Riskiest counties in the U.S.

Preface. I suppose that if you’re trying to figure out where to survive peak oil, the hazards might be something to consider. This isn’t the greatest tool in the world. To use it, select a county in the Counties tab to see what the risks are, they include Avalanche, Coastal Flooding, Cold Wave, Drought, Earthquake, Hail, Heat wave, Hurricane, Ice Storm, Landslide, Lightning, Riverine flooding, Strong wind, Tornado, Tsunami, Volcanic Activity, Wildfire, Winter Weather.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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The National Risk Index.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency has calculated the risk for every county in America for 18 types of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, volcanoes and even tsunamis. And of the more than 3,000 counties, Los Angeles County has the highest ranking in the National Risk Index.

FEMA’s other 10 riskiest places are three counties in the New York City area — Bronx, New York County (Manhattan) and Kings County (Brooklyn) — along with Miami, Philadelphia, Dallas, St. Louis and Riverside and San Bernardino counties in California.

Loudoun County, a Washington, D.C. outer suburb, has the lowest risk of any county, according to FEMA. 

FEMA’s index scores how often disasters strike, how many people and how much property are in harm’s way, how vulnerable the population is socially and how well the area is able to bounce back. And that results in a high risk assessment for big cities with lots of poor people and expensive property that are ill-prepared to be hit by once-in-a-generation disasters.

While the rankings may seem “counterintuitive,” the degree of risk isn’t just how often a type of natural disaster strikes a place, but how bad the toll would be, according to FEMA’s Mike Grimm.

Oklahoma is twice as likely to get tornadoes as New York City, but the damage potential is much higher in New York because there are 20 times the people and nearly 20 times the property value at risk, FEMA officials said.

“It’s that risk perception that it won’t happen to me,” Grimm said. “Just because I haven’t seen it in my lifetime doesn’t mean it won’t happen.”

That sort of denial is especially true with frequent and costly flooding, he said, and is the reason only 4% of the population has federal flood insurance when about one-third may need it.

Disaster experts say people have to think about the big disaster that happens only a few times a lifetime at most, but is devastating when it hits — Hurricane KatrinaSuperstorm Sandy, the 2011 super outbreak of tornadoes, the 1906 San Francisco earthquake or a pandemic.

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Homes & Buildings

Preface. To prepare for the day when there is no natural gas, oil, or coal to heat homes and buildings, the best possible way to prepare for the future and lessen suffering would be retrofitting homes to use less energy and insulate them from extreme heat or cold. As well as cooking boxes and other energy efficient appliances. And hot water bottles in cold weather.

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Why carbon capture contraptions are absurd

Preface.  At the first peak oil conference in Denver (ASPO 2005), many of the other attendees speculated that renewable energy would be the last chance for Wall Street to make money before limits to growth and energy decline put a stop to that.  Keep that in mind as you read this post.

Mind you — carbon has been captured and stored for 50 years now, with 73% of it injected into the ground to push up more oil.

Several papers are summarized below. The most important is by Sekera and Lichtenberger (2020). This is the most complete, up-to-date review of where carbon capture stands today. They shown that the two most popular carbon dioxide removal methods likely to be funded, with taxpayer money, generate more CO2 than they capture. No private investor would spend a penny on this. 

Direct Air Capture (DAC) doesn’t scale up. To keep pace with global CO2 emissions – currently 36 gigatonnes per year – would require over 30,000 large-scale DAC plants, more than three for every coal-fired power station operating in the world today. Each plant would cost up to $500m to build for a grand total of $15 trillion. To store 10 gigatonnes of CO2 a year would require four million tonnes of potassium hydroxide, 1.5 times more than the world-wide supply. Running them would take 100 exajoules, a sixth of all global energy to heat the calciner to around 1,500 F (800 C), so each DAC plant would need a gas furnace, and a ready supply of gas. Electricity can’t do this (Swain 2021). Microsoft found that DAC was 50 times more expensive per metric ton than other solutions (Joppa 2021).

Bryce (2022) points out that just the USA alone, which emits over 5.4 billion tons of CO2 a year, if we captured just half of it, 3 billion tons, that would require underground locations that could swallow 8.2 million tons every single day of the year. And it would take additional energy to compress it to 1,000 pounds per square inch to cram it into the storage.

My excerpts of this paper below don’t come close to capturing all that’s in their paper. Just a few startling points:

  • The energy requirements for a net removal of ~ 3.3 gigatons of carbon equivalents by amine DAC “would amount to a global energy requirement of 29% of total global energy use in 2013 (540 EJ year−1)”, equal to nearly the total amount of electricity generated in the U.S. in 2017. Yet, even these amounts omit some downstream components of the DAC life cycle process, such as the energy requirements for transportation or sequestration of the captured CO2 and energy requirements for manufacturing sorbent at scale.
  • Although captured CO2 could be used for a variety of products other than oil (though nearly all CO2 is used to get more oil out of the ground), such as synfuels, chemicals, building materials, and cement, the amount is enormously small compared to the amount of CO2 that needs to be stored, and most of these uses wouldn’t permanently store CO2. It would soon be recycled back into the atmosphere.  And the few places that exist where CO2 might be stored might pollute groundwater, cause earthquakes, and find ways to escape back into the air. 
  • There’s a lot of money to be made by corporations with taxpayer funding for these bogus “solutions” and corporate greenwashing.  The EROI is almost certainly very negative as well.
  • With renewable energy providing just a few percent of all our energy use, it wouldn’t make sense to use what little we have to remove CO2 rather than power cars, homes, industry, and transportation.  

It’s also extremely unlikely that a cement or other CO2 emitting industry is also sitting on top of geological formations directly below them to sequester the CO2 in.  At any distance, the pipes and other infrastructure to move it there would be net energy negative and put companies even further in the red with debt (unless the public pays for this with tax money of course).

As Sekera and Lichtenberger (2020) point out:  To capture of 1 GtCOof the 37 GtCO2 emitted per year, a liquid solvent DAC system powered by natural gas would require a land area more than five times the size of the city of Los Angeles. If solar replaces the fossil fuel power source, then the required land area expands dramatically requiring a land area 10 times the size of the state of Delaware, based on estimates of the National Academies of Sciences. Nor does it include the land required for transport, injection, and storage after the CO2 has been captured. Or the vast territory required for pipelines to transport the captured CO2 to injection sites. Just one Gt of CO2 capture and transport would need a CO2 pipeline capacity larger than the existing petroleum pipeline system.

The largest DAC plant on the drawing board is the one that’s to be built by Occidental, using the DAC technology of Carbon Engineering. It will use the captured co2 for “enhanced oil recovery” – to pump out more oil. And the facility will largely be powered with natural gas it appears.  The net result is – the whole process puts more co2 into that atmosphere than it takes out. But if taxpayers pay for this scheme, then it costs Occidental nothing, AND they make themselves look “Green”.

Coal-fired plant capital costs could rise 40%-75% (as per IPCC), and their electricity consumption could rise by 30%-40% for CCS particulate removal and flue gas desulfurization (Cembalest 2011).

Energy expert Vaclav points out the daunting scale of the challenge: 

“Sequestering a mere 1/10 of today’s global CO2 emissions (less than 3 Gt CO2) would thus call for putting in place an industry that would have to force underground every year the volume of compressed gas larger than or (with higher compression) equal to the volume of crude oil extracted globally by [the] petroleum industry whose infrastructures and capacities have been put in place over a century of development. Needless to say, such a technical feat could not be accomplished within a single generation.” (Smil 2005).

And Joseph Romm in one of several articles below states that “Even a very small leakage rate of well under 1% a year would render the storage system all but useless as a “permanent repository”.

In the news:

2022 Hydrogen project lauded by Shell to boost green credentials emits more carbon than 1.2 million cars. Despite Shell’s claims of capturing 5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide at its hydrogen plant in less than five years, it emitted another 7.5 million tonnes of greenhouse gases over the same period. Just 48% of the plant’s carbon emissions are captured, falling woefully short of the 90% carbon capture rate promised by industry for fossil hydrogen projects – also referred to as ‘blue’ hydrogen. This rate drops to only 39% when including other greenhouse gas emissions from Shell’s project.  This research delivers a serious blow to proponents of fossil hydrogen who are pushing for more public funds to support its use, with $654 million of the $1 billion cost of Quest having come from Canadian government subsidies, yet despite this vast expense it has failed to deliver anywhere near the cut in emissions needed to tackle global heating. 

2022 Could Carbon Capture Tech Be The Key To A Net-Zero Future? Last week, the U.S. Department of Energy stated that it was beginning to distribute the $2.3 billion earmarked for CCS technology in President Biden’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. Oil majors are also betting on the future of CCS as ExxonMobil announces that it estimates the carbon capture market could be worth $4 trillion by 2050. Meanwhile, the U.S. energy firm Occidental Petroleum is establishing the biggest CO2 extraction project in the world, believing CCS will eventually become a $3-5 trillion industry. 

2022 The U.S. Spent $1.1B On Failed Carbon Capture Projects In A Decade. “…on 11 carbon capture projects at coal-fired power plants and industrial facilities since 2009, most of which turned out to be failures and were never built, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in a recent report. In its recommendations, GAO said that “absent a congressional mechanism to provide greater oversight and accountability—such as requiring regular DOE reporting on project status and funding—DOE may risk expending significant taxpayer funds on CCS demonstrations that have little likelihood of success.”  

2022 World’s biggest carbon removal machine ‘freezes over’ in Iceland. The company running the world’s largest carbon removal machine in Reykjavik Iceland has been forced to make modifications to the equipment after freezing weather in Iceland caused the technology to stop working and has yet to hit its target of removing 4,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide from the air each year. Though it is the world’s largest such machine, the device is still operating on a small scale. Even when it hits full capacity, sucking up 4,000 tonnes of CO2 a year will deal with a tiny fraction of global emissions, which totaled 31.5 billion tonnes in 2020.

Sekera J, Lichtenberger A (2020) Assessing Carbon Capture: Public Policy, Science, and Societal Need. Biophysical Economics and Sustainability 5.

We reviewed the scientific and technical literature on CDR, focusing on two methods that have gained most legislative traction: point-source capture and direct air capture–which together we term “industrial carbon removal” (ICR), in contrast to biological methods. We anchored our review in a standard of “collective biophysical need,” which we define as a reduction of the level of atmospheric CO2. For each ICR method, we sought to determine (1) whether it sequesters more CO2 than it emits; (2) its resource usage at scale; and (3) its biophysical impacts. We found that the commercial ICR (C-ICR) methods being incentivized by governments are net CO2 additive: CO2 emissions exceed removals.

Seeing an opportunity for “market solutions,” commercial interests, investors, and some research scientists have launched startup businesses to develop and promote chemical–mechanical methods. In addition, fossil fuel interests have moved to reframe an old oil extraction technique (“enhanced oil recovery”) as a new climate mitigation method.

A vast technical and scientific literature on carbon capture and storage has emerged. For our analysis, we reviewed over 200 scientific papers as well as journalistic reports. We also reviewed numerous bills and legislation. Our objective was to determine whether the carbon dioxide removal methods being publicly subsidized and incentivized are scientifically justified from the perspective of collective biophysical need. This is a novel approach. It joins public purpose with biophysical imperatives. That is, it combines the driving purpose of societal need with the realities of biophysical constraints and imperatives that must be recognized by public policymakers. Together these two lenses form an over-arching criterion that we have termed “collective biophysical need.” Given the fundamental problem around which there is general scientific consensus—excess atmospheric CO2—we define the collective biophysical need as a reduced level of atmospheric CO2. Within this over-arching criterion, we looked at three aspects of ICR. The first, and threshold, question is whether a given process removes more CO2 than it emits. We then looked at resource usage at climate-significant scale, (particularly energy consumption and land requirements); and ancillary biophysical impacts at scale.

This biophysical approach is in contrast to the perspective of commercial viability, which is widespread in both the scientific literature and in public policymaking on carbon dioxide removal. That approach rests on a market-centric perspective, which leads to a tendency to assess the utility of carbon removal methods from the standpoint of their commercial viability, and which assumes that commercial firms will be the source of climate mitigation solutions.

Biological systems remove CO2 from the atmosphere and sequester it in soil and biomass. Such systems include forests (reforestation, afforestation, and averting deforestation); farming techniques (soil and biomass carbon sequestration through regenerative farming and other improved agricultural methods); grasslands and wetlands restoration. Our preliminary research suggests that biological methods are not only more effective at atmospheric CO2 reduction, they may also be more effective and efficient in resource usage not only in terms of energy but also in terms of land. In addition, they provide co-benefits such as soil-nutrient restoration, air and water filtration, fire management, and flood control.

Projections vary concerning the annual global sequestration rate needed; one study estimates 2.5 GtCO2 per year by 2030, increasing to 8 to 10 Gt per year by 2050. Yet currently the largest DAC facility globally captures only 4000 tCO2/year, which is only 0.000004 Gt. One unbuilt DAC facility aspires to capture 36,500 tCO2/year, which is negligible: only 0.0000365 Gt, and another aspires to one million tons per year, which is still only one one-thousandth of a Gt.  

For DAC to operate at climate-significant scale, the amount of energy required is massive and vast amounts of land are required. There are no plans presently for a pathway for addressing resource needs or for scaling up operations to a scale that would make any practical difference to the problem of excess atmospheric CO2.

To remove 2.5 GtCO2 per year would require a wartime level effort to excavate miles of caverns underground or massive pipeline systems to move CO2. extensive monitoring, measuring, verification, and data tracking system would be required to verify storage and to detect and monitor leakage, air and water quality, seismic activity, and other ancillary impacts from subsurface storage. The sensing and tracking technology and network could constitute a new “Internet of Carbon” (Buck 2018), which, itself, raises questions of additional energy consumption and resulting additional CO2 emissions, land requirements, and intellectual property (IP) rights to such technology. Legislation would be required to establish standards for a monitoring system. Diligent, long-term monitoring and government-funded oversight would be needed, as experience thus far demonstrates that industry self-monitoring and reporting cannot be relied upon.

In 2018, Clean Water Action reviewed industry claims for the 45Q carbon capture tax credit and found major discrepancies in industry reporting about how much CO2 was actually stored. Companies reported one amount to the IRS—nearly 60 million tons—to obtain their tax credits and another amount to EPA—3 million tons—to certify that they had permanently sequestered and stored the CO2. In 2020, a federal investigation prompted by Sen. Robert Menendez found that claimants for the 45Q tax credit failed to document successful geological storage for nearly $900 million of the $1 billion they had claimed (Frazin 2020; Hulac 2020). If ICR were operated at scale, these findings indicate that a monitoring and data tracking system may need to be government-operated.

Partial LCA

Studies that deem CCS-EOR to represent climate mitigation commonly perform a partial life cycle analysis, drawing a “project boundary” that omits parts of the full life cycle—either upstream or downstream emissions or both (see Fig. 2). The choice of boundary is especially important because captured CO2 is primarily used for enhanced oil recovery, and studies that perform a partial LCA often ignore downstream emissions from that use.Researchers define their boundaries differently depending on their research objectives. In some cases, the objective is, in fact, to support “oil production” goals. In others, the boundary begins at the point that CO2 is purchased, thereby ignoring the emissions from capturing the CO2 at the power plant or other source, and the emissions from transport of the CO2 to the oil well injection site (orange box in Fig. 2), and ends at the completion of the CO2-EOR injection process (M in Fig. 2).

Conclusions

Our overall policy finding is that the scientific literature does not support the use of public funds to subsidize the commercial development and deployment of ICR, especially those methods that have been shown to emit more CO2 than they sequester, thereby adding to the existing stock of atmospheric CO2. In specific, these methods are (1) any process in which captured CO2 is used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR); and (2) direct air capture (DAC) when fossil fuel-powered. Furthermore, the current ICR path disregards known risks of chemically intensive, industrial carbon removal, and the adverse side effects and subsurface storage uncertainty at scale.

It is troubling that the biophysical issues of operating ICR at scale are insufficiently addressed or analyzed in the ICR literature. Legislators, too, have neglected to address the biophysical requirements for and consequences of operating ICR at climate-significant scale. As DAC increasingly takes prominence among carbon removal advocates, it is problematic that the issues of DAC energy consumption are short-shrifted. Scientific and technical papers increasingly acknowledge that fossil fuel-powered DAC is thermodynamically counterproductive, yet these same papers fail to tackle the consequential question of whether renewable energy should be funneled to DAC rather than used to directly supply energy for buildings and transport. Virtually ignored in legislation, and unacknowledged in many reports advocating CCS/CCUS and DAC, are the massive land requirements for DAC operation as well as land requirements (acquisition and occupancy) for pipelines for CO2 transport. Also slighted or ignored in both policymaking and most of the literature are other biophysical costs like the prodigious amount of chemicals needed for direct air capture (DAC) to operate at scale. In addition, one must consider the adverse biophysical impacts of massive CO2 transport and storage operations and infrastructure, including potential fugitive emissions, groundwater contamination, air pollution, and earthquakes. Lastly, both legislation and most of the literature ignore the “wartime level of effort” that would be required to scale-up to a climate-significant level of operation.

Our review of legislation, policy actions, and policy-oriented reports shows that government decisions on carbon removal are largely driven by the question of commercial viability. Public policy decisions are being finance-driven, not science-driven. The market frame is pervasive even though, as many studies show—and almost all acknowledge—no viable market exists for the amount of CO2 that must be removed and sequestered in order to have climate-significant impact. Although clothed in the mantle of the market, studies call for government subsidy. Also illogically, papers advocating CO2 “utilization” frequently employ a partial LCA that ignores emissions from the commercial uses to which captured CO2 is put. The history of government subsidies for renewable energy development is frequently advanced as the rationale for why government should subsidize the private development of industrial carbon removal. Early-stage subsidies built the platform for later-stage market success of solar and wind, and, it is argued, the same should be done for DAC. This argument is faulty. Unlike energy generated from solar or wind, for which there is a market, there is not, and cannot be, a “market” for burying CO2. (The dubiousness of an effective market for “carbon credits” has been widely documented; regardless, that is not the same thing as a market for captured carbon.) Paying the cost of CO2 subsurface storage is a non-market transaction. There is no “customer;” there is only the single payor—government—which pays for the service from the collective resources of the polity.

The current path also foregoes the benefits of biological carbon sequestration, which in the U.S. in particular has been dismissed by many policymakers and legislators. Public subsidy in the near-term of commercial ICR methods can create long-term “lock-in” of the fossil fuel industry as the holder of the expertise and owner of the infrastructure  and the intellectual property (IP) that would be necessary should governments decide that scaling up to a wartime level of mobilization is necessary.

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Barnard M (2021) Alberta Oil Sands Emissions Alone Are 3 Times The Global Market For CO2. Cleantechnica.com.

[What follows is my summary and paraphrasing of most of the longer article, which is worth reading for the details]

So there’s a market for CO2 you ask? Yes, about 230 million tons a year, 130 for fertilizer, 80 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and 30 for other stuff.  The CO2 for oil recovery comes from natural gas wells with too much CO2, all attempts to capture and use the CO2 from coal haven’t worked.  If there were a larger market, it is super cheap to produce.

Meanwhile, emissions amount to 40 billion tons a year, or 174 times more CO2 emitted than we have any use for.

And what about sequestering?  Most CO2 that is sequestered is that used for EOR, but the oil industry produces far more net CO2 than it sequesters.

The article then delves into how carbon is sequestered at tar sands facilities in Alberta Canada, which is just one of the 200 world oil producing areas, and notes that it would cost $45 billion CAD (Canadian dollars) to capture the CO2 emitted from the oil sands alone. Given that the tar sands capital expenditures in 2019 were $10 billion CAD, that’s over four times as much spending as was done for profit making ventures.  And the real amount of CO2 released is probably far higher than the Canadian Energy Centre states, plus the CO2 to ship tar sand oil to refineries, and after the oil is burned in vehicles, the emissions over the life cycle skyrocket far above CO2 emitted in Alberta during mining.

Romm J (2013) Carbon Capture And Storage: One Step Forward, One Step Back. Resilience.org

A new survey finds a sharp drop in large-scale integrated projects to capture CO2 from energy systems and bury it underground. This drop from 75 projects to 65 over the past year is yet more evidence that we shouldn’t expect large-scale deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) before the 2030s at the earliest, nor expect that CCS would provide more than 10% of the answer to the carbon problem by 2050.”

The 200-page Global CCS Institute study, “The Global Status of CCS, 2013,” doesn’t offer much to be optimistic about. The New York Times summarized the findings with this headline, “Study Finds Setbacks in Carbon Capture Projects.” The Times reports:… the technology for capturing carbon has not been proved to work on a commercial scale, either in the United States or abroad. The Energy Department canceled its main project demonstrating the technology in 2008.
 
As that story notes, one major CCS demonstration at a West Virginia coal plant was shut down in 2011 because “it could not sell the carbon dioxide or recover the extra cost from its electricity customers, and the equipment consumed so much energy that, at full scale, the project would have sharply cut electricity production.”
 
It finds that “while C.C.S. projects are progressing, the pace is well below the level required for C.C.S. to make a substantial contribution to climate change mitigation.”
 
Back in 2011, I wrote three pieces for The Economist in an online debate on why CCS can’t possibly be a stand-alone solution and why we are a long way away from CCS even making a substantial contribution:
 
No doubt that’s why the pro-CCS debater, Barry Jones wrote “The international community aims to deliver 20 demonstration projects by 2020, applying CCS to various kinds of industrial sectors. The idea is that CCS then becomes a commercial reality and begins to make deep cuts in emissions during the 2030s.”
 
CCS simply hasn’t yet proven to be practical, affordable, scalable, and ready to be ramped up rapidly.  Even a very small leakage rate of well under 1% a year would render the storage system all but useless as a “permanent repository”.
 
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Kintisch E (2013) U.S. Carbon Plan Relies on Uncertain Capture Technology. Science 341: 1438-1439

Talk about unfortunate timing. On one side of the Atlantic Ocean last week, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) chief Gina McCarthy was unveiling a landmark proposal to require new coal-fired power plants built in the United States to capture and store at least some of the carbon dioxide they emit. Meanwhile, in Norway, government officials announced that they were scrapping a long-anticipated $1 billion effort to test carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology on a massive scale at an oil refinery.

The so-called Mongstad project was just the kind of CCS demonstration project that specialists say will be critical to making the technology practical, allowing coal-fired power to satisfy the proposed U.S. regulations. Its cancellation, after the project went 50% over budget, was part of a discouraging pattern. Over the past decade, “a lot of programs were put in place” to develop CCS, says chemical engineer Howard Herzog of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge. But “the bad news is they hit a wall.” Herzog has documented more than 25 other major CCS projects around the world that have been canceled or put on hold in recent years.

Such setbacks pose a major challenge to President Barack Obama’s plans to use CCS to help reduce carbon pollution and curb global warming. If last week’s proposal is ultimately adopted, for instance, it would require U.S. utilities building new coal-powered plants to cap carbon emissions at 500 kilograms per megawatt hour—roughly half what an average coal plant emits. CCS could enable a plant to comply, and EPA officials say there are a variety of existing and nearly ready methods companies could use. But few full-scale CCS installations—which could trap about half a million kilograms of carbon dioxide per year or more—have been built to test those technologies.

Not that governments and the power industry aren’t interested. Congress has given the U.S. Department of Energy some $6 billion to spend on CCS R&D since 2008, with a goal of bringing five large-scale demonstrations online by 2016. That investment has borne some fruit, says Jeffrey Phillips, who manages the CCS research program for the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto, California. It has helped cut by more than 10% the amount of energy that it takes to run state-of-the-art CCS processes, for instance, which is a major issue in the industry. But “is that enough to convince an energy executive to spend $2 or $3 billion” on a new coal-fired power plant with CCS? “Absolutely not,” he says.

Skyrocketing prices for commodities, such as steel, have made building new coal-fired plants more expensive than ever—and CCS can add an estimated 30% to the price tag. CCS would also increase operating costs. One pilot project in New Haven, West Virginia, suggested that power produced by a full-scale CCS facility would cost 50% more than from a traditional coal plant. And regulators are reluctant to pass such extra costs on to consumers.

At the same time, the plummeting price of natural gas has made gas-fired plants more attractive, putting even conventional coal plants at a disadvantage. (The proposed rules cover natural gas plants, too, but most are already clean enough to qualify.) Such trends—combined with the rules proposed by the Obama administration—”could mean that [U.S.] power generation companies may completely give up on coal” for new plants for the foreseeable future, Phillips says.

Others are more optimistic. The new proposal—now out for public comment and certain to face legal challenge—also provides incentives to develop CCS, says John Thompson, an analyst with nonprofit Clean Air Task Force in Boston. “Flexible” rules allowing power generators to phase in CCS over time, for instance, could give firms an opportunity to experiment and innovate.

In the short run, “these regulations don’t change much,” Herzog says, because no new coal plants are on the drawing board. He says a second Obama proposal, which will restrict emissions from existing coal plants, “could be more consequential.” That is expected next year.

References

Bryce R (2022) Carbon Capture Didn’t Make Sense 12 Years Ago And It Doesn’t Make Sense Now. Real Clear Energy.

Cembalest, Michael. 21 Nov 2011. Eye on the Market: The quixotic search for energy solutions. J. P. Morgan

Joppa L et al (2021) Microsoft carbon removal. Lessons from an early corporate purchase. Microsoft

Smil V (2005) Energy at the Crossroads: Global Perspectives and Uncertainties. The MIT Press.

Swain F (2021) The device that reverses CO2 emissions. Cooling the planet by filtering excess carbon dioxide out of the air on an industrial scale would require a new, massive global industry – what would it need to work? BBC.

 

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Material and other limits to scaling wind up to 24 GW by 2050

Preface. Here are just a few of the many important points made in this excellent paper:

  1. Research showing no constraints on the materials needed to build wind turbines “dismiss potential physical constraints and issues with natural resource supply, and do not consider the growth rates of the individual technologies needed or how the energy systems are to be sustained over longer time frames”
  2. Wind turbines and solar panels depend on scarce minerals (i.e. rare earth)
  3. A fast growth of renewables would add new fossil fuel demand to current demand during a transition period

And ramping up wind turbines given their 25 year lifespan is fraught with difficulties:

“This study investigates the implications of fulfilling these growth patterns by letting wind energy grow exponentially reaching 19 TW by 2030 and 24 TW by 2050. These capacities are then assumed to be sustained to the year 2100. Laxson et al. (2006) describes a sustained manufacturing model, where installed capacity of wind energy grows to reach 1%, 20% and 30% of U.S. electricity demand by 2020 or 2030. After 25 years the capacity installed 25 years earlier are replaced (repowered). The need to replace the capacity after the end of the service life of the wind turbines affects the desired manufacturing capacity of the wind industry. If the installed capacity of wind is to be sustained over a longer time frame, an industry capable of replacing the capacity taken out of use must exist. If the growth trajectory is too slow to reach a manufacturing capacity large enough to replace the old turbines in the future, the actual wind capacity in use can in fact see a drop after the initial goal is reached. On the other hand, if the manufacturing capacity is expanded too fast, the demand for new turbines will drop and leave manufacturing capacity idle.

And then the authors offer evidence that in real life, wind turbine lifespan is 20 years, not 25 or 30 as some scientists have assumed.”

Hoffs C (2022) How are Wind Turbines made? Cleantechnica.com (see videos, illustrations)

Land: Once developers select a site for a land-based turbine tower, they level the ground and lay down a concrete foundation, which can use as much as 600–1000 tons of concrete and 165 tons of steel. The average US tower height (or “hub” height, measured from the base to the center of the blades) in 2021 was 300 feet, 66% higher than in 1999. By 2035, the average onshore American wind turbine tower is projected to reach about 500 feet. When ready to be erected, a crane pulls the tower upright.

OFFSHORE:  Installing an offshore wind turbine foundation, on the other hand, is a different story. Honestly, it is nothing short of epic. Huge ships leave port and arrive at a site that’s up to 200 feet deep. The ships then plant down legs to root it to the seabed and elevate the ship out of the water. Next, an onboard crane lowers a steel tower “monopile” (or, depending on the site, a different anchoring structure such as a jacket, tripod, or gravity base) into the water and drills it into the sea floor. A crane places a transition piece above the monopile or anchored foundation, on which the tower will be secured with cables. For deeper floating offshore wind turbines, extending down 200 feet or more, wind turbines are placed atop buoyant substructures at port facilities and towed to their location where mooring lines connect the structure to anchors rooted into the seabed. For offshore wind, large boats transport the pre-assembled steel tower to the foundation. Crane operators on the ship’s deck remotely guide the towers into position on top of the transition piece.

Related posts: https://energyskeptic.com/category/energy/wind/

 

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Davidsson S, Grandell L, Wachtmeister H, et al (2014) Growth curves and sustained commissioning modelling of renewable energy: Investigating resource constraints for wind energy. Energy Policy 73: 767–776 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.003

Although the wind itself is a type of renewable energy, the wind turbines converting the kinetic energy in the wind into electrical energy are not renewable and are built using a wide range of non-renewable resources.

Several recent studies have proposed fast transitions to energy systems based on renewable energy technology. Many of them dismiss potential physical constraints and issues with natural resource supply, and do not consider the growth rates of the individual technologies needed or how the energy systems are to be sustained over longer time frames. A case study is presented modelling potential growth rates of the wind energy required to reach installed capacities proposed in other studies, taking into account the expected service life of wind turbines.

The annual installation and related resource requirements to reach proposed wind capacity are quantified and it is concluded that these factors should be considered when assessing the feasibility, and even the sustainability, of fast energy transitions. Even a sustained commissioning scenario would require significant resource flows, for the transition as well as for sustaining the system, indefinitely. Recent studies that claim there are no potential natural resource barriers or other physical constraints to fast transitions to renewable energy appear inadequate in ruling out these concerns.

A few recent peer reviewed studies stand out by proposing future energy systems almost completely based on energy from the wind and the sun, claimed to be achievable as soon as the year 2050, or even more rapidly by 2030 (García-Olivares et al., 2012; Jacobson and Delucchi, 2009; Kleijn and van der Voet, 2010).

Substituting the entire current energy system based on fossil fuels with renewable energy technologies involves up-scaling a disparate set of small scale industries, and the timeframe to do this within only a couple of decades, can appear optimistic. The implications of the fast growth of the renewable energy technologies needed to do this are often not adequately addressed in the studies proposing future energy systems based on renewable energy. The question of how these energy systems are then to be sustained over a longer time scale are usually not considered.

This study aims to add the perspectives of time and scale to evaluating the feasibility of fast energy transitions by taking account of annual growth rates needed to reach proposed future energy systems as well as investigating how an energy system based on renewable energy technologies could be sustained in the long run. This is mainly done by modelling growth patterns needed to reach the installed capacities of wind energy proposed in other studies, taking account of the life expectancies and need for replacement of technology, using wind energy as an example. The requirement of natural resources for the construction of wind energy is quantified on an annual basis to examine the impact on views of potential material constraints.

The growth of renewable energy technologies needed for an energy transition must inevitably come with the growth of an industry capable of manufacturing and installing that technology, capital to finance these investments, as well as an increased demand for certain natural resources.

Renewable energy technologies such as wind and solar energy are more metal intensive than current energy sources and a transition to renewable energy would increase demand for many different metals (Kleijn et al., 2011). Several different critical metals have been identified as potential bottlenecks in the deployment of “low-carbon energy technologies” (Moss et al., 2011). It has also been argued that a shift to an energy system based on renewable energy would inevitably be largely driven by fossil fuels, and a fast growth of renewables would actually add new fossil fuel demand to current demand during a transition period (Moriarty and Honnery, 2009).

The concept of “energy return on investment” (EROI) appears lower for renewable energy technologies than many conventional fossil fuels we currently rely on for our energy supply (Hall et al., 2013). Concerning solar photovoltaics (PV), it has been suggested that high energy input for the production of crystalline silicon solar cells could be a constraint for the growth of this technology, while current thin film technologies could never reach significant production levels due to the use of scarce materials (Tao et al., 2011). Dale and Benson (2013) even claim that the solar PV industry has not yet paid back any net energy to society, partly due to its high relative growth rates, and concludes that both the timing and magnitude of energy inputs and outputs are important factors in determining an energy balance for the solar industry.

Others raise issues with the variable production of electrical energy from wind and solar energy as well as the large amount of capital needed for investment in new energy production as potential constraints on this development (Trainer, 2013, 2012).

Installed wind capacity Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) describe an energy system consisting of 51% wind energy and 40% solar energy that is “technically possible” to achieve before 2030. This scenario is further elaborated on in Jacobson and Delucchi (2011) and Delucchi and Jacobson (2011), where the time frame is postponed due to difficulties in implementing the necessary policies by 2030, but it is still said to be technically feasible to achieve by 2030. Kleijn and Van der Voet (2010) present a similar scenario, with slightly more wind energy but many times more solar PV, since the total energy demand is assumed to be much larger. García-Olivares et al. (2012) propose an energy mix similar to the Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) scenario, but state that solar PV is unlikely to be able to reach these levels due to constraints induced by scarce materials used for solar PV technology and propose using concentrating solar power (CSP) instead. Table 1 summarizes the main features of these three studies as well as the current situation as of 2012.

The studies described in Table 1 all propose energy systems completely based on renewable energy technology, with wind and solar energy making up almost the entire global energy supply by 2030 or 2050. Although important differences occur between the different studies, some interesting similarities exist. While the solar energy contributions vary greatly both in size and technologies chosen, the assumed contribution from wind is very similar between the studies, with suggested installed capacities ranging from 18 to 24 TW. All three studies discuss potential constraints caused by natural resources and conclude that this factor will likely not constrain the development towards the proposed energy future. The growth patterns needed for the individual technologies is not given much attention, and when growth rates of technologies are mentioned it appears as if exponential growth rates are assumed, or at least deemed feasible.

This study investigates the implications of fulfilling these growth patterns by letting wind energy grow exponentially reaching 19 TW by 2030 and 24 TW by 2050. Although not specified in the studies, these capacities are then assumed to be sustained to the year 2100, to be able to investigate the implications of sustaining this capacity.

Laxson et al. (2006) describes a sustained manufacturing model, where installed capacity of wind energy grows to reach 1%, 20% and 30% of U.S. electricity demand by 2020 or 2030. After 25 years the capacity installed 25 years earlier are replaced (repowered). The need to replace the capacity after the end of the service life of the wind turbines affects the desired manufacturing capacity of the wind industry. If the installed capacity of wind is to be sustained over a longer time frame, an industry capable of replacing the capacity taken out of use must exist. If the growth trajectory is too slow to reach a manufacturing capacity large enough to replace the old turbines in the future, the actual wind capacity in use can in fact see a drop after the initial goal is reached. On the other hand, if the manufacturing capacity is expanded too fast, the demand for new turbines will drop and leave manufacturing capacity idle.

The sustained commissioning model in this study builds upon the ideas proposed by Laxson et al. (2006), with some modifications. The use of the word commissioning instead of manufacturing is proposed to highlight the fact that taking wind capacity into use is not only about physically producing wind turbines, but requires an entire industry of getting the right materials, manufacturing parts, permission to install wind farms, assembling and installing turbines, as well as getting the wind farms connected to an electrical grid capable of transporting the power to consumers.

Höök et al. (2012) reviewed historical growth rates of energy output from the six energy resources considered as global energy systems, defined as energy sources contributing over 100 Mtoe, or supplying about 1% of global annual primary energy. These include oil, gas, coal, biomass, hydropower and nuclear power. Generic growth behavior for these six energy systems was found, with growth rates decreasing as the energy output increased. It is stated that none of the fossil fuels have grown at more than 10% over longer time periods, and not even the “oil boom” showed sustained growth rates of more than around 7%. The growth rates for nuclear and hydropower show similar behavior as those seen for fossil fuels, despite fundamental differences in technology, suggesting that similar growth patterns could be expected for other energy technologies as well.

Technology can be taken out of use for several different reasons, making the assumption of expected service life somewhat difficult to estimate. However, it must be considered certain that they will not last forever. In the case of wind turbines, the end-of-life can be reached due to technical failure or fatigue, or when the turbine no longer satisfies the need or expectations of the user, when a wind farm is either decommissioned or repowered, where the individual turbines are replaced with new ones (Ortegon et al., 2013). The assumed service life will have a significant impact on annual installations needed in the models in this study.

The question then is what a reasonable estimate of service life for a wind turbine is. Ortegon et al. (2013) state that the designed life expectancy for a wind turbine is 20-30 years, but assumes a service life of 20 years. Laxson et al. (2006) state that the design service life of a wind farm is 20 to 30 years but use a 25 year service life in the models. Within the life cycle assessment (LCA) community it appears to be somewhat of a standard to assume a 20 year service life. Kubiszewski et al. (2010) presents a meta-analysis of 119 different turbines from 50 different analyses between 1977 and 2006, where a vast majority assumed a 20-year life span. Davidsson et al. (2012) looked at ten more recent LCAs of wind turbines and found similar tendencies. Dolan and Heath (2012) reviewed and harmonized 72 LCAs on wind turbines and concluded that 20 years was the most commonly cited lifetime estimate as well as a common design life for modern wind turbines. Basically, a 20 year service life appears to be the most reasonable assumption based on current literature.

One of the first countries to build large quantities of wind energy was Denmark, and data on both commissioned and decommissioned facilities exist all the way back to 1977 (Energistyrelsen, 2014). Using the assumption that the wind turbines will be in use for 20 years it is then possible to compare how much capacity that should be decommissioned 20 years after its construction with the actual numbers on decommissioning. Figure 1 shows these theoretical numbers on decommissioning as well as actual historical decommissioned capacity. Although they do not correlate exactly, especially since a large amount of turbines was taken out of use in the year 2002, they appear to follow a similar pattern, and the total cumulative decommissioned capacity of 431 MW comes remarkably close to the theoretical number of 468 MW.

Including an assumption on service life for a technology can have large impacts on the annual installation need for the growth period, but also for the energy system in a longer time frame. Looking at a scenario for 2050, assuming a 20 year service live of wind turbines, only turbines built after 2030 will even be in use at that time. Turbines built between now and 2030 will only be in service during the transition and for scaling up the industry. After 2050 the old turbines will need to be replaced, so an industry capable of sustaining this level of production needs to be in place.

Wind turbines can roughly be divided into two categories: geared turbines and gearless turbines. The turbines can operate with either a fixed speed or limited variable speed concept, both cases using a three-stage gearbox. Turbines operating with variable speed can use either a gearbox or a direct drive train concept. Some concepts use significant amounts of scarce materials in their design. For instance, permanent magnet synchronous generators (PMSG), which is a widely used generator concept with a direct drive train, uses significant amounts of rare earth elements (REEs). These generators often operate without gears, which can be beneficial since the gearbox often needs maintenance. There are other direct drive concepts that do not use these materials, such as induction generators and exited synchronous generators (EESG). The need for rare earth elements is estimated to be 160-200 kg/MW for generators used in direct drive concepts, while PMSG designs used in combination with a gearbox the need for REE is reduced to about 30 kg/MW (Buchert, 2011).

As a constraint for a total expansion of wind energy on a global scale the significance of these materials are often dismissed since designs not relying on them would likely arise if the supply of these materials becomes increasingly limited.

Wind turbines require large amounts of other materials, such as steel and copper as well, and these materials are quantified in the case study as an example of resource requirements. This study uses the assumption that 1 MW of wind capacity requires 140 tons of iron and steel and 2 tons of copper, as described by Kleijn and Van der Voet (2010).

Figure 2a presents the cumulative growth curves of wind capacity enabling 19 TW by 2030 and 24 TW by 2050 with exponential growth profiles. Figure 2b shows the resulting annual commissioning required to reach 19 TW wind capacity by 2030, as well as what is required to sustain this capacity in the future. It can be seen that not only the cumulative installations, but also the annual installations grow exponentially, leading to quite extreme annual installations at the end of the growth period. Reaching 19 TW by 2030 with exponential growth means that 21 % of all installed capacity would be installed in the final year, and 68 % would be installed in the last 5 years. Reaching 24 TW by 2050 with exponential growth means that 11% of all the capacity would be installed in the final year, and 45% would be installed in the last 5 years (Figure 2c). Sustaining these capacities will require an annual commissioning growing exponentially in a kind of cyclic behavior.

Similar results were found by Honnery and Moriarty (2011) who used 3 different exponential growth rates reaching 2 different installed capacities of wind power and found that these growth rates leads to “boom and bust cycles” in equipment manufacture as well as net energy output from the system.

Assuming double digit exponential growth of energy technologies for decades after reaching significant contributions to the global energy system can simply not be considered realistic since the pure arithmetic of such growth patterns leads to unreasonable expectations on annual installation rates. Further discussions on the nature of exponential growth can be found in other studies (Bartlett, 1993; Meadows et al., 1972).

Figure 2. a) Cumulative installed capacity of wind power reaching 19 TW by 2030 and 24 TW by 2050 with exponential growth. b) Annual commissioning of wind capacity required for reaching 19 TW by 2030 and sustaining this capacity. c) Annual commissioning of wind capacity required for reaching 24 TW by 2050 and sustaining this capacity.

Reaching 24 TW by 2050 alone is modelled using a logistic function. Figure 3a describes a logistic growth curve fitted to the historic data and constrained at 24 TW wind capacity. This appears to be a more realistic growth pattern than exponential growth, but what is not always considered is that the annual additions needed will not only be installing new turbines, but also replacing old turbines at the end of their service life. Assuming a 20 year service life for a wind turbine, the annual requirements of replacing old turbines can be modelled with a second logistic curve with a 20 year time lag. Figure 3b shows the annual commissioned capacity needed both for the net growth as well as replacing old capacity taken out of use.

Figure 3. a) Cumulative installed capacity of wind energy described by a logistic curve fitted to historical data reaching 24TW by 2050. b) Annually commissioned wind capacity required to reach 24TW by 2050 taking account for replacing decommissioned turbines.

The maximum annual installations needed for logistic growth is much lower than the exponential case, but reaching 24 TW still requires significant numbers. Also, as can be seen in Figure 3b, assuming logistic growth of cumulative installed capacity in this case means that the total annual installations needed when taking account for replacing old turbines creates a dip in annual installation need before rising again. This type of pulsing behavior is commonly seen in nature (Odum, 2007), and might not be an unrealistic scenario. However, it might not be optimal, since this would create an industry capable of installing more wind capacity in a year than is needed to sustain this in the long run.

Less scarce materials are commonly ruled out as constraints based on quite simple arguments, but for a complete transition to a renewable energy system even common materials have been mentioned as potentially problematic. Kleijn and van der Voet (2010) suggest that the sheer size of the proposed transition would challenge production even for “bulk materials” such as steel and copper.

Constructing the wind capacity of 24 TW would only demand a few per cent of global iron ore and copper reserves. However, using the growth patterns from the case study, this total resource requirement can be spread out over the time period leading up to the proposed realization year and be translated into annual requirements for the different resources. These annual quantities can then be compared with projections for future production of these resources. It could also be useful to take account for competing demand from other uses for a more complete systems view.

The quantities presented in Table 2 could give an indication of the size of the annual resource requirements for building these quantities of wind capacity. Table 2 describes the resulting maximum annual installations

Even in the sustained commissioning model, the annual installation of 1.2 TW needed to sustain the 24 TW wind capacity leads to significant annual requirements for copper and steel.

Under these assumptions, only sustaining the 24 TW of wind energy, assumed to provide 15% of global energy demand by Kleijn and Van der Voet (2010), would need the equivalent of 11% of total global steel production and 14% of global copper production (based on 2012 rates of production).

This means that reaching and sustaining this installed wind capacity would require quantities of steel that is similar to the current automotive industry, that used 12% of the steel produced in 2011, while the entire sector of electrical equipment used only around 3% (World Steel Association, 2012). The amount of copper needed for the turbines is comparable to what is used for making electric motors, of around 12% of the global copper production, while the electric energy transmission sector use about 26% (Achzet et al., 2011).

This study makes no attempt to project what the future energy systems might look like, neither on the demand nor the supply side. Instead, the assumptions of future installed capacity of wind energy for the case study is taken directly from these other studies, and translated into possible growth patterns. It should be mentioned that the works used in this case study are quite extreme when it comes to proposed installed capacities of wind and solar energy compared to most other studies proposing similar energy transitions. However, they are still considered relevant since they are widely cited in peer reviewed scientific journal articles.

During the growth phase this demand would be additional to current demand and must be assumed to come from supplementary production, and even if the replacement of turbines in the future would be based on recycling old turbines, a similar sized commissioning industry would be needed, as well as an industry capable of recycling the materials and making them available for new turbines. The pure scale of creating and sustaining this type of energy system is simply massive.

In the case of wind energy, metals considered somewhat scarce, such as neodymium, are sometimes mentioned as a potential issue, but “bulk” materials such as steel and copper are usually dismissed as potential constraints. However, none of them pay much attention to assumed growth rates or what resource flows that would be needed to sustain the growth or to sustain the proposed energy system in the future.

Three common ways to evaluate natural resource constraints in other studies have been found. First, the “Reserve-to-production ratio” (R/P ratio), comparing the current annual production to reserve estimates is a very common method. Secondly, simply comparing the total demand incurred by the proposed energy system to reserve estimates is a frequently used method. Thirdly, simply stating that the materials used are theoretically recyclable is sometimes used as an argument that no natural resource constraints will occur. All three of these arguments have their merits and can be used to make fast and easy estimates of natural resource constraints, but using any of them to completely dismiss potential problems with natural resource supply appears questionable.

An example of R/P ratio being used to disregard natural resource constraints can be found in Jacobson and Delucchi (2011), where it is stated that the world have “somewhat limited reserves” of iron ore, which is claimed to last for 100-200 years at current production. However, this assumes that annual production remains constant and global steel production is currently increasing rapidly, and realizing the Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) scenario would mean a significant increase of an already expanding demand for steel. Comparing current production to reserve estimates could give a first indication of potential constraints, but it appears insufficient to motivate a total dismissal of problems that might occur. Bartlett (2006) describes several problems with using the R/P ratio for a resource under growing production, and states that it gives rise to unwarranted optimism.

The method of comparing the total requirements of a resource for reaching a future energy system to estimated reserves can be found in García-Olivares et al. (2012), where it is stated that the complete power system needed for the energy system described would need 40% of total estimated copper reserves. Adding assumptions of the copper needed from the demand side of the transport sector García-Olivares et al. (2012) reach a total of 60% of global copper reserves. This method has the potential of indicating if the quantities needed could be a problem. For instance, the claim that realizing the energy system proposed in García-Olivares et al. (2012) could demand 60% of the current copper reserves appear like extraordinary quantities, although reserve estimates can change with time.

This method does not say anything about what resource flows would be needed and how fast the materials could be brought to market.

The third common argument to dismiss potential resource constraints is using the simple fact that some materials are recyclable. Jacobson and Delucchi (2011) argue that some rare resources, such as neodymium for electric motors and generators, platinum for fuel cells and lithium will have to be recycled or replaced with less scarce materials to reach a 100% renewable energy system, unless additional resources are located. Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) claim that there are indications that there are not enough economically recoverable lithium to build “anyway near the number of batteries needed in a global electric- vehicle economy”, but at the same time state that recycling could change this equation. There is no doubt that recycling would be important for sustaining a “sustainable” energy system in the future, but this does not mean that recycling will change the total amount of materials needed in the system at a given moment in time. The same atoms simply cannot both be in use and recycled to build other technology at the same time. The minimum amount of a resource needed to sustain the system simply does not change because of recycling. A more comprehensive discussion on recycling using the case of lithium is available in Vikström et al. (2013).

The end of life recycling rate (EOL-RR) appears to be around 70-90% for iron and steel, but since the steel demand is growing and is commonly used for long lived uses, the recycled content (RC) in new material is lower at around 32-52%, while the same factors for copper has been estimated to be between 43-53% and 22-37% respectively (Graedel et al., 2011).

While some expect that the recycling rates for metals used in electricity generation technologies will be higher due to expected high collection rates (Elshkaki and Graedel, 2013), others mentions different situations that could lead to materials not being recycled (Davidsson et al., 2012).

For some materials, recycling can even be technically problematic. In the case of REEs, such as neodymium, recycling is commonly mentioned as being important for a sustainable energy system, but at the moment no infrastructure for recycling of REEs from the permanent magnets exists and the end-of-life recycling rate is estimated to be less than 1% (Buchert, 2011).

One important problem with recycling rare earth elements is the fact that the metals oxidize quickly and disappear in the slag (Buchert et al., 2009). However, it could be technically possible to reach recycling rates of more than 90% for both neodymium and dysprosium (Schüler et al., 2011). A sustainable energy system would have to recycle as much as possible of the materials after the end of the service life, but even if recycling rates would eventually come close to 100%, the industry for replacing old technologies would still demand large resource flows indefinitely. The case study culminating in 24 TW of installed wind capacity demands an equivalent of over 10% of current (2012) global annual demand of bulk materials such as copper and steel. Even if these turbines were to be recycled at the end of their life and built using only recycled materials, it would still mean large material flows.

Another important perspective is the fact that this study only includes the material demands for constructing wind energy,

An energy system completely based on renewable energy technology would likely need more of these technologies, but also energy storage and transmission capable of creating a functioning energy system. For instance, Barnhart and Benson (2013) investigates energy and material requirements for different energy storage technologies and concludes that building an energy storage capacity that could be required in the future require amounts of materials and energy that are comparable to current annual production values.

An industry growing too fast can mean that the industry consumes more energy than it produces on an annual basis (Honnery).

There are many other examples of potential constraints on the growth of renewable energy technology, many of which are discussed by others. IEA (2013b) mentions costs, grid integration issues and permit issues as obstacles to a goal of 18% of global electricity from wind energy by 2050.

For wind energy, constructing the wind turbine and the connected capital costs constitute the majority of the total cost, with 76 – 85% of the total cost being capital cost (Timilsina et al., 2013). Financing for this cost needs to be in place before the wind capacity can be commissioned. Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) state that the construction of the proposed energy system would cost around 100 trillion USD over 20 years (not including transmission), which will be paid back by the sale of electricity and energy. Trainer (2012) interprets this as an investment of 5 trillion USD annually would be needed, which is said to be around 11 times the early 2000s annual investments in energy of around 450 billion USD. However, as discussed in this paper, this type of growth pattern is not very realistic.

The variability of production and grid integration is commonly suggested as the main barriers for implementation of renewable energy and it has even been suggested that this factor limits penetration rates of wind energy to 2 % of electricity production (Lenzen, 2010). These factors are discussed in more detail in other studies (Trainer, 2013, 2012).

The fact that energy production from renewable energy technologies is intermittent and non-dispatchable can also be argued to add to the total costs due to the need for backup power (Larsson et al., 2014).

The grid improvements and backup power requirements have to be in place before the variable energy production is taken into use, so the estimated growth curves can prove important for these aspects as well.

Although these technologies are likely more sustainable than fossil fuels, they are not without environmental impacts and are built using non-renewable resources. They should therefore not automatically be considered sustainable. A rapid growth in these technologies will even increase demand for a variety of different resources. Suitable growth rates of energy technologies, as well as how an energy system can be sustained over a longer time frame, should be considered when discussing sustainable energy systems for the future.

References

Achzet B., Reller A., Zepf V., University of Augsburg, Rennie C., BP, Ashfield M. and Simmons J., ON Communication, 2011. Materials critical to the energy industry. An introduction. http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/sustainability/group- reports/Materials_March2012.pdf Ang, B.W., Ng, T.T., 1992. The use

Bartlett, A.A., 2006. A Depletion Protocol for Non-Renewable Natural Resources:

Australia as an Example. Natural Resources Research 15, 151–164.

Buchert, M., 2011. Rare Earths – a Bottleneck for future Wind Turbine Technologies? Presented at Wind Turbine Supply Chain & Logistics, Berlin, 29 August 2011. Available from: http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1296/2011-421-en.pdf

Dale, M., Benson, S.M., 2013. Energy Balance of the Global Photovoltaic (PV) Industry – Is the PV Industry a Net Electricity Producer? Environ. Sci. Technol. 47, 3482–3489. Davidsson, S., Höök, M., Wall, G., 2012. A review

Elshkaki, A., Graedel, T.E., 2013. Dynamic analysis of the global metals flows and stocks in electricity generation technologies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 59, 260-273.

Graedel TE et al (2011) What Do We Know About Metal Recycling Rates? U.S. Geological Survey. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1605&context=usgsstaffpub

K., Sibley, S. F., Sonnemann, G., 2011. Recycling rates of metals: A status report. Journal of Industrial Ecology. 15(3), 355-366.

Larsson, S., Fantazzini, D., Davidsson, S., Kullander, S., Höök, M., 2014. Reviewing electricity production cost assessments. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 30, 170–183.

Laxson, A., Hand, M.M., Blair, N., 2006. High Wind Penetration Impact on U.S. Wind Manufacturing Capacity and Critical Resources. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Report No. NREL/TP 500-40482.

Lenzen, M., 2010. Current State of Development of Electricity-Generating Technologies: A Literature Review. Energies 3, 462–591. Lund, H., 2007. Renewable energy strategies for sustainable development. Energy 32, 912–919. Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., Behrens III, W.W., 1972. The Limits to Growth. Earth Island Limited, London.

Tao, C.S., Jiang, J., Tao, M., 2011. Natural resource limitations to terawatt- scale solar cells. Solar Energy Materials and Solar Cells 95, 3176–3180.

Trainer, T., 2012. A critique of Jacobson and Delucchi’s proposals for a world renewable energy supply. Energy Policy 44, 476–481. Trainer, T., 2013. 100% Renewable supply? Comments on the reply by Jacobson and Delucchi to the critique by Trainer. Energy Policy 57, 634–640. USGS, 2013. 2011 Mineral Yearbook: Rare Earths [Advanced Release]. Available from:

http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/myb1-2011-raree.pdf

Vikström, H., Davidsson, S., Höök, M., 2013. Lithium availability and future production outlooks. Applied Energy 110, 252–266. Wilson, C., Grubler, A., Bauer, N., Krey, V., Riahi, K., 2013. Future capacity growth of energy technologies: are scenarios consistent with historical evidence? Climatic Change 118, 381–395. 395. 67-8

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Book Review: Rule Makers, Rule Breakers: How Tight & Loose Cultures Wire Our World

Preface.  A must-read book for those who want to understand themselves, their family and friends, their culture and the world.  A new framework that gives clearer vision, rather than muddying it up by giving false understandings like astrology or seeing the world from economic and political rather than ecological and resource awareness.

Gelfand’s book about loose versus tight cultures has real world, life and death consequences.  She wrote an article in The Guardian about covid-19,  Why countries with ‘loose’, rule-breaking cultures have been hit harder by Covid, that says: “Back in March, I started to worry that loose cultures, with their rule-breaking spirit, would take longer to abide by public health measures, with potentially tragic consequences. I was hopeful that they would eventually tighten. All of our computer models prior to Covid suggested they would. But they didn’t. In research that tracked more than 50 countries, published this week in the Lancet Planetary Health, my team and I show that, taking into account other factors, loose cultures had five times the number of cases that tight cultures did, and more than eight times as many deaths.  Our  analysis of data from the UK revealed that people in loose cultures had far less fear of the Covid-19 virus throughout 2020, even as cases skyrocketed. In tight nations, 70% of people were very scared of catching the virus. In loose cultures, only 49% were.  Reality never bit in these populations in part because people in cultures that are adapted to low levels of danger didn’t respond as swiftly to the “threat signal” embodied by the pandemic when it came. This can happen in nature too. The most infamous case is the fearless dodo bird of Mauritius, which, having evolved without predators, became extinct within a century of its first contact with humans.”

In this book, Gelfand points out that “Singapore’s response to the 2003 SARS outbreak is a case in point. Soon after SARS hit, the Singaporean government quickly implemented strict rules and restrictions on people’s movement and somewhat intrusive early-detection measures, such as monitoring people’s temperature at schools, work, and households (thermometers were distributed to over a million people). Webcams were even installed in the homes of quarantined citizens, who were phoned at random points during the day and required to present themselves in front of the camera to ensure they didn’t leave home” and Singapore is among the best at reducing covid-19 deaths.

In light of the treasonous violent insurrection Trump set off in the Capitol in 2021, Gelfand is also prescient about Trump and how he manipulated the tight, conservative portion of the American population:  “…While Trump isn’t a cultural psychologist, he possessed an intuitive grasp of how threat tightens citizens’ minds and leads them to yearn for strong leaders who’ll combat these threats. He masterfully created a climate of threat: At campaign rallies throughout 2015 and 2016, Trump warned his ever-growing crowds that the United States was a nation on the brink of disaster. He cited mounting threats from Mexicans bringing violence across the border, global trade agreements and immigrants taking away jobs, radicalized Muslims plotting terror on American soil, and China “raping” the country. Throughout his campaign, he sent a clear message—that he was capable of restoring social order. “I alone can fix it”.   Perceptions of threat have led some in the working class to prefer populist leaders who promise to dismantle the social structures that have left them behind and restore traditional order. These leaders run on promises of delivering more tightness. Trump vowed to “restore law and order” to the American political system, tighten borders, keep out immigrants, and crack down on crime.

Months before the 2016 election a nationwide survey was conducted to peer into the minds of Trump supporters.  They answered questions about how fearful they felt about various external threats to the United States, such as ISIS and North Korea. They also responded to statements aimed at gauging their desire for cultural tightness. Those who felt the country was facing greater threats desired greater tightness. This desire, in turn, correctly predicted their support for Trump. In fact, desired tightness predicted support for Trump far better than other measures. For example, a desire for tightness predicted a vote for Trump with 44 times more accuracy than other popular measures of authoritarianism. Concern about external threats also predicted support for many of the issues that Trump has championed, such as monitoring mosques, creating a registry of Muslim Americans, and deporting all undocumented immigrants. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Trump had the most support in tight states—where citizens felt the most threatened.  Threats lead to desire for stronger rules, obedience to autocratic leaders, and—at worst—intolerance.

What follows are notes from my Kindle.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Gelfand M (2018) Rule Makers, Rule Breakers: How Tight and Loose Cultures Wire Our World. Scribner.  

We may tease Germans for being excessively orderly or Brazilians for showing too much skin, but we rarely consider how these differences came about. Far beyond dress codes and pedestrian patterns, people’s social differences run deep and broad—from politics to parenting, management to worship, and vocations to vacations.

The diversity of human behavior is astonishing, especially since 96% of the human genome is identical to that of chimpanzees, whose lifestyles, unlike humans, are far more similar across communities.

Behavior, it turns out, largely depends on whether we live in a tight or loose culture. The side of the divide that a culture exists on reflects the strength of its social norms and the strictness with which it enforces them. All cultures have social norms—rules for acceptable behavior—that we regularly take for granted. As children, we learn hundreds of social norms—to not grab things out of other people’s hands; to walk on the right side of the sidewalk (or the left, depending on where you live); to put on clothes each day. We continue to absorb new social norms throughout our lives: what to wear to a funeral; how to behave at a rock concert versus a symphony; and the proper way to perform rituals—from weddings to worship. Social norms are the glue that holds groups together; they give us our identity, and they help us coordinate in unprecedented ways. Yet cultures vary in the strength of their social glue, with profound consequences for our worldviews

Tight cultures have strong social norms and little tolerance for deviance, while loose cultures have weak social norms and are highly permissive. The former are rule makers; the latter, rule breakers. In the United States, a relatively loose culture, a person can’t get far down their street without witnessing a slew of casual norm violations, from littering to jaywalking to dog waste. By contrast, in Singapore, where norm violations are rare, pavements are pristine, and jaywalkers are nowhere to be found.

In Japan, a tight country, there’s a huge emphasis on punctuality—trains almost never arrive late. On the rare days that delays do occur, some train companies will hand out cards to passengers that they can submit to their bosses to excuse a tardy arrival at work.

We’re a super-normative species: Without even realizing it, we spend a huge amount of our lives following social rules and conventions. Studies show that even babies follow norms and are willing to punish norm violators even before they have formal language.

After being taught a certain arbitrary behavior and then witnessing a puppet incorrectly imitating it, three-year-olds vigorously protested. Quite clearly, children learn not only to interpret social norms from their environment, but also to actively shape and enforce them.

There’s no evidence so far that animals copy others for social reasons such as simply fitting in and belonging.

Social norms are far from random. Rather, they evolve for a highly functional reason: They’ve shaped us into one of the most cooperative species on the planet. Countless studies have shown that social norms are critical for uniting communities into cooperative, well-coordinated groups that can accomplish great feats. Social norms are, in effect, the ties that bind us together, and scientists have collected evidence to prove it.

Unable to control their employees’ behaviors, companies would quickly go out of business. Without these shared standards of behavior, families would splinter apart. Clearly, it’s in our interest to adhere to social norms.

Ignoring social norms not only can damage our reputations, but also may result in ostracism, even death. From an evolutionary perspective, people who developed keen abilities to follow social norms may have been more likely to survive and thrive. This powerful fact has made us a remarkably cooperative species—but only so long as the interactions are between people who share the same basic norms. When groups with fundamentally different cultural mind-sets meet, conflict abounds. Thus the paradox: While norms have been the secret to our success, they’re also the source of massive conflict all around the world.

In New Zealand, people can drive with open bottles of alcohol in their cars as long as they remain within the legal blood alcohol limit. Women have the highest number of sexual partners in the world—an average of 20.4 during their lifetime (the global average is 7.3). Prostitution has long been decriminalized; according to the unique “New Zealand Model,” anyone over age eighteen can engage in it, complete with workplace protections and health-care benefits.

Over one-third of popular music videos portray at least one incident of violence, whether it be fighting, gunshots, battles, suicides, murders, or bomb explosions, and at least one-fifth include examples of antisocial behavior, from vandalism to littering

“Kiwis,” as New Zealanders playfully call themselves (after the flightless bird), tend to become acquainted very quickly, and they eschew formal titles. People are known to walk barefoot on city streets, in grocery stores, and in banks. Public dissent and protests are frequent.

Tightt nations: Pakistan, Malaysia, India, Singapore, South Korea, Norway, Turkey, Japan, China, Portugal, and Germany (formerly East).  Tightness is highest in South and East Asian nations, followed by Middle Eastern nations and European countries of Nordic and Germanic origin.

Loose nations:  Spain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Greece, Venezuela, Brazil, the Netherlands, Israel, Hungary, Estonia, and the Ukraine.  Latin-European, English-speaking, and Latin American cultures are much less tight, with Eastern European and former Communist nations the loosest.

Figuratively speaking, in the tightest of cultures, people feel as though they’re in a library for a greater portion of their lives. But in the loosest of cultures, people feel as though they’re often at a park, with much more freedom to do as they wish. Of course, nations tend to fall between these two extremes. And where they fall, they don’t necessarily stay. Though cultural psyches run deep, cultures can and do change on the continuum.

The looseness of these contexts tends to be carefully designated. Take Takeshita Street in Tokyo. Within the confines of this narrow pedestrian shopping street, Japan’s cultural demands for uniformity and order are completely suspended. On Takeshita Street, people stroll and preen in zany costumes, ranging from anime characters to sexy maids to punk musicians.

There is no linear relationship between nations’ scores on tightness-looseness and their economic development. Singapore and Germany, both tight, enjoy significant economic success, but Pakistan and India, also tight, still struggle. The United States and Australia, both loose, are wealthy, but the Ukraine and Brazil, also loose, have comparatively lower gross domestic products. Tightness-looseness is also distinct from previous ways that scholars have compared cultures, such as whether they’re collectivist or individualist (collectivist cultures emphasize family ties; individualist cultures stress self-reliance). There are plenty of nations in each of the four quadrants: collectivist and tight (Japan and Singapore), collectivist and loose (Brazil and Spain), individualist and loose (the United States and New Zealand), and individualist and tight (Austria and Germany).

The daily life of Spartans likewise resembled life in a military camp. In addition to following highly regulated diets, men and women were expected to frequently exercise to maintain a fit physique. The Spartans found obesity grotesque, so those who were overweight were banished from the city-state. Men and women who failed to pass physical exams (along with those who engaged in illegal activity or didn’t marry) were shunned, lost their citizenship, or had to wear special clothing as signs of societal disgrace. Sparta’s cutthroat physical standards even applied to newborn babies: If an infant was deemed weak or deformed, it was left at the foot of a mountain to die. Spartans abided by clear-cut mannerisms taught in childhood. They were trained to wear solemn expressions and speak concisely. Children were disciplined to never cry, speak in public, or express fear.

Total uniformity in dress, hairstyle, and behavior was demanded. Foreigners and foreign influence were prohibited, and Spartan citizens were forbidden to travel abroad. While the tight lifestyle might sound rather austere, Sparta was a proud culture, and its practices paid off: The radical discipline of Sparta’s citizens enabled it to achieve military predominance across Greece.

Athens had permissive norms, with frequent gorging and drinking. Strolling the streets of Athens, you would have noticed a wide range of fashion styles, accessorized with jewelry pieces from the bustling Athenian marketplace, the agora. There you’d witness unbridled self-expression by artists, pastry chefs, actors, writers, and public intellectuals from different schools of thought.

Nahua, indigenous tribe of Mexico and Guatemala

From early childhood, the Nahua taught their sons and daughters to be obedient and abide by norms. By age six, children completed many of the family’s daily tasks, such as taking care of siblings, helping in the fields and around the house, and going to the market. By age 15, girls did all the housework of grown women, while boys drove plows, planted and harvested crops, and raised cattle. The Nahua placed a great emphasis on “good” behavior in children. Sexuality was discouraged from childhood on, and curiosity about bodily functions was forbidden. Parents in Nahua strongly believed that children lacking self-discipline would grow up to become poor workers and bring great shame to their families. To ward off this fate, children who fell short of their parents’ expectations were severely punished—whipped, beaten, kicked, ridiculed, or denied food or sleep for offenses such as losing things or grumbling. Later, marriageability depended on one’s willingness to follow the rules. If a young man’s mother learned that his intended was known for being lazy or disobedient, she would object to the union. In public, women and girls were expected to be demure and unassuming at all times, lest their behavior be labeled shamelessly flirtatious. Since women were expected to remain virgins before marriage, any appearance of a sexual drive could damage their reputations and was severely punished by their parents. Once married, wives were expected to be compliant and faithful. To ensure nothing could destabilize the new family structure, they were discouraged from keeping female friends, who might act as a go-between for a wife and her prospective lover. Men also discontinued their friendships with other men, lest intimacy develop between these men and their wives. Divorce was highly frowned upon. Community members reported on the wrongdoings of others, and appropriate conduct was maintained through unrelenting gossip, accusations of sorcery, and, in severe cases, expulsion from the community.

Copper Inuit children enjoyed an unstructured and informal lifestyle. The parenting style was laissez-faire to say the least. Diamond Jenness, a pioneer of Canadian anthropology, described children growing up like “wild plants” until puberty, roaming about on their own, roughhousing with peers, and not hesitating to interrupt or correct their parents. Children had total autonomy over their schedules, including whether to attend school. Parents rarely used any form of physical punishment with their kids; they mostly ignored misbehavior or briefly teased children who acted out of line.

Intercourse was fairly common among adolescents, who had sex even in their parents’ house. If and when couples eventually did get married, the process was rather informal: They established a separate home, but returned to their respective families’ homes if things didn’t work out. Open marriages were tolerated, including wife-swapping in some cases, which promoted alliances with members of unrelated families. Men and women had their own roles within the home, but these roles were flexible: women sometimes went hunting, and men learned how to cook and sew. Within the broader community, only “rudimentary law” existed, according to the legal anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel; there was no centralized power to resolve conflicts between community members. The fact that individuals were left to manage conflict on their own undoubtedly contributed to the high rates of homicide and blood feuds among the Copper Inuit.

Crime rates in Japan have fallen so low in the last 13 years that police officers are literally looking for things to occupy their time. According to the Economist, as of 2014, Japan had one of the lowest murder rates in the world, just 0.3 per 100,000 people. The streets of Japan are so safe that some police officers have resorted to prodding individuals to steal: Policemen in the southern city of Kagoshima started leaving cases of beer in unlocked cars just to see if passersby would grab them. But even this sting was underwhelming; it took a week before they could revel in the opportunity to punish a hapless offender.

Crime rates per hundred thousand people are all significantly lower in tight countries.

In looser countries, like New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United States, crime is much more common.

At least 16 crimes can result in a death sentence in Saudi Arabia, including drug possession, burglary, rape, adultery, and gay sex. Get caught drinking alcohol, and you may face jail time and even a public flogging.

Tight cultures tend to have more police per capita and employ more security personnel to check for inappropriate behavior in public spaces. Surveillance cameras are rampant in tight countries, reminding the public to behave themselves. In Saudi Arabia, high-tech cameras called saher, which translates to “one who remains awake,” dot highways, exit roads, and intersections. They capture images of drivers talking on the phone, texting, not wearing seat belts, and driving over the speed limit, as well as tailgating and changing lanes excessively. Similarly, Japan has millions of surveillance cameras on streets, buildings, store entrances, taxis, and train stations.

Tight cultures also tend to rank higher on religiosity, cleanliness, and organization.  Even after factoring in national wealth, they found that tighter countries tend to have more cleaning personnel on city streets.

Japan’s obsession with cleanliness made international headlines after the nation’s defeat in the 2014 World Cup, when Japanese fans swarmed over Brazil’s Arena Pernambuco stadium with bright blue trash bags, gathering up litter to discard—a post-game tradition in their home country that they’d taken on the road.

By contrast, in an extreme show of loose behavior, when the Vancouver Canucks lost the Stanley Cup in 2011, the city transformed into a “drunken vomity hellhole” that cost around $4 million to repair, blogger Isha Aran reported. Slovenly behavior like this is generally more widespread in loose cultures.

In addition to generally being cleaner, tight cultures tend to have less noise pollution. Germany has mandated quiet hours on Sundays and holiday evenings. During these quiet hours, you’re forbidden to mow your lawn, play loud music, or run washing machines. Even libraries, which are supposed to be the quintessential haven for quiet, are rated as being much noisier in looser cultures.

If you live in a tighter culture, you’re more likely to be able to depend on the preset schedules of public transport.

People are more likely to dress the same, buy the same things, and generally downplay their uniqueness. Why? Because if everybody acts like everybody else, order and coordination become much easier. Take something as seemingly benign as which hand you use for writing. One of my studies found that there are far fewer “lefties” in tight cultures.

The tighter a country is, the more likely it is to require school uniforms. This uniformity even extends to the cars people drive. I had my team of research assistants also venture into parking lots around the world. We found less variation in the make and color of cars in tight cultures as compared with loose ones.

In the Middle East, the adhan, or Islamic call to prayer, resonates through the streets five times a day, synchronizing individuals throughout the region.  The more people have to attune their conduct to others’, he argued, the stronger their ability to regulate their impulses. My research supports this argument: People in tight cultures do indeed show higher self-control. For example, people in the United States, New Zealand, Greece, and Venezuela weigh much more than people in tight countries like India, Japan, Pakistan, and Singapore, even taking into account a country’s wealth and people’s average height.

Some of the highest scores for alcohol consumption in liters per capita also came from loose countries such as Spain, Estonia, and New Zealand. Residents of tight nations such as Singapore, India, and China score low on alcohol consumption rates.

Residents of loose countries such as the United States, Hungary, and Estonia are more likely to gamble than residents of tight countries such as South Korea and Singapore. Loose nations also have lower gross national savings—a country’s gross national income minus public and private consumption—even when taking into account wealth and income distribution, suggesting that economies in loose cultures are spending more income than they produce.

Loose cultures have a significant edge when it comes to being open—to new ideas, different people, and change—qualities that tight cultures sorely lack.

“If one were to order all mankind to choose the best set of rules in the world, each group would, after due consideration, choose its own customs; each group regards its own as being by far the best.” Herodotus illustrates his point with a story in which King Darius, the ruler of Persia, asks a group of Greeks who were cremating their dead fathers how much money it would take for them to eat their fathers’ corpses. The Greeks, shocked, reply that they’d never agree to do such a thing.  The king then asks the Callatiae, an Indian tribe, who were known to eat their parents, how much money it would take for them to cremate their corpses. The Callatiae cry out in horror and tell Darius not to suggest such appalling acts.

Generally, people in tight cultures are more likely to believe their culture is superior and needs to be protected from foreign influences.

China

  • China ranks in the 90th percentile of countries with the most negative attitudes toward foreigners. And in Japan, where foreigners make up only 2% of the population, many landlords have a “no foreigners” policy, and certain bathhouses, shops, restaurants, and hotels deny entry to foreign customers
  • In China, unmarried or divorced women in their late twenties are referred to as “leftover women,” or sheng nu, by the government and are mocked as being “a used cotton jacket” on state-sponsored TV programs.

Tight nations are more likely to have autocratic governments that don’t hesitate to forcefully crack down on any dissent or censor the media.

Population density

  • People live in small spaces in close proximity to their neighbors, contending with packed streets and cheek-to-jowl buses and trains. Compare Singapore, with its astonishing population density of over 20,000 people per square mile as of 2016, with Iceland, which has only eight people per square mile.
  • High population density is a basic human threat. In societies where personal space is hard to come by, there’s great potential for chaos and conflict.

Groups with many ecological & historical threats or depleted resources are tighter to create order in the face of chaos

  • Though they were separated by miles and, in some cases, decades or centuries, the tight cultures of Sparta, the Nahua, and Singapore faced a common fate: Each had (or has) to deal with a high degree of threat, whether from Mother Nature and her constant fury of disasters, diseases, and food scarcity, or from human nature and the chaos caused by invasions and internal conflicts. And when we look at the loose cultures of New Zealand, Athens, and the Copper Inuit, we see the opposite pattern: These groups had (or have) the luxury of facing far fewer threats.
  • In his book The Revenge of Geography, Robert Kaplan reminds us that the United States—with its safe separation from other continents by two large oceans—has felt few threats from outsiders throughout its history. The same is also true of New Zealand and Australia.
  • Conflict has been particularly prevalent in Asia. China has experienced massive conflict throughout its history, with an exceedingly long list of battles
  • China’s location makes territorial threat a constant source of anxiety. It borders 14 countries, and has had disputes with each of them.
  • Korea also has been repeatedly clobbered by its neighbors
  • When nations face the possibility of invasion, they must strengthen internal order to ensure a united, coordinated front against the enemy. Tight social norms are essential to this defense.
  • China, for example, has lost nearly 450,000 lives in the past fifty years to natural disasters (twenty-five times more than the United States), in part due to the typhoons that torment its long coastline.
  • Japan has also been one of Mother Nature’s favorite targets throughout its history. A combination of cold weather and volcanic activity led to the Kangi Famine from 1229 to 1232. During the Edo Period (1603–1868), more than 150 famines hit Japan, leaving at least hundreds of thousands dead. In the modern era, Japan has suffered from several devastating earthquakes,
  • Nations like Japan need stronger norms to provide the order and coordination required to recover from chronic natural disasters. Without strong norms, people would be tempted to go rogue in such dire circumstances—looking out only for themselves or their immediate family, for example, by engaging in looting—causing total chaos. But with strong norms and punishments for deviance, such nations are in a much better position to cope and survive.
  • They often deplete natural resources, including arable land and drinking water supplies. Our data suggest that cultures that lack such resources are tighter than cultures that have them in abundance. The reason is simple: When cultures have few natural resources, managing them in a controlled, coordinated way is a matter of survival.  Of the nations I surveyed, Pakistan, India, and China, all tight, had the fewest natural resources within their territories, with high levels of food deprivation and low access to safe water.

Religion

  • Religion tends to breed tightness, both today and in ancient history,
  • Beyond the codification of right and wrong, the belief in the Almighty inculcates the same tight accountability that security cameras bring to public spaces.

Threatening events

  • I set up a field study in Boston to test whether the city’s cultural norms had tightened in response to the event. People who reported being the most affected by the bombings were indeed more likely to report that the United States needed to have stronger social norms. They also reported that the American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence, there should be more restrictions over people entering the country, and the United States is superior to other countries. These are all attitudes we see in nations that face chronic invasions.
  • As threats crop up, groups tighten. As threats subside, groups loosen.
  • Threats don’t even need to be real. As long as people perceive a threat, the perception can be as powerful as objective reality. In fact, long before Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, or Viktor Orbán, politicians have been hyping up threats to tighten groups for centuries.

Diversity can make a society looser: Israel

  • When Israel was founded, its settlers faced rampant malaria, typhus, and cholera. The country has fought numerous wars, mostly due to territorial issues and the long-held animosity between Arabs and Israelis, which continues to this day. Yet Israel is relatively loose, with its high levels of informality and chronic attempts to circumvent rules. Why?
  • One reason that stands out as especially compelling: Israel is highly diverse; 75% of the nation is Jewish, 20% Arab, and the remaining 5% a mix of non-Arab Christian and Baha’i, among other groups. The country has high levels of ethnic diversity, with significant percentages of the citizenry hailing from Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. With so many different groups with different coexisting norms, it is hard to agree on any one standard for behavior.
  • Another possible explanation for Israel’s relative looseness is its fierce tradition of debate. Debate and dissent, which mandate the exploration of multiple perspectives, promote looseness and the rejection of dogma. 
  • In addition, Israel is a young, exploratory “start-up nation” made up of settlers who had the chutzpah to dive into something new, risky, and unknown.
  • Israelis are notably leery of being told what to do; they prefer challenging rules and guidelines over obeying them. “An outsider would see chutzpah everywhere in Israel,” explain Dan Senor and Saul Singer, authors of Start-Up Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle, “in the way university students speak with their professors, employees challenge their bosses, sergeants question their generals, and clerks second-guess government ministers. To Israelis, however, this isn’t chutzpah, it’s the normal mode of being.

Too much diversity can lead to tightness though.  When diversity gets to be extreme, as it is in Pakistan, which has at least six major ethnic groups and over 20 spoken languages, and India, with its 22 official languages and hundreds of dialects, diversity can cause conflict, which, as we know, requires strict norms to manage. When diversity gets to be very high, tightness begins to increase markedly.

Tightness and looseness in the Netherlands And the United States

  • Thanks in large part to its location and trading activity, the Netherlands has become home to an eclectic mix of ethnic, racial, and religious groups, which may have contributed to its looseness. For centuries, the Netherlands welcomed refugees from all over Europe, including French Protestants, Portuguese and German Jews, and English separatists, among many others. Today, over 20% of the population comes from abroad
  • To quantify levels of tight-loose across the 50 states, Jesse Harrington and I scoured research institutes and the Smithsonian archives for data on each state going back to the early 1800s, including records on punishment methods, state restrictions, cultural practices, and ecological and historical events. The patterns we discovered were illuminating. Take, for example, differences in the harshness of punishments across states. Compared with Alaska and Maine, Indiana and Texas spank far more students, execute more criminals, and punish marijuana possession more harshly. In 2011 alone, over 28,000 students were paddled or spanked in Texas schools.  
  • In states where children are more likely to be hit in school, there are higher rates of executions, more restrictions on alcohol, sterner views of marriage, fewer foreigners, and so on. These states are stricter—they’re tight, rule makers. Meanwhile, states with more lenient punishments also have fewer restrictions on alcohol and marriage and have more foreigners. These states have more latitude—they’re loose, rule breakers.
  • Some of the tightest states in the country include Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. At the looser end of the spectrum are California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Maine, and Massachusetts. Delaware, Iowa, Idaho, Nebraska, Florida, and Minnesota fall in the middle. From these rankings, regional patterns emerge: The South is tightest, the West and Northeast are loosest, and the Midwest is in the middle.

Conservativism, liberalism, religion and personality in the United States

  • Conservatism reflects individuals’ emphasis on traditional values and often manifests as resistance to change, whereas tightness is a state of culture that reflects the strength of social norms in one’s environment. While tight states and countries have more conservatives and loose states and countries have more liberals, there are plenty of conservatives in loose regions and plenty of liberals in tight ones.
  • People in tight states are more likely to have a personality trait that psychologists call “conscientiousness,” which entails self-discipline, rule following, and the desire for structure. These people report being more organized, careful, and dependable, and agree with statements such as “I see myself as someone who is a reliable worker,” as someone who “makes plans and follows through with them,” and as someone who “does things efficiently.” By contrast, people in loose states report having less conscientiousness. More disorderly and less reliable (and honest enough to be self-critical!), they’re more likely to agree that they can be “somewhat careless,” “disorganized,” and “easily distracted.” It’s true: If you spend time in states like North Carolina, Georgia, Utah, and Kansas, you’ll generally find people who are more cautious, thorough, and orderly relative to people in loose states like Alaska, Maine, Hawaii, and Rhode Island.
  • In the South, home to the tightest U.S. states, strong rules about etiquette, hospitality, formality, and, above all, respect prevail. Children learn to say “yes, ma’am” and “yes, sir” to adults and not to interrupt them.  Southerners reacted with a higher rise in cortisol, a hormone that indexes stress, as well as testosterone, a hormone that primes aggression in response to threat. It’s no small wonder that people in the South try to avoid this kind of rude behavior in the first place.
  • Recreational marijuana use is now legal in nine states, all of them loose: Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon, Washington, Vermont, and Nevada.
  • More rurality and less mobility produce an interesting cultural cocktail: You can bet that outside your home, neighbors and acquaintances know what you’re doing, and they may have strong opinions about it. In these small, tight-knit communities, the neighborhood watch is on full alert. According to Southern Living, people in small towns often know whom every teenager is dating, which neighbors just made a large purchase, and even when the town mechanic has hired a new guy. The gossip mill, it turns out, has important social functions.  In towns where negative reputations can spread overnight, the fear of being bad-mouthed can help to deter bad behavior and promote cooperation.
  • We’ve found that tight states tend to have more police and law enforcement officials, and citizens generally agree that the police should use strict punishment—including force—to keep the social order. Tight states also incarcerate a greater percentage of their populations. By contrast, in the urban and highly mobile areas common to loose states, you might pass thousands of strangers on your daily commute and find yourself living in relative anonymity, with little neighborly supervision. Other indicators of social disorder—such as higher divorce, single-parent households, and even homelessness—are higher in loose states.
  • Among Americans in tight states there is a remarkably high percentage of religious believers—80% in Kansas, for example. In Mississippi and South Carolina, among the most religious states in America, 83% and 78% of adults, respectively, are Christian. “Megachurches” with huge congregations of over 2,000 people are found throughout the South. Christian doctrine often leaks into public schools as well. In Texas, public school students can enroll in elective courses that teach morality lessons directly from the Bible. 
  • In Utah, over 60% of the population are Mormon, and strict regulations abound in their daily lives. Tea and coffee are banned at all times. Premarital sex is forbidden, as are pornography, masturbation, and homosexual acts. Sabbath Sunday is reserved for worship; working, shopping, eating out, playing sports, or other activities that may involve worldly temptations are not permitted. Bishops privately interview every adult Mormon to assess how well they’ve been adhering to the Mormon way of life and whether they’re worthy of entering the temple. Much like an intelligence-gathering agency, the Mormon Church’s Strengthening Church Members Committee (SCMC) keeps tabs on local Mormons to identify those who may be publicly criticizing the faith or its leadership. When it does, the SCMC promptly notifies the dissenter’s bishop, who may charge the member with apostasy—the abandonment of religious faith.
  • People in loose states are more likely to view themselves as original, curious, deep thinkers, and imaginative—all indications of what is called “trait openness,” as seen below.
  • Not only are loose states more fun, but they’re also more tolerant. Moral codes in loose states emphasize preventing harm to others—a universalistic code that applies to anyone, regardless of their race, language, religion, or creed. 

The Deep South of the United States

  • Differences in tightness-looseness across the 50 states were set in motion by the cultural characteristics of those who settled in different parts of the New World. In the 1700s, when large waves of migrants from northern Ireland and lowland Scotland began arriving in America. These migrants established an early presence around Pennsylvania and then moved southward, settling in states like West Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Texas. There these pioneers unpacked their cultural suitcases, which were filled with the social norms and values of their motherlands. As descendants of Celtic herdsmen, they were known for their tight normative codes, which emphasized courage, strength, and a suspicion of outsiders—a combination of characteristics psychologists call a “culture of honor.” These cultural traits proved useful in the treacherous Southern environment they explored, where the threat of losing their livestock in raids from neighboring groups was constant. Given this danger, coupled with a lack of formal law enforcement, the settlers developed tight social norms to enforce cooperation and prevent pilfering. Norms for generosity and respect—which promoted group cohesion—were paramount. Settlers frequently entertained guests to showcase this generosity and to gain honor in the eyes of the community.
  • Despite their generosity and cooperation, these early settlers were ready to inflict quick and violent retribution on wrongdoers. Such demonstrations of valor helped them maintain a reputation for strength that could deter further attacks. Even teasing was considered a major norm violation in the South and could lead to an eruption of violence, particularly if one was insulted in public. These honor cultures spread into the Deep South—areas now known as the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia—and by 1790, Scotch-Irish settlers constituted the majority of the population of many Southern states. Today, these states are among America’s tightest; they’re where the culture of honor lives on. 
  • Strict norms were designed to control slaves, who outnumbered their masters. Those who tried to run away were to be whipped after a first attempt; after subsequent attempts their punishments escalated to anything from having an ear chopped off, to castration, to having an Achilles tendon severed, to execution. 
  • In the nineteenth century, the American South increasingly felt as though it was being “occupied” by “foreign” troops from the North, which had diametrically opposed views on how the nation should be governed. In 1861, the South and North entered into the bloodiest conflict in the nation’s history with an outcome that only reinforced the South’s tight culture. Southerners saw a need to defend their region’s “peculiar institution,” a euphemism for slavery, as indispensable to their agrarian-based economy. Northern efforts to curtail slavery’s spread, they felt, threatened their lifestyle, and their survival. Clearly, the Southern states that relied the most on slavery had the most to lose from a Union victory. According to this logic, today they should be tighter than Southern states that were less dependent on slave labor. And they are. There is a strong correlation between the percentage rankings of slave-owning families from the 1860 census and state-level tightness today. The tightest Southern states, such as Mississippi, South Carolina, and Georgia, had much higher levels of slave-owning families than did loose states, such as Delaware and Maryland.
  • The South continued as a predominantly agrarian region marked by close-knit tight communities. According to historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown, who authored Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South, medicine, law, the clergy, and the military were the only tolerated non-agriculture professions in the South.
  • Some of the least diverse places in the country today can be found in tight states.

The Northern states

  • The settlers in the northern and western United States couldn’t have been more different. From the outset, the first settlers in these regions were known for religious pluralism and multicultural cohabitation, which we know pushes groups to be loose. Toward the beginning of the seventeenth century, a few decades before the Barbadians arrived in the Deep South, the Dutch (inhabitants of one of the loosest nations today) founded New York as a global trading hub that later attracted immigrants from Poland, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, and Portugal. The New York region attracted people who practiced many different faiths, including Catholics, Anglicans, Puritans, Quakers, and Jews.
  • This loose mentality was later reinforced with the rise of industrialization during the nineteenth century, which made the North more urban and diverse.
  • California became a “start-up state,” luring risk-takers who were willing to make a treacherous journey for a better future on the West Coast. “Here were to be seen people of every nation in all varieties of costume, and speaking 50 different languages, and yet all mixing together amicably and socially,

Loose communities exist within tight states, and vice versa, and tight-loose theory can predict where they’ll take hold. In the tight state of Louisiana lies New Orleans, the historically diverse and cosmopolitan port city that is one of the most permissive in the country,

In tight communities in loose states, and they often display very low diversity. For example, the city of Colorado Springs, nestled in the loose state of Colorado, is almost 80% white.

When groups don’t have to worry about food, water, disease, or invasions, they don’t need as many strict rules to coordinate, and they evolve into more permissive societies. This principle clearly applies to nations, and it plays out in states, too. Mother Nature played a key part in perpetuating tight-loose differences across the U.S. states, and she continues to selectively cast her destructive spell over certain regions. Many of the states that rank high in tightness, for example, were marked by difficult ecological conditions early on. In the nineteenth century, the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and several areas westward were inhospitable territories that experienced very little rain. There were few places where agriculture could survive without the help of extensive irrigation projects. The altitude was so high—even the plains and mountain valleys stood above the tallest summits of the Appalachians—that many familiar crops wouldn’t grow at all.

We also tracked where hurricanes hit with available data from 1851 to 2004. It’s clear that a disproportionate number of tight states have gotten clobbered. In the list of over 50 of the deadliest hurricanes that have occurred in U.S. history, around 85% have done their worst damage in the 10 tightest states.

Examining Centers for Disease Control data from 1993 to 2007, we found that vulnerability to common diseases (e.g., malaria, measles, tuberculosis, rubella, typhoid) predicted states’ tightness levels. While tight states such as Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina scored high on pathogens, loose states such as Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont scored low. Tight states exhibit higher rates of food insecurity, with fewer households having adequate access to food, and they also have less access to clean air. Tight Indiana, for example, has the poorest air quality in the country, followed by Ohio and Kentucky. By comparison, Oregon, Maine, and New Mexico—all loose states—are among the states with the clearest air. Summing up: Where there’s threat, there’s tightness.

Throughout American history, the state of California has been rocked by natural disasters ranging from earthquakes to wildfires to mudslides to heat waves. Yet California is a loose state, for reasons similar to an exception we noted when looking at individual nations—Israel. Thanks to the adventurous immigrants it’s drawn from all around the world, the state boasts tremendous diversity

Communism & the Red Scare.  The first Red Scare was ignited shortly afterward in 1919 by a series of bombs detonated across the country by a few anarchists. These events amped up public fear and paranoia of politically radical groups, and then fear of immigrants and minorities. Laws were passed to deport immigrants, limit free speech, and infringe on the civil rights of suspected communities. After the USSR tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949, Americans feared a nuclear war was imminent and that Soviet spies had infiltrated the U.S. government. A witch hunt against Communists ensued,

When such threats aren’t chronic, a country’s system of norms loosens again. All the restrictions, monitoring, and punishments of the 1950s, for example, gradually gave way to the extreme looseness of the 1960s. During this “decade of change,” the nation witnessed groundbreaking movements that sought to end discrimination toward traditionally marginalized groups—including women, African Americans, and gay Americans—and dismantle many of the country’s long-held social norms and values. As more households acquired television sets, more Americans were exposed to new ideas and places. The following decades ushered in unbridled permissiveness, including greater recreational drug use and sexual promiscuity.

9/11

Fast-forward to September 11, 2001, which unleashed another temporary wave of tightness. Congress introduced 130 new pieces of legislation, created over 260 new government organizations to secure the nation, and spent over $600 billion on homeland security from 2001 to 2011. The Patriot Act, hurriedly drafted and signed a month after the attacks by ninety-eight out of a hundred senators, law enforcement officers were given permission to search homes and businesses without owners’ or occupants’ consent or knowledge.

Tightness-looseness can help account for the astounding political upheavals happening around the globe in the twenty-first century, including British citizens’ 2016 vote to leave the European Union and the success of the Law and Justice Party in Poland’s parliamentary election. Hungary has tightened considerably in recent years due to a different kind of “threat”—primarily Muslim refugees,

Perceived threat—often about terrorism, immigration, and globalization—tightens cultures and catapults autocratic leaders onto the national stage.

Class & Wealth

Class divides have become a front-burner political issue. A 2017 Pew Research survey found that almost 60% of Americans believe there are “very strong” or “strong” conflicts between the rich and poor, up 12% from 2009. Respondents ranked class conflicts ahead of those between the young and the old and city and rural dwellers. This chasm between the haves and have-nots exists around the world.

The chance of falling into destitution is a constant threat among members of the lower class. In her article “The Class Culture Gap,” legal scholar Joan Williams notes that “American working-class families feel themselves on a tightrope where one misstep could lead to a fall into poverty and disorder.” Losing one’s job and any semblance of security is a constant threat for the working class, who often live paycheck to paycheck. Author Joseph Howell similarly notes that slipping into hard living—a term he uses to describe the dregs of poverty—is a relentless preoccupation among the working class that motivates them to vigilantly guard their precarious status. Whereas upper-class individuals experience the world as safe and welcoming, lower-class individuals tend to view it as fraught with extreme danger. And because money can buy second chances, those who have it have a different attitude toward novelty and risk. Upper-class families know that they have a safety net if they run into problems and so they encourage their children to explore and take chances. Because lower-class families lack a safety net to offset the negative effects of careless mistakes and lapses in judgment, they tend to actively discourage this kind of experimentation.

In addition to facing economic uncertainty, the lower class is saddled with serious safety and health threats. Their jobs have much higher odds of injury, dismemberment, and death.  Poorer communities in the United States face more than double the rate of violent crime relative to higher-income communities.  They are also far more likely to be victims of gun violence, robbery, aggravated and simple assault, and sexual assault and rape. The lower class also experiences greater health vulnerabilities throughout their lives relative to their upper-class counterparts, showing higher rates of illnesses such as coronary heart disease, stroke, chronic bronchitis, diabetes, and ulcers. In fact, there’s a staggering 10-15 year difference in the life expectancy rate between the top and bottom 1% in the U.S.

The combination of high threat, low mobility, and low exposure to diversity is a perfect recipe for the evolution of tightness in the lower class.

Lower-class adults were more likely to indicate that they faced stronger rules, harsher punishments, more monitoring, and fewer choices in their childhood home, current workplace, and lives more generally. They also reported that the situations they encounter on a daily basis are much tighter, with fewer behaviors that are deemed acceptable. What’s more, the lower-class participants were more likely to desire a tighter society, as evidenced by their strong agreement with statements like “a functioning society requires strong punishments for wrongdoing.” Put simply, they live in a tighter, circumscribed world, while the upper class experiences considerable looseness. Just like citizens of tight nations and states, the lower class see the world through a prism of threat: They’re more concerned with paying the rent or mortgage, losing their homes and jobs, obtaining proper medical care, and having enough food to eat. They also live in more dangerous places.

The predominant upper-class view of rules is that they’re made to be broken.

For members of the lower class, rules are critical for survival. In communities where teens may be tempted to turn to drugs and gangs, strict rules laid down by authority figures are essential to keeping kids on track. And for people in low-wage, routinized jobs where creativity is discouraged, rule breaking can lead to getting fired.  For the lower class, rules are meant to be followed, as they provide moral order in a world of potential turmoil.

Those in the lower classes were more likely to endorse survey items such as “I like order” and “I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life” and to report that they “don’t like change” and “prefer to stick with things that [they] know.” They had lower openness to experience, and yearned for the “good old days.” They had a strong distaste for morally ambiguous behaviors, such as euthanasia and drug and alcohol use, and were more likely to view homosexuality as immoral.

In an experiment, lower-class children were more likely to tell others that they were doing a task wrong or cheating.  By contrast, upper-class children appeared to be more understanding and accepting of violating the rules given, sometimes even laughing appreciatively. Even by age three, these more privileged kids thought there was nothing wrong with breaking the rules once in a while.

It turns out that children in different social classes are exposed to radically different types of socialization. The working class has what psychologists call “strict” or “narrow” socialization, and the upper class has “lenient” or “broad” socialization. Lower-class parents stressed the importance of conformity, wanting their children to be obedient and neat. Upper-class parents wanted their kids to have self-direction—to be independent. Kohn also found striking contrasts in parental attitudes about punishment of wrongdoing. Lower-class parents punished their children for disobedience and for the negative consequences of their behavior, regardless of whether it was intentional or accidental. By contrast, not only were upper-class parents less likely to punish their children, but they also chose whether and how to punish based on the intent behind their child’s behavior.

Knowing that their children will likely have to navigate a world of social threat—and work at jobs where they have little discretion—lower-class parents emphasize the importance of conformity to try to help them succeed. After all, not following protocol at work can get one fired or badly hurt. “In the working class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions, so parents “bring their children up in a home in which conformity, obedience, and intolerance for back talk are the norm—the same characteristics that make for a good factory worker.” In these contexts, self-direction is actually counterproductive, but it’s a necessary trait for those navigating loose worlds and occupations, hence a trait that upper-class parents foster in their children.

Bernstein also found a fascinating connection between social class and the way that people use language. The working class uses what he calls a “restricted code” form of speech defined by simpler and more concrete grammatical constructions with fewer counterfactual statements (like what if). Meanwhile, the middle class has an “elaborated code” of speech that is more abstract and complex and more flexible.

Children also encounter these structural differences in school. Metaphorically speaking, schools with a predominantly lower-class population are more likely to resemble the military, with their strong emphasis on rules and obedience, whereas schools with upper-class populations resemble universities, with their comparable freedom.

From a very young age, the lives of the children of the lower and upper classes begin to diverge—from the values their parents enforce, to the language they speak, to the structure of their households and schools, even to how they react to Max, the norm-violating puppet. These cultural differences have a profound impact on how these children behave as adults.  When given the opportunity to conform or stand out, lower-class individuals, this study showed, prefer to blend in whereas upper-class individuals prefer to be unique.

Beyond their more reckless driving behavior, people higher in social class take more liberty in violating conversational etiquette.  The loose behavior of upper-class individuals can even make them less ethical. Studies have shown that they’re far more likely to say they’d engage in unethical actions ranging from cheating on a test, to stealing software, to keeping extra change from a cashier. In our surveys of hundreds of people, working-class individuals were less likely to endorse unscrupulous actions like stealing supplies at work or cheating on tests.

We’ve seen that the lower class tends to be tighter—more conforming, norm-abiding, and cooperative—while the upper class is looser—more deviant, less cooperative, and even a bit more unethical.

Psychologist Murray Straus found discrepancies in creativity are inculcated early. He worked with families from different socioeconomic backgrounds and asked them to complete problem-solving tasks while an observer took detailed notes on their ideas. Among the sixty-four American families participating, those with higher socioeconomic status attempted many more creative solutions to the tasks than did families from lower-class backgrounds. The same results were found in India and Puerto Rico. In short, members of the lower class, while more likely to abide by rules and norms and even be more ethical, are less likely to think outside of the box.

In loose nations and states, there’s a high degree of openness and tolerance of individuals who are different, including immigrants, while in tight nations and states, people react more negatively to those who threaten the social order. Remarkably, the same tight-loose signature applies to social class: Studies show that, in general, members of the lower-class report more negative attitudes toward homeless people, homosexuals, Muslims, the disabled, and even people with tattoos.  Women, minorities, and homosexuals have less power and less latitude, and are subjected to stronger punishments, even for the same norm violations. They, in short, live in much tighter worlds.

When women and minorities were said to engage in norm-breaking behaviors, managers thought they warranted more punishment than when the same behaviors were done by majority males. Similarly, a study looking at the financial advisor industry found that although misconduct is more frequent among male employees, women are more likely to be punished, and more severely so [my comment: yea, like Martha Stewart nabbed for insider trading when thousands of men are who usually do this].

African American criminals are punished more harshly and sentenced to more time behind bars than white criminals with comparable histories. In the United States, African Americans are imprisoned at a rate that is five times the imprisonment rate of whites. African Americans are also far more likely to be targeted, brutalized, and killed by police, a phenomenon that prompted the Black Lives Matter.

The pattern is clear: People with different levels of status and power—whether that status and power are based on income, race, gender, sexual orientation, or another individual characteristic—live in different cultural worlds.

While you might expect an American moving to Japan or a German moving to New Zealand to experience culture shock, it may be less evident that someone moving between classes might have just as much trouble adapting. This is particularly the case for members of the working class, who are typically ill-prepared to cross into upper-class schools and workplaces that have been effectively designed to promote looseness. Though it’s often not obvious, the working class is inadvertently put at a cultural disadvantage in these spaces.

One reason poor students do less well in college: The loose norms and openness of many college campuses are comfortable for upper-class students, but they can be disorienting and alienating to students from working-class backgrounds.  Lower-class children, who have grown up in tight environments that emphasize conformity over independence, structure over creativity, and obedience over deviance, are more likely to struggle. For them, attending college, even one close to home, can feel like traveling to a foreign country. By the end of their first semester, lower-class students felt less academically prepared, less successful at making friends, and more stressed out. These students were overwhelmed by the complexity of college life, and yearned for clarity and simplicity. Lower-class students’ alienation on campus translates to a higher likelihood of dropping out.

Class differences are deeply cultural, and the world urgently needs greater cultural empathy across class lines. Arguably, we need this now more than ever. People from different social classes are increasingly isolated from one another, as seen in the growing urban-rural divides around the globe. We tend to further compartmentalize ourselves on social media and follow different media outlets (e.g., Fox News versus MSNBC) as well. As a result, we are left with little understanding of each other’s cultures, which can lead us to form negative stereotypes about one another.

Many of the differences between the lower and upper classes have an underlying logic. Lower-class occupations, including plumbers, butchers, factory workers, janitors, and prison guards, require sophisticated technical and physical skills. They also require the ability to be dependable and follow rules. A tight mind-set is critical for success in these contexts. Meanwhile, upper-class jobs, such as those in law, engineering, medicine, academia, and management, among other white-collar professions, are built on alternative strengths, such as creativity, vision, independence, and even breaking from tradition. These strengths necessitate a looser mind-set. Neither set of strengths should be viewed as superior.

While we may never agree with others’ voting choices, once we know that they stem from our cultural codes, we can at least begin to understand them.

Corporate culture

In 1998, two auto industry giants, Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Corporation, tied the knot. Both companies were deeply enmeshed in their own way of doing business, and their cultural incompatibility soon became apparent. American employees were taught German formalities, such as keeping their hands out of their pockets during professional interactions. German members of Daimler’s team felt uncomfortable when their American counterparts called them by their first names, rather than by their title and last name. And while the Germans wanted thick files of prep work and a strict agenda for their team meetings, Americans approached these gatherings as a time to brainstorm and have unstructured conversations.  Daimler had a top-down, heavily managed, hierarchical structure devoted to precision. As a result, the company’s manufacturing operations were rigid and bureaucratic.

Chrysler, on the other hand, was a looser operation with a more relaxed, freewheeling, and egalitarian business culture. Chrysler also used a leaner production style, which minimized unnecessary personnel and red tape. As these company cultures collided, Daimler faced a decision: compromise or cannibalize. It chose the latter. Daimler CEO Jürgen Schrempp had promised Chrysler CEO Robert Eaton a “merger of equals,” but his actions showed this was an acquisition rather than a merger.

Over time, Daimler dispatched a German to head Chrysler’s U.S. operations, replaced American managers with German ones, and laid off thousands of Chrysler employees, moves that fomented talk of “German invaders.  Trust between these two foreign units became irreparable. Key Chrysler executives left, and after nine years of declines in stock price and employee morale, the transnational pair finally divorced in 2007.

People in loose cultures prefer visionary leaders who are collaborative. They want leaders to advocate for change and empower their workers. “The goal of a leader should be to maximize resistance—in the sense of encouraging disagreement and dissent,” explains Dov Frohman, founder of Intel Israel. “If you aren’t aware that the people in the organization disagree with you, then you are in trouble.

People in tight cultures view effective leaders as those who embody independence and great confidence—that is, as people who like to do things their own way and don’t rely on others.

Just as countries have practical reasons for becoming collectively tighter or looser, so do industries. Tightness abounds in industries that face threat and need seamless coordination. Sectors such as nuclear power plants, hospitals, airlines, police departments, and construction evolve into tight cultures due to their life-or-death stakes.

The military is the iconic example of tightness.  From day one, U.S. Marine recruits endure a punishing boot camp and indoctrination period that turn individual soldiers into one synchronous corps who, above all, respect their leaders.

Zooming in to any specific organization, we can see why certain units evolve to be tight versus loose even in the same organization. Some occupations are inherently more accountable to laws and regulations, even in the absence of physical threat—think lawyers, auditors, bankers, and government officials. These jobs are bound to high standards of professional accountability. As a result, their work unit cultures foster much stronger norms and compliance monitoring.

Without even realizing it, each of us has developed tight and loose mind-sets that effortlessly help us navigate our social surroundings. Far more than a mere mood or even an attitude, a mind-set is like the program we use to make decisions. The tight mind-set involves paying a great deal of attention to social norms, a strong desire to avoid mistakes, a lot of impulse control, and a preference for order and structure. Relishing routine, it requires a keen sensitivity to signs of disorder. The loose mind-set, by contrast, is less attentive to social norms, more willing to take risks, more impulsive, and more comfortable with disorder and ambiguity. These different mind-sets influence our daily lives and relationships in ways that we might not be fully aware.  Environments automatically change our mind-sets—constrained at the symphony; relaxed at the rock concert. Psychologically, this is your mind and body adjusting to the strength of social norms in your surroundings.

If you have a partner, you might see tight-loose tensions play out in different attitudes about religion, savings, or neatness.

Highly structured and rule-bound activities, like playing bridge or doing karate, foster a tight mind-set, whereas more spontaneous and open-ended activities, like painting or hip-hop dancing, foster a loose mind-set.

Species such as bats, dolphins, and even rats use forms of radar to navigate their physical environment. Humans, too, employ a type of radar to detect the social norms and cues that surround them, whether they’re aware of it or not. In fact, a defining quality of tight and loose mind-sets is the strength or weakness of this normative radar. Some people just seem to be oblivious to social norms. We call otherwise intelligent adults who lack normative radar idiots, jerks, or comedians. We all know people who seem completely unaware of social norms. Perhaps it’s a friend who blurts out inappropriate thoughts. Maybe it’s an uncle who tells the same stories over and over.

People with low normative radar have difficulty understanding what is expected of them, and they tend to behave similarly across a wide range of situations. Paying no heed to situational requirements, they act primarily on their own beliefs and desires.

People with high normative radar are quite sensitive to the social norms around them. They’re what psychologist Mark Snyder calls “high self-monitors.” They’re very good at picking up on interpersonal and social expectations, and are likely to behave differently across situations in response to what is considered acceptable.

In a study, participants listen to 20 prerecorded sentences in which a trained actress conveyed different emotions by changing her voice intonations and inflections. The results were striking. People with high normative radar identified the different emotions with great accuracy. Meanwhile, people with low normative radar struggled with the task.

People in tight nations clearly possessed higher normative radar; they’re higher self-monitors and they excel at adapting their behavior to situational requirements. This is a learned trait. In tight countries dominated by strong rules with substantial constraints on acceptable behavior, a keen ability and desire to detect social expectations pays off—if only to avoid punishment. By the same logic, in countries where rules are weaker, and a wider range of behavior is permissible (as at a rock concert), people tend to possess a looser mind-set and lower normative radar.

Other vignettes described a person applauding in a concert versus at a funeral, shouting at the library versus on a city sidewalk, and so on. The brains of participants from both the United States and China registered the norm violations in the central-parietal brain region, which is responsible for processing surprising events. Yet individuals’ neural responses to norm violations varied dramatically. The neurons of Chinese subjects fired with great force in the frontal area of the brain, which helps us think about the intentions of others and make decisions about punishment. Americans, in contrast, showed little response to norm violations in the frontal region. Differences in normative radar, it appears, become deeply embrained.

When norms are strong, we feel a strong sense of accountability—we sense that our actions may be evaluated and even punished if they deviate. When that warning signal goes off, the tight mind-set takes over. Its prime motive is to avoid making mistakes by being vigilant, cautious, and careful. In situations with fewer normative requirements, we have fewer fears about doing the wrong thing. Rather than being driven to avoid mistakes, we set bolder, often riskier goals.

People in tight cultures who have to abide by strong social norms are socialized to be more cautious. They’re more likely to agree with statements such as, “I am very careful to avoid mistakes” and “I choose my words with care,” and they’re also more deliberate in their decision making.  These are learned differences, but they may also have at least some genetic basis.  

A graduate student of mine recalls encountering an arsenal of regulations at her childhood school in Taiyuan, Shanxi. Students had to sit at their desks with their hands behind their backs at all times, could only raise their right hands when they had a question, and had to be completely silent in the school’s corridors. Pupils who acted out faced a range of punishments, such as standing in front of the classroom for the entirety of the class, being excluded from fun school activities, or even being hit with a ruler. Many Chinese schools have strong monitoring systems. Some classrooms even have webcams that continuously broadcast how well children are behaved, with footage being shown to parents and school officials.

Greater activity in the parietal lobe predicted Chinese participants’ greater self-regulation of eating habits and ability to resist temptations such as alcohol, procrastinating, and playing video games.

People with a low tolerance for ambiguity have trouble dealing with people who are unfamiliar or different.  These traits of distaste for ambiguity and prejudice against other ethnic groups appears to be passed on from parents to children very early in life.

Several examples of how couples who have tight and loose tendencies manage to get along are given towards the end of the book.

She concludes that the best societies are a balance of tight and loose, of constraint and freedom, because the extremely tight and extremely loose nations had the lowest levels of happiness, highest levels of suicide, lowest life expectancies, and highest death rates from cardiovascular diseases and diabetes.  These most extreme nations also have higher levels of political instability and the lowest GDP per capita.

When you look at Egypt or the fallen Soviet Union, it seems incredible that ghastly autocrats like Putin took over.  But when a regime that tightly controlled society, no matter how bad, causes society to descend into chaos and crime, people seek security and become vulnerable to fascism and autocrats to restore order. Putin now rules with an iron fist, where protests, online criticism, or advocacy of political or human rights can result in jail or thousands of dollars in fines.  Putin partnered with the Russian Orthodox Church to rally to traditional and family values (my comment: See NOTE 1 at the end).  Many examples of other nations are given as well.

Most worrisome for the postcarbon future is the section titled:  When cultures collapse, Radicalization steps in. It seems like this is already happening in the U.S. (and elsewhere) with right wing extremists & militias, QAnon, hundreds of congressional leaders denying Biden won the election and that Trump was elected.

The book spends the next few pages explaining how ISIS came to be one of the most violent terrorists organizations.

The rise of populist politicians and movements can be explained by the rise of nationalist groups that long for tightness and fighting “loose” globalists.  Hence those who voted for Trump.  In 2016 over 900 hate groups existed in the U.S., a 17% increase over 2014, including neo-Nazi groups, KKK outposts, white nationalist groups, neo-Confederate groups, and skinheads.

NOTE 1

The book “One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America” by Kevin Kruse, tells the history of how corporate America has tried to undo New Deal reforms since the 1940s by creating a new free-enterprise religion, and to erode the separation of church and state.  Corporate America’s creation of free-enterprise Jesus began in 1935 with the founding of an organization called Spiritual Mobilization. 

Some of the corporations who donated money to this and similar organizations include: 

American Cyanamid and chemical corporation, Associated Refineries, AT&T,  Bechtel Corporation, Caterpillar Tractor Company, Chevrolet, Chicago & Southern Airline, Chrysler corporation, Colgate-Palmolive Company, Deering-Milliken, Detroit Edison, Disney, DuPont, Eastern Airlines, General Electric, General Foods, General Motors, Goodwill, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, IBM, J. C. Penney, J. Walter Thompson, Mark A. Hanna, Marriott, Marshall Field, Monsanto Chemical Company, National Association of Manufacturers, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance, Paramount Pictures, PepsiCo, Precision Valve Corp, Quaker Oats, Republic Steel Corp, Richfield Oil Co., San Diego Gas & Electric, Schick Safety Razor, Standard Oil Company, Sun Oil company, Sun shipbuilding company, Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, United Airlines, US Rubber company, US steel corporation, Utah Power & Light, Warner Bros. Pictures, Weyerhauser.

In the 1930s, corporations were well known to have brought on the Great Depression with their tremendous greed and dishonesty.  The New Deal reformed the financial system, distributed wealth more evenly, provided a social safety net, protected citizens by regulating businesses to prevent them from selling unsafe food, drugs, etc., emitting toxic pollution, aided farmers in slowing soil erosion to prevent more dust bowls, the federal interstate highway system, and other infrastructure and public services that benefited everyone, especially corporations.

The New Deal embodied the ideals of the Social Gospel, a movement dedicated to the public good, economic equality, eradication of poverty, slums, child labor, an unclean environment, inadequate labor unions, poor schools, and war (Wiki Social Gospel).  Corporate America fought against these reforms and has been trying to undo the New Deal ever since then.

 

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How corporations used conservative religion to gain wealth & power & undo the New Deal

Source: Republican Jesus

Preface. This is a book review of One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America by Kevin Kruse (2016), followed by excerpts from the book.  Much of this introduction is my take on what this all means.

This book tells the history of how corporate America has tried to undo New Deal reforms since the 1940s by creating a new free-enterprise religion, and to erode the separation of church and state.

Corporate America’s creation of free-enterprise Jesus began in 1935 with the founding of an organization called Spiritual Mobilization.  Some of the corporations who donated money to this and similar organizations include:

American Cyanamid and chemical corporation, Associated Refineries, AT&T,  Bechtel Corporation, Caterpillar Tractor Company, Chevrolet, Chicago & Southern Airline, Chrysler corporation, Colgate-Palmolive Company, Deering-Milliken, Detroit Edison, Disney, DuPont, Eastern Airlines, General Electric, General Foods, General Motors, Goodwill, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, IBM, J. C. Penney, J. Walter Thompson, Mark A. Hanna, Marriott, Marshall Field, Monsanto Chemical Company, National Association of Manufacturers, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance, Paramount Pictures, PepsiCo, Precision Valve Corp, Quaker Oats, Republic Steel Corp, Richfield Oil Co., San Diego Gas & Electric, Schick Safety Razor, Standard Oil Company, Sun Oil company, Sun shipbuilding company, Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, United Airlines, US Rubber company, US steel corporation, Utah Power & Light, Warner Bros. Pictures, Weyerhauser.

In the 1930s, corporations were well known to have brought on the Great Depression with their tremendous greed and dishonesty.  The New Deal reformed the financial system, distributed wealth more evenly, provided a social safety net, protected citizens by regulating businesses to prevent them from selling unsafe food, drugs, etc., emitting toxic pollution, aided farmers in slowing soil erosion to prevent more dust bowls, the federal interstate highway system, and other infrastructure and public services that benefited everyone, especially corporations.

The New Deal embodied the ideals of the Social Gospel, a movement dedicated to the public good, economic equality, eradication of poverty, slums, child labor, an unclean environment, inadequate labor unions, poor schools, and war (Wiki Social Gospel).

Corporate America fought against these reforms and has been trying to undo the New Deal ever since then.

One of their most successful tactics was getting religious leaders to spout a new version of Jesus – replacing the Social Gospel Jesus of the New deal with a Republican free-enterprise, Ayn Rand, selfish Jesus.

At first everyone saw through this propaganda since it was obviously driven by craven self-interest.

So the propaganda was crafted more subtly, and sold to conservative religious leaders via what appeared to be a religious organization called “Spiritual Mobilization” run by minister James Fifield.  Congregations began to hear sermons about the free-enterprise Jesus with open hearts and minds, which they would have laughed at if the speaker were from a corporation. The new religion taught them to detest unions, social welfare, and to fear and hate government.

Later on, capitalist Jesus expanded to the teachings of the evils of food stamps, Obamacare, to be against abortion and birth control (since the more people there are they less they can be paid).  This propaganda came not just from the pulpit, but also conservative religious TV and radio stations.

Recent scholarship has revealed Jesus to be the Social Gospel Jesus of the Democrats in Rex Weyler’s book “The Jesus Sayings: The quest for his authentic message”. Weyler also found that people have been twisting the real Jesus since St. Paul, so Republican manipulation isn’t anything new, it’s been going on for 2000 years.  By looking at the Dead Sea scrolls (found in the last century) and modern scholarship, Weyler found that the most likely Jesus was a man who spent his time helping the poor and encouraged people to turn their spiritual philosophy in to action.  Jesus was a wise and humble teacher, advocating self-awareness and social compassion. The core, genuine message of Jesus includes (Solomon 2008): 1) Give to anyone who asks; knowledge and righteousness are revealed in action, 2) seek spiritual resources within yourself; don’t wait for a deity to solve your problem, and that knowing one’s self is the first step to offering comfort and compassion to the world.

This book shows how the Bible, America’s history, and Constitution were misquoted and misinterpreted to twist Jesus into Capitalist Jesus.

This is why you don’t have a chance of talking Uncle Bob out of voting for demagogues at the Thanksgiving table – you’re attacking his religion and core beliefs he’s been taught since his first sermon, and his brain shuts down in anger.  And he’ll never change because the main and just about only social organization that knits rural American communities together is Church.  If you read enough to doubt right-wing ideology and religious philosophy, you’re going to be a very lonely and perhaps even outcast person.

People like to say that capitalism is imperfect, but it’s the best system that exists.  Well, I’ll agree that free-enterprise is better at raping, pillaging, and poisoning land, water, and air more quickly than any other system.  Just look at how industrial farming is depleting aquifers and eroding and compacting top soil to the point where it won’t produce much food after just centuries rather than the average of 1,500 years in past civilizations (Montgomery 2007).

If Capitalism is so great, why are Social Gospel nations like Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Canada consistently ranked the happiest nations in the world as well as high in the per capita nominal GDP rankings? Socialist Cuba did far better than other nations when their fossil fuels were suddenly cut, with Russia coming in second.

 

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com Women in ecology  author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Podcasts: WGBH, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity

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One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America by Kevin Kruse 2016

This book argues the postwar revolution in America’s religious identity had its roots in the domestic politics of the 1930s and early 1940s.

Decades before Eisenhower’s inaugural prayers, corporate titans enlisted conservative clergymen in an effort to promote new political arguments embodied in the phrase “freedom under God.”

As the private correspondence and public claims of the men leading this charge make clear, this new ideology was designed to defeat the state power its architects feared most—not the Soviet regime in Moscow, but Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal administration in Washington. With ample funding from major corporations, prominent industrialists, and business lobbies such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the US Chamber of Commerce in the 1930s and 1940s, these new evangelists for free enterprise promoted a vision best characterized as “Christian libertarianism.

By the late 1940s and early 1950s, this ideology had won converts including religious leaders such as Billy Graham and Abraham Vereide and conservative icons ranging from former president Herbert Hoover to future president Ronald Reagan. The new conflation of faith, freedom, and free enterprise then moved to center stage in the 1950s under Eisenhower’s watch.

Though his administration gave religion an unprecedented role in the public sphere, it essentially echoed and amplified the work of countless private organizations and ordinary citizens who had already been active in the same cause.

Corporate leaders remained central. Leading industrialists and large business organizations bankrolled major efforts to promote the role of religion in public life. The top advertising agency of the age, the J. Walter Thompson Company, encouraged Americans to attend churches and synagogues through an unprecedented “Religion in American Life” ad campaign.

Inundated with urgent calls to embrace faith, Americans did just that. The percentage of Americans who claimed membership in a church had been fairly low across the 19th century, increasing from just 16% in 1850 to 36% in 1900. In the early decades of the 20th century the percentages plateaued, remaining at 43% in both 1910 and 1920, then moving up slightly to 47% in 1930 and 49% in 1940. In the decade and a half after the Second World War, however, the percentage of Americans who belonged to a church or synagogue suddenly soared, reaching 57% in 1950 and then peaking at 69% at the end of the decade, an all-time high.

While this religious revival was remarkable, the almost complete lack of opposition to it was even more so. A few clergymen complained that the new public forms of faith seemed a bit superficial, but they ultimately approved of anything that encouraged church attendance.

IN DECEMBER 1940, MORE THAN 5,000 industrialists from across America took part in their yearly pilgrimage to Park Avenue. For three days every winter, the posh Waldorf-Astoria Hotel welcomed them for the annual meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). Tucked away near the end of the program was a name that few knew upon arrival but everyone would be talking about by the week’s end: Reverend James W. Fifield Jr.

Ordinarily, a Congregationalist minister might not have seemed well suited to address the corporate luminaries assembled at the Waldorf-Astoria. But his appearance had been years in the making. For much of the 1930s, organizations such as NAM had been searching in vain for ways to rehabilitate a public image that had been destroyed in the crash and defamed by the New Deal. In 1934, a new generation of conservative industrialists took over NAM with a promise to “serve the purposes of business salvation.” “The public does not understand industry,” one of them argued, “because industry itself has made no effort to tell its story; to show the people of this country that our high living standards have risen almost altogether from the civilization which industrial activity has set up.” Accordingly, NAM dedicated itself to spreading the gospel of free enterprise, through a wide array of films, radio programs, advertisements, direct mail, a speakers bureau, and a press service that provided ready-made editorials and news stories for 7,500 local newspapers. By 1937 the organization devoted $793,043 to the cause, more than half its total income that year. Seeking to repair the image of industrialists, NAM promoted the values of free enterprise

Its efforts at self-promotion were seen as precisely that. As one observer noted, “Throughout the 30s, the corporate campaign was marred by extremist, overt attacks on the unions and the New Deal that it was easy for critics to dismiss the entire effort as mere propaganda.

While established business lobbies such as NAM had been unable to sell free enterprise effectively in the Depression, neither had the many new organizations created specifically for that purpose. The most prominent, the American Liberty League formed in 1934 to “teach the necessity of respect for the rights of persons and property” and “the duty of government to encourage and protect individual and group initiative and enterprise.” It benefited from generous financial support from corporate titans, particularly at DuPont and General Motors. But their prominence inadvertently crippled its effectiveness, as the Liberty League was easily dismissed as a collection of tycoons looking out for their own self-interest. Jim Farley, chairman of the Democratic Party, joked that it really ought to be called the “American Cellophane League” because “first, it’s a DuPont product and second, you can see right through it.” Even the president took his shots. “It has been said that there are two great Commandments—one is to love God, and the other to love your neighbor,” Franklin D. Roosevelt noted soon after its creation. “The two particular tenets of this new organization say you shall love God and then forget your neighbor.” Off the record, he joked that the name of the god they worshiped seemed to be “Property”.

In introducing the New Deal, Roosevelt and his allies revived the old language of the so-called Social Gospel to justify the creation of the modern welfare state. The original proponents of the Social Gospel, back in the late 19th century, had significantly reframed Christianity as a faith concerned less with personal salvation and more with the public good. They rallied popular support for Progressive Era reforms in the early 20th century before fading from public view in the conservative 1920s. But the economic crash and the widespread suffering of the Great Depression brought them back into vogue. When Roosevelt launched the New Deal, an array of politically liberal clergymen championed his proposal for a vast welfare state as simply “the Christian thing to do.” His administration’s efforts to regulate the economy and address the excesses of corporate America were singled out for praise. Catholic and Protestant leaders hailed the “ethical and human significance” of New Deal measures, which they said merely “incorporated into law some of the social ideas and principles for which our religious organizations have stood for many years.” The head of the Federal Council of Churches, for instance, claimed the New Deal embodied basic Christian principles such as the “significance of daily bread, shelter, and security.

Throughout the 1930s, the nation’s industrialists tried to counter the selflessness of the Social Gospel with direct appeals to Americans’ self-interest but had little success.

Accordingly, at the Waldorf-Astoria in December 1940, NAM president H. W. Prentis proposed that they try to beat Roosevelt at his own game. With wispy white hair and a weak chin, the 56-year-old head of the Armstrong Cork Company seemed an unlikely star. But 18 months earlier, the Pennsylvanian had electrified the business world with a speech to the US Chamber of Commerce that called for the recruitment of religion in the public relations war against the New Deal. “Economic facts are important, but they will never check the virus of collectivism,” Prentis warned; “the only antidote is a revival of American patriotism and religious faith.” The speech thrilled the Chamber and propelled Prentis to the top ranks of NAM. His presidential address at the Waldorf-Astoria was anticipated as a major national event, heavily promoted in advance by the Wall Street Journal and broadcast live over both ABC and CBS radio. Again, Prentis urged the assembled businessmen to emphasize faith in their public relations campaigns. “We must give attention to those things more cherished than material wealth and physical security,” he asserted. “We must give more attention to intellectual leadership and a strengthening of the spiritual concept that underlies our American way of life.

Fifield delivered a passionate defense of the American system of free enterprise and a withering assault on its perceived enemies in government. Decrying the New Deal’s “encroachment upon our American freedoms,” the minister listed a litany of sins committed by the Roosevelt administration, ranging from its devaluation of currency to its disrespect for the Supreme Court. He denounced the “rising costs of government and the multitude of federal agencies attached to the executive branch” and warned ominously of “the menace of autocracy approaching through bureaucracy.” His audience of executives was stunned. Over the preceding decade, these titans of industry had been told, time and time again, that they were to blame for the nation’s downfall.

Fifield, in contrast, insisted that they were the source of its salvation.

Minister Fifield convinced the industrialists that clergymen could be the means of regaining the upper hand in their war with Roosevelt in the coming years. As men of God, they could give voice to the same conservative complaints as business leaders, but without any suspicion that they were motivated solely by self-interest. In doing so, they could push back against claims that business had somehow sinned and the welfare state was doing God’s work.

Conservative clergymen now used their ministerial authority to argue, quite explicitly, that New Dealers were the ones violating the Ten Commandments. In countless sermons, speeches, and articles issued in the months and years after Fifield’s address, these ministers claimed that the Democratic administration made a “false idol” of the federal government, leading Americans to worship it over the Almighty; that it caused Americans to covet what the wealthy possessed and seek to steal it from them; and that, ultimately, it bore false witness in making wild claims about what it could never truly accomplish.

Above all, they insisted that the welfare state was not a means to implement Christ’s teachings about caring for the poor and the needy, but rather a perversion of Christian doctrine. In a forceful rejection of the public service themes of the Social Gospel, they argued that the central tenet of Christianity remained the salvation of the individual. If any political and economic system fit with the religious teachings of Christ, it would have to be rooted in a similarly individualistic ethos. Nothing better exemplified such values, they insisted, than the capitalist system of free enterprise.

He and his colleagues devoted themselves to fighting back against the government forces that they believed were threatening capitalism and, by extension, Christianity. In the early postwar era, their activities helped reshape the national debate about the proper functions of the federal government, the political influence of corporations, and the role of religion in national life.

Fifield had watched in alarm as Roosevelt convinced vast majorities of Americans that unfettered capitalism had crippled the nation and that the federal government now needed to play an important new role in regulating the free market’s risks and redistributing its rewards. For Fifield and his flock, Roosevelt’s actions violated not just the Constitution but the natural order of things.

The New Deal undermined the spirit of Christianity and demanded a response from Christ’s representatives on earth. “If, with Jesus, we believe in the sacredness of individual personalities, then our leadership responsibility is very plain.” This duty was “not an easy one,” he cautioned. “We may be called unpatriotic and accused of ‘selling out,’ but so was Jesus.” Finding the leaflet to his liking, Hoover sent Fifield a warm note of appreciation and urged him to press on.

Though they had hoped to destroy the Roosevelt administration themselves, its wounds were largely self-inflicted. In 1937, the president’s labor allies launched a series of sit-down strikes that secured union recognition at corporations such as General Motors and US Steel but also roused sympathy for seemingly beleaguered businessmen. At the same time, Roosevelt overreached with his proposal to “pack” the Supreme Court with new justices, a move that played into the hands of those who sought to portray him as dictatorial in intent. Most significant, though, was his ill-fated decision to rein in federal spending in an effort to balance the budget. The impressive economic recovery of Roosevelt’s first term suddenly stalled, and the country entered a short but sharp recession in the winter of 1937–1938.

As the New Deal faltered, Fifield began to look forward to the next presidential election—in “the critical year 1940”—when conservatives might finally rout the architects of the regulatory state. To his dismay, international tensions soon marginalized domestic politics and prompted the country to rally around Roosevelt again.

As the distraction of the foreign war drew to a close, Fifield looked forward to renewing the fight against the New Deal. The minister now counted on the support of not just Hoover but an impressive array of conservative figures in politics, business, and religion. The advisory committee for Spiritual Mobilization’s wartime pledge was, in the words of one observer, “a who’s who of the conservative establishment.” At mid-decade, its 24-man roster included three past or present presidents of the US Chamber of Commerce, a leading Wall Street analyst, a prominent economist at the American Banking Association, the founder of the National Small Businessmen’s Association,

Senator Albert Hawkes agreed. “After careful examination of the records during the past ten years, one can only conclude that there is the objective of the assumption of greater power and control by the government over individual life. If these policies continue,” he warned, “they will lead to state direction and control of all the lives of our citizens. That is the goal of Federal planners. That is NOT the desire of the American people!

In February 1945, Haake explained to Pew why the NAM campaign to ministers and others like it had all failed. “Of the approximately 30 preachers to whom I have thus far talked, I have yet to find one who is unqualifiedly impressed,” Haake reported. “One of the men put it almost typically for the rest when he said: ‘The careful preparation and framework for the meetings to which we are brought is too apparent. We cannot help but see that it is expertly designed propaganda and that there must be big money behind it.

If industrialists wanted to convince clergymen to side with them, they would need a subtler approach. Rather than simply treating ministers as a passive audience to be persuaded, Haake argued, they should involve them actively in the cause as participants. The first step would be making ministers realize that they too had something to fear from the growth of government. “The religious leaders must be helped to discover that their callings are threatened,” Haake argued, by realizing that the “collectivism” of the New Deal, “with the glorification of the state, is really a denial of God.” Once they were thus alarmed, they would readily join Spiritual Mobilization as its representatives and could then be organized more effectively into a force for change both locally and nationally.

With the new financial support and sense of direction, Spiritual Mobilization underwent a massive overhaul. In February 1947, Fifield reported that he had already reached their goal for “the signing of 10,000 ministers as representatives.” This national network of clergymen would be the primary channel through which the work and writings of Spiritual Mobilization would flow. In a new monthly publication that bore the organization’s name, Fifield ran a column—with the businesslike heading “Director to Representatives”—devoted to marshaling these ministers to achieve their common goal of defeating the New Deal. Fifield repeatedly warned them that the growth of government had crippled not only individual initiative but personal morality as well. “It is time to exalt the dignity of individual man as a child of God, to exalt Jesus’ concept of man’s sacredness and to rebuild a moral fabric based on such irreducibles as the Ten Commandments,” he urged his minister-representatives.

Clergymen responded enthusiastically. Many ministers wrote the Los Angeles office to request copies of Friedrich Hayek’s libertarian treatise The Road to Serfdom and anti–New Deal tracts by Herbert Hoover and libertarian author Garet Garrett, all of which had been advertised in Spiritual Mobilization. Some sought reprints of the bulletin itself.

Fifield’s backers in the Businessmen’s Advisory Committee were so pleased with his progress that they nearly doubled the annual budget. To raise funds, its members secured sizable donations from their own companies and personal accounts and, more important, reached out to colleagues across the corporate world for their donations as well. Pew once again set the pace, soliciting donations from officials at 158 corporations. “A large percentage of ministers in this country are completely ignorant of economic matters and have used their pulpits for the purpose of disseminating socialistic and totalitarian doctrines,” he wrote in his appeal. “Much has already been accomplished in the education of these ministers, but a great deal more is left to be done.” Many of the corporations he contacted—including General Motors, Chrysler, Republic Steel, National Steel, International Harvester, Firestone Tire and Rubber, Sun Oil, Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Colgate-Palmolive-Peet—were already contributing the maximum allowable annual donation. Other leading businesses, from US Steel to the National Cash Register Company, had donated in the past, but Pew hoped they would commit to the limit as well. Recognizing that there were many conservative groups out there “fighting for our American way of life,” Pew assured a colleague in the oil industry that Spiritual Mobilization deserved to be “at the top of the list” when it came time to donate, “because recent polls indicated that of all the groups in America, the ministers had more to do with molding public opinion.

“According to my book there are five principal issues before the country: The socialization of industry, the socialization of medicine, the socialization of education, the socialization of labor, and the socialization of security,” he noted. “Only through education and the pressure which the people exert on their politicians can we hope to prevent this country from becoming a totalitarian state.

Fifield’s financial backers helped secure free airtime for these programs across the nation. “Republic Steel is taking steps to get them on radio stations in every town where they have a factory or office,” Fifield noted in March 1949. “We are expecting to be on 150 radio stations by June.” A year later, The Freedom Story was broadcast on a weekly network of over 500 stations; by late 1951, it aired on more than 800.

Fifield’s journal purposely presented itself as created by ministers for ministers. Spiritual Mobilization had long operated on the principle that clergymen could not be swayed through crude propaganda. “The articulation should be worked out before-hand, of course, and we should be ready to help the thinking of the ministers on it,” Haake noted in one of his early musings on Spiritual Mobilization, “but it should be so done as to enable them to discover it for themselves, as something which they really had believed but not realized fully until our questions brought it out so clearly. I am sure we may not TELL them: not as laymen, or even as fellow clergymen. We must help them to discover it themselves.

Faith and Freedom thus presented itself as an open forum in which ministers could debate a wide variety of issues and disagree freely. But there was an important catch. “Clergymen may differ about politics, economics, sociology, and such,” Fifield stated, “but I would expect that in matters of morality all followers of Jesus speak in one voice.” Because Fifield and Johnson insisted that morality directly informed politics and economics, they were able to cast those who disagreed with them on those topics as essentially immoral

Time and time again, he condemned a variety of “socialistic laws,” such as ones supporting minimum wages, price controls, Social Security pensions for the elderly, unemployment insurance, veterans’ benefits, and the like, as well as a wide range of federal taxation that he deemed to be “tyrannical” in nature.

As the Fourth of July drew near, the Committee to Proclaim Liberty focused its attention on encouraging Americans to mark the holiday with public readings of the preamble to the Declaration of Independence. The decision to focus solely on the preamble was in some ways a natural one, as its passages were certainly the most famous and lyrical in the document. But doing so also allowed organizers to reframe the Declaration as a purely libertarian manifesto, dedicated to the removal of an oppressive government. Those who read the entire document would have discovered, to the consternation of the committee, that the founding fathers followed the high-flown prose of the preamble with a long list of grievances about the absence of government and rule of law in the colonies. Among other things, they lambasted King George III for refusing “his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good,” for forbidding his governors from passing “Laws of immediate and pressing importance,” for dissolving the legislative bodies in the colonies, and for generally enabling a state of anarchy that exposed colonists to “all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within.” In the end, the Declaration was not a rejection of government power in general but rather a condemnation of the British crown for depriving the colonists of the government they needed. In order to reframe the Declaration as something rather different, the Committee to Proclaim Liberty had to edit out much of the document they claimed to champion.

“. . . That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men . . .” Here is the reason for and the purpose of government. Government is but a servant—not a master—not a giver of anything. “. . . deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . .” In America, the government may assume only the powers you allow it to have. It may assume no others. The ad urged readers to make their own declaration of independence in 1951. “Declare that government is responsible TO you—rather than FOR you,” it continued. “Declare that freedom is more important to you than ‘security’ or ‘survival.’

“The effort to establish socialism in our country has probably progressed farther than most of us fully realize,” asserted a Lutheran minister in Kansas. “It would be well to remember that every act or law passed by which the government promises to ‘give’ us something is a step in the direction of socialism.” A clergyman from Brooklyn agreed. “Today our homes are built for us, financed for us, and the church is provided for us. Our many services are in danger of robbing us of that which is most important,” he warned, “the right to our own kingdom of self.

Americans had learned that the Soviet Union now had the atomic bomb. The energetic young Graham seized on the headlines to make the Armageddon foretold in the New Testament seem imminent. “Communism,” he thundered, “has decided against God, against Christ, against the Bible, and against all religion. Communism is not only an economic interpretation of life—communism is a religion that is inspired, directed, and motivated by the Devil himself who has declared war against Almighty God.” He urged his audience to get religion not simply for their own salvation but for the salvation of their city and country. Without “an old-fashioned revival,” he warned, “we cannot last!

Three important movements in the 1940s and early 1950s—the prayer breakfast meetings of Abraham Vereide, Graham’s evangelical revivals, and the presidential campaign of Dwight D. Eisenhower—encouraged the spread of public prayer as a political development whose means and motives were distinct from the drama of the Cold War. Working in lockstep to advance Christian libertarianism, these three movements effectively harnessed Cold War anxieties for an already established campaign against the New Deal.

Graham was the most prominent of the new Christian libertarians, a charismatic figure who spread the ideas of forerunners such as Fifield to even broader audiences. In 1954, Graham offered his thoughts on the relationship between Christianity and capitalism in Nation’s Business, the magazine of the US Chamber of Commerce. “We have the suggestion from Scripture itself that faith and business, properly blended, can be a happy, wholesome, and even profitable mixture,” he observed. “Wise men are finding out that the words of the Nazarene: ‘Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you’ were more than the mere rantings of a popular mystic; they embodied a practical, workable philosophy which actually pays off in happiness and peace of mind. . . . Thousands of businessmen have discovered the satisfaction of having God as a working partner.

Graham’s warm embrace of business contrasted sharply with the cold shoulder he gave organized labor. The Garden of Eden, he told a rally in 1952, was a paradise with “no union dues, no labor leaders, no snakes, no disease.” The minister insisted that a truly Christian worker “would not stoop to take unfair advantage” of his employer by ganging up against him in a union. Strikes, in his mind, were inherently selfish and sinful.  If workers wanted salvation, they needed to put aside such thoughts and devote themselves to their employers.

On Labor Day that same year, he warned that “certain labor leaders would like to outlaw religion, disregard God, the church, and the Bible,” and he suggested that their rank and file were wholly composed of the unchurched.

His hostility to organized labor was matched by his dislike of government involvement in the economy, which he invariably condemned as “socialism.” Graham warned that “government restrictions” in the realm of free enterprise threatened “freedom of opportunity” in America.

Graham’s thoughts on the dangers of socialism became a bit of an international scandal after the Billy Graham Evangelical Association sent followers a free calendar. A page on England noted that “when the war ended a sense of frustration and disillusionment gripped England and what Hitler’s bombs could not do, socialism with its accompanying evils shortly accomplished. England’s historic faith faltered. The churches still standing were gradually emptied.” Learning of the slight, a columnist for the London Daily Herald denounced Graham with a new nickname: “the Big Business evangelist.

As preachers like Billy Graham helped to popularize public prayer, they thus managed to politicize it as well. They shared the Christian libertarian sensibilities of Spiritual Mobilization but were able to spread that gospel in much subtler—and much more effective—ways than that organization ever could. At the same time, their work helped to democratize the phenomenon of public prayer.

Congressional breakfast meetings quickly became a fixture on Capitol Hill. Each month, Vereide printed a program to guide the groups in their morning meditations, offering specific readings from Scripture and providing questions for discussion. The groups were officially nonpartisan, welcoming Republicans and Democrats alike, but that was not to say they were apolitical. Most of the Democratic members of the House breakfast group, for instance, were conservative southerners who held federal power and the activism of the New Deal state in as much contempt as the average Republican did. Political overtones were lightly drawn but present nonetheless. “The domestic and the world conflict is the physical expression of a perverted mental, moral and spiritual condition,” noted a program for a House session. “We need to repent from our unworkable way and pray.” The congressional prayer meetings gave Vereide immediate access to the nation’s political elite.

Having won over political leaders in Washington, D.C., Vereide used their influence to establish even more breakfast groups across the nation. The minister pressed ahead in his drive to give the organization an international presence, with quick success. Within a few years, Christian Leadership breakfast groups were meeting regularly in 31 foreign countries. England, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland represented the bulk of the initial growth of the group, but the ICCL made its presence felt in nations as varied as China, South Africa, and Canada, with isolated operations in localities such as Havana and Mexico City as well. Vereide recognized that the tensions of the Cold War could be exploited to win more converts to his cause.

The earthy Richardson had little use for Graham’s religion, but the two shared a common faith in free enterprise. “When Graham speaks of ‘the American way of life,’” an early biographer noted, “he has in mind the same combination of economic and political freedom that the National Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the Wall Street Journal do when they use the phrase.

He chided Democrats for wasting money on the welfare state at home and the Marshall Plan abroad. “The whole Western world is begging for more dollars,” he noted that fall, but “the barrel is almost empty. When it is empty—what then?” He insisted that the poor in other nations, like those in his own, needed no government assistance. “Their greatest need is not more money, food, or even medicine; it is Christ.

Graham led prayer meetings all over town, including daily sessions in the Pentagon auditorium. On Monday mornings, he held “Pastor’s Workshops” with local clergymen; on Tuesdays, there were luncheons at the Hotel Statler to discuss religion with “the men who have so much a part in shaping the destiny of the Capital of Western Civilization: the business men of Washington.

EISENHOWER SEEMED AN UNLIKELY CANDIDATE to lead the nation to spiritual reawakening. For decades he had remained distant from religion and could not even claim a specific denominational affiliation. His grandfather had been a minister for the River Brethren, an offshoot of the Mennonites, and his father maintained that faith.

While he lacked ties to any specific denomination, Eisenhower remained firmly committed to the Bible itself. Like his parents, he considered it an unparalleled resource. One of his aides during the Second World War remembered that Eisenhower could “quote Scripture by the yard,” using it to punctuate points made at staff meetings.

Graham’s spiritual support was surely influential in the general’s decision, as was the financial support Richardson promised. Once Eisenhower announced his intentions, the oilman put his vast fortune to work for him. Richardson’s direct contribution to the campaign was reportedly $1 million, but he also paid for roughly $200,000 in expenses at the Commodore Hotel in New York, where the general had established offices after returning home, and then covered most of his expenditures during the Republican National Convention in Chicago as well.

Eisenhower condemned a set of “evils which can ultimately throttle free government,” which he identified as labor unrest, runaway inflation, “excessive taxation,” and the “ceaseless expansion” of the federal government. These were commonplace conservative positions, but Eisenhower presented them in religious language that elevated them for his audience.

Faith and Freedom followed the lead of Graham and Vereide, claiming it would never endorse one party or the other. But it offered a “political checklist for Christians” that nudged readers rather strongly toward the Republicans.

He took more than 55% of the popular vote, with even more impressive margins in the Electoral College, where he won 442 to 89. Stevenson only managed to win nine states.

Reflecting on the election returns, Eisenhower resolved to put that mandate in the service of a national religious revival. He asked Graham to meet with him in the suite Sid Richardson had provided at the Commodore Hotel in New York, to discuss plans for his inauguration and beyond. “I think one of the reasons I was elected was to help lead this country spiritually,” the president-elect confided.

“These days I seem to have no trouble filling my calendar,” the president-elect told them. “But this is one engagement that I requested. I wanted to come and do my best to tell those people who are my friends, who are supporters of the idea that is represented in the foundation, how deeply I believe that they are serving America.” The basic idea of the Freedoms Foundation was that those who promoted “a better understanding of the American way of life” should be singled out for awards and attention, especially those who celebrated the central role played by “the American free enterprise system” in making the nation great. Fittingly, for an organization devoted to the promotion of big business, its president was Don Belding, head of a national advertising agency whose clients included Walt Disney and Howard Hughes. The board of directors, meanwhile, included leaders at General Foods, Maytag, Republic Steel, Sherwin Williams, Union Carbide and Carbon, and US Rubber, as well as individuals such as Sid Richardson and Mrs. J. Howard Pew. The corporate presence was so pronounced that one honoree sent his award back, grumbling that the Freedoms Foundation was “just another group promoting the propaganda of the National Association of Manufacturers.

More than any other individual, Senator Frank Carlson deserved credit for creating the National Prayer Breakfast. An outspoken opponent of the New Deal, he denounced Franklin Roosevelt as the “destroyer of human rights and freedom” for his administration’s interventions in the economy. He held Harry Truman in similar contempt. “Little Caesars walk the highways of our nation, trying to tell us what to wear, eat, plant, sow and reap,” Carlson complained in 1947.

As Eisenhower’s cabinet focused its attention on spiritual rewards yet to come, its members faced the danger that the press and the public might focus more on the earthly riches they had already amassed. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson had been the country’s highest-paid executive as president of General Motors, the world’s largest private corporation. Wilson’s initial refusal to divest his holdings in the corporation, which had nearly $5 billion worth of contracts with the same federal department he would now lead, had delayed his confirmation and tarnished his image. When asked whether his GM holdings would tempt him to favor his corporation over his nation, Wilson famously answered that he always thought “what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.” The auto tycoon eventually agreed to release his shares, but he was not the only top Defense Department official whose business associations gave the appearance of impropriety. Deputy Secretary Roger Kyes had been in charge of procurement for General Motors; Secretary of the Army Robert Ten Broeck Stevens’s family textile company made uniforms for that branch of the military; Secretary of the Air Force Harold Talbott had ties to both Chrysler and North American Aviation; and Secretary of the Navy Robert Anderson—put in the post at Sid Richardson’s recommendation—had previously managed a major facility for Associated Refineries.

Though he attracted a considerable deal of scrutiny, Wilson was by no means the only corporate titan in the Eisenhower cabinet. Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, for instance, had long served as president of the Mark A. Hanna Company of Cleveland, a sprawling conglomerate with interests in coal, oil, natural gas, iron, steel, copper, rayon, plastics, shipping, and banking. Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks, a New England financier and banker, was such a zealous advocate for business that Eisenhower privately worried that he “seems so completely conservative in his views that at times he seems to be illogical.” Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield ran one of the nation’s largest automobile agencies but also found success in real estate, oil, and insurance, while Hobby had made her fortune as a Texas newspaper publisher. Although not businessmen themselves, both Dulles and Brownell had close ties to the corporate world from their time at two of New York’s oldest law firms; Dulles had reportedly earned more in billings than any other corporate attorney in America.

Business leaders, of course, had long been working to “merchandise” themselves through the appropriation of religion. In organizations such as Spiritual Mobilization, the prayer breakfast groups, and the Freedoms Foundation, they had linked capitalism and Christianity and, at the same time, likened the welfare state to godless paganism.

After decades of work, these businessmen believed their efforts had finally paid off with the election of Dwight Eisenhower. Watching him enthusiastically embrace public faith, these supporters assumed that the national religious revival was largely a means to a more important end: the rollback of the New Deal state. But they soon realized that, for all his sympathies for and associations with business leaders, Eisenhower saw the religious revival itself as his essential domestic duty. To their amazement, once in office he gave relatively little thought to the political and economic causes that his backers had always seen as the real reason for that revival.

He refused to go further, especially when it came to the welfare state that his supporters had long worked to destroy. Despite his personal sympathies with their position, the president believed “the mass of the people” disagreed. “Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history,” he warned. “There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes you can do these things. Among them are H. L. Hunt . . . , a few other Texas oil millionaires, and an occasional politician or business man from other areas. Their number is negligible and they are stupid.

Even though Eisenhower’s rise to power had depended on support from “Texas oil millionaires” such as Sid Richardson, he refused to roll back the welfare state they despised. In fundamental ways, he ensured the longevity of the New Deal, giving a bipartisan stamp of approval to its continuation and significantly expanding its reach. Notably, Eisenhower pushed Congress to extend Social Security coverage to another ten million Americans and increase benefits as well. In his first term, the president repeatedly resisted calls from conservatives to cut education spending; in his second, he secured an additional $1 billion for the cause. On a much larger scale, Eisenhower established the single largest public works project in American history with the interstate highway system, but did little to bring down tax rates for the wealthy; the top bracket barely dipped, declining from 94% to 92% over the course of his two terms in office.

For conservatives who had assumed that the success of “under-God consciousness” during the Eisenhower administration would naturally lead to tangible reductions in the welfare state, his time in office was a disappointment.

The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) praised the president for the pious example he had set.

As with earlier drives to supplant the secular authority of the welfare state with the higher power of the Almighty, the Seven Divine Freedoms ultimately served an earthly purpose. Organizers made the political aims of the project explicit in their plans. “There is a growing realization that the enemies of freedom are not foreign powers,” observed R. L. Decker, the NAE’s executive director, “but that there are forces at work within the nation which are just as dangerous and more sinister than any foreign foe. These forces take advantage of the natural desires of the people for unity and security and material prosperity to propose panaceas for our social, economic, and political problems which, if accepted, would rob us of our freedom as effectively as defeat in warfare,” he continued.

The group would encourage public and private leaders to sign the “Statement of Seven Divine Freedoms” and thereby signify that the United States of America had been founded on the principles of the Holy Bible.  Eisenhower was the first to sign, in an Oval Office ceremony on July 2, 1953. “This is the kind of thing I like to do,” he said afterward. “This statement is simple and understandable, and sets forth the basic truth which is the foundation of our freedoms.” Nixon added his name next, as did members of the cabinet.

“By means of the radio, motion pictures, television, newspaper and periodical advertisements, signboards and posters, essay contests and amateur dramatics as well as community rallies, sermons and editorials,” Decker insisted, “this theme ‘Freedom is of God and we must have faith in him’ can constantly be dinned into the consciousness of America

The Judiciary Committee sat to consider a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States. If passed, it would have declared, “This Nation devoutly recognizes the authority and law of Jesus Christ, Saviour and Ruler of nations through whom are bestowed the blessings of Almighty God.”1 The campaign for this “Christian amendment” had been under way, in fits and starts, for nearly a century. Like most efforts to add religious elements to American political culture, the idea originated during the Civil War. In 1861, several northern ministers came to believe that the conflict was the result of the godlessness of the Constitution. “We are reaping the effects of its implied atheism,” they warned, and only a direct acknowledgment of Christ’s authority could correct such an “atheistic error in our prime conceptions of Government.

These clergymen banded together to create the National Reform Association, an organization that was single-mindedly dedicated to promoting the Christian amendment. It won the support of prominent governors, senators, judges, theologians, college presidents, and professors.

Advocates of the Christian amendment still faced an inherently difficult challenge in the Senate. By its very nature, their proposal to change the Constitution forced them to acknowledge that the religious invocation was something new for the document. The founding fathers had felt no need to acknowledge “the law and authority of Jesus Christ,” and neither had subsequent generations of American legislators. Some of the more imaginative advocates of the Christian amendment at the Senate hearings simply waved away this history and argued that leaders such as Washington and Lincoln had supported the idea even if they never acted upon it. For evidence, they repeatedly made reference in their testimony to letters and meetings in which these presidents allegedly had lent support to their cause. At the hearings, the presiding senator kindly offered to have these documents inserted into the official transcript once they were found. But the published record provided a quiet rebuke to such claims, noting that inquiries to the Library of Congress and other authoritative sources showed that the alleged documents did not, in fact, exist.

Disneyland’s dedication testified to how deeply piety and patriotism were intertwined in its creator’s worldview. Disney, a Congregationalist, relied on Christianity as a constant guide. His faith in his country was equally strong, though his political beliefs changed considerably over the course of his life. During the 1930s, he had been a strong supporter of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. His cartoons during the Depression helped establish the so-called “sentimental populism” of the era’s popular culture, always championing “little guys”—Mickey Mouse, the Three Little Pigs, the Seven Dwarves—in their struggles against stronger foes. But in the 1940s, Disney’s politics took a sharp turn to the right. In 1941, a bitter strike at his company led him to denounce “Communist agitation” in a full-page ad in Variety. The day after Pearl Harbor, Disney was stunned when the US Army abruptly commandeered his studio for seven months’ use as a supply base. During the war, the government never paid him for some propaganda shorts he made, and his overseas profits dwindled to a trickle. Disney emerged from the conflict a staunch conservative. He helped bring the House Un-American Activities Committee to Hollywood in October 1947 and, in his appearance as a friendly witness, condemned communist influence in labor unions, pointedly naming names. When fellow Congregationalist James Fifield organized the Committee to Proclaim Liberty a few years later, Disney readily signed on to support its “Freedom Under God” festivities.

In its conflation of piety and patriotism, Disneyland embodied larger currents in American popular culture during the postwar era. Political leaders and religious reformers led the way in fomenting the religious revival of the Eisenhower era, but their counterparts in Hollywood and on Madison Avenue proved to be indispensable allies. Prompted by both patriotism and an eye for profits, entertainers and advertisers did a great deal to promote public expressions of faith in the era. Prominent advertising agencies promoted religious observance as a vital part of American life and religion as an essential marker of the national character.

Like much of corporate America, the advertising industry discovered religion as a means of professional salvation in the aftermath of the Great Depression. The industry had fallen into turmoil when ad revenues plummeted along with corporate profits in the crash of the late 1920s and early 1930s. More ominously for advertising executives, the New Deal represented the first real efforts to regulate their work, as it empowered the Federal Trade Commission to fight false claims about food and drugs. As the nation prepared itself for the Second World War, further growth of the federal government seemed guaranteed. Thus, in November 1941, hundreds of ad executives gathered at a spa in Hot Springs, Virginia, to discuss the danger of “those who would do away with the American system of free enterprise” or who might “modify the economic system of which advertising is an integral part.

The Advertising Council classified its projects as acts of public service, but in truth they were acts of public relations, meant to sell the American people on the merits of free enterprise. In 1946, for instance, the council launched a campaign titled “Our American Heritage.” On the surface, it seemed wholly nonpartisan, simply intended to raise Americans’ awareness of their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Internally, though, organizers described it as a conservative-minded effort that would help Americans resist becoming “pawns of a master state.

The J. Walter Thompson Company (JWT), the largest advertising firm in the world, handled the practical work of the campaign. Its advertisements had a simple message for Americans: go to church. Copywriters drew on their conventional strategies, pitching religion as a path to personal improvement and self-satisfaction. “Find yourself through faith,” the campaign urged; “come to church this week.” Ads typically dramatized the concerns of a frantic father or an anxious housewife and then, in the same tones used to hawk antacid or mouthwash, promised that faith would cure their problems quickly.

Television and film followed the religious trend throughout the 1950s. Billy Graham’s Hour of Decision program was televised by three different networks, on some 850 stations, to an estimated audience of twenty million viewers.

The most lasting legacy of The Ten Commandments was its marketing campaign. As he prepared for the debut, DeMille worked with the Fraternal Order of Eagles on an ambitious plan to establish monuments of the Ten Commandments on public property across the nation. The organization had been distributing copies of the Ten Commandments for years, inspired by an incident in which Judge E. J. Ruegemer of St. Cloud, Minnesota, learned that a juvenile defendant in his courtroom had never heard of the laws and “sentenced” the boy to learn and obey them. Ruegemer, the head of the Eagles’ Youth Guidance Commission, persuaded the fraternal order to take up the cause. Members and their families volunteered to make reproductions of the Ten Commandments, initially manufacturing them as paper scrolls in St. Paul and framing them with hand-cut wood and glass. The nearly nine hundred thousand members of the organization popularized the venture, distributing scrolls far and wide. Recipients included city halls in small towns from Washington State to Pennsylvania, judges in Idaho and Massachusetts, and a police detective in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

When he learned of the Eagles’ campaign, DeMille immediately wanted to join in. A consummate showman, the director urged the Eagles to work on a grander scale. Instead of modest scrolls, he suggested the organization craft larger stone monuments that more closely resembled the tablets described in Exodus. Together, DeMille and the Eagles established Ten Commandments monuments across America.

Schwarz capitalized on his new influence in Congress to present himself as a leading authority on the problem of communism and the solution of Christianity. In 1957, he addressed a breakfast meeting of the Republican Club, where he so inspired attendees that they “immediately,” as one told Schwarz, took steps “to refer you to the House Un-American Activities Committee and to arrange a personal interview between you and an Assistant to the President of the United States.” He was soon summoned to testify before the committee’s staff on the topic “The Communist Mind.” In an interview that ran for an hour and twenty minutes, the doctor—who liked to compare himself to a pathologist in his new line of work—patiently led congressional aides through his diagnosis of the communist menace. Ultimately, he urged greater awareness of “the basic foundations of American civilization” as the only cure.

Improbably, Schwarz’s congressional testimony quickly became a cause célèbre. The first transcripts were rapidly distributed, forcing Congress to print another 50,000 copies the following year. Executives at the Allen-Bradley Company, an electronics corporation in Milwaukee, published large portions of the interview as a special double-page advertisement in the largest metropolitan newspapers. “WILL YOU BE FREE TO CELEBRATE CHRISTMAS IN THE FUTURE?” the headline blared. “NOT UNLESS: You and other free Americans begin to understand and appreciate the benefits provided by God under the American free enterprise system.” The ad urged Americans to read Schwarz’s words and share them with friends. Much like the other corporations who sponsored like-minded messages, the Allen-Bradley Company insisted it had nothing to gain. “With this advertisement,” the sponsor noted, “this company is trying to sell you nothing except the importance of holding fast to your American freedoms including the freedom to live, the freedom to worship your God, and the freedom to work as you choose.” Republican senator Barry Goldwater, meanwhile, wrote Schwarz soon repackaged his testimony as a best-selling book, You Can Trust the Communists ( . . . To Do Exactly as They Say). Released in 1960, it quickly sold a million copies.  While Schwarz successfully spread his message in print, his energies were more devoted to a whirlwind tour of personal appearances.

In 1958, the CACC launched its first School of Anti-Communism. For $5 a day—or $20 for the week—participants were treated to a slate of anticommunist films, lectures, and discussions in a packed schedule that ran from 8:30 a.m. to 9:45 p.m.  The first School of Anti-Communism was held in St. Louis, but they soon spread to cities around the nation including Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, Miami, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland.

While the school made an impression on the public, it also impacted the finances of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. The accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst reported that the organization raked in $311,253 for the week, an impressive sum in light of the low admission fees. Even after expenses, the CACC still turned nearly $250,000 in profits. Schwarz promised the proceeds would be used to operate similar schools across the country. But in the short term, he decided to capitalize on the overwhelming local popularity of the Southern California school of by staging a sequel two months later, billed as “Hollywood’s Answer to Communism.” Organizers worked diligently to surpass the success of the first event. Frawley again led the way, this time securing the landmark Hollywood Bowl for the rally. As master of ceremonies, he enlisted the former song-and-dance man and future US senator George Murphy.  The actors made a curtain call as well, with Reagan, Wayne, Boone, Rogers, and Evans all on hand again. This time, though, they were joined by a cast of all-stars that included Jimmy Stewart, Rock Hudson, Robert Stack, Donna Reed, Ozzie and Harriet Nelson, Nat “King” Cole, Jane Russell, Edgar Bergen, Andy Devine, Walter Brennan, Tex Ritter, Irene Dunne, Vincent Price, Cesar Romero, and a host of others then starring on television and in film. Notable directors such as John Ford and studio executives such as Walt Disney and Jack Warner offered their support too.

“When I finally spoke,” Schwarz remembered, “only ten minutes remained, so I delivered an uncharacteristically brief message. It was sufficiently forceful to earn me a comparison to Adolf Hitler in the student newspaper of Stanford University.” The highlight of the Hollywood Bowl event, however, was a special appearance by C. D. Jackson, the publisher of Life magazine. After the Southern California school, his publication ran a two-paragraph item that dismissed the event as a gathering of wild-eyed extremists no different from the John Birch Society. Privately, Schwarz knew well that the two far-right groups often shared a common constituency. In a nine-page, single-spaced letter, Birch Society founder Robert Welch informed him in the fall of 1960 that “we have told our members to encourage, support, and work for your ‘schools’ wherever they were put on, so far as they had the opportunity and ability to do so; and to encourage the attendance of friends and acquaintances (as well as attending themselves).” In some instances, Birchers had taken an even more prominent role in the CACC schools. “I know,” Welch wrote, “that at your recent school in San Diego, some of the people who worked hardest to bring it off successfully were our members, for I saw right on the listing of committees and workers the names of some of our members who had specifically written to ask us whether or not they should participate, and whom we encouraged to do so.” Likewise, “quite a number of the leaders and hardest workers” in the Milwaukee and Chicago schools had been Birchers too.

Publicly Schwarz bristled at any suggestion that his organization had anything in common with the increasingly marginalized Birchers. In retaliation for the hit piece in Life, CACC’s sponsors lashed out. An FBI report noted that Frawley “at once cancelled $80,000 ‘Life’ advertising accounts for Schick Razor and Technicolor.” At the same time, “Richfield and other large national advertisers also withdrew substantial contracts calculated to total half million dollars.” (The sponsors went after less prominent critics with equal zeal. In September 1961, an executive with Richfield Oil sent the head of the Los Angeles FBI office the names and addresses of a dozen private citizens who had written the corporation to complain about its sponsorship of the school, suggesting that they needed to be formally investigated.) Meanwhile, conservative activists organized a grassroots campaign calling for individuals to cancel their subscriptions.

He sat down to write the Engel decision 15 years later, Black was determined to defend the wall of separation between Church and State. Religious liberty was essential, he told his wife, because “when one religion gets predominance, they immediately try to suppress the others.” History was littered with evidence of the dangers that inevitably followed when church and state merged. “People had been tortured, their ears lopped off, and sometimes their tongues cut or their eyes gouged out,” Black continued, “all in the name of religion.” To illustrate that point, the justice crafted a rigorously researched opinion. He began with the Book of Common Prayer and then reread John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, a classic Christian allegory written by a Baptist author who had been imprisoned for defying the Church of England. That was merely the beginning. “The Judge had religious references on his fingertips,” marveled one of his clerks, who ran back and forth to the library to collect them. As he wrote and rewrote the opinion, Black piled on more history each time. Lower courts had repeatedly made unsubstantiated claims about the nation’s “religious heritage” to support the defendants in Engel, but Black was determined to expose their errors with a meticulously researched rebuttal. By the sixth draft, the bulk of his opinion had become a lengthy narrative about the tangled history of church-state relations in the entire Anglo-American world from the 16th to 18th centuries. “It is a matter of history,” he insisted, “that this very practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America.” Based on their “bitter personal experience,” Black wrote, the founders crafted the First Amendment to keep the state out of religion and religion out of the state.

In Black’s view, religion certainly deserved a place of prominence in American life, but the state could not dictate it. “It is no part of the business of government,” he read, “to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by the government.   “The prayer of each man from his soul must be his and his alone,” he said. “If there is anything clear in the First Amendment, it is that the right of the people to pray in their own way is not to be controlled by the election returns.

The outraged reaction to the Engel decision was, in large part, driven by alarmist coverage in the press. The court’s majority had gone to great lengths to note that their ruling merely struck down the Regents’ Prayer and, moreover, did so only because of the unique role that New York State officials played in its composition and implementation, but newspapers lost the nuances. “God Banned from the State,” ran a typically hyperbolic headline. Hostile editorials only compounded the problem. The New York Daily News, for instance, lambasted the “atheistic, agnostic, or what-have-you Supreme Court majority,” while the Los Angeles Times complained they made “a burlesque show” of the First Amendment. Publisher William Randolph Hearst Jr. went so far as to call for a complete rewriting of the First Amendment in a signed editorial that ran in all his papers. The media’s misrepresentations were so widespread that the Columbia Journalism Review devoted its fall issue to figuring out just how and why it had all gone so spectacularly wrong.

For a year and a half, Kennedy managed to avoid issues of church and state. But now the Warren Court had forced his hand. In a press conference two days after the decision, Kennedy finally addressed it. In measured remarks, he cautioned Americans to approach the issue calmly. Noting that it was important to “support the Supreme Court’s decisions even when we may not agree with them,” the president reminded Americans that “we have in this case a very easy remedy, and that is to pray ourselves, and I would think that it would be a welcome reminder to every American family that we can pray a good deal more at home, we can attend our churches with a good deal more fidelity, and we can make the true meaning of prayer much more important in the lives of all our children.” As Kennedy called for calm, however, a few of his predecessors fueled the fires. Herbert Hoover denounced Engel as a “disintegration of a sacred American heritage,” while Eisenhower asserted that he “always thought this nation was an essentially religious one.” Truman pointed out that it was actually the Court’s duty to interpret the Constitution, but he was largely ignored.

Congressional leaders only ramped up their rhetoric. The ruling, Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia thundered, was “an outrageous edict” and “a blow to all believers in a Supreme Being.” His colleagues in the Senate largely agreed. Barry Goldwater of Arizona denounced the decision as a “blow to our spiritual strength,” while James Eastland of Mississippi likewise called it as a major step toward “the destruction of the religious and spiritual life of this country.

Winegarner’s role in the debate was short-lived. In May 1964, columnists Roland Evans and Robert Novak revealed that the Citizens Congressional Committee was “operated, financed, and directed by Gerald L. K. Smith, notorious promoter of right-wing causes,” and that Winegarner was Smith’s nephew. A onetime ally of Senator Huey Long and an outspoken anti-Semite, Smith had made no secret of his involvement, bragging that the committee was “an auxiliary, financed and directed by The Cross and the Flag,” the far-right publication of his Christian Nationalist Crusade. In its pages, Smith attacked the “cabal of international Jews” in the Kennedy administration and the “nine-man oligarchy” they manipulated on the Supreme Court, before telling readers there was hope. With its “mammoth petition,” the Citizens Congressional Committee had demanded the restoration of “the right of Christian devotions in public schools.

While exposure of the committee’s extremist roots was embarrassing to the larger cause, it was not surprising. Indeed, the campaign for a constitutional amendment to restore prayer to public schools had quickly attracted activists on the far right. Billy James Hargis of the archconservative Christian Crusade devoted himself to circulating petitions across the West, while Carl McIntire, a fundamentalist broadcaster with an affinity for far-right politics, lobbied for it over his own network of 582 radio stations. The John Birch Society supported the amendment idea as part of its long-standing drive to impeach Earl Warren and generally discredit the Supreme Court. Similarly, segregationists who criticized the Court’s rulings on civil rights latched on to the school prayer issue as a more popular and palatable way to condemn it again.

The visibility of such supporters led some to dismiss the constitutional prayer amendment as a cause championed only by the far right or the Deep South, but in truth it had much broader backing. At the 1962 Governors’ Conference, the leaders of forty-nine states called for a prayer amendment that “will make clear and beyond challenge the acknowledgment of our nation and people of their faith in God”; a year later, they renewed their call unanimously. The governors weren’t alone. The Supreme Court’s rulings against school prayer and Bible reading were deeply unpopular across the nation, and a solid majority of Americans seized on the amendment idea as a solution. In August 1963, shortly after the Schempp decision, Gallup asked Americans if they wanted prayer and Bible reading in public schools; 70 percent said yes. They flooded their political representatives with mail, with one study estimating that 50 percent of all correspondence to Congress in the 1963–1964 term focused on the proposal for a school prayer amendment. These letters, postcards, and petitions overwhelmingly supported the idea, with officials citing a margin of nearly twenty to one in favor. Congress leapt into action. Between the summer of 1962 and spring of 1964, 113 representatives and 27 senators introduced 146 different amendments to restore prayer and Bible reading to public schools.5 With such overwhelming popular and political support, the “prayer amendment” seemed sure to sail through Congress and be ratified by the states with equal speed.

Though the two camps in this battle were far from homogeneous, each clustered around a set of convictions. To put it in broad strokes, proponents of the prayer amendment believed America was a Christian nation—or, in their more generous moments, a Judeo-Christian nation. They were deeply invested in promoting a prominent role for religion in public life, believing that formal recognition of God was not simply an affirmation of the nation’s religious roots but an essential measure for preserving the country’s character. In their eyes, liberty came directly from God. If Americans ever came to believe that their rights stemmed from the state instead, then those rights could just as easily be taken away by the state. Thus, the debate for the pro-amendment side was about much more than school prayer; it was about the survival of the nation.

For opponents of the amendment, the stakes were just as high. Legal and religious authorities who opposed the idea warned that a school prayer amendment would radically reshape the status quo, effectively weakening the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious freedom. Under a new “tyranny of the majority,” they believed, local religious minorities would be persecuted. But more than that, all faiths would be endangered. If the state intruded on churches’ and synagogues’ roles as religious educators, it would usurp not just their activities but also their authority. In their place, the state would foster a broader but blander public religion, one drained of the vital details that animated individual faiths. The prayer amendment, the heads of major denominations concluded, would ultimately hurt religion rather than help it.

While Celler’s delaying tactics enraged supporters of the Becker Amendment, they proved crucial in giving opponents time to mobilize. Most civil libertarians and religious organizations had assumed the campaign for a constitutional amendment would go nowhere, but as momentum shifted in Becker’s direction they realized, almost too late, what was happening. In March, ACLU headquarters sent its affiliates warnings that the discharge petition drive was “becoming alarming.” They scrambled to find allies. The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, the political voice of the eight largest Baptist bodies in the nation, soon announced its opposition, claiming the Becker Amendment threatened their religious liberty. A week later, the American Jewish Committee denounced it as “the most serious challenge to the integrity of the Bill of Rights in American history.” On St. Patrick’s Day, representatives of Protestant and Jewish organizations and civil liberties groups gathered at a hastily arranged meeting in New York. Sizing up the situation, they realized the Becker Amendment had “an excellent chance” of winning a majority of votes from the Judiciary Committee. If that happened, the full House and Senate would invariably vote for it.

Reverend Eugene Carson Blake of the United Presbyterian Church worried that “school prayer and Bible reading either become a ritual that is meaningless and has no effect on the children, or it is some kind of indoctrination.” Either way, it amounted to “state religion,” he warned. “If you get the idea that religion and Americanism are the same thing, all of us are scared to death, because we think religion transcends the State.

“The politician who says he believes in reducing the scope of Government and then asks for a Government role in nurturing and guiding the inner man can expect scrutinizing conversations as these issues are pursued by our people in future debate.

“It is so easy to think that one is voting for prayer and the Bible,” cautioned the Christian Science Monitor. “It comes as a shock that this is not the issue. The issue is that agencies of government cannot avoid favoring one denomination and hurting another by the practical decisions that have to be made by government authority on what version of the Bible shall be imposed and what prayer. The churches know this and that is why they are against the Becker Amendment.

The prolonged fight over the amendment marked not the end of a struggle but the beginning. The House hearings revealed how fault lines across the country were shifting on the issue of separation of church and state. Clerical leaders had taken stands that were largely in line with their denominations’ traditional perspectives on the matter, but conservative laymen recoiled from their arguments. They felt bewildered—and, in many instances, betrayed—by their leaders’ objections to seemingly wholesome traditions such as school prayer and Bible reading. Their faiths’ traditional stances on issues of church-state separation had always seemed academic. In the wake of Becker’s failure, conservative laymen began to doubt the authority of their religious representatives and look for new leaders to replace them.

Dirksen refused to accept defeat. “This crusade will continue,” he announced. “The next time, we will be better organized throughout the country.” In a telephone call the night before the vote, he had been assured by Dr. Daniel Poling, the eighty-one-year-old fundamentalist and former editor of the Christian Herald, that a new grassroots organization would rise up to champion the cause of school prayer. Its leaders would be Poling, Billy Graham, and a “Catholic prelate” to be named later. That specific organization never came to pass, but the proposal was prescient. For too long, religious conservatives believed that their voice in political matters—especially when it came to the role of religion in public life—had been drowned out by the more liberal leaders of their denominations. If conservative Christians at the grassroots would simply organize themselves according to their politics rather than their particular denominations, they could end the reign of the religious establishment. If effective leaders could bridge the long-standing gaps between different faiths—and bring together, as Poling proposed, conservative Catholics with fundamentalist and evangelical Protestants—then laypeople would finally have their say.

When he tried to explain his razor-thin loss in the 1960 presidential race, Nixon often singled out a last-minute decision by Life publisher Henry Luce to scrap an article in which Graham had given him a strong endorsement. Both Nixon and Graham believed the article would have made the difference.

Eight years later, they were determined not to repeat that mistake. Echoing his earlier service to Eisenhower, Graham proved pivotal both in Nixon’s decision to run and in his performance on the campaign trail. “You are the best prepared man in the United States to be president,” Graham reportedly told him in January 1968. “I think it is your destiny to be president.” Unlike his coy approach in 1952, this time he made no secret of his support. At a Billy Graham crusade in Portland, Oregon, he introduced Nixon’s daughters to the crowd and announced that “there is no American I admire more than Richard Nixon.” At the Republican National Convention in Miami in August, Graham provided a prayer after Nixon’s acceptance speech and then participated in top-level discussions about potential running mates. In September, Nixon took a place of honor next to Graham on stage at another crusade in Pittsburgh, where the preacher told the worshipers and those watching at home that his long friendship with Nixon had been “one of the most moving religious experiences of my life.” Shortly before the election, Graham informed the press that he had already cast an absentee ballot for Nixon, a fact that was repeated in Republican television ads right up to election day.

Graham’s influence in the Nixon White House was profound. His words and deeds helped make piety and patriotism seem the sole property of the right.

“Every president in American history had invoked the name and blessings of God during his inauguration address, and many . . . had made some notable public display of their putative piety,” religious scholar William Martin observed, “but none ever made such a conscious, calculating use of religion as a political instrument as did Richard Nixon.” Not even Eisenhower came close. While his purposely bland public religion had helped unite Americans around a seemingly nonpartisan cause, the starkly conservative brand of faith and politics advanced by Nixon and Graham only drove them apart.

“Even in this period when religion is not supposed to be fashionable, when agnosticism and skepticism seem to be on the upturn,” he reflected, “most of the people seem to be saying ‘We are praying for you, Mr. President, and for the country.’” He appeared sincere, but later, when an aide praised his performance, Nixon laughed it off. He’d simply fed the crowd some “church stuff” to keep them happy.

Behind the scenes, however, the ulterior motives were clear. “Sure, we used the prayer breakfasts and church services and all that for political ends,” Nixon aide Charles Colson later admitted. “One of my jobs in the White House was to romance religious leaders. We would bring them into the White House and they would be dazzled by the aura of the Oval Office, and I found them to be about the most pliable of any of the special interest groups that we worked with.” The East Room church services were crucial to his work. “We turned those events into wonderful quasi-social, quasi-spiritual, quasi-political events, and brought in a whole host of religious leaders to [hold] worship services for the president and his family—and three hundred guests carefully selected by me for political purposes.

Well versed in the public relations value of public piety, Haldeman exploited the services to their full potential. At his suggestion, for instance, the supposedly private programs were broadcast over the radio, with print reporters, photographers, and TV cameramen on hand to record the spectacle for wider distribution.

Other officiants were even more direct in blessing the president. In June 1969, Rabbi Louis Finkelstein, chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, concluded his sermon with a bold prophecy. “I hope it is not too presumptuous of me, in the presence of the President,” he noted, “to say that future historians, looking back at our generation, may say that in a period of great trials and tribulations the finger of God pointed to Richard Milhous Nixon, giving him the vision and the wisdom to save the world and civilization.

Such comments were no accident. The White House staff went to great lengths to ensure that clergymen invited to the East Room were conservatives connected to a major political constituency. In recommending Archbishop Joseph Bernardin of Cincinnati as officiant for a service before St. Patrick’s Day, a cover memo noted bluntly that “Bernardin was selected because he is the most prominent Catholic of Irish extraction and a strong supporter of the President. We have verified this.” Harry Dent, a former aide to Strom Thurmond who directed the administration’s “southern strategy,” likewise forwarded a list of “some good conservative Protestant Southern Baptists” who could be trusted to preach a message that pleased the president.

Political concerns also dictated who attended each service. Low-level members of the White House staff, such as switchboard operators or limousine drivers, were occasionally invited, to support the illusion that these were private affairs for the larger White House “family,” but internal policies instructed that no more than a quarter of the attendees should be “non-VIPs.” Instead, the congregation was composed of prominent members of the White House and its supporters, so much so that the New York Times joked: “The administration that prays together, stays together.” Invitations usually went to the administration’s allies in Congress, but occasionally they were used to lobby more independent members about particular bills.

With the bulk of the seats reserved for administration officials and congressmen they might sway, the remaining few were precious political commodities. Potential campaign donors were always given preference. An early “action memo” to Colson ordered him to follow up on the “President’s request that you develop a list of rich people with strong religious interest to be invited to the White House church services.” At this, Colson had quick success. The guests for an ensuing East Room service, for instance, included the heads of AT&T, Bechtel, Chrysler, Continental Can, General Electric, General Motors, Goodyear, PepsiCo, Republic Steel, and other leading corporations.

As the political purpose of the White House church services became obvious, criticism from the press increased. Originally, Nixon thought it would be “very useful” to win the media’s approval for the new tradition and decided to invite several prominent reporters, pundits, newspaper publishers, and network presidents to a service early in his administration. Guests included CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite and newspaper publisher Samuel I. Newhouse, as well as prominent reporters from major dailies. For his sermon to the press, Reverend Louis H. Evans Jr. dwelled on the dangers of passing judgment without having the full facts at hand. “Can we be accepted for what we truly are, can we accept others for what they are,” Evans asked, “or will they cling to stereotypes, to distorted priori portraits?” Such blunt entreaties did not, of course, keep the press from passing judgment. In July 1969, the Washington Post challenged the sincerity of this “White House Religion.” “Unfortunately, the way religion is being conducted these days—amid hand-picked politicians, reporters, cameras, guest-lists, staff spokesmen—has not only stirred needless controversy, but invited, rightly or not, the suspicion that religion has somehow become entangled (again needlessly) with politics,” the editors chided. “Kings, monarchs, and anyone else brash enough to try this have always sought to cajole, seduce or invite the clergy to support official policy—not necessarily by having them personally bless that policy, but by having the clergy on hand in a smiling and prominent way.” In the end, the Post gently suggested it might be best “to avoid using the White House as a church.

Religious leaders began to denounce the East Room church services as well. Reinhold Niebuhr, once an outspoken critic of Spiritual Mobilization, now targeted its apparent heirs. For an August 1969 issue of Christianity and Crisis, the seventy-seven-year-old theologian penned a scathing critique titled “The King’s Chapel and the King’s Court.” The founding fathers had expressly prohibited establishment of a national religion, he wrote, because they knew from experience that “a combination of religious sanctity and political power represents a heady mixture for status quo conservatism.” In creating a “kind of sanctuary” in the East Room, Nixon committed the very sin the founders had sought to avoid. “By a curious combination of innocence and guile, he has circumvented the Bill of Rights’ first article,” Niebuhr charged. “Thus he has established a conforming religion by semi-officially inviting representatives of all the disestablished religions, of whose moral criticism we were [once] naturally so proud.” The “Nixon-Graham doctrine of the relation of religion to public morality and policy” neutered the critical functions of independent religion, he warned. “It is wonderful what a simple White House invitation will do to dull the critical faculties, thereby confirming the fears of the Founding Fathers.

“I call upon Americans to bend low before God and go to their knees as Washington and Lincoln called us to our knees many years ago,” he implored. “I submit that we can best honor America by rededicating ourselves to God and the American dream.” A return to religion, Graham argued, would bind the wounds of the nation and “stop this polarization before it is too late.” As Graham looked out from the Lincoln Memorial, though, it seemed it might already be too late. The crowd before him welcomed his message, but they had become increasingly distracted by a smaller contingent of radicals arrayed behind them. Roughly a thousand sprawled in the shadows of the Washington Monument, smoking red-white-and-blue joints and waving Vietcong flags. Though Graham had hoped to win them over, they still viewed him and his supporters with suspicion. (Speaking with a reporter, a young man with long brown hair and a drooping mustache referred to Graham’s clean-cut crowd as “the Americans.”) As the service went on, a few hundred radicals, some completely nude, waded waist deep into the reflecting pool and launched into antiwar chants.

When mounted policemen finally intervened to keep the hecklers at bay, the conservative crowd cheered them on. “Push ’em back,” yelled a man in yellow Bermuda shorts. “They can use a bath!” “They ought to be clubbed,” said a bald man in a striped shirt. An angry housewife upped the ante: “I hope they break a few necks, that’s what I hope.

As the speakers descended the steps, they joined the crowd in a procession down Constitution Avenue. US servicemen and Boy Scouts led the way with the American flag and the flags of states and territories. Hippies stood on the sidelines chanting “One, two, three, four! We don’t want your fucking war!

Once in office, Reagan helped deepen the sacralization of the state. “I am told that tens of thousands of prayer meetings are being held on this day; for that I am deeply grateful,” he said in his first inaugural address. “We are a nation under God, and I believe God intended for us to be free.

[ And that’s just some of what this book has to say – find out about Nixon, Reagan, and what’s happened since by reading the book ]

References

  • Aleklett, K., et al. 2012. Peeking at peak oil. Berlin: Springer.
  • Hook, M., et al. 2009. Giant oil field decline rates and their influence on world oil production. Energy Policy 37(6):2262–2272.
  • Friedemann, A. 2016. Limits to Growth? 2016 United Nations report provides best evidence yet. www.energyskeptic.com
  • Friedemann, A. 2015. When trucks stop running, Energy and the Future of Transportation. Springer.
  • Friedemann A (2021) Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy. Springer
  • Kerr, R. 2011. Peak oil production may already be here. Science 331:1510–11.
  • Montgomery, D.R. 2007. Dirt: the erosion of civilizations. California: University of California Press.
  • Murray, J., et al. 2012. Oil’s tipping point has passed. Nature 481:43–4.
  • Newby, J. 2011. Oil Crunch (Fatih Birol). Catalyst. ABC TV.
  • IEA. 2010. World energy outlook 2010, 116. International Energy Agency.
  • Smil, V. 2010. Prime Movers of Globalization: The History and Impact of Diesel Engines and Gas Turbines. MIT press.
  • Solomon, L. May 2, 2008. Author Rex Weyler on sorting myth from history, and why we need both. TheTyee.ca
  • Zittel, W, et al. 2013. Fossil and nuclear fuels. Energy Watch Group.

P.S. My favorite books about how corporations manipulate government are “Republic, Lost” and Dark Money

Posted in Corruption, Corruption & Finance, Distribution of Wealth, Religion | Tagged , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Green New Deal is not a solution for the real problem: Overshoot

Preface.  Seibert & Rees’ paper is very important.  And also well-written, unlike the usual scientific jargon perfect for putting you to sleep at night.  It’s short too. In just 13 pages Siebert and Rees cover the most important issues we face and the real solutions for them, as well as explaining why the Green New Deal is a fantasy and the reasons “renewables” can’t possibly help solve our actual problem: overshoot.  I started to highlight sections I liked but gave up, it’s all good, all worth highlighting.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity, Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Seibert MK, Rees WE (2021) Through the Eye of a Needle: An Eco-Heterodox Perspective on the Renewable Energy Transition. Energies.

https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/14/15/4508/htm

Abstract

We add to the emerging body of literature highlighting cracks in the foundation of the mainstream energy transition narrative. We offer a tripartite analysis that re-characterizes the climate crisis within its broader context of ecological overshoot, highlights numerous collectively fatal problems with so-called renewable energy technologies, and suggests alternative solutions that entail a contraction of the human enterprise. This analysis makes clear that the pat notion of “affordable clean energy” views the world through a narrow keyhole that is blind to innumerable economic, ecological, and social costs. These undesirable “externalities” can no longer be ignored. To achieve sustainability and salvage civilization, society must embark on a planned, cooperative descent from an extreme state of overshoot in just a decade or two. While it might be easier for the proverbial camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for global society to succeed in this endeavor, history is replete with stellar achievements that have arisen only from a dogged pursuit of the seemingly impossible.

  1. Introduction

We begin with a reminder that humans are storytellers by nature. We socially construct complex sets of facts, beliefs, and values that guide how we operate in the world. Indeed, humans act out of their socially constructed narratives as if they were real. All political ideologies, religious doctrines, economic paradigms, cultural narratives—even scientific theories—are socially constructed “stories” that may or may not accurately reflect any aspect of reality they purport to represent. Once a particular construct has taken hold, its adherents are likely to treat it more seriously than opposing evidence from an alternate conceptual framework.

The Green New Deal (GND) is the dominant aspirational pathway in the mainstream narrative for achieving socially just ecological sustainability. Its central message is that a smooth transition away from climate-hostile fossil fuels is a relatively simple technological matter. Not only do proponents claim that electrification of all energy consumption by means of high-tech wind turbines and solar photovoltaic (PV) panels is technically possible, but that such a vast and unprecedented replacement of society’s entrenched energy foundation is both financially feasible and carries the added benefit of creating thousands of “green” jobs [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. The only missing ingredient, we are told, is political will. Energy transition plans produced by numerous academic institutions and researchers around the world support or conform obediently to the GND paradigm, and politicians everywhere have taken up the GND banner as the core of their environmental pledges.

We argue that while the GND narrative is highly seductive, it is little more than a disastrous shared illusion. Not only is the GND technically flawed, but it fails to recognize human ecological dysfunction as the overall driver of incipient global systemic collapse. By viewing climate change, rather than ecological overshoot—of which climate change is merely a symptom—as the central problem, the GND and its variants grasp in vain for techno-industrial solutions to problems caused by techno-industrial society. Such a self-referencing pursuit is doomed to fail. As Albert Einstein allegedly said, “we cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them”. We need an entirely new narrative for a successful energy transition. Only by abandoning the flawed paradigmatic source of our ecological dilemma can we formulate realistic pathways for averting social–ecological collapse.

  1. Climate Change in the Context of Overshoot

Long-standing calls from ecologists and informed environmentalists for society to adopt a systems perspective and employ a multi-disciplinary approach to anthropogenic climate change have largely fallen on deaf ears. Most people have succumbed to the mechanistic–reductionist paradigm that has dominated Cartesian science, as is evident by the isolation of climate from its broader ecological context and its treatment as a discrete, independent variable. The reality is that climate change is only one symptom of systems destabilization as the human enterprise has come to overwhelm the ecosphere.

To recalibrate our focal lens, consider the following accelerating changes. The population of H. sapiens is nearly eight times larger than it was at the beginning of the fossil-fueled Industrial Age a mere 200 years ago, and it has been growing nearly 20 times faster [8]. To accommodate the explosion of humanity, over half the land surface of Earth has been substantially modified, particularly for agriculture (that most ecologically destructive of technologies). One consequence of this is the competitive displacement of non-human species from their habitats and food sources. Prior to the dawn of agriculture eight to ten millennia ago, humans accounted for less than 1%, and wild mammals 99%, of mammalian biomass on Earth. Today, H. sapiens constitute 36%, and our domestic livestock another 60%, of a much-expanded mammalian biomass, compared with only 4% for all wild species combined [9,10,11]. McRae et al. [12] estimate that the populations of non-human vertebrate species declined by 58% between 1970 and 2012 alone. Freshwater, marine, and terrestrial vertebrate populations declined by 81%, 36%, and 38%, respectively, and invertebrate populations fell by about 50%.

While fossil fuels (FFs)—coal and later oil and natural gas—have been humanity’s major source of energy over the past two centuries, 50% of all FFs ever burned have been consumed in just the past 30 years (as much as 90% since the early 1940s) as super-exponential growth has taken hold [13,14]. It should be no surprise, therefore, that carbon dioxide emissions—the major material by-product of FF combustion and principal anthropogenic driver of climate change—have long exceeded photosynthetic uptake by green plants. By 1997 (when annual consumption was 40% less than in 2021), humanity was already burning FFs containing about 422 times the net amount of carbon fixed by photosynthesis globally each year [15]. Between 1800 and 2021, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations increased by 48%, from 280 ppm to approximately 415 ppm.

These data show that plunging biodiversity and climate change, along with air/land/ocean pollution, deforestation, desertification, incipient resources scarcity, etc., are the inevitable consequences—indeed, parallel symptoms—of the same root phenomenon: the spectacular and continuing growth of the human enterprise on a finite planet. H. sapiens is in overshoot, exploiting ecosystems beyond their regenerative and assimilative capacities.

Overshoot is possible only because of: (a) the short-term availability of prodigious stocks of both renewable (fish, forest, soil, etc.) and non-renewable (coal, oil, natural gas, etc.) forms of so-called “natural capital”; and (b) the enormous, but finite, natural waste assimilation and recycling processes of the ecosphere. However, a reckoning is at hand. In just a few decades of geometric population and economic growth, humans have exploited (often to collapse) natural capital stocks that took millennia to accumulate and have impeded natural life-support processes through excessive, often toxic, waste discharges. The human enterprise now uses the bio-productive and assimilative capacities of 1.75 Earth equivalents [16]. In simple terms, the industrial world’s ecological predicament is the result of too many people consuming too much and over-polluting the ecosphere.

Clearly, the climate crisis cannot be solved in isolation from the macro-problem of overshoot—certainly not by using technologies that are reliant on the same FFs and ecologically destructive processes that created the problem in the first place.

  1. Problems with So-Called Renewables

Here, we holistically examine renewable energy (RE), focusing on the widely overlooked limitations of the RE technologies commonly set forth as solutions (but that do not constitute all possible RE options). This examination shows that RE cannot deliver the same quantity and quality of energy as FFs, that the espoused technologies are not renewable, that their production—from mining to installation—is fossil-energy-intensive, and that producing them—particularly mining their metals and discarding their waste—entails egregious social injustices and significant ecological degradation.

The challenge before us is to identify which RE technologies are both sustainable and viable. Sustainability implies the ability to persist in perpetuity with minimal negative environmental impacts (i.e., within ecological limits). Viability entails basic, practical issues for production and implementation (e.g., is it possible to build and implement the RE technology without FF inputs? Can it be done on a climate-relevant schedule? Is it affordable?). Within this context, such pat slogans as “100% clean energy” and “net zero emissions” must be discarded. Every energy-producing technology—no matter how rudimentary or advanced—uses inputs from the environment and produces pollution or other ecological degradation over its life cycle. Trade-offs must be assessed. Just because raw sunlight and wind are “clean” and continuous energy flows does not mean that harnessing them to perform work is. While we inevitably face a future underpinned entirely by RE, the question is not how to meet current total demand, but rather to determine: (a) which RE technologies are actually sustainable and viable; (b) the contexts in which they might be so, including the priority uses to which they might be applied; and (c) how to effectively and fairly reduce energy demand.

GND proponents are appallingly tolerant of the inexplicable. They fail to address how the gigatons of already severely depleted metals and minerals essential to building so-called RE technologies will be available in perpetuity considering typical five to 30-year life spans and the need for continuous replacement [17,18,19]. They offer no viable workarounds for the ecological damage and deplorable working conditions, often in the Global South, involved in metal ore extraction [20,21]. Green New Dealers advance no viable solutions (technical or financial) for electrifying the many high-heat-intensive manufacturing processes involved in constructing high-tech wind turbines and solar panels (not to mention all other products in modern society) [22,23,24,25]. The waste streams generated by so-called renewables at the end of their short working lives are either ignored or assumed away, to be dealt with eventually by yet non-existent recycling processes [26,27,28]. Proposals for electrifying the 80% of non-electrical energy demand overlook crucial facts, namely that the national-scale transmission systems and grids required for electrified land transportation do not even exist today, nor is the needed build-out likely given material, energy, and financial constraints [29].

Finally, as emphasized previously, the quest for a magical source of free energy ignores the overriding overshoot crisis—which, paradoxically, was enabled by abundant, cheap fossil energy. We argue that the only viable response to overshoot is a managed contraction of the human enterprise until we arrive within the safely stable territory defined by ecological limits. This will entail many fewer people consuming far less energy and material resources than at present.

Obviously, a managed descent will require a paradigmatic shift in society’s socially constructed values, beliefs, and assumptions. At a minimum, we must replace our unrelenting anthropocentricism and strictly instrumental approach to Nature with a more holistic, eco-centric perspective. People must come to acknowledge both their utter dependence on the integrity of the ecosphere and the intrinsic worth of other species and natural ecosystems. This means overcoming capitalism’s addiction to material growth and adopting systems compatible with one-Earth living (‘one-Earth living’ implies any material standard of living that, if extended to everyone on Earth, would be sustainable—i.e., the human population would be living within the global carrying capacity [30]. Obviously, the more people, the lower the average sustainable standard of living).

Far from encouraging such a radically new paradigm, the GND promotes an eco-washed version of the status quo with its unquestioning faith that technology will save us and its comforting narrative of business-as-usual by alternative means. This myth has become so well accepted in the public and academic mind that to question it is to be perceived as anti-renewable, pessimistically discounting human ingenuity, or even a shill for the FF industry. Those who do venture critical observations often do so with trepidation and constraint.

The following eco-heterodox view of the renewable energy transition flows from our commitment to critical discourse and stewardship of our one and only planet. This perspective widens the lens of analysis and confronts naked realities that can no longer be ignored. Our overriding goal is to assist society in developing a considered appreciation of what a truly renewable energy landscape might look like.

 

3.1. The Electrification Question

Only 19% of global final energy consumption is in the form of electricity. The other 81% is in the form of liquid fuel [31]. There are formidable obstacles to converting electricity consumption alone to so-called renewable sources.

 

3.1.1. Big Picture Sanity Check

Transitioning the U.S. electrical supply away from FFs by 2050 would require a grid construction rate 14 times that of the rate over the past half century [32]. The actual installed costs for a global solar program would have totaled roughly $252 trillion (about 13 times the U.S. GDP) a decade ago [33], and considerably more today. A recent report describing what would be needed to achieve 90% “decarbonization” and electrification by 2035 neglects to mention that, in order to meet such targets, the United States would have to quadruple its last annual construction of wind turbines every year for the next 15 years and triple its last annual construction of solar PV every year for the next 15 years—only to repeat the process indefinitely since solar panels and wind turbines have average lifespans of around 15 to 30 years [34,35]. In addition, Clack et al. [36] found that one of the most cited studies on 100% electrification in the United States is error-prone and laden with untenable assumptions.

3.1.2. Heat for Manufacturing

The manufacturing processes used today to make solar panels, high-tech wind turbines, batteries, and all other industrial products involve very high temperatures that are currently generated using FFs. Despite the critical importance of heat in manufacturing, there is scant information on whether or how it can be generated with RE alone.

Approximately 30% of industrial heating applications require temperatures below 212 °F (100 °C); 27% can be met with temperatures between 212 °F and 750 °F (100 °C and 400 °C); and 43% require temperatures above 750 °F (400 °C) [37]. Most existing RE heating technologies can supply heat only within the lowest temperature category [37]. This is highly problematic given that solar panel manufacturing requires temperatures ranging from 2700 °F to 3600 °F (1480 °C to 1980 °C) and the steel and cement manufacturing for high-tech wind turbines, hydropower plants, and nuclear plants require temperatures ranging from 1800 °F to 3100 °F (980 °C to 1700 °C).

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration [38], natural gas, petroleum, electricity, and coal are the current sources of industrial energy, with natural gas and petroleum being predominant. If modern industrial manufacturing—responsible for generating the seemingly countless components of so-called RE technologies—is to continue without FFs, renewable-based technologies must be developed that would supply seamless replacements for high-heat sources of energy at acceptable economic and ecological costs.

Existing reports explore numerous RE heat sources for manufacturing, including various forms of bioenergy, concentrated solar power (CSP), hydrogen, geothermal, and nuclear [22,23,24,25]. We discuss each in turn as they relate to the fossil energy sources they could potentially replace.

Possible replacements for natural gas include biomethane and hydrogen. Biomethane is a near-pure source of methane derived from one of two methods: the “upgrading” of biogas or gasified woody biomass. Biogas is a mixture of gases that results from the breakdown of agricultural, livestock, and household waste; sewage in wastewater treatment plants; and municipal waste (i.e., the anaerobic digestion of organic matter in an oxygen-free environment). Gasification entails heating wood in a low oxygen environment to produce synthetic gas, or syngas. The upgrading process involves removing nearly all gases in the biogas and syngas except for methane.

Problems abound with biomethane as an industrial energy replacement option. At present, biogas upgrading accounts for roughly 90% of all biomethane production [39]. From a technological standpoint, all five commercially viable processes for biogas upgrading have disadvantages, if not outright roadblocks, that limit their production and viability. The polyethylene glycol used in one type of physical scrubbing is a derivative of petroleum, and the other form of water-based physical scrubbing requires significant amounts of water and electricity [40,41]. Chemical scrubbing involves toxic solvents that are costly and difficult to handle, and it has a high heat demand [40,41,42]. Despite low energy and financial inputs [40], membrane separation involves fragile and short-lived membranes (lasting 5–10 years) [42] and produces relatively low methane purity [40]. Pressure swing adsorption is a highly complex process [40,42], and neither cryogenic separation nor biological methods are yet commercially viable [42,43]. Moreover, not all upgrading technologies are energetically self-sufficient—many, if not most, rely on FFs [41]. Problematically, upgrading biogas produces CO2 [40,41]. Carbon capture and storage is one proposal for dealing with the resulting CO2 but presents ecological problems and high costs [40]. Gasification has yet to be deployed at a large industrial scale [43].

There are additional problems with feedstock and co-location requirements. Current waste streams are insufficient to support the widespread use of biomethane in the transportation sector, let alone the industrial sector [44]. It is estimated that the maximum practical contribution of biomethane via biogas and gasification is only around 11% of Europe’s current total natural gas consumption [43]. Harvesting woody biomass for gasification would have to be judiciously considered within the broader context of its sustainable management. Given the post-FF transportation limitations discussed later, biomethane production facilities would have to be co-located with feedstock sites, which would then have to be co-located with manufacturing sites. These requirements present obvious challenges, if not outright roadblocks.

The single greatest problem with producing hydrogen is that, regardless of method, more energy is required to produce and compress the product than it can later generate [22,25,29,33]. The only viable, large-scale feedstock for hydrogen is natural gas, and the gas reforming process requires temperatures ranging from 1300 °F to 1830 °F (700 °C to 1000 °C) [25,29,33,45]. Gas reforming produces substantial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and presents numerous problems in the way of leakage, corrosion, and accidental combustion [22,25,45].

Potential replacements for petroleum (i.e., crude oil) include bioethanol (ethanol made from corn or other fermented plant matter) and biodiesel. As discussed later, the land requirements for feeding 8+/− billion people without FF inputs preclude the large-scale use of cropland and plant biomass for energy purposes, even if net energy was satisfactory.

Contenders for non-fossil-generated electricity include geothermal, nuclear, concentrated solar power (CSP), solar PV, and wind turbines. Geothermal systems produce temperatures of around only 300 °F (150 °C) and must be located in mountainous regions with active tectonic plate movement or near volcanic hot spots [24]. Production wells are commonly up to two kilometers deep [23,24]—depths that can be reached only with fossil-fueled machinery and advanced technologies. As discussed later, nuclear has massive water and material requirements. Facilities cannot be built and maintained without fossil-fueled machinery, and there is the still-unsolved problem of dangerous radioactive waste disposal. The much-touted small modular reactors (SMRs) are still in the R&D phase, still produce radioactive byproducts that must be disposed of, and pose the problem of transportability. Despite theoretical upper temperature limits ranging from 1800 °F to 2200 °F (1000 °C to 1200 °C), existing CSP systems generate heat in the range of only 300 °F to 570 °F (150 °C to 300 °C) [22,24]. CSP plants typically cost in excess of $1 billion and require around five square miles of land. Though they can store thermal energy in molten salt, the on-site salt stores less than one day’s worth of electrical supply and almost all CSP plants have a fossil backup to diminish thermal losses at night, prevent the molten salt from freezing, supplement low solar radiance in the winter, and for fast starts in the morning [22,29]. The DC electricity generated by wind and solar PV can only be stored in batteries, which presents serious ecological and practical problems, as discussed later.

The only potential replacement for coal is charcoal derived from wood. This poses two obvious problems. The remaining stock of woody biomass—vastly depleted during the Industrial Age—is nowhere close to supporting current manufacturing needs, particularly recognizing the need to set aside half of the Earth’s major eco-regions to ensure the functional integrity and health of the ecosphere [46]. Even if a sustainable supply of an already-stretched renewable resource was not a concern, industrial furnaces/boilers and steel manufacturing equipment are specifically designed to function with thermal coal and coke (made from coking coal); switching to charcoal would require the redesign and reconstruction of entire systems.

Such roadblocks impede the electrification of all manufacturing processes that do not already use electricity. Even so, there has been little R&D on massive electrification options. Additionally, again, since most existing fossil-powered equipment would require complex, large-scale system redesigns, 100% electrification of manufacturing would be extremely difficult, if not impossibly expensive [25].

In short, no RE source or system is viable if it cannot not generate sufficient energy both to produce itself (literally from the ground up) and supply a sufficient surplus for society’s end-use consumption. Currently, no so-called RE technology is in the running.

3.1.3. Problems with Solar Panels

Manufacturing solar panels uses toxic substances, large quantities of energy and water, and produces toxic byproducts [33,47]. Mono-and poly-crystalline solar panels require high temperatures at every step of their production. For example, temperatures of 2700° to 3600 °F (1500° to 2000 °C) are needed to transform silicon dioxide into metallurgical-grade silicon. Up to half of the silicon is lost in the wafer sawing process. For every 1 MW of solar panels produced, about 1.4 tonnes of toxic substances (including hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide, sulfuric acid, nitric acid, and hydrogen fluoride) and 2868 tonnes of water are used, while 8.6 tonnes of emissions are released—8.1 tonnes of which are the perfluorinated compounds sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), and hexafluoroethane (C2F6) that are thousands of times more potent than CO2 [48]. Other toxic byproducts, such as trichlorosilane gas, silicon tetrachloride, and dangerous particulates from the wafer sawing process, are also produced. Amorphous (thin-film) solar panels are made with cadmium, which is a carcinogen and genotoxin.

The actual performance of installed solar panels is problematic [33,49,50]. The efficiency rates of solar panels are low (on average around 15% to 20%) and almost always less than what manufacturers advertise. Solar panels are highly sensitive and lose function in non-optimal conditions (e.g., when there is haze or humidity, if the panels are not angled properly, or if any obstructions—such as bird droppings, dust, snow, or pollution—block even small parts of the panel’s surface). They become less efficient as they age, sometimes losing up to 50% efficiency.

Solar panels have a life span of only 20 to 30 years, making for a massive waste management problem. Inverters (which transform the DC output of solar panels into the AC input required by appliances) need to be replaced every five to eight years [33]. By the end of 2016, there were roughly 250,000 tonnes of solar panel e-waste globally, accounting for about 0.5% of all annual global e-waste [26]. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency [51], solar panel waste could amount to six million tonnes annually by 2050, and the cumulative waste by then could reach 78 million tonnes. By 2050, dead solar panels could account for 10% of all e-waste streams, and their cumulative end-of-life waste may be greater than all e-waste in 2018 [20]. The much-touted silver bullet of recycling is not the panacea is it purported to be. Recycling requires copious amounts of energy, water, and other inputs, and exposes workers to toxic materials that have to be disposed of. Currently, there are only two types of commercially available solar PV recycling and only a handful of recycling facilities around the world [26,27].

Even without such drawbacks, solar PV has a low energy return on energy invested (EROEI)—too low to power modern civilization [52,53,54,55].

3.1.4. Problems with Batteries and Other Storage

There are four primary types of commercially proven, grid-scale energy storage: pumped hydroelectric storage, compressed air energy storage, advanced battery energy storage, and flywheel energy storage. Pumped hydroelectric storage is possible only if hydroelectric dams are part of the system. Flywheel energy storage is used more for power management than long-term energy storage. Of the remaining two, compressed air storage is deployed at only two power plants in the world, with likely little expansion since it is quite inefficient and relies on large underground cavities with specific geological characteristics [29,56,57]. Only a few power plants in the United States have operational battery storage, accounting for 800 MW of power capacity [56,58]. Consider that the United States consumes around 4000 terawatt-hours of electricity every year [59], or 563 times the existing battery storage capacity.

An entire year of production from the world’s largest lithium-ion battery manufacturing facility—Tesla’s $5 billion Gigafactory in Nevada—could store only three minutes’ worth of annual U.S. electricity demand [32]. Manufacturing a quantity of batteries that could store just two days’ worth of U.S. electricity demand would require 1000 years of Gigafactory production [32]. Storing only 24 h worth of U.S. electricity generation in lithium batteries would cost $11.9 trillion, take up 345 square miles, and weigh 74 million tons [29]—at enormous ecological cost. A battery-centric future means mining gigatons of rare-earth mineral ores. For every kilogram of battery, 50–100 kg of ore needs to be mined, transported, and processed [60]. Constructing enough lithium batteries to store only 12 h’ worth of daily power consumption would require 18 months’ worth of global primary energy production and the entire global supply of several minerals [29].

Battery chemistry is complex, and improvements in one characteristic (e.g., energy density, power capability, durability, safety, or cost) always come at a cost to another. The monitoring and cooling systems and the steel used to encase the flammable lithium (other types of batteries are also flammable) weigh 1.5 times as much as the battery itself [29]. Batteries lose capacity over time, are negatively impacted by temperature extremes, pose safety issues that internal combustion engines do not [61], and have a poor energy-to-weight ratio [62]. Batteries also have higher GHG emissions than internal combustion engines [63].

Not all vehicles and machinery used today can be powered by batteries. Small cranes, a crawler crane [64], light and some heavy-duty construction equipment, and passenger cars can be powered by batteries. However, other large cranes (used to load and unload cargo and in large construction projects, mining operations, and more), container and other large ships, airplanes, and heavy-duty trucks cannot [29,60]. Sripad and Viswanathan [65] concluded that the Tesla Semi concept vehicle is technically infeasible given current lithium-ion battery technology and is likely financially prohibitive. Tesla CEO Elon Musk stated in early 2021 that production was on hold due to battery cell unavailability and lack of profitability [66].

Batteries have a life span of around 5 to 15 years, creating an additional, significant waste management problem [20]. They cannot be disposed of in landfills due to their toxicity and are one of the fastest-growing contributors to e-waste streams. Only 5% of all lithium batteries are recycled.

3.1.5. Problems with Wind Power

The large metal wind turbines that have become ubiquitous today are composed primarily of steel towers, fiberglass nacelles and blades, and multi-element generators and gearboxes that contain large amounts of steel (iron) and copper. Roughly 25% of all large wind turbines use permanent magnet synchronous generators (PMSGs)—the latest generation technology that uses the rare earth metals neodymium (Nd), praseodymium (Pr), dysprosium (Dy), and terbium (Tb). The remaining 75% of operating wind turbines use some form of conventional magnetic generator. Employment of PMSGs is expected to grow given their post-implementation advantages [67].

Steel production is dependent on coal. Steel is an alloy of iron and carbon, the latter contributed by metallurgical, or coking, coal. The production of coke from metallurgical coal requires temperatures around 1800 °F (1000 °C). Combining coke and iron to make steel then requires blast furnaces at temperatures of 3100 °F (1700 °C). On average, 1.85 tons of CO2 are emitted for every ton of steel produced [25].

Mining and processing the rare earth metals now common in most wind turbines produces significant toxic waste. Many rare earth metals are bound up in ore deposits that contain thorium and uranium, both of which are radioactive [68]. Sulfuric acid is used to isolate the rare earth metals from the ore, exposing the radioactive residue and producing hydrofluoric acid, sulfur dioxide, and acidic wastewater [68,69]. One ton of radioactive waste is produced for every ton of mined rare earth metals. Rare earth metal processing for wind turbines already generates as much radioactive waste as the nuclear industry [69].

A typical 3 MW wind turbine weighs anywhere from 430 to 1200 tonnes [70]. All components must be transported by large trucks from manufacturing to installation sites and then erected using enormous cranes once on-site. As previously noted, neither heavy-duty trucks nor cranes can yet operate on battery power. As shown later, electrified freight on a Paris Agreement schedule (~50% emissions reductions by 2030) is improbable, if not impossible.

Massive concrete bases—often requiring more than 1000 tons of concrete and steel rebar and measuring 30 to 50 feet across and anywhere from six to 30 feet deep—are needed to fix the tower to the ground. Heavy-duty fossil powered machinery is required to excavate the site. Cement, which is the primary ingredient in concrete, is produced in industrial kilns heated to 2700 °F (1500 °C). At least one ton of CO2 is emitted for every ton of cement produced [71], and the cement must then be transported on fossil-fueled trucks to the installation site.

A 3.1 MW wind turbine creates anywhere from 772 to 1807 tons of landfill waste, 40 to 85 tons of waste sent for incineration, and about 7.3 tons of e-waste [20]. Wind turbine blades, made of composite materials, are completely unrecyclable at present [28].

Finally, while superior to solar PV, neither onshore nor offshore wind power has an EROEI >3:1—far less than necessary to sustain modern civilization [52].

3.1.6. Eco-Impacts of Hydropower

Large hydroelectric dams have enormous ecological impacts [72]. They disrupt water flow, degrade water quality, block the transport of vital nutrients and sediment, destroy fish and wildlife habitat, impede the migration of fish and other aquatic species, and compromise certain recreational opportunities. Reservoirs slow and broaden rivers, making them warmer. Many dams are not operating efficiently, are not up to environmental standards, produce less energy over time, and are in need of significant repairs [73,74,75].

3.1.7. Problems with Nuclear

To meet the anticipated primary energy demand in 2050—assuming 60% emissions reductions from 2004 levels—approximately 26,000 1-GW nuclear power plants would have to be built. The world currently has 449, many of which are nearing the end of their lives and will soon face decommissioning [76]. The EROI and materials for facility construction and operation aside, the enormous financial costs, regulatory time frames, social opposition, and waste disposal hurdles make the all-nuclear option a practical impossibility [76].

Only two prototype Generation IV “intrinsically safe” reactors have been built, one in China and one in Russia, with significant R&D remaining and commercialization forecasted to be two to three decades out [77]. Even though Generation IV reactors use fuel more efficiently and can even use some nuclear waste, claims about greatly reduced radioactive waste are misleading [78]. The narrow focus on reduced actinides is irrelevant since it is other fission byproducts that are of the greatest concern for long-term safety. Moreover, the fuel retreatment process to reduce actinide quantities relies on exceptional technological requirements and itself generates waste that must be disposed of.

Small modular reactors (SMRs) would offer the benefits of a smaller size and transportability but are still in the R&D phase and pose two major problems [79]. Just as with large wind turbines, SMRs need to be transported long distances, which is not possible without large fossil-fueled trucks and cranes. Additionally, SMRs still produce the same radioactive waste products that large reactors do [80].

The holy grail of nuclear fusion continues to be plagued by problems [81]. To replicate fusion here on Earth, temperatures of at least 100 million degrees Celsius—about six times hotter than the sun—would be needed. Deuterium and tritium, the fuels available for Earth-bound fusion, are 24 orders of magnitude more reactive than the ordinary hydrogen burned by the sun, implying a billion times lower particle density and a trillion times poorer energy confinement. In Earth-bound fusion, energetic neutron streams comprise 80% of the energy output of deuterium–tritium reactions (the only potentially feasible reaction type). These neutron streams lead to four problems with fusion energy: radiation damage to structures, radioactive waste, the need for biological shielding, and the potential for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Fusion reactors would share other serious problems that plague fission reactors: daunting water demands for cooling; parasitic power drains that make it uneconomic to run a fusion plant below 1000 MW; the release of biologically hazardous, radioactive tritium into the environment; and high operating costs. Additionally, they require a fuel (tritium) that is not found in Nature and is generated only by fission reactors.

Nuclear power plants cannot be built without large fossil-fueled cranes and enormous amounts of concrete, the production of which, as noted, emits a significant amount of CO2 and requires high temperatures that cannot currently be generated without FFs.

3.1.8. Metal Extraction and Its Social Injustices

A shift to the RE technologies covered here would simply increase society’s dependence on non-renewable resources—not just FFs but also more metals and minerals, adding massive exploitation of the geosphere to the existing over-exploitation of the atmosphere [17]. The demand for minerals is expected to rise substantially through 2050. Hund et al. [18] project increases of up to 500% from 2018 production levels, particularly for those used in energy storage (e.g., lithium, graphite, and cobalt), and a recent International Energy Agency (IEA) [82] report estimates that reaching “net zero” globally by 2050 would require six times the amount of mineral resources used today. This would entail a quantity of metal production—requiring considerable FF combustion—over the next 15 years roughly equal to that from the start of humanity until 2013 [17].

The explosion in demand is already underway. Michaux [19] shows that the production/consumption of industrial minerals increased by 144% between 2000 and 2018; precious metal consumption is up by 40% and base metal consumption by 96%. However, both the rate of mineral discovery and the grade of processed ores are well into decline. Michaux concludes that “global reserves are not large enough to supply enough metals to build the renewable non-fossil fuels industrial system or satisfy long term demand in the current system”. Clearly, without extraordinary advances in mining and refining technology, the 10% of world energy consumption currently used for mineral extraction and processing would rise as poorer and more remote deposits are tapped [17].

Social injustices abound in the production of current so-called RE technologies, confounding demands for social justice in the energy transition. Much of the mining and refining of the material building blocks of so-called renewables takes place in developing countries and contributes to environmental destruction, air pollution, water contamination, and risk of cancer and birth defects [20]. Low-paid labor is often the norm, as is gender inequality and the subjugation and exploitation of ethnic minorities and refugees [20]. Mining often relies on the exploitation of children, some of whom are exposed to risks of death and injury, are worked to death in e-waste scrapyards, or drown in waterlogged pits [20]. Land grabs and other forms of conflict and violence are routinely linked to climate change mitigation efforts around the world [21]. In short, while so-called RE technologies may deliver cleaner point-of-use conditions in the Global North, substantial ecological costs and social damage have been displaced to the Global South [20]. As the push for “green” energy and technology intensifies, such harms are increasingly spilling over into North America and Europe [21].

3.1.9. Problems with Technological Carbon Sequestration

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) and direct air capture (DAC) are widely advanced as mechanisms for removing carbon. Like all other so-called RE technologies, both carry hidden costs and problems. CCS presupposes the continued use of FFs, which is problematic given FFs’ rapidly declining EROI and environmental and human health concerns. Both CCS and DAC pose energetic, ecological, resource, and financial problems. Over their life cycles, some technologies emit more CO2 than they capture [83]. It would cost around $600 billion to capture and sequester 1 Gt of carbon [84]. The largest DAC facility in the world captures only 4000 t CO2 per year, which is 0.000004 Gt [83]. A larger plant is now being engineered but will still capture only one Mt (0.001 Gt) of CO2 annually [85]. These quantities are minuscule in comparison to what is needed: the world emitted roughly 38 Gt CO2 in 2019 [86]. Vast quantities of natural resources and land would be needed to scale up such operations. “Renewably” powered DAC alone would use all wind and solar energy generated in the United States in 2018—and this would capture only one-tenth of a Gt of CO2 [83]. Advocates of CCS and DAC also largely ignore their ecological impacts, including the transportation, injection, and storage of CO2 in the Earth, as well as potential groundwater contamination, earthquakes, and fugitive emissions.

3.1.10. Hidden Fossil Fuel Subsidy

Every so-called RE technology today is subsidized by FFs throughout its entire life cycle. The metals and other raw materials are mined and processed using petroleum-fueled, large-scale machinery. These metals and raw materials are transported around the world on cargo ships that burn bunker fuel and on trucks that are powered by diesel and travel on roads constructed with FFs. Manufacturing processes use very high temperatures that can only be generated reliably and at scale from FFs. Finished products are transported from manufacturing to installation sites on trucks powered by diesel and, in the case of industrial-scale wind turbines, nuclear facilities, and hydroelectric dams, erected on-site with large petroleum-fueled machinery. At the end of their lives, they are then deconstructed, oftentimes with FFs, and transported to landfills or recycling facilities on large petroleum-fueled trucks. There is no possibility that all these FF-demanding processes can be replaced by renewable electricity in the foreseeable future, let alone on a schedule consistent with the Paris Agreement.

3.1.11. Performance Gains in Energy Extraction

Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors on a microprocessor chip will double every two years or so, has driven the information technology revolution for 60 years. This accounts for the billion-fold exponential increase in the efficiency of microchips in storing and processing information.

Moore’s Law is sometimes used to assure society that there can be equivalent exponential increases in future renewable energy output [32]. Regrettably, the analogy does not hold—Moore’s law is irrelevant to the physics of energy systems. Combustion engines are subject to the Carnot Efficiency Limit, solar cells are subject to the Shockley–Queisser Limit, and wind turbines are subject to the Betz Limit. Bound by the Shockley–Queisser Limit, a conventional, single-junction PV cell can convert a maximum of only about 33% of incoming solar energy into electricity (multi-layered solar cells could theoretically double this efficiency but can be orders of magnitude more expensive; useful in space exploration, they are impractical for large-scale terrestrial applications) [87,88]. State-of-the-art commercial PVs achieve just over 26% conversion efficiency—close to their theoretical efficiency limit. The Betz Limit states that the theoretical maximum efficiency of a wind turbine is just over 59%, meaning that blades can convert at most this amount of the kinetic energy in wind into electricity [89,90]. Turbines today exceed 45% efficiency, again making additional gains difficult to achieve.

Starry-eyed optimists who argue that the amount of solar radiation that reaches the Earth’s surface far exceeds global energy consumption confuse total energy flow with practical harvestability and thus generally ignore the limiting laws of physics.

3.1.12. The Liquid Fuels Question

Liquid fuels currently account for 81% of non-electric global energy consumption. It is highly unlikely that synthetic liquid fuel substitutes for FFs can be produced sustainably in any more than small quantities for niche applications. This is highly problematic, as modern urban civilization is dependent on highway transportation for essential supplies. As noted above, battery-powered cars and, in particular, trucks have serious limitations and raise many questions regarding resource use and manufacturing. We must also ask how asphalt roads and highways—made of petroleum-based products and laid with heavy machinery—will be maintained and built in the future. Like the bright green dream of electrified transportation, synthetic substitutes for liquid FFs pose myriad problems.

3.1.13. Biofuels vs. Food Production

The current population—and projected growing populations—can only be fed by using an array of fossil-fueled subsidies. The FF-based synthetic pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides, not to mention the petroleum-fueled heavy machinery, responsible for The Green Revolution have allowed for much higher agricultural outputs per unit of land area—at great ecological cost—than was previously attainable. Today’s global food distribution system also relies on liquid-fossil-powered transportation and refrigeration systems. Clearly, removing FFs from the agricultural system would result in significantly reduced output. Even if a global one-child policy were enacted soon, we would still have eight to 3.5 billion mouths to feed by the end of the century [91]. Even under such an optimistic scenario, virtually every square inch of arable land would have to be dedicated to food production. This would ethically prohibit the widescale production of fuels like bioethanol and biodiesel. (It is scandalous that 40% of the U.S. corn crop is dedicated to heavily subsidized, carbon-emitting ethanol production, with virtually no net energy gains over the history of its production [92,93]). The delay in enacting, or the absolute failure to enact, fertility reduction policies, particularly in high-fertility countries, raises the specter of an even more dire scenario.

3.1.14. The Pipedream of Other Synthetic Fuels

Algae is not a solution to our liquid fuel needs [29]. More energy is consumed to cultivate the algae than it usefully generates. Major technical difficulties still need to be overcome despite 60 years of research. Protozoans that invade a pond can eat all the algae within 12–18 h. The National Research Council concluded that scaling up algal biofuel production to replace even 5% of U.S. transportation fuel would place unsustainable demands on energy, water, and nutrients. The U.S. Department of Energy found that “systems for large-scale production of biofuels from algae must be developed on scales that are orders of magnitude larger than all current world-wide algal culturing facilities combined”.

Nor is synthetic hydrogen an option. As discussed earlier, hydrogen is also a net energy sink and is extremely difficult to transport and store.

3.1.15. Electrification of Transportation

Electrifying the rail freight system seems improbable [29]. The current U.S. fleet of 25,000 mostly diesel–electric locomotives would use as much grid electricity as 55 million electric cars. Electrifying major routes (160,000 of the 200,000 miles of tracks) would require the energy equivalent of that generated by 240 power plants (keeping in mind, too, that railway load is one of the most difficult for an electric utility to cope with). It would also require a national grid—which does not yet exist—or at least a much-expanded grid.

An all-electric passenger rail system is equally improbable. Just as with freight, it would require an expanded grid. Passenger trains are highly inefficient due to the constant stopping and accelerating [94] and are extremely costly. California’s planned high-speed rail connecting the length of the state was originally estimated to cost $33 billion but, by 2019, the price tag had ballooned to $79 billion. Annual operation and maintenance costs are currently pegged at $228 million [95].

With accelerating climate change, possible food shortages, no viable alternatives to FFs, and the time when “the trucks stop running” not far off [29], the prospects for our globalized, transport-based, just-in-time urbanized civilization are dire [96].

  1. Summary and What Might Actually Salvage Civilization

We have exposed fatal weaknesses in society’s dominant aspirational pathway for combating climate change. The GND illusion paints a picture of “affordable clean energy” that ignores innumerable costs that cannot be afforded by any reasonable measure. It suggests solutions to the climate–energy conundrum that are impossible to deliver with current technologies, and certainly not within the timeframe specified by the IPCC and Paris Agreement.

Not only is the GND technically flawed, but it fails to situate climate disruption within the broader context of ecological overshoot. Anthropogenic climate change is merely one symptom of overshoot and cannot be treated in isolation from the greater disease. The GND offers little more than a green-washed version of the unsustainable growth-based status quo. Even if feasible, its operationalization would only exacerbate human ecological dysfunction.

What, then, might actually salvage a fossil-dependent world in overshoot? The answer is both stunningly simple and wretchedly complex: the world must abandon neoliberal capitalism’s material growth imperative and face head-on that material life after fossil fuels will closely resemble life before fossil fuels. Put another way, we must act on the ecological imperative to achieve one-Earth living. This entails moving on three broad fronts.

4.1. Energy Realism

First, we must relinquish our faith in modern high technology and instead shift our attention to understanding what a genuinely renewable energy landscape will look like. As noted, the so-called RE technologies being advanced as solutions are neither renewable nor possible to construct and implement in the absence of FFs. They are not carbon neutral and will simply increase human dependence on non-renewable resources and cause unacceptable social and environmental harm.

Truly renewable energy sources will be largely based on biomass (especially wood), simple mechanical wind and water generation, passive solar, and animal and human labor. This means society will have to innovate and adapt its way through major reductions in energy supply. The upside is that new variants on old extraction technologies will be more ecologically sophisticated than today’s so-called renewables, closely tuned to essential needs, and cognizant of the conservation imperative. On this latter point, it is important to highlight that approximately 62% of energy flow through the modern economy is wasted through inefficiency [97], and more still is wasted through trivial or at least non-essential uses (think leaf-blowers and recreational ATVs). Globally, per capita energy consumption has increased nine-fold since 1850, though perceived well-being certainly has not. Together, these facts show there is much latitude for painless reductions in energy use.

A reduction in energy means there will be a resurgence in demand for human muscle and draft animals. Denizens of FF-rich societies tend to forget that that industrial energy now does the work that people and animals used to do. How many Americans are conscious of the fact that they have hundreds of “energy slaves”, per capita, in continuous employment to provide them with goods and services they have come to take for granted? According to Hagens and White [98], if we ignore nuclear and hydropower electricity, “99.5% of ‘labor’ in human economies is done by oil, coal, and natural gas” (for a summary of the energy slave concept and various definitions, see [99]). It is again important to highlight the silver lining accompanying this shift. More human labor will mean more physically active lives in closer contact with each other and Nature, which can restore our shattered sense of well-being and connection to the land. Similarly, a waning focus on material progress will allow for emphasis to shift to progress of the mind and spirit—largely untapped frontiers at present with unlimited potential.

On the draft animal side, the number of working horses and mules in the United States peaked at 26 million around 1915—when the human population was about 100 million—only to be gradually replaced by fossil-powered farm and industrial equipment [100]. Should the United States again become as dependent on animal labor, the country may once more need this many draft animals if the population shrinks to 100 million. If human numbers remain in the vicinity of 2021’s population of 333 million, the required horse/mule population might be as high as 87 million and require around 172 million acres of land for range and fodder production (note that of the five to 10 million horses in the United States today, only about 15% are working farm or ranch animals [100]).

4.2. Population Reduction

The second front in a one-Earth living strategy is a global one-child fertility standard. This is needed to reduce the global population to the one billion or so people that can thrive sustainably in reasonable material comfort within the constraints of a non-fossil energy future and already much damaged Earth [101,102]. Even a step as seemingly bold as this may be insufficient to avoid widespread suffering, as such a policy implemented within a decade or two would still leave us with about three billion souls by the end of the century [91]. Failure to implement a planned, relatively painless population reduction strategy would guarantee a traumatic population crash imposed by Nature in a climate-ravaged, fossil-energy-devoid world. (A human population crash imposed by a human-compromised environment (not Nature) may already be underway. Controversial studies have documented evidence of falling sperm counts (50%+) and other symptoms of the feminization of males, particularly in western countries, caused by female-hormone-mimicking industrial chemicals; see, for example, [103]).

Concerns over the restriction of procreative freedom, racism, and physical coercion that dominate much of the present discourse on population reduction must be put into perspective. Population is an ecological issue that, if left unchecked, can have catastrophic consequences. The human population growth curve over the past 200 years resembles the boom, or “plague”, phase of the kind of population outbreak that occurs in non-human species under unusually favorable ecological conditions (in our case, the resource bounty made available by abundant cheap energy). Plague outbreaks invariably end in collapse under the pressure of social stress or as crucial resources are depleted [104].

Previous cultures have recognized this fact, along with the need for population regulation, for thousands of years [105,106]. A judicious balance between the freedom and well-being of individuals and society involves knowing when to arc nimbly between these poles as circumstances change. There is perhaps no greater rallying cry for the restriction of certain individual freedoms than the imminent threat of global social–ecological collapse.

Though it hardly seems worth stating, a universal one-child policy applied globally is not discriminatory. Moreover, it is entirely justified when the restoration of ecological integrity for the well-being of present and future generations—of humans and non-humans alike—is the motivation. Fortunately, there is a full toolbox of socially just and humane tools for bringing about the necessary population reduction [107,108]. That some inhumane practices have been used in particular circumstances historically is no reason to ignore the gravity of contemporary overshoot and the ample mechanisms available for sustainable population planning. When it comes to both the environmental and social aspects of overshoot, no other single individual action comes close to being as negatively consequential as having a child [109].

We should note that the human population at carrying capacity is a manageable variable whose magnitude will depend, in part, on society’s preferred material standard of living. This is a finite planet with limited productive capacity. A constant, sustainable rate of energy and material throughput will obviously support fewer people at a high average material standard than it will at a lower material standard.

We cannot stress enough that a non-fossil energy regime simply cannot support anywhere close to the present human population of nearly eight billion; this urgently necessitates reducing human numbers as rapidly as possible to avoid unprecedented levels of social unrest and human suffering in the coming decades. (This flies in the face of mainstream concerns that the falling fertility rate in many (particularly high-income) countries is cause for alarm; see, for example, [110]).

4.3. Radical Societal Contraction and Transformation

The third major front of a one-Earth sustainability strategy is a fully transformative plan to reshape the social and economic foundations of society while simultaneously managing a systematic contraction of the human enterprise (the latter to be consistent with Global Footprint Network estimates that humanity is in 75% overshoot). This is necessitated, in part, by the need to phase out fossil energy within a set time and carbon budget. (The situation is becoming increasingly urgent; Spratt et al. [111] argue that little or no budget exists to remain even within 2 °C). Whatever the identified FF budget, it must be rationed and allocated to: (1) essential uses, such as agriculture and essential bulk transportation; and (2) de-commissioning hazardous fossil-based infrastructure and replacing it with renewable-based infrastructure and supply chains.

Other elements of such a plan would include: (3) economic and political restructuring in conformity with the new energy and material realities (e.g., the cessation of interest-bearing debt and possibly even a shift to negative interest; a renewed focus on community building and regional self-reliance; re-localization of essential production and other economic activities; emphasis on economic resilience over mere efficiency; and a down-shifting of control over land and resource use to local self-governing bodies); (4) worker retraining for new forms of work and employment; (5) social planning to ensure a just allocation and distribution of societal resources, as it is inherently unjust for some individuals to appropriate much more than their fair share of the Earth’s limited bounty; (6) planned migrations and resettlement from unsustainable dense urban centers and vulnerable coastlines; and (7) large-scale ecosystem restoration. Restoration would serve the multiple purposes of not only creating meaningful employment but also reclaiming ecosystem integrity for the benefit of humans and non-humans alike, capturing carbon, increasing social–ecological resilience, and increasing the stock of biomass available for human energy consumption. In many respects, this endeavor will resemble Polanyi’s [112] Great Transformation (about the emergent dominance of neoliberal market economics) in reverse, all contained within an envelope of ecological necessity.

Actions to embark swiftly, judiciously, and systematically on the transformation will be of a far greater scale and level of effort than WWII mobilization and will involve unprecedented levels of global cooperation. In our view, two main conditions must be satisfied concurrently for such an undertaking to have any chance of succeeding. First, we must have politicians in office who care about people and the planet (i.e., who are not beholden to corporate, monied, or otherwise compromised interests) and who are willing to fight fiercely for ecological stability and social justice. This starts with whom we choose to elect (politicians do not magically fall into office—we put them there), holding them relentlessly accountable, and fighting to get money out of politics. Second, history shows that monied and ruling elites do not relinquish their power willingly—their hand must be forced. Virtually no important gain has ever been made by simply asking those in power to do the right thing. Unrelenting pressure must be exerted such that the people and/or systems in question have no choice but to capitulate to specific, well-thought-out demands. We must reacquaint ourselves with the revolutionary change-makers of the past who, at great cost, delivered for us the better world we live in now through intelligent, direct action and risk-taking.

To adopt a biblical metaphor, it may very well be easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for humanity to shift its prevailing paradigm and embark on a planned, voluntary descent from a state of overshoot to a steady-state harmonic relationship with the ecosphere—in just a decade or two. On the other hand, history shows that virtually all important achievements have only ever arisen from a dogged pursuit of the seemingly impossible. To contemplate the alternative is unthinkable.

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Posted in Climate Change, Electric & Hydrogen trucks impossible, Limits To Growth, Manufacturing & Industrial Heat, Overpopulation, Overshoot, Peak Critical Elements, Politics | Tagged , , , , , , , | Comments Off on The Green New Deal is not a solution for the real problem: Overshoot

How will 500,000 products made with fossils as feedstock & process energy be created post fossil fuels?

Preface. It is quite likely that after fossils are gone, plastics will no longer be made, since they are incredibly complex – PhDs in numerous fields make them possible – and most kinds have been around for only 50 years or less. Thwaites (2011) showed how hard replicating a complex process that we take for granted would be by performing a simple exercise:  He tried to make an ordinary toaster from scratch. Even the simplest toaster had 404 parts of plastic, steel, mica, copper, and nickel. After a great deal of struggle, he was able to make the metal pieces, which mankind has made since the Iron Age. But plastics were beyond him. He’d have had to refine crude oil to make propylene, which takes at least six chemical transformations to make into the simplest plastic, polyethylene.

Crude oil is the feedstock for half a million products. What follows is a description of how plastic is made. My book “Life After Fossil Fuels” discusses plastic in more depth — how much biomass is needed, how to replace asphalt and lubricants, and recycling.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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We consume about ONE BILLION TONS of products a year. We live like kings. Of all the fossil fuels we use in a year, about seven percent – 500 million metric tons of oil equivalent, the weight of all the people on earth – is used as both feedstock and energy to make these one billion tons of products (IEA 2018).  Mostly its oil for high-value chemicals. Natural gas and coal are used to make ammonia and methanol, but difficult to turn into other products because they require multiple energy-intensive steps (IEA 2018, KAUST 2020).

How do I love thee crude oil? Let me count the ways: Plastic, asphalt, glue, aspirin, insecticides, antiseptics, bandages, purses, boats, cameras, shampoo, candles, cell phones, curtains, luggage, dashboards, fertilizers, ink, pharmaceuticals, refrigerants, shower curtains, surf boards, synthetic rubber, tents, toothpaste, Legos and my umbrella. And unfortunately, single use plastic bottles. 

Crude oil flows like molasses and needs to be heated to separate the hydrocarbons into different products based on their number of atoms and therefore molecular weight. They’re fed into a distillation tube where the heavier oil sinks to the bottom while the shorter, lighter chains of hydrocarbon float to the top.

The segment made into plastic and other petrochemicals is Naptha, which contains ethane and propene. They will need to be further broken down into smaller fragments with high heat and pressure, and then formed into long repeating chains called polymers. Especially polyethylene and polypropylene, the most common polymers on earth because they can make plastics ranging from pliable to tough (Bryce 2021).

Many other kinds of polymers can be made as well, and mixed with additives such as dyes, chemicals, antioxidants, foaming agents, plasticizers, and flame retardants for food storage, cosmetics, medicine, technology, and health care products.

Unfortunately this is an alien substance never before seen in nature that microbes don’t know how to break down into water and carbon dioxide. That’s why it can take centuries to decompose, leaching added chemicals back into the environment.

After the oil is gone, how will we make half a million tons of products every year?

The oil most plastics and other products are made from is petroleum 84% Carbon and 12% Hydrogen. There has to be a hell of a lot of whatever replaces oil.

Dirt? Nope, it’s 47% oxygen, 28% silicon, 8% aluminum, 5% iron, 3.6% calcium, 3% sodium, 3% potassium, and 2% magnesium. Air is nitrogen and oxygen. Water? No, that’s just hydrogen and oxygen.

That leaves biomass. In decreasing order of abundance, the most common elements in biomass are carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and Ca, K, Si, Mg, Al, S, Fe, P, Cl, Na, Mn, Ti.  Biomass varies quite a bit in mineral composition, with carbon 35 to 65% of the dry weight, and hydrogen roughly six percent.

It’s not surprising biomass is chemically similar to fossils fuels, which were made from plants. Mother Nature’s recipe for fossil fuels is as follows: Find an anaerobic (no oxygen) basin, fill with remains of mostly marine plants, crush fields of decaying plant remains under tons of earth, pressure cook for hundreds of millions of years. Yield: One gallon of crude oil per 196,0000 tons of plants. That’s a lot of plants! Imagine cruising through Kansas and having to cram 40 acres of wheat into your gas tank every 20 miles (Dukes 2003).  Nature has done a whole lot of economic work for us!

Petrochemicals from fossil fuels (IEA 2018)

Check out the Sankey diagram here.  The main chemicals made by natural gas are fertilizer, ammonia, and urea as well as some plastics, but petroleum is preferred for HVC’s (high value chemicals) because it has long carbon chains.  As you can see, large chunks of oil and natural gas are used to make petrochemicals.  Not shown is coal, which is also used — the feedstocks are interchangeable for some products so which one is used as the feedstock can depend on which is the cheapest.

Key thermoplastics, types 1 through 7

  • 1 PET is mainly used to make polyester fiber, but its other key end-use is food and beverage packaging. Its key properties are its high crystallinity and strength
  • 2 HDPE is one of the most versatile plastics, used in anything from shampoo bottles to hard hats. It is made entirely of ethylene and is among the most recycled plastics.
  • 3 PVC is a tough resin that is most frequently used in construction. PVC windows, doors and pipes are commonplace on construction sites and in buildings throughout the world.
  • 4 LDPE was the first polyethylene plastic to be invented and is another key plastic used for packaging. It is the key constituent of most plastic carrier bags.
  • 5 PP is a versatile plastic with many end-uses. Because it has a higher melting point than some other key polymers, it is often used in automotive applications, where high temperatures can be encountered.
  • 6 PS comes in three main forms: “general purpose” “high impact” and “expandable”. The latter is used in packaging applications to protect goods during transport and storage.
  • 07 O. Other thermoplastics include polycarbonate, acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, styrene acrylonitrile, polymethyl methacrylate, polyacrylonitrile, polyvinyl acetate, and many others. They have a wide range of uses, but produced in much smaller volumes than 1-6 above

References

Bryce E (2021) How do we turn oil into plastic? LiveScience.com.

Dukes JS (2003) Burning buried sunshine: Human consumption of ancient solar energy. Climatic Change 61: 31–44.

IEA (2018) The future of petrochemicals. Towards more sustainable plastics and fertilisers. International Energy Agency.

KAUST (2020) Making more of methane. King Abdullah University of Science and Technology. News release. https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2020-09/kauo-mmo090220.php

Thwaites T (2011) The Toaster Project: or a heroic attempt to build a simple electric appliance from scratch. Princeton Architectural Press.

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Why wind and solar will cause more blackouts

Preface. Clearly fossil fuel plants need to be replaced with energy storage — batteries, pumped hydro, or compressed air. Many hours of backup power will be needed since, unfortunately, over two-thirds of total wind power in the U.S. happens outside the 9–5 peak weekdays maximum demand (Baxter 2005).

Peak solar generation is at high noon, which is not the same time of day as peak people demand. For example, in New England the morning demand starts at 5 am and ramps up to 9 am, stays that high until 5 pm, and then reaches an even higher evening peak from 5:30 to 7:30 pm when people come home (EIA 2011).

A much bigger problem is that wind and solar are seasonal, requiring massive storage to solve the “gigawatt-day” problem of days or weeks when renewable generation is insufficient to meet demand, even after all available load flexibility and short-term storage resources have been deployed (CEC 2011; CCST 2012).

Imagine a future in which wind and solar supply up to 100 % of U.S. electricity. You would need to store hundreds of hours of power (Houseman 2014). Winds are highly variable. Seasonal wind—March comes in like a lion, goes out like a lamb— might require 200 hours of storage, which could clearly be done only with very inexpensive storage media, such as water or air (Cavallo et al. 1995).

Grid operators are ringmasters. They have had to cope with the mismatch between demand and supply, and over decades have learned what the patterns are, and how to turn power plants up and down, on and off, accordingly. But wind goes from a whisper to a roar when storms arrive (Halper 2015), a bucking bronco that gets increasingly hard to manage and control the more wind and solar penetrate as a percentage of overall power (IEA 2013).

So far, wind and solar power penetration is so small that operators can balance it with natural gas peaker plants, dispersing excess generation across a larger region, more frequent scheduling (15 min or less), (pumped) hydropower, or curtailment.

But that is starting to change as renewables penetrate more. I’ll add more blackout stories as I see them in the news below.

Renewables caused or almost caused blackouts in the news:

2021-1-10 Europe narrowly escaped blackout: electricity suppliers warn – Austria

2020-8-20 Poor Planning Left California Short of Electricity in a Heat Wave. Scores of power plants were down or operating below their capacity just as hot weather drove up demand.

As you probably know, the supply and demand of electricity must match within a very small range. There’s yet another quality of electricity called VARs that I’ve read about but never understood. Renewables do not generate Volt-Ampere Reactives (VARs), but wind and solar farms can be expensively altered to generate them, and if they don’t, utilities will curtail their power. Alternating current has electromagnetic properties that have to be kept in balance. It’s a lot like riding a bicycle: The energy you put into the pedals will move the bike forward, but you also have to put some energy into maintaining your balance, or you’ll fall over and won’t be able to move forward at all. If you are a good bicyclist on a smooth road, the “maintaining your balance energy” will be small. If you are a poor bicyclist who swerves around a lot, or if you’re on a bad road, the “maintaining your balance” energy will be larger. In either case, the “maintaining your balance” energy is necessary. That energy is also a parasitical drain on your energy effort: it doesn’t move the bike forward. A well-run grid is like a good bicyclist on a smooth road.  Rotating electric machinery puts VARs on the grid, and if the entire grid was thermal (nuclear, gas, coal) and hydro units with rotating electric machinery.  But wind turbines and solar make direct current that needs to be changed into alternating current, and that process does not put VARs on the grid in the same fashion, which can mess up the grid (Angwin M (2020) Shorting the Grid. The Hidden Fragility of Our Electric Grid)

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Starn J (2021) The Day Europe’s Power Grid Came Close to a Massive Blackout. Bloomberg.

A fault occurred at a substation in Croatia and caused an overload in parts of the grid, which in a domino effect spread beyond the country’s borders as far as France and Italy. Although not directly caused by intermittent sources such as wind or solar in this case , it’s only a matter of time before too many renewables and too few balancing fossil fuel plants lead to more blackouts. Similar outages have happened in California, Australia and Germany as well.

The reason is that transmission grids need to stay at a frequency of 50 hertz to operate smoothly and any deviations can damage equipment that’s connected. Had the frequency swings not been reduced within minutes, it could have caused damage across the entire European high voltage network, potentially causing blackouts for millions.

Spinning turbines of thermal plants powered by coal or natural gas connected to the grid create kinetic energy called inertia which helps keep the network at the right frequency. This spinning can’t be created by wind turbines or solar panels. The main solution being proposed for energy storage to replace fossil generation are batteries, but they cannot create inertia either. Batteries to store just one day of U.S. electricity will cost $40 trillion or more and last only 5 to 15 years, depending on battery type (Friedemann 2016). No other kind of energy storage will do the trick, not pumped hydro, compressed air energy storage (there are few sites to put more than the single one that exists in Alabama), or concentrated solar power. Or a national super grid.

Currently, too many renewables are being added while fossil fuel plants are shut down too quickly.

So Germany, despite it’s plan to ditch fossil fuels continues to generate more energy from coal than from wind, because the wind does not blow permanently. It is also generating zero energy from solar at the moment because it’s winter.  And in 2018, the UK went for nine days with zero power generations from wind farms because of  a wind draught.  

We might see an unwelcome repeat of what many Soviet bloc countries experienced in the 1980s—timed blackouts lasting months and even years.

References

Baxter, R. 2005. Energy storage: a nontechnical guide. Tulsa: PennWell.

Cavallo, A., et al. 1995. Cost effective seasonal storage of wind energy, 119–125. TX: Houston, CRC Press.

CCST. 2012. California’s energy future: electricity from renewable energy and fossil fuels with carbon capture and sequestration. California: California Council on Science and Technology.

CEC. 2011. 2020 Strategic analysis of energy storage in California. California: California Energy Commission.

EIA. 2011. Demand for electricity changes through the day. U.S. Energy Information Administration. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=830.

Friedemann AJ (2016) When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation. Springer.

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Water Theft

Preface. As fresh water supplies are depleted worldwide and water crises increase, water theft is becoming more common.  And damage to marine environments as well.

It is estimated that between 30% and 50% of the global water supply is stolen (Loch et al 2020).

Goundwater is a third of California’s water, but its use in California isn’t regulated, and so farmers may drain them as early as the 2030s (de Graaf et al. 2015).  From 2000-2008, California used up a fifth of all the aquifer water that had ever existed there (Konikow 2013), and even more during the great drought of 2011 to 2017. There are plans to finally monitor groundwater (California is the only state that doesn’t do so), but not until 2040.   So the theft of water from future generations goes unpunished.

Agriculture uses 70% of fresh water, and surprisingly, this is the area of greatest thefts.

It’s not theft, but perhaps ought to be: crops that require a huge amount of water, such as soy and corn in drought-prone California, should be replaced with more drought-tolerant crops, such as corn and soy which use more water than most other crops, even fruit and nut crops (Levy et al 2020).

Human-induced climate change will steal water as well.  California’s snow banks supply half of all water, and may decline by 13 to 50% from climate change (Qin et al 2020). Since snow provides water year round for up to 3 crops a year, production may be reduced to just one crop in a state that produces a third of America’s food, raising prices for everyone.

Also in California, pot farms are wreaking destruction. Creek water is diverted to ponds to grow marijuana, rather than continuing on to the eel river, lowering water levels so much that the spawning grounds for salmon and other fish are endangered. Growers also use pesticides and other toxic chemicals that wash into streams and pollute watersheds.   

Water theft isn’t always literally stealing water – farms and industry that discharge toxic wastes into water rather than treat them are also stealing fresh water by making it undrinkable, or expensive to treat. And since treatment is very expensive, it can be avoided by water fraud that alters samples to make the water look clean.

In addition, leaks from sewer lines and underground storage tanks release hazardous substances, such as sulphates, chlorides, nitrates, or petroleum products (e.g. gasoline, diesel, kerosene, oil). They contaminate not only underground and drinking water, but also rivers and oceans;

Mining and dredging of the marine environment and underwater construction of offshore wind turbines and other construction projects endanger the marine ecosystem, as does the illegal dumping of garbage offshore.

As incentives to steal water increase, so does the challenge for regulators with respect to resourcing, detection, enforcement and appropriate sanctions.    

I’ve included the section on water theft from Interpol and the UN below since it is the shortest most comprehensive overview.  This paper also covers environmental destruction of air and land, biodiversity loss of elephants and other trafficked animals, stealing of natural resources from illegal logging, fishing, and mining.

And here’s an amazing factoid: Humans control the majority of freshwater on earth because human-managed reservoirs comprise only a small percentage of all water bodies, they account for 57% of the total seasonal water storage changes globally (Cooley 2021).

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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INTERPOL & UNEP (2016) Strategic report.  Environment, peace, & security: A convergence of threats. International Criminal Police Organization & UN Environment.

Water is one of the most plentiful resources on our planet. Although it is a key factor for development, some populations still suffer from water deprivation. As a scarce commodity, states and institutions are facing pressing challenges to ensure water security, as they aim to provide access to clean water and sanitation. The quality of water is particularly compromised by human induced pollution, such as:

  • Improper waste management: until the 1970s, there was no or inadequate waste management planning to dispose of waste, which was discharged into the water. The transition towards disposing properly of waste accumulated as a result of a growing urbanization rate, the development of tourism, and the intensification of industrial activities proved challenging, as the Khian Sea episode illustrates. The main issues now concern consumer behavior, which contributes to marine litter and plastic pollution, as well as developing countries confronted with the need to adopt waste-management policies adapted to their growth;
  • Marine projects: environmental impact assessments have demonstrated the detrimental effect of underwater construction projects, such as the Öresund crossing, but more importantly of ocean mining. As the seabed offers large quantities of minerals and metals, it draws considerable attention. The exploitation and extraction of the seabed’s resources, however, endangers the marine ecosystem, notably by disrupting the marine habitat of species;
  • Leakages from sewer lines and underground storage: leaks from damaged and/or old sewage systems and underground storage tanks release hazardous substances, such as sulphates, chlorides, nitrates, or petroleum products (e.g. gasoline, diesel, kerosene, oil). They contaminate not only underground and drinking water, but also rivers and oceans;
  • Leachates from landfills, pesticides, and fertilizers: these toxic substances eventually pollute groundwater, rivers, and oceans, as a result of infiltrations in the soil and land runoffs;
  • Oil pollution: one of the most devastating sources of water pollution is oil spills, which typically involves the discharge of petroleum into the water. They generally occur through negligence or intentional non-compliance. Although the number of incidents has significantly decreased over the past years, this remains an issue for concern, as the environmental impact is considerable and long-lasting.

Criminal Activity

There is a wide variety of water-related crimes but this report distinguishes between three categories: water fraud, water pollution, and water theft.

Water fraud involves the alteration of sampling techniques or results to avoid treatment costs. The main danger from these practices is the negative health implications. For instance, when statistics are manipulated deceitfully to promote water as being clean, it poses a genuine health risk as the water supplied may not be as clean and safe as advertised;

Water pollution implies the intentional contamination of water, usually by companies or vessels (e.g. improper disposal of sewage, chemicals and waste, oil spills). The following trends can be underlined with regard to:

  1. Oil-pollution crimes include illegal oil discharges, false statements or records, and bypassing pollution prevention equipment. Illegally operating vessels have sailed under the national flags of countries, such as Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, United Kingdom, Hong Kong (China), Italy, Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Russia;
  2. Illegal garbage discharges entail the illegal discharge of garbage and the absence or the illegal alteration of garbage record books.

Water theft is understood, here, as non-revenue water, that is the unauthorized use and consumption of water before it reaches the intended end-user. It is estimated that between 30 and 50 per cent of the global water supply is illegally purchased. Regions experiencing chronic water stress (e.g. Southern Europe, Africa) and marginalized deprived areas (e.g. slums in India, Bangladesh, or Brazil) are particularly vulnerable. Local communities are, therefore, forced to find alternative solutions to fulfil their daily needs for water. In Africa, the number of unregulated wells has skyrocketed from 2 million to an estimated 23-25 million in a decade. While this reflects poor water management, this practice is also conducive to the major degradation of water resources.

Criminal Supply Chain

In cases of pollution (e.g. illegal waste discharge and oil spill), water is not considered as a commodity, which can be traded. In other words, water pollution is not about obtaining water as a raw product and trafficking in it: water suffers collateral damage of negligence or criminal behavior. Water pollution not only affects environmental quality but it also disrupts business activities. Oil spills contaminate an area which can sometimes be very large (e.g. BP oil spill in 201438), thereby destabilizing other sectors, such as fisheries, and disrupting the supply chain of the companies active in the polluted region. Criminals involved in other water-related crimes, such as water fraud and water theft, jeopardize the integrity of the existing supply chain. The supply of water takes place in two general stages:

Production: before reaching its end-users, water is usually collected from a source point, such as lake, river, or groundwater. It is then routed, through a ground-level or underground structure, to a treatment facility. After being purified, the water is piped to a storage system, such as a reservoir, tank, or cistern. An underground network finally connects the storage facility to the end-users. To ensure the quality of the water supplied, different samples are collected and analyzed at each point (collection, treatment, and storage). However, the samples and the results provided are sometimes tainted with fraud, undermining the supply chain integrity and posing a serious health risk, as mentioned earlier.

Distribution: the delivery of water to end-users highlights two issues. On the supply side, the

public sector is sometimes involved in over-billing or imposing maintenance charges which should not be borne by the consumers. Alternatively, on the demand side, end-users are sometimes engaging in reprehensible behavior to evade costs associated with the access to water (e.g. concealing illegal connections, tampering with meter readings).

Crime Convergence

Water crimes intersect with other criminal activities. Financial motivations spur on unscrupulous individuals wishing to avoid costs. Fraud and document forgery are common practices (e.g. presenting forged or false declarations, manipulating the vessels’ records detailing their waste and oil discharges, reporting fake results of analyses to eliminate costs associated with water treatment). This is compounded by endemic corruption. In the public sector, bribery, misappropriation of funds, and fraud plague the tendering and procurement processes in creating the water-supply infrastructure. This also highlights the disregard for health and safety regulations, which put the life of consumers at risk. In parallel, corrupt practices between public and private actors can take place at several stages: some consumers engage in administrative corruption to influence the design of the water-supply infrastructure to ensure easier access to water or to benefit from preferential treatment in general (e.g. higher flow of water, repairs). This exacerbates the problem of unequal and unfair distribution of a vital resource, based on a corrupt system that relies on bribes.

Corruption in the water sector is also fueled by the involvement of organized crime, and more specifically mafia-type groups. The monopoly over the water supply underpins the power and influence that organized crime groups have over vulnerable communities living in poor and/or marginalized areas (e.g. slums), particularly in Bangladesh, Brazil, and India.

The misuse of water for terrorist purposes is not new and highlights the problem of water being exploited for criminal ends. More recently, the control of dams in Iraq by the terrorist group Daesh, (also known as the Islamic State or ISIL), has raised concerns about some populations which could be threatened by the group’s decision to flood villages or deprive them of water in regions already facing water scarcity. Similarly, the Nigerian terrorist group, Boko Haram, is believed to have poisoned water sources, resulting in the death of cattle as well as the displacement of populations. Not only do terrorist acts targeting water or the water infrastructure directly affect populations, but they can also contribute to pollution.

References

Cooley SWet al (2021) Human alteration of global surface water storage variability. Nature.

Konikow LF (2013) Groundwater depletion in the United States (1900-2008): Scientific Investigations Report 2013-U.S. Geological Survey. https://doi.org/10.3133/sir20135079

Levy MC, Neely WR, Borsa AA et al (2020) Fine-scale spatiotemporal variation in subsidence across California’s San Joaquin Valley explained by groundwater demand. Environmental Research Letters 16.

Loch A, Perez-Blanco CD, Carmody E (2020) Grand theft water and the calculus of compliance. Nature Sustainability 3: 1012-1018.

Qin Y, Abatzoglou JT, Siebert S (2020) Agricultural risks from changing snowmelt. Nature Climate Change 10: 459-465.

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