Book Review: The Age of Wood: Our Most Useful Material & the Construction of Civilization

Preface. This is a book review, mainly with excerpts, of Ennos’s book “The Age of Wood. Our Most Useful Material and the Construction of Civilization”. If you know anything about woodworking, you will enjoy the detailed descriptions of how and why wood is so versatile and how various objects are made with wood, from wheels to cathedrals.

Wood was essential towards the evolution of us becoming homo sapiens, not just for fires, but all kinds of tools and weapons, that archeologists ignore  in favor of stone and metal since wood objects composted long ago. Even today, wood is essential in our fossil-fueled world.   And in the past, many wooden inventions transformed civilizations, wooden wheels, ships for war and trade, musical instruments, myriad tools, furniture, and barrels, which were the equivalent of tin cans, plastic bottles, and shipping containers today.

My book, Life after fossil fuels explains why we will return to the age of wood as our energy source and infrastructure, which all civilizations before fossil fuels was based on.  If I’d read it before publication, some of the material in it would have been cited in my book.  And if you are trying to preserve knowledge for our postcarbon future, this would be a good one to have on the shelf.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Ennos R (2021) The Age of Wood: Our Most Useful Material and the Construction of Civilization.

Wood and Human Evolution

For so long history and the story of humanity have been defined by stone, bronze, and iron, it’s time to recognize the equally important role wood played, and still does.

Anthropologists wax lyrical about the developments of stone tools, and the intellectual and motor skills needed to shape them, while brushing aside the importance of the digging sticks, spears, and bows and arrows with which early humans actually obtained their food. Archaeologists downplay the role wood fires played in enabling modern humans to cook their food and smelt metals. Technologists ignore the way in which new metal tools facilitated better woodworking to develop the groundbreaking new technologies of wheels and plank ships. And architectural historians ignore the crucial role of wood in roofing medieval cathedrals, insulating country houses, and underpinning whole cities.

Wood is the one material that has provided continuity in our long evolutionary and cultural story, from apes moving about the forest, through spear-throwing hunter-gatherers and ax-wielding farmers to roof-building carpenters and paper-reading scholars. The foundations of our relationship with wood lie in its remarkable properties. As an all-round structural material, it is unmatched. It is lighter than water, yet weight for weight is as stiff, strong, and tough as steel and can resist both being stretched and compressed. It is easy to shape, as it readily splits along the grain, and is soft enough to carve, especially when green. It can be found in pieces large enough to hold up houses, yet can be cut up into tools as small as a toothpick. It can last for centuries if it is kept permanently dry or wet, yet it can also be burned to keep us warm, to cook our food, and drive a wide range of industrial processes. With all these advantages, the central role of wood in the human story was not just explicable, but inevitable.

The key to getting a better grip on a smooth surface is not to use a hard material such as a claw, but a soft one, such as skin.  We could cover our finger pads with a biological rubber such as elastin, but this would wear away too fast. The solution evolved by primates is more ingenious: we use a soft internal fluid within our finger pads and surround it by a stiffer lining—producing a structure rather like a partially deflated car tire. Beneath the tips of our fingers are pads of fat, which deform easily to allow a large surface area of the more rigid surrounding skin to make contact.

This arrangement gives us an excellent grip on hard surfaces such as glass, ten times as good as that of hard hooves or claws—explaining why we remain sure-footed on smooth concrete and tiles, whereas horses are prone to slip in their stables, and panicking dogs often scrabble about on the kitchen floor. Also we have ridges known as fingerprints. On smooth materials such as glass, this makes our grip worse, since it reduces the area of contact, just as grooved tires in racing cars have poorer grip in the dry than slicks. However, fingerprints do give some important advantages. They can improve our grip in the wet (just like grooved tires) since they can channel away the surface film of water, and also on rough surfaces, such as branches, since the ridges interlock with ones in the bark. And the skin ridges where our touch receptors are located can magnify strains and so improve the sensitivity of our fingers. Finally, the alternation of strong ridges with flexible troughs in the skin allow it to deform smoothly when we grip an object, preventing blistering.

Primatologists are learning that the reason monkeys increased in size as they evolved was related to changes in their diets. Bush babies and their relatives the lorises are insectivores; they eat insects and other invertebrates, which are hard to find, hard to catch, and rather small. Insects provide enough energy to support a bush baby. However, a larger creature would be no better at finding, catching, and eating insects, but the amount of energy it would have to expend moving about to do so would be much greater.  Other possibilities for primates include eating leaves or fruit

A leaf-eating primate has to eat huge quantities of young leaves and hold them for days in its stomach to detoxify and digest them; this limits its energy intake. Leaf-eating monkeys tend to be large, potbellied animals with a slow metabolism and limited intelligence—they cannot afford to develop a large brain, but then again, as leaves aren’t hard to find, they don’t need to!

Those primates that changed their diet to eat fruit rather than leaves also tended to get bigger because fruit is plentiful in rain forests and is full of energy. With so many different types of trees in tropical rain forests, each species is widely scattered through the forest. Moreover, because of the lack of seasonality, trees can fruit at any time. Trees that are in fruit are rare and hard to find.

So fruit-eating primates not only have to be able to spot when fruits are ripe, they also have to be able to remember where fruiting trees are located within the forest, and to predict when they are likely to fruit, so they can get to them before the fruit is eaten by other animals. Consequently fruit-eating animals have to hold a great deal of information in their heads, mapping the world in space and time. Field studies and experiments on captive fruit-eating primates have shown that they can remember the location of large numbers of fruiting trees and compute accurate routes to travel rapidly and economically to the next tree to ripen. So it is no surprise to find that fruit-eating primates such as macaques and spider monkeys have brains that are on average about 25% bigger than those of their leaf-eating cousins, the langurs and howler monkeys. This has enabled them to develop more sophisticated social behavior and live in more cohesive groups.

The intelligence of monkeys’ pales in comparison with that of our closest relatives, the great apes: orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos, whose brains are twice as large relative to their body weight. Most primatologists believe the apes acquired their larger brains to help them communicate with and manipulate their peers.

An orangutan would probably be killed by a fall from the canopy that would scarcely harm a small monkey. It struck me then that the early apes might have also evolved larger brains to help them navigate safely around their perilous arboreal environment and allow them to plan and follow the best routes through the trees. To do this they would also have had to develop a self-image; they would have to realize that their body weight altered their mechanical world by bending down the branches that were supporting them. In other words, their intelligence had a physical basis, not a social one: a feeling for the mechanical properties of wood.   Many years later I was surprised and pleased to learn that my idea was now a bona fide theory of the evolution of intelligence in apes—the “clambering hypothesis” of Daniel Povinelli and John Cant. Since the publication of their hypothesis in 1995, other field-workers have built up evidence that orangutans, in particular, do have a high level of understanding of the mechanics of trees.

Understanding the mechanics of tree branches gives the great apes another advantage: they can use them to construct a nest in which they can safely sleep. All the great apes are capable of making themselves complex cup-shaped nests in the tree canopy, while monkeys sit on as thick a branch as they can find, resting their weight on pads of skin that develop on their buttocks, but even so they repeatedly wake up throughout the night. An ape, sleeping within a broad, cup-shaped nest, is far safer and can sleep for longer periods and more deeply.

This is reflected in the neural activity in sleeping monkeys and sleeping apes. The apes have more frequent bouts of both NREM (non–rapid eye movement) and REM (rapid eye movement) sleep. These types of sleep are important in reordering and fixing memories, which can in turn help improve cognitive ability. Building nests could have helped apes get even cleverer.

It might seem to be a simple task to construct a nest, and that certainly appears to be what primatologists have thought, as they have given them scant attention. But it is not just a matter of breaking a few branches off and weaving them together. It is nearly impossible to snap a living branch off a tree by bending it. And this is not because the branches are too strong, but because the structure of wood affects how it breaks.

Wood is eight to ten times stronger longitudinally than transversely, and most types of wood are also 20–50% stronger in the radial direction than in the tangential. This pattern matches the forces the wood has to withstand. The high strength and stiffness of wood along the grain enables it to withstand the bending forces to which tree trunks and branches are subjected by gravity and the wind.  This structural arrangement also makes it almost impossible to detach a living branch. If you bend a branch of green wood, what you are doing is stretching the wood on the convex side, and compressing the wood on the concave side. In a typical branch the wood will fail first in tension, and the branch will start to break across, like a carrot or stick of celery. But it won’t break all the way. As the crack reaches the center of the branch, it gets diverted, traveling up and down the weak center line of the branch,

An orangutan would find a good strong horizontal branch to rest on, then construct its nest around this support. First, it would lean out and with one hand draw thick branches in toward itself, breaking them in greenstick fracture and hinging them inward, before finally weaving the branches together. The result was a cup-shaped elliptical nest around four feet long and two and a half feet wide. Sitting in the completed structure, the ape would reach out to grab thinner branches and, holding them in two hands, first break them in greenstick fracture, then twist them to break the two ends apart. It then stuffed the broken branches, complete with twigs and leaves, into the nest, behind and around itself to produce a mattress and a pillow, and finally on its lap to produce a blanket. The whole process was remarkably rapid. In Julia’s film, the male ape took only five minutes to build his nest, and half of that time was spent resting between the two stages.  It takes young orangutans years of observing their mothers and practicing by themselves for them to perfect their constructions. And orangutans are the only other great ape that walks more or less upright and with straight legs like us.

Our ancestors gained their ability to walk bipedally when they still lived in the trees. Moreover, it is becoming clear that far from striding out immediately into the plains, our ancestors remained in well-wooded regions and stayed in the canopy long after they had become able to walk upright. We have already seen that orangutans frequently walk upright along narrow branches, and that when they do so, they also cling to higher branches with their hands. As an animal puts its foot down, the branch moves downward under its weight, storing energy, before springing up again and returning that energy. The orangutan could therefore bounce along the branch almost effortlessly, like a person walking on a trampoline.  By holding on to branches could help an animal overcome another major difficulty of evolving bipedalism: keeping its balance.

It seems that it was only with the emergence of Homo erectus, less than 2 million years ago, that humans became fully adapted to a terrestrial lifestyle. What previously was continuous tropical and monsoon forest has opened up, the trees unable to cope with the longer dry seasons except in the damper soils along river valleys. Clearly, this change in vegetation was bad news for forest-dwelling apes.  They would have been forced to the forest floor, first of all to travel between the scattered trees, but also in search of other types of food to supplement their diet of fruit, such as eating the termites that abound in savannas, raiding honey from bees’ nests, and hunting small mammals such as bush babies. Like the chimps, they probably fashioned wooden tools, such as probes, chisels, and spears to do this, and maybe used stone hammers to break open the hard nuts and seeds that the new types of drought-tolerant plants produced. But their main source of food in the dry season, like modern-day hunter-gatherers such as the Hadza people of Tanzania, who live in similar savanna woodland, would have been underground roots and bulbs.

Roots are strongly defended. First, plants protect them mechanically, by incorporating tough fibers within them. Both the early australopiths and Homo habilis developed their dentition to cope with these mechanical defenses. Later australopiths, such as Paranthropus boisei and Paranthropus robustus, also developed large sagittal crests on the top of their heads, rather like ones you can see on modern hyenas, which acted as the insertion points of huge jaw muscles. It is thought that this would have helped them grind up the tough roots and crack open hard nuts and seeds.

Plants also defend their underground storage organs chemically, by incorporating astringent chemicals to precipitate out digestive enzymes, and toxins to poison consumers. Australopiths developed large guts to help digest this difficult food. They must have been potbellied, just like proboscis monkeys. But the main difficulty in eating roots is accessing this subsoil resource in the first place. Baboons, the only primates that currently live on the African plains, use their hands to dig in the soil, but they can only reach shallow bulbs and corms. Warthogs use their impressive tusks to dig a bit deeper. The hominins would have had to develop a new technology to access even longer, deeper roots.

The digging sticks used by modern-day hunter-gatherers, such as the women of the Hadza tribe, are even larger and more sophisticated. They cut sticks that are over a yard in length, an inch and a half thick, and weigh anything from one to two pounds. Their favorite ekwa hasa roots are around four feet long and highly nutritious. The Hadza women dig them up by pounding the pointed end of their sticks into the soil to break it up and levering out the loosened soil with a digging motion; the process is so efficient that the women can collect enough roots in a few hours for the daily needs of their band.

There must have been strong selection pressure in early hominins to learn how to break off and prepare thicker, longer, and stronger sticks. This may have driven them to develop new stone tools with sharp edges that could saw through wooden branches and whittle the ends into points. To do this, and to handle the digging sticks effectively, they would also have had to evolve stronger gripping hands with fully opposable thumbs.  Its strength, stiffness, and toughness is down to the molecular structure of the cell walls themselves. The cell walls are stiffened by crystalline microfibrils of cellulose, which are embedded in a softer matrix of hemicellulose that is stabilized by a polymer called lignin.  When the cell wall finally breaks, the fibrils uncoil like a stretched spring, creating a rough fracture surface with thousands of tiny hairlike fibrils projecting out of the wood. This process absorbs huge amounts of energy, making wood around a hundred times as tough as fiberglass, and giving wood its resistance to fracture. It’s the reason why trees stand up so well to hurricanes that can destroy more rigid man-made structures, and why wooden boats are far more resistant to bumps than fiberglass ones.

But the early hominins would also have been helped by the first of two incredibly fortuitous properties of wood, properties that are of no actual benefit to the trees that make it. If wood is broken off a tree and starts to dry out, its mechanical properties improve! This is most unusual for biological materials; bones, horn, and nails all get weaker and more brittle as they desiccate. At the 60% relative humidity of the savanna dry season, the water content of wood typically drops from 30% to 12% and its stiffness triples. Early hominins would have made use of this transformation – a fully dried stick would be able to dig a hole around 50% deeper than a green stick.

It seems puzzling that they continued to return to the trees; there must have been a major problem that prevented them from coming down permanently. Looking at the present-day African plains, it is clear what that problem must have been: they would have been extremely vulnerable to being eaten by predators such as saber-toothed cats, scimitar-toothed cats, and the ancestors of present-day lions and hyenas.  Baboons are the only large primates that live on the plains of Africa, and they have real problems with predation. Compared to early hominins, they are physically far better able to defend themselves; they have huge canine teeth, and a fully grown male may weigh as much as ninety pounds, more than a match for many large cats. Even so, baboons have to live together in groups of 20 to 200 individuals to protect one another, and yet they still get a rotten night’s rest. Even when they are living in zoos, baboons wake up 18 times a night, only sleep for 60% of their rest period, and get into deep REM sleep only around 10% of the time. This contrasts with 18% of the time for chimpanzees, which sleep in nests, and 22% for modern humans.

The only plausible way that our ancestors could have protected themselves on the ground at night from predators was by using fire. This is where the second of wood’s fortuitous properties comes in: it is flammable, especially when dry, and when it is burned, it releases a large amount of heat and light. The flammability of wood is of no use to trees; it’s just another fortunate accident that it does burn, though most living trees, especially ones growing in rain forests, are extremely resistant to being set alight.

The cell walls of living wood contain a lot of water, around 30% of their dry weight, and the cell lumens in the sapwood around the outside of the trunk and branches are filled with water; a tree trunk can therefore contain three times its dry weight of loose water. Before wood can burn, all this water has to be heated up and evaporated off, which requires as much as a third of the energy that is released when the wood finally burns. Cell wall material is chemically stable, even at temperatures above 212°F; the lignin keeps the cellulose fibers rigidly bound together, which explains why we can’t cook wood and make it into a useful food by boiling it!

Starting fires without matches or firelighters is no easy business. The usual methods employed by modern hunter-gatherers are either to generate heat by rubbing sticks together, or to make sparks by striking flints against each other. It is unlikely that early hominins would have been able to do either.

Predators such as cheetahs and birds of prey are drawn to bush fires, feeding on the small mammals and birds that are flushed out in a panic by the flames. Savanna chimpanzees are also attracted to fires, gathering the cooked seeds of bean trees and eating them. From following and using naturally occurring fires it is a small step to keeping those fires alight.  They simply carry smoldering logs with them as they travel about the bush, lighting fires when they need them. And from keeping fire alight in smoldering logs, it is only another small step to keep a fire burning at a permanent camp, and building it up at night to repel predators.

Setting up a permanent camp, and being able to sit together around the campfire, would have had other advantages. It would help to keep the hominins warmer during the cool nights typical of savanna regions. The light from the fire would also help lengthen the time when individuals could carry out tasks such as making and mending tools. There would also be opportunities for a greater variety of social interactions: sharing food and exchanging information. Having a permanent fire would help speed up the evolution of both practical and social skills.

The advantages of cooking are perhaps best shown by what happens to those human health fanatics who eat only raw food. Even if they grind up their food carefully before eating it, raw foodists have problems in digesting what they eat and invariably lose weight and conditioning. Typical weight loss is around forty-four pounds for men and fifty-five pounds for women.

The Naked Ape & the sweating hypothesis

Hairlessness is an extremely unusual trait for terrestrial mammals: only the naked mole rat comes to mind.  A newly hairless hominin would have had to produce more melanin to absorb the harmful ultraviolet rays, turning its skin black.  It has been at least 1.2 million years since hominins lost their hair in our ancestor Homo erectus

But what drove hair loss? The generally accepted explanation among anthropologists is that losing hair allowed early humans to keep cool in the hot savanna regions into which they had moved (and it still is the main hypothesis). So effective is heat removal by sweating that anthropologists have gone on to suggest that losing our hair was crucial for another advance in the evolution of humans: the ability to hunt large animals.

But it is not certain that it is hairlessness that gives the San Bushmen the advantage; two other mammalian predators also hunt in this way in savannas, African hunting dogs and spotted hyenas, and both of them are covered all over with hair like the prey they hunt. In fact, endurance hunting is rare in hunter-gatherer societies, maybe because it has the disadvantage that though the hunter can keep cool by sweating, by doing so he loses large amounts of water.

The hunting hypothesis suggests that early men could run farther and for longer in the heat of the day than prey animals because sweating would keep them cooler for longer. If they tracked their prey for long enough, their prey would eventually overheat and become immobilized. But wait, that’s a problem, for example,  US army recruits have been known to lose over four quarts of water per hour when exercising in the desert. The resulting dehydration can be fatal if weight losses exceed 2% of body weight. Nowadays hunters can carry water bottles with them to keep up their fluid levels, but there is no guarantee that early humans had invented vessels that were capable of carrying water.

The sweating hypothesis has a more fundamental problem, one rarely mentioned by anthropologists. In the heat of the day a naked body would actually absorb more heat than one covered in hair, meaning it would need to be more actively cooled. You might think that this would only occur when the air temperature exceeds our body temperature of 98.6°F, when heat would enter our bodies via convection. This only rarely happens in savannas, where the mean daytime maximum temperature is usually around 84°F. However, this leaves out the most important mode of heat transfer between our bodies and the environment: radiation. On a hot sunny day a hairless human body will absorb long-wave radiation emitted from the hot ground, and even more important, the much larger amount of short-wave radiation (mostly light) that comes from the sun. On such a day the net radiation entering our bodies can amount to around 670 watts per square yard, much more than the amount of energy we ourselves generate. The layers of hair follicles on a hairy animal will shield it from practically all of this radiation, so while the surface of its pelt might be hot, its skin remains at body temperature. For this reason, most savanna mammals are hairier than their cousins that live in dense forest and tend to have particularly dense hair on their upper flanks to ward off the sun’s rays. Protected by their heavy fur coats, they have to use far less water to keep themselves cool than naked humans.

In deserts the problems of keeping cool in the daytime are most acute. It is noteworthy, then, that those “ships of the desert,” the camels, have particularly heavy coats of hair on their upper flanks, while their human riders cover themselves with loose flowing robes. The shielding effect of hair also helps explain why humans have maintained a dense covering of hair on the tops of our heads; it helps us keep our most vital organ—our brains—cool.

The importance of hair in thermo-regulating our brain was driven home to many English cricket supporters back in 1994, when the English all-rounder Chris Lewis shaved his head at the start of a tour of the West Indies. He promptly went down with sunstroke So important is our head hair in keeping our brains cool that the human races that inhabit hotter parts of the world, such as Native Americans and Africans, have lower rates of male-pattern baldness than the Caucasian inhabitants of the cool regions

And you may have spotted another problematical aspect of the hunter hypothesis: its inbuilt sexism. The researchers who have investigated this theory (almost all men) have concentrated on an activity, hunting, that they have assumed was also carried out entirely by men. They totally ignored the contribution of women, who, they assume, spent much of their time “gathering” or perhaps simply waiting for the men to bring home their catch. They do not explain how hairlessness would have helped the women dig up roots, make fires, or cook. Indeed, according to the theory, women should actually be hairier than men since they would not have had such great cooling demands on their metabolism, whereas the reverse is true.

Several scientists have championed an alternative hypothesis, one that was first put forward in 1874 by the naturalist Thomas Belt, and one that applies to both sexes: that humans lost their hair to reduce their ectoparasite load. The reasoning is that hair loss occurred because early humans were now living and sleeping together in semipermanent camps, rather than in solitary nests.

Ectoparasites would therefore be more likely to build up around the camp and become more of a problem. It is certainly true that before the advent of modern insecticides, we were highly troubled by such parasites. Our mattresses were infested by bedbugs, our head hair by lice, and pubic hair by crab lice. Moreover, humans are the only one of the 193 species of monkeys and apes to have its own species of flea, Pulex irritans, something that is only possible because we live in permanent settlements; the larvae fall to the floor and live on organic debris in our houses, guaranteed to find new humans to bite once they have emerged from their pupae as adults.

Ectoparasites are not only irritating and suck our blood; they also carry dangerous infectious diseases such as typhus, various forms of spotted fever, and bubonic plague. There would therefore have been strong selection pressure on any morphological feature in early humans that would have reduced the ectoparasites’ numbers. The ectoparasite theory suggests that the best way to do this was to lose our body hair. in World War I it was found that cutting soldiers’ hair shorter greatly reduced the buildup of head lice.

Reducing the length and thickness of our hair not only makes it easier to visually spot fleas and lice on our skin; recent research by Isabelle Dean and Michael Siva-Jothy of the University of Sheffield, England, has also shown that our fine body hairs act as excellent movement detectors, allowing us to feel where the parasites are. Finally, the theory also provides a satisfying explanation of why women are less hairy than men: staying longer at camp than the men, they may have been more prone to being loaded with parasites.

Whichever hypothesis you favor, the benefits would have had to be large enough to overcome a serious disadvantage of nakedness. Naked Homo erectus individuals would have suffered from a quite different thermoregulatory problem than overheating during the day: they would have been extremely prone to getting cold at night.

All warm-blooded animals have a range of air temperatures at which they are comfortable and at which they can keep their core body temperature constant without having to raise their resting metabolism. Within these temperatures they can regulate their body heat merely by changing their behavior—by curling up, for instance, or stretching out. As you might expect from what I have outlined above, our upper critical temperature is quite low, around 97°F, even in deep shade, and our lower critical temperature is high, around 77°F. We could be comfortable living naked in a rain forest, therefore, where air temperatures range around 82°F–90°F (and rain forest tribes consequently tend to wear few clothes), but not elsewhere.

At night in the Serengeti it can effectively feel more like 43°F–50°F; tourists to the region are advised to bring sweaters and jackets for the cool evenings. A naked Homo erectus living 1.2 million years ago on the open plains of East Africa would therefore have got cold at night and have had disturbed sleep. There are three possible ways out of this conundrum

Early humans could have huddled around the fires that they built and maintained overnight for protection from predators. Most of us have sat around campfires sometime in our youth, and they certainly warm the side that faces the fire. However, the side of our bodies that faces away from the fire and the top of our shoulders, which face the sky, can get cold. Out in the open our bodies also lose heat rapidly to the cold ground.

Another way they could have kept warm is to have used animal skins as bedclothes. However, it is difficult to believe that physical evolution could have been moving one way—making people colder—while behavioral evolution at the same time had to try to make up for it. Besides, the first actual physical evidence for clothes, or the tools such as needles needed to make them, comes far later in the story of humans—scraped hide 300,000 years ago, and sewn clothes just 20,000 years ago.

It is far more likely that the Homo erectus were already doing something that would help keep them warm at night before they lost their hair; at their campsites they were already building shelters that helped protect them from the rain, shelters that would also have helped keep them warm. They would certainly have a good incentive to do this in the rainy season. None of the great apes like getting wet; Sumatran orangutans, for instance, often make second nests directly above their sleeping nests and use them as canopies to keep off the rain. For early humans, long used to building sleeping nests on which they rested, it would not have been a problem to construct simple huts to shelter themselves. Indeed, many tribes of hunter-gatherers still build small semipermanent huts from thin branches that they cut off savanna trees; they insert the thick ends of the branches into a ring of postholes in the ground and fasten them together at the top in the same way that apes weave their nests together. The frames are then covered with leaves or skins or even coated in mud.  The huts of modern hunter-gatherers fall apart within a few weeks or months of being abandoned and leave no trace.

You might think that flimsy wooden huts would provide little warmth, since cold air could rapidly penetrate such a drafty structure, but they can be quite effective, and anything that shields us from the cold night sky helps.  Even sleeping under trees provides more warmth, one reason the hunter-gatherers of the Hadza tribe of Tanzania still sleep beneath trees during the dry season. Largely because the huts cut down air currents and shielded them from the cold night sky, sleeping inside a hut would feel 8°F–10°F warmer than outside, enough to allow for a comfortable night’s sleep.

Because early hominins were sleeping inside wooden huts they could afford to lose their body hair. And this would in turn have made us even more dependent on our practical woodworking skills, to make fires and build ever-more-elaborate shelters, and eventually to use other materials to make sheets and clothing. Paradoxically, as we got better at these activities, we would have started to be able to colonize cooler climates. Becoming hairless forced us to become more ingenious and to rely on our intelligence to help us manipulate our environment, rather than have to adapt to it as other animals do. It would have helped a fairly feeble primate conquer the world.

Stone & wood tools

The study of stone tools has dominated anthropology and archaeology ever since 1831, when the Danish antiquarian Christian Thomsen introduced the concept of classifying the “ages of man” according to their dominant materials—stone, bronze, and iron.  Archaeologists have spent huge amounts of time and effort classifying stone tools, arranging them in chronological order, replicating their manufacture and use, and following their development. In doing so, they cemented in place a worldview in which the lives of our early ancestors, and in particular their material culture, was dominated by their relationship with stone. It was generally assumed that early “Stone Age” men were the first to produce tools; that the first tools were made of stone; that stone tools dominated their world; and that the sophistication of early stone tools demonstrated the mental superiority of early humans.

Stone tools were the only human artifacts that appeared to have survived from the time of early hominins; anything made of organic materials—skin, plant fibers, or wood—had long since vanished. However, in the last 50 years new discoveries by primatologists and anthropologists mean that we now know that none of the assumptions made by nineteenth-century archaeologists are valid.

Apes produce a wide range of tools, so humans cannot be exalted over other animals because they were the first toolmakers. Most ape tools —spears, chisels, digging sticks, and nests—are made of wood, not stone, and it is highly likely that early hominins would have inherited their woodworking skills from the apes. So the first tools used by early hominins would have been made of wood, not stone. The reconstructions of the lives of early hominins that have been made by devotees of stone make it obvious that they used mainly wooden tools—to hunt animals, to dig up plant roots, and to construct shelters—and that they burned wood to keep off predators, keep themselves warm, and cook their food. If we cast our mind back to those dioramas in local museums, for instance, most of the tools they depict were actually made of wood. The men had wooden spears to kill game and used wooden poles to hang it from, and back at camp the women were standing beside wooden huts and cooking their food over wood fires. Stone tools were only used to butcher the animals that had already been killed and to scrape their hides to make skins.

Finally, the first stone tools were hardly sophisticated objects, particularly if we compare them with the artfully constructed nests of apes. The earliest ones, the Oldowan tools, which date from 3.2–2.5 million years ago, often resemble random pebbles, and even the flakes produced by the Acheulean technology, which emerged 2.2 million years ago, are pretty rough and ready. After all they were produced rapidly, simply by hammering two lumps of stone together, or by hitting a piece of stone with a bone or a log of wood. Hand axes, which were first produced around 2 million years ago, certainly look more impressive and show evidence for the first time of clear design. However, even hand axes can be made in as little as 20 minutes and are essentially just tear-shaped flakes of rock with two edges. Their design remained largely unchanged for hundreds of thousands of years, so their manufacture demonstrates little evidence of intellectual progress.

Only much later, with the sophisticated retouching techniques that were developed in the Upper Paleolithic period, around one hundred thousand years ago, did stone tools become sophisticated enough to impress any small child that we might have brought into the museum. Only then did humans shape blades that actually look like modern daggers, harpoons, and barbed arrowheads. So stone tools were by no means as novel or central to the life of early humans as has been assumed.

In any branch of learning, once a culture is established, it seems to be hard for those initiated into it to break free. Anthropologists have continued to this day to overemphasize the importance of stone tools and ignore those made from other materials.

The properties of stones result from their composition; they are made up of crystals or amorphous blocks of inorganic chemicals. In typical igneous rocks, such as granite and dolomite, these have solidified from a molten state, while in flint they have precipitated out from solution. Sedimentary rocks, such sandstones and shales, are composed of bits of igneous rock that have been pressed together, while chalk and limestone are made from the fossilized inorganic skeletons of dead organisms. The strong bonds between the atoms make stone extremely stiff and hard. This makes it ideal as an impact tool. If you use a stone to strike a nut or hit a piece of bone, it’s the nut or the bone that will deform more, and all the kinetic energy in the stone will be used to break them. None will be absorbed by the stone. However, if two stones are hit together, the energy has nowhere else to go, and cracks will readily run through or between the crystals, breaking one or both stones. Stone is brittle and breaks easily, and if there are no predetermined lines of weakness, as in flint, hitting the stones together in the right way can create fractures in a predicted direction, creating sharp edges. The hardness of stone makes these edges ideal for cutting; they can withstand the large compressive stresses set up as the sharp point is pressed into or slid across a softer material such as flesh or even bone and slice through it. This is why sharp flint tools are ideally suited to butchering animals and scraping skins.

The brittleness of stone has a major downside, though. It makes the material weak in tension, since small surface cracks can readily run through the whole stone; rods of stone, just like sticks of blackboard chalk, are easily snapped. Stone knives therefore need to be short and thick to prevent their blades from being loaded in tension, and even if a stone spear could be fashioned, it would be far too delicate to use; it would fall apart at its first throw.

In contrast, we have already seen that wood has evolved in trees to be strong in both compression and tension, and extremely tough along the grain, which is why tree trunks and branches are so good at resisting bending. Dried wooden branches have even better properties, being just as strong and tough as green wood, and three times as stiff. They are, therefore, ideal for making digging sticks and spears: they are rigid and strong in bending, so they don’t flex or break when subjected to bending force; they are tough enough to withstand impacts; and they are still hard enough to pierce skin or soil. They are also relatively easy to make; they can be shaped when the wood is green, when it is still soft enough to be cut, carved, and finished.

It’s thoroughly predictable, therefore, that most of the large tools that the early hominins used were made of wood and only the small cutting tools were made of stone. Their huts would essentially have been inverted versions of the nests built by their ape cousins, and their spears and digging sticks would have been similar to those created and used by savanna chimps. And there was probably little difference in the planning involved in producing wooden and stone tools. The tools that modern apes create are made for the moment and used immediately, either to sleep, dig, or hunt, and they are hardly modified at all from branches and twigs.

The increasing success of humans is best explained by their development of their wooden tools, particularly their weapons. The first real intellectual advance that hominins made must have occurred when our ancestors started to use stone tools not just to process their kills but to construct wooden tools. This would have had to happen when early hominins moved onto the savannas. They would have needed to make thicker digging sticks to get at roots and tubers in the dry season, and larger spears to hunt game bigger than bush babies. And they would have had to use larger branches to construct the huts in which they sheltered.

The first fully terrestrial hominin, Homo erectus, would not have been able to do this without using tools. With their small incisors, they would not have been able to sharpen their spears and digging sticks, and having less powerful arms than their arboreal ancestors, they would not have been able to break off big enough branches to make their shelters. They would have needed to use stone scrapers to sharpen the points of their tools, and to use stone knives, axes, or saws to cut off branches. Homo erectus would have had to become the world’s first carpenters. In doing so they would be the first primates to make a tool not just for immediate use, but to make another tool.

The chimp fashions every aspect of its spear where and when it will be used. It strips off the leaves and side branches of the branch with its hands and sharpens the thin end with its teeth. When hominins made a spear using a hand ax, their actual actions are not necessarily more complex, but the process did involve two separate sets of actions that could take place at different times and places: making a hand ax, and then using it to make the spear. The whole process therefore involved not only integrating information from the past, using so-called working memory, but also imagining future actions, using what has been called constructive memory.

Making the chimp’s spear involves 14 steps, which acted on three “foci,” the chimp itself, the prey item, and the tool. In contrast, the human spear took 29 steps, acting on eight foci. The complexity of the task had been more than doubled.  Early humans may have carried around hand axes that were made by someone else. The process might, therefore, also show evidence of greater social organization, not just better individual mental capacity, within Homo erectus.

We have found no actual wooden objects for the first million years following those first signs of woodworking, so we do not know what tools Homo erectus made. This has led many anthropologists to doubt the importance of wooden tools, and in particular to doubt the hunting capability of these early humans.  They often thought that hominins might until recently have been at best opportunistic scavengers, only able to rob the carcasses of large herbivores, maybe acting together with small stabbing spears to drive away other carnivores from the prize.

Only when humans colonized the cooler, wetter parts of the globe did conditions allow wooden tools to be preserved. One of the main reasons we have such a fine archaeological record of early humans in Europe is that the wet, acidic peat soils that accumulate in the colder regions protect organic materials such as wood from rotting and preserve them surprisingly intact.  The earliest recorded wooden tool is the Clacton Spear, 450,000 years old.

The sheer number of spears and corpses that have been found suggested that some sites must have been an ambush area; the early humans, who would have belonged either to the species Homo heidelbergensis or to our even closer relative Homo neanderthalensis, must have acted together in a group to cut off the horses between dry land and water before slaughtering them, though the horses had probably not all been killed at the same time. Altogether, the finds speak volumes of the sophistication of these early humans. They were not only capable of fine carving, of being able to imagine the shape of the spears within the trees and shape them with stone tools, but were also able to organize themselves into efficient hunting parties, to exploit the behavior of their prey animals, and kill them safely from a distance.

A major finding 1990 was that rather than relying on a sharp wooden point, Neanderthals and early Homo sapiens started to haft a sharp stone tool, rather like a hand ax, to the front of their spears, cutting a groove in the end to receive it, and holding the blade in place using a combination of animal glue and sinew binding. The manufacture of composite spears was therefore extremely complex, with several separate tasks or “modules”—preparing the rope; boiling up the glue; shaping the stone point; and cutting the groove in the handle—even before the final assembly. This shows even greater organizational and technical ability and intelligence on the part of the Neanderthals. I find it hard to imagine that I would be able to carry out such a complex task without lengthy training.

The experimenters were clearly expecting the stone-tipped spears to be better at penetrating flesh, they found little evidence of this. Both wood and stone are harder than skin, so they both cut through it with ease. In some studies, the wooden tips even penetrated farther than the stone ones, though there was some evidence that the wider stone blades could cause damage over a greater volume of flesh.

Composite spears have the disadvantage that the brittle stone tip is more prone to snapping off, so they would need mending more often. The real advantage may have been due to the higher density of the stone. The heavy tip of the spear would bring its center of gravity forward, enabling it to be thrown effectively, while it could also be held and used as a stabbing spear. Composite spears could therefore act both at close quarters and at a distance and be used as both offensive and defensive weapons.

But both wooden javelins and composite spears have a limited killing range. The shortness of our arms means that we need to contract our arm muscles much faster than at their optimal speed to move the hand holding the spear forward and upward. Furthermore, of all the energy used to accelerate our arms and hands, around half is wasted. This limits the speed we can impart to a hand-thrown object, so few people can throw spears of any type more than thirty yards. Fortunately, though, our ancestors developed several ways to overcome this problem and make themselves into more efficient hunters; and most of them did so using techniques that worked by artificially extending the length of their arms.

Early humans threw their javelins with the aid of leather thongs called amenta, which they looped over two fingers. It is also becoming clear that from around twenty-three thousand years ago Upper Paleolithic Homo sapiens did much the same, but using a special tool to hold the string. From the beginning of the twentieth century, archaeologists had been unearthing decorated rods of wood or antler into which a hole had been drilled toward the wider end.

In the past, wood craftsmen had many jobs, still seen in the last names from wood-based trades: the Carpenters, Wrights, Wainwrights (who made carts and wagons), Bodgers, Bowyers, Fletchers (arrows), Turners, Bowlers, Coopers, sawyers, Foresters, Colliers (charcoal), Masons, Millers, and Glaziers, Potters, and Smiths (charcoal to heat their furnaces).

Spears, Bows & Arrows

Even better results can be achieved to throw a spear farther and with greater accuracy by using a spear thrower. Also developed in the Upper Paleolithic and still used extensively in Central and South America (where they are called atlatls)

The spear thrower is a simple stick six to 18 inches long with a cup or hook at the far end. To use it, the thrower is held horizontally under the spear, its hook overlapping the back of the shaft, while the hand holds on to the shaft farther forward. The thrower acts as a third joint to the arm, the spear or dart being propelled forward by rotating the thrower forward with the wrist at the same time as the arm. The mechanics is identical to that of the modern dog-ball throwers

Yet another technique to increase the killing range of wooden tools was to use the stick itself as an extension to the arm and rotate it forward as it was thrown, like a person throwing a stick for a dog. This technique is fairly effective at increasing the speed of the stick when it is released, but as the stick tumbles through the air, it slows down far faster than a spear because of the increased aerodynamic drag. These problems were overcome, though, by the people who perfected this method, the Aborigines of Australia. They invented a wide range of boomerangs, all of which have a streamlined cross section to reduce drag and help them fly through the air.

Some (the less crooked ones) are designed to fly straight and can be lethal at up to 200 yards. But of all the ways of improving the killing performance of wooden projectiles, the best is the bow and arrow. This combination was probably first invented some 65,000 years ago in Africa, though evidence from Europe only seems to go back some 20,000 years. Rather than relying on the fast-twitch performance of our arm and shoulder muscles, bows make use of the larger forces and greater energy we can produce when these muscles contract slowly. As we pull back on the string, elastic energy is stored in the bow, which is subsequently released when we let go of the string, propelling the arrow forward.

Bows have three major advantages over all the other techniques we have seen. First, since our muscles can produce more energy when contracting slowly, a bow can release more energy to a projectile, so that arrows can be shot over nine hundred feet.

Second, since a bow is drawn with a slow, smooth movement, it can be aimed far better and is a far more accurate weapon than a spear. Finally, since from the front the archer barely seems to move, she or he is far less conspicuous to prey than a javelin thrower, so the bow and arrow makes a much better stealth weapon.

It takes 102 tasks, spread across 10 subassemblies, to make a complete bow and arrow set. The development of wooden weapons had made us an apex predator, allowing us to inflict a mass extinction on the world around us. Even before we had learned to modify our environment by farming it, we had used wooden tools to kill off mammoths and other magnificent beasts in Asia, North & South America, Australia and Europe.

Clearing forests

Only in the last 60 years have we realized how effective Neolithic polished axes could be at cutting wood and their vital role in our rise to civilization. They help cut down forests, farm, and build towns in wetter areas where burning them down wasn’t possible.  We developed polished stone axes when the climate changed 15,000 years ago to open small clearings in forests where fresh regrowth would attract game and to set up camps.  Sawing is only good for branches of an inch or less, while axes allowed us to cut down trees and build roomy houses out of beams and planks split from tree trunks.  Now we could build boats to venture farther away and trade with other peoples. The earliest boats were canoes dug out of a trunk, and log boats.

Agriculture

After forests could be cleared, crops could be grown.Farming depended on wooden tools as well, wooden digging sticks to plant seeds, spades to dig irrigation canals, and wooden buckets to pour water on crops.  Polished stone tools enabled them to build large homes, fence fields, make furniture, hoseware, boats, and tools.

Coppicing

After using logs and planks from tree trunks to build homes, people discovered coppicing woodlands, which could produce smaller manageable pieces of wood to build homes faster and easily. Many trees don’t die when cut down, but resprout shoots that can be harvested repeatedly (i.e. oak, ash, chestnut, hazel, willow).  After a while rods of consistent diameter and length will grow.  These shoots grow rapidly from the stump that already has a root system supplying the tree with water, and the water doesn’t have to be transported up a tall trunk.  They grow faster than tree branches and more wood per area of ground.  It’s great for firewood and eventually to produce charcoal.  Also since they grow so fast, the leaves are farther apart, making a straighter, stiffer, and stronger piece of wood than a branch.

Coppicing is incredibly energy efficient. In the 1650s, people in England and Wales obtained about 20 terajoules of heat energy a year burning firewood, just over the energy people and farm animals expended on their own metabolism. Burning wood produces about 7.3 megajoules per pound, so that meant about 1.2 million tons of firewood burned a year. A coppiced woodland can produce 2 tons of wood per acre, son only 600,000 acres, or 950 square miles of coppiced woodland, 1.6% of the surface area of England and Wales could produce this much wood.

Peat is another possible fuel, but was even more uneconomic to move and has only have the energy per kilogram as wood with 20% of its density, or 10% of the energy per unit volume. Despite that, the dutch got 25 petajoules of heat from peat, 3 times more energy per person than England, and removing peat exposed rich clay soils which were drained and converted to arable farmland. Peat also fired glassworks, potteries, brickworks, saltworks and more. By by 1700 the easy peat reserves were mostly exhausted.

But growing timber for all the non-fuel uses of wood takes a lot longer.  Forests can produce half as much wood a year, about one ton per acre.  Though still, that meant in 1650 1400 square miles of land, 4% of the land area could meet demand.  And in fact, forests covered about 10% of the land before the industrial revolution, so it would appear to not be a problem.

Wood Transport to cities & industries

But it was. The problem lay in how hard it was to cut and transport the wood to where it was needed.  It is very time-consuming to harvest, cut into usable pieces, and pack into a small space.  Coppiced firewood was cut into relatively straight twigs and bound into faggots 3 feet long with an 8 inch diameter, then put on wagons for transport.  If no rivers were involved, the poor states of roads made wheeled transport even more slow and expensive with exorbitant prices if carried more than a few miles.  So possible for villages and small towns, but impossible as larger towns and cities grew.

So in medieval Europe, larger cities could only exist at ports or on large navigable rivers.  In the largest city on the continent, Paris, the whole Seine River basis was adapted to allow the rafting of wood.  The same was trye on the Rhine where enormous rafts were floated. By the end of the 18th century, Dutch rafts could be 400 yards long and 90 yards wide.

Any more wood for industries was impossible to provide, so industries lay well outside of cities, where the forests were.  Glassmakers used potash from burning beech trees, soap with potash and animal fats, gunpowder from alder wood charcoal.  And the largest industry, the ironworks, were located where there was both iron ore and forests, with the iron smelted from charcoal of oak, beech, and hazel.

Metal Smelting

Ironically, metals made people even more reliant wood and used far more of it to smelt metals.  We were already heating clay to waterproof it.  The first clay pots were found in East Asia about 10 to 20,000 years ago. With waterproof pots, we could store food and liquids, and cook food on fires. We also learned how to make bricks.  To make really good pots, bricks, smelt metal, and around 2300 BC glass, required charcoal, which created temperatures up to 1800 F.

Metal axes were far superior to the old polished stone axes, and allowed people to make precise joints such as the mortise and tenon, overlapping joints, and dovetails, allowing plank ships and wheels to be constructed.   Finally boats that had watertight joints could be created and ships made much larger and more stable.  The Roman Empire couldn’t have existed without the huge plank ships that transported wheat from Egypt to Rome.

Charcoal

Only at around 400°F does heat start to break the wood down. The huge polymer molecules—cellulose, hemicellulose, and lignin—start to split up and to form a wide range of smaller liquid molecules. This process, known to scientists as pyrolysis, releases energy, which for the first time starts to generate heat to drive the burning. As the temperature rises further from 400°F to 600°F, these small molecules evaporate, and some of them react with the oxygen in the air to produce a flame, generating further heat. Some of the gases escape, however, along with some carbon particles, and are released as smoke. Finally, when the breakdown of the cell wall has been completed, only carbon is left; the wood has been transformed into charcoal.

Unlike the volatile chemicals produced by pyrolysis, the carbon does not evaporate and only burns when the temperature reaches 900°F; it reacts with oxygen at its surface to produce carbon dioxide and energy. Since nothing evaporates from the charcoal, however, no flame is produced and there is no smoke, which is why the embers of a fire just glow red-hot.

Material life was much the same from the Iron Age until the industrial revolution

As you can see in museums and living history attractions, people depended heavily on wood. The homes were made of wood or had wood frames roofed with wooden shingles. The furniture was almost all made of wood – the beds, tables, chairs, cupboards, and kitchenware such as barrels, jugs, cups, bowls, and spoons. Their fuel were piles of logs to heat homes and cook food. Farm carts and wagons were wood as well as tool handles, plows, hay rakes, mattocks, and scythes. The Power plants: water mills and windmills, were nearly entirely made of wood.  Non-wood items such as iron cutting tools or iron pots and pans had been smelted with wood charcoal. Clothes spun on wooden spinning wheels, and leather tanned with tree bark. And wood was burned to make salt, brew beer, and more.

So of course the rich favored glass, pottery, and metal objects since commoners could not afford them. Despite not using as much wood, the enormous amount of wood it took to make the charcoal to make these finer items would have left the poor colder and less well sheltered.

Wood has many disadvantages that metals, plastics, and other technologies eventually replaced.  Wood isn’t great for complex three-dimensional items, it can’t be molded into a shape like clay or metal, and its hard to join pieces together.  Because it’s more weak and brittle across the grain than along it, wood is hard to carve and vulnerable to splitting.

Iron was better than copper or tin because it is far commoner and possible to mine and smelt locally.  It also had better mechanical properties and could be made into finer and harder-wearing cutting tools, especially bar iron.

What about stone homes?

The impermanence of wood led many cultures to attempt to build stone buildings.  But in the end, they weren’t watertight or large, and ended up housing the dead usually.  Though they can be made, especially round buildings.  Or using wood, but hiding it from view.  Which is why the Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris burned so spectacularly, above the stone vault roof the actual roof consists of giant wooden trusses made of huge tree-trunk-size beams to hold the roof up.

Stone buildings are perfect for Italy where they stay cool on hot summer days.  But in Northern Europe the stone loses heat rapidly and once cold, take ages to heat up again.  This was somewhat overcome by hanging tapestries on the walls, and later wood paneling, since wood is a far better insulator of heat than stone, since it’s innumerable tiny air spaces restrict heat flow.  In fact, wood is 10 times better at stopping heat loss than wood.

Types of trees and their wood qualities

To withstand high winds, large broad-leaved canopy trees produce wood with large water-conducting vessels and fairly hollow fibers giving them a medium specific density of 0.5 (oak, ash, beech, pine, spruce, fir). Understory trees are shorter, need less water, and so are slower growing and longer lived, producing denser and harder timber (holly, dogwood). Fast growing pioneer trees that colonize open ground (birch, poplar, maple, aspen, willow) have wide vessels and thin walled fibers to enable rapid growth and a low specific density around 0.35.  Tropical rain forests have slow growing trees with a density of 1.0 (ebony and ironwood) so heavy they sink in the water.

Color: this varies a lot depending on the defensive chemicals used, such as tannins and phenolics to kill fungal diseases and prevent rot. The longer a tree lives, and the warmer the climate, the darker the wood from defensive chemicals.  So oaks and cedars have the darkest and most durable timber, and flimsier poplars and willows lighter wood.

Carpenters and green woodworkers use mostly medium-density wood from large canopy trees.  Caok and cedar for buildings, ships, and carts that might get wet, or ash and beech for tools and indoor furniture.

Wood for Ship’s Masts and American Independence

In Britain the problem of obtaining masts became acute. The country had a tree cover below 10%, and its forests had long before been put under management. Few conifers grew there, and no trees tall and straight enough to be made into ships’ masts. Even by the sixteenth century, Britain had been forced to obtain almost all its masts from the countries adjoining the Baltic Sea. The problem was that the fleets of its northern rivals, Holland and Sweden, were always threatening to cut off this supply, and in any case tall trees were becoming scarcer and more expensive.  And Australian gum trees were useless.

The old-growth forests of New England contained huge, straight-trunked eastern white pine trees in seemingly limitless numbers. From the mid-seventeenth century onward these trees, which could grow up to 230 feet tall with a diameter of over five feet, became the tree of choice for the British navy.

Unfortunately, in seeking to secure their supply of masts, the British government made a series of policy blunders that were to have disastrous consequences. They had difficulty buying tree trunks on the open market because the colonists preferred to saw them up for timber; this was after all a much easier way of processing them, considering their huge size, rather than hauling the unwieldy trunks for miles down to navigable rivers. The British could have bought up areas of forest and managed them themselves, but instead, in 1691 they implemented what was known as the King’s Broad Arrow policy. White pine trees above 24 inches in trunk diameter were marked with three strokes of a hatchet in the shape of an upward-pointing arrow and were deemed to be crown property.

Unfortunately, this policy soon proved to be wildly unpopular and totally unenforceable. Colonists continued to fell the huge trees and cut them into boards 23 inches wide or less, to dispose of the evidence. Indeed, wide floorboards became highly fashionable, as a mark of an independent spirit. The British responded by rewriting the protection act to prohibit the felling of all white pine trees over 12 inches in diameter. However, because trees were protected only if they were not “growing within any township or the bounds, lines and limits thereof,” the people of New Hampshire and Massachusetts promptly realigned their borders so that the provinces were divided almost entirely into townships.

Many rural colonists just ignored the rules, pleaded ignorance of them, or deliberately targeted the marked trees because of their obvious value. The surveyors general of His Majesty’s Woods, employing few men and needing to cover tens of thousands of square miles, were almost powerless to stop the depredations of the colonists, and the local authorities were unwilling to enforce an unpopular law. The situation reached a crisis in 1772, exactly when the Chemin de la Mâture was being completed, with the event known as the Pine Tree Riot.

News of the riot spread around New England and became a major inspiration for the much more famous Boston Tea Party in December 1773. The Pine Tree Flag even became a symbol of colonial resistance, being one of those used by the revolutionaries in the ensuing War of Independence. Designed by George Washington’s secretary Colonel Joseph Reed, it was flown atop the masts of the colonial warships.

The British were forced to use smaller trees from the Baltic for their masts, and had to clamp together several trunks with iron hoops to construct “made masts.” This arrangement was at best unsatisfactory, and many British ships spent most of the ensuing war out of action in port with broken masts. To make matters worse, the colonists started to sell their pines to the French, who had opportunistically sided with the rebels.

Without Britain’s usual naval superiority, America prevailed and became independent in 1783.

Woodcraft before coal started the Industrial age

Even the simplest of wood items took a long time to make with the hand tools of a carpenter. Time to cut to size, to make the joints with careful measurements, markings, and finally cutting and making animal glues not nearly as strong as today’s.  A door would take several days – selecting and cutting down trees, sawyers to cut into planks, and years of drying the wood out.  Even wealthy households had very little furniture like chairs, tables, or chests, expected to last for generations.

Wheels took several days, carts several weeks, and ships years to construct.

If a craftsman came up with an innovation, it wasn’t likely to spread to others.  Crafts were handed down through the generations.  Techniques were learned by watching over many years in apprenticeships, not from written instructions.  In many ways, following past traditions can maintain

high standards and mistakes avoided, but this limits innovation, especially since improvements were kept secret from outsiders or even within a guild.

A lack of scientific understanding of the properties of wood was especially a problem for ships, which for most of history let in quite a lot of water since the joints between planks weren’t waterproofed.  Finally in 1805 diagonal bracing was invented allowing ships to become much larger, sturdier, and waterproof, but soon after ships were mainly made from iron.

Coal begins the Industrial Revolution

Coal has 5 times more energy than wood and 50 times more than peat.  Great Britain had huge reserves of coal near ocean and river transport. Its use went from 150,000 tons a year in 1600 to 500,000 tons in 1700, enabling population to grow from 200,000 to 575,000.  The iron, glass, salt, and other industries far away in forests moved to London burning huge amounts of coal in addition to that used in homes to heat and cook with.

The Royal Society began publications of DIY manuals on smithing, joinery, bricklaying and more, allowing innovations to spread quickly.

To transport all the new goods being made, new canals were built.

For a while ironmaking was held back by limited amounts of wood charcoal, but then the kinks of using coal were figured out (explained in more detail in the book).  Iron pots, pans, fireplaces, and of course cannons – 14,000 of them were made to win wars.

America had so much wood that it wasn’t until 1850 that coal finally overtook wood charcoal in making iron.  Even the steam engines burned wood rather than coal almost until the 20th century.

Chapter 12 Wood in the 19th century

As mentioned earlier, timber is prone to splitting, difficult to join, flammable, and vulnerable to warping & rotting in the open air.  So you’d think that by the end of the 18th century iron bridges and other infrastructure would have replaced wood, but cast iron is brittle and breaks when stretched from cracks. So it couldn’t be used for chains or beams that might be bend, or withstand impacts. As an material, it couldn’t replace wood, and was only safely used to replace masonry, in the pillars for instance.

It was wrought iron that changed everything. Bridges of record length, buildings of unprecedented size, and gigantic ships that were finally watertight and far more protected from cannon balls, able to destroy any wooden ship.  Wrought iron is 10 times stiffer than wood and up to 3 times as strong in tension, and 10 times as tough. It could also be made in large quantities and large pieces. And chains for a new type of bridge: the suspension bridge.  Railways hadn’t been able to use cast iron, but wrought iron was so successful that huge locomotives could be built with wrought iron boilers less likely to explode and wrought iron rails that could handle heavy trains. Greenhouses were built.

Wrought iron precision machinery could manufacture goods once made by hand, and overcome the difficulty of joining wood with metal joints, rods, and eventually nails.  Mines could go deeper as wrought-iron rods linking lattice works of timber.

By 1830 nails were already revolutionizing how homes were built and could be mass produced. Instead of logs cut into heavy beams, precision steel saws cut logs into thin planks and two0by-fours nailed together to make the light framing that allowed walls to be fully assembled on the ground and lifted into place and nailed.  On the outside the whole structure was sheathed in planks, and on the inside with boards, and insulation placed in between to keep the house warm in winter and cool in summer.

This enabled American settlers to be cheaply housed, and most Americans live in wood-framed homes today, further improved with the invention of the wrought-iron screw making houses, furniture, fencing and faster and cheaper to construct.

Books and newspapers benefited from cheap ways to turn wood pulp into paper. Today over 440 million tons of paper are made a year.

But coal and iron can’t hold a candle to the world that we know today, dependent on petroleum and its ability to make massive amounts of steel, plastic, and concrete (the making of which is described on pages 228-229).

Plastic was a miracle product because it could be poured into molds, while complex objects made of wood would take a considerable amount of time to carve. Some plastics are stronger than wood yet much lighter than iron or steel.

Plywood overcame the tendency of wood to split along the grain, plus could be bent and molded into two and even 3-dimensional curves. In the 1920s glued veneers solved the waterproofing problems in construction. Chipboard and fiberboards have their uses too.  And wood-laminate architecture is leading to the construction of wood high-rise buildings, such as an 18-story tower in Norway.  It weighs just a fifth as much as a conventional concrete-and-steel structure, use half as much energy to construct, and more resistant to fires than steel frames.

Wood is not obsolete – quite to opposite, 1.9 billion cubic yards were used in 2018, more than the 1.7 billion cubic yards of cement.

Plantation forestry

Monocultural stands of trees are especially vulnerable to wind damage, fungal diseases, and pests, which can destroy whole forests.  Not much can be done since trees have too long a life cycle to selectively breed to become resistant to diseases.  To work around this, exotic trees are often planted, like the Monterey pine, and it brings with it exotic pests and diseases that can kill native trees not adapted to cope with them.  To name a few: ash trees killed by ash borer beetles and fungus Chalara; chestnuts in America with chestnut blight from Japan, hundreds of species of tree are now threatened by Armillaria root rot around the globe killing everything from conifers to eucalyptus – indeed, only larches and birches appear to have any resistance.

Forests don’t fit into the short time and scale of the modern world.  It takes decades to grow trees.

And if the goal is being carbon neutral, forget it.  It takes fossil energy to harvest, transport, and machine trees.  The most energy-intensive step of all is kiln drying. The energy to evaporate water is 1 megajoule per pound (MG/lb), and newly felled wood has so much water that kiln drying makes up the lion’s share of all wood products, about 4.5 MJ/lb of dry wood.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Posted in Energy Books, Jobs and Skills, Life After Fossil Fuels, Wood | Tagged , , , , , | 1 Comment

Tree planting is not a simple solution but sure beats Carbon Capture!

Preface.  The article from Science below lists both negative and positive outcomes depending on where trees are planted. The unintended negative effects could be a reduced water supply, the destruction of native grasslands and spread of invasive tree species, or displacement of farmland. But there are many good outcomes — greater carbon and water storage, reduced soil erosion, increased biodiversity, a source of food, wood, and shade, and jobs.

When you see articles about why you should NOT plant trees, they are nearly always promoting Carbon capture and storage (CCS).  Sure the carbon in trees might vanish in a wildfire or consumed by pests.  But so will the CO2 buried by CCS (and there’s not enough underground storage to put more than maybe 1% of CO2). It is bound to leak.  Basically, CCS is a scam, the last corporate welfare from the government before declining fossil fuels (especially world peak oil in 2018).  For details on why CCS is a waste of time, money, and energy, see my posts here.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Holl KD, et al. 2020. Tree planting is not a simple solution. Science 368: 580-581

A plethora of articles suggest that tree planting can overcome a host of environmental problems, including climate change, water shortages, and the sixth mass extinction. Business leaders and politicians have jumped on the tree-planting bandwagon, and numerous nonprofit organizations and governments worldwide have started initiatives to plant billions or even trillions of trees for a host of social, ecological, and aesthetic reasons. Well-planned tree-planting projects are an important component of global efforts to improve ecological and human well-being. But tree planting becomes problematic when it is promoted as a simple, silver bullet solution and overshadows other actions that have greater potential for addressing the drivers of specific environmental problems, such as taking bold and rapid steps to reduce deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions.

These ambitious tree-planting efforts are well-intentioned and have numerous potential benefits, such as conserving biodiversity, improving water quality, providing shade in urban areas, and sequestering carbon. Nonetheless, the widespread obsession over planting trees can lead to negative consequences, which depend strongly on both how and where trees are planted. For example, whereas tree planting often enhances floral and faunal diversity, planting trees in historic grasslands and savannas can harm native ecosystems and species. Likewise, trees are often suggested as an important income source for small landholders but may increase social inequity and dispossess local people from land if tree-planting programs are imposed by governments and external investors without stakeholder engagement. Repeatedly, top-down reforestation projects have failed because the planted trees are not maintained, farmers use the land for livestock grazing, or the land is recleared.

The massive Chinese government Grainfor-Green tree-planting program, which cost an estimated $66 billion, illustrates a number of these trade-offs. The program is credited with increasing tree cover by 32% and reducing soil erosion by 45% in southwestern China over a 10- to 15-year period. But like many large-scale reforestation programs, most new tree cover is composed of one or a few non-native species that have much lower biodiversity than native forests. Moreover, large-scale tree planting in the semiarid Loess Plateau in central China has reduced river runoff and in turn the amount of water available for human activities, owing to the large amount of water transpired by rapidly growing trees. Most of the trees for this program were planted in former agricultural land, resulting in a 24% decrease in cropland. During the same time period, native forest cover decreased by 7%. This illustrates a major overarching concern about tree planting, which is the displacement of agriculture from the land being reforested to areas occupied by native forests, thus resulting in further deforestation.

Reforestation projects can be an important component of ensuring the well-being of the planet in coming decades, but only if they are tailored to the local socioecological context and consider potential trade-offs. To achieve the desired outcomes, tree-planting efforts must be integrated as one piece of a multifaceted approach to address complex environmental problems; be carefully planned to consider where and how to most effectively realize specific project goals; and include a long-term commitment to land protection, management, and funding.

The first priority to increase the overall number of trees on the planet must be to reduce the current rapid rate of forest clearing and degradation in many areas of the world. The immediate response of the G7 nations to the 2019 Amazon fires was to offer funding to reforest these areas, rather than to address the core issues of enforcing laws, protecting lands of indigenous people, and providing incentives to landowners to maintain forest cover. The simplistic assumption that tree planting can immediately compensate for clearing intact forest is not uncommon. Nonetheless, a large body of literature shows that even the best-planned restoration projects rarely fully recover the biodiversity of intact forest, owing to a lack of sources of forest-dependent flora and fauna in deforested landscapes, as well as degraded abiotic conditions resulting from anthropogenic activities.

Tree planting is not a substitute for taking rapid and drastic actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Certainly, planting trees in formerly forested lands is one of the best options to offset a portion of anthropogenic carbon emissions, but increasing global tree cover will only constitute a fraction of the carbon reductions needed to keep temperature increases below 1.5° to 2°C. Potential carbon sequestration estimates of increasing tree cover range more than 10-fold, depending on assumptions about the rate of carbon uptake, the amount of land considered appropriate for reforestation, and how long those trees remain on the land. Moreover, much uncertainty remains about how much carbon trees will sequester in the future, given that increasing drought and temperatures from climate change can lead to substantial tree mortality either directly or indirectly through feedback loops involving fire and insect outbreaks. Conversely, some high-latitude areas that were unsuitable for trees may become favorable in the future.

Maximizing the benefits of tree planting requires balancing multiple ecological and social goals to prioritize where to increase tree cover regionally and globally. Some global maps estimate potential land area for reforestation without factoring in that people need places to live, produce food, and extract natural resources. Large-scale reforestation may be feasible in some areas, particularly those in public ownership, but reforestation will mostly occur in multiuse landscapes. Several recent studies suggest that prioritizing forest restoration on the basis of criteria, such as past land use, potential for natural regrowth of forest, conservation value, and opportunity cost from other land uses, can increase feasibility and improve reforestation success. For example, choosing appropriate locations for tree planting in the Brazilian Atlantic Forest biome can triple conservation gains and halve costs. Large-scale planning is more likely to result in successful reforestation projects over the long term and prevent deforestation elsewhere. But recognizing competing land uses means that the actual land area feasible for reforestation is much lower than the amount proposed by some ambitious global reforestation maps and national commitments.

Successful tree planting requires careful planning at the project level, which starts by working with all stakeholders to clearly identify project goals. People plant trees for many different reasons, such as restoring forest, sequestering carbon, providing income from timber harvesting, or improving water quality. A single tree-planting project may achieve multiple goals, but it is rarely possible to simultaneously maximize them all, because goals often conflict, and prioritizing one goal may result in other undesirable outcomes. Clear goals are key to being able to evaluate whether the project was successful and to selecting the most cost-effective way to increase the number of trees. For example, if a primary project goal is to restore historically forested habitat, simply allowing the forest to regrow naturally often results in the establishment of more trees at a much lower cost than actively planting trees, particularly in locations with nearby seed sources and less-intensive previous land use. By contrast, if the goal is to provide landowners with fruit trees or species with valuable timber, then plantations of non-native species may be the most suitable approach. Many additional questions must be addressed prior to project implementation, such as potential unintended consequences of tree planting, which species to plant, how landowners will be compensated for lost income, and who is responsible for maintaining trees over the long term.

Most projects set targets of how many trees to plant, rather than how many survive over time or, more importantly, whether the desired benefits are achieved. By contrast, most tree-planting goals, such as carbon sequestration and providing timber and non-timber forest products to landowners, require decades to achieve. This short-term view has resulted in large expenditures on tree-planting efforts that have failed. For example, approximately $13 million were spent to plant mangrove trees in Sri Lanka following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, yet monitoring of 23 restoration planting sites five or more years later found that more than 75% of the sites had <10% tree survival because of poor project planning and lack of seedling maintenance.

Hence, successful tree-planting projects require a multiyear commitment to maintaining trees, monitoring whether project goals have been achieved, and providing funding for corrective actions if they are not. Using this adaptive management approach will certainly increase the price tag of tree planting, but it is money better spent than simply planting trees that mostly do not survive.

To realize the potential benefits of increasing tree cover, it is essential that tree-planting projects include thorough goal setting, community involvement, planning, and implementation, and that the time scale for maintenance and monitoring is sufficient. Otherwise the extensive human energy and financial resources invested in tree planting are likely to be wasted and have undesirable consequences, thus undermining the potential of this activity to deliver the expected environmental benefits that are critically needed for humans and nature in this time of rapid global change.

Posted in Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS), Plant Trees | Tagged , , | 4 Comments

How safe and cheap are Gen IV Advanced Nuclear Reactors?

Preface. Peak conventional oil, which supplies over 95% of our oil, may have peaked in 2008 (IEA 2018) or 2018 (EIA 2020). We are running out of time. And is it really worth building these small modular reactors (SMR) given that peak uranium is coming soon? And until nuclear waste disposal exists, they should be on hold, like in California and 13 other states.

And since trucks can’t run on electricity (When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation 2015, Springer), what’s the point? Nor can manufacturing be run on electricity or blue hydrogen (Friedmann 2019). Once oil declines, the cost to get uranium will skyrocket since oil is likely to be rationed to transportation, especially agriculture.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Hyman L et al (2023) Small Modular Reactors Struggle With Scalability. oilprice

https://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Small-Modular-Reactors-Struggle-With-Scalability.html

There may be roughly 70 different permutations of SMRs being considered around the world today. But they all use either water, molten salts, or sodium as a moderator for the nuclear reaction. Too much variety makes it more difficult to achieve scale. Since the waste may be greater than what’s produced from conventional reactors, waste disposal should be part of the cost analysis. As for siting, district heating facilities need to be located near the users. Will local governments in the US permit SMRs near urban areas? That may be the biggest question mark of all.

Gilinsky V (2021) Dangerous Decisions about Advanced Nuclear Reactors Could Lead to New Threats. The National Interest.

Congress should have answers to tough questions before giving the Energy Department’s Advanced Reactor Development Program additional funding.  A good start would be to ask: Can we be sure that we will not end up with plutonium-fueled reactors coupled with reprocessing? 

The Department of Energy’s recently launched Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) is slipping by without any close Congressional oversight. The program was launched with an award of $160 million to TerraPower for its Natrium design and X-energy for its Xe-100. Each is to build a full-scale nuclear reactor within the next seven years, one that could be duplicated and sold commercially. While not a huge sum, it is intended to be the down payment on over $3 billion, a sum that is supposed to be cost-shared by the companies, with more for other projects.

At a March 25 Senate Energy Committee hearing on “advanced” reactors, executives of the two companies described a future with almost unlimited opportunities worldwide. No one asked how the reactors will be fueled. Will they be fueled with nearly highly enriched uranium, or with plutonium? And what will be the security consequences of selling and encouraging reactors fueled with such fuels around the world?

And they aren’t advanced: These reactors are re-engineered versions of old designs, some over fifty years old. “Advanced small modular reactors” trips off the tongues of people who think they are talking about the nuclear future, whereas in fact, they are talking about reviving the past.  

Small is inaccurate too. TerraPower envisions a 300 MW plant and growing it to gigawatt scale.

The Natrium reactor TerraPower has promised to build with DOE funds is not, as many people think, the highly advertised “traveling wave” reactor design that TerraPower pursued when started by Bill Gates. That idea involved the active (fissioning) reactor region slowly “traveling” from the center of the reactor core over the life of the reactor, “breeding” plutonium from uranium and fissioning it in place, therefore with no need for reprocessing. That Bill Gates was assumed to be a shrewd investor boosted the company’s credibility. The traveling wave idea didn’t work, but TerraPower retained the label for a different design, apparently because it aids marketing. 

The Natrium reactor is a scaled-up version of a General Electric design for a small sodium-cooled, plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor (natrium is German for sodium, and “fast” means it relies on energetic neutrons). This is the reactor the nuclear enthusiasts have wanted to build since Congress canceled the Clinch River Fast Breeder Reactor in 1983. But it makes no sense to create many tons of plutonium when just a few pounds are needed for a bomb.

That’s why Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter made it U.S. policy to discourage commercializing of plutonium-fueled reactors. Enthusiasts tried but failed to revive fast reactors as part of the second Bush administration’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership program. It appears they are trying again. 

Cho A( 2020) Critics question whether novel reactor is ‘walk-away safe’. Science 369: 888-889

Engineers at NuScale Power believe they can revive the moribund U.S. nuclear industry by thinking small. Spun out of Oregon State University in 2007, the company is striving to win approval from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the design of a new factory-built, modular fission reactor meant to be smaller, safer, and cheaper than the gigawatt behemoths operating today (Science, 22 February 2019, p. 806). But even as that 4-year process culminates, reviewers have unearthed design problems, including one that critics say undermines NuScale’s claim that in an emergency, its small modular reactor (SMR) would shut itself down without operator intervention.

NuScale’s likely first customer, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS), has delayed plans to build a NuScale plant, which would include a dozen of the reactors, at the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Idaho National Laboratory. The $6.1 billion plant would now be completed by 2030, 3 years later than previously planned, says UAMPS spokesperson LaVarr Webb. The deal depends on DOE contributing $1.4 billion to the cost of the plant, he adds.

In March, however, a panel of independent experts found a potential flaw in that scheme. To help control the chain reaction, the reactor’s cooling water contains boron, which, unlike water, absorbs neutrons. But the steam leaves the boron behind, so the element will be missing from the water condensing in the reactor and containment vessel, NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) noted. When the boron-poor water re-enters the core, it could conceivably revive the chain reaction and possibly melt the core, ACRS concluded in a report on its 5–6 March meeting.

NuScale modified its design to ensure that more boron would spread to the returning water. The small changes eliminated any potential problem, Reyes says. However, at a 21 July meeting, ACRS concluded that operators could still inadvertently drive deborated water into the core when trying to recover from an accident.

The issue pokes a hole in NuScale’s credibility, says Edwin Lyman, a physicist with the Union of Concerned Scientists. “This is a case of the public relations driving the science instead of the other way around,” he says. Sarah Fields, program director of the environmental group Uranium Watch, says the safety questions argue against NuScale’s request to operate without an emergency planning zone. “That’s a crazy thing to do for a reactor design that’s totally new and with which you have no operating experience.”

NRC plans to publish its safety evaluation report next month, and by year’s end it is expected to issue draft “rules” that would essentially approve the design. But that won’t end the regulatory odyssey. The current design specifies a reactor output of 50 megawatts of electricity, whereas the UAMPS plan calls for 60 megawatts. The change requires a separate NRC approval, Reyes says, during which NuScale will resolve the outstanding technical issues. That additional 2-year review should start in 2022.

References

  • EIA. 2020. International Energy Statistics. Petroleum and other liquids. Data Options. U.S. Energy Information Administration. Select crude oil including lease condensate to see data past 2017.
  • Friedmann J, et al. 2019. Low-carbon heat solutions for heavy industry: sources, options, and costs today. Columbia University.
  • IEA. 2018. International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2018, figures 1.19 and 3.13. International Energy Agency.
Posted in Gen IV SMR reactors | Tagged , , , | 4 Comments

Australian Senate hearings on Peak Oil & Transportation 2006

Preface.  This post has a summary of two of the nine senate hearings on Peak Oil in Australia in 2006. Someday historians may want to know which politicians knew about the energy crisis and when they knew it, probably to blame them for doing nothing, even though there’s not much they can do.

There is also a pdf here about peak oil from Feb 7, 2007: Australia’s future oil supply and alternative transport fuels that Australian’s may find of interest, and a summary here as well:

Bakhtiari addresses the Australian Senate Committee

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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2006 Summary of two of nine Australian Senate hearings on Peak Oil

11 APRIL 2006   PERTH COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Official Committee Hansard, Senate Rural & Regional Affairs & Transport References Committee

Australia’s future oil supply and alternative transport fuels

Australia’s future oil supply and alternative transport fuels, with particular reference to projections of oil production and demand in Australia and globally and the implications for availability and pricing of transport fuels in Australia; potential of new sources of oil and alternative transport fuels to meet a significant share of Australia’s fuel demands, taking into account technological developments and environmental and economic costs; flow-on economic and social impacts in Australia from continuing rises in the price of transport fuel and potential reductions in oil supply; and options for reducing Australia’s transport fuel demands.

BENNETT, Dr David, Founder, Sustainable Transport Coalition BEVERIDGE, Mr Andrew, Project Manager, Commercialisation, Office of Industry and Innovation, University of Western Australia

BOWRAN, Dr David, Grains Industry Development Director, Department of Agriculture and Food, Western Australia

FLEAY, Mr Brian Jesse, Private capacity.

HARRIES, Professor David, Director, Research Institute for Sustainable Energy.

HEAD, Mr Glen Michael, Director, Perth Fuel Cell Bus Trial and Transport Sustainability, Department for Planning and Infrastructure, Western Australia

IRESON, Mr Gary, Director, Gas and Power, Wesfarmers Energy, and President, LPG Australia

RICE, Mr David, Principal Network Planning Office, Department for Planning and Infrastructure

ROBINSON, Mr Bruce, Convenor, ASPO Australia

ROSSER, Mr Matthew, Chair, Sustainable Energy Association, Western Australia

UPTON, Mr Michael Leslie, Manager, Vehicle Policy, Royal Automobile Club, Western Australia

WOOLERSON, Mr Tim, Bus Fleet Manager, Public Transport Authority

WORTH, Dr David John, Convenor, Sustainable Transport Coalition

Mr. Robinson – There are large numbers of solutions as to how we can do things better. The clearly sensible thing to do is to put up the fuel tax, which I hope we come to later. The clearly sensible thing to do as a politician is to avoid mentioning that. The only way we can do that is to engage the community. We had petrol rationing during the war. If people understand the situation then, firstly, they will think of a lot of ways that they can lower their own oil vulnerability. They can do their own risk assessment. There will be a whole growth industry of consultants who can go around and help people go through that—and ASPO Australia is hoping to be part of that, because no-one else is. Also if people understand they can look at things as people have done in wartime and other times to change the situation.

It starts at a sensible, professional level—not just saying that $3 a liter is unacceptable, which we heard a community service organization say. We have to accept the scenario that these things might happen and we have to have a plan B. We might have something like the hurricane that hit New Orleans, and at federal, state and local levels the US was shown worldwide to be completely bloody useless. They had rows of buses sitting in a lake when there was no transport to take people out from nursing homes. We are going down that road but if, from this Senate inquiry, we can engage the community there are all sorts of plan B’s from oil vulnerability assessments. That is crucial. We cannot just go back to talking about whether we do biodiesel or fish and chip shop oil.

Mr Head—I would like to respond to both senators’ questions about market and market failure and then lead into a potential government response to that. One of the concerns is that there is massive investment at the moment in the status quo. We have our transport companies investing in their production plant for 10 to 15 years out and airline companies investing 20 years out. We know that any societal change to a new technology has very long lead times. We have discussed natural gas for vehicles, LNG and CNG, and these lead times are significant and substantial. That means that the companies and the markets that the economists are relying on to take the lead are going to play out their existing hand of cards for as long as they possibly can. I respectfully suggest that they might not want to look at a different set of cards until retail prices have doubled or tripled.

As a taxpayer, I would like someone in the political sphere to stand up and say, ‘This is the future that is coming—whether it is today, whether it is tomorrow, it is coming.’ We can deal with that when it arises, at the point where we will be paying $1 billion per year every single year, or we can perhaps invest a few billion dollars up front and make sure that never happens. You will only get a rational analysis of that from the taxpayers and the voters if they are informed.

This brings it back to the points that have already been raised about oil vulnerability maps and the level of public engagement we need. We need this like we have never needed it before. We have to be innovative. We have to not go to people with information but engage them in an intellectual way and also at an emotional level. People have to understand the consequences. For all those reasons we cannot rely on the markets. The government does need to take a strong lead.

Prof. Harries—I liken our current situation with oil to the situation we were in with electricity going back many decades. We had monopoly providers and there was very little planning. We virtually said: ‘What did we do before? Let us build another coal-fired power station.’ Oil has been a far greater problem because we have relied on very large monopoly oil producers from overseas and we have felt (a) that we had very little capacity to anything and (b) there is very little need. One of the things that have exacerbated that problem is that at the state government policy level there is actually very little in terms of transport policy. No-one owns the transport policy agenda in this state, like they do stationary energy. There is no office for sustainable transport policy.

We are facing massive uncertainty. I am personally very reluctant to look at crystal balls and guess what fuel prices are going to be. I think we have to accept that we have got huge uncertainty. We are behind the eight ball in that we have not had the planning systems in place to help us deal with that. The sensible strategy—and I have heard some of them around the table— is to start putting ourselves in a position where we can start planning. That means not just informing the public and working with groups. It also means—and this is very dear to my heart—understanding what we are going to need to have a very flexible approach to be able to deal with that uncertainty. That is going to go right across the board. How can we help companies develop the liquefied natural gas infrastructure they need? What training are we going to need? What skills are we going to need? What information are we going to need to be able to help us move when we need to move?

My plea is that we are going to have to look at our information needs and how we can address them. As politicians you have a very unenviable task because of that uncertainty and because of the limited planning capability we have. It is going to be very hard for you to engage the public—‘Hey, we have a problem; let’s do something.’ I think we are going to have to take it step by step. We need to look at what we are missing—what are the gaps. We need to do a real SWOT planning analysis of what we need to know.

Mr Rice—We are working on producing oil vulnerability maps for Sydney, Melbourne, and Perth. Are they vulnerable because they do not have access to public transport? In which case, we can start long-term strategic planning.

Mr Fleay—There is some real landmark guidance as to how to go. The first thing I want to deal with is how in all of the discussion here people have come up with problems and things that need to be done. The problem with all of those things is that they impact on all people and all businesses in different ways and on different time scales. There is an inherent complexity in them and all sorts of feedback loops and the like, such that you cannot use a top-down management approach. The very nature of such systems is that no one person can fully understand them. This is some of the modern thinking that arises from the so-called chaos theory. That means that you need a process whereby you can engage all the stakeholders and the public in this process to deal with those things. It was done successfully with the Network City plan, which was quite a significant effort. It has also been done on smaller scales. Basically it involves getting various stakeholders with their different viewpoints to state their case—people giving an overview of things and the like. With the Network City planning, there were 140 tables with eight people each, each with a computer. This enabled good, close dialogue between the people on a table which could then be fed into the whole group. All sorts of solutions emerge from that.

I was also involved in a similar thing on a smaller scale at Geraldton when there was a conflict between road trains and residents. At the end of that meeting, even though there were strong differences, we looked at what it would be like if we continued the way we were and what it would be like if we went down a different pathway. At various stages in the process each side had to argue the other’s case. It reached a point at the end where everybody, all of the 70 people involved, agreed that we could not carry on as we were and that we had to change, and there was a perspective on doing so. This is the way forward. What governments have to do is not manage and come up with solutions but give leadership of this kind in order to get an informed population and to unleash the creativity of people to find solutions. We cannot do it any other way. This is the way forward.

It has to be a continuing process. The essence of it is, I think, that it combines in one process people cooperating and competing at the same time. The two are not mutually exclusive; they are complementary. It is finding that mix that is absolutely essential to seeing the way forward here. We cannot move forward before that, particularly if we start bringing the peak oil into it. If we start to say, ‘It looks as though we’ve got to reduce our use of oil by this amount,’ it puts a perspective on it that enables us to make the change. You have the potential in that for everybody to see that everybody is making adjustments and to see it as just and equitable. That is critical.

In connection with the question of trade, coming back to the theories of economists and economics the so-called law of competitive advantage, which dates back to the early 19th century, is based on the premise that rather than being self-sufficient countries should specialize on what they can do best and trade, which of course means increased transport. That is the basis of all free trade and even interstate trade—if you think of each state in this country as being a bit like a country. Ever since the early 19th century, the cost of transport has been diminishing. Initially it was coal fired, then oil came in in the early 20th century. Oil was significantly superior as a transport fuel, especially with the very cheap oil from the giant oil fields which dominated in that period. My view is that that period has come to an end, and therefore we have to start thinking of a focus on being more self-sufficient as a strategy into the 21st century. The old view is losing its validity. However, that is a very complex question because of the great deal of interdependence that occurs around the world. Just to give you an indication, Japan was nearly self-sufficient in grain in 1950, but as a consequence of its industrial development it now imports about 70 per cent of its grain. A similar thing applies to South Korea and so on.

So a huge period of readjustment has to take place, but nobody is giving much thought to that at the moment. I mention in my submission that it is something we need to start thinking about, and we need to start a dialogue with the economists about the deficiencies in their theories regarding the way they handle energy. That must be a part of this. I also mention that it raises the question of the current dependence of food production and the whole food chain to households on fossil fuel energy—mainly petroleum. I also throw in that modern industrial agriculture has been described as a way of using land to convert petroleum into food. I deal with that in my submission. We need to know important information about where all the embodied energy in all these steps is so that we can have a clear picture of which things are the critical ones to tackle first and so we can create a long-term strategy. My view is that the most important use for the remaining oil—the first priority—is that food supply and food chain, for obvious reasons.

Dr. Bennett – I want to move on to alternative fuels. I take a particular interest in biofuels. We recently had a conference, at which Senator Milne spoke, on bioenergy and biofuels. At that conference, the speaker from BP Australia stated that BP would not touch palm oil. This is one of the moral hazards of biofuels. The fact is that the increasing demand for biofuels is now a significant hazard in the preservation of biodiversity and tropical rainforests around the world. Similar activities are taking place in relation to tropical rainforests and sugar cane plantations. It amounts to the fact that the more we make demands on the plant kingdom of this earth in terms of both food and fuel, the more we are going to do damage to it. The situation is that one rates human food first, animal food second and fuel third. It is disturbing to see the diversion of human and animal food into fuel. It seems to me that one of the actions that government can take is to make no more concessions and no more subsidies for the production of biofuels.

CHAIR—Stunned silence.

Mr Rice—We have a problem with obesity—why not turn that into transport, particularly walking and cycling. Again, do not overlook those for personal transport. About half of our trips in Perth—and Perth is a very spread out city—are less than five kilometers long. We could save a huge amount of fuel, we could have big health benefits and we could have social benefits with more eyes on the streets for a relatively little cost. We are talking about the ‘no regrets’ option. We are talking about how you as politicians are going to get some of these things in place. It is not going to be by just saying nasty things like, ‘You’ll have to cope with a high increase in fuel.’ It is going to be by saying some useful things as well, like how this is going to benefit people.

If we look at social changes, it is now commonplace to wear seatbelts and it is not commonplace anymore for thinking people to smoke. It may be not commonplace in the future for thinking people to drive V8s unless they absolutely have to. There is an encouragement thing. There is a health thing. There are a lot of pluses in this, particularly if you adopt that broader overall sustainability view of what government is all about. If you do not govern for sustainability, why are you governing at all?

Senator MILNE—I wanted to follow up on the issue of China, because it is very difficult to even contemplate the scale of the global impacts of China and India combined but China primarily. Lester Brown in his book Plan B basically says that at its rate of growth China will absorb virtually all the cereal and grain crops of the whole planet. What else is anyone else going to eat? Plus, they are in the black—America is in the red—and they can afford to buy up as much food-producing land as is necessary… His conclusion is that the current economic model does not work for China and that, as it does not work for China, it does not work for the rest of the world. It is pretty profound to try and take in the scale of the impact. On this question of liquid natural gas, I have seen all the stuff in recent times about Australia touting its liquid natural gas to the US, to China and to anyone who will buy it. I am interested in the collective view here on whether it is appropriate for Australia to be selling—and I understand the WTO rules; let us just put those aside—liquid natural gas?

Mr Ireson—In response to whether it is appropriate to be exporting the LNG that we have: I think the reality is that, without the export income, these kinds of investments would not be undertaken in the first place. The scale of investment that is required to develop these resources is very hard to get your head around. For a country like Australia, without the interest from the oil majors and their seeing this is a country that they want to develop because it has free trade and certainty in terms of taxation treatment and the like, we would not have the developments. Without the developments, we would not have the domestic access to the natural gas that I was talking about earlier that in fact now gives us a competitive advantage against imported diesel. So I think we have to be very careful that we do not isolate ourselves. At the end of the day, it is business on a global scale that we are talking about and it is very hard to be isolated from that.

Mr Head—I am going to be a bit controversial, and Gary may wish to come back on this one. According to data from our Department of Industry and Resources—don’t get hung up on the figures; it is the magnitudes we are looking at here—we have 80 to 130 years worth of natural gas supplies. That is at current levels of use, which we know is not going to happen: demand is going to increase. If we were to translate a significant proportion of our transport task to natural gas, that duration, that window of opportunity, would reduce right back down to between 20 and 50 years, notwithstanding that the peak is going to occur somewhere halfway along that period. With the time lags for introducing new technologies and getting societies to make that transition, it will take us 20 years to get to the point where we are all using natural gas. And then what do we do? We say: ‘Shit, natural gas is running out; we’ll have to do something. We’ll have to introduce the new technology now so it’ll be ready in 20 years time.’ So it kind of makes you think that it might be worthwhile leapfrogging some technologies which we have a pretty good idea are problematic from the point of view of a long-term solution to supply and which also have the greenhouse gas and climate implications. Gary’s point about developing export markets and local markets for it—I cannot see a justification for that.

Mr Fleay—I dealt with this question of alternative fuel in one part of my submission. I finished up with a chart showing the energy-profit ratio on a vertical axis and increasing economic effectiveness on a horizontal axis. The energy-profit ratio is the energy content of the fuel divided by the energy used to get it. The higher that figure, the more useful the fuel. There is a difference in effectiveness. We are never going to see a coal-fired airplane, for example. It is that sort of picture. This chart gives a picture on the basis of the information I have available.

What comes out in that picture is that the petroleum products that have been taken from giant oil fields stand out above everything else. Nothing else can match them. It would be useful to look at that. But we do need a lot more information in this country. A lot of work needs to be done to find out what the energy-profit ratios of our various fuels are to update that figure. This is an important task so that we are able to sort the wheat from the chaff, know what you can and cannot do and know what can be used for a transition to help us to get to one point. In this sense, everything that everybody says has some role somewhere in it, including using natural gas as a bridging fuel for transport while we make a lot of other changes. This is the essential point.

Hydrogen is not an energy source—it is an energy carrier. You have to manufacture it. When you look at that aspect of it—and you obviously cannot in the long term think of using a fossil fuel to manufacture it—you find that, with the problems of storing it and the energy needed to compress it and so forth, the prospect of hydrogen being a successful transport fuel is quite remote. You have to have the right approach to make the right sort of analysis. This is important to develop.

Mr. Robinson — There is a book called The Hype About Hydrogen which echoes Brian’s point that we need a source for hydrogen, whether we make it from coal or gas or nuclear power. There is no foreseeable source of hydrogen. So we cannot talk about the transition to a hydrogen economy. The hardest thing is not storing the hydrogen but finding it or getting it or making it first. As to the biofuel thing that we were talking about, for instance, if we took all of Australia’s wheat crop, which is on average 20 million tonnes per annum, and turned all of that into ethanol, we would get some nine per cent or 10 per cent of Australia’s oil usage. There would be no bickies in the parliamentary tea rooms and no bread in Woolies. We would not be exporting any wheat around the world. So biofuels have very serious scale limitations. In terms of alternative fuels, I think it is quite clear that conservation is the best alternative fuel—that is, not using it rather than replacing it.

Dr Bennett—In my personal submission I make the point that, for defense reasons, Australia has to do something about its long-term oil resources. I am not quite sure that natural gas is the thing but, if you think back through the wars of the 20th century, they were all essentially about oil. Hitler was stopped on his way to the Caspian Sea in Stalingrad and on his way to the Middle East at El Alamein. China is already pumping oil into the ground as a strategic resource. As far as we could gather from the appropriate government committee, Australia is bound by some international regulation that we have to have 90 days of supply, and most of that has been in the Bass Strait oil pipelines rather than in a standard resource. It seems to me that we have to start thinking very quickly about having a resource. Whether we have that resource as an untapped oilfield, or as an oilfield that has been refilled with oil which has been purchased on the world market, is not up to me to say.

Mr Rosser—I just want to pick up a couple of points on the previous topic. I was at the Farmers Federation conference two weeks ago. The conference was entitled ‘Fueling the future’. The farmers were very keen to stand up and say that they had no moral obligation to supply foods, that they would sell to the highest bidder and if the highest bidder was going to be fuel then so be it, because, when grain hits low record levels, no-one feels a moral obligation to pay them a fair price for their product. They were as one; there was unanimous consensus in that room. I suppose it is something you could only understand by being a primary producer.

Mr Upton—I would like to issue a word of caution about imposing extra taxes and so on. They are obviously a way of changing responses but, no matter how much tax you put on something, you cannot make it happen if the research, the knowledge or the will is not there. I am thinking about what happened in California towards the end of the nineties. They tried to push the introduction of battery electric cars by a whole range of incentives, but the technology was not ready. While manufacturers made electric cars and some people used electric cars, it did not go any further than that because the technology was not at a point where it was usable. I am cautioning that, before taxation is used to change things, you have to do the research to make sure that what you are trying to make happen can happen.

Mr Fleay—To reinforce again what I said about the failure of top-down management processes in these circumstances: imposing taxes and a lot of things of that kind have that character about them because they impact on all sorts of people in different ways. In fact, I agree with Mike Upton. That is why this approach is the key to going forward: to learn something from the lessons that the Department of Planning and Infrastructure have applied here, not because they are perfect but because of their potential if we go down that path. I noticed Senator Sterle said he has a background with the Transport Workers Union. I cannot think of one area of workers who are going to be more seriously impacted in this area. The whole business about mass distance charging for trucks is a classic example of this. That is why you have to have this bottom-up approach where all the stakeholders are involved and you reach just outputs so that they see all the changes that everybody has to make and all the things they have to give up in order to gain something fair and equitable. With all the sorts of issues that we have here, that can only happen by bottom-up participation. Everything that everybody has said has a role to play in this. There is not anything that is totally wrong or totally right. Because of this complexity, you can only handle it in this way.

Mr. Head — [In answer to what the barriers were to more fuel-efficient cars]/ It is our role to support local Australian industries and we have local car makers who have committed to a six-cylinder vehicle platform for the foreseeable future—in other words, eight to 20 years. They are committed to rolling out models based on that power plant and that drive train. That leaves us at a point where we politically have to stick our hands up and say: ‘We’re not going to support local manufacturers. We’re going to import what we think are the right vehicles. Tough for you guys.’ So that is one of the barriers.

Mr Fleay—I assume that demand management in transport is part of the agenda for the topic we are discussing. I would like to say something here about the TravelSmart program and its potential. As a preface, I spent my life working in the water industry here, where we have been battling for 30 years to deal with the question of resource limitations. It is my view, in the context of what we are talking about, that the Water Corporation here now sets an example for all corporations insofar as its commercial advertising pleads with its customers to buy less of its product. For those senators who are not familiar with the TravelSmart program, which has an international reputation and has been copied around Australia, it uses a direct-marketing approach. People are approached individually in their houses to review the way they use their cars as opposed to the alternatives of public transport, walking and cycling. It is a dialogue to change their pattern. It is, at a modest level, a very positive result for the people who have participated in terms of reduced car use and increased use of public transport, walking and cycling. Not only that but the increased revenue from public transport alone has paid for the cost of the program in about 18 months or two years. It also has a very high cost-benefit ratio, which includes the health benefits of increased exercise.

This is the small beginning of transport management in the transport business which needs to reach the stage that the water industry has reached. However, if the question of future oil supplies were introduced into this, insofar as people go out, talk to others about what can and cannot be done and say, ‘Here is what you can do,’ there is enormous potential for empowering people as a part of this general process of getting understanding and creating the climate for the right sort of change. I do not think we should underestimate this. It is an area where the transport industry is way backward but where the water industry in this country, and particularly here, has created a change of culture due to the drastic impact of climate change.

Mr. Robinson — Andrew mentioned location specific fuel taxes. This was done in South Australia when the South Australian government had legislative control of what we call the fuel franchise levy. ASPO Australia is suggesting a smart card—a flexible, tradable, allocation pricing system which can handle emergencies and the location specific things. People who live near a train station and an urban city should get less of the low tax petrol. We are taking a model from the water industry in Perth. Domestic water, the amount for basic household necessities, is quite cheap. As you use more and more in a household, you pay more and more incrementally for the units. Those sorts of things can be done. A lot of those things can be done, rather than just going on with business as usual with the fringe benefits tax whereby everyone in Canberra is driving up and done freeways and lending their cars out so they get over the March rush, or whatever it is called, to get over 40,000 kilometers. Those things are just stupid and perverse and they are no more market distorting than putting the price of petrol up, particularly in an incremental way whereby people can see where it is going. It is going into the health system, it is going into defence, it is going into all these sorts of things that we need. We need to be following Dr Samsam Bakhtiari’s thing. We need to be building Noah’s ark, where people said, ‘There is probably something coming; we need to have the ark well planned and under construction.’ It is bloody hard to build an ark under water. If we wait until peak oil hits us, then we are not going to have the time or the resources to do this.

Mr Rice—Yes. Leach Highway is an issue to us—a huge one. First of all, within the time scale that we have been talking about, and in the time scale of political governments, 100 years or so is what we are really dealing in, so any guidance or direction we can get is really useful. For instance, if we are talking about a mixture of personal transport and freight transport, my logic says the trucks are going to get bigger because they will be more fuel efficient; the cars are going to get smaller because they will be more fuel efficient. There is a safety issue—does that impact on the way we design our roads, for instance? That is a fairly simple one. A more complex one is how we can save fuel in urban freight transport. The answer is not to put more on rail. That is a part of the answer and our government is trying to do that. We have a target of getting from about three per cent to 30 per cent of our containers coming from the Fremantle inner harbour from rail in the past to rail in the future. But that is going to make a small difference.

What they are also doing is looking at using our roads more sensibly and, implicitly, using our fuel more sensibly by booking the trucks that come in and out of the Fremantle terminal relative to the containers, because surveys have found that a lot of trucks are going in empty to pick up a container and bring it out and they are passing trucks that are doing exactly the opposite. Obviously, there are some improvements that can be made. How do you make those improvements? You need data and you need some level of control. The problems that we are getting with data relate to some extent to the free market forces where competition is good and then the data becomes commercial-in-confidence and we cannot get it. So there is a bigger issue there.

I believe that in an intelligent future the government as a whole—call it Big Brother if you like—is going to need to have some influence on the availability of data, whether it is for personal trips so that we can group more trips together or whether it is for the clumping of bits of freight so that we move away from lots of small, just-in-time deliveries to some efficient, medium sized deliveries. This is going to have an impact on warehousing because the central distribution systems that are the current rage, and are logistically reasonably efficient because we have got very cheap fuel, are going to have to change. I believe people are going to have to do more warehousing in their businesses again, like they used to. There are a lot of things that we can do but we have got to get the intelligence about it in order to be able to, and we have got to get some leadership.

There was a very interesting survey that I read some years ago about politicians and leadership and how far in front of the community they were. The thesis was that the politicians were in front of the community, therefore they modified their expectations in parliament and cut them back quite a lot. The survey found that, yes, that was true—but the bite was that the politicians were only a tiny little bit in front of the community and they thought they were a long way in front of the community. So I am saying: have courage, but also be realistic. We can all talk about these things and the greenhouse effect and so on, but if this inquiry is going to have any impact whatsoever you need to build upon some synergies to get through.

One of the synergies that you can build upon is COAG’s interest at the moment in urban congestion and congestion management. If we can better manage congestion we can better manage fuel. We did a survey in Perth recently—it was a statistically valid survey—in which we asked people: what kind of problems do you see coming from traffic in your area? To our surprise the answer was, clearly, congestion. You say if you come from Sydney or Melbourne that we do not have any congestion, but that was the current perception of the voters. So there is something in congestion management that can be combined with environmental improvement, better use of our roads, something that the community wants and fuel saving, all together. So look for those synergies and pick the low-hanging fruit first.

Dr Worth—I want to come back to my hobbyhorse about government involvement. A lot of what we have heard in the last period on this topic has been about what things government can do and the need for that. A lot of it comes back to market failure, that there is just not enough information for markets to operate efficiently. The point I want to make about why governments need to get involved is around the speed of change. Markets take a long time to move. It took us 17 years to move the car fleet in Australia from leaded fuel to unleaded. The price of oil has tripled in three or four years. I get a sense that people think that it will stop, but it could double in the next year or 18 months. That is a real reason for governments to get involved, to look at demand management as the simplest and cheapest way of cutting fuel use.

CHAIR—We will go around the room now with concluding statements. What is the key thing you would like us to go away from this hearing with today?

Prof. Harries—Underlying everything I have said is the need for us to get information to do research to be able to manage the uncertainty and, as David Worth has said, the problems. Markets do not happen overnight. You have got to actually help the system happen. What we are on about here is trying to make a smooth transition to alternative markets and alternative ways of doing things—and to do that we need information.

Mr Rice—Grab some inspiration. Govern for sustainability. Why else would you govern?

Mr Robinson—It is highly probable, as people have discussed, that there are lots of things we can do to adapt, particularly if we start thinking in advance. A lot of them are very positive for health and the economy. I would like to congratulate the Senate for starting the process. It is an enormous quantum leap in Australia. We should all be trying, particularly in the opportunity with the Senate, to engage the community and decision makers about peak oil.

Dr Bowran—I would like to see appropriate sectoral strategies so that you have actually got a framework to know which parts are going to go forward with particular types of innovations.

Mr Beveridge—First of all we need a national strategy—and that is where the government can play a really crucial part—but one that can be implemented locally, which is key. I see the government as a catalyst for change. It is clear today that we have got a lot of passion from the stakeholders, which is fantastic. We all ought to be congratulated for providing that passion, which is really good. That should be harnessed. We really need to take decisive action because the clock is ticking.

Mr Fleay—The central theme of your report should be issues I have been hammering about engagement of people, providing leadership and participation and avoiding top-down management approaches. That approach, which has shown some benefit here locally—but it is more a question of what it can potentially become than what it has been so far—is the key to pulling together all the points that people have made and being able to engage with people and to get change. If you can get it to a certain point, positive feedback will take place and it will gain its momentum.

Mr Upton—I would say, like others, that it is important to do get the information and do the research, to determine what is practical—you have to be pragmatic about these things—and to convince the public. Work with the credible stakeholders that can help you to convince the public what the real issues are and how we can all work together to solve those.

Dr Bennett—I would like to go back to a point that Brian Fleay made: agriculture these days is a process of converting oil to food. Some of the modelling activity by the department of agriculture indicates that in the eastern wheat belt, where there is a significant energy input, it is very likely that, as oil prices rise and climate change proceeds, there will be a process of overshoot and collapse, and that might be the case with a number of other parts of the economy. If you think that, on a world basis, the fact that the use of oil in agriculture has probably allowed the increase of the world population to go from two billion to six billion, then the prospect for the world human population as a consequence of what we are facing is dire.

12 APRIL 2006   PERTH COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Official Committee Hansard

Senate Rural & Regional Affairs & Transport References Committee

Australia’s future oil supply and alternative transport fuels

Australia’s future oil supply and alternative transport fuels, with particular reference to:

  1. projections of oil production and demand in Australia and globally and the implications for availability and pricing of transport fuels in Australia;
  2. potential of new sources of oil and alternative transport fuels to meet a significant share of Australia’s fuel demands, taking into account technological developments and environmental and economic costs;
  3. flow-on economic and social impacts in Australia from continuing rises in the price of transport fuel and potential reductions in oil supply; and
  4. options for reducing Australia’s transport fuel demands.

WITNESSES

BENNETT, Dr David, Founder, Sustainable Transport Coalition

BEVERIDGE, Mr Andrew, Project Manager, Commercialisation, Office of Industry and Innovation, University of Western Australia

CREEMERS, Mr Alexander Henricus Maria, Private capacity

DeLANDGRAFFT, Mr Trevor Frederick, President, Western Australian Farmers Federation

FLEAY, Mr Brian Jesse, Private capacity

GRIFFITHS, Dr Cedric Mills, Theme Leader, Maintaining Australian Oil Self Sufficiency,

CSIRO Petroleum, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation

HARDWICK, Mr Ross, Executive Officer, Western Australian Farmers Federation

HARRIES, Professor David, Director, Research Institute for Sustainable Energy, Murdoch University.

HEAD, Mr Glen Michael, Director, Perth Fuel Cell Bus Trial and Transport Sustainability, Department for Planning and Infrastructure, Western Australia

NEWMAN, Professor Peter William Geoffrey, Director, Institute for Sustainability and Technology Policy, Murdoch University

PYTTE, Mr Anthony Mark, Australia Country Manager, Sasol Chevron Consulting Ltd

RICE, Mr David, Principal Network Planning Officer, Department for Planning and Infrastructure, Western Australia

ROBINSON, Mr Bruce, Convenor, Australian Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas

RONALDS, Dr Beverley Frances, Chief, CSIRO Petroleum, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization

SAMNAKAY, Mr Iqbal, Policy Officer, Transport, Department for Planning and Infrastructure, Western Australia

SCHLAPFER, Dr August, Lecturer, Energy Studies, School of Science and Engineering, Murdoch University

SELWOOD, Mr Richard Neil, Chief Executive Officer, Natural Fuels Australia Ltd

WORTH, Dr David John, Convenor, Sustainable Transport Coalition

Robinson – We will not be in the majority in saying this, but we feel that the fuel price should go up, that there should be a fuel tax escalator along the lines of Margaret Thatcher’s, and that a smartcard, a tradeable fuel allocation system, should be ready in the event of sudden oil shortages. Also, there should be a sensible, rational allocation. I got here today by catching the train. I walked 200 or 300 metres across one road, caught a train here and walked across one or two more roads. Not everyone in the Australian community can do this. People in the farming community cannot do this. So the requirement for fuel varies. I refer to people working on nightshifts in hospitals, and people running farms and businesses. Not everyone can have all the fuel that they will need in the future, if there are fuel shortages—and, certainly, that is what we predict.

Fleay – I want to make one comment about biofuels. I am very concerned about some of the propositions that came up about using some microbiological product to take all the waste—to virtually strip the land bare of all so-called wastes—and convert it to ethanol as a way of getting resource. This has a disastrous impact on soil, because the organic content of the soil is extremely important in providing the environment for the great mass of invertebrate organisms and other things that are critical to soil fertility. This process is, in effect, mining the soil. I have put in a recommendation about having a rigorous approach to assessing these alternative fuels. This includes finding the energy input and energy output and, where you are doing it from crops, including the impact of the process on the soils. We cannot afford to diminish the property of our soils.

One of the problems that wasn’t dealt with yesterday is the process of funding of transport, federal-state relationships and the whole tax system. The fact that roads are funded from taxes is, in effect, a sort of subsidy, whereas funding for rail is through borrowed funds on which there is interest. This is a very lopsided thing; it is very unbalanced.

Studies done throughout history have found that over the last 2,000 years cities in general are about an hour wide—that is to say, people are prepared to spend about an hour each day traveling to and from work. If people were walking, that determined the size of the city and so forth.

Mr Robinson—I am concerned that the climate change people do not mention oil depletion and they have scenarios that are unrealistic for the amount of oil. I think it would be really useful if climate change and oil depletion matters for Australia and internationally were looked at together, because a lot of the mitigation and annotation are the same. There certainly should be energy taxes, but we should not tax just carbon, because carbon from oil and natural gas is more valuable than carbon from coal. It should not just be on an atom basis. In a climate change sense they are valuable but, in a resource depletion sense, carbon atoms in oil are much more valuable than carbon atoms in coal.

Mr Kilsby— My own background is in transport engineering and urban planning. I would like to highlight some submissions that the urban planning and transport group made to you. There are a couple of points on transport and a couple of points on urban planning that I would particularly like to draw to your attention. On transport the key points that we wanted to make are that while the oil position is a national issue it is in the cities where there are more possibilities of limiting or moderating the demand for oil than in rural and regional areas. Urban transport planning is an issue that the Commonwealth government ought to take rather more interest in it than it has to date, if only to make sure that as much oil as possible is available in rural and regional areas.

Another key point on transport, as you have just heard, is that the most vulnerable transport mode will be aviation because what alternatives to oil are there for fuel in planes? There is nothing on the horizon there and, by extension, the parts of the economy that rely on a thriving aviation sector—particularly the tourism industry—are also very vulnerable.

Road transport is quite vulnerable, although perhaps not to the same extent as aviation, because road vehicles require a portable, energy dense fuel. That is why petrol and diesel are the fuels of choice. It would take decades to establish the infrastructure and the vehicle fleet to take advantage of any

alternatives. And that is decades, as you have heard, that we have not got and alternatives that we have not really got either.

The other two main modes are rail transport and sea transport. They are possibly the least vulnerable because a railway locomotive is essentially a rolling power station on rails and a ship is a floating power station. In both cases there is a wider choice of energy sources available, mainly because the power plants are larger than for road vehicles or for aircraft.

On urban planning there are two points we want to highlight. One is that there are many people who have no option but to use their cars to get around. These people tend to live in the outer areas of our cities. The two gentlemen from Griffith University, who will follow me, I think, will make this abundantly clear. It seems to me that the provision of alternatives in such areas should be a priority for government. By that I mean the development of adequate public transport networks, of bicycle networks and of pedestrian networks. The second point on urban planning is that if we are faced with a physical decline of oil in the future—not just higher prices—then it is going to be necessary to establish clear priorities for the use of a more limited amount of oil. Put crudely, as you heard, this could involve a choice between feeding people and letting them drive to work. We will not have the energy resources to make drastic changes when it becomes evident that we have a problem. The sooner planning for a decline starts, the better.

We do not have time on our side, as I think Dr Bakhtiari amply showed.

On the committee’s specific terms of reference, going to oil availability, I would say that there will be less oil available in future and it will cost more. ASPO does not claim to have a crystal ball or that the future will unfold the way we expect it to, but we do say that this is a significant risk to urban transport and, hence, to the national economy. There are well-established risk management techniques which we think should be used. The risk of there being less oil is at least as significant as the risk of terrorist attack, for instance. There are no alternative fuels in sight that will completely replace oil for transport. There will be many flow-on economic and social impacts. I think the greatest community anger will arise from those places where alternatives to cars could have been provided but were not. Those are basically the outer areas of our cities.

Options for reducing fuel demand are mainly urban, possibly from technological development, but all the others—that is, the development of public transport and other policies that I would call business as usual, such as demand management techniques and economic measures—even though we would probably have to apply them in a different way to business as usual outcomes, would have effects in the cities rather than in the rural and regional areas. But, given that there is only a finite amount of oil to go around, applying them in the cities would ensure that there is in the areas where alternatives cannot be provided more oil to go around than there would otherwise be. I think that is as much as I wanted to say.

Mr Kilsby—I was living in the Netherlands when the first oil shock happened in 1973…the Netherlands scarcely missed a beat because they had an alternative in place. The alternative was mainly bicycle networks, which are very good in Holland. The Dutch enjoyed it so much that when the oil started flowing again they considered adopting the ‘carless Sunday’ as a feature of national life rather than an emergency measure, which was why it was introduced. That taught me that the more prepared you are and the more alternatives there are in place the better off you are likely to be when such a catastrophe occurs.

Senator MILNE—Thank you for your submission. It certainly flows on from a lot of other submissions we have had from various local governments on the whole issue of a rapid transition to public transport. One of the big issues for Australian cities is that the most vulnerable live the greater distance from the centre of the city and that there has been a lack of planning for that.   My next question relates particularly to the tourism industry and the agricultural sector, both of which are going to be severely adversely impacted upon by rising prices and oil depletion. What about the aviation sector? At the moment air fares do not reflect the real cost of flying anyone anywhere. Have you done any predictive modeling on the point at which that cannot continue?

Mr Kilsby—No, I have not.

Senator MILNE—Do you have any thoughts about impacts on tourism generally? Have you modeled that or looked at that around the country?

Mr Kilsby—I am currently doing some work in Cairns, for instance, in Far North Queensland. I think it would be hard to find an Australian town that is more dependent on the tourism economy and on people arriving by plane.

Senator MILNE—Can you spell that out a bit more? What we heard this morning was that the new generation of huge global aircraft, the A380s, is unlikely to ever be economic because of the fuel costs. When you say that people will not arrive in Australia by air, do you want to expand on your thinking about that?

Mr Kilsby—My thinking is very much governed by what I am currently doing in Cairns. Most fuel in Cairns—because it is a long way from the refinery, which is in Brisbane—has to be imported by ship, and they currently import more oil for the airport than they import petrol and diesel product for the whole of Far North Queensland. It struck me that the airport is really much like a coaling station, in the days when ships used to run on coal. There are no local fuel resources at all. It all has to be refined in Brisbane and brought up to Cairns by ship. If that becomes less possible in future, then a large part of the economy of that city is going to collapse, because it is geared around servicing tourists. The tourists either drive—and it is a long, long way from anywhere else to get up there—or they come in by plane from Asia, because that is one of the first stops that they make.

Senator MILNE—Do you know of any other work, apart from that which you are doing, where tourism hubs that are more remote and dependent on air travel for their viability are looking at these projections? It would be good to have some specific examples of regional economies that are going to be significantly affected in the short term because of aviation fuel prices and availability.

Mr Kilsby—I am not aware that the aviation industry is even contemplating a shortage of fuel at the moment.

Mr Kilsby—The growth of corn and so on that you need to produce the ethanol and biodiesel requires energy of its own, and it requires land as well. I suspect that the conflict between the land and the energy that you need to supply the additives to petrol and the need for alternative uses of those lands [i.e. food] and energy will be something that you have to consider.

Senator WEBBER—I want to pursue what Senator Joyce was talking about. All of our state economies are very different. I am from Western Australia, and we have the same issue of getting fuel from Perth into the north-west, only then the fuel is used to exploit our resource sector. I am not sure that biodiesels or anything else is an alternative for large haul packs in iron ore mines and what have you. And we do not have a large tourism sector there; it is purely a resource sector. I do not know of many tourists who go to Port Hedland. So that is an issue: all state economies are different, as is what confronts them.

You said in your opening remarks that you felt the need for more Commonwealth government interest in the development of urban transport. Has your organization given any thought to how you think that can be developed? I know that every time we talk about the Commonwealth government spending more money on any particular part of our state economies, there is usually a fight afterwards and then an ad hoc arrangement over the shared responsibilities of state and federal governments. Obviously we need an overall plan, so do you have any other views about how we can organize that?

Mr Kilsby—It seems to me that climate change presents quite a good model for that. The Australian Greenhouse Office is a national office that tried to collect expertise in one place, and the fuel crisis that we are heading for is probably of similar magnitude. So something like an Australian fuel office in central government would probably be the way to go as far as we can see.

Senator WEBBER-There is another issue that I want to pursue. We have had a discussion today about the fact that one of the issues we need to look at is increased use of public transport and the incentives we need to ensure people do that. There has been discussion about the free public transport network that we have in the CBD of Perth. There are other discussions about subsidising public transport. What do you think we need to do to make it more attractive? We have discussed this at previous hearings, overdevelopment and maintaining modern infrastructure to make sure it is reliable and that sort of stuff. What do you think? And if it is about subsidising the use of public transport, then who should pay, as it is seen as a state government responsibility?

Mr Kilsby—In terms of making it more attractive, there are probably three transport sectors. There are private and public sectors, but they both require motors, and there is also the unmotorized sector, which, at the moment, would not make much of a dent in the oil requirement because it only affects the shorter spectrum of trip making. It seems to me that with good urban planning we could perhaps do things to shorten the trip length, and then the third element would become more attractive as well. It is in those outer areas that transport is most difficult to provide. Sydney is clearly the largest Australian city and it is a long way to the CBD from where we are putting people in new houses now. There are probably two million people living out in Western Sydney at the moment, and the only public transport that is being provided of any significance is trains to bring them into the CBD. I think that the Department of Planning in the New South Wales government has an excellent idea in the metropolitan strategy where they are trying to introduce regional cities within Sydney to reduce the amount of trip making that goes on in terms of person kilometers.

Senator STERLE—I refer to page 4 of your submission and the recommendation that states: ‘7. That taxation and fiscal policy instruments should encourage sustainable transport.’ Could you explain that?

Mr Kilsby—At the moment, I think the taxation instruments actually encourage the opposite to sustainable transport with the FBT arrangements and so on. I know that in Canada they have recently introduced a system whereby travel to work by public transport is allowable as a tax expense. It is really that sort of thing that we had in mind.

Senator STERLE—I have had a lot of conversation with the pro-rail lobby. I do not want to talk about freight on trains because I do not think we will ever get common ground on that; I want to talk about public transport on trains. I cannot speak for Sydney, but I can speak for where I come from. We are just putting in a brand new railway 70 kilometers down to Mandurah. It is going to be wonderful—it really will be—but we have had a wonderful train system in Western Australia for a number of years to the northern suburbs and out to the east and to the west. But I still cannot find anything that says we have it right. How can we attract patronage onto public transport? I hear the pro-rail lobby say, ‘Throw a heap of money at us and give us the infrastructure,’ and I have seen some great planning for future suburbs. But we have rail and people are not using it. Why do you think that is? I know you have mentioned costings and all that. Are you suggesting that if we offer free transport people would get on the trains?

Mr Kilsby—No, I am not suggesting that. What I am suggesting is that we concentrate more on local transport, especially in the outer areas because at the moment we are offering people the alternative of traveling quite long distances to central areas, which is where activity tends to be concentrated in our cities, and I think, certainly in Sydney, that we have grown beyond that point. The rail network that Sydney has is probably the most extensive in Australia, but it is very old and you cannot fight your way onto a train at peak times; they are completely crowded, and they are going quite a long way into the CBD. It strikes me that we have to think a little beyond the niche market of getting people traveling to the CBD and start thinking about the more dispersed travel that happens in outer areas of our cities.

Senator STERLE—This is where I get confused. Do you mean putting in extra railway lines to service other suburbs?

Mr Kilsby—That would certainly help, but it probably takes 10 years to get a new railway line implemented and I suspect that is time we do not have. There are alternatives in producing alternatives to cars, and we already have some of these in Sydney. We have a busway that is about to open from the north-west growth area, which is about 40 kilometres from the CBD, to take people down to Parramatta, which is a lot closer than the CBD. We propose to build a railway line from there, starting in 2017, which is a long way away at the moment.

Senator STERLE—I am a bit confused: are you talking about integrating both forms of public transport—rail and bus?

Mr Kilsby—Yes.

Senator STERLE—I just had this vision that we were talking about railway lines and spurs and branching into the suburbs where the housing is already—that sort of stuff.

Mr Kilsby—No, I do not see that that would help very much.

Senator STERLE—But is it realistic?

Mr Kilsby—No.

Senator JOYCE—You talked about the development of railway lines. Do you have any comments on the fact that in some places in New South Wales they are actually ripping up railway lines and sealing the roads so that they can put all the heavy transport back on the road? Surely that is completely counterintuitive to where it is all heading at the moment—for instance, with the branch lines out in the regional areas that move such things as the wheat crop. I can quote you one example: the Baradine to Gwabegar line. They are closing that line down and transport of all the grain produce will go back on the roads. Surely this is completely against the whole inclination. Do you feel that the government—especially the state government—is lacking in capacity to effectively organize itself to make the moving of heavy goods on rail possible? Are people giving up on it? Do you have any views on that?

Mr Kilsby—That is mainly a freight problem. Australia’s rail infrastructure for freight probably falls into two classes. On the one hand, there are some world-class facilities for the bulk export lines and for interstate containerized traffic. On the other hand, things like the grain lines that you mentioned are in a pretty woeful state. I would like to see these developed further.

Senator JOYCE—Once people get something on a truck, they keep it on a truck, and that exacerbates the problem. It is the ability for rail to organize the collection of produce and things like that that are at the crux of the issue. Do you have any views on how rail could better organize itself to be an effective competitor in the transport industry rather than just being there?

Mr Kilsby—I think that would boil down to the economics of particular cases.

Senator JOYCE—Why is rail so ineffective in the transport market in New South Wales and Queensland?

Mr Kilsby—Because they concentrate on particular markets where they do have a competitive advantage. One of those is the long-distance containerized market. Certainly in urban areas there is virtually no freight that moves by rail. It goes from Melbourne to Sydney by rail, but there is very little that moves around within Sydney by rail.

Senator MILNE—We have a national obesity crisis and a national diabetes crisis and we have people paying huge amounts of money to go to gyms. We have the potential to move people by bicycle, but we have very little in the way of safe bicycle facilities. Everywhere we have been, people have said to us that safety is a big disincentive to their riding. The other thing is a bit like gas: you need a transitional fuel from cars to bikes. One of those is electricity. We have seen huge bureaucratic resistance to electric bikes and small electric cars, like the Riva and so on. Can you give any insight into why you think the bureaucracies are so reluctant to license electric bikes and small electric cars in Australia?

Mr Kilsby—I would support the introduction of a low-energy sector. I think that it is one thing that we in Australia are lacking. There is nothing between a bicycle and a car, effectively, whereas if you go overseas—certainly to Europe or developing countries—you see that most people move around on some sort of moped or light motorbike, which we do not have. I cannot really comment on why the bureaucracy are so hostile to that, other than to say that they are probably following their charters or their terms of reference, which say that they have to manage the road system in the interests of the people who are on it at the moment.

Senator MILNE—That is true to some extent, although there is an attempt to have the Riva car registered in Australia and that is being resisted furiously by the bureaucracy on safety grounds. Yet these vehicles are in the EU, in London and all over the place. Apparently they do not meet our safety standards, even though we have an MOU with the EU. As far as I can tell, what we are seeing everywhere is a huge bureaucratic resistance. Some would argue it is political; maybe it is. It is something I want to pursue. We have a chicken and egg situation. We do need safe bicycle lanes, but we also need to have some form of transition in terms of electric bikes. Anyway, I will leave it there.

DODSON, Dr Jago, Research Fellow, Urban Research Program, Griffith University

SIPE, Dr Neil Gavin, Head of School, School of Environmental Planning, Griffith University

Dr Dodson—We have made a written submission to the inquiry, which was effectively a covering letter describing some research that we at the Urban Research Program at Griffith University in Brisbane have been undertaking regarding the potential distribution of adverse impacts arising from the socioeconomic costs of rising fuel prices. This report was sent to the committee. I do not know whether you have all seen it; perhaps you have.

CHAIR—Yes, we have. I must say that a number of people also have been quoting your research to us. Dr Dodson—Since that came out in December 2005, we have received quite a lot of media coverage of it, so we suspect that a few people have read it. We will run very quickly through that. Since you have all read it, we will not dwell too extensively on it. We have just recently completed another research paper which examines specifically the impact of rising fuel prices on households with mortgages, and we will also report to you today briefly some outcomes of that.

We believe our original paper Oil vulnerability in the Australian city was the first attempt in Australia to really comprehend on a very close spatial neighborhood scale the likely distribution of urban impacts of rising fuel prices. This research builds to some extent on research interests that both Dr Sipe and I have had over many years in terms of the distribution of socioeconomic opportunity in Australian cities and the connections between socioeconomic status and access to transport services. This is a continuation of research we have had a longstanding interest in.

The first study we undertook was an attempt to understand the distribution of the socioeconomic impacts of rising fuel costs. We became aware that there were very few data sets that were able to illuminate the issue at a very fine level of spatial detail. Therefore we decided to create an oil vulnerability index, as we term it, based on ABS census data. That is not ideal data to use for this kind of research; however, we feel that as a first cut piece of investigation by academics in Australia, it is worthy of some attention by the committee. Subsequently we have also submitted it to a refereed international urban research journal. The referees were unanimous in agreeing that it should be published and reported to the scholarly community, so we feel confident that our approach has some validity.

In our index, effectively we combined what we describe as an indexed indicator of car dependence, which is the variable within the census of the mode of travel used for the journey to work, with the proportion of households within a given locality that have two cars or more. We decided that together those two variables were a good indicator of the level of car dependence experienced by households. We then combined that with the ABS socioeconomic index for areas, which is the measure the ABS uses to describe socioeconomic status. So together we felt that car dependence and socioeconomic status were useful markers of the likely vulnerability experienced by localities to rising fuel costs on the basis that, if you have high levels of car dependence, your fuel costs are going up and you are of modest or low socioeconomic status, then your capacity to absorb that rising price relative to your income is probably far reduced.

Moving to the results, our initial study investigated Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. The choice of cities was largely due to time constraints in our own research schedules. We have focused solely on the major cities in Australia, using the definition of the urban areas for these cities provided by the ABS. I have just outlined the way the ratings are done. On these diagrams, the areas in red and yellow are the most vulnerable; those in green and dark green are the least vulnerable. On the image that you see before you, the inner city areas tend to be less vulnerable in our measure to rising fuel prices and it is the outer suburban areas, particularly those in the growth corridors of Brisbane, which are most vulnerable. If we look at Sydney next, a comparable effect is seen in Sydney, although there is some centralization within the western suburbs. But you can see high vulnerability areas extending along the north-west and south-west growth corridors with lower oil vulnerability concentrated within the CBD and, to some extent, the areas immediately around the CBD and on the North Shore.

In Melbourne there is a comparable effect, particularly with the growth corridors in former industrial areas or areas that have had a high concentration of industrial employment which has since been heavily restructured over recent decades. They have structural unemployment in some of those localities to the west, north and south-east of Melbourne but also with relatively poor provision of public transport in those localities. So combined, you have high car dependence and relatively low socioeconomic status, which contributes to the patterns of oil vulnerability we have presented. As with the other cities, the inner city and middle suburban areas appear to be exhibiting the lower levels of vulnerability to rising fuel costs.

In our first study, we attempted to chart the population numbers within these different categories by oil vulnerability rating: the higher on the scale, the more vulnerable they are. This slide shows Brisbane. If we go to Sydney, there is a similar distribution, and in Melbourne too. You can see there is some variation in the distribution of oil vulnerabilities between these cities.

We have just counted those in the highest vulnerability categories in numbers of population. These people are likely to be experiencing the worst socioeconomic impacts of rising fuel costs. There are, however, a large number in the moderate vulnerability areas who may also be highly impacted.

In our next study, which came out about a week ago, on mortgage and oil vulnerability in the Australian city, we used a similar method of indexing. But, in this study, we have combined ABS census data on car dependence with data on the proportion of households with mortgages and on income this time around. We decided that, for assessing the impact of rising fuel prices on these households, income was a better measure than socioeconomic status—largely because those at the very lowest end of the socioeconomic spectrum were less likely to be homeowners.

The reason we chose to specifically investigate mortgage vulnerability is that it is apparent that the Reserve Bank of Australia is now conceiving of the inflationary impacts of rising fuel costs as a key issue that it needs to address through its control of the interest rate settings. The recent rate rise that came through, I think, in early June was indicative of this perceived relationship that the Reserve Bank sees and is now seeking to address. We felt that there is potential for not only rising fuel costs to impact on households but also rising mortgage costs as interest rates go up. We see this as a twin vulnerability, particularly given that there may be some inflexibility in the labor market in terms of the ability of incomes to rise commensurate to the increases in transport and interest rate costs.

This is our index, called a VAMPIRE—vulnerability assessment for mortgages, petrol, interest rate expenditure. Again, similar to the patterns of vulnerability shown in the socioeconomic oil vulnerability in the size that we showed previously, this study shows a much more widespread distribution of vulnerability in many more areas that have higher vulnerability status. We have done five cities this time. It is primarily those in the outer growth corridors of Brisbane. It is the western suburbs of the Gold Coast, away from the coastline. In Sydney, again, it is in the outer western suburbs along the growth corridors. By comparison, the inner city, the North Shore and inner south-east are relatively less vulnerable. In Melbourne, it is far more distributed in a broad arc right around the outside of Melbourne, compared to the previous assessment of socioeconomic vulnerability, which was fairly tightly concentrated. This is far more general. In Perth, again, you see that phenomenon of a lower vulnerability in a city with a much higher vulnerability arc around the outer and middle suburbs.

The reasons we see these patterns in Australian cities, we feel, are primarily related to the operation of housing markets which tend to provide the cheaper and newer housing in outer suburban and fringe localities. Households seeking to purchase a home for the first time are more likely to locate in those areas, and those on modest and lower incomes who are seeking home ownership are also more likely to locate in those areas because of the way that the housing market is structured.

However, this means that they run into the problem of the relatively poor provision of public transport services in fringe and outer suburban areas compared to the inner-city localities. This is a problem of historic government underinvestment in public transport infrastructure and services in the outer suburbs. This dates back to the shift in Australian transport planning practice that occurred after the Second World War, when planners began to move away from the previous Australian model of largely transit oriented development based around the existing rail and tramway lines to modes of urban development based on the private motor car and the provision of roads and major freeways.

The result is that public transport services have not kept up with growth. The highest quality public transport services are situated within the inner cities. Those on the fringe experience a far lower quality of service in terms of the frequency of services, the hours of operation, the days of operation and, importantly, the connectivity between not only individual modes but also between modes.

In the best public transport services in the world you find a high level of integration between modes, with central planning to ensure that, for example, buses connect to rail stations that give passengers time enough to transfer. The heavy rail system will convey them at high speed to another connection point and then transfer them to another local bus service to take them to where they want to go. In large part that type of public transport service does not exist in Australian cities. It does exist in some localities, but to a large extent the outer and fringe suburbs are poorly served by public transport. We see that as the key point of vulnerability in the context of the rising fuel prices in Australian cities.

In terms of our suggestions or recommendations regarding improvements to public transport, we think there needs to be dedicated public transport statutory type authorities within each state government that stand alone and are independent from the immediate departmental control of state bureaucracies. We also feel there should be strong federal government interest and involvement in public transport planning, coordination and funding. There is some opportunity for partnership arrangements between the federal government and the states. I will leave that to you to contemplate.

In particular, suburban public transport and circumferential public transport routes is required. The majority of public transport heavy rail and bus services in Australian cities are radially focused—that is, they travel from the outer suburbs into the CBD. There is a paucity of public transport services that travel around the outer suburbs that provide the quality of service found within inner and radial areas. We see some scope for expansion of rail services to new fringe estates, particularly in the growth corridor areas of Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. For example, Rowville in Melbourne’s outer south-east was promised a train line in 1969. They have been waiting almost 40 years for that to materialize. They are still waiting. Now they are facing rising fuel prices. We see some scope for those rail lines that have been planned for many decades in a lot of instances but have not materialized to be introduced and completed.

There was some discussion in the earlier presentation about how one might finance public transport. If you look at the total transport budget that state governments currently expend, there is actually multiple billions of dollars available for transport. The trouble is that most of it is currently dedicated to providing major road infrastructure such as freeways and tunnels. If you add in tollways, the sums are in the multiple billions. If those projects were postponed—they do not need to be cancelled; they can just be postponed in the budgetary process—that money could be transferred to the funding of specifically local scale public transport services to make sure that the outer suburbs have as high a quality of service as those in the inner city.

We feel that there would then be a high level of amelioration of the oil vulnerability and the mortgage vulnerability that we have described. Should oil prices decline in the future then it would be possible to still revisit further road construction and road projects. However, if it did turn out that a peak oil scenario did happen then Australian cities would be protected, at least partly, in terms of the personal-private cost of transport by provision of improved public transport services.

Finally, we perceive a need to improve local-scale amenity in terms of walking and cycling and access to local shopping trips so that households, in responding to rising fuel prices, are able, even if they do not make all their trips by public transport, to start to cut out a few of those minor local trips that might save them money over time. Those primarily involve walking to the local shops and to employment and other services.

Senator WEBBER—That raises a lot of questions actually. Dr Dodson, you spoke about road expenditure versus provision of local public transport. I am from Perth, so I was very pleased to see that there was something about that.

Dr Dodson—Perth is somewhat of an exception to this general rule.

Senator WEBBER—Absolutely, and we will get to our train line in a minute. In fact, that is what I wanted to say. In Perth, we have got fast-developing suburban corridors. It is relatively cheap to build roads because of our sand base, as opposed to a lot of the other challenges around on this side of the country. What do you mean by the provision of local public transport in terms of that swap from developing roads to developing local public transport? It is much cheaper for me to build a major road or extend the freeway to allow people to get into the city to work than it is to build the train line. It is quicker. Surely, it is not necessarily an either/or, if I am going to allow the city to keep developing. It has to be both. I cannot leave them out there not being able to get anywhere.

Dr Dodson—That is certainly the case. However, given the concern that has been expressed to this committee about rising fuel prices, there is strong potential that there will be less demand for those radial roads that provide access to the CBD. In the future, people will be making fewer trips; therefore, the existing road space potentially would have less traffic on it and there would be greater demand for public transport if fuel prices continue to rise. The problem at the moment is that Australian cities do not have particularly good public transport services in those outer suburban areas, so there is a lack of good examples or models with which to expand upon.

However, there is enormous scope, we believe, for provision of local bus services within local suburban areas that would connect to higher frequency arterial bus services and to rail services, where they exist, with timed connections. They would be timed to arrive a few minutes before the train departs so passengers have time to transfer and get ready for the train and then passengers offloading from the train have time to get onto the bus that ferries them to their local area. We feel those kinds of services would be critical in a scenario where fuel prices were markedly higher than they currently are in order to provide metropolitan access to households, particularly in the outer suburbs.

Dr Sipe—I would just add that we are not really talking about not spending money on roads; we are talking about having more of a balance. In south-east Queensland with the latest regional plan, basically about 20 per cent of the transport funds are spent for public transport and 80 per cent is for roads. Some of those roads are not necessarily to service newly developing areas.

They are trying to move traffic faster through the city by spending $3 billion on a tunnel. We would really question whether, in 10 years, there is going to be anybody who can afford to pay the toll and the fuel to use the tunnel. It is really that issue of bringing things a little bit more into balance, because clearly at this point in time the roads lobby is in charge.

Dr Dodson—It is worth noting that, in Australian cities where public transport is provided at a high level of service quality and interconnectivity, people will use it. In our research report we mention the member for Wentworth, Malcolm Turnbull, who has recently achieved the ability to use his parliamentary vehicle allowance to purchase a yearly public transport ticket. We found it curious that, while Mr Turnbull is one of Australia’s richest citizens, he would deliberately choose to use public transport. The reason he is able to make that choice is that the high-quality services are there. He can get around inner city Sydney easily and efficiently. The newspaper quoted him saying that it is more efficient to use public transport in Sydney. He has that choice because he lives in an electorate where those services exist. Households in the outer areas of Sydney, where that level of quality does not exist, do not have that choice.

Senator WEBBER—That brings me to another point, which is the socioeconomic argument around that. We were having a discussion before about the incentives we need to give people to use public transport. Some people in Victoria and other places have talked about perhaps making it free. It seems to me that, if you accept what you say about the current infrastructure—and it is absolutely right—you are therefore subsidizing the rich.

If you are going to make it free—and most of the infrastructure is in the inner city, where people are fairly affluent—you are not really helping those in the northern suburbs in my home town or in the western suburbs here.

Dr Dodson—I might respond to that by suggesting that there is a subtlety to that observation in the sense that the processes of housing market restructuring in Australian cities over the last two or three decades have resulted in the gentrification of the inner city. Wealthier households have returned to the inner city, after a couple of decades in the 1950s, the 1960s and the early 1970s when they began to depart the inner city. If you look at it in the sense of a subsidy, it is based on a combination of existing infrastructure, housing market change and labor market change. As we point out in our paper, there is a serious inequity when you have your lowest and most modest income households in localities on the fringe, where now they are facing high transport costs. That is a serious social equity issue that we feel that governments should address through their transport policies.

Senator WEBBER—I notice one of your recommendations was to encourage more local access to employment services. Given the urban and suburban sprawl that we have, how do we do that? I do not know of many outer metropolitan areas that want an industrial estate next to them. To make this work, you need large-scale employment. The corner shop cannot employ that many people.

Dr Dodson—You can provide access to industrial areas through the provision of high-quality public transport. That is how industrial areas serviced their labor needs historically until the development of the private motor car. In terms of local services, the postwar period in Australian cities saw a shift away from high streets and local shopping strips towards regional, car based shopping malls. In conditions of rising fuel prices, we would suggest that there may be greater opportunities for providers of services and retailers on the local scale, where they previously would not have been particularly competitive relative to the regional shopping malls. Now that the costs of travel to those regional services are increasing, as fuel prices rise, the relative competitiveness of those local services may increase.

We see that there is an opportunity to support that kind of travel behavior through making local trips by walking and cycling far more pleasant than they typically are for those living in outer suburban estates—where there may not be cycle facilities, where the footpaths may be poorly developed or where there may be limited shading. All of those local amenities that encourage people or support walking and cycling need to be considered and provided in areas where they are insufficient.

Dr Sipe—With development over the past couple of decades, developers in new housing estates have not been providing local retail. There may be a shopping mall but local retail is missing. In Western Sydney in a lot of these areas governments have allowed people to set up shops out of their homes because this need is basically not being provided. In the US it has gone to the extreme where developers are now subsidizing corner shops and local retail rather than putting in a golf course, because they view it as something that is lacking. They support it even though the money is not there in the initial years of a new development to make it financially viable.

Senator WEBBER—I accept a great deal of what you have to say, but where does that leave people in regional Australia? There are lots of towns in my home state where there is not a lot of local employment and people basically live on some form of social security. There is no public transport and they are paying $1.75 a liter for petrol. What do we do to address those kinds of social problems?

Dr Dodson—That is a question we have not undertaken an enormous amount of research into. However, we have recently submitted a grant application to a federal government agency to examine that issue. I think that issue needs to be contemplated within the much larger issue of the impact of rising fuel prices on productive and socioeconomic structures within rural and regional Australia. I see the transition from relatively cheap motor fuel that can drive truck based freight haulage to a greater emphasis on rail as a likely outcome. Although we have not done the research to demonstrate it, we see that as a likely scenario where fuel prices continue to rise or stay at high levels. Therefore the socioeconomic impact on individuals and households needs to be understood within that broader context. There is a possibility that transport systems and settlement patterns in regional and rural areas may undergo significant restructuring in order to better align settlement patterns with the rail infrastructure. That is a potentially stark or extreme depiction, but I think in a forum like this there needs to be debate about what is going to happen with rising fuel prices. I cannot offer any specific solution in that regard, however.

Senator MILNE—Congratulations on this work. It is long overdue. It is great to have something of this kind in the public arena. It is terrific. I have a couple of issues. The first one is the spatial expansion of cities. The frustration I have in this argument is that we can talk about the need to provide public transport, we can talk about the need for transport around the circumference of suburbs but, the minute you put that in, developers and local government see the opportunity to expand another 10 kilometers or 15 kilometers beyond that. That is our problem. Every time we try and anticipate need, people then see it as potential to develop further. Where is there any emphasis in the country on containment of the physical size of cities so that we can start providing adequate transport and adequate services into the future, given the carbon constraints and the oil price and depletion issues we are facing?

Dr Dodson—The issue of urban expansion in terms of infrastructure has been of great concern to governments for the last 30 years—since the original oil shocks in the 1970s. Many state governments have put in place urban consolidation policies to encourage higher density development within existing urban areas, although those have been fairly uneven and partially applied. There has been extensive urbanization in greenfield sites since that period.

Dr Sipe—I guess the most recent example is in south-east Queensland, where, with the regional planning effort over the past couple of years, they have established an urban footprint. I guess we will have to see to what extent—

Senator MILNE—They adhere to it.

Dr Sipe—Right. There were a few areas that had not been decided on and some of those have flipped from nondevelopment into the development realm. We are hoping that this provides some containment on that issue of expansion.

Senator MILNE—The other big issue, and you mention it in your submission, is this. If we were to persuade the federal government to work in a cooperative way with the states and to start seriously investing in public transport provision as a way of dealing with this issue, with the productivity of cities, with congestion, with health issues, with climate change et cetera, financing would become the major issue. If people pick up the argument they are then going to ask, ‘How do you propose we pay for this?’ Have you looked at any financing models that would fit with the fact that we are a federation of states and that local government has the planning provisions and opportunities as well? How far advanced are you on that? That is the key question. If we can get to the persuasion, which I think we are going to have to get to because the circumstances are upon us, how do we pay for it?

Dr Dodson—Our suggestion, as we have outlined today, would be to shift the balance in existing states funding from roads towards public transport, walking and cycling. There is probably some scope for that to occur at the federal level as well. Around $7 billion to $8 billion is spent in federal road funding. A lot of that goes to rural and regional areas, so it would probably not be appropriate to transfer that to public transport provision—although perhaps some sort of regional public transport coach or train network assistance might be worth contemplating. However, I think there would be some significant scope for the use of some of those federal road funds in partnering arrangements or co-financing arrangements with states to identify areas of high public transport need within Australian cities and to plan and coordinate the rollout of new, high-quality services to those localities. As we suggested, it would probably require a dedicated federal government agency to undertake the research, analysis and planning to determine what measures would be the most appropriate in any given locality or circumstance.

Dr Sipe—The only thing I would add is this. As you can tell, I am not from these parts. I come from America. There seems to be a reluctance on the part of both the Commonwealth and the state and local governments to incur any debt in providing public facilities. I see that this is an untapped resource. A lot of these facilities should not be paid for by existing taxpayers. There is an intergenerational issue. They should be paid for over the 20 or 30 years of the life of the project. It seems that governments want to be debt free, and I am not sure that that is necessarily a good thing. Maybe the US is not the best example, having gone to the other extreme, but I think there is some middle ground there in financing projects over a period of time using revenues from public transport or toll roads. I think that is a much better way of doing things than these public-private partnerships that we have seen around Australia.

Senator JOYCE—I want to follow up on one question that Senator Milne put to you. Do you have any idea of the ideal size for a city? As an outsider, as someone who does not live in a city, I came down here the other day and I saw a bus driving around with nobody in it. I thought, ‘Well, that just goes to show that you can have cheap transport that nobody uses.’ What we see as investment in transport infrastructure might just exacerbate the problems that are already there. In your study, do you talk about an ideal size for a city or can cities just get as big as they like?

Dr Dodson—The question of an ideal size of a city is one that exercised the minds of a number of urban researchers in Australia in the 1960s and 1970s; I am not sure that it was ever resolved. The result was the decentralization program under the Whitlam government, which sought to shift population to regional areas such as, I believe, Bathurst-Orange in New South Wales, Albury-Wodonga and parts of Victoria. I am not sure whether they had a program in Queensland or other states. I would not wish to comment too much on the success of those programs. I do not think they are perceived as having had a dramatic impact on changing the rate of growth of Australian capital cities. There may be some scope in the future to revisit questions of decentralization of urban populations to rural and regional centers. We certainly have not done

any analysis or investigation of that type of policy. The problems would be in providing employment and other services in such localities to make it feasible.

Senator JOYCE—I will put the question on its head, then. Do you feel that, with unplanned transport infrastructure in place, there is the potential to exacerbate transport problems for an area and create more red areas? I am thinking about the south-east corner of Queensland, obviously. Wouldn’t an ad hoc growth to an area basically exacerbate problems that are going to be almost impossible to fix because there would be houses where you wanted to put transport infrastructure?

Dr Dodson—That comes down to a question of good planning. Until the postwar period, housing development occurred effectively in unison with rail and tramways. It was after the postwar period that the private motor car gave households and individuals the capacity to travel almost anywhere at will within the city, and that enabled the extensive, often low-density, development you see in, for example, the North Beaudesert shire area of south-east Queensland. Our view would be that well-coordinated and well-planned development with a strong public transport component to it can ameliorate those problems, but it will not necessarily solve them universally and provide some utopian type of urbanization.

Senator JOYCE—What is the cost of fixing the problem that is already there? The houses are already there; the roads are already there. If you want to put in a rail infrastructure, you are going to have to start moving houses and roads and changing everything around. Have you done any costing of your potential loss because the planning process was not proper and in place at the start? A lot of this is a nirvana; it is never going to happen because the cost of putting in new rail networks will be prohibitive.

Dr Dodson—Perhaps yes and perhaps no. I note that the Queensland government is currently expending large sums of money in putting road tunnels through the centre of Brisbane. It is building a number of bus lanes that go through existing inner city localities, many of which have far higher real estate values than those out on the fringe. In terms of the cost of providing new fixed route infrastructure for public or even road transport, I am not sure that the cost of purchasing the corridors and lines for that is necessarily prohibitive. It does not seem to be at the moment.

CHAIR—There are also other forms of public transport, too, like light rail. I understand that that is much less disruptive and you can move a lot of people. Have those things been factored into your equation?

Dr Dodson—In some areas there are opportunities for upgrading underutilized rail infrastructures. There are a couple of train lines in south-east Queensland that are underutilized that could potentially be upgraded. But also simply providing bus services that operate in a coordinated way across outer suburban areas would, in many cases, provide a sufficient level of service that would match or be comparable to a rail service if it were planned, well coordinated and operated efficiently.

Senator JOYCE—What are you going to use as motivation? Once someone jumps in their car to drive to the train station, how are you going to encourage them to get out? It is the same issue that people have in regional areas where, once they put stuff on a truck to get it to a railhead, they say, ‘Don’t bother stopping; keep going.’ It is the same idea with the car: once they jump in the car to drive to the train station and they have the radio going, how are you going to encourage them to get out?

Dr Dodson—The way to do it is to provide the highest possible quality of service that you can so it makes it easy and efficient for them to do it. That level of service exists in many instances in the inner areas of Australian cities, and a high proportion of households and individuals use it. It is the lack of service and the poor quality of service in the outer-suburban areas that prevent people from using public transport, in my opinion. The rising price of motor vehicle travel will be a strong motivational element in encouraging people to use public transport. But the trouble is that it needs to be there and it needs to be of high quality so that they can use it.

Senator JOYCE—I was interested that you were looking at Brisbane. Brisbane is a unique town in that it is hilly and therefore you will need tunnels or bridges in order to get around the place. Because houses are parked on the sides of hills in places like Waterworks Road, there will be an immense capital cost in trying to set up the infrastructure—unless you move the roads, because the roads follow the accessible paths in the lower areas of the topography. Is there a sense that the cost of this is going to be astronomical, as opposed to better planning and getting people to live in areas where the cost of this infrastructure would not be so great?

Dr Sipe—That is what they are trying to do with the regional plan.

Senator JOYCE—Yes, they are moving them but they are just moving them down the street. They are moving them to Ipswich when they should be moving them over the hill and far away.

Dr Dodson—There does not seem to be an immense topographical constraint to the provision of existing public transport services. Buses could easily run along the large arterial roads and the major roads that already exist throughout south-east Queensland. The trouble is that existing government planning is focused on not impeding motor vehicle traffic. In the case of the eastern suburbs of Brisbane, we have Old Cleveland Road, which is a major arterial road, yet the government is now planning to tunnel a busway to provide public transport under that road for approximately 25 kilometers out to the eastern suburb of Capalaba. From my perspective, you can always use existing road space for buses. So there is a question about the opportunity cost of using tunneling, which is going to cost billions of dollars, to provide that service when you could use the existing road service and coordinate services with the regional rail network, and then have plenty of money left over to provide very high-quality local suburban bus services for those in the outer suburbs who are going to be most affected by rising fuel prices. I am not particularly concerned about topography being an impediment to improving public transport.

Dr Sipe—There have been a number of questions about getting people to use public transport. The evidence we have been able to put together over the last six to nine months suggests that that is not going to be a problem, that the price of fuel will take care of that. The real question is: are the public transport companies and authorities planning for this? For example, in Brisbane they basically now publish how many buses go past the bus stop because they are full. The problem is not getting people on; it is providing the capacity. That is what we see as the real problem. Who is building buses? What happens if every city in the world decides it needs 100 more buses?

CHAIR—We are not going to have enough carriages on the Perth trains. Come peak hour now, we are packed in like sardines because we do not have enough carriages on our trains.

Dr Sipe—So who is looking out for this? Somebody should be thinking, ‘If all the cities in Australia are facing this problem, what about all the cities in other parts of the world?’ I have not read that General Motors is going to give up building Hummers and begin to build train carriages and buses.

 

Posted in Energy Policy & Politicians, GOVERNMENT, Transportation | Tagged , , , , , | 1 Comment

Australian government was Peak Oil Aware in 2006

Preface. This post is excerpts from Bakhtiari’s testimony about Peak Oil before the Australian Senate Committee in 2006. I’ve excerpted what I found of interest, so if it seems disjointed, that’s my fault. And it isn’t just the Australian Senate that’s “peak oil aware”. Perth’s government assembled 1200 people to brainstorm coping solutions for peak oil as Bakhtiari mentions below.

Some of Bakhtiari’s predictions are wrong — although he knew about fracked oil, he didn’t realize it would be enough to delay peak oil until 2018, when world oil production peaked, and may soften decline for as long as 2025. Though meanwhile it could decline rapidly financially, since it never made money even at $100 a barrel, and investors are weary of backing this industry.  He also may have overestimated how high the price of oil could go if Gail Tverberg is right that low prices rather than high ones will signal peak oil. This is because high prices crash the economy since people can’t afford expensive oil, and oil companies can’t afford to explore or start new petroleum producing projects if the price is low.

At any rate, though the timeline is wrong, Bakhtiari’s idea that the initial T1 phase, the plateau we’ve been on since 2005 is rather benign, appears to be right.  But the decline rate gets worse and worse over T2, T3, and T4 (explained near the end of this post), and I suspect that with the peaking of oil in 2018, we are about to enter T2 and the other more serious phases. These in turn I predict will increase the trend towards autocracies (i.e. Trumpism), social unrest, mass migrations, electric grid outages, supply chain disruptions and more.

It’s also possible the Middle East has higher reserves than Bakhtiari thought, since Saudi Arabia had to invite in outside experts to estimate their reserves when they went public. It is widely estimated that the Middle East has over two-thirds of the conventional, easy, cheap oil reserves in the world.  The other two main sources, the U.S. and Russia are going to shrink. America has less than 4% of remaining reserves, mostly from fracked oil wells that decline by 80% over 3 years. So when all fracked oil is in decline, production will quite dramatically fall.  Nor will Russia fill in the gap. Russia is a super corrupt mafia totalitarian state that isn’t investing in future oil and gas infrastructure and is likely at or past peak oil already.

Australia has done a great deal to educate their public and leaders about the issue of Peak Oil, far more than the United States where I found 2040 hits on peak oil in their parliamentary system. Whether that will make a difference given the lack of alternative energy resources to replace oil, and the possibility China will invade Australia for resources when the U.S. military is immobilized from lack of fuel, remains to be seen. 

I published this back in 2006, and I’m republishing it today because it is just as relevant now.  Also, I’m interested in the topic of why leaders in government, economics, and even science deny peak oil and the repercussions.  If we’d just faced the problem squarely, and while kicking and screaming all the way prepared for the inevitable end of oil, we’d be in much better shape.  More farms would have been converted to organic already, more research on pest control without pesticides, Roman stone roads and aqueducts to last for millennia instead of the 20 years today due to rusting rebar that expands up to 7 fold and destroys roads, dams, and other infrastructure today.  Well, what to do is a huge topic I address elsewhere at energyskeptic, and many people have published books about this topic, and postcarbon.org, resilience, transition towns and more are dedicated to our inevitable future.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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July 26, 2006. Bakhtiari on Australia’s future oil supply and alternative transport fuels. Parliament of Australia.

Dr Bakhtiari has recently retired as a senior advisor for the National Iranian Oil Company in Tehran and has written several books and more than 65 papers on the Iranian and international oil and gas industry.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I will begin with a short opening statement for you to consider. Crude oil is a commodity unlike any other. It is simultaneously a strategic raw material, a unique industrial feedstock and the most essential of fuels. It is also the most conveniently and widely traded form of energy and therefore the swing element in the world’s energy mix. It is no wonder that the price of crude oil is the most important figure quoted daily worldwide. Its relevance could well rise significantly in the near future as the impact of peak oil or, in other words, the peaking of global crude oil production, becomes evident to all and sundry.

At present, worldwide crude oil output is stagnant at around 81 million barrels a day, give or take one million barrels. OPEC’s 11 member countries are now limited to a maximum of 31 million barrels per day, having produced only 29.35 million barrels in May 2006, and the so-called non-OPEC countries, which represent the rest of the world, are capped at 50 million barrels per day. Thus the world now produces and consumes some 30 billion barrels in each single year.

Most of the world’s major producers are struggling to keep oil production on an even keel, especially both the OPEC and non-OPEC champions—that is, Saudi Arabia and Russia—which are both producing some nine million barrels a day at present while facing almost insurmountable problems to avoid declines in the near future. Moreover, most of the world’s super giant oilfields are now getting old and some of them have entered terminal decline. Suffice it to mention the three largest ones: Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar, Mexico’s Cantarell and Kuwait’s Greater Burgan oilfields, which are surely but steadily going downhill. The last super giant to be discovered was the Kashagan oilfield in the north Caspian Sea offshore from Kazakhstan back in 1999, and it is now scheduled to begin initial production in 2008-09.

Not only have discoveries of super giants dwindled to nil in the 21st century but yearly oil finds have plummeted to between four and six billion barrels a year. There is little hope that this trend will be reversed in the near future because most of the planet’s petroleum provinces have now been explored for petroleum and there is only one last frontier area remaining—that of Antarctica, with its pristine wilderness and its population of some 20 million penguins.

The decline of global oil production seems now irreversible. It is bound to occur over a number of transitions, the first of which I have called transition 1, which has just begun in 2006. Transition 1 has a very benign gradient of decline, and it will take months before one notices it at all. But transition 2 will be far steeper, and each successive transition will show more pronounced declining gradients. My WOCAP model has predicted that over the next 14 years present global production of 81 million barrels per day will decrease by roughly 32%, down to around 55 million barrels per day by the year 2020.

Thus in the face of peak oil and its multiple consequences, which are bound to impact upon almost all aspects of our human standards of life, it seems imperative to get prepared to face all the inevitable shockwaves resulting from that. Preparation should be carried out on individual, familial, societal and national levels as soon as possible. Every preparative step taken today will prove far cheaper than any step taken tomorrow. I thank you for your attention during my opening statement, and I am ready now to try, to the best of my abilities, to reply to any questions that you have.

CHAIR—In the first set of questions, can we concentrate on the issue of peak oil itself and defining that, and then we will move on to the other issues.

Senator JOYCE—Thank you very much, Mr Samsam Bakhtiari. I have been a follower of you for a while; I have been one of your quiet fans. With regard to Hubbetrt’s peak, within the Ghawar oilfields and the Cantarell oilfields, can you explain to us some of the signs that these oilfields are running out of oil? I am talking about gaseous inertia or water inertia. What do you believe are the key indicators that these oilfields are past peak production?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—The super giant oilfields are all very great oilfields. Today you have 40% of world production in these super giants. Managing a super giant is a very difficult procedure. The larger the super giant, the more difficult it is. I will firstly state the case of Ghawar. Why? Because it is the largest oilfield in the world by far. At the beginning, it was estimated that it had in 1952—that is when it came on stream, which is some 54 years ago— some 70 billion barrels of recoverable oil. That was 54 years ago. In the meantime, much of that has been already recovered. The situation for Ghawar today is that you have two major problems. It is still producing, we think, between four and 4½ million barrels every single day, but in order to produce that much oil much needs to be done. I will show you two points, if you allow me.

What is happening today is that they are injecting eight million barrels of sea water into Ghawar every single day. What do they get out? This is very schematic. They get 12.5 million barrels of liquid out of the field and they split that into eight million barrels of water and 4.5 million barrels of oil. The water that they are injecting is increasing constantly.

The last information I have is that it has grown now to nine million barrels, but these figures are very approximate, because we do not know exactly what is going on. But it is roughly of that magnitude. So when they say that Ghawar crude is cheap, it is certainly not cheap any more, because you have to do all this enormous processing. You have these huge pipelines which come from the sea and an enormous compressor re-injecting that water under the oil column and pushing the column up. That is one point. There are problems. If you did not have problems you would not need to do all that.

They have done something else. Usually in all these super giants you drill vertical wells and you take out the oil from the vertical wells by the pressure either of the gas or the water. That is how it is mostly in the four super giants in Iran. But in the 1990s there was a new technology called horizontal wells. In Ghawar they thought that instead of relying on the vertical wells they would drill horizontal wells. Horizontal wells are both a blessing and a curse. Why?

Let me show you roughly how this works. You have a cap here. Here you have the oil. On top you have the gas and below you have the water. Naturally this is very schematic. A vertical well comes here in the middle of the oil column and you get your oil by either the pressure of the water beneath or the pressure of the gas from the top. With the gas here you say that this field is gas driven. Most of the Iranian fields are gas driven. Ghawar is water driven. It is either/or, but sometimes, very rarely, both.

The horizontal well is different. It comes down like this and then it goes horizontally for a few kilometers. The horizontal well is a blessing because you can get to the exact middle of the oil structure and so take out your oil more easily. But there is a very great danger with horizontal wells. They tell us that in Ghawar today there are 220, roughly, horizontal wells. The great danger of the horizontal well is that when the water reaches the well it is dead. So one day in the future at Ghawar, the water level will eventually reach the horizontal well.

It is happening but not on a large scale. When it happens on a large scale then Ghawar is going to collapse and you will have a cliff in the production of Ghawar. When you have a cliff there, the whole Saudi production system is going to fall apart. If that happens, we will start hearing bells ringing all over the place, and the price of oil is going to go through the roof.

Senator JOYCE—I have heard you say before that China are prepared to pay any price for oil. Therefore, if they are prepared to pay any price for oil, they are prepared to go anywhere to get it. I got myself into a lot of trouble by suggesting that countries would exploit the Antarctica. If China were prepared to pay any price for oil, which means they would be prepared to go anywhere to get it, and if there were areas of territorial dispute, is there the possibility that oil would be found in the Antarctic continent?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I have studied oil reserves for the past 40 years, from when it was a very new science. In the beginning, there were a few specialists who were not very good, and then came the greatest specialist of oil reserves. He began working for a petrol consultant in the 1990s and, in 1995-96, established what is in my opinion the best set of oil reserves in the world.

These are the oil reserves of Dr Colin Campbell. I think these reserves are the best. I have been able to prove not only that these reserves adapted very well to my model but also that they correlate the production of the 11 OPEC countries in a satisfactory way. So I have adopted them.

Dr Campbell is of the opinion that the total endowment for conventional oil of the planet is around 1,900 billion barrels. I think this is the best number that we have at present. I have been working with that number for the past seven or eight years. Out of that number of 1,900 billion barrels, Dr Campbell is of the opinion that for the two polar sectors, the Arctic and Antarctica, you should have roughly 52 billion barrels. I think that Dr Campbell splits that number roughly half and half between the two poles.

As you know, exploration in the Arctic began in 1995-96—and this exploration is now growing faster and faster. They have given to a research team of the USGS and the Geological Survey of Denmark a joint research project to explore the tectonics and oil sources of the Arctic. Their report should be out next year, 2007, which is the International Polar Year. Antarctica is today the last frontier for the petroleum oil industry. Whether the oil industry is going to go there, I certainly do not know. I know from the very early studies I have made that it is going to be very difficult—firstly, because of the conditions in Antarctica. For seven months of the year it is dark—and you are more aware of the temperatures than I am. Senator Joyce, I believe you have lately been down there on a four-week trip and have seen things first-hand. So it is certainly not something for tomorrow, because conditions are not ready yet. As you know, it is very difficult to drill in ice—and there is an icecap of at least 2,000 meters that you have to drill through before you get to the lower tectonics. But maybe one day, when the price of oil goes up to $200 or $300 a barrel, some oil companies will decide to try their hand there. That could be a possibility. I hope it will not happen. But some governments will have their backs to the wall and in suburbia there will be unrest over petrol. Many things could happen—among them, drilling in the Southern Ocean or Antarctica.

It is extremely difficult to forecast precisely the price of oil in the future. I can see a range of $100 to $150 not very far into the future.

Senator JOYCE—That is $100 to $150 a barrel?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Yes, this we are certainly going to get to. In my opinion, we could get there very easily. We are a couple of hurricanes or some geopolitical problems or a war away from having a worse problem than we have today. There you could go very easily, but after that where can this price go? I am studying that right now, and I have not reached a conclusion yet. There must be some outer limit, and I am beginning to think that maybe the outer limit could be $300 per barrel. I am not so sure yet, because we are entering a brand new era in human history, an era we have not been prepared for at all. For the past six generations, we have been used to having cheap oil always available whenever we wanted it, more or less. Today, in 2006, all of this is beginning to change. We are entering an era in which we know nothing much, where we have a brand new set of rules. I am trying to find out what these new rules are. I have already reached two or three new rules. One of the new rules, in my opinion, is that there will be in the very near future nothing like business as usual. In my opinion, nothing is usual from now on for any of the countries involved. And the lower you are in the pile, the worse it is going to get.

Senator JOYCE—You also made the statement that steps made today are cheaper than steps made tomorrow. With regard to mitigating or alleviating the crisis that would be caused by an oil shortage or a price of oil that is completely prohibitive to the development of industry and the fundamental freedom of people to drive around, what steps do you envisage would be worthwhile taking today? And without loading your answer, can you refer to issues such as the production of a biorenewable fuel industry, the development of ethanol as a fuel alternative and biodiesels, and alternative forms of combustible material that can be used in internal combustion engines.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Allow me to take your questions one by one. I said that steps needed to be taken, because now I am thinking that the price is going to go up. There is no other way. Now let me open a parenthesis: the price might go down tomorrow to $55, but it will come back up again. So you will have in this period a high level of volatility, but eventually it will go to very great heights—maybe to $200, maybe to $300. As long as you have price driven oil, I think it is a very good thing whatever this price is, because one day you will have a question of availability. You will be ready to pay any price, but there will not be any oil.

I remind you that oil is a very special commodity, which is something that is very difficult to realize today. For example, you have no free market in oil. Naturally, you can go to the NYMEX stock exchange and buy as many barrels as you want at the price of $74 now, but these are paper barrels. If you try to buy 10,000 barrels a day of real oil, of genuine barrels, you will have enormous problems getting that much oil on a regular and sustainable basis. So that is one of the problems that we will encounter in the medium term.

Any step you take today is to your advantage. I will give you one example. The city of Perth in Western Australia has free buses. I have been on these free buses. It is a fantastic service. Maybe today it is still too early. It might not be very economical but it is a marvelous step for the future, because one day it will pay enormous dividends, in my opinion. Also, they have a very light rail service going around 140 kilometers of their coast, and this links all of the suburbs. One day this light rail service will save all these suburbs. I was asked about this yesterday. I think that Western Australia is at the forefront of the world in terms of steps being taken. And Australia is at the forefront today of the other countries, because the other countries do not know anything at all and are not willing to prepare. So the faster these new decisions are put in place, I think it will be of benefit to any society, especially societies with suburbs.

Senator JOYCE—You said it is not really a perfect market. Yes, you can go to the New York Stock Exchange and buy oil, but it is paper oil; you are not buying the actual product. You have also talked about how the price of oil will possibly go to a horizon of about $300 a barrel. Of course, that would mean we would be paying about $6 a liter or something like that for fuel for our car, which obviously means we could not afford to fill up. Do you feel the major oil companies have the intention to exploit an arrangement which has the world paying $200 to $300 a barrel for oil? Obviously it would be in their financial interests to get to that position, because it is maximizing the returns on their stock on hand. Their stock on hand is the oil in the ground, and obviously there is a great financial windfall for them to keep the predominant means of internal combustion a mineral based oil product. The question I am asking is: will the oil companies drive the intention for people to continually use oil and be quite prepared to profit from a market of $200 to $300 a barrel? Will they ride us out to the very end? Will their intentions be to ride this cash flow window to its completion?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I do not think it is in the interests of the oil companies for the price to go very high. I think they are very well satisfied with the present price, but I think it will not be in their hands. It will not be in the hands of the companies, it will not be in the hands of the oil producers. I can see Saudi Arabia and others being very worried by prices that are too high, but I do not think any one of these players can do anything about it.

When there is not enough oil, first you will have to raise its price and then you will have the problem of its availability. There may be some kind of worldwide rationing—I do not know. I am trying to look at the future but the future I am talking about, as you mentioned, might be beyond 2020. Maybe beyond 2020 we will have some reasonable idea. What will happen after that is very difficult to predict. I do not think the oil companies would like such a scenario at all. They will be forced—

Senator JOYCE—Who can afford oil at $200 a barrel? Who would be using it?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I think the Chinese are ready to pay anything for oil. I agree with you that it will be very difficult.

Senator MILNE—Recently we had the head of BP in Australia talking about their statistical review. They take at face value the claims, particularly of Middle Eastern countries, about the extent of their reserves. We are aware that a few years ago these countries readjusted their reserves, yet there were no new discoveries that would have justified that. This is a really critical question to ask because it goes to the heart of the argument. Could you give us your frank appraisal of the Saudi reserves, in particular, and the Middle Eastern reserves, generally, and the extent to which they have been inflated for political and economic purposes et cetera and do not reflect what is actually there?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Most reviews of the reserves of the major Middle Eastern countries today, especially the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, mention reserves amounting to between 600 billion to 700 billion barrels. These are official reserve figures—in other words, the countries involved say that they have so much oil reserves available. The Oil and Gas Journal and BP take these reserves at face value. As you mentioned, in the 1980s these reserves were revised upwards. For example, in 1988 Saudi Arabia, which had reserves of 160 billion barrels, suddenly took these up to 260 billion barrels. Since 1989, it has kept this number of 260 billion barrels; there has been no change to it up to this day. So, for 17 years, it as if they have not produced anything.

In Dr Campbell’s opinion—and it is also my personal opinion—the reserves of the Middle East are roughly one half of what is officially said and presented. In other words, there should only be between 300 billion and 350 billion barrels of oil. This is the best figure I have come up with. I and Dr Campbell, as a rule of thumb, divide the official reserves by two to get a number that we believe is the actual amount of the reserves in these countries. Does that answer your question?

Senator MILNE—It certainly does. Can you go on to tell us what your view is of the US Geological Survey and its accuracy in terms of the reserves?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Every institution gives its own numbers, and we can only compare theirs to ours. You can see that the reserves given by the USGS, which is an endowment for the world of over 3,200 million reserves, is much, much higher than the numbers we are using, of only 1,900 million. Of course, we can not accept such reserves as realistic, as we cannot accept the projections of certain institutions like the International Energy Agency in Paris, which predicts that the world will be consuming 118 million barrels per day in the year 2030 as realistic, because I cannot see how the world can get over 81 or, say, 82 per day right now, let alone in the future. I believe we are in decline. So you have an enormous discrepancy between what these institutions publish and what we believe in, whether it is in reserves or whether it is in production of crude oil per day.

Senator MILNE—Given what you have said about the fact that the Middle Eastern reserves are probably half of what they say they are, and given what you have just said about the US survey, how are we going to tell? Given that the Saudis and the other Middle Eastern countries keep on saying that their reserves are the same—and they have been saying they are the same for all these years whilst production has kept on going—how are we going to know? What indications are there going to be so that we can revise the estimates to be more accurate? If they are half of what they say they are, then the shock in the share markets et cetera everywhere around the world will be huge. You mentioned before that they may not be able to manipulate it forever because of the horizontal wells and the step change that will occur. Is that the main indication—when one of the wells goes kaput? Or what will happen, in your view?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—From an outsider’s point of view, you have two ways of following what will happen. One is the price. The second is the production. If the production for the next couple of years remains stagnant, then it will mean the institutions that are predicting production of over 100 or 110 are wrong. By the way, the future is always predicted wrongly. So that is one basis. The other way of following this is by the price. If you see the price returning to $50 and staying there, it will mean that we were wrong. But, if you see the price continuing to increase, it will prove that we have been right.

So these are the two ways you can follow the story, but I will return to the French philosopher Pascal. He said the best way may be to take a bet and bet that we are right, because the ones who bet that way have not much to lose. If we are wrong, everything is going to be fine. But, if we are right, I think the ones who took precautions will be very much rewarded in the future.

Senator MILNE—What do you regard as the most authoritative estimate of world reserves? You have spoken about Colin Campbell. Is there anything that you would refer to or would you argue that that is the most accurate assessment?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—No, I certainly believe it is the most accurate. I have studied almost all, not all, of the reserve sets that I have been given or that I have come by. I can assure you that my personal archive is a very complete one. I have met almost everybody in this industry—and especially those at the world petroleum congresses, which were the Olympics of oil and were held every four years; before the internet age, at least—and I really think that the 1,900 billion barrels in Dr Campbell’s set of data are the very best that you could find in the world today. I cannot imagine that we will have any better set in the future, especially given that Dr Campbell with Mr Jean Laherrere, a petrol consultant, have done very impressive research on almost all the oil provinces on the planet.

Joyce—Is that 1,900 billion barrels of recoverable oil from now to the end?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—1,900 billion barrels total is the estimate of convention oil. You have the non-conventional, which include, among others—

Senator JOYCE—Shale oil.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—the tar sands, the shale oil and the heavy oil of Venezuela and Orinoco and all these kinds of oils, which are classified by Dr Campbell as non-conventional.

Senator WEBBER—I want to continue to explore the impact of price. Obviously the higher the price, the greater the impact on consumer behavior. In my home state of Western Australia, the higher price is making fields that were seen to be unprofitable worth developing. For example, we have all known that the Browse field has been there for a long time and now Woodside are looking at developing it. Could you give us an understanding of how an increase in price may bring other oilfields onto the market? I am asking about the relationship between the increase in the price and the increase in the development of fields that were previously seen as unprofitable. Does the increased price mean that there will be an increase in exploration with the result that new fields may come on stream?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari— Many people are of the idea that with the price increasing you will have new fields that before were not very profitable. Now, we will certainly see some of these factors coming into play. For example, you have exactly what you mentioned in the North Sea: small fields with reserves of 50 million to 100 million barrels of recoverable reserve were left by the wayside in the 1980s and 1990s, when it was not at all profitable to go and develop these fields with prices of $9 or $10 per barrel. These fields might very well be developed now at prices above $70. This will certainly happen not only in the North Sea but maybe also in America, where there are very small fields that now are going to be profitable and will be developed.

In my opinion, however all these are developed in the future, it will have very little impact on either peak oil or world production. It might make a change of, say, half a million barrels in total, not more, and half a million barrels will have very little impact. It will just shift the production curve upwards a bit but it will have very little impact. The reason is this: if you look at the US curve of decline, which was correctly predicted by Dr King Hubbert in 1956 and which peaked in 1970, it has been steadily coming down—but for the addition of Alaska. Alaska just shifted it a bit but it made no difference on the peak. It has been declining continuously since, notwithstanding the developments in exploration, exploitation and all the new technologies and the new investment that were possible at prices of $36 in the early 1980s. So I think that neither investment nor new technology will have any significant impact on the process of transition that we have entered.

Senator STERLE—Can you explain the claimed inadequacies of optimistic official agency predictions of oil production? We have had submissions from oil agencies that have told us that it is very rosy out there because they are spending lots of shareholders’ money—that is how rosy it is. Your report and your figures and Dr Campbell’s figures are at completely the opposite end of the spectrum. Can you explain how the oil agencies could be so far removed from your studies and be so different?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Maybe one explanation could be that they are interested parties and we are disinterested parties. If you hear some people saying today that the price of oil is going to drop to $25 in the near future, and I think it is almost impossible for such a thing to happen unless there is a major catastrophe on a global scale. Maybe they are saying this because they want to grow and buy smaller oil companies. They might say that they will buy at $30 because the price is going to fall to $25, so $30 is a very good price and would be a very good price to pay a small company. And there are other problems. Nobody likes the idea of peak oil. Firstly, you have the politicians. Naturally, a politician will never say that there is such a thing as peak oil. It is suicide to give bad news so a politician will never do that. He will always say, ‘The IEA says that we will be having 118 million barrels in 2030 so why worry?’

Secondly, you have the media. The media does not like peak oil. Why? There is no sponsorship for peak oil. The oil companies do not like peak oil because you should not say that your soup is cold; you should always say that it is very hot and very tasty, yes? So nobody wants to hear of this phenomenon of peak oil. I believe that some of the institutions—I will not name them; they are here and maybe you can guess which ones they are—are saying these things to act as a protection for some politicians who can say: ‘Because these institutions are saying these things, then we follow them. We do not follow Campbell and others.’

Senator JOYCE—It could also inhibit the development of a biorenewable fuel industry too. If they say there is a lot of alternative product around, then they do not need a biorenewable fuel industry.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I do not believe that there are alternatives around. In my opinion there is no alternative to crude oil. There is nothing that can replace it, and this is the problem the world is facing today. There are no alternatives and I will try to explain very briefly why.

In general economics we are taught a very basic rule. When the price goes up, demand comes down, and you have the marvelous figure of Professor Sam Wilson to explain exactly how this works. For crude oil this does not work at all. We were always taught that when the price doubles demand will come down by something. In the past two years the price has tripled and demand has not come down by anything. How far can we go? Nobody knows. I think that it will take three digits—at least over $110 or $120—for us to start seeing demand maybe coming down.

Why? Firstly, you have no way of preserving oil products easily—no way at all. We are all used to the car and we want to drive that car as far as we can possibly pay for it. Even at prices of $1.40 per liter for petrol you are beginning to have problems in the population economically, so what will it be like when the prices are much higher than that? $1.40 per liter is one of the cheapest prices in the Western world. It is just a little above fuel prices in California today so it is very cheap.

Not only do you not have preservation, you do not have any means of substitution, and I will come back to your previous question on alternatives. There is no alternative to crude oil. For the ones who believe that GTL is going to be an alternative, I am sorry to say that this is not a fact.

Today you have only 85,000 barrels per day of GTL capacity in the world. I do not think you will ever have much more than that, and 85,000 is nothing. It is a drop of water in an ocean. The latest GTL plant has just been started in Qatar and I do not know how it is going to fare. It makes 34,000 barrels. It is an enormous plant. I think it cost one and a half billion dollars at least. It has two enormous reactors. If anything goes wrong with these reactors—my God, I do not know what is going to happen! So that is for GTL.

You have coal to liquid. The only coal to liquid plant today in the world is in Secunda in South Africa. It makes 150,000 barrels per day of liquids. I can tell you that because I have visited it, half by helicopter and half by walking around the facilities. It is a very messy affair and it is very inefficient energy wise. Now the Chinese are trying to make CTL—coal to liquid—of one million barrels per day capacity. I think it is going to cost them $10 billion at least. I cannot imagine how this site is going to be. I am waiting for them to finish, but it will probably take them quite a long time to get that one million barrels per day off the ground.

You mentioned ethanol, biodiesel and all that. This is not the future. This is not sustainable because in the future, if our predictions are correct, the No. 1 priority will not be transport and all that. The No. 1 priority is going to be food. And for food you will have to have top priority for fertilizer and insecticides and whatever you need to produce food only. So ethanol is a very, very wasteful system.

And again, however much you want to make some ethanol, it will still be a drop of water in the ocean. Just let me tell you that for every liter of ethanol you will need between three and four liters of water to produce it. The best way to go for these types of fuel, and certainly the most efficient way, is sugarcane. That is what the Brazilians are doing today. With sugarcane you need one square kilometre of sugarcane to produce 3,800 barrels of ethanol per year. It is not very easy and it is very inefficient.

So I cannot see any of these alternatives coming up in the future in a big way. Now, certainly solar power will have a small role to play. Today it is still very expensive at between roughly $US 7,000 and $US 10,000 per megawatt. But it could certainly play a role, especially in Australia where you have quite a lot of sun and quite a lot of land to develop that. Wind also, in windy countries, could play a small role. But these roles will amount to two to three, or maybe four, per cent of oil consumption over the next 15 or 20 years, and not more. The orders of magnitude are not at all the same. You will make a small dent with each one of these but not much more than a dent. Replacing crude oil is not that easy.

CHAIR—I would like to follow up on this issue of price. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics—ABARE—in their submission to us have done predictions based on future oil costs of $US 30 per barrel. How realistic do you think that is?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I believe you will never, ever see $US30 per barrel again unless you have a bird flu epidemic that wipes out at least millions of people or, as Senator Joyce said, something hits the planet and disrupts all calculations.

Senator JOYCE—That takes out Europe.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—If oil falls below even $US50 per barrel, that in my opinion would be very bad news, because if it goes back to, say, $US50 per barrel for some reason and for a short period of time, people will think: ‘Ah! So $US75 was just a spike and now we are back to the good old days and we can begin consuming again. Let’s go and buy that big SUV that we were looking at.’ You then lose two or three years at least.

CHAIR—My next question relates to the industry. BP when they made a presentation to the committee said that the prices now are basically the same proportionally as the spike in the 1970s. What is your opinion of those comments?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—If you take into account inflation, it is the roughly same—it was $US 75 to $US 80 in those days. But those were spikes. Today it is a totally different problem.

Today it is a transition into the unknown; then it was known. I am now personally of the opinion that if they had continued with the spikes we would have been much better off today. But they did not. After the two oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 you had two price counter shocks in 1987 and 1998, when it dropped below $US10 per barrel. That was very bad news, because then demand started going up again. If all these reserves had been better controlled, maybe the transition would have been much easier. Just to remind you, in 1950, which is not that long ago, global consumption was only 10 million barrels per day. That was very easily controllable with the reserves we had. What is not easily controllable is the 81 million barrels per day that we have today.

CHAIR—I want to go back to the price per barrel. What is your understanding of what IEA is saying is the standard price per barrel in the world?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—It is very difficult to reply to that question because you have many costs per barrel, depending on whether they are onshore or offshore and whether those offshore are in shallow waters, deep waters or ultra deep waters. To make an average over all that is very difficult. I could not answer you. I can tell you that it is not $75 per barrel; it is certainly lower than that.

Senator MILNE—In your opening presentation, you said that you thought that in 2006 we had begun transition 1, and that it would be a relatively gentle stage, and then we would go to extreme discomfort, presumably in transition 2. Can you outline to me the time frames you see for each of the transition stages, and how they will proceed? What will trigger moving from transition 1 to transition 2? When do you expect the real crisis to hit in that transitional phase?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Certainly. From now on, from 2006 to 2020, making predictions is an extremely difficult process, because we do not know exactly what to expect of these transition periods. But I have decided for the time being to split the next 14 years into four transition periods, which I call transition 1, 2, 3 and 4. Every transition period has a steeper gradient and I do not know exactly how long each of these will take, because it depends on many factorsNevertheless, I envisage now that transition 1 should take between three, four or five years, but I would have to revise this every three to four months.

Now I will try to explain to you when I predict will be the end of transition 1 by drawing you a model on the whiteboard. We are here in 2006, which is, according to my model, the first year of transition 1. And we want to go all the way to the end of transition 1. Here, in the world of oil, we have the following: today, we have a demand for oil which comes from all of the countries and the regions on earth. The demand is about 81 million barrels per day. What happens to this demand is that it does trigger a supply. This supply comes from two entities. The first entity is non-OPEC and the second entity is the 11 OPEC countries. The OPEC countries are the marginal producer—that is, whatever non-OPEC produces is subtracted from the demand, and it leaves what is required from the OPEC countries to produce to make up the rest of the demand.

This is the system today. It is a very simple system. It has been in place since 1960, when they created OPEC. In my opinion, the international oil industry created the entity of OPEC for this very simple reason: to have a marginal producer. So far it has worked very well. But today OPEC is not playing its role, because it is producing oil out, which is not a good thing.

I will open a parenthesis here about the oil industry and the oilfields. There is nothing worse for an oilfield than to be pushed. I believe that is what is happening to oilfields like Ghawar and Cantarell. They have been pushed. A better example is the Samotlor oilfield of Russia, which was a marvelous oilfield that the Soviets in the 1980s, when they badly needed money to have a system that would be a rival to the American Star Wars, destroyed, in my opinion. It was an extraordinary oilfield which could produce three million barrels a day. Today it is only producing 300,000 barrels a day. If they had managed that oilfield better, I think they would have had a much higher return. Pushing an oilfield is not very good for it. Letting an oilfield rest is the best thing you can do for it. The Iraqis’ oilfields had a marvelous time during the 1990s because they rested for a long time. I would be glad if such a thing could happen to the Iranian super giants—if they could rest for some time. I think it would not be bad.

Coming back after this parenthesis to this system, between the beginning and the end of T1, you will have the two major scales tilting. At the end of T1 you will have a supply, and this supply is going to dictate the demand. Here you will have entities which will have the marginal demand. So it will be a totally different system form what we had at the beginning. It is this tilting of the scale that will in my opinion determine the end of T1. We have just begun shifting from one to the other.

In the time frame of T1, you might have some volatility in that it will start shifting to one side and then shifting back again to the demand side and going back and forth. So one has to be very careful. But in the end it will be the total shift that will in my opinion make the end of T1 clearer. About T2, T3 and T4, it is still very early. I am working on the next transition, but first we have to get this transition right.

One thing I might add about T1 is that I see not only that business as usual is not in the new rules but also that mega projects are not to be begun, because mega projects are long-term projects that take 10, 20, maybe 25 years. Because we do not know exactly where we are going at this stage, it is very dangerous to begin mega projects. But people are still doing this.

The Europeans have begun a freight train line from Barcelona to Kiev, which is roughly 2,600 kilometers. The idea of having freight trains is a very good idea, but it is a bit late now. If you have rails you might make the service a bit better, but you should not construct it from scratch because it will take 20 years and will never be finished because the high oil prices will trigger rises in prices for all other commodities.

You already see that steel is way above the usual prices. Copper has hit between $7,000 and $8,000, and it will go much higher than that. Nickel is $22,000. I think $22,000 is very cheap today; it will go much higher. All these commodities and all these metals will go very much higher, because it is the crude oil price which dictates the prices. Sugar is going up, orange juice is going up—everything is going up—because the price of crude oil is going up. It is the price of crude oil which more or less dictates all the other price hikes. In my opinion, you will have a correlation between all the price hikes in the future, and you can already see the first signs now.

Senator HUTCHINS—What do you see in transition phases 2, 3 and 4? Do you see any specific dates?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—No, not now, not yet. The gradients will get steeper, so the effects and the impacts will be greater. T1 is very benign; the gradient is very slow and you almost do not notice it. We will go from, maybe, 81 to 79.5 over the next few years; it is not difficult. But T2 will be much more difficult—it is already—because it will start dropping considerably; then you will notice the drops every year, probably, and then it will get worse and worse. It is a process, fortunately, where the introduction is easier than the following phases. But it is still very early to start predicting what T2 will do. Firstly, we have to see what T1 is going to do, because already, in many aspects, T1 is difficult to predict, with all the events that could take place in the next three to four years.

Senator HUTCHINS—What should governments do if you say that supply will determine demand?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I think that every society, every city and every government should do a certain number of things—many things; 1,001 things. There are not one or two solutions. There is no panacea. There is no silver bullet that you can just shoot to get rid of this. You have to start as early as possible and think about this type of future. I do not think the Europeans are ever going to make it.

I do not think that Airbus A380 is a valuable airplane. It is a marvelous airplane, but it is arriving at the wrong time. They should have built it 20 years ago—and it would have been marvelous—when we were in the ascending curve of petroleum, not in the descending one, and not now that we have entered T1. I told them five years ago but naturally they did not want to listen at all, so they carried on. Now they have the problems and they are paying the penalties to all these companies already. It is still not commercial. I do not know why it will be commercial. I do not see a very bright future for that.

There is not too much innovation now; there is certainly a returning to commodities and exploration. I know of a company in Australia that invested very heavily and has just found a brand new copper mine. That is fabulous, because the copper they are going to extract in a few years is going to make enormous profits. If you put money into oil exploration—whether onshore or offshore—almost whatever you find is going to make money. These are types of investment. Or you could invest in agriculture but not ethanol or biodiesel.

Senator HUTCHINS—Yes, I was going to ask you about that—You seem to be dismissive of alternative fuels.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Yes. I do not think it is a very good idea. You can always try it on a small scale, but I think that energy wise it does not make much sense. Now we are in transition 1, I try to look at things from an energy point of view, not from an economic point of view. We do not know these days exactly what economics are. You have to think energetically and about the things you really need. For example, Western Australia—sorry, I am always coming back—

Really, I think Western Australia is doing all the right things. They were kind enough to have been the very first to invite me, and I am very happy for them. Western Australia does not have enough water and the water table is falling. It is a very big problem. They are putting in two desalination plants. They are obliged to put in two desalination plants. The desalination plant will need fuel—it will need gas—to run. In my opinion, they have no alternative so they are obliged to do this. When you are forced then you have to do it. I see that one problem in the future in Australia, much more important than the oil problem, is going to be water.

Your precipitation is going lower and lower. I heard that in June you had an average of only 14 millimeters of rain instead of the normal 108 millimeters. When I crossed from Perth to Sydney in the plane, over 3½ hours, what I saw was very dry. I think one of the problems is water. When you consider that every liter of ethanol or biodiesel will take between three and four liters of water then you start having a problem on the water side and on the energy side. I think you have to reconsider the economics of all of that in the near future.

Senator WEBBER—On that optimistic note—being a Western Australian—what do you consider the prospects for the future of gas as an alternative?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Gas is the big issue, because we are not only having peak oil but, according to my prediction, in 2008 or 2009 we are also going to have global peak gas. Peak gas and peak oil are two totally different things because oil is a very special commodity. Gas is not the same because you cannot just put it in a ship. You either have to consume it locally, pipe it to some other country or put it in a LNG tanker. You have only those three alternatives. Fortunately, Australia has an enormous amount of gas, and I believe this is going to become very handy because the peak for gas will be between 100 and 105 TCF global production in 2008-09.

Because of this peak in gas, you will have enormous problems all over the world but firstly in the US. The price of gas is going to go sky high. Today, it is incredibly cheap. Gas in the US has a threshold price today of between $7 and $8 per million BTU. This is going to go much higher. Every year you will have to add $2 to $3 to that price. The US price is going to affect all the other prices, and it has already begun in South-East Asia. All that will be linked through the LNG price that you will have, and the price of LNG is going to go very high.

I think that Russia does not have much gas anymore, although it is the largest producer in the world. I am very worried for the Europeans, and probably this winter you will see that the Europeans are going to have an enormous number of problems. If it is a harsh winter in Europe, you might have thousands of people dying. You had hundreds last year, but that was only the beginning. If this winter is harsh, you will have thousands dying because the Russians simply do not have enough gas to provide to Europe.

The Americans do not have enough gas. The Americans had the incredible chance to have the mildest winter last year in 100 years. If that had not happened, I do not know where the price of gas would be today. That was very lucky, and they now have enough reserves for the coming winter because all the storage depots are almost full.

That is a positive point, but the Europeans do not have that kind of chance, so you will have lots of problems. The price of LNG is going to go sky high because everybody will want LNG—in America, Mexico and Canada, which are in full decline; in all the South-East Asian countries and especially in China; and even in Europe. If the Europeans cannot get the Russian gas, their only solution will be to get LNG from wherever they can.

I can tell you that, with gas prices in the US being around $6 per barrel, you have LNG spot sales today of $12 per barrel—and we are in a normal situation. So, wait for the panic and you will have prices of $25 or $30 per barrel, and maybe much more than that. For one week in March this year the British did not have enough gas and the price of gas shot up to $258 per barrel oil equivalent. At first I thought I had made a mistake of one decimal place, but then I realized it was not $25.8—it was $258. For one week they were paying that price for their gas.

And we are in a very normal situation now; we are not at peak yet. So you can imagine how it is going to be when it is at peak, with the panic in all those countries because of the winter months. Just wait and see how it develops this winter in Europe.

Senator WEBBER—That is pretty dark.

Senator JOYCE—Going back to the biorenewable fuels issue, ethanol is being used in Brazil, and the terminal gate price of ethanol in Australia is around 80c a liter, so the reason that it is not being utilized is that the oil companies refuse to take it up. I have heard of a lot of what is going wrong but what we are really looking for is the solution; we are looking for the way out. Or is the world as we know it going to come to an end and this is just a prologue to the end? We need to find the solution.

I do not say ethanol is a panacea but it is certainly a mitigating circumstance. We need to take it up. It could run conjointly with a whole range of issues. I have two questions. Firstly, if ethanol is not the answer, can you explain why it is being used so prolifically in places like Brazil, and why the United States, Europe and Asia are all taking it on board as a component of trying to deal with the impending oil crisis—or the oil crisis that is already here, apparently? Secondly, what is your solution? What is the noble horizon we need to head towards in order to maintain our current standards of living and economies?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Allow me to take those questions one by one. First I will address the alternatives. Brazil can use ethanol as a fuel because of its enormous amount of sugarcane. There is also the idea of self-sufficiency. People like the Brazilians and the South Africans always have a complex about self-sufficiency. If the South Africans have gone after GTL and have pursued coal to liquids, it is because they want to be self-sufficient. It was not an economic decision; it was a political decision. I think the Brazilians are in somewhat the same situation. For them, because of the enormous amount of sugarcane they have, it does make some sense, but I really doubt that it makes a lot of sense in terms of energy. And I believe that, come the day there is conflict between producing ethanol or biodiesel and producing food, food is going to win because, first of all, you have to eat.

There is another danger in Brazil. They are destroying the Amazon rainforest at the rate of some 20,000 square kilometers per year and on that land they are planting food crops—in enormous amounts. I think that this will also be part of the future: when the other countries do not have enough food, they will go back to the Brazilians. Brazil has become one of the largest exporters of food in the world, whether it be soy beans, sugar, coffee or beef. It is almost anything. They have the surpluses. The Americans are also trying to get the ethanol. It makes a small dent for the time being, but not a very big one. I think that it is only a question of a few million gallons. I do not know what percentage you have, but it is not very much.

All of the others are trying. I heard there are a few million in Australia, but it will not make a very big difference, so I am not very keen on these types of bio alternatives. As for your second question about what should be done, there are many things.

Everyone should study their own situation and see what can be done with the possibilities at hand, and not one thing, not two, but 10, 20 or 50. In my opinion, the first thing is to develop free public transportation, and that applies to everybody. Make it free from now. Even if it does not make very much economic sense now, it will in the future. Certainly, there is absolutely no doubt, as you go into transition 1, that free public transportation has to make sense. That is one of the things.

There are many other things that you can do. Plan; get new ideas from the grassroots. That is what Perth has been trying to do, to congregate 1,200 people from different walks of life in teams of eight, give them each a computer and have all of these ideas go back to the top for the selection of the ones they think are viable and useful. Have teams of elders. You have a fantastic man out there, Mr Brian Fleay. He predicted peak oil in 1995. It is extraordinary what he did. He was maybe the second person, after Dr Campbell, to have done that. And he did it almost from scratch. So people like this could have predicted that in 1995—in 1995 he wrote his book, so he must have predicted it in 1993 or 1994.

Senator JOYCE—Sorry, I have missed something. What is this team of elders?

CHAIR—What he is talking about is dialogue with the city.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Yes, to have these people present their ideas and solutions, and then to build on that through a committee of elders. Or create steering committees through such people, and then get younger people to come in, very bright people, to start setting the priorities, because one day you will have to set priorities for the use of petrol. Have these in place soon, maybe in the next year or two. You will not need them in the next year or two, but have them in place already so that you are prepared. Get prepared for any eventuality. Have a special committee for that now. That is what I can see. I can advise that such things should be done this year or next year so that when or if the crisis really hits, then you have something to fall back on; you have a team that is already prepared and who has thought these problems through.

Thinking about these problems is very important, but there is something else. It is going to be very, very difficult to change the minds, to have the minds set on the new realities. For six generations we have been thinking one way—that is, that petrol is always there, petrol is not too expensive, oil products are not too expensive. We do not think about it. We do not think about fertilizers. We do not think about insecticides. Why? They are not that expensive, so it does not come into the day-to-day consideration. Petrol was always $1, not that much of a problem. We are used to that. The problem is going to be when it becomes $3 or $4 or $5. Then people will notice. Already at $1.40, some people are beginning to think about it, so when it becomes higher they have to change their minds, their way of thinking and their way of planning.

Senator JOYCE—But changing the way people think is a very hard task. That is not really a solution; it is nirvana. I want to go back to shale oil. They say there are three trillion barrels of shale oil equivalent in China and two trillion barrels in the United States, and I think we have 440 billion barrels of equivalent shale oil between Proserpine and Gladstone. Surely if the price of oil keeps heading north, this potential oil will begin to be exploited. Can you give me your impressions? You have gone through gas to liquid and coal to liquid. Do you have any opinions on the shale oil issue?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Yes. There is a lot of shale—many thousands. There is an enormous amount of oil in there, but it is a very messy and difficult industry. In Canada, you have about 1.1 million barrels per day of synthetic crude oil produced, which is being exported mostly to the US, and which makes economic sense, especially at the prices of $74 to $75 per barrel. I think it costs them around $30 to $40 per barrel, so they are making some money. But I think it is limited, and I think the limits to that industry are, according to my prediction, roughly three million barrels per day. I cannot see Canada or the US together making more than three million barrels per day at the 2020 or 2025 horizon, investing enormous amounts of money. The shale oil industry is like the oil industry. You go to the best places first, naturally. And then, as you go along, it gets more difficult, it gets more expensive and it gets messier. I think you need roughly 2,000 ton of shale oil to make one barrel of synthetic crude oil. You can imagine, on an enormous scale, what that involves for the land and for everywhere else.

Already, at the level of 1.1 million barrels a day, the Canadian rivers are becoming so polluted as to have triggered alarm bells over Canada; the fish are dying and it will soon be impossible to clean up all the rivers. There are side problems for that as well. If one day we reach three million barrels per day I do not know what the situation will be there, but I do not think we can go further than three million; that is it.

There is also the heavy oil in Venezuela. Today there are 600,000 barrels of capacity. I do not think the Venezuelans can go beyond twice that amount, and with the government they have now they are stuck with their 600,000. I do not think anybody will be willing to invest in such expensive and difficult processes of exploitation. But even if the conditions were right I think they can go to 1.2. I really cannot see them going much further than that. So, yes, there is the potential but you have to transform the potential into production.

I forgot to tell you about the tar sands and the shale oil. All the heat you need for that comes from natural gas. You are spending 1.5 million BTUs for every barrel you are going to produce; that makes a lot of gas. What the Americans are beginning to tell the Canadians is, ‘We’d rather have this gas than anything else.’ So you have other problems that arise in this exploitation—at most, three million for tar sands and shale and one million for the Orinoco heavy oil. That makes a total of four million over the next 20 or 25 years. It will not change a thing for people—it is a drop of water—in the 81 we are facing now.

Senator JOYCE—Everyone knows about the price of fuel in Venezuela—I think you can buy a liter of petrol for 6c or 7c or something; it is still cheap—and we know what the price of petrol is on the streets in Australia. The organizations that control basically from the wellhead to the bowser are predominantly the same four major oil companies. We know that the price of Chevron has gone through the roof and that the price of Caltex domestically has gone through the roof, so they are making a far greater return on their asset. Can you say what you believe is their interest in the future—where oil prices are going? Can you also give some sort of indication about what sort of control the major oil companies have through the whole process of oil production as it stands today, from the oilwell to the bowsers? What form of control do they have over the total production of that product? What sorts of profits do you think they would intend to make in the future?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I think that oil companies are like all corporations: they want to make profits, and they want to make the highest return for their shareholders. In 2005, they set new records in every country for profits. I think that in 2006 they will have far higher returns and record profits of, maybe, $50 billion for Exxon or something like that. It will be roughly the same, maybe $40 billion, for BP and a bit less, maybe, for Shell. Their shares will be reevaluated all the time as the price of oil goes up—and, as I told you, it can only go up.

But they control part of the system. You have many players. You have the national oil companies now, like Saudi Aramco, the National Iranian Oil Company and the national oil companies of Kuwait or Qatar. The oil companies control part of the system and it seems that their share of oil production is beginning to decline as well. It is still quite substantial, but it is also beginning to decline. Naturally, I think they are in it for the profits, and they control wherever they are from the wellhead all the way down to the retail. I think they get profit centers all along the way, and they are making enormous profits.

Senator JOYCE—The issue I am getting at is a transfer pricing issue. By the time the fuel gets to Australia, the same organization controlled entity has made its profit offshore. It is only the final stage. The purpose of Australia is just to move the product, not to make the profit. That would be a fair statement, wouldn’t it? Everyone talks about the terminal gate price of fuel as if that is the true price. It is a transfer pricing issue. By the time the fuel arrives in Australia, the same controlled entity has made the profit overseas. The purpose of Australia is to move the final product of petrol—not to make profit but to move product—because the profit has been made before the product actually arrives in Australia. The purpose of the Australian retail market is to move product, not to make profit. Therefore, it would be the intent of the oil industry to keep exclusively their product out there in the market and not encourage an alternative market apart from their product, which is oil.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Yes. Certainly that is one of the goals of any corporation which makes a product: not to have rivals in the field and to try somehow to destroy or not let them in. Certainly you have this factor. I do not think that any oil company would be very happy to see an enormous boom in biodiesels, unless they could control it, which they cannot. So it will be certainly in their interest to see alternatives. Some oil companies want to get into solar and into other types of alternatives, but I do not think it is their job or their way of doing things. Somebody is going to do it much better than that.

Senator STERLE—I have two questions. If we were to take all the alternatives around the world—solar, hydro, gas, CTL, GTL and all those—how far off subsidizing our thirst for oil would that be? Could we supply the world’s demands? Nowhere near it?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Very, very little. In any scenario and in any field for the next, say, 20 years: very, very little. It is a drop of water. If you make the calculation of increasing even by 100 per cent every single year, it is still a drop of water in solar, in biodiesel, in anything.

Senator STERLE—So there really is no alternative at this stage?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—No.

Senator STERLE—You spoke about Western Australia and the free public transport. I think it is going to send some ripples, but we really are faced in the world today—and I can only talk of Australia and my home state in particular—with some very hard decisions to be made.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Yes.

Senator STERLE—It will bring in a lot of side issues of employment and revenue for governments—all sorts of things will pop up. If we are not fair dinkum in what we are leaving for the next generation—for our environment, our economies, our communities and our world— we really are in serious trouble. I pick up on that earlier comment you made about public transport and integrating public transport in trains and buses and whatever else there might be. It is not nirvana; it is a reality that we really are confronted with and we have to face.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Yes. Provided that our models and our predictions are correct, this is exactly what you are going to face very soon. I do not want to be more negative, but I have started looking into T2, T3 and T4, and, my God, there are some things I started seeing down there that really send shudders up my spine. But I will spare you that today. Maybe that is for another time.

But I entirely agree with your statement. It should be done if only to get prepared so that if things go the wrong way you have something to fall back on—that you have some organization which you have already set up. As the crisis develops you develop this organization and make it ever bigger and more powerful to take care of the crisis.

There are companies which are employing 300,000 people in 140 countries who do not know a thing about peak oil. I do not know how they are going to react tomorrow.

The Europeans do not want to believe this reality. Next year they are going to start—they have already started—dying from the cold. According to my statistics, at least 900 people in eastern European countries froze to death last year. This year it is going to be double or triple that amount. This is the reality already. When there is a real crisis, how are they going to react?

The most important point is that governments do not to cause people to panic. The worst reaction to this type of crisis will be panic. If governments are not prepared there will be panic. The more prepared governments and institutions are, the less panic you will have. Panics are very costly. I entirely agree with what you just said. There is still time to get prepared. We are not that much down the T1 slope. It will be a very slow development, so there is time.

Senator STERLE—Apart from what you saw in Perth with the free public transport around the CBD, are any other countries taking that lead?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—No, nobody. There might be a city or two, but I have not heard of any that have taken this drastic step already, and I have not seen such things at all. I can tell you that the future is to rails because rails are the most fuel efficient system. Would you like to see some figures on that? I can illustrate this for you on the whiteboard. This will give you an order of magnitude. At ton kilometers per liter of fuel, airplanes are between two and three, cars are between 10 and 22, trucks are between 65 and 85 and trains are around 320. So on these very simple figures, I think you can see that the future is to trains, but not trains that you build now; trains that you already have and that you are going to spend money on. I have heard that Sydney in 2006 is planning to spend half its budget on roads and other infrastructures and half on public transportation—it seems to be roughly fifty-fifty. I think that as soon as you change this percentage towards rail and public, fuel efficiency might begin to make some sense. I think you can see the future here.

CHAIR—It is not planes.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Aeroplanes will be the first casualty in the system. They are already making losses. I do not know how they can carry on because the jet fuel is directly proportional to the increases in crude oil. It is not like petrol. Petrol is very much cheaper because you have hidden subsidies and you have the taxes naturally.

Senator MILNE—I have a strategic question about Iran’s contribution to global oil supply as well as to gas. What percentage of global reserves does Iran hold? If Iran were to stop supplying overnight for a geopolitical reason, what impact would that have on 81 million barrels used per day? In other words, T1 is assuming everything goes along smoothly. Let us assume there is a geopolitical crisis and Iran decides to stop supplying into that 81 million barrels a day. What impact would that have?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—At present I think that Iran is supplying roughly two million barrels of oil for exports. In the case of some geopolitical problem, you would have to take the two million out of the 81 million. That in itself would not be very harsh. Why? Because major consuming countries have their strategic petroleum reserves. They could start taking it out of their reserves. The latest data on the US SPR is that they have 688 million barrels in their reserves. I believe that the Japanese must have something around 120 million barrels. The Europeans, all together, have roughly the same amount as the Japanese. The Chinese are trying to build up a strategic reserve of roughly 40 million barrels, but they have not started yet. Maybe they hope for the price of crude oil to come a bit lower before they start. They could do that. What would be impacting heavily on the price is the psychological impact of any geopolitical happening, whether in the Persian Gulf or in South-East Asia. Because the leeway in T1 is extremely small—as I have tried to mention to you—the slightest impact geopolitically will have enormous consequences. If you had in Saudi Arabia, for example, or anywhere else, some two million to three million barrels of spare capacity—that you usually had before—then people would not be so worried about this geopolitical impact. But you do not have spare capacity anymore. I do not believe the Saudis have any spare capacity today, although they say they have a million or 1½ million barrels. They have no spare capacity. Nobody, in my opinion—neither OPEC, nor non-OPEC, nor the Russians, nor the Saudis—has any spare capacity. It would have an enormous impact. The price could go anywhere.

I will give you just one example of what we in NOIC did in 1975 after the first price shock, when the price went from roughly $2 per barrel to $11 per barrel. To find out what the real price was NOIC set up an auction, saying, ‘We have a few barrels and we are going to auction these barrels, so whoever is interested should give us a bid.’ Through the bids, we found out what the real price was. Some bids were up to $41. There were people who were willing, at $11 per barrel, to pay $41.

Then you have the problem that the national oil companies today in the Middle East and in OPEC are not what they were in the past. That is another problem. If there is a disruption, as long as the system is working, you have little problem. It just goes on and on. You see that in cases of earthquake or catastrophe. Once there is a catastrophe, it is very difficult to put it back to the way it was before. You see it taking 10, 12 or 15 years to bring it back. If you have geopolitical problems in the Middle East, it will be very difficult after the crisis has been fortunately somehow solved to put the system back to where it was before. For all these reasons—and because of the herd instinct and the panic that might follow—you could easily have prices doubling overnight. If somebody were smart enough to have an auction, you would see prices that even I could not imagine today.

Senator MILNE—You have just talked about the strategic ramifications of even two million barrels being taken out. Australia, as you know, has just signed up to long-term gas exports to China at a fixed price. Given what you have just said, that looks like an increasingly bad deal.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—At a fixed price?

Senator MILNE—That is what I said. Yes, I can see that you are not impressed by the brilliance of that and neither are we, but nevertheless the Prime Minister and Premier Wen both opened the terminal in China recently, celebrating Australia selling bulk gas at a fixed price—to the horror of much of our country. But there are some people who are saying that given what we are having with peak oil and approaching peak gas and given Australia’s wealth in gas and the importance of gas as a transition fuel Australia ought not be exporting gas, that we should be keeping gas as a transition fuel as transition 1, if you like, goes to the more difficult transitions 2, 3 and 4. What is your view about that?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—I cannot comment on political decision-taking by national politicians but I believe that gas is a very strategic commodity today and the more you have the better it will be. You will certainly see in the next few years, even during transition 1, cases of what they call in international law ‘force majeure’ and when you are confronted with force majeure then there are many decisions that you can take.

Natural gas is certainly a strategic commodity today and commodities are becoming very strategic. Commodities like coal and copper, which do not seem to be very strategic, are very strategic. Uranium, for example, is already costing $47 or $48, which is still very cheap. Uranium was $10 not so long ago when nobody was thinking about it, but I can see uranium going way over $100 a pound. All other commodities are important, but natural gas is a very strong commodity. You can always use it domestically in the long term and I can see that happening easily for gas.

CHAIR—What would you recommend that we invest in? As a committee we need to make recommendations against our terms of reference, so what would you suggest we recommend should be the focus of government to deal with this issue?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—It is a very difficult question but I would have one major recommendation, and Senator Siewert touched upon it: to create some kind of national steering committee of experts in the field, dependent upon this committee maybe, to study as fast as possible all these questions, then under the aegis of this steering committee maybe create a very small executive committee to study all that and the priorities so that you have something that is working. That is the only thing that I could recommend now—to study.

CHAIR—Where do ships fit in your chart? You have airplanes, cars, truck and trains. Where does sea transport fit in?

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Ships are way down. Shipping is marvelous, in terms of energy efficiency, whether it be cargo or container ships. That is marvelous. Shipping is very good.

CHAIR—One of the scenarios into the future is likely to be that there will be less air travel and more ship transport and cargo.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Yes, certainly. Airplanes in transition 1 are at risk. They are already at risk today and they are going to be much more at risk than that. Air travel will have to be more and more reduced in the future and it is going to be more and more expensive. Shipping will come back because the factor of time is not going to be as important as the factor of energy efficiency.

CHAIR—If I understand you correctly, you are saying that we should be investing now as a matter of priority in public transport.

Dr Samsam Bakhtiari—Certainly, yes. Right now. As soon as possible. Start tomorrow on public transport. It is better than starting the day after tomorrow. You also have the problem that, at some stage, you will not be able to invest that easily. The further we go down the line, investment gets more difficult. People who think they will undertake projects in 10 years time do not realize the problems of making these projects. I will give you two examples. The Europeans have woken up to this lately. They now want to bring gas from the Persian Gulf to Europe, but that is a 20-year project and it will cost at least $25 billion. It is not feasible today. They are dreaming. And even if they think of putting a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan to India, they are also dreaming. You cannot do that today. It is too late. You could have done that as long as you were on the curve, but when you are on the top the projects have to be smaller and smaller and you have to start them as soon as possible, and not get caught up by the events. It is a different way to do things.

Byron King, who writes the “Whiskey & Gunpowder” column, wrote Bakhtiari to ask him to further explain his thinking on T1 through T4. Here’s what he said:

“The four Transition periods (T1, T2, T3, and T4) will roughly span the 2006-2020 era. Each Transition [will] cover, on average, three to four years.

The major palpable difference between the four Ts is their respective gradient of oil output decline – very small for T1, perceptible for T2, remarkable in T3, and rather steep for T4. In fact, this gradation in decline is a genuine blessing for those having to cope and adapt.

It should be borne in mind that these four Ts are only an overall theoretical structure for future global oil output. The structure is thus so orderly because [it is] predicted with ‘Pre-Peak’ methods, ‘Pre-Peak’ assumptions, and [a] ‘Pre-Peak’ set of rules.

The problem is that we now are in ‘Post-Peak’ mode, and that none of [the] above applies anymore.

The fact of being in ‘Post-Peak’ will bring about explosive disruptions we know little about, and which are extremely difficult to foresee. And the shock waves from these explosions rippling throughout the financial and industrial infrastructure could have myriad unintended consequences for which we have no precedent and little experience.

So the only Transition we can see rather clearly (or rather, we hope to be able to comprehend) is T1. It is clear that T1 will witness the tilting of the ‘Oil Demand’ and ‘Oil Supply’ scales — with the former dominant at the onset and the latter commanding toward the close (say, by 2009 or 2010).

But even during that rather benign T1, the unexpected might become the rule and the orderly ‘Pre-Peak’ rapidly give way to some chaotic ‘Post-Peak.

In any instance, the overall structure of the ‘Four Transitions’ is a general guideline for the next 14 years or so — as far as global oil output is concerned. In practice, reality might prove to be worse than these theoretical Transitions; but certainly not better.

I also agree that at the junction of two Ts, there should be some kind of a milestone. For example, at the close of T1, Supply should totally dominate Demand…I am toying with [the] idea, very preliminary, that close of T2 could be OPEC [oil production] surpassing non-OPEC [oil production], although OPEC died in 2004”.

Posted in Energy Policy & Politicians, GOVERNMENT, Other Experts | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on Australian government was Peak Oil Aware in 2006

We’ve wiped out two-thirds of wildlife in just 50 years

Last updated 2022-4-28

Preface.  Human over-consumption is driving extinction far more than climate change. Humans  began reducing biodiversity 4 million years ago, when large carnivores in Africa began disappearing (Faurby, S., et al. 2020. Brain expansion in early hominins predicts carnivore extinctions in East Africa. Ecology Letters.)

The WWF report singles out habitat destruction caused by humans as the main threat to the world’s biodiversity (McGreevy 2020 here).

And extinctions can cascade through ecosystems, threatening humans. The loss of one species can trigger secondary extinctions of additional species, because species interact, yet the consequences of these secondary extinctions for services remain under-explored (Keyes 2021, Leytham-Powell 2021).

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Einhorn C (2022) From King Cobras to Geckos, 20 Percent of Reptiles Risk Extinction. New York Times.

The first global analysis of its kind found that logging and farming are taking away reptile habitat at an unsustainable pace, exacerbating a worldwide decline in biodiversity. Other threats are urban development, logging, dams, energy production, mining, transportation, pollution, fires, invasion, disease, hunting and fishing, and climate change.  Scientific paper: Cox N et al (2022) A global reptile assessment highlights shared conservation needs of tetrapods. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04664-7

Lewis S (2020) Animal populations worldwide have declined nearly 70% in just 50 years, new report says. CBS news.

The report blames humans alone for the “dire” state of the planet. It points to the exponential growth of human consumption, population, global trade and urbanization over the last 50 years as key reasons for the unprecedented decline of Earth’s resources.

The report points to land-use change — in particular, the destruction of habitats like rainforests for farming — as the key driver for loss of biodiversity, accounting for more than half of the loss in Europe, Central Asia, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Much of that land is being used for agriculture, which is responsible for 80% of global deforestation and makes up 70% of freshwater use. Using this much land requires a vast food system that releases 29% of global greenhouse gases, and the excessive amount of land and water that people are using has killed 70% of terrestrial biodiversity and 50% of freshwater biodiversity.

Destruction of ecosystems has threatened 1 million species — 500,000 animals and plants and 500,000 insects — with extinction.

Where and how humans produce food is one of the biggest threats to nature, the report says. Much of the habitat loss and deforestation that occurs is driven by food production and consumption.  Species overexploitation, invasive species and diseases and pollution are all considered threats to biodiversity, the report said. However, human-caused climate change is projected to become as, or more important than, other drivers of biodiversity loss in the coming decades.

“This report reminds us that we destroy the planet at our peril — because it is our home,” WWF U.S. president and CEO Carter Roberts said in a statement. “As humanity’s footprint expands into once-wild places, we’re devastating species populations. But we’re also exacerbating climate change and increasing the risk of zoonotic diseases like COVID-19.

McGreevy N (2020) Humans Wiped Out Two-Thirds of the World’s Wildlife in 50 Years. Smithsonian.

Threats to global biodiversity are also threats to humans, experts warn.

Two major reports released this month paint a grim portrait of the future for our planet’s wildlife. First, the Living Planet Report from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) found that in half a century, human activity has decimated global wildlife populations by an average of 68%.

The study analyzed population sizes of 4,392 monitored species of mammals, fish, birds, reptiles, and amphibians from 1970 to 2016, reports Karin Brulliard for the Washington Post. It found that populations in Latin America and the Caribbean fared the worst, with a staggering 94 percent decline in population. All told, the drastic species decline tracked in this study “signal a fundamentally broken relationship between humans and the natural world,” the WWF notes in a release.

We’re seeing very distinct declines in freshwater ecosystems, largely because of the way we dam rivers and also because of the use of freshwater resources for producing food to feed a growing population of people worldwide.

Then, on Tuesday, the United Nations published its Global Biodiversity Outlook report, assessing the progress—or lack thereof—of the 196 countries who signed onto the Aichi Biodiversity Targets in 2010. This ten year plan outlined ambitious goals to staunch the collapse of biodiversity across the globe. Yet according to the U.N.’s report, the world has collectively failed to reach a single one of those goals in the last decade, reports Catrin Einhorn for the New York Times.

2016-8-13. Climate change isn’t the biggest danger to Earth’s wildlife, our thirst for natural resources is even more damaging

2016-8-10 “Biodiversity: The ravages of guns, nets, and bulldozers” Nature)

Even though climate change is going to have a very powerful impact on plants and wildlife world-wide, climate change has also become a scape-goat, with a “growing tendency for media reports about threats to biodiversity to focus on climate change.”

But scientists have found that over-exploitation, including logging, hunting, fishing and the gathering of plants is the biggest single killer of biodiversity, directly impacting 72% of the 8,688 species listed as threatened or near-threatened by the IUCN. Agricultural activity comes second, affecting 62% of those species, followed by urban development at 35% and pollution at 22%.  Species such as the African cheetah and Asia’s hairy-noes otter are among the 5,407 species that find themselves threatened by agricultural practices, while illegal hunting impacts several populations such as the Sumatran rhino and African elephant.

Climate change on the other hand comes in on a surprising, if somewhat unimpressive, 7th place in the 11 threats identified by the team. Even when you combine all its effects, it currently threatens just 19% of the species on the list, the team reports. Species such as the hooded seal, which the team reports has seen a population decline of 90% in the northeastern Atlantic Arctic over the past few decades as a result of declining ice cover, are part of the 1,688 species directly impacted by climate change.

REFERENCES

Keyes AA et al (2021) An ecological network approach to predict ecosystem service vulnerability to species losses. Nature Communications.

Leytham-Powell C (2021) Extinction cascading through ecosystems could spell trouble for humans. UC Colorado.

Posted in Biodiversity Loss, Extinction, Food production, Scientists Warnings to Humanity | Tagged , , | 2 Comments

Slavery in the Roman Empire

Preface. After fossils decline, we go back to wood as our main thermal source of energy for cooking, heating, smelting metals, ceramics, bricks, glass and other products that need the high heat of wood charcoal.

Sadly, another source of energy is likely to be slavery. I’ve extracted the parts of Holland’s “Rubicon” that dealt with slavery below.

And added on parts I found of interest about how children were raised and other aspects of Roman life I hadn’t read elsewhere.

Other collapses:

Bardi (2021) How Resource Depletion Leads to Collapse. The Story of a Lost Kingdom. The Garamantes were a North-African civilization that grew at the time of the Roman Empire, powerful enough that the Romans built a system of fortifications to defend their possessions on the coast. But the Garamantes ran out of their water resources where they prospered by means of a sophisticated irrigation system using non-renewable fossil water from underground aquifers in the Sahara. After extracting at least 30 billion gallons of water over some 600 years, the 4th-century A.D. Garamantes found their water was running out. To deal with the problem, they would have needed to add more man-made underground tributaries to existing tunnels and dig additional deeper, much longer water-extraction tunnels. To do that, they would have needed vastly more slaves than they had. The water difficulties must have led to food shortages, population reductions, and political instability (local defensive structures from this era may be evidence for political fragmentation). Conquering more territories and pulling in more slaves was therefore simply not militarily feasible. The magic equation between population and military and economic power on the one hand and slave-acquisition capability and water extraction on the other no longer balanced. The desert kingdom declined and fractured into small chiefdoms and was absorbed into the emerging Islamic world.

Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Tom Holland. 2005. Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic. Anchor.

It would have been hard for the rebels not to have been overwhelmed by the discovery of just how many other slaves there were in Italy. Human beings were not the least significant portion of the wealth to have been plundered by the Republic during its wars of conquest. The single market established by Roman supremacy had enabled captives to be moved around the Mediterranean as easily as any other form of merchandize, and the result had been a vast boom in the slave trade, a transplanting of populations without precedent in history. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, had been uprooted from their homelands and brought to the center of the empire, there to toil for their new masters.

Even the poorest citizen might own a slave.

in the countryside, where conditions were at their worst. Gangs were bought wholesale, branded, and shackled, then set to labor from dawn until dusk. At night they would be locked up in huge, crowded barracks. Not a shred of privacy or dignity was permitted them. They were fed the barest minimum required to keep them alive.

Exhaustion was remedied by the whip, while insubordination would be handled by private contractors who specialized in the torture—and sometimes execution—of uppity slaves. The crippled or prematurely aged could expect to be cast aside, like diseased cattle or shattered wine jars. It hardly mattered to their masters whether they survived or starved. After all, as Roman agriculturalists liked to remind their readers, there was no point in wasting money on useless tools.

This exploitation was what underpinned everything that was noblest about the Republic—its culture of citizenship, its passion for freedom, its dread of disgrace and shame. It was not merely that the leisure that enabled a citizen to devote himself to the Republic was dependent on the forced labor of others. Slaves also satisfied a subtler, more baneful need. “Gain cannot be made without loss to someone else.” so every Roman took for granted. All status was relative. What value would freedom have in a world where everyone was free? Even the poorest citizen could know himself to be immeasurably the superior of even the best-treated slave. Death was preferable to a life without liberty: so the entire history of the Republic had gloriously served to prove. If a man permitted himself to be enslaved, then he thoroughly deserved his fate. Such was the harsh logic that prevented anyone from even questioning the cruelties the slaves suffered, let alone the legitimacy of slavery itself.

It was a logic that slaves accepted too. No one ever objected to the hierarchy of free and un-free, merely his own position within it. What the rebels wanted was not to destroy slavery as an institution, but to win the privileges of their former masters.

GLADIATORS

That midsummer of 73 there was a breakout from a gladiatorial school in Campania.

such schools had become increasingly big business in the region. Gladiators were very much a homegrown speciality.

Even as the rituals of blood-spilling began to be commercialized by a growing Roman interest in them, gladiators continued to dress in the style of Samnite warriors, complete with brimmed helmets and ungainly, bobbing crests. As time went by and Samnite independence faded into history, so the appearance of these fighters came to seem ever more exotic—like that of animals preserved from extinction in a zoo. To the Romans themselves, the whiff of the foreign that clung to gladiatorial combat was always a crucial part of its appeal. As the Republic’s wars became ever more distant from Italy, so it was feared that the martial character of the people might start to fade. In 105 BC the consuls who laid on Rome’s first publicly sponsored games did so with the specific aim of giving the mob a taste of barbarian combat. This was why gladiators were never armed like legionaries but always in the grotesque manner of the Republic’s enemies—if not Samnites, then Thracians or Gauls.

But the carnage also served as a deadly warning. Gladiatorial combat was evidence of what might happen once the spirit of competition was given free rein, once men started to fight each other not as Romans, bound by the restraints of custom and obligation, but as brutes. Blood on the sand, corpses dragged away on hooks. Should the frameworks of the Republic collapse, as they had almost done during the years of civil war, then such

It might be the fate of everyone, citizen as well as slave. Here, then, was another reason why the training schools tended to be concentrated in Campania, at a safe distance from Rome. The Romans could recognize the savagery in the soul of the gladiator and feared to have it harbored it in their midst. In the summer of 73, even though the number on the run was well below a hundred, the Romans still sent a praetor to deal with them, along with an army of three thousand men. The fugitives having taken refuge on the slopes of Vesuvius, the Romans settled down to starve them out. Gladiators, however, knew all about lunging at an opponent’s weak spot. Finding the slopes of the volcano covered with wild vines, they wove ladders out of the tendrils, then descended a precipice and attacked the Romans in the rear. The camp was captured, the legionaries routed. The gladiators were immediately joined by further runaways. Leg irons were melted down and forged into swords. Wild horses were captured and trained, a cavalry unit formed. Spilling out across Campania, the slaves began to pillage a region only just starting to recover from Sulla’s depredations. Nola was besieged yet again, and looted. Two further Roman armies were routed. Another praetor’s camp was stormed.

What had begun as a makeshift guerrilla force was now forming itself into a huge and disciplined army of some 120,000 men. Credit for this belonged to the leader of the original breakout, a Thracian named Spartacus. Before his enslavement he had served the Romans as a mercenary, and combined the physique of a gladiator with shrewdness and sophistication. He recognized that if the rebels stayed in Italy, it would be only a matter of time before their outraged masters annihilated them, so in the spring of 72 he and his army began to head for the Alps. They were pursued by Gellius Publicola, the humorist whose joking at the expense of Athenian philosophers had so amused his friends years before, and who had just been elected to the consulship. Before he could engage with Spartacus, however, the slaves met with the Roman forces stationed to guard the northern frontier, and destroyed them. The route over the Alps, and to freedom, now stood wide open. But the slaves refused to take it. Instead, meeting and brushing aside Gellius’s army, they retraced their steps southward, back toward the heartlands of their masters and everything they had previously been attempting to escape.  

SPARTACUS  

Only Spartacus himself appears to have fought for a genuine ideal. Uniquely among the leaders of slave revolts in the ancient world, he attempted to impose a form of egalitarianism on his followers, banning them from holding gold and silver and sharing out their loot on an equal basis. If this was an attempt at Utopia, however, it failed. The opportunities for violent freebooting were simply too tempting for most of the rebels to resist. Here, the Romans believed, was another explanation for the slaves’ failure to escape while they had the chance. What were the bogs and forests of their homelands compared to the temptations of Italy? The rebels’ dreams of freedom came a poor second to their greed for plunder. To the Romans, this was conclusive evidence of their “servile nature.” In fact, the slaves were only aiming to live as their masters did, off the produce and labor of others. Even on the rampage they continued to hold a mirror up to Roman ideals.

It was no wonder that the Romans themselves, who could recognize efficient looting when they saw it, should have begun to panic.

After a furious debate the consuls were stripped of their two legions, and Crassus was awarded sole command. The new generalissimo immediately launched a recruiting drive, quadrupling the size of the forces at his disposal. Having won the chance to establish himself as the savior of the Republic, he did not intend to waste it.

When two of his legions, in direct contradiction of his orders, engaged with Spartacus and suffered yet another defeat, Crassus’s response was to resurrect the ancient and terrible punishment of decimation. Every tenth man was beaten to death, the obedient along with the disobedient, the brave along with the cowardly, while their fellows were forced to watch. Military discipline was reimposed. At the same time, a warning was sent to any slaves tempted to join Spartacus that they could expect no mercy from a general prepared to impose such sanctions on his own men. Ruthless as Crassus was, he never did anything without a fine calculation of its effect. At a single brutal stroke the property-grubbing millionaire had transformed his image into that of the stern upholder of old-fashioned values. As Crassus would have been perfectly aware, the traditions of Roman discipline always played well with the voters.

Spartacus made a third attempt to force the barricades. This time he broke free. Fleeing Crassus, he began to zigzag northward. Crassus, with one eye on the rebels and the other on the ever-nearing Pompey, followed him at a frantic speed, picking off stragglers in a series of escalating clashes. At last the rebels were cornered again, and Spartacus turned and prepared to fight. Ahead of his marshaled men, he stabbed his horse, spurning the possibility of further retreat, pledging himself to victory or death. Then the slaves advanced into battle. Spartacus himself led a desperate charge against Crassus’s headquarters, but he was killed before he could reach it. The vast bulk of the rebels’ army perished alongside their general. The great slave uprising was over. Crassus had saved the Republic.

Except that, at the very last minute, his glory was snatched from him. As Pompey headed south with his legions toward Rome he met with five thousand of the rebels, fugitives from Spartacus’s final defeat. With brisk efficiency he slaughtered every last one, then wrote to the Senate, boasting of his achievement in finishing off the revolt. Crassus’s feelings can only be imagined. In an attempt to counteract Pompey’s glory-hogging he ordered all the prisoners he had captured to be crucified along the Appian Way. For more than a hundred miles, along Italy’s busiest road, a cross with the body of a slave nailed to it stood every forty yards, gruesome billboards advertising Crassus’s victory.

To most Romans, however, the war against Spartacus had been an embarrassment. Compared to Pompey’s achievement in slaughtering thousands of tribesmen in a far-off provincial war, Crassus’s rescue act in Rome’s backyard was something to forget. This is why, even though both men were voted laurel wreaths, Crassus had to be satisfied with a second-class parade, touring the streets of Rome not in a chariot but on foot. No pavement-pounding for Pompey, of course. Nothing but the best for the people’s hero. While Pompey, preening like a young Alexander, rode in a chariot pulled by four white horses, his trains of loot and prisoners snaking ahead of him through the streets, his adoring fans going wild, Crassus could only watch, and fume.

There were also powerful interest groups in Rome that positively encouraged inactivity. The more that the economy was glutted with slaves, the more dependent it became on them. Even when the Republic was not at war, this addiction still had to be fed. The pirates were the most consistent suppliers. At the great free port of Delos it was said that up to ten thousand slaves might be exchanged in a single day. The proceeds of this staggering volume of trade fatted pirate captain and Roman plutocrat alike. To the business lobby, profit talked louder than disrespect.

the Senate had long been in bed with the business classes. It was for this reason, perhaps, that the most farsighted critic of the Republic’s hunger for human livestock was not a Roman at all, but a Greek. Posidonius, the philosopher who had celebrated the Republic’s empire as the coming of a universal state, recognized in the monstrous scale of slavery the dark side of his optimistic vision. During his travels he had seen Syrians toiling in Spanish mines, and Gauls in chain gangs on Sicilian estates. He was shocked by the inhuman conditions he had witnessed. Naturally, it never crossed his mind to oppose slavery as an institution. What did horrify him, however, was the brutalizing of millions upon millions and the danger that this posed to all his high hopes for Rome. If the Republic, rather than staying true to the aristocratic ideals that Posidonius so admired, permitted its global mission to be corrupted by big business, then he feared that its empire would degenerate into a free-for-all of anarchy and greed. Rome’s supremacy, rather than heralding a golden age, might portend a universal darkness. Corruption in the Republic threatened to putrefy the world. As an example of what he feared, Posidonius pointed to a series of slave revolts, of which that of Spartacus had been merely the most recent. He might just as well have cited the pirates. Bandits, like their prey, were most likely to be fugitives from the misery of the times, from extortion, warfare, and social breakdown. The result, across the Mediterranean, wherever men from different cultures had been thrown together, whether in slave barracks or on pirate ships, was a desperate yearning for the very apocalypse so feared by Posidonius. Rootlessness and suffering served to wither the worship of traditional gods, but it provided a fertile breeding ground for mystery cults. Like the Sibyl’s prophecies, these tended to be a fusion of many different influences: Greek, Persian, and Jewish beliefs. By their nature, they were underground and fluid, invisible to those who wrote history—but one of them, at least, was to leave a permanent mark.

Mithras, whose rites the pirates celebrated, was to end up worshiped throughout the Roman Empire, but his cult was first practiced by the enemies of Rome. Mysterious threads of association bound him to Mithridates, whose very name meant “given by Mithra.” Mithras himself had originally been a Persian deity, but in the form worshiped by the pirates he most resembled Perseus, a Greek hero, and one from whom Mithridates, significantly, claimed descent. Perseus, like Mithridates, had been a mighty king, uniting West and East, Greece and Persia, orders far more ancient than the upstart rule of Rome. On Mithridates’ coinage there appeared a crescent and a star, the ancient symbol of the Greek hero’s sword. This same sword could be seen in the hand of Mithras, plunging deep into the chest of a giant bull.

The alliance between the pirates and Mithridates, which was very close, went far beyond mere expediency. And what is equally certain is that the pirates, preoccupied with plunder as they were, also saw themselves as the enemies of everything embodied by Rome. No opportunity was wasted to trample on the Republic’s ideals. If a prisoner was discovered to be a Roman citizen, the pirates would first pretend to be terrified of him, groveling at his feet and dressing him in his toga; only when he was wearing the symbol of his citizenship would they lower a ladder into the sea and invite him to swim back home. Raiding parties would deliberately target Roman magistrates and carry off the symbols of their power.

Roman business, having sponsored a monster, now began to find itself menaced by its own creation. The pirates’ growing command of the sea enabled them to throttle the shipping lanes. The supply of everything, from slaves to grain, duly dried to a trickle, and Rome began to starve. Still the Senate hesitated.

***

And a few other bits of interest about the Roman Empire

In their relations with their fellows, then, the citizens of the Republic were schooled to temper their competitive instincts for the common good. In their relations with other states, however, no such inhibitions cramped them. “More than any other nation, the Romans have sought out glory and been greedy for praise.” The consequences for their neighbors of this hunger for honor were invariably devastating. The legions’ combination of efficiency and ruthlessness was something for which few opponents found themselves prepared. When the Romans were compelled by defiance to take a city by storm, it was their practice to slaughter every living creature they found. Rubble left behind by the legionaries could always be distinguished by the way in which severed dogs’ heads or the dismembered limbs of cattle would lie strewn among the human corpses. The Romans killed to inspire terror, not in a savage frenzy but as the disciplined components of a fighting machine.

The Romans lacked a specific word for “baby,” reflecting their assumption that a child was never too young to be toughened up. Newborns were swaddled tightly to mold them into the form of adults, their features were kneaded and pummelled, and boys would have their foreskins yanked to make them stretch. Old-fashioned Republican morality and newfangled Greek medicine united to prescribe a savage regime of dieting and cold baths. The result of this harsh upbringing was to contribute further to an already devastating infant mortality rate. It has been estimated that only two out of three children survived their first year, and that under 50% went on to reach puberty. The deaths of children were constant factors of family life. Parents were encouraged to respond to such losses with flinty calm. The younger the child, the less emotion would be shown, so that it was a commonplace to argue that “if an infant dies in its cradle, then its death ought not even be mourned.” Yet reserve did not necessarily spell indifference. There is plenty of evidence from tombstones, poetry, and private correspondence to suggest the depth of love that Roman parents could feel.

Caesar’s upbringing was famously strict, and his mother, Aurelia, was accordingly remembered by subsequent generations of Romans as a model parent; so model, in fact, that it was said she had breastfed her children. This, notoriously, was something that upper-class women rarely chose to do, despite it being their civic duty, since, as everyone knew, milk was imbued with the character of the woman who supplied it.

The Romans believed that girls had to be molded just as much as boys. Physical as well as intellectual exercises were prescribed for both. A boy trained his body for warfare, a girl for childbirth, but both were pushed to the point of exhaustion. To the Romans, self-knowledge came from appreciating the limits of one’s endurance. It was only by testing what these might be that a child could be prepared for adult life.

No wonder that Roman children appear to have had little time for play. Far fewer toys have been found dating from the Republic than from the period that followed its collapse, when the pressure to raise good citizens had begun to decline. Even so, children were children: “As they grow older, not even the threat of punishment can keep them from playing games with all the energy they have.” Girls certainly had their dolls, since it was the custom to dedicate these to Venus as part of the rituals of marriage. Boys, meanwhile, played obsessively with spinning tops. Dice appear to have been a universal mania. At wedding parties the groom would be expected to toss children coins or nuts that could then be played for as stakes.

Smoke from sacrifices to the gods continued to rise above the seven hills, just as it had done back in far-off times, when trees “of every kind” had completely covered one of the hills, the Aventine. Forests had long since vanished from Rome, and if the city’s altars still sent smoke wreathing into the sky, then so too did a countless multitude of hearth-fires, furnaces, and workshops. Long before the city itself could be seen, a distant haze of brown would forewarn the traveler that he was nearing the great city. Nor was smog the only sign.

Nobility was perpetuated not by blood but by achievement. A nobleman’s life was a strenuous series of ordeals or it was nothing. If he failed to gain a senior magistracy or—worse—lost membership of the Senate altogether, a nobleman’s aura would soon start to fade. If three generations passed without notable successes, then even a patrician might find that he had a name known only “to historians and scholars, and not to the man in the street, the average voter, at all.

Marius, of course, provided the great example of a commoner made good. If it were sufficiently dashing, a military career might well provide a new man with both glory and loot. All the same, it was hard for anyone without contacts to win a command. Rome had no military academy. Staff officers were generally young aristocrats adept at pulling strings. Caesar would never have had the opportunity to win his civic crown had he not been a patrician. Even once it had been obtained, a military posting could bring its own problems. Lengthy campaigns, of the kind that might win a new man spectacular glory, would also keep him away from Rome. No one on the make could afford a long-term leave of absence. Ambitious novices in the political game would generally serve their time with the legions, and maybe even win some honorable scars, but few made their names that way. That was usually left to established members of the nobility. Instead, for the new man, the likeliest career path to triumph in the Cursus, to the ultimate glory of the consulship, and to seeing himself and his descendants join the ranks of the elite was the law.

In Rome this was a topic of consuming interest. Citizens knew that their legal system was what defined them and guaranteed their rights. Understandably, they were intensely proud of it. Law was the only intellectual activity that they felt entitled them to sneer at the Greeks. It gratified the Romans to no end to point out how “incredibly muddled—almost verging on the ridiculous—other legal systems are compared to [their] own!”16 In childhood, boys would train their minds for the practice of law with the same single-minded intensity they brought to the training of their bodies for warfare. In adulthood, legal practice was the one civilian profession that a senator regarded as worthy of his dignity. This was because law was not something distinct from political life but an often lethal extension of it. There was no state-run prosecution service. Instead, all cases had to be brought privately, making it a simple matter for feuds to find a vent in the courts. The prosecution of a rival might well prove a knockout blow. Officially the penalty for a defendant found guilty of a serious crime was death. In practice, because the Republic had no police force or prison system, a condemned man would be permitted to slip away into exile, and even live in luxury, if he had succeeded in squirreling away his portable wealth in time. His political career, however, would be over. Not only were criminals stripped of their citizenship, but they could be killed with impunity if they ever set foot back in Italy. Every Roman who entered the Cursus had to be aware that this might be his fate. Only if he won a magistracy would he be immune from the prosecutions of his rivals, and even then only for the period of his office. The moment it ended his enemies could pounce. Bribery, intimidation, the shameless pulling of strings—anything would be attempted to avoid a prosecution. If it did come to the law courts, then no trick would be too low, no muck-raking too vicious, no slander too cruel. Even more than an election, a trial was a fight to the death.

To the Romans, with their inveterate addiction to passionate and sensational rivalries, this made the law a thrilling spectator sport. Courts were open to the general public. Two permanent tribunals stood in the Forum, and other temporary platforms might be thrown up as circumstance required. As a result, the discerning enthusiast always had a wide choice of trials from which to choose. Orators could gauge their standing by their audience share. This only encouraged the histrionics that were already part and parcel of a Roman trial. Close attention to the minutiae of statutes was regarded as the pettifogging strategy of a second-class mind, since everyone knew that only “those who fail to make the grade as an orator resort to the study of the law.” Eloquence was the true measure of forensic talent. The ability to seduce a crowd, spectators as well as jurors and judges, to make them laugh or cry, to entertain them with a comedy routine or tug at their heart strings, to persuade them and dazzle them and make them see the world anew, this was the art of a great law-court pleader. It was said that a Roman would rather lose a friend than an opportunity for a joke. Conversely, he felt not the slightest embarrassment at displays of wild emotion. Defendants would be told to wear mourning clothes and look as haggard as they could. Relatives would periodically burst into tears. Marius, we are told, wept to such effect at the trial of one of his friends that the jurors and the presiding magistrate all joined in and promptly voted for the defendant to be freed.

Rome’s leading orator in the decade following Sulla’s death, Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, was notorious for aping the gestures of a mime artist. Like Caesar, he was a celebrated fop, who “would arrange the folds of his toga with great care and exactness,” then use his hands and the sweep of his arms as extensions of his voice. He did this with such grace that the stars of the Roman stage would stand in the audience whenever he spoke, studying and copying his every gesture. Like actors, orators were celebrities, gaped at and gossiped about. Hortensius himself was nicknamed “Dionysia” after a famous dancing girl, but he could afford to brush all such insults aside. The prestige he won as Rome’s leading orator was worth any number of jeers.

***

The armies of the Republic had not always been filled with penniless volunteers. When the citizens assembled for elections on the Campus Martius, ranked strictly according to their wealth, they were preserving the memory of a time when men of every class had been drafted, when a legion had indeed embodied the Republic at war. Ironically, in those nostalgically remembered days, only those without property had been excluded from the levy. This had reflected deeply held prejudices: among the Romans, it was received wisdom that “men who have their roots in the land make the bravest and toughest soldiers.” The horny-handed peasant, tending to his small plot, was the object of much sentimental attachment and patriotic pride. Unsurprisingly, for the Republic had become great on his back. For centuries the all-conquering Roman infantry had consisted of yeoman farmers, their swords cleaned of chaff, their plows left behind, following their magistrates obediently to war. For as long as Rome’s power had been confined to Italy, campaigns had been of manageably short duration. But with the expansion of the Republic’s interests overseas, they had lengthened, often into years. During a soldier’s absence, his property might become easy prey. Small farms had been increasingly swallowed up by the rich. In place of a tapestry of fields and vineyards worked by free men, great stretches of Italy had been given over to vast estates, filled with chain gangs—

In 107 Marius had bowed to the inevitable: the army was opened to every citizen, regardless of whether he owned property or not. Weapons and armor had begun to be supplied by the state. The legions had turned professional. From that moment on, possession of a farm was no longer the qualification for military service, but the reward. This was why, when the first mutterings of mutiny began to be heard in the winter of 68, the whispers were all of how Pompey’s veterans, merely for fighting rebels and slaves, were already “settled down with wives and children, in possession of fertile land.” Lucullus, by contrast, was starving his men of loot. The charge was patently untrue—Tigranocerta had fallen and been plundered only the previous year—but it was widely believed.

***

Capture by pirates had recently become something of an occupational hazard for Roman aristocrats. Eight years previously Julius Caesar had been abducted while en route to Molon’s finishing school. When the pirates demanded a ransom of twenty talents, Caesar had indignantly claimed that he was worth at least fifty. He had also warned his captors that he would capture and crucify them once he had been released, a promise that he had duly fulfilled. Clodius’s own dealings with pirates were to contribute less flatteringly to his reputation. When he wrote to the king of Egypt demanding the ransom fee, the response was a derisory payment of two talents, to the immense amusement of the pirates and the fury of the captive himself. The final circumstances of Clodius’s release were lost in a murk of scandal. His enemies—of whom there were many—claimed that the price had been his anal virginity.

Whatever the rewards it was capable of bringing them, however, kidnapping was only a sideline for the pirates. Calculated acts of intimidation ensured that they could extort and rob almost at will, inland as well as at sea. The scale of their plundering was matched by their pretensions. Their chiefs “claimed for themselves the status of kings and tyrants, and for their men, that of soldiers, believing that if they pooled their resources, they would be invincible.” In the nakedness of their greed, and in their desire to make the whole world their prey, there was more than a parody of the Republic itself, a ghostly mirror image that the Romans found unsettling in the extreme. The shadowiness of the pirates’ organization, and their diffuse operations, made them a foe unlike any other. “The pirate is not bound by the rules of war, but is the common enemy of everyone,” Cicero complained. “There can be no trusting him, no attempt to bind him with mutually agreed treaties.” How was such an adversary ever to be pinned down, let alone eradicated? To make the attempt would be to fight against phantoms. “It would be an unprecedented war, fought without rules, in a fog”; a war that appeared without promise of an end. Yet for a people who prided themselves on their refusal to tolerate disrespect, this was a policy of unusual defeatism. It was true that the rocky inlets of Cilicia and the mountain fastnesses that stretched beyond them were almost impossible to police. The area had always been bandit country. Ironically, however, it was Rome’s very supremacy in the east that had enabled the pirates to swarm far beyond their strongholds. By hamstringing every regional power that might pose a threat to its interests and yet refusing to shoulder the burden of direct administration, the Republic had left the field clear for the triumph of brigandage. To people racked by the twin plagues of political impotence and lawlessness, the pirates had at least brought the order of the protection racket. Some towns paid tribute to them, others offered harbors. With each year that passed the pirates’ tentacles extended farther.

***

Nothing was more scandalous to the Romans than a reputation for enjoying haute cuisine. Celebrity chefs had long been regarded as a particularly pernicious symptom of decadence. Back in the virtuous, homespun days of the early Republic, so historians liked to claim, the cook “had been the least valuable of slaves,” but no sooner had the Romans come into contact with the fleshpots of the East than “he began to be highly prized, and what had been a mere function instead came to be regarded as high art.” In a city awash with new money and with no tradition of big spending, cookery had rapidly become an all-consuming craze. Not only cooks but ever more exotic ingredients had been brought into Rome on a ceaseless flood of gold. To those who upheld the traditional values of the Republic, this mania threatened a ruin that was as much moral as financial. The Senate, alarmed, had accordingly attempted to restrain it. As early as 169 the serving of dormice at dinner parties had been banned, and later Sulla himself, in a fine show of hypocrisy, had rushed through similar laws in favor of cheap, homely fare. All mere dams of sand. Faddishness swept all before it. Increasingly, millionaires were tempted to join their cooks in the kitchens, trying out their own recipes, sampling ever more outlandish dishes. This was the crest of the wave that Sergius Orata had ridden to such lucrative effect, but oysters did not lack for rivals in the culinary stakes. Scallops, fatted hares, the vulvas of sows, all came suddenly and wildly into vogue, and all for the same reason: for in the softness of a flesh that threatened rapid putrescence yet still retained its succulence the Roman food snob took an ecstatic joy.

Most treasured, most relished, most savored of all, were fish. So it had always been. The Romans had been stocking lakes with spawn for as long as their city had been standing. By the third century BC Rome had come to be ringed by ponds. Freshwater fish, however, because so much easier to catch, were far less prized than species found only in the sea—and as Roman gastronomy grew ever more exotic, so these became the focus of intensest desire. Rather than remain dependent on tradesmen for their supply of turbot or eel, the super-rich began to construct saltwater ponds. Naturally, the prodigious expense required to maintain these only added to their appeal.

***

Roman nostalgia for the countryside cut across every social boundary. Even the most luxurious of villas also served as farms. Inevitably, among the urban elite, this tended to encourage a form of playacting that Marie-Antoinette might have recognized. A favorite affectation was to build couches in a villa’s fruit store. A particularly shameless host, if he could not be bothered to grow and harvest his own fruit, might transport supplies from Rome, then arrange them prettily in his store for the delectation of his guests. Pisciculture had a similarly unreal quality. Self-sufficiency in fish came at a staggering price. As agriculturalists were quick to point out, homemade lakes “are more appealing to the eye than to the purse, which they tend to empty rather than fill. They are expensive to build, expensive to stock, expensive to maintain.

In pisciculture, as in every other form of extravagance, however, it was Lucullus who set the most dazzling standards of notoriety. His fishponds were universally acknowledged to be wonders, and scandals, of the age. To keep them supplied with salt water, he had tunnels driven through mountains; and to regulate the cooling effect of the tides, groynes built far out into the sea. The talents that had once been devoted to the service of the Republic could not have been more spectacularly, or provocatively, squandered.

***

A city that indulged a dance culture was one on the point of catastrophe. Cicero could even claim, with a perfectly straight face, that it had been the ruin of Greece. “Back in the old days,” he thundered, “the Greeks used to stamp down on that kind of thing. They recognized the potential deadliness of the plague, how it would gradually rot the minds of its citizens with pernicious manias and ideas, and then, all at once, bring about a city’s total collapse.” By the standards of that diagnosis, Rome was in peril indeed. To the party set, the mark of a good night out, and the city’s cutting-edge craze, was to become ecstatically drunk and then, to the accompaniment of “shouts and screams, the whooping of girls and deafening music,” to strip naked and dance wildly on tables.

Roman politicians had always been divided more by style than by issues of policy. The increasing extravagance of Rome’s party scene served to polarize them even further. Clearly, it was an excruciating embarrassment for traditionalists that so many of their standard bearers had themselves succumbed to the temptations of luxury: men such as Lucullus and Hortensius were ill placed to wag the finger at anyone.

***

It was a deliberate tactic on Cato’s part to make his enemies, in comparison to his own imposing example, appear all the more vicious and effeminate. Chasing after women and staying out drunk were not expressions of machismo to the Romans; the very opposite, in fact. Indulgence threatened potency.

their togas had the texture and transparency of veils, and they wore them, in a much-repeated phrase, “loosely belted.” This, of course, was precisely how Julius Caesar had dressed in the previous decade. It is a revealing correspondence. In the sixties as in the seventies, Caesar continued to blaze a trail as the most fashionable man in Rome. He spent money as he wore his toga, with a nonchalant flamboyance. His most dandyish stunt was to commission a villa in the countryside and then, the moment it had been built, tear it down for not measuring up to his exacting standards. Extravagance such as this led many of his rivals to despise him. Yet Caesar was laying down stakes in a high-risk game. To be the darling of the smart set was no idle thing. The risk, of course, was that it might result in ruin—not merely financial, but political too. It was noted by his shrewder enemies, however, that he never let his partying put his health at risk. His eating habits were as frugal as Cato’s. He rarely drank. If his sexual appetites were notorious, then he was careful to choose his long-term partners with a cool and searching caution.

***

Early every December women from the noblest families in the Republic would gather to celebrate the mysterious rites of the Good Goddess. The festival was strictly off-limits to men. Even their statues had to be veiled for the occasion. Such secrecy fueled any number of prurient male fantasies. Every citizen knew that women were depraved and promiscuous by nature. Surely a festival from which men were banned had to be a scene of lubricious abandon? Not that any male had ever dared take a peek to confirm this thrilling suspicion. It was one of the idiosyncrasies of Roman religion that even those who sniggered at it also tended to regard it with awe. Men, just as much as women, honored the Good Goddess.

The mansion began to fill with incense, music, and great ladies. Now, for a few brief hours, it was the city’s women who held the safety of Rome in their hands. There was no longer any call for them to skulk in the shadows, afraid of prying eyes. Yet one of Aurelia’s maids, looking for some music, observed a flute-girl who was doing exactly that. She approached her; the flute-girl shrank away. When the maid demanded to know who she was, the flute-girl shook her head, then mumbled Pompeia’s name. The maid shrieked. Dressed in a long-sleeved tunic and breastband the stranger might have been, but the voice had been unmistakably male. Uproar ensued. Aurelia, frantically covering up the sacred statues of the goddess, suspended the rites. The other women went in search of the impious intruder. They finally found him, hidden in the room of one of Pompeia’s maids. Off came the veil of the bogus flute-girl to reveal … Clodius.

Gossip convulsed the city.

Clodius, by dressing up in women’s clothes and gate-crashing a sacred ritual, had clearly taken offensiveness to a whole new level. Overnight he became the toast of every loose-belted dandy and the bogey of every conservative in Rome. Caught in the middle, deeply embarrassed by the affair, was Caesar. Naturally, he had to affect outrage. Not only had Clodius violated the pontifical house, but it was also rumored that he had been planning to violate Pompeia herself. Cuckolded Roman husbands had been known to set their slaves on adulterers, to beat them, rape them, even castrate them; at the very least Caesar would have been justified in dragging Clodius through the courts. But the pontifex had an image problem: despite his elevated religious status, he remained a topic of fevered gossip himself, the rake who had been labeled “a man for every woman, and a woman for every man.”28 For Caesar to adopt the tone of the moral majority might open him to even greater ridicule, quite apart from making an enemy of Clodius and alienating the fast set who were his natural supporters. After all, he was planning to run for the consulship within a couple of years. Clodius was far too well connected, and capricious, to risk offending. In the end Caesar resolved his dilemma by divorcing Pompeia but refusing to say why: “Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion”29 was his single, Delphic comment. Then, before anyone could press him further, he slipped away to Spain, where he was due to serve as governor. It was a measure of his eagerness to be away from Rome that he arrived in his new province before the Senate had even had time to confirm his appointment. Caesar’s departure did nothing to dim the obsession with the scandal. The continuing hysteria that surrounded Clodius’s stunt submerged even the news of Pompey’s arrival.

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Walter Youngquist: Geodestinies dams and hydropower

Preface. I was fortunate enough to know Walter for 15 years. He became a friend and mentor, helping me learn to become a better science writer, and sending me material I might be interested in, and delightful pictures of him sitting in a lawn chair and feeding wild deer who weren’t afraid of him. I thought his book Geodestinies: The Inevitable Control of Earth Resources over Nations and Individuals, published in 1997, was the best overview of energy and natural resources ever written, and encouraged him to write a second edition. He did try, but he spent so much time taking care of his ill wife, that he died before finishing it. I’ve made eight posts in Experts/Walter Youngquist of just a few topics from the version that was in progress when he died at 96 years old in 2018 (500 pages).

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Walter Youngquist: Geodestinies Coal

Preface. Before the excerpt from Geodestinies, I thought an introduction to how coal is formed would be worthwhile, especially since I still thought it was the “once-popular explanation” below (Cottier 2021 How Ancient Forests Formed Coal and Fueled Life as We Know It. Discover).

“Coal doesn’t form at a steady rate. Huge quantities appear now and then in the geological timeline, but small, isolated patches are more typical. This spotty record raises the question of why coal creation isn’t constant throughout Earth’s history. 

A once-popular explanation argued that the Carboniferous was so productive because woody plants had just begun to grow and the fungi of the time hadn’t yet evolved to decompose lignin, the polymer that makes wood rigid. Rather than decay and disappear, these prehistoric trees remained preserved until they were buried by sediment and turned into coal.

It’s a simple, elegant solution, but many experts find it unconvincing. For one, the odds seem low that tens of million of years passed before any fungus hit upon an enzyme that could break down lignin. More importantly, there’s much more to coal than woody plants: In many places, the bulk of the dead plant matter came from lycopods, a giant tree whose living relatives include club mosses and which contained little lignin. 

The way coal is formed is very simple: You need a lot of rain (to form swamps and foster plant growth) and a hole (for the plants to fill).  Which was especially true in the Carboniferous and a few other coal-bearing periods.  During the Carboniferous, as the Earth’s landmasses merged into the supercontinent Pangaea, the collision of tectonic plates forged both mountain ranges and wide basins beside them. Voila — holes to fill. Some of those basins, including the ones in present-day Europe and the eastern U.S., happened to form in the ever-wet tropics. In the global scheme of thingsit comes down to how many large, sinking tectonic basins sit in the appropriate locations and allow deteriorating organic matter to accumulate.

When plants died in these waterlogged regions, many fell into stagnant pools with little oxygen. Since most decomposers (bacteria, fungi, worms and the like) can’t survive in such conditions, the plants never fully decayed. Instead they formed peat, an accumulation of partially decayed organic material. But even this is not enough to guarantee coal — if the wetlands dry out, the exposed peat will disintegrate. One way or another, it must be covered by sediment. 

Sometimes, in swamps located either near the ocean or in flatlands where rising seas can reach them, this happens repeatedly during glacial-interglacial cycles. Peat forms during glacial periods, when the polar ice sheets grow and the sea level falls. Then, when the ice melts and the sea floods into the swamps, the peat is preserved, locked away beneath new marine sediment. In some places, the rock record attests to dozens of these repeating marine and non-marine layers, known as cyclothems. “Then you just have to wait a hundred thousand years until the next cycle begins again,” Looy says. Peat can also be preserved farther inland, as the eroding sediments of the surrounding landscape bury it.

Over time, when new sediment and peat layers compress the buried peat, the increasing weight squeezes out water, gradually leaving behind coal. It hardens slowly into increasingly refined forms, starting with lignite, or brown coal, and proceeding through sub-bituminous and bituminous to anthracite — the black, lustrous lumps you might imagine.

glaciation, rainfall, sedimentation — is actually quite simple. With basins in the appropriate spots, the coal cycle runs almost like clockwork, an hour hand spinning round and round. “Once you see the system as linked together, it’s not that complex,” he says. “The glaciers come, the glaciers go. Peat forms, peat doesn’t form. It makes sense.”

And coal is almost always cropping up somewhere in the world. Even today, in select tropical regions like Borneo and the Congo Basin, peat piles up into what could be the next generation of deposits (though not all peat necessarily makes the transformation to coal). 

But nothing recent rivals the likes of the Carboniferous and the Permian. To create the immense troves of fossil fuel that have driven so much of human activity, you need precise circumstances, and our planet doesn’t often provide them. “You have an alignment of conditions … and those conditions give you all this coal,” DiMichele says. “Getting that set of conditions is not something that just happens again and again.”

Other Youngquist Geodestinies Posts:

Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy“, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer; Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

* * *

In regard to the “depths of the Earth,” mining at best can get down to only reach a depth of about 10,000 feet because the geothermal gradient is about 2° F for every hundred feet. That means the temperature at 10,000 feet down is about 200° F higher than at the surface. Mines at that depth require expensive cooling systems. A lot of pumps are also needed to keep out the water that would otherwise flood the mine. A major hazard at greater depths is overlying rock pressure. It is so great that walls of the mine are subject to “rock bursts,” in which rocks burst out of the sides of the mine and crush anything in their path, including mine cars and people.

But when it comes to coal, the depth is far less. Coal is usually mined safely at depths less than 3,500 feet; any deeper and the weight of the overlying rock could collapse.

The world’s reserves of hard coal (bituminous and sub-bituminous) and low-grade coal (lignite) are about the same, but their consumption trends are different. Demand for hard coal is rising, while the use of lignite for fuel is essentially flat. Lignite has a high-water content making it more costly to ship per unit of energy than for hard coal. The result is that the world will run out of higher quality coal much sooner than it will run out of lower quality coal.

It has been estimated that 90% of the total energy in coal, oil, and natural gas deposits in the United States, is in the form of coal. These coal deposits are already known; there is no expensive exploration work involved as there is for deeply hidden oil reservoirs.

Coal, however, has some substantial problems, starting with the fact that underground coal mines are dangerous. Each year miners are killed, and many others have their health permanently impaired. In the United States, most western coal, and considerable eastern coal, now is mined by open-pit methods. Underground mines are becoming less common. In mountainous areas such as the Appalachians, surface or strip mining and mountaintop removal mining of coal can have severe impacts on scenery, hydrology, water quality, local air quality, flora, and fauna.

Scientific American (2007) examined the U.S. government’s recent push to promote coal-to-liquid as a partial answer to the problem of oil supply. Their conclusions were: …liquid coal comes with substantial environmental and economic negatives. On the environmental side, the polluting properties of coal — starting with mining and lasting long after burning — and the large amounts of energy required to liquefy it, mean that liquid coal produces more than twice the global warming emissions as regular gasoline and almost double those of ordinary diesel…. One ton of coal produced only two barrels of fuel [gross return, not counting the energy input to produce it]. In addition to the carbon dioxide emitted while using the fuel, the production process creates almost a ton of carbon dioxide for every barrel of liquid fuel….Which is to say, one ton of coal in, more than two tons of carbon dioxide out…. Liquid coal is also a bad economic choice. Lawmakers from coal states are proposing that U.S. taxpayers guarantee minimum prices for the new fuel, and guarantee big purchases by the government for the next 25 years…. The country would be spending billions in loans, tax incentives and price guarantees to lock in a technology that produces more greenhouse gases than gasoline does….

Coal to oil to coal — in less than 100 years.  For energy measured in terms of barrels of oil equivalent (boe), world oil energy domination over coal only happened in 1963. Given current trends of increased coal production (especially in China and India) the reverse crossover point of coal becoming once again the dominant world energy source appears likely to occur no later than 2050. Some estimates put it as early as 2013. This means that oil will have reigned as the top energy source for less than 100 years. Yet another example of how the “oil interval” will be only a passing moment in human history. But coal is also a finite fossil fuel whose use will end within a century. Europe is going back to coal, with new coal-fired plants now scheduled for Italy, Germany, and in the United Kingdom. “Europe’s power station owners emphasize that they are making the new coal plants as clean as possible. But critics say that ‘clean coal’ is a pipe dream….” (Rosenthal, 2008).

Coal is still vital to U.S. economy in 2030 In spite of its environmental drawbacks and the decline in quality of coal being mined, the Energy Information Agency projects coal will still be a major source of fuel for electric power generation in 2030. Other sources of electricity (wind, solar, etc.) are still regarded to be very minor sources, in total, supplying less than half the fuel energy that coal will provide. Gas, however, will replace coal to some extent for a limited time.

Fossil Fuels — A Brief Flash. The fuels just mentioned are fossil fuels, the accumulation of myriad animal and plant remains during a period of more than 500 million years. It is sobering to realize that the most useful fossil fuels, coal and petroleum, which took geologic ages for nature to produce, will be consumed in a brief flash of Earth history, probably lasting less than 500 years. Even in terms of human history this will be a very short and unique time.

Coal exists in 37 states, and is mined underground in 22 states. It is estimated that eventually underground coal mining in the United States will involve 40 million acres, eight million of which already have experienced underground mining. Ground subsidence over coal mines is already occurring on more than two million acres. The U.S. Bureau of Mines estimates that nearly 400,000 acres of land in urban areas in 18 states may be subject to subsidence, and the total costs to stabilize these lands would be about $12 billion (Johnson and Miller, 1979).

In the East, coal companies have more recently been removing the tops of mountains and mining coal by the open pit method. The overburden is dumped in adjacent valleys, and has severe adverse effects on both the landscape and the environment that will be visible far into the future. In some regions of West Virginia where mining accounts for almost all the jobs, miners and environmentalists have clashed. There seems to be no happy resolution to this problem. In whatever form and by whatever means energy is produced (“captured” would probably be more accurate) in some energy forms more than others, there is always an environmental impact.

David Hughes (2007) reports that 50% of all coal consumed has been used since 1970, and 90% has been used since 1909. Hughes says world coal production will peak by 2025, as do several other recent studies, much earlier than those who have been saying the significant production life for coal is hundreds of years. These consumption patterns also generally apply to the consumption of all metals and nonmetals.

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Book review of “Bright Green Lies”

This is a book review of “Bright Green Lies. How the Environmental Movement Lost its Way and What We can Do About It” by Derrick Jensen, Lierre Keith, and Max Wilbert.

This is a timely book.  The Biden administration is alarmed by how China controls up to 90% of rare earth and other essential minerals we’ll need for bright green power and anything else electronic. Analysts are predicting that the Biden infrastructure plan will include mines for lithium (such as the open-pit lithium mine at Thacker Pass, Nevada), a new copper mine in Arizona on land the San Carlos Apache Tribe considers sacred and more destruction of U.S. land, rivers, and aquifers.

This book covers the amazing amount of damage bright green power will do to the climate, biodiversity, and ecology, but above all by mining.  If you are trying to lose weight, read this book, you will lose your appetite, I guarantee you!

And why destroy our country to mine metals to compete with China? In my book “Life After Fossil Fuels”, I write “Let China monopolize the second most polluting industry on earth. Mining spews out acid rain, wastewater, and heavy metals onto land, water, and air. One fifth of China’s arable land is polluted from mining and industry.  Mining the materials needed for renewable energy potentially affects 50 million square kilometers, 37% of Earth’s land (minus Antarctica), with a third of this land overlapping key biodiversity areas, wilderness, or protected areas. If mined, that would drive biodiversity loss, harm (rain) forests, and poison ecosystems.  Renewable energy is anything but clean and green. And quite a Pyrrhic victory for China!”

Some religions promise life after death, bright green lies promise that we can continue our gluttonous earth-destroying lifestyle without any sacrifices.  Instead of Jesus, our savior will be Renewable Energy, recycling, and more. 

Naomi Klein’s “shock doctrine” applies to Bright Green Lies.  You’re being told that because of climate change, you need to hand over huge subsidies to the industrial economy to destroy huge amounts of the natural world with toxic wastes for the electricity generating contraptions that will allow you to continue with your non-negotiable lifestyle.

More than any other book, this one zeroes in on the massive amount of ecological destruction that mining the materials to make millions of wind turbines, solar panels, nuclear and other electricity generating devices will cause.  In many ways the harm is more substantial than greenhouse gases, which get all the attention.  I am just sickened by the harm mining for wind and solar contraptions causes.   Tremendous harm, agricultural areas seeded with toxic metals, great harm to creatures great and small with consequent biodiversity loss, polluted rivers, lakes, and oceans from all the toxic chemicals used to extract metals from ores, and much more. 

The authors expose the huge negative ecological impact wind turbines can have on landscapes, especially from the mines required to get copper, iron, and other ores to construct them with.  There’s a lot to be said about this, and not surprising when you consider the scale of Stuff required. Just the blades to generate 2.5 TW of power would need about 90 million metric tons of crude oil to make the resins. The 3.8 million 5 MW turbines Mark Jacobson calls for would need 2.4 billion tons of steel, 1.9 million tons of copper, 2.6 billion tons of concrete, and much more. We’re talking 60,000 Hoover dams of materials here!  

On top of that, wind, solar, and other renewables are not reducing emissions, nor are they making a dent in energy use except for a teeny tiny amount in electricity generation.  Germany, which has gone further than any other nation to wean themselves off fossil fuels, known as “Energiewende”, is a huge failure as shown in Chapter 3: The solar lie part 1.  Yet the most expensive attempt in the world to replace fossils with renewables is falsely praised as a success by the Sierra Club, Naomi Klein, Bill McKibben, and other environmentalists.  The authors also point out that solar power may actually have a negative energy return on energy invested (EROEI), especially in northern climates.   

Solar panels, like wind turbines also require a horrifying amount of raw materials, none of which are renewable, such as lead, indium, nylon, polypropylene, silicon, zinc sulfide, gold, silver, chlorine, aluminum, copper and tin, and few of which will ever be recycled.  In addition, solar panels need transformers, substations, transmission lines, a network of roads to provide maintenance access, vehicles, fuel for the vehicles, factories to build the vehicles, and so on.  And that’s nothing compared to what a concentrated solar plant such as Ivanpah requires, which destroyed wildlife after covering 3500 acres (5.4 square miles) of ecologically fragile desert land.  Like wind turbines, solar panels depend on mines producing vast amounts of toxic wastes. 

Increasing the electric grid to carry more renewables, or building more dams and geothermal power also has a huge impact on the mining of billions of tons of minerals and ecological harm.  And a dozen other “solutions” such as tidal power or biofuels. None can be done without destructive mining.

And please don’t forget: Most of the components of wind and solar will not be recycled for reasons discussed in Chapter 8, and what little is done to recycle will just add even more toxic elements onto the earth to tease metals and minerals apart and large amounts of fossil fuels for the high heat needed to separate them. For most metals, it is back to the mines and yet more destruction.  Nor is collecting recycling materials with hundreds of thousands of diesel-powered garbage trucks good for the environment, and at least half of this material will end up in the landfill anyhow.

Keep in mind, that after all this destruction, rinse and repeat. Onshore wind has a lifespan of about 20 years on shore, 15 years offshore, solar panels from 18 to 25 years, and so on as I write about in energyskeptic.com post “55 Reasons why wind power can not replace fossil fuels“.

When it comes to batteries for energy storage and autos, keep in mind that it takes half a million gallons of water to produce just one ton of lithium.  Thousands of already dry areas of Bolivia and Chile – the flora and fauna – are under threat from lithium mining.  Cobalt is mined by 40,000 child slaves in intense heat with no safety equipment.  Lead and other battery minerals are equally destructive.

Pumped hydro storage seems like a less destructive way to store electrical energy, but this book will disabuse you of that notion.  Nor are compressed air energy storage and other proposals any better or feasible.

You’d think that bright green contraptions would solve our problems with efficiency, but that isn’t true either.  Why? Well, you’ll just have to read the book…it’s complicated.

There’s been so much hype that compact dense cities will reduce energy use and emissions, keep wild lands from development, and save biodiversity that you may be surprised by how absurdly untrue these myths are.  For one thing, cities aren’t staying compact. Every heard of urban sprawl?  From 1945 to 2000, 45 million acres, larger than Washington state, was developed.

Real Solutions

  • Subsidies can be diverted from the military to everything from battered women’s shelters to free education to free health care to wildlife and stream restoration to massive projects of dam removal, reforestation, and revivification of prairies and wetland
  • Industrial civilization is incompatible with life on the planet. That makes the solution to our systematic planetary murder obvious, but let’s say it anyway: Stop industrial civilization. Stop our way of life, which is based on extraction. No, that doesn’t mean killing all humans. That means changing our lifestyle dramatically.
  • First, we need to stop the ongoing destruction being caused by so-called green energy projects, by oil and gas extraction, by coal mining and ore mining, by urban sprawl, by industrial agriculture, and by all the other million assaults on this planet that are perpetrated by industrial civilization. And second, we need to help the land heal.
  • Stopping deforestation, restoring logged areas, grasslands, wetlands, salt marshes, peat bogs, and seagrasses would remove more carbon dioxide from the air each year than is gen[1]erated by all the cars on the planet
  • And finally on page 446, since overconsumption and overpopulation are the driving forces of this endless destructive growth, “all forms of reproductive control must become available to all”.
  • Close all military bases on foreign soil.

This book doesn’t address the fact that peak oil has happened. From “Life After Fossil Fuels”: “Conventional crude oil production leveled off in 2005, and it appears to have peaked in 2008 at 69.5 million barrels per day (mb/d) according to Europe’s International Energy Agency (IEA 2018 p45). The U.S. Energy Information Agency shows global peak crude oil production at a later date in 2018 at 82.9 mb/d (EIA 2020) because they included tight oil, oil sands, and deep-sea oil.”  

Within the next few years, oil will be declining at a rate of 6% or more a year.  Oil is the master resource that makes all other goods possible: coal, natural gas, mining, logging, transportation, agriculture, construction, cement, steel, and so on. Nothing could possibly reduce greenhouse gases more than oil decline. No geoengineering project could even come close and would almost certainly bring on unexpected side effects worse than the “cure”.  Oil decline will be exponential, which means in as little as 16 years we could be producing just 10% as much oil, and everything else for that matter, than we produce today. Or sooner if a shrinking economy triggers enough instability to case civil war, social unrest, and war over the remaining oil. 

Bright Green Lies is trying to stop the madness of destroying the planet and biodiversity for something that won’t solve any of our problems, except to enable the billionaires to grow even richer in the very last financial bubble before collapse.

Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy“, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer; Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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