples” invaded Egypt. The pharaoh’s army and navy managed to defeat them, but the victory so weakened Egypt that it soon slid into decline, as did most of the surrounding civilizations. After centuries of brilliance, the civilized world of the Bronze Age came to an abrupt and cataclysmic end. Kingdoms fell like dominoes over the course of just a few decades. No more Minoans or Mycenaeans. No more Trojans, Hittites, or Babylonians. The thriving economy and cultures of the late second millennium B.C., which had stretched from Greece to Egypt and Mesopotamia, suddenly ceased to exist, along with writing systems, technology, and monumental architecture. But the Sea Peoples alone could not have caused such widespread breakdown. How did it happen? In this major new account of the causes of this “First Dark Ages,” Eric Cline tells the gripping story of how the end was brought about by multiple interconnected failures, ranging from invasion and revolt to earthquakes, drought, and the cutting of international trade routes. Bringing to life the vibrant multicultural world of these great civilizations, he draws a sweeping panorama of the empires and globalized peoples of the Late Bronze Age and shows that it was their very interdependence that hastened their dramatic collapse and ushered in a dark age that lasted centuries.

The economy of Greece is in shambles. Internal rebellions have engulfed Libya, Syria, and Egypt, with outsiders and foreign warriors fanning the flames. Turkey fears it will become involved, as does Israel. Jordan is crowded with refugees. Iran is bellicose and threatening, while Iraq is in turmoil. AD 2013? Yes. But it was also the situation in 1177 BC, more than three thousand years ago, when the Bronze Age Mediterranean civilizations collapsed one after the other, changing forever the course and the future of the Western world.

The Bronze Age in the Aegean, Egypt, and the Near East lasted nearly 2,000 years, from approximately 3000 BC to just after 1200 BC. When the end came, as it did after centuries of cultural and technological evolution, most of the civilized and international world of the Mediterranean regions came to a dramatic halt in a vast area stretching from Greece and Italy in the west to Egypt, Canaan, and Mesopotamia in the east. Large empires and small kingdoms, which had taken centuries to evolve, collapsed rapidly. With their end came a period of transition, once regarded by scholars as the world’s first Dark Age. It was not until centuries later that a new cultural renaissance emerged in Greece and the other affected areas, setting the stage for the evolution of Western society as we know it today.

In the current global economy, and in a world recently wracked by earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan and the “Arab Spring” democratic revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the fortunes and investments of the United States and Europe are inextricably intertwined within an international system that also involves East Asia and the oil-producing nations of the Middle East. Thus, there is potentially much to be gleaned from an examination of the shattered remains of similarly intertwined civilizations that collapsed more than three thousand years ago.

Edward Gibbon wrote about the fall of the Roman Empire. A more recent example is Jared Diamond’s book Collapse. However, these authors were considering how a single empire or a single civilization came to an end—the Romans, the Maya, the Mongols, and so forth. Here, we are considering a globalized world system with multiple civilizations all interacting and at least partially dependent upon each other. There are only a few instances in history of such globalized world systems; the one in place during the Late Bronze Age and the one in place today are two of the most obvious examples,

“The strategic importance of tin in the LBA [Late Bronze Age] … was probably not far different from that of crude oil today.”  At that time, tin was available in quantity only from specific mines in the Badakhshan region of Afghanistan and had to be brought overland all the way to sites in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) and north Syria, from where it was distributed to points farther north, south, or west, including onward across the sea to the Aegean. Bell continues, “The availability of enough tin to produce … weapons grade bronze must have exercised the minds of the Great King in Hattusa and the Pharaoh in Thebes in the same way that supplying gasoline to the American SUV driver at reasonable cost preoccupies an American President today!

Genuinely useful analogies between the world of 1200 BC and that of today, include an increase in political, social, and economic fragmentation, as well as the conducting of direct exchange at unprecedented social levels and over unprecedented distances. Most relevant is that the situation at the end of the Late Bronze Age provides an analogy for our own increasingly homogenous yet uncontrollable global economy and culture, in which … political uncertainties on one side of the world can drastically affect the economies of regions thousands of miles away.

We are not certain where the Sea Peoples originated: perhaps in Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy, according to one scenario, perhaps in the Aegean or western Anatolia, or possibly even Cyprus or the Eastern Mediterranean.

We think of them as moving relentlessly from site to site, overrunning countries and kingdoms as they went. According to the Egyptian texts, they set up camp in Syria before proceeding down the coast of Canaan (including parts of modern Syria, Lebanon, and Israel) and into the Nile delta of Egypt. The year was 1177 BC. It was the eighth year of Pharaoh Ramses III’s reign. 3 According to the ancient Egyptians, and to more recent archaeological evidence, some of the Sea Peoples came by land, others by sea. 4 There were no uniforms, no polished outfits. Ancient images portray one group with feathered headdresses, while another faction sported skull-caps; still others had horned helmets or went bareheaded. Some had short pointed beards and dressed in short kilts, either bare-chested or with a tunic; others had no facial hair and wore longer garments, almost like skirts. These observations suggest that the Sea Peoples comprised diverse groups from different geographies and different cultures. Armed with sharp bronze swords, wooden spears with gleaming metal tips, and bows and arrows, they came on boats, wagons, oxcarts, and chariots.

We know that the invaders came in waves over a considerable period of time. Sometimes the warriors came alone, and sometimes their families accompanied them.

According to Ramses’s inscriptions, no country was able to oppose this invading mass of humanity. Resistance was futile. The great powers of the day— the Hittites, the Mycenaeans, the Canaanites, the Cypriots, and others—fell one by one. Some of the survivors fled the carnage; others huddled in the ruins of their once-proud cities; still others joined the invaders, swelling their ranks and adding to the apparent complexities of the mob of invaders. Each group of the Sea Peoples was on the move, each apparently motivated by individual reasons. Perhaps it was the desire for spoils or slaves that spurred some; others may have been compelled by population pressures to migrate eastward from their own lands in the West.

Of all the foreign groups active in this arena at this time, only one has been firmly identified. The Peleset of the Sea Peoples are generally accepted as none other than the Philistines, who are identified in the Bible as coming from Crete.

This was not the first time that the Egyptians fought against a collective force of “Sea Peoples.” Thirty years earlier, in 1207 BC, during the fifth year of Pharaoh Merneptah’s reign, a similar coalition of these shadowy groups had attacked Egypt.

The identification of the Shardana and the Shekelesh as “countries of the sea” reinforces the suggestion that they are to be linked with Sardinia and Sicily, respectively.

The general practice of the day was to cut off the hand of a dead enemy and bring it back as proof, in order to get credit and reward for the kill.

In 1177 BC, as previously in 1207 BC, the Egyptians were victorious. The Sea Peoples would not return to Egypt a third time.  However, it was a Pyrrhic victory. Although Egypt under Ramses III was the only major power to successfully resist the onslaught of the Sea Peoples, New Kingdom Egypt was never the same again afterward, most likely because of the other problems faced by the entire Mediterranean region during this period.

Beyond Egypt, almost all of the other countries and powers of the second millennium BC in the Aegean and Near East—those that had been present during the golden years of what we now call the Late Bronze Age—withered and disappeared, either immediately or within less than a century. In the end, it was as if civilization itself had been wiped away in much of this region. Many, if not all, of the advances of the previous centuries vanished across great swaths of territory, from Greece to Mesopotamia. A new transitional era began: an age that was to last for at least one century and perhaps as many as three in some areas. There seems little doubt that terror must have prevailed throughout the lands in the final days of these kingdoms.

There was a tendency on the part of earlier scholars to attribute any destruction from this period to the Sea Peoples. However, it may be presumptuous to lay the blame for the end of the Bronze Age in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean entirely at their feet. It probably gives them too much credit, for we have no clear evidence, apart from the Egyptian texts and inscriptions, which give conflicting impressions. Did the Sea Peoples approach the Eastern Mediterranean as a relatively organized army, like one of the more disciplined Crusades intent on capturing the Holy Land during the Middle Ages? Were they a loosely or poorly organized group of marauders, like the Vikings of a later age? Or were they refugees fleeing a disaster and seeking new lands? For all we know, the truth could involve a combination of all or none of the above.

We are no longer certain that all of the sites with evidence of destruction were razed by the Sea Peoples. We can tell from the archaeological evidence that a site was destroyed, but not always by what or by whom. Moreover, the sites were not all destroyed simultaneously, or even necessarily within the same decade. As we shall see, their cumulative demise spans several decades and perhaps as much as a century. Moreover, while we do not know for certain the cause, or all the causes, of the collapse of the Bronze Age world in Greece, Egypt, and the Near East, the weight of contemporary evidence suggests that it was probably not the Sea Peoples alone who were to blame. It now seems likely that they were as much the victims as they were the aggressors in the collapse of civilizations. 28 One hypothesis suggests that they were forced out of their homes by a series of unfortunate events and migrated eastward where they encountered kingdoms and empires already in decline. It is also quite possible that they were able to attack and ultimately vanquish many of the kingdoms of the region precisely because those monarchies were already in decline and in a weakened state.

The Sea Peoples may well have been responsible for some of the destruction that occurred at the end of the Late Bronze Age, but it is much more likely that a concatenation of events, both human and natural—including climate change and drought, seismic disasters known as earthquake storms, internal rebellions, and “systems collapse”—coalesced to create a “perfect storm” that brought this age to an end.

The Hyksos invasion of Egypt brought the Middle Kingdom period (ca. 2134–1720 BC) to an end. Their success was quite possibly the result of an advantage in weapons technology and first-strike capability, for they possessed composite bows that could shoot arrows much farther than a traditional bow of the time. They also had horse-drawn chariots, the likes of which had not previously been seen in Egypt. After their conquest, the Hyksos then ruled over Egypt, primarily from their capital city of Avaris in the Nile delta, during the so-called Second Intermediate period (Dynasties Fifteen–Seventeen) for nearly 200 years, from 1720 to 1550 BC.  It is one of the only times during the period from 3000 to 1200 BC when Egypt was ruled by foreigners.

About 1550 BC the Egyptians expelled the Hyksos from the land. They fled back to Retenu (one of the ancient Egyptian names for modern-day Israel and Syria,

The Minoans of Crete had already been in contact with several areas in the ancient Near East long before their interactions with the New Kingdom Egyptian pharaohs. For example, we know of Minoan-manufactured objects that had been transported across the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean all the way to Mesopotamia, the land between the two rivers—the Tigris and Euphrates—by the eighteenth century BC, nearly 4,000 years ago.

We do know that they established a civilization on Crete during the third millennium BC that lasted until ca. 1200 BC. Partway through this period, in about 1700 BC, the island was hit by a devastating earthquake that required the rebuilding of the palaces at Knossos and elsewhere on the island. However, the Minoans recovered quickly and flourished as an independent civilization until Mycenaeans from the Greek mainland invaded the island later in the second millennium, after which time the island continued under Mycenaean rule until everything collapsed ca. 1200 BC. Minoans seem to have been in both the import and the export business, industriously networking with a number of foreign areas in addition to Egypt.

We should first note that the Hittites, despite ruling a large empire from their homelands in central Anatolia for much of the second millennium BC, were lost to history, at least geographically, until only about two hundred years ago.

We are told at one point that a Hittite king named Mursili I, grandson and successor of the above-named Hattusili I, marched his army all the way to Mesopotamia, a journey of over one thousand miles, and attacked the city of Babylon in 1595 BC, burning it to the ground and bringing to an end the two-hundred-year-old dynasty made famous by Hammurabi “the Law-Giver.” Then, instead of occupying the city, he simply turned the Hittite army around and headed for home, thus effectively conducting the longest drive-by shooting in history. As an unintended consequence of his action, a previously unknown group called the Kassites was able to occupy the city of Babylon and then ruled over it for the next several centuries.

We should probably understand that the trade between the Aegean, Egypt, and the Near East during the Bronze Age took place on a scale many times larger than the picture that we currently see through the lens of archaeological excavation.

We may sum up this century as a period that saw the rise of international connections on a sustained basis throughout the ancient Mediterranean world, from the Aegean to Mesopotamia. By this time, the Minoans and Mycenaeans of the Bronze Age Aegean were well established, as were the Hittites in Anatolia. The Hyksos had been evicted from Egypt, and the Egyptians had begun what we now call the Eighteenth Dynasty and the New Kingdom period. However, as we shall see next, this was only the beginning of what would become a “Golden Age” of internationalism and globalization during the following fourteenth century BC.

Egypt established itself as one of the great powers for the rest of the Late Bronze Age, along with the Hittites, Assyrians, and Kassites/Babylonians, in addition to assorted other players such as the Mitannians, Minoans, Mycenaeans, and Cypriots,

Thus, the two last major players of the Late Bronze Age in the ancient Near East, Assyria and Cyprus, finally appear on stage. We now have a full cast of characters: Hittites, Egyptians, Mitannians, Kassites/Babylonians, Assyrians, Cypriots, Canaanites, Minoans, and Mycenaeans, all present and accounted for. They all interacted, both positively and negatively, during the coming centuries, though some, such as Mitanni, vanished from the stage long before the others.

The cargo carried in the Uluburun ship consisted of an incredible assortment of goods, truly an international manifest. In all, products from at least seven different countries, states, and empires were on board the ship. In addition to its primary cargo of 10 tons of Cypriot copper, one ton of tin, and a ton of terebinth resin, there were also two dozen ebony logs from Nubia; almost 200 ingots of raw glass from Mesopotamia, about 140 Canaanite storage jars in two or three basic sizes, which contained the terebinth resin, remains of grapes, pomegranates, and figs, as well as spices like coriander and sumac; brand-new pottery from Cyprus and Canaan, including oil lamps, bowls, jugs, and jars; scarabs from Egypt and cylinder seals from elsewhere in the Near East; swords and daggers from Italy and Greece, including one with an inlaid hilt of ebony and ivory; and even a stone scepter-mace from the Balkans. There was also gold jewelry, including pendants, and a gold chalice; duck-shaped ivory cosmetic containers; copper, bronze, and tin bowls and other vessels; twenty-four stone anchors; 14 pieces of hippopotamus ivory and one elephant tusk; and a six-inch-tall statue of a Canaanite deity made of bronze overlaid with gold

The tin probably came from the Badakhshan region of Afghanistan. There were also at least two Mycenaeans on board, even though this seems to have been a Canaanite ship. Clearly this ship does not belong to a world of isolated civilizations, kingdoms, and fiefdoms, but rather to an interconnected world of trade, migration, diplomacy, and, alas, war. This really was the first truly global age.

About the same time as the run-up to the Battle of Qadesh, the Hittites were also busy on a second front, in western Anatolia, where they were trying to contain rebellious subjects whose activities were apparently being underwritten by the Mycenaeans. This may be one of the earliest examples that we have of one government deliberately engaging in activities designed to undermine another (think Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, 3,200 years after the Battle of Qadesh).

Dörpfeld believed that the Mycenaeans had captured this city (Troy VI) and burned it to the ground, and that it was this event that formed the basis of Homer’s epic tales. Blegen, digging several decades later, disagreed, and published what he said was indisputable evidence for destruction not by humans, but by an earthquake. His argument included positive evidence, such as walls knocked out of line and collapsed towers, as well as negative evidence, for he found no arrows, no swords, no remnants of warfare. In fact, it is now clear that the type of damage that Blegen found was similar to that seen at many sites in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, including Mycenae and Tiryns on mainland Greece. It is also clear that these earthquakes did not all take place at the exact same time during the Late Bronze Age.

By the time of the first Sea Peoples attack on the Eastern Mediterranean in 1207 BC, Assyria had been one of the major players on the international scene in the ancient Near East for nearly 200 years. It was a kingdom linked by marriage, politics, war, and trade over the centuries with the Egyptians, Babylonians, Hittites, and Mitanni. It was, without question, one of the Great Powers during the Late Bronze Age.

Tudhaliya IV decided to attack the island of Cyprus. The island had been a major source of copper throughout the second millennium BC, and it is possible that the Hittites decided to try to control this precious metal, so essential to the creation of bronze.  We are not certain about his motivation for attacking Cyprus. It may instead have had something to do with the possible appearance of the Sea Peoples in the area or with the drought that is thought to have occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean at this time.

International trade was ongoing at the end of the thirteenth century BC, even when things were beginning to fall apart in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean regions.

THE END OF AN ERA: THE TWELFTH CENTURY BC

This is the moment for which we have been waiting: the climax of the play and the dramatic beginning of the end to 300 and more years of the globalized economy that had been the hallmark of the Late Bronze Age in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. The twelfth century BC, as we will see in this final act, is marked more by tales of woe and destruction than by stories of trade and international relations.

The city and kingdom of Ugarit, located on the coast of north Syria, a functioning, busy, and prosperous commercial city and port, was suddenly destroyed and abandoned soon after the beginning of the twelfth century BC. Within the ruins, products from all over the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean have been found.

The textual evidence from the various archives and houses at Ugarit indicate that international trade and contact was going strong in the city right up until the last possible moment. In fact, one of the scholars publishing the letters from the House of Urtenu noted almost twenty years ago that there was very little indication of trouble, apart from the mention of enemy ships in one letter, and that the trade routes seemed to be open right up until the end. The same was true in Emar, on the Euphrates River far to the east in inland Syria, where it has been noted that “the scribes were conducting normal business until the end.” However, Ugarit was destroyed, apparently quite violently, during the reign of King Ammurapi, most likely between 1190 and 1185 BC. It was not reoccupied until the Persian period, approximately 650 years later. The excavators report “evidence of destruction and fire throughout the city,” including “collapsed walls, burnt pisé plaster, and heaps of ashes,” with a destruction level that reached two meters high in places. Marguerite Yon, the most recent director of the excavations, says that the ceilings and terraces in the residential quarters were found collapsed, and that elsewhere the walls were “reduced to a shapeless heap of rubble.” She believes that the destruction was caused by enemy attack rather than an earthquake, as had previously been suggested by Schaeffer, and that there was violent fighting in the city, including street fighting. This, she says, is indicated by “the presence of numerous arrowheads dispersed throughout the destroyed or abandoned ruins,” as well as the fact that the inhabitants—eight thousand, more or less—fled in haste and did not return, not even to collect the hoards of valuables that some had buried before leaving.

During this same period, in the twelfth century BC, a number of cities and towns were destroyed in southern Syria and Canaan. Just as in north Syria, it is not clear who destroyed them or when exactly they were destroyed, and as with Hazor and Megiddo, it is unclear who destroyed Lachish VI or the earlier city of Lachish VII. Both, or neither, could have been devastated by the Sea Peoples, or by someone—or something—else entirely.

Even as far to the east as Mesopotamia, evidence of destruction can be seen at multiple sites including Babylon, but these were clearly caused by forces other than the Sea Peoples.

In Anatolia at this time, a number of cities were also destroyed. Once again, though, the reason in each case is hard to discern; and once again the Sea Peoples have traditionally been credited for the devastation on the basis of little or no evidence.  The Kashka—longtime enemies of the Hittites—are more likely than the Sea Peoples to have been responsible for the actual destruction, though it may well have taken place only after the Hittite Empire had been severely weakened through other agencies, such as drought, famine, and interruption of the international trade routes.

The one site in the west that was destroyed by fire early in the twelfth century BC was Troy, specifically Troy VIIA, located on the western coast of Anatolia.

If the Mycenaeans were not involved in the destruction of Troy VIIA, it may have been because they were also under attack at approximately the same time. It is universally accepted by scholars that Mycenae, Tiryns, Midea, Pylos, Thebes, and many other Mycenaean sites on the Greek mainland suffered destructions at this same approximate time, at the end of the thirteenth century BC, and early in the twelfth.

It is clear that something tumultuous occurred, although some scholars see this as merely the final stages of a dissolution or collapse that had begun as early as 1250 BC. Jeremy Rutter of Dartmouth College, for example, believes that “the destruction of the palaces was anything but an unforeseen catastrophe which precipitated a century of crisis in the Aegean, but was instead the culmination of an extended period of unrest which afflicted the Mycenaean world from the mid-thirteenth century onwards.

It is unclear, according to Iakovidis, what caused the fires that destroyed large portions of Mycenae just after 1200 BC, but he eschews the notion of invasions or other dramatic events, preferring to attribute the gradual decline of the site during the following decades to the collapse of the palatial system and of long-distance trade. Recent research by other archaeologists may prove his thesis to be correct.

Thus, we are now faced with a situation in which our current knowledge is being reassessed and conventional historical paradigms are being overthrown, or at least called into question. While it is clear that there were destructions on Cyprus either just before or after 1200 BC, it is by no means clear who was responsible for this damage; possible culprits range from the Hittites to invaders from the Aegean to Sea Peoples and even earthquakes. It is also conceivable that what we see in the archaeological record is merely the material culture of those who took advantage of these destructions and settled into the now fully or partially abandoned cities and settlements, rather than the material culture of those who were actually responsible for the destructions.

Regardless, Cyprus seems to have survived these depredations essentially intact. There is now every indication that the island was flourishing during the remainder of the twelfth and into the eleventh century BC;

We need to acknowledge first and foremost, as frequently noted in the preceding pages, that it is not always clear who, or what, caused the destruction of the Late Bronze Age cities, kingdoms, and empires of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.

Second, we need to admit that there is currently no scholarly consensus as to the cause or causes of the collapse of these multiple interconnected societies just over three thousand years ago; culprits recently blamed by scholars include “attacks by foreign enemies, social uprising, natural catastrophes, systems collapse, and changes in warfare.

Recent research by archaeo-seismologists reveals that Greece, as well as much of the rest of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, was struck by a series of earthquakes, beginning about 1225 BC and lasting for as long as 50 years, until about 1175 BC. We must concede that although these earthquakes undoubtedly caused severe damage, it is unlikely that they alone were sufficient to cause a complete collapse of society, especially since some of the sites were clearly reoccupied and at least partially rebuilt afterward.

CLIMATE CHANGE, DROUGHT, AND FAMINE

One suggestion favored by scholars, especially those seeking to explain not only the end of the Late Bronze Age but also why the Sea Peoples may have begun their migrations, is climate change, particularly in the form of drought, resulting in famine.

Drought was long the favored explanation of earlier scholars for the movement of the Sea Peoples out of the regions of the Western Mediterranean and into the lands to the east. They postulated that a drought in northern Europe had pressured the population to migrate down into the Mediterranean region, where they displaced the inhabitants of Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy, and perhaps those in the Aegean as well. If this occurred, it might have initiated a chain reaction that culminated in the movement of peoples far away in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Using data from the site of Tell Tweini (ancient Gibala) in north Syria, the team noted that there may have been “climate instability and a severe drought episode” in the region at the end of the second millennium BC. 31 In particular, they studied pollen retrieved from alluvial deposits near the site, which suggest that “drier climatic conditions occurred in the Mediterranean belt of Syria from the late 13th/early 12th centuries BC to the 9th century BC.”  Kaniewski’s team has now also published additional evidence of a probable drought on Cyprus at this same time, using pollen analysis.  Their data suggest that “major environmental changes” took place in this area during the end of the Late Bronze Age and the beginning of the Iron Age, that is, during the period from 1200 to 850 BC.

If Kaniewski and his colleagues are correct, they have retrieved the direct scientific evidence that scholars have been seeking for a drought that may have contributed to the end of the Late Bronze Age. In fact, they conclude that the data from both coastal Syria and coastal Cyprus strongly suggest “that the LBA crisis coincided with the onset of a ca. 300-year drought event 3200 years ago. This climate shift caused crop failures, dearth and famine, which precipitated or hastened socio-economic crises and forced regional human migrations at the end of the LBA in the Eastern Mediterranean and southwest Asia.

While it “is difficult to directly identify a point in time when the climate grew more arid,” the change most likely occurred before 1250–1197 BC, which is precisely the time period under discussion here. Also, there was a sharp increase in Northern Hemisphere temperatures immediately before the collapse of the Mycenaean palatial centers, possibly causing droughts,

Abandonment of these centers, meaning that it first got hotter and then suddenly colder, resulting in “cooler, more arid conditions during the Greek Dark Ages.

Exciting as these findings are, at this point we must also acknowledge that droughts have been frequent in this region throughout history, and that they have not always caused civilizations to collapse. Climate change, drought, and famines, even if they “influenced social tensions, and eventually led to competition for limited resources,” are not enough to have caused the end of the Late Bronze Age without other mitigating factors having been involved.

The hypothesis of internal rebellions is not enough to account for the collapse of the Late Bronze Age civilizations in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.  Among events that could have led to an internal rebellion, we have just glimpsed the specter of outside invaders cutting the international trade routes and upsetting fragile economies that might have been overly dependent upon foreign raw materials.

The cutting of the trade routes could have had a severe, and immediate, impact upon Mycenaean kingdoms such as Pylos, Tiryns, and Mycenae.

While natural disasters such as earthquakes could cause a temporary disruption in trade, potentially leading to higher prices and perhaps to what we today would call inflation, more permanent disruptions would more likely have been the result of outside invaders targeting the affected areas.

The wealthiest city-states in the Eastern Mediterranean were the hardest-hit by the events taking place during the twelfth century BC, since they were not only the most attractive targets for the invaders but also the most dependent on the international trade network. Dependence, or perhaps overdependence, on capitalist enterprise, and specifically long-distance trade, may have contributed to the economic instability seen at the end of the Late Bronze Age.

What jumps out from the materials in the Rapanu and Urtenu archives is the tremendous amount of international interconnection that apparently still existed in the Eastern Mediterranean even at the end of the Late Bronze Age. Moreover, it is clear from the few texts published from the Urtenu archive that these international connections continued right up until almost the last moment before Ugarit’s destruction. This seems to be a clear indication that the end was probably sudden, rather than a gradual decline after trade routes had been cut or because of drought and famine, and that Ugarit specifically was destroyed by invaders, regardless of whether these forces had also cut the international trade routes.

Even if decentralization and private individual merchants were an issue, it seems unlikely that they caused the collapse of the Late Bronze Age, at least on their own. Instead of accepting the idea that private merchants and their enterprises undermined the Bronze Age economy, perhaps we should consider the alternative suggestion that they simply emerged out of the chaos of the collapse,

The Sea Peoples, despite their moniker, most likely traveled both by land and by sea—that is, by any means possible. The Sea Peoples who came by land possibly, and perhaps likely, proceeded along a predominantly coastal route, where the destruction of specific cities would have opened up entire new areas to them,

In 1985, when Nancy Sandars published a revised edition of her classic book on the Sea Peoples, she wrote, “In the lands surrounding the Mediterranean, there have always been earthquakes, famines, droughts and floods, and in fact dark ages of a sort are recurrent.” Furthermore, she stated, “catastrophes punctuate human history but they are generally survived without too much loss. They are often followed by a much greater effort leading to greater success.” So what was different about this period, the end of the Late Bronze Age? Why didn’t the civilizations simply recover and carry on? As Sandars mused, “many explanations have been tried and few have stood. Unparalleled series of earthquakes, widespread crop-failures and famine, massive invasion from the steppe, the Danube, the desert—all may have played some part; but they are not enough.” She was correct. We must now turn to the idea of a systems collapse, a systemic failure with both a domino and a multiplier effect, from which even such a globalized international, vibrant, inter-societal network as was present during the Late Bronze Age could not recover.

Colin Renfrew of Cambridge University, one of the most respected scholars ever to study the prehistoric Aegean region, had already suggested the idea of a systems collapse back in 1979. At the time, he framed it in terms of catastrophe theory, wherein “the failure of a minor element started a chain reaction that reverberated on a greater and greater scale, until finally the whole structure was brought to collapse.

The general features of systems collapse are: (1) the collapse of the central administrative organization; (2) the disappearance of the traditional elite class; (3) a collapse of the centralized economy; and (4) a settlement shift and population decline. It might take as much as a century for all aspects of the collapse to be completed. In the aftermath of such a collapse, there would be a transition to a lower level of sociopolitical integration and the development of “romantic” Dark Age myths about the previous period. Not only does this fit the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean region ca. 1200 BC, but it also describes the collapse of the Maya, Old Kingdom Egypt, and the Indus Valley civilization at various points in time.

In my opinion none of these individual factors would have been cataclysmic enough on their own to bring down even one of these civilizations, let alone all of them. However, they could have combined to produce a scenario in which the repercussions of each factor were magnified, in what some scholars have called a “multiplier effect.

The failure of one part of the system might also have had a domino effect, leading to failures elsewhere. The ensuing “systems collapse” could have led to the disintegration of one society after another, in part because of the fragmentation of the global economy and the breakdown of the interconnections upon which each civilization was dependent. In 1987, Mario Liverani, of the University of Rome, laid the blame upon the concentration of power and control in the palaces, so that when they collapsed, the extent of the disaster was magnified. As he wrote, “the particular concentration in the Palace of all the elements of organization, transformation, exchange, etc.—a concentration which seems to reach its maximum in the Late Bronze Age—has the effect of transforming the physical collapse of the Palace into a general disaster for the entire kingdom.” In other words, to put it in modern investment terms, the Bronze Age rulers in the Aegean and the Near East should have diversified their portfolios, but they did not.

Liverani’s work and suggested that the economy of the Late Bronze Age became unstable because of its increasing dependency on bronze and other prestige goods. Specifically, he saw “capitalist enterprise”—in which he included long-distance trade, and which dominated the palatial system present in the Late Bronze Age—as having transformed traditional Bronze Age modes of exchange, production, and consumption to such an extent that when external invasions and natural catastrophes combined in a “multiplier effect,” the system was unable to survive.

An unanticipated systems collapse—quite possibly triggered by climate change, or precipitated by earthquakes or invasion—seems much more likely, but Monroe’s words might serve as something of a warning for us today, for his description of the Late Bronze Age, especially in terms of its economy and interactions, could well apply to our current globalized society, which is also feeling the effects of climate change.

Major Observations

  1. We have a number of separate civilizations that were flourishing during the 15th to 13th centuries BC in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, from the Mycenaeans and the Minoans to the Hittites, Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Canaanites, and Cypriots. These were independent but consistently interacted with each other, especially through international trade routes.
  1. It is clear that many cities were destroyed and that the Late Bronze Age civilizations and life as the inhabitants knew it in the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, and the Near East came to an end ca. 1177 BC or soon thereafter.
  1. No unequivocal proof has been offered as to who or what caused this disaster, which resulted in the collapse of these civilizations and the end of the Late Bronze Age. Discussion of Possibilities There are a number of possible causes that may have led, or contributed, to the collapse at the end of the Late Bronze Age, but none seems capable of having caused the calamity on its own.

In addition:

  1. Clearly there were earthquakes during this period, but usually societies can recover from these.
  2. There is textual evidence for famine, and now scientific evidence for droughts and climate change, in both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, but again societies have recovered from these time and time again.
  3. There may be circumstantial evidence for internal rebellions in Greece and elsewhere, including the Levant, although this is not certain. Again, societies frequently survive such revolts. Moreover, it would be unusual (notwithstanding recent experience in the Middle East to the contrary) for rebellions to occur over such a wide area and for such a prolonged period of time.
  4. There is archaeological evidence for invaders, or at least newcomers probably from the Aegean region, western Anatolia, Cyprus, or all of the above, found in the Levant from Ugarit in the north to Lachish in the south. Some of the cities were destroyed and then abandoned; others were reoccupied; and still others were unaffected.
  5. It is clear that the international trade routes were affected, if not completely cut, for a period of time, but the extent to which this would have impacted the various individual civilizations is not altogether clear—even if some were overly dependent upon foreign goods for their survival, as has been suggested in the case of the Mycenaeans. It is true that sometimes a civilization cannot recover from invaders or an earthquake, or survive a drought or a rebellion, but at the moment, for lack of a better explanation, it looks as though the best solution is to suggest that all of these factors together contributed to the collapse of what had been the dominant Late Bronze Age kingdoms and societies in these regions. Based on the evidence presently available, therefore, we may be seeing the result of a systems collapse that was caused by a series of events linked together via a “multiplier effect,” in which one factor affected the others, thereby magnifying the effects of each. Perhaps the inhabitants could have survived one disaster, such as an earthquake or a drought, but they could not survive the combined effects of earthquake, drought, and invaders all occurring in rapid succession. A “domino effect” then ensued, in which the disintegration of one civilization led to the fall of the others. Given the globalized nature of their world, the effect upon the international trade routes and economies of even one society’s collapse would have been sufficiently devastating that it could have led to the demise of the others. If such were the case, they were not too big to fail.

Sherratt described the similarities between the Late Bronze Age world and our own “increasingly homogenous yet uncontrollable global economy and culture, in which … political uncertainties on one side of the world can drastically affect the economies of regions thousands of miles away.

The most important premise is that such a system exhibits phenomena that are generally surprising, and may be extreme, where basically anything can happen—and if you wait long enough, it generally will. For example all stock markets will eventually have some sort of crash, and all traffic systems will eventually have some kind of jam. These are generally unexpected when they arise, and could not have been specifically predicted in advance, even though one knew full well that they could and would occur.

Since there has never been a civilization in the history of the world that hasn’t collapsed eventually, and since the reasons are frequently the same, as Jared Diamond and a host of others have pointed out, the eventual collapse of the Late Bronze Age civilizations was predictable, but it is unlikely that we would have been able to predict when it would happen, or that they would all collapse at the same time, even with a full working knowledge of each civilization. Even a detailed knowledge of the specifications of a car’s engine, color and shape, is useless when trying to predict where and when traffic jams will arise in a new road system. Likewise, understanding individuals’ personalities in a crowded bar would give little indication as to what large-scale brawls might develop.

As such systems become more complex, and the degree of interdependence between their constituent parts grows, keeping the overall system stable becomes more difficult. Known as “hyper-coherence,” this occurs when each part of the system becomes so dependent upon each other that change in any part produces instability in the system as a whole. Thus, if the Late Bronze Age civilizations were truly globalized and dependent upon each other for goods and services, even just to a certain extent, then change to any one of the relevant kingdoms, such as the Mycenaeans or the Hittites, would potentially affect and destabilize them all.

Moreover, it is especially relevant that the kingdoms, empires, and societies of the Late Bronze Age Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean can each be seen as an individual sociopolitical system. Such complex socio-political systems will exhibit an internal dynamic which leads them to increase in complexity…. [T]he more complex a system is, the more liable it is to collapse. Thus, in the Late Bronze Age Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, we have individual sociopolitical systems, the various civilizations, that were growing more complex and thus apparently more liable to collapse. At the same time, we have complex systems, the trading networks, that were both interdependent and complicated in their relationships, and thus were open to instability the minute there was a change in one of the integral parts. Here is where one malfunctioning cog in an otherwise well-oiled machine might turn the entire apparatus into a pile of junk, just as a single thrown rod can wreck the engine of a car today. Therefore, rather than envisioning an apocalyptic ending overall—although perhaps certain cities and kingdoms like Ugarit met a dramatic, blazing end—we might better imagine that the end of the Late Bronze Age was more a matter of a chaotic although gradual disintegration of areas and places that had once been major and in contact with each other, but were now diminished and isolated, like Mycenae, because of internal and/or external changes that affected one or more of the integral parts of the complex system.

It is clear that such damage would have led to a disruption of the network. We might picture a modern power grid that has been disrupted, perhaps by a storm or an earthquake, wherein the electric company can still produce power but cannot get it out to the individual consumers.

If the disruption is permanent, as might be the case in a major catastrophe, such as a nuclear explosion today, eventually even the production of the electricity will halt. The analogy may hold for the Late Bronze Age.

The consequence of such instability is that when the complex system does collapse, it decomposes into smaller entities, which is exactly what we see in the Iron Age that follows the end of these Bronze Age civilizations. Thus, it seems that employing complexity theory, which allows us to take both catastrophe theory and systems collapse one step further, may be the best approach to explaining the end of the Late Bronze Age in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean in the years following 1200 BC.

The argument that the Bronze Age civilizations were increasing in complexity and were therefore prone to collapse does not really make all that much sense, especially when one considers their “complexity” relative to that of the Western European civilizations of the last 300 years. Thus, while it is possible that complexity theory might be a useful way to approach the collapse of the Late Bronze Age once we have more information available as to the details of all the relevant civilizations, it may not be of much use at this stage, except as an interesting way to reframe our awareness that a multitude of factors were present at the end of the Late Bronze Age that could have helped destabilize, and ultimately led to the collapse of, the international system

And yet, scholarly publications still continue to suggest a linear progression for the collapse of the Late Bronze Age, despite the fact that it is not accurate to simply state that a drought caused famine, which eventually caused the Sea Peoples to start moving and creating havoc, which caused the Collapse. The progression wasn’t that linear; the reality was much more messy. There probably was not a single driving force or trigger, but rather a number of different stressors, each of which forced the people to react in different ways to accommodate the changing situation(s).

Rather than a single driver, is therefore advantageous both in explaining the collapse at the end of the Late Bronze Age and in providing a way forward for continuing to study this catastrophe.

A fluid event, taking place over the course of several decades and perhaps even up to a century, not an occurrence tied to a specific year.

Egypt stands out and is the most representative of the entire collapse. For it was in that year, according to the Egyptian records, that the Sea Peoples came sweeping through the region, wreaking havoc for a second time. It was a year when great land and sea battles were fought in the Nile delta; a year when Egypt struggled for its very survival; a year by which time some of the high-flying civilizations of the Bronze Age had already come to a crashing halt. In fact, one might argue that 1177 BC is to the end of the Late Bronze Age as AD 476 is to the end of Rome and the western Roman Empire. That is to say, both are dates to which modern scholars can conveniently point as the end of a major era. Italy was invaded and Rome was sacked several times during the fifth century AD, including in AD 410 by Alaric and the Visigoths and in AD 455 by Geiseric and the Vandals.

The end of the Late Bronze Age and the transition to the Iron Age is a similar case, insofar as the collapse and transition was a rolling event, taking place between approximately 1225 and 1175 BC or, in some places, as late as 1130 BC.

The mighty Bronze Age kingdoms and empires were gradually replaced by smaller city-states during the following Early Iron Age. Consequently, our picture of the Mediterranean and Near Eastern world of 1200 BC is quite different from that of 1100 BC and completely different from that of 1000 BC. We have firm evidence that it took decades, and even centuries in some areas, for the people in these regions to rebuild and reclaim their societies, and to forge new lives that would bring them back up out of the darkness into which they had been plunged.

The area of the Mycenaean kingdom of Pylos remained, as a whole in fact, severely depopulated for nearly a millennium.

It is clear that after the catastrophes were over, there were no palaces, the use of writing as well as all administrative structures came to an end, and the concept of a supreme ruler, the wanax, disappeared from the range of political institutions of Ancient Greece. In terms of literacy and writing, the same holds true for Ugarit and the other entities that had flourished in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Late Bronze Age, for with their end came also the end of cuneiform writing

Christopher Monroe has stated, “all civilizations eventually experience violent restructuring of material and ideological realities such as destruction or re-creation.” We see this in the constant rise and fall of empires over time, including the Akkadians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Hittites, Neo-Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Mongols, Ottomans, and others, and we should not think that our current world is invulnerable, for we are in fact more susceptible than we might wish to think. While the 2008 collapse of Wall Street in the United States pales in comparison to the collapse of the entire Late Bronze Age Mediterranean world, there were those who warned that something similar could take place if the banking institutions with a global reach were not bailed out immediately. For instance, the Washington Post quoted Robert B. Zoellick, then the president of the World Bank, as saying that “the global financial system may have reached a ‘tipping point,’ ” which he defined as “the moment when a crisis cascades into a full-blown meltdown and becomes extremely difficult for governments to contain.” In a complex system such as our world today, this is all it might take for the overall system to become destabilized, leading to a collapse.

Posted in Cascading Failure, Collapse of Civilizations, Collapsed & collapsing nations, Drought & Collapse, Interdependencies, Supply Chains | Tagged , , , , | Comments Off on 1177 B.C. The year civilization collapsed

Shale “fracked” natural gas peak by 2020: Mason Inman’s “Natural gas, the fracking fallacy”

[ In 2005 the U.S. was making desperate plans to build dozens of Liquefied Natural Gas plants for importing gas. Fracked gas changed that for the past 10 years, indeed, now the U.S. is talking about exporting natural gas.  But most companies have been spending more money than they’ve made, and now in 2016 we are seeing the shale bubble burst.  Even if Wall Street had been able to continue funding drillers using middle class money placed in 401K and IRA high-yield bond and stock mutual funds, scientists at the University of Texas have estimated that the largest fracked gas plays will peak in 2020.

There is a lot of natural gas left in the world.  But much of it is stranded, requiring too many miles of pipelines to reach civilization (too expensive).

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer]

Inman, Mason. December 3, 2014. Natural Gas: The fracking fallacy. Nature 516, 28-30

Editorial

The EIA projects that production will rise by more than 50% over the next quarter of a century, and perhaps beyond, with shale formations supplying much of that increase.

But such optimism contrasts with forecasts developed by a team of specialists at the University of Texas, which is analyzing the geological conditions using data at much higher resolution than the EIA’s. The Texas team projects that gas production from four of the most productive formations will peak in the coming years and then quickly decline. If that pattern holds for other formations that the team has not yet analyzed, it could mean much less natural gas in the United States’ future.

Like all energy forecasts, the lower projections from the Texas team could turn out to be inaccurate. Technological advances in the next few decades could open up more resources at lower costs, driving US production even higher than the EIA has predicted. But it is also possible that the Texas forecasts are too high, and that gas production will fall off even faster than the team suggests.

The one certainty here is that the United States and other nations have invested relatively little in tracking and assessing their natural resources. The EIA has a total budget of US$117 million, less than the value of one day’s gas production from the country’s shale formations.

Natural gas: The fracking fallacy

The United States is banking on decades of abundant natural gas to power its economic resurgence. That may be wishful thinking.

When US President Barack Obama talks about the future, he foresees a thriving US economy fueled to a large degree by vast amounts of natural gas pouring from domestic wells. “We have a supply of natural gas that can last America nearly 100 years,” he declared in his 2012 State of the Union address.

Obama’s statement reflects an optimism that has permeated the United States. It is all thanks to fracking — or hydraulic fracturingwhich has made it possible to coax natural gas at a relatively low price out of the fine-grained rock known as shale. Around the country, terms such as ‘shale revolution’ and ‘energy abundance’ echo through corporate boardrooms.

Companies are betting big on forecasts of cheap, plentiful natural gas. Over the next 20 years, US industry and electricity producers are expected to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in new plants that rely on natural gas. And billions more dollars are pouring into the construction of export facilities that will enable the United States to ship liquefied natural gas to Europe, Asia and South America.

All of those investments are based on the expectation that US gas production will climb for decades, in line with the official forecasts by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). As agency director Adam Sieminski put it last year: “For natural gas, the EIA has no doubt at all that production can continue to grow all the way out to 2040.”

But a careful examination of the assumptions behind such bullish forecasts suggests that they may be overly optimistic, in part because the government’s predictions rely on coarse-grained studies of major shale formations, or plays. Now, researchers are analyzing those formations in much greater detail and are issuing more-conservative forecasts. They calculate that such formations have relatively small ‘sweet spots’ where it will be profitable to extract gas.

Tad Patzek, head of the University of Texas at Austin’s department of petroleum and geosystems engineering says this is “bad news, we’re setting ourselves up for a major fiasco”.

If US natural-gas production falls, plans to export large amounts overseas could fizzle. And nations hoping to tap their own shale formations may reconsider. “If it begins to look as if it’s going to end in tears in the United States, that would certainly have an impact on the enthusiasm in different parts of the world,” says economist Paul Stevens of Chatham House, a London-based think tank.

The idea that natural gas will be abundant is a sharp turnaround from more pessimistic outlooks that prevailed until about five years ago. Throughout the 1990s, US natural-gas production had been stuck on a plateau. With gas supplying 25% of US energy, there were widespread worries that supplies would shrink and the nation would become dependent on imports. The EIA, which collects energy data and provides a long-term outlook for US energy, projected as recently as 2008 that US natural-gas production would remain fairly flat for the following couple of decades.

The shale boom caught everyone by surprise. It relied on fracking technology that had been around for decades — but when gas prices were low, the technology was considered too costly to use on shale. In the 2000s, however, prices rose high enough to for companies to afford fracking shale formations. Combined with new techniques for drilling long horizontal wells, this pushed US natural-gas production to an all-time high, allowing the nation to regain a title it had previously held for decades: the world’s top natural-gas producer.

Rich rocks

Much of the credit for that goes to the Marcellus shale formation, which stretches across West Virginia, Pennsylvania and New York. Beneath thickly forested rolling hills, companies have sunk more than 8,000 wells over several years, and are adding about 100 more every month. Each well extends down for about 2 kilometers before veering sideways and snaking for more than a kilometer through the shale. The Marcellus now supplies 385 million cubic meters of gas per day, more than enough to supply half of the gas currently burned in US power plants.

A substantial portion of the rest of the US gas supply comes from three other shale plays — the Barnett in Texas, the Fayetteville in Arkansas and the Haynesville, which straddles the Louisiana–Texas border. Together, these ‘big four’ plays boast more than 30,000 wells and are responsible for two-thirds of current US shale-gas production.

The EIA — like nearly all other forecasters — did not see the boom coming, and has consistently underestimated how much gas would come from shale. But as the boom unfolded, the agency substantially raised its long-term expectations for shale gas. In its Annual Energy Outlook 2014, the ‘reference case’ scenario — based on the expectation that natural-gas prices will gradually rise, but remain relatively low — shows US production growing until 2040, driven by large increases in shale gas.

The EIA has not published its projections for individual shale-gas plays, but has released them to Nature. In the latest reference-case forecast, production from the big four plays would continue rising quickly until 2020, then plateau for at least 20 years. Other shale-gas plays would keep the boom going until 2040.

Petroleum-industry analysts create their own shale-gas forecasts, which generally fall in the neighborhood of the EIA assessment. “EIA’s outlook is pretty close to the consensus,” says economist Guy Caruso of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, who is a former director of the agency. However, these consultancies rarely release the details behind their forecasts. That makes it difficult to assess and discuss their assumptions and methods, argues Ruud Weijermars, a geoscientist at Texas A&M University in College Station. Industry and consultancy studies are “entirely different from the peer-reviewed domain”, he says.

To provide rigorous and transparent forecasts of shale-gas production, a team of a dozen geoscientists, petroleum engineers and economists at the University of Texas at Austin has spent more than three years on a systematic set of studies of the major shale plays. The research was funded by a US$1.5-million grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in New York City, and has been appearing gradually in academic journals1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and conference presentations. That work is the “most authoritative” in this area so far, says Weijermars.

If natural-gas prices were to follow the scenario that the EIA used in its 2014 annual report, the Texas team forecasts that production from the big four plays would peak in 2020, and decline from then on. By 2030, these plays would be producing only about half as much as in the EIA’s reference case. Even the agency’s most conservative scenarios seem to be higher than the Texas team’s forecasts. “Obviously they do not agree very well with the EIA results,” says Patzek.

The main difference between the Texas and EIA forecasts may come down to how fine-grained each assessment is.

  • The EIA breaks up each shale play by county, calculating an average well productivity for that area. But counties often cover more than 1,000 square kilometers, large enough to hold thousands of horizontal fracked wells.
  • The Texas team, by contrast, splits each play into blocks of one square mile (2.6 square kilometers)a resolution at least 20 times finer than the EIA’s.

Resolution matters because each play has sweet spots that yield a lot of gas, and large areas where wells are less productive. Companies try to target the sweet spots first, so wells drilled in the future may be less productive than current ones. The EIA’s model so far has assumed that future wells will be at least as productive as past wells in the same county. But this approach, Patzek argues, “leads to results that are way too optimistic”.

The high resolution of the Texas studies allows their model to distinguish the sweet spots from the marginal areas. As a result, says study co-leader Scott Tinker, a geoscientist at the University of Texas at Austin, “we’ve been able to say, better than in the past, what a future well would look like”.

The Texas and EIA studies also differ in how they estimate the total number of wells that could be economically drilled in each play. The EIA does not explicitly state that number, but its analysis seems to require more wells than the Texas assessment, which excludes areas where drilling would be difficult, such as under lakes or major cities. These features of the model were chosen to “mimic reality”, Tinker says, and were based on team members’ long experience in the petroleum industry.

Alternative Futures

The lower forecasts from Texas mesh with a few independent studies that use simpler methods. Studies by the following researchers suggest that increasing production, as in the EIA’s forecasts, would require a significant and sustained increase in drilling over the next 25 years, which may not be profitable.

  1. Weijermars 6, R. 2014. US shale gas production outlook based on well roll-out rate scenarios. Applied Energy, 124, 283-297.
  2. Mark Kaiser7 of Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge
  3. retired Geological Survey of Canada geologist David Hughes8,

Some industry insiders are impressed by the Texas assessment. Richard Nehring, an oil and gas analyst at Nehring Associates in Colorado Springs, Colorado, which operates a widely used database of oil and gas fields, says the team’s approach is “how unconventional resource assessments should be done”.

Patzek acknowledges that forecasts of shale plays “are very, very difficult and uncertain”, in part because the technologies and approaches to drilling are rapidly evolving. In newer plays, companies are still working out the best spots to drill. And it is still unclear how tightly wells can be packed before they significantly interfere with each other.

Yet in a working paper9 published online on 14 October, two EIA analysts acknowledge problems with the agency’s methods so far. They argue that it would be better to draw upon high-resolution geological maps, and they point to those generated by the Texas team as an example of how such models could improve forecasts by delineating sweet spots. The paper carries a disclaimer that the authors’ views are not necessarily those of the EIA — but the agency does plan to use a new approach along these lines when it assesses the Marcellus play for its 2015 annual report. (When Nature asked the authors of that paper for an on-the-record interview, they referred questions to Staub.)

Boom or bust

Patzek argues that actual production could come out lower than the team’s forecasts. He talks about it hitting a peak in the next decade or so — and after that, “there’s going to be a pretty fast decline on the other side”, he says. “That’s when there’s going to be a rude awakening for the United States.” He expects that gas prices will rise steeply, and that the nation may end up building more gas-powered industrial plants and vehicles than it will be able to afford to run. “The bottom line is, no matter what happens and how it unfolds,” he says, “it cannot be good for the US economy.”

If forecasting is difficult for the United States, which can draw on data for tens of thousands of shale-gas wells, the uncertainty is much larger in countries with fewer wells. The EIA has commissioned estimates of world shale potential from Advanced Resources International (ARI), a consultancy in Washington DC, which concluded in 2013 that shale formations worldwide are likely to hold a total of 220 trillion cubic meters of recoverable natural gas10. At current consumption rates — with natural gas supplying one-quarter of global energy — that would provide a 65-year supply. However, the ARI report does not state a range of uncertainty on its estimates, nor how much gas might be economical to extract.

Such figures are “extremely dubious”, argues Stevens. “It’s sort of people wetting fingers and waving them in the air.” He cites ARI’s assessments of Poland, which is estimated to have the largest shale-gas resources in Europe. Between 2011 and 2013, the ARI reduced its estimate for Poland’s most promising areas by one-third, saying that some test wells had yielded less than anticipated. Meanwhile, the Polish Geological Institute did its own study11, calculating that the same regions held less than one-tenth of the gas in ARI’s initial estimate.

If gas supplies in the United States dry up faster than expected — or environmental opposition grows stronger — countries such as Poland will be less likely to have their own shale booms, say experts.

For the moment, however, optimism about shale gas reigns — especially in the United States. And that is what worries some energy experts. “There is a huge amount of uncertainty,” says Nehring. “The problem is, people say, ‘Just give me a number’. Single numbers, even if they’re wrong, are a lot more comforting.”

The EIA is underfunded

Patzek says that the EIA’s method amounts to “educated guesswork”. But he and others are reluctant to come down too hard. The EIA is doing “the best with the resources they have and the timelines they have”, says Patzek. Its 2014 budget — which covers data collection and forecasting for all types of energy — totaled just $117 million, about the cost of drilling a dozen wells in the Haynesville shale. The EIA is “good value for the money”, says Caruso. “I always felt we were underfunded. The EIA was being asked to do more and more, with less and less.”

Representatives of the EIA defend the agency’s assessments and argue that they should not be compared with the Texas studies because they use different assumptions and include many scenarios. “Both modelling efforts are valuable, and in many respects feed each other,” says John Staub, leader of the EIA’s team on oil and gas exploration and production analysis. “In fact, EIA has incorporated insights from the University of Texas team,” he says.

Access the data used in this feature at https://github.com/the-frack-lab/data/wiki/Nature-feature-%22The-Fracking-Fallacy%22

Rebuttal of the rebuttal above article

Nature published objections to the article above in a later issue, Art Berman best rebuts the rebuttal below:

Nature Responds To EIA and BEG Denial Letters

Posted in The Petroleum Truth Report on December 19, 2014

Today, Nature responded to letters earlier this week from the EIA (Energy Information Administration) and BEG (Bureau of Economic Geology, University of Texas at Austin) claiming that Mason Inman’s article “The Fracking Fallacy” published on December 4, 2014 was flawed.
Nature stands by Inman’s article and, interestingly, revealed that EIA was asked some questions by Inman while he was working on the article but they did not reply.
It is also interesting that the EIA denial letter was not signed by the EIA Administrator Adam Sieminski but by Deputy Administrator Howard Gruenspecht.
Let’s get a few things straight as people attempt to sort through this bit of energy theater.
First, Allen Brooks has documented the events and facts of this story in two issues of Musings From The Oil Patch:
Allen showed many of BEG Director Scott Tinker’s slides that set off the debate in the first of these articles but the key chart in my view is the following:

 
 
Despite denial of any differences by both the EIA and BEG, the obvious truth is that the BEG Sloan studies of the major shale gas plays in the United States forecast lower EUR (estimated ultimate recovery), a shorter life-cycle, an earlier and steeper decline and a lower contribution to total gas supply than does the EIA.
Period.
Denying that there is any discrepancy between EIA and BEG is false.  This difference does not disappear by accusing Inman and Nature of misrepresentation and bias.  Attempts by both agencies to discredit Tad Patzek or minimize his role in the BEG studies–more about that a bit later in my comments–are factually incorrect and shameful.
The BEG studies confirm what many “shale gas skeptics” (including me) have said for many years:  The shale gas phenomenon is real, it has contributed a significant volume of gas that nobody thought was available, and there is a lot less of it than some people believe.  I add that it also costs more than represented to produce although that is not part of the immediate debate among EIA, BEG and Nature.
The EIA published 2013 proven reserves of shale gas earlier this month.  Shale gas will provide about 6 years of supply at present consumption.  We can debate about the various classes of reserves and speculate about resources from now until we run out of gas but the plain and simple truth is what Inman and the BEG studies concluded:  there is less gas than many people thought and certainly less than EIA has represented in its natural gas forecasts (do the EIA people who do the gas forecasts talk to the people who do the reserve accounting?).

Much of the EIA’s position stated in Gruenspecht’s letter (and interpreted by me)  is that uncertainty exists and the EIA represents multiple scenarios and should not be held to account for one or, in fact, any of them.  That sounds good but, as someone pointed out to me, applications for LNG export to the Department of Energy are based on the EIA base case.

Tad Patzek was quoted often in the Nature article and was shamelessly “thrown under the bus” by the EIA and BEG in both denial letters.

Tad is Professor and Chairman of the Petroleum Eng. & Geosystems Department at the University of Texas at Austin and a lead researcher in the BEG Sloan studies on U.S. shale gas plays.

Despite comments in both letters saying that Tad’s role was relatively minor in those studies, I dispute those statements as distortions of fact.  The work done by Tad and his engineering team addressed the determination of individual well EUR which, in my view, is the core of the studies.

I believe that the BEG Sloan studies represent a monumental achievement and demonstrate an unparalleled level of comprehensive and integrated analysis on the important subject of shale gas. I fully support the technical analysis and Tad Patzek and his team provided the credible core of that work.  Please see the papers following for proof of this:

1.     Patzek, T.W. Male, F., and Marder, M.,“A simple model of gas production from hydrofractured horizontal wells in shales,” AAPG Bulletin, v. 98, no. 12 (December 2014), pp. 2507–2529.
2.     Patzek, T. W., Male, F. and Marder, M. “Gas production in the Barnett Shale obeys a simple scaling theory,”  PNAS, doi:10.1073/pnas.1313380110, November 18, 2013. Awarded with the Cozzarelli Prize by the National Academy of Sciences for the best paper in engineering in 2013.
3.      Patzek, T. W., Male, F. and Marder, M. “Supporting Materials to: Gas production in the Barnett Shale obeys a simple scaling theory,”  PNAS, doi:10.1073/pnas.1313380110, November 18, 2013.
4.     John Browning, Katie Smye, Scott W. Tinker, Susan Horvath, Svetlana Ikonnikova, Tad Patzek Gürcan Gülen, , Frank Male, Eric Potter, Forrest Roberts , and Qilong Fu, “Study develops Fayetteville shale reserves, production forecast, OGJ, 01/06/2014.
5.     John Browning, Scott W. Tinker, Svetlana Ikonnikova, Gürcan Gülen, Eric Potter, Qilong Fu, Susan Horvath, Tad Patzek, Frank Male, William Fisher, Forrest Roberts and Ken Medlock, III, “BARNETT SHALE MODEL-2 (Conclusion): Barnett study determines full-field reserves, production forecast,” OGJ, September 9, 2013.
6.     John Browning, Scott W. Tinker, Svetlana Ikonnikova, Gürcan Gülen, Eric Potter, Qilong Fu, Susan Horvath, Tad Patzek, Frank Male, William Fisher, Forrest Roberts and Ken Medlock, III, “BARNETT SHALE MODEL-1: Barnett study determines full-field reserves, production forecast,” OGJ, p. 62, August 5, 2013.
7.     Frank Male, Akand W. Islam, Tad W. Patzek, Michael P. Marder, Paper SPE168993-MS: “Analysis of Gas Production From Hydraulically Fractured Wells In The Haynesville Shale Using Scaling Methods,” presented at the SPE Unconventional Resources Conference – USA, held in The Woodlands, Texas, USA, 1-3 April 2014.
8.     Frank Male, Akand W. Islam, Tad W. Patzek, Svetlana Ikonnikova, John Browning and Michael P. Marder,  “Analysis of gas production from hydraulically fractured wells in the Haynesville shale using scaling methods,” submitted to the Journal of Unconventional Oil and Gas Resources, 2014 (now in revision to be send back to the editor).

References

  1. Patzek, T. W., Male, F. & Marder, M. Gas production in the Barnett Shale obeys a simple scaling theory. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 110, 19731–19736 (2013).

Ten years ago, US natural gas cost 50% more than that from Russia. Now, it is threefold less. US gas prices plummeted because of the shale gas revolution. However, a key question remains: At what rate will the new hydrofractured horizontal wells in shales continue to produce gas? We analyze the simplest model of gas production consistent with basic physics of the extraction process. Its exact solution produces a nearly universal scaling law for gas wells in each shale play, where production first declines as 1 over the square root of time and then exponentially. The result is a surprisingly accurate description of gas extraction from thousands of wells in the United States’ oldest shale play, the Barnett Shale.

The fast progress of hydraulic fracturing technology (SI Text, Figs. S1 and S2) has led to the extraction of natural gas and oil from tens of thousands of wells drilled into mudrock (commonly called shale) formations. The wells are mainly in the United States, although there is significant potential on all continents (1). The “fracking” technology has generated considerable concern about environmental consequences (2, 3) and about whether hydrocarbon extraction from mudrocks will ultimately be profitable (4). The cumulative gas obtained from the hydrofractured horizontal wells and the profits to be made depend upon production rate. Because large-scale use of hydraulic fracturing in mudrocks is relatively new, data on the behavior of hydrofractured wells on the scale of 10 y or more are only now becoming available.

There is more than a century of experience describing how petroleum and gas production declines over time for vertical wells. The geometry of horizontal wells in gas-rich mudrocks is quite different from the configuration that has guided intuition for the past century. The mudrock formations are thin layers, on the order of 30–90 m thick, lying at characteristic depths of 2 km or more and extending over areas of thousands of square kilometers. Wells that access these deposits drop vertically from the surface of the earth and then turn so as to extend horizontally within the mudrock for 1–8 km. The mudrock layers have such low natural permeability that they have trapped gas for millions of years, and this gas becomes accessible only after an elaborate process that involves drilling horizontal wells, fracturing the rock with pressurized water, and propping the fractures open with sand. Gas seeps from the region between each two consecutive fractures into the highly permeable fracture planes and into the wellbore, and it is rapidly produced from there.

Gas released by hydraulic fracturing can only be extracted from the finite volume where permeability is enhanced. Exponential decline of production once the interference time has been reached is inevitable, and extrapolations based upon the power law that prevails earlier are inaccurate. The majority of wells are too young to be displaying interference yet. The precise amount of gas they produce, and therefore their ultimate profitability, will depend upon when interference sets in.

For the moment, it is necessary to live with some uncertainty. Upper and lower bounds on gas in place are still far apart, even in the Barnett Shale with the longest history of production. Pessimists (4) see only the lower bounds, whereas optimists (19) look beyond the upper bounds. A detailed economic analysis based on the model presented here is possible, however, and is being published elsewhere (17, 18, 20, 21). The theoretical tools we are providing should make it possible to detect the onset of interference at the earliest possible date, provide increasingly accurate production forecasts as data become available, and assist with rational decisions about how hydraulic fracturing should proceed in light of its impact on the US environment and economy.

  1. Browning, J. et al. Oil Gas J. 111 (8), 62–73 (2013).
  2. Browning, J. et al. Oil Gas J. 111 (9), 88–95 (2013).
  3. Browning, J. et al. Oil Gas J. 112 (1), 64–73 (2014).
  4. Gülen, G., Browning, J., Ikonnikova, S. & Tinker, S. W. Energy 60, 302–315 (2013).
  5. Weijermars, R. Appl. Energy 124, 283–297 (2014).
  6. Kaiser, M. J. & Yu, Y. Oil Gas J. 112 (3), 62–65 (2014).
  7. Hughes, J. D. Drilling Deeper (Post Carbon Institute, 2014); available at http://go.nature.com/o84xwk and Hughes JD (2013) Energy: A reality check on the shale revolution. Nature 494(7437):307–308
  8. Cook, T. & Van Wagener, D. Improving Well Productivity Based Modeling with the Incorporation of Geologic Dependencies (EIA, 2014); available at http://go.nature.com/dmwsdd
  9. US Energy Information Administration Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources (EIA, 2013); available at http://go.nature.com/mqkmwx
  10. Assessment of Shale Gas and Shale Oil Resources of the Lower Paleozoic Baltic–Podlasie–Lublin Basin in Poland — First Report (Polish Geological Institute, 2012); available at http://go.nature.com/lw8fg7
  11. Assessment of Shale Gas and Shale Oil Resources of the Lower Paleozoic Baltic–Podlasie–Lublin Basin in Poland — First Report (Polish Geological Institute, 2012); available at http://go.nature.com/lw8fg7

 

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Natural Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) as a Drop-in Diesel fuel

[The reason GTL is a big deal is that it can substitute for diesel without having to modify a diesel engine to do so — therefore, it’s a “drop-in fuel” substitute.

However, GTL isn’t likely to be the answer, since it’s far more “economically attractive” to use natural gas to produce electricity and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), according to the U.S. Energy Information administration.

Once oil begins to decline, a substitute for diesel fuel must be found to continue to allow the billions of truck, train, shipping, and agricultural tractor/harvester etc., diesel combustion engines to operate since they can’t run on diesohol, ethanol, and can at most use 5 to 20% biodiesel (though there are some truck diesel engines warrantied now for 100% biodiesel).  Yet even if all diesel engines were warrantied for 100% biodiesel, there can never be enough biodiesel made to be the sole provider of freight vehicle fuel, not even if all oilseeds (soybeans, etc) now being used for food were also converted to biodiesel.

Currently there are only 5 GTL plants in the world producing from 2,700 to 140,000 barrels/day.  Another is under construction, and 3 are proposed in the USA, only 1 large-scale).

There are 2 articles below. The 1st one explains the GTL process and the 2nd looks at the largest GTL plant in the world in Qatar. 

In the USA, a GTL plant can only be profitable if it maximizes wax production for the chemicals market rather than making diesel and other fuels.

Alice Friedemann wwww.energyskeptic.com]

 

Tom Murphy on Gas to Liquids

As with coal, methane gas can be synthesized into liquids like octane via the Fischer-Tropsch method.

The U.S. uses about 20 tcf of natural gas per year. A liter of octane (at 700 grams) requires 1100 liters of natural gas. Replacing a 3% annual shortfall of 200 million barrels (at 160 ℓ/bbl) of oil would require 35 trillion liters of methane, or 1.2 tcf: a 6% annual increase in natural gas production—similar to the impact on coal.   The U.S. Energy Information Agency projects that shale gas—currently at about 15% of domestic gas production— will nearly triple by 2035 to be our single biggest resource for natural gas. This is on top of a conventional supply that falls by 29% over the same period. In aggregate, the rapid expansion of shale gas allows a slow net growth rate of 0.4% per year. The faith in shale gas to deliver seems stretched a bit, so that it is difficult to assess the likelihood of net gas production growth at all. And even if it does grow, the 0.4% per year projection falls far short of the 6% level that would be needed to offset a 3% per year decline in oil.

Gas-to-liquids plants face challenges in the U.S. market

February 19, 2014. United States Energy Information Administration (EIA)

The most common GTL technique to convert natural gas to diesel and other liquid fuels (and waxes) is Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) synthesis.

Although F-T synthesis has been around for nearly a century, it is very expensive but has lately been of interest due to the growing spread between the value of petroleum products and the cost of natural gas.

The first step is to convert natural gas to a mixture of hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide (syngas) and then removing sulfur, water, and carbon dioxide to prevent catalyst contamination. The F-T reaction combines hydrogen with carbon monoxide to form different liquid hydrocarbons. These liquid products are then further processed using different refining technologies into liquid fuels.

The F-T reaction typically happens at high pressure (40 atmospheres) and temperature (500o-840oF) in the presence of an iron catalyst. The cost of building a reaction vessel to produce the required volume of fuel or products and to withstand these temperatures and pressures can be considerable ($18-19 billion to create the Qatar facility).

Diagram of GTL process, as explained in the article text

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

There are currently five GTL plants operating globally, with capacities ranging from 2,700 barrels per day (bbl/d) to 140,000 bbl/d. Two in Malaysia,  two in Qatar, and one in South Africa. One plant in Nigeria is currently under construction.

Three plants in the United States are proposed, only one of them  a large-scale GTL plant.  Update Jan 29, 2015: Sasol has delayed an expansive $14 billion project in southwestern Louisiana to make diesel out of natural gas. The Sasol project depended on two dynamics in the energy markets: oil prices remaining high and natural gas prices staying low, because the conversion process for producing diesel is expensive and highly complex. Now any diesel produced by the plant would almost surely cost more than diesel produced by conventional refiners.  The Westlake, La facility would have produced 96,000 barrels of fuel a day. “In order for the G.T.L. technology to pay, it has to use inexpensive natural gas and sell into a high-priced market, the $100-a-barrel oil market we have grown accustomed to the last few years,” said Don Hertzmark, an international energy consultant who has worked on gas-to-liquids and other global natural gas projects for three decades. “That cost advantage has collapsed, taking with it the profit potential for G.T.L. in the United States at least for now.   GTL technology has a mixed record — the world’s largest plant in Qatar, cost $19 billion, 3 times more than its original projected cost, and was plagued with unexpected maintenance problems. BP and ConocoPhillips briefly operated demonstration plants in Alaska and Oklahoma, but never built a commercial facility. Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips announced plans to build giant plants in Qatar, but backed out, putting their capital instead into terminals to export liquefied natural gas (Krauss).

In December 2013, Shell cancelled plans to build a large-scale GTL facility in Louisiana because of high capital costs. The Annual Energy Outlook 2014 does not include any large-scale GTL facilities in the United States through 2040. Other uses for available natural gas in industry, electric power generation, and exports of pipeline and liquefied natural gas are more economically attractive than GTL.

To improve the profitability of GTL plants, developers have reconfigured their designs to include the production of waxes and lubricating products. Because of the smaller size of the chemical market, smaller-scale GTL plants similar to those proposed in the Midwest are economically viable. F-T waxes are used in industries producing candles, paints and coatings, resins, plastic, synthetic rubber, tires, and other products.


High Costs Slow Quest For Ultraclean Diesel

February 23, 2007, by Russell Gold. Wall Street Journal 

[Although this article was published in 2007, it’s still true in 2014.

Updates: In 2012 the Shell Qatar plant reached full production of 140,000 GTL barrels/day (b/d), a drop in the bucket of the 90,000,000 b/d produced worldwide and over its lifetime will produce 3 billion barrels of oil equivalent (half GTL, half other products), less than 1 month of world oil production]

The rush to build a new industry that turns natural gas into a transportation fuel is stumbling over rising costs, showing how tough it is for emerging fuels to compete with crude oil.

This past week, Exxon Mobil Corp. backed out of plans to build an enormous gas-to-liquids, or GTL, plant in Qatar. Yesterday, Royal Dutch Shell PLC broke ground on its own similarly sized GTL plant in Qatar, but said the cost might have tripled to as high as $18 billion.

  • The Hope: Energy companies have been investing in a potential petroleum substitute that turns natural gas into a liquid fuel.
  • The Problem: Gas-to-liquids projects have surged in cost due to overall oil-patch inflation.
  • The Result: Exxon Mobil this week joined other companies putting GTL projects on hold.

Escalating budgets are threatening to constrain the growth of the GTL industry, which produces a clear liquid that can run existing diesel engines without any of the sooty pollutants associated with diesel. The rising costs of steel, engineering and labor have led to steep inflation among major energy projects world-wide, underscoring how the rush to find new fuel sources is driving up the cost of developing them.

Higher costs have hit companies developing Canada’s oil sands, where crude is packed into tar-like deposits. Prices for corn and other crops have risen, in part, because of the U.S.’s increasing interest in ethanol.

Other than Shell’s Qatar facility, the only other GTL plant under construction also is facing cost pressures. Last year, Halliburton Co. hal -10.86% took a charge to earnings because of delays and cost increases for the plant its KBR Inc. kbr -11.23% unit is building in Nigeria for Chevron Corp. cvx -5.42% and Sasol Ltd. ssl -10.03%

Exxon officials wouldn’t say whether rising costs were the main factor in the decision to drop plans for the Qatar GTL plant. “Deciding not to progress with GTL is in line with our investment approach, which is very disciplined,” said Exxon spokeswoman Jeanne Miller.

Other GTL proposals, including projects led by Marathon Oil Corp. MRO -11.02% and ConocoPhillips, cop -6.72% in recent years were put on hold.

Exxon’s decision is likely to cause other companies to rethink their commitment to GTL. Bernard Picchi, an energy analyst for research and trading firm Wall Street Access, who keeps close tabs on GTL, said he expects other GTL hopefuls “to take a timeout, a deep breath and re-evaluate the cost and technology.”

Using technology developed in Nazi Germany, the process of turning natural gas into liquids had long been too expensive to be commercial. Small-scale GTL plants in Malaysia, operated by Shell, and South Africa, by Sasol, have been in operation for years. Several years ago, the Middle Eastern nation of Qatar decided to encourage large projects to turn its natural-gas resources into an exportable liquid fuel. The scale of the facilities, as well as rising oil costs, were expected to make the GTL fuel competitive. The Exxon and Shell projects, alongside a project by Sasol, were set to generate more than 300,000 barrels a day of the fuel.

Qatar hoped the plants could help GTL put a dent in crude oil’s near-monopoly on the world’s largest energy market — powering the world’s vehicles — by creating an alternative fuel.

Shell Chief Executive Jeroen van der Veer, flanked by Qatar’s energy minister and Prince Charles of Britain, said yesterday that Shell had an advantage over other competitors because of the GTL plant in Malaysia it has operated since 1993. “For us, GTL is proven technology,” he told reporters in Qatar, according to Reuters. He said the project remained inside its development-cost estimates of $4 to $6 per oil-equivalent barrel of production over a period of time.

Based on that, total project costs have been pegged as high as $18 billion based on estimated lifetime output of about three billion barrels of oil equivalent. A Shell spokesman said that is comparable to other big exploration and production projects it undertakes.

At the same time as announcing the end of its GTL project, Exxon said it had been selected by Qatar Petroleum to participate in a project to tap offshore natural gas for the industrial and power sector. The project, in which Exxon will own a 10% stake, will deliver 1.5 billion cubic feet of gas a day by 2012.

Krauss, C. Jan 28, 2015. Oil Company Sasol Delays Huge Louisiana Project as Prices Slide. New York Times.

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Population posts on the internet

[Below are posts I’ve run across on population. It will be left to Mother Nature to cut our numbers back to what the earth can support after fossil fuels decline.  In the brief 100 years or so the oil-boom lasted, we have ravaged our atmosphere, oceans, and soil hemically and physically with enormous diesel-combustion petroleum powered machines that blew up and leveled mountains, destroyed biodiversity to clear forests and wetlands to grow food, scarred the earth with mining, and paved the landscape with roads, parking lots, cities, shopping malls.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

Erlich, Paul. 2017. Population and the environment: How do law and policy respond? Without policy changes, a global crash is inevitable. Environmental Law Institute.

The basic driver of today’s environmental overshoot is aggregate consumption, now causing humanity to live on its natural capital, rather than on the interest that flows from that capital. Natural capital is not just fossil fuels, minerals, and timber, but it also includes soils, plankton, fish stocks, pollinators, natural enemies of crop pests, disease vectors, and sinks for carbon dioxide, plastic trash, and other pollutants and toxins.

The signs of overshoot are everywhere: hundreds of millions hungry, and billions of people malnourished in terms of micronutrients, the accelerating sixth mass extinction, the dramatic decline in energy returned on energy invested in the scramble for oil, the heating planet and increasing extreme weather, the escalating refugee crisis, the scramble after remaining high-grade resources, the pollination crisis, the weight of plastic trash in the oceans soon to exceed that of fishes, ocean dead zones, symptoms of global toxification with hormone-mimicking compounds, falling sperm counts, and the automatic decline (with population growth) of democratic government, as each individual voter’s say is diluted. These, examples, along with global footprint analyses, show that the human population greatly exceeds Earth’s long-term carrying capacity.

From a policy viewpoint, the driver most easily addressed is overconsumption by the rich. We know when incentives are right, consumption patterns can be changed overnight. This was clearly demonstrated in the rapid U.S. reaction and mobilization after Pearl Harbor. There are potentially many legal and other mechanisms for curbing overconsumption: regulations, tax policies, campaigns to change norms, etc., but none of them seem feasible considering the hold faith-based economics has on politicians and businesspeople alike. The magical notion that growth on a finite planet can continue forever and that growth is the cure for all economic problems has a death grip on most societies, built into such institutions as fractional reserve banking and advertising.

Humanely shrinking the global population, the other side of the aggregate consumption coin, will take many decades to show significant progress. It would require moving the total fertility rate (average completed family size) down to somewhere just a little above 1, by making a single child family the ethical norm. But there persists a widespread belief in a right to have as many children as one desires.

All rights, regardless of their putative origins, clearly have attached responsibilities and limitations where they impinge on other peoples’ rights. The right to pursue happiness does not allow one to drive 100 miles per hour through school zones or throw garbage over the back fence, no matter how joyous it makes you. In order to suppress such activities, people form governments, and governments prohibit various actions because they interfere with some of their principal functions: maintaining order and peace and protecting public health. Since overpopulation is now a major threat to all three, indeed to the persistence of civilization, regulating the size of their populations clearly should be a central policy concern of all national governments.

Giving women everywhere legally equal rights to men and providing everyone with access to modern contraception and safe back-up abortion might lead to the critically necessary slow decline in numbers. But the required changing of norms before legal steps could be taken could be a slow process in many societies, and just achieving those goals could be controversial and difficult. More direct regulation, as in China’s one-child program, would present even more difficult policy and legal challenges. And whatever steps are taken, because of the momentum built into its age structure, humane shrinkage of the global population is not likely even to reduce it below today’s level within this century.

The scientific community’s repeated warnings about the population problem have fallen on deaf ears. Numerous studies point to the problem. There is, sadly, no sign that a general abandoning of economic growth-mania or humane global population shrinkage could occur in the critical next few decades. All this means that progressive civil society must start putting its efforts into planning to soften the coming collapse of civilization and finding ways to prepare for a post-collapse recovery that might give survivors in remnant societies a reasonably decent life.

Paul R. Ehrlich is Bing Professor of Population Studies. Emeritus, and president of the Center for Conservation Biology at Stanford University.

21 Nov 2014 Richard Adriann Reese The Population Bomb – revisited by What Is Sustainable. culturechange.org

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Giant Oil Field Decline Rates

Summary of article 1, Cobb’s “Aging Giant Oil Fields” 2013

  • The world’s 507 giant oil fields comprise a little over 1% of all oil fields, but produce 60% of current world supply
  • Of the 331 largest fields, 261, or 79%, are declining at 6.5% per year.
  • Techno-fixes have made matters worse because they’ll increase the decline rate to 10% or more, because we’re getting oil now, faster, with new technology that we would have gotten later.
  • And that will make it harder for unconventional oil (tar sands, deep ocean, tight “fracked” oil, etc.) to replace it

Summary of article 2, Koppelaar’s “… future oil supply”:

Based on 3 studies, average global oil decline rate of 4.5 to 6% assumed. No problems until 2013, and only then if there’s a rapid recovery of the economic system. Otherwise:
2014: in a weak recovery oil starts to tighten
2017: weak recovery, growing demand can’t be met
2020: if there’s another economic downturn, there is ample supply for a decade]

Aging giant oil fields, not new discoveries are the key to future oil supply

April 7, 2013  by Kurt Kobb

With all the talk about new oil discoveries around the world and new techniques for extracting oil in such places as North Dakota and Texas, it would be easy to miss the main action in the oil supply story: Aging giant fields produce more than half of global oil supply and are already declining as a group. Research suggests that their annual production decline rates are likely to accelerate.

Here’s what the authors of “Giant oil field decline rates and their influence on world oil production” concluded:

  1. The world’s 507 giant oil fields comprise a little over 1% of all oil fields, but produce 60% of current world supply (2005). (A giant field is defined as having more than 500 million barrels of ultimately recoverable resources of conventional crude. Heavy oil deposits are not included in the study.)
  2. “[A] majority of the largest giant fields are over 50 years old, and fewer and fewer new giants have been discovered since the decade of the 1960s.” The top 10 fields with their location and the year production began are: Ghawar (Saudi Arabia) 1951, Burgan (Kuwait) 1945, Safaniya (Saudi Arabia) 1957, Rumaila (Iraq) 1955, Bolivar Coastal (Venezuela) 1917, Samotlor (Russia) 1964, Kirkuk (Iraq) 1934, Berri (Saudi Arabia) 1964, Manifa (Saudi Arabia) 1964, and Shaybah (Saudi Arabia) 1998 (discovered 1968). (This list was taken from Fredrik Robelius’s “Giant Oil Fields -The Highway to Oil.”)
  3. The 2009 study focused on 331 giant oil fields from a database previously created for the groundbreaking work of Robelius mentioned above. Of those, 261 or 79 percent are considered past their peak and in decline.
  4. The average annual production decline for those 261 fields has been 6.5 percent. That means, of course, that the number of barrels coming from these fields on average is 6.5 percent less EACH YEAR.
  5. Now, here’s the key insight from the study. An evaluation of giant fields by date of peak shows that new technologies applied to those fields have kept their production higher for longer only to lead to more rapid declines later. As the world’s giant fields continue to age and more start to decline, we can therefore expect the annual decline in their rate of production to worsen. Land-based and offshore giants that went into decline in the last decade showed annual production declines on average above 10 percent.
  6. What this means is that it will become progressively more difficult for new discoveries to replace declining production from existing giants. And, though I may sound like a broken record, it is important to remind readers that the world remains on a bumpy production plateau for crude oil including lease condensate (which is the definition of oil), a plateau which began in 2005.

[rest of article snipped from here on]

1 Mar 2010  Drawing the lower and upper boundaries of future oil supply

By Rembrandt Koppelaar, ASPO Netherlands

The oil supply challenge is often summarized in terms of the production volume equivalent of Saudi-Arabia’s that needs to be replaced.

This popular metric is based on in-depth studies of global decline rates that show a decline range between 4.5 and 6 percent over the current 73 million barrels of crude oil produced per day. By using such literature values for all types of production, it can be shown that:

  • In the next 3 years there’s a sufficient oil supply for world demand under any economic scenario.
  • Supply constraints will arise if OPEC proves to be too slow in turning available capacity into production.
  • Oil supply can no longer meet growing demand beyond 2013 only in the unlikely case of a rapid economic recovery.
  • In case of a fairly weak economic recovery the oil market will begin to tighten in 2014 when production capacity begins to decline and growing demand can no longer be met around 2017.
  • If we suffer another economic downturn, ample oil supply will be available for a period of at least a decade.

Decline rates over current conventional production.
Recent studies have been conducted to date on the global decline rate of total conventional oil production, including fields with rising, declining and plateau production.

1) Cambridge Energy Research Associates in 2007, showed that 2007 average decline of oil fields under production was 4.5% per year (CERA 2007). This study used data from 811 oil fields representing two thirds of global oil production, obtained from the IHS Energy database. The selection was comprised of 400 fields, each with reserves of more than 300 million barrels, that produced half of global production in 2006, and 411 fields with less than 300 million barrels that produced only 8.5% of production in 2006.

2) Höök et al. (2009) estimated that the overall decline rate is 6% globally based on the finding that decline rates in smaller fields are equal or greater than those of giant fields.

Based on these studies, a starting point for current decline lies between 4.5% and 6%. Within this range a decline rate around 5% can be taken as a reasonable number. The value given by CERA (2007) of 4.5% probably over represents giant and super giant fields and hence is likely too low as small fields have bigger decline rates. The value given by Höök et al. (2009a) of 6% is probably too high as the total decline rate is inferred directly from post-peak decline of giant and supergiant fields on the assumption that smaller fields will tend to have an equal and higher decline, ignoring the effect of fields still on a plateau and in build-up.

Although 5% is a good starting point, the catch lies in knowing what will happen in the future. More supergiant and giant fields will go into decline due to depletion as time passes by, causing an increase in the average decline rate that needs to be compensated. This was shown by Höök et al. (2009) who found that the world average decline rate of the 331 giant fields was near zero until 1960, after which the average decline rate increased by around 0.15% per year.  Höök, M., Hirsch, R., Aleklett, K., 2009. Giant oil field decline rates and their influence on world oil production, Energy Policy Vol. 37, pp. 2262-2272

For scenario analysis we can take optimistic and pessimistic boundaries based on the studies describe above. The most optimistic stance is to extrapolate the starting point decline rate, estimated here at 5%, onto the entire forecast horizon up to 2030. The most pessimistic view based on current information would be a rapid increase in decline in the next five to ten years up to 6.7% as the production-weighed decline rate rapidly catches up with the average decline rate. After this a more smooth decline increase of 0.15% per year as historically was the case, up to a value of 8.6% in 2030, is an informed estimate. The real decline will lie somewhere in between these two bounds.

 

 

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