Nuclear winter could kill 2 to 5 billion people

Preface. Carl Sagan introduced the idea of a “nuclear winter”, which helped to end the cold war.  The smoke from fires started by bombs would absorb so much sun the earth wold grow cold, dry, and dark, killing plants on land and in the water world-wide, jeopardizing the whole human race. This has been confirmed several times in the past few decades. Research shows that even a small regional nuclear war could have the same effect globally. There are nine nations with 12,000 nuclear warheads, so this threat isn’t going away any time soon.

Most recently, Xia et al (2022) report that a small nuclear war between India and Pakistan could kill 2 billion people, and a larger war between Russia and the U.S. 5 billion.

Witze (2022) summarizes this paper:

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan could loft up to 47 million tonnes of soot into the atmosphere cutting food production calories in half; a full-out nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia 150 million tonnes and food production reduced by 90%. The globe-encircling pall would persist for years until the skies eventually cleared.

Soot from burning cities would encircle the planet and cool it by reflecting sunlight back into space. This in turn would cause global crop failures that — in a worst-case scenario — could put 5 billion people on the brink of death. Lead author Xia said that as a result large percent of people would starve. Their model looked at how climate would change, how crops and fisheries would respond to six levels of war dropping temperatures from 1 to 16 °C, these effects lingering a decade or more.  The study assumed people would cope in various ways such as eating crops intended for livestock (or not), less food waste, and likely less international food trade as countries tried to feed their own people.

Mid to high latitude nations would suffer most since they have such a short season for growing crops and get much colder from the soot.  Tropical regions would do better, and Australia best of all.

Jägermeyr (2020) and Toon (2019) say a nuclear winter could last 5 to 10 years, and crop production might drop by 25 to 50%.

In addition, Coupe et al (2021) report that turning to the oceans for food may not be possible either because nuclear war could trigger an unprecedented El Niño-like event lasting up to seven years. During a “nuclear Niño,” rainfall would mostly stop in the equatorial Pacific because of the cooler climate, as well as shut down up-welling of deeper, colder waters along the equator in the Pacific Ocean, reducing the nutrients that phytoplankton at the base of the marine food web need to survive, and another 40% of plankton might be destroyed from reduced sunlight  drastically reducing photosynthesis.  Sherrer et al (2020) also report drastic declines in fisheries.

Bardeen (2021) found ozone loss and UV radiation would be extreme, destroying much of the ozone layer over a 15-year period, with the ozone loss peaking at an average of about 75% worldwide. Even a regional nuclear war would lead to a peak ozone loss of 25% globally, with recovery taking about 12 years.  And Witze (2020) discusses how a small nuclear war might affect the planet.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Financial Sense, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Bardeen CG et al (2021) Extreme Ozone Loss Following Nuclear War Results in Enhanced Surface Ultraviolet Radiation. JGR atmospheres https://doi.org/10.1029/2021JD035079

For a global nuclear war, heating in the stratosphere, reduced photolysis, and an increase in catalytic loss from the HOx cycle cause a 15 year-long reduction in the ozone column, with a peak loss of 75% globally and 65% in the tropics. This is larger than predictions from the 1980s, which assumed large injections of nitrogen oxides (NOx), but did not include the effects of smoke. NOx from the fireball and the fires provide a small (5%) increase to the global average ozone loss for the first few years. Initially, soot would shield the surface from UV-B, but UV Index values would become extreme: greater than 35 in the tropics for 4 years, and greater than 45 during the summer in the southern polar regions for 3 years. For a regional war, global column ozone would be reduced by 25% with recovery taking 12 years.

Jägermeyr J et al (2020) A regional nuclear conflict would compromise global food security. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

A limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan with just 50 Hiroshima-sized detonations could perturb the climate for at least 5 to 10 years, send temperatures plunging 1.8 C (3.25 F), and lower production of maize, wheat, rice, and soybeans four times more than any drought, flood, or volcanic eruption in history.  Worst hit are nations 30°N, including the United States, Europe, and China for 10 to 15 years.  But this affects the whole world because much of production from the north is exported.  Maize reserves are gone after 1 year, wheat after 2, ending exports to poor nations which already have food insecurity and are barely able to feed themselves with imports. At least 1.3 billion would see their food supplies drop by more than 20%, including nations that now export grains.

This is a conservative estimate since India and Pakistan may have much larger bombs than used in Hiroshima. Also, they weren’t included in the study to avoid mixing the direct effects of war with the indirect climate effects on agriculture.  But it would be reasonable to assume food production in both nations would drop almost to zero, with additional deaths from radioactive fallout, and stratospheric ozone depletion allowing more UV rays in damaging people and agriculture even more globally.

Toon OB. 2019. Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global catastrophe. Science.

Surface sunlight will decline by 20 to 35%, cooling the global surface by 2° to 5°C and reducing precipitation by 15 to 30%, with larger regional impacts. Recovery takes more than 10 years. Net primary productivity declines 15 to 30% on land and 5 to 15% in oceans threatening mass starvation and additional worldwide collateral fatalities.

Should a war between India and Pakistan ever occur, as assumed here, these countries alone could suffer 50 to 125 million fatalities, a regional catastrophe. In addition, severe short-term climate perturbations, with temperatures declining to values not seen on Earth since the middle of the last Ice Age, would be triggered by smoke from burning cities, a global disaster threatening food production worldwide and mass starvation, as well as severe disruption to natural ecosystems. Compounding the devastation brought upon their own countries, decisions by Indian and Pakistani military leaders and politicians to use nuclear weapons could severely affect every other nation on Earth.

Major crop-growing regions of North America and Eurasia experience declines of NPP averaging 25 to 50% over this time. Very large reductions in NPP occur in India, China, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia, as well as in tropical South America and Africa. Ocean reductions in NPP are highest in the Arctic, where production is almost entirely extinguished. In addition, in many regions where major fisheries exist, production is significantly reduced, including the North Atlantic and North Pacific, where NPP decreases by 25 to 50%. Together, the reductions in temperature, primary productivity, and precipitation suggest major disruptions to human and natural systems worldwide.

Toon, O.B., et al. 2019. Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global catastrophe. Science Advances.

Alan Robock and Woen Brian Toon: “Some people think that the nuclear winter theory developed in the 1980s was discredited. And they may therefore raise their eyebrows at our new assertion that a regional nuclear war, like one between India and Pakistan, could also devastate agriculture worldwide. But the original theory was thoroughly validated. The science behind it was supported by investigations from the National Academy of Sciences, by studies sponsored within the U.S. military, and by the International Council of Scientific Unions, which included representatives from 74 national academies of science and other scientific bodies.”

  • Just 100 of the smallest of the 17,000 nuclear bombs that exist dropped on cities and industrial areas in a fight between India and Pakistan would start firestorms that would put massive amounts of smoke into the upper atmosphere, about 5.5 million tons (5 million metric tons) of black carbon. This ash would absorb incoming solar heat, cooling the surface below.
  • Even a very small regional nuclear war on the other side of the planet could disrupt global climate for at least a decade by wiping out the ozone layer for 10 years. These particles would block the sun, making the earth’s surface cold, dark and dry. Agricultural collapse and mass starvation could follow. Hence, global cooling could result from a regional war, not just a conflict between the U.S. and Russia.
  • Cooling scenarios are based on computer models. But observations of volcanic eruptions, forest fire smoke and other phenomena provide confidence that the models are correct.  Colder temperatures would reduce global rainfall and other forms of precipitation by up to about 10 percent. This would likely trigger widespread fires in regions such as the Amazon, and it would pump even more smoke into the atmosphere.
  • Global average surface temperatures would drop suddenly by about 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5 degrees Celsius), their lowest levels in more than 1,000 years. In some places, temperatures would get significantly colder — most of North America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East would experience winters that are 4.5 to 10.8 degrees F (2.5 to 6 degrees C) colder, and summers 1.8 to 7.2 degrees F (1 to 4 degrees C) cooler. The colder temperatures would lead to lethal frosts worldwide that would reduce growing seasons by 10 to 40 days annually for several years. [The Top 10 Largest Explosions Ever]
  • Survivors will find that the pollution from dioxins, PCBs, asbestos, and other chemicals will make the air unhealthy to breath.

Human toll. An all-out nuclear war between India and Pakistan could slaughter people locally and lead to more deaths across the planet.

  • 20 million people in the region could die from direct bomb blasts and subsequent fire and radiation.
  • 1 billion people worldwide with marginal food supplies today could die of starvation because of ensuing agricultural collapse.

If war broke out between two countries and 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs, each the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT, were dropped on cities, the smoke from these fires would result in a giant ozone hole that would last for 5 years or more.  The worst effects would be the northern high latitudes, with a 50-70% ozone loss (and 20% globally, 25-45% mid-latitude).

The resulting increase in UV radiation would kill or harm plants and animals resulting in serious consequences for human health.

The ash that absorbed heat up in the atmosphere would also intensely heat the stratosphere, accelerating chemical reactions that destroy ozone. This would allow much greater amounts of ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth’s surface, with a summertime ultraviolet increase of 30 to 80 percent in the mid-latitudes, posing a threat to human health, agriculture and ecosystems on both land and sea.

The ozone losses predicted here are significantly greater than previous “nuclear winter/UV spring” calculations… Our results point to previously unrecognized mechanisms for stratospheric ozone depletion”.

The absorption of sunlight by the stratospheric soot produces a global average surface cooling of 1.25°C persisting for several years and large reductions in precipitation associated with the Asian summer monsoon and other disruptions to the global climate system.

Previous studies had estimated that global temperatures would recover after about a decade. However, this latest work projected that cooling would persist for more than 25 years, which is about as far into the future as the simulations went. Two major factors caused this prolonged cooling — an expansion of sea ice that reflected more solar heat into space, and a significant cooling in the upper 330 feet (100 meters) of the oceans, which would warm back up only gradually.

Depletion of the ozone column relative to normal conditions may impact living organisms, which are usually adapted to local UV radiation levels. Increased UV radiation is largely detrimental, damaging terrestrial and oceanic plants and producing skin cancer, ocular damage, and other health effects in humans and animals. Conclusive evidence shows that increased UV-B radiation damages aquatic ecosystems, including amphibians, shrimp, fish, and phytoplankton. The effects of sunlight on the biota are quantified as a product of the sun’s spectrum at the Earth’s surface and the action spectra for biologically damaging processes, such as erythema, carcinogenesis, and photoinhibition. An analysis of biological sensitivity to UV spectral changes concluded that a 40% ozone column depletion at 45°N – as computed here – would increase DNA damage (believed related to carcinogenesis) by 213%, and plant damage (e.g., photoinhibition) by 132% relative to normal conditions.

The global-scale ozone reductions predicted here for relatively small injections of sooty smoke into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere indicate an unexpected sensitivity associated with such perturbations, and suggest that certain events-such as regional nuclear conflicts, or geo-engineering schemes based on absorbing carbonaceous aerosols-might pose an unprecedented hazard to the biosphere worldwide. Our regional nuclear scenario involves <0.1% of the yield of nuclear weapons that currently exist. The current build-up of arsenals in an increasing number of states suggests scenarios in the next few decades that are even more extreme. The potential hazard to global ozone, and hence terrestrial biota, deserves careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the scientific community.

2016-05-04 Nuclear battles in South Asia and moved the doomsday clock to 3 minutes to midnight. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported that war between India and Pakistan is growing every more likely

Nuclear material is spreading, making wars more likely (Conant 2013)

Already many nations have nuclear weapons: Belgium, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.  Japan could easily construct nuclear weapons if they wanted to, and other nations are in the process of acquiring them (i.e. Iran).

Russia wants to supply nuclear power globally.  If a country can’t afford the $3 billion price tag, Russia will cut a deal for a Rent-A-Reactor.

Russia has plans to build 40 reactors on their own soil, and another 80 world-wide by 2030. Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom has already built nuclear plants in Turkey, Vietnam, China, and India. New potential clients include Nigeria, Finland, Eastern block countries, Algeria, Indonesia, Namibia, and Middle Eastern countries. Rosatom is even interested in the United States, where they already provide half of America’s nuclear fuel.

Nuclear proliferation experts are alarmed:

  • Nuclear bomb material and know-how will be spread widely. Some of the scarier countries Russia is courting are Myanmar (Burma), Iran, and Belarus.
  • Russia is not known for putting a high priority on safety.
  • Russia plans to build fast-breeder reactors. A meltdown could create an explosion that would blow the top off and send out highly toxic radioactive plutonium, uranium, cesium, and iodine quite a distance.
  • Mass production of small nuclear plants generating just 300 to 500 MW would spread nuclear risk accidents and proliferation of nuclear bomb material even more widely
  • Worse yet, Russia plans to build floating reactors, which have the potential to poison entire oceanic food chains, are hard to defend against terrorists, and are vulnerable to tsunamis.

When will our luck run out?

Ron Rosenbaum in his book “How the end begins: the road to a nuclear World War III” explains how and why nuclear weapons may well be launched. He also recounts the many times a nuclear war was almost launched — sometimes by accident — and how flawed the complex reasoning of Mutually Assured Destruction is to begin with. He concludes:  “I think only luck has saved us, and our luck is bound to run out.”

Many fear Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has the potential to go nuclear, and as the U.S. and other nations increasingly turn to autocratic leaders, the danger increases as well.

What other nuclear nations besides North Korea will try nuclear blackmail after peak oil?

North Korea is portrayed as a nation run by insane ruler, but building nuclear weapons to blackmail other nations for oil is a predictable consequence of the collapse that followed a drastic reduction of their fossil fuels after the Soviet Union collapsed.

Andrei Lankov, a professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, wrote “the world is likely to say that the North Koreans are acting “irrationally.” But this is not the case — they are a very rational regime, actually the world’s most Machiavellian. North Korean leaders are sending a message…using both artillery and centrifuges to say: “We are here, we are dangerous, and we cannot be ignored. We can make a lot of trouble, but also we behave reasonably if rewarded generously enough.  … U.S. policy toward Pyongyang has been based … on the assumption that North Korea can be persuaded and bribed into surrendering its nuclear program. It is an illusion: The survival of the North Korean regime depends to a large extent on its blackmail diplomacy. There has never been a chance that it would surrender its nuclear program, which alone makes it possible to extract sufficient aid from the outside world.

Though North Korea may have been more predisposed to take this route given their long and tragic history, including being occupied by the Japanese in the 1920s, massively destroyed by the Korean War in 1950-53, and major natural disasters in the mid-1990s.   With little farmland and poor soils, the North Korean population was far past their carrying capacity when massive fossil fuel and food imports dropped.

Conclusion. With world peak oil production of both conventional and unconventional oil in 2018, and conventional in 2008 likely (Friedemann 2022), what other nuclear nations might turn to blackmail as well? Or use nuclear weapons to take over other countries.  After all, before fossil fuels, that was the only way to “grow the economy”…

References

Bardeen CG et al (2021) Extreme Ozone Loss Following Nuclear War Results in Enhanced Surface Ultraviolet Radiation. JGR atmospheres. https://doi.org/10.1029/2021JD035079

Choi, C. Q.  February 22, 2011. Small Nuclear War Could Reverse Global Warming for Years: Regional war could spark “unprecedented climate change,” experts predict. National Geographic News.

Conant, E. October 17, 2013. Russia’s new Empire: Nuclear Power. The federation is aggressively selling reactors all over the world, raising safety concerns. Scientific America.

Coupe J, Stevenson S, NS Lovenduski et al (2021) Nuclear Niño response observed in simulations of nuclear war scenarios. Communications Earth & Environment.

Friedemann A (2022) Peak oil is here! energyskeptic.com

Jägermeyr J et al (2020) A regional nuclear conflict would compromise global food security. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

Lankov, Andrei. 24 Nov 2010. North Korean Blackmail. New York Times.

Mills, M.J.  8 Apr 2008. Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences vol 105:14:5307-5312.

Murray T. 9 Dec 2011. Recipe for Nuclear Winter. candobetter.net

Pfeiffer, Dale Allen. 17 Nov 2003. Drawing Lessons from Experience; The Agricultural Crises in North Korea and Cuba. From the Wilderness.

Pimentel, David.  in “Population Politics” by Virginia Abernethy (2000)

Robock, A. 2011. Nuclear winter is a real and present danger. Nature 473: 275-6

Robock, Alan et al., January 2010. LOCAL NUCLEAR WAR. Worry has focused on the U.S. versus Russia, but a regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan could blot out the sun, starving much of the human race.  Scientific American.  Original paper: 19 April 2007. Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics.

Robok, A.  19 April 2007. Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics.

Scherrer KJN et al (2020) Marine wild-capture fisheries after nuclear war. PNAS. http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/NuclearFishPNAS.pdf

Smil, Vaclav Smil. 2000. “Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and the Transformation of World Food Production”.

Townsend, Erik. 6 Jan 2013. Why Peak Oil Threatens the International Monetary System. ASPO-USA

Witze A (2020) How a small nuclear war would transform the entire planet. Nature 579: 485-487.

Witze A (2022) Nuclear war between two nations could spark global famine. A pall of smoke from burning cities would engulf Earth, causing worldwide crop failures, models show. Nature.

Wolbach WS et al (2018) Extraordinary Biomass-Burning Episode and Impact Winter Triggered by the Younger Dryas Cosmic Impact ~12,800 Years Ago. The Journal of Geology.

Xia L et al (2022) Global food insecurity and famine from reduced crop, marine fishery and livestock production due to climate disruption from nuclear war soot injection. Nature Food 3: 586-596. https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-022-00573-0

2 July 2012. War-Related Climate Change Would Reduce Substantially Reduce Crop Yields.  ScienceDaily.

ENDNOTE

IFLSCIENCE (2021) The Truth Behind The Urban Legend That Cockroaches Can Survive Nuclear War.

Can cockroaches survive nuclear blasts? Would they be alone to inherit the Earth following a nuclear apocalypse?  The short answer to the first question is yes, sort of. They were found among the rubble following the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, though it should be noted that humans were found alive also, many of whom died of radiation sickness after the fact. However, there survives no record of anyone tracking the health of the cockroaches following their survival.

Humans have, however, tested their resistance to radiation before and after those nuclear blasts. Over a month, they exposed different groups of cockroaches, fruit flie, and flour beetles to 1,000 rads (a unit of absorbed radiation dose), 10,000 rads, and 100,00 rads. After the ordeal, 10% of the roaches from the 10,000 rad group were still alive, which is 10 times the lethal dose for humans. However, none of them managed to survive 100,000 rads.

But, the flour beetles did — 10% survived a whopping 100,000 rads for the full 30 days of the experiment, proving themselves to be much tougher than the long-dead cockroaches.

However, the experiment didn’t look at whether the radiated cockroaches and flour beetles could produce viable offspring. It could be that the insects survive the blast and the radiation, only to be unable to continue the species long enough to deal with the problem that the whole food chain has been wiped out anyway.

Either way, it looks like cockroaches would fare worse than many other insects if a nuclear war occurred.

“There is some evidence that they seem quite resilient to gamma rays, although they are not necessarily the most resistant across insects,” evolutionary biologist Mark Elgar told EarthSky. “You could argue that some ants, particularly those that dig nests deep into the ground, would be more likely to survive an apocalypse than cockroaches.”

So, to answer the second question, it doesn’t look like cockroaches are inheriting the Earth after all.

Hernandez, V. October 24, 2016. World War III Update: Experts say 5 of Russia’s Satan missiles could destroy US east coast & kill 4 million people. International Business Times.

Experts warn that if Russia would unleash just five of its SS-18 missile, also known as the Satan, it could destroy the east coast of the US and kill more than 4 million people. Russia is believed to have 55 Satans, its most powerful missile, part of the largest nuclear stockpile in the world which could make the nuclear bombs dropped during World War II in Japan pale in comparison.

Just one SS-18 missile, in an apocalyptic nuclear strike, could wipe out 75 percent of New York for thousands of years, Dr Paul Craig Roberts, former assistant secretary of the Treasury for economic policy warns. He said that the SS-18 missiles could carry nuclear warheads with payloads of up to 20,000 kilotons.

It is more than 1,000 times powerful than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Roberts says at maximum payload, a direct hit on New York is capable of killing 4.5 million people, injuring another 3.6 million and send radioactive fallout covering over 600 miles. It could also be armed with 10 smaller nukes of 550 kilotons each that can spread across a wide area and almost impossible to intercept.

Roberts, in an article for the Centre for Research on Gloablization, warned Russia could easily annihilate NATO and lead to the total collapse of the western alliance. Based on FEMA predictions from the Cold War, the targets of a Russian nuclear attack would include cities with huge populations such as New York, Philadelphia, Miami, Boston, Jacksonville and Washington DC.

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Maddow’s “Blowout”, Russian peak oil, corruption, fake news

Preface.  Since this blog focuses on peak resources, I drastically rearranged my notes from this book in the order I found most interesting. I’m also interested in corruption, Putin, fake news, and more, as you’ll see below.  Since the book is 405 pages, I’ve obviously left out quite a bit, so buy it if you want to know more and much better flow and continuity.

Although peak oil is often spoken of as a geological issue, it can also stop flowing from wars, financial crashes, and in Russia’s case, from corruption.

By the way, Russia isn’t communist any more. It is a mafia totalitarian state. The only 5 nations that are still “communist” are North Korea, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Maddow, R. 2019. Blowout: Corrupted Democracy, Rogue State Russia, and the Richest, Most Destructive Industry on Earth. Crown.

Russia Peak Oil & Corruption

Putin had decided that Russia would be a petro-state—choosing an economic future for his country that best served his own needs. Oil and gas could be wielded as an international cudgel to force other countries to respect and deal with Russia no matter anything else Russia did. The industry also—bonus!—trailed enough easy cash to generate almost instant, almost limitless corruption wherever needed. And when you have those kinds of goals in mind for your one indispensable industry, and you run that industry like a Mafia chop shop with less omertà, eventually the actual business side of your dark little authoritarian scheme is going to suffer. Both financially and in its basic technical competence. And indeed, by 2014, the bright red star of Russian energy was dimming.

Putin used Russian natural gas and oil not only to make money for the Russian state but also to keep neighboring countries corrupt and dependent. It solved so many problems. It reduced expectations for democratic governance and the rule of law in those countries. It created a corruptly empowered political class invested in preserving the Russia-dependent system that enriched its practitioners and their families. It also created comfortable space for organized crime to flourish. The Russian government, under Putin’s control, has steadily become more integrated with all kinds of transnational organized crime in the former Soviet sphere.   The beauty of Putin’s ever-deepening kinship with the mob was that it gave him a whole other set of levers with which to settle problems—and to make problematic people go away—whenever it might be unseemly to wield the overt powers of the state.

There were substantial problems in 2012, and almost all of them of Putin’s making. Gazprom, for instance, wasn’t really able to keep up with all the new European demand, because its production capabilities sucked. The company hadn’t invested in new technologies, because as a state-sanctioned monopoly propped up by the Russian government and therefore free from competition, it really hadn’t needed to. Dig deep enough in the company accounting ledgers and you’d find that Gazprom lost about $40 billion a year to corruption and waste. That’s a loss nearly equal to its annual profits.

Why was the state gas company buying TV stations? Well, why not? Gazprom was better understood not as an energy company but as a big battering ram President Putin used to get stuff he wanted. So yes, inefficient, money-bleeding, crappy Gazprom owned a television station and a bunch of other media properties, but only because Putin had arranged it in order to silence one of the few remaining critical voices in the Russian press. Vladimir used his security forces to arrest and to intimidate the critic who owned the media company, and then he used Gazprom as the piggy bank to buy the company at a steep jailhouse discount. Independent television journalism in Russia was thus dealt another blow, and Putin would instead have another reliable mouthpiece for the Kremlin’s party line.

For pure waste, though, little in the Gazprom history measured up to the Nord Stream gambit. “We’re spending money like hell,” said Managing Director Matthias Warnig, an old pal of Putin’s from their spy days. Nord Stream was a pipeline project that was built from both sides at once—from Russia and from Germany. Same pipeline, same materials, same building standards. But the Russian side of the construction project (led by the Rotenberg brothers of St. Petersburg, and remember them) cost three times as much, per mile of pipeline, as the German side did. That money was not going into the pension and health fund of the Russian pipe fitters’ union; it went into the pockets of Putin and his pals. The founder of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, James Grant, sized up Gazprom and rated it, simply, “the worst managed company on the planet.” Congratulations, citizens of Russia, that’s the hash your government managed to make of the globe’s biggest supplies of natural gas.

Putin had been gangstering up the Russian oil industry for years. Eschewing competition that might encourage innovation and meritocratic success, Putin instead just smashed and grabbed any homegrown enterprises that proved resourceful or entrepreneurial or attractive to legitimate investors—goodbye, Yukos. He harassed foreign interlopers, too. He invented a dubious environmental violation bill of attainder, to force Shell Oil to hand over controlling interest to Gazprom in a $20 billion project in the far east of Russia.

Wheel of Fortune. Putin and the Russians “have essentially been coasting on the assets inherited from the Soviet Union,” Gustafson explained in talks promoting his book back in 2012. “Virtually all of Russian oil comes from fields that were already known in Soviet times. There have been very few new discoveries that are producing today. The drama of this situation is that the inheritance is now starting to run down….

It might have been dawning on Putin, under that bright red Lukoil canopy in New York in September 2003, that in allowing Russian businessmen—even patriotic Russian businessmen—to do business with ExxonMobil and BP and Chevron and Shell, he risked losing his iron grip on the industry that provided the lifeblood of the Russian state.

There was still plenty of oil and gas underfoot in Russia. But it was in the tight shale formations, or offshore in the Arctic seas, and it was going to be both difficult and expensive to get. “Bottom line is Russia is not running out of oil, but it’s running out of cheap oil,” explained Gustafson. “That looks pretty bleak….

More Corruption

The country, meanwhile, has eroded into a stultifying economic sinkhole for average Russians. “Despite receiving $1.6 trillion from oil and gas exports from 2000 to 2011, Russia was not able to build a single multi-lane highway during this time. There is still no interstate highway linking Moscow to the Far East,” Karen Dawisha wrote in her richly detailed 2014 book, Putin’s Kleptocracy. “The inability of well-trained young graduates to succeed as entrepreneurs and innovators in Russia has stimulated emigration and plans to emigrate.” Dawisha went on to quote a pollster in Moscow on the plight of young Russians: “They have nowhere to go, nothing to do, and nothing to hope for.” “The lack of adequate medical care produces five times more deaths from cardiovascular disease among women in Russia than in Europe,” the professor wrote. “More Russian women die annually from domestic violence than the number of soldiers the USSR lost in the entire Afghan war. For Russian men, the situation is even grimmer. Poor workplace and road safety standards, plus high rates of suicide and homicide combine with the negative health effects of high alcohol consumption to make life especially precarious….According to the World Health Organization, the life expectancy of a fifteen-year-old male is three years lower in Russia than in Haiti.

Russia under Putin has become warped and stunted—a gigantic multi-continental country of 150 million souls, living on an economy considerably smaller than Italy’s.

When the Resource Curse takes hold in a country as big and influential and aggressive as 21st century Russia, it turns out to be the entire world’s problem. What has happened to Russia is like when a faraway humanitarian concern morphs from a charity cause into an international terrorism threat. Russia’s Resource Curse has become a malignant tumor spreading through the rest of the world.

But as Putin’s Russian Federation revealed itself to be a robustly corrupt, authoritarian regime happily committed to securing its own survival by force, it repeatedly and increasingly put itself into rogue state territory, and that ultimately screwed up its ability to play in the global markets as if it were some kind of normal country. Putin’s best-known exports list has lately comprised the most dreaded organized crime syndicates on earth, money laundering on such a massive industrial scale that it can bring down whole national cornerstone banks in any part of the globe, exotic assassinations, rogue-state-friendly weapons systems, illegal out-of-uniform military incursions, and the first seizure of another country’s territory in Europe since World War II. That sort of activity can get in the way of a country’s global business operations, on the odd chance that there’s anyone on the face of the globe who sees it as their responsibility to punish and isolate the kinds of international bad actors that invade their neighbors, shoot down civilian airliners, and send intelligence officers armed with nerve agent to assassinate their exiles in British cathedral towns.

If the problem is that Russia’s behavior is too outré to be accepted in the global economy, then change the expectations for what counts as outré. Be the leveler. Corrupt other countries. Gain control over the former Soviet states in the near abroad by owning their politicians, by controlling the range of possibilities their people are allowed to choose for themselves. Ruin exemplars of governance and responsive democracy. Support separatism and the dissolution of bonds and treaties and Western norms wherever they’re vulnerable. Become internationally powerful through force (when you can muster it) or sabotage. Cheating is now Russia’s most viable avenue in world affairs.

This is the vexing predicament facing the Kremlin: Putin’s thug dream of resurgent Russian dominance—fueled by oil and gas—is one that can’t come true without international help to make his one indispensable industry capable of competing in the global market. And he can’t get that international help as long as he’s recognized as a gangster and treated like one.

So as of 2015, Putin faced a rapidly diminishing ability to use oil and gas as a substitute for legitimate global power, and no way forward without some kind of move—any move, no matter how nutty—to get those sanctions lifted and to relieve Russia of the burden of U.S.-led opprobrium and global Western leadership. It was worth trying almost anything.

As Special Counsel Mueller and reporters throughout Europe and America have made clear, the Russian Federation ultimately embarked on a deliberate and aggressive campaign to tear apart Western alliances, to rot democracy, and to piss in the punch bowl of free elections all over the civilized world. It continues to this day. And Putin isn’t doing this because of Russia’s strength. Not according to people who have watched the action up close. Russia “gives the impression that I am a lion who walks through the world hitting France with one paw, with the other Britain and America,” says Romanian security expert Dan Dungaciu. “But it is not a lion. It is rather in the role of a hyena, which senses a crisis and goes there and plays on the crisis.

Russian fake news and interference in 2016 election

it’s clear that jobs at Internet Research were coveted. Most of the hundreds of young people who worked at 55 Savushkina made around $700 a month; under the table, in cash. No need to report it to the tax authorities. This was very good money indeed for playing make-believe on your computer, twelve hours a day (two days on, two days off). The salary was equal to that of a full professor at a local university

Most all of the fun at Internet Research was in creating personas that could comment and blog and post and tweet and network with people anywhere in the world: a European fortune-teller who opined on dating, dieting, crystals, and feng shui; a young professional woman who unleashed bons mots about Kim Kardashian’s latest nekkid selfie; a specialist in vintage automobile repair living on a sunny coast in Central America; a movie critic in Los Angeles. “It was an opportunity for them to live a life they always dreamed about and to pretend to be somebody else,

“They can be a gorgeous knockout. They can be bodybuilders. They can live in any part of the globe. In America. They could live the life they’ve always wanted to live—through the internet.

The Internet Research Agency was engaged in constant, rapid-response-driven information warfare. Speaking to co-workers was frowned upon. Talking about the work to anybody outside the building was forbidden. The nondisclosure form was the first thing a new employee signed. Show up late and you were docked pay. Fall short on the quota of work and you were docked pay. The folks on the social media teams were expected to produce five political posts, ten nonpolitical posts, and more than 150 comments every two days. Without fail.

The topics and tenor of the political content were decided at the top, every day. “We’d come in, turn on a proxy server to hide our real location and then read the technical tasks we had been sent,” an Internet Research Agency employee explained to The Guardian in March 2015. Most of the technical tasks the previous year, as the agency was getting its sea legs, centered on Ukraine—looking for ways to justify Putin’s invasion and takeover of Crimea and his ongoing military effort to do the same in the Donbas. Daily tasks called for savaging the new democratically elected, pro-EU, pro-U.S., anti-Russian government in Kyiv. They were fascists, anti-Semites, baby killers. Ukrainians fighting in their own country against out-of-uniform Russian soldiers and artillery and tanks were invariably described as “terrorists.” The more shocking the fake stories about heinous atrocities committed by the Ukrainians against the Russian “freedom fighters” in the Donbas, the better.

In the first days of March 2015, immediately following the assassination of the Putin critic Boris Nemtsov, technical task orders spurred hundreds of posts and tweets pointing fingers at Ukraine for the murder. It wasn’t Putin but the government in Kyiv that had killed Nemtsov! How does that even remotely make sense? Oh, follow along, why don’t you. See, the Ukrainians killed him as an exercise in reverse psychology. Shooting Nemtsov on the night before his big antiwar march was designed to stir up anti-Putin opposition in Russia! Killing an anti-Putin leader—that’s obviously a plot against Putin. “The murder is pure provocation….The state is doing everything to catch Nemtsov’s murderers….[Putin’s] best specialists have been sent to fulfill this goal.” There was no evidence, no hint of corroboration, to back up this nonsensical claim. Which means you just have to make it more loudly and more frequently.

And it wasn’t just about shaping the response to real events that people would normally be talking about. The Internet Research Agency spread word of stories and ideas and characters that would otherwise not get a second glance if it weren’t for the artificial hype its employees were churning out on a twenty-four-hour no-rest double-shift schedule. The morning after Foreign Minister Nathan Smith (Texas National Movement) gave his interview across town in St. Petersburg, Internet Research trolls were tasked to weigh in on the momentous secession crisis facing the Lone Star State. Dozens of tweets and social media posts started popping up, ready to be shared and retweeted, all across America. And in not particularly bad English.

Internet Research soon set up its own Facebook page promoting secession—and it was a hit! “Heart of Texas” drew followers by the tens of thousands, all of whom could be spoon-fed content devised by Russian agents in St. Petersburg and in turn pass it on to who knows how many Facebook friends and Twitter followers. “Heart of Texas” was one of scores of separate IRA-controlled Facebook pages

They had to get up to speed on American culture and politics, and specifically the most contentious and divisive issues of the day—immigration, gun laws, race, the Confederate flag. They had to spend hours screening one slightly cartoonish but very popular political series on Netflix. “At first we were forced to watch the ‘House of Cards’ in English,” said one of the trolls who worked at IRA in 2015. “It was necessary to know all the main problems of the United States of America. Tax problems, the problem of gays, sexual minorities, weapons. Our goal wasn’t to turn Americans toward Russia. Our goal was to set Americans against their own government. To provoke unrest, provoke dissatisfaction.

We also know that the Kremlin-run trolls at the Internet Research Agency were actively spewing incendiary provocations and content designed to promote Donald Trump leading up to, and all the way through, the 2016 general election campaign, and then through the start of the Trump administration. Content created by the Internet Research Agency and its brethren is known to have reached well over a hundred million Americans in the election season. The IRA greatest hits Facebook pages were “Stop A.I.” (meaning “All Invaders,” complete with many graphics of scary-looking Muslims), “Being Patriotic,” “Blacktivist,” and “Heart of Texas.” Each of those pages got more than eleven million discrete engagements.

African American voters—the bread and butter of the Democratic base vote—appear to have been targeted more aggressively than any other demographic, to turn them against Clinton or to dissuade them from voting altogether. “A particular hype and hatred for Trump is misleading the people and forcing Blacks to vote Killary,” said the IRA-invented Woke Blacks. “We cannot resort to the lesser of two devils. Then we’d surely be better off without voting AT ALL.

The IRA-created United Muslims of America posted an ad that read, “American Muslim voters refuse to vote for Hillary Clinton because she wants to continue war on Muslims in the middle east and voted yes for invading Iraq.” An official-sounding but fake “TEN_GOP” account—often assumed to be registered to the Republicans’ state party in Tennessee—shouted out a make-believe story about the election board in Broward County illegally counting tens of thousands of fraudulent mail-in ballots marked for Hillary.

As the election neared, the Internet Research Agency pros turned both rhetorical barrels on Hillary Clinton. If the Democratic nominee won the presidency, a “Heart of Texas” Facebook ad screamed two weeks before the election, there would be no choice but to secede. Because another Clinton in the White House would mean “higher taxes to feed undocumented aliens. More refugees, mosques, and terrorist attacks. Banned guns. Continuing economic depression.

They found the most ragged faults and fissures in our democracy: immigration, race, religion, economic injustice, mass shootings. Then they poured infectious waste into them. They used traditional media, social media, and disinformation to try to make citizens of differing experiences and viewpoints hate and distrust each other as much as possible; made public discourse and discussion as evil and mean-spirited and alienating as possible; created miserable expectations for coarseness and cruelty and blatant dishonesty in politics and civic life.

The Russian operation pushed American politicians and political parties to more and more extreme positions; it celebrated all manner of fringe, splinter, and radical politics and demonized centrists, moderates, and anybody on any point of the ideological spectrum who actually believed the levers of government could be harnessed for anything useful at all. And his achievement came cheap. A thousand—ten thousand—highly trained Illegals chatting up middle managers at conferences and dead dropping their expense forms could never have pulled off something this high-impact. This new type of operation was infinitely more effective, and bargain-basement affordable, and, because it worked, the blowback has been minimal. At basically zero cost, Putin succeeded in his biggest aim: he corrupted and polluted our most treasured possession, our democracy.  

Tillerson and Russia

Russia was dependent on foreign know-how in oil and across the board for that matter, as can be seen in how few inventions were patented there, Russia took home only 0.2 percent of the 1.3 million overseas patents awarded since 2000 by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, lagging behind the state of Alabama in total annual awards.

Rosneft sucks. It wasn’t as if it got big and powerful by streamlining its supply chains and inventing stuff. Rosneft sucks all the time, but especially lately, when—because of sanctions against Russia for its terrible international behavior—it no longer has access to all that nifty Western Arctic- and shale-drilling technology it needs to reap that increasingly hard-to-get Russian oil.

Russia’s economic future therefore depends on Putin making deals with major international oil and gas companies who can be counted on to understand his imperatives and to not care at all about ethics and governance and geopolitical consequences of their cozying up to the Kremlin. Those kinds of deals aren’t just beneficial to the Russian economy; they’re critical necessities for Putin’s one-track plan for twenty-first-century Russia. And it turns out that as long as Putin is honoring the “sanctity of contract” and implementing friendly tax laws, industry leaders from the West have shown little hesitation in making those deals. That’s the business part.

Here comes the hero. Here comes the handsome hero.  Aside from being the possessor of impressive (and very valuable) technological prowess—or so it was said—Tillerson had shown himself a savvy strategist, both in business and in geopolitics. Why was Exxon (under Tillerson) welcomed with a bear hug when Shell and BP and even Exxon (before Tillerson) had all been roared at and given such a hard time? Well, for one, Tillerson was not making boneheaded Lee Raymond–esque demands about getting majority control of Rosneft; Rex made clear—in word and in deed—that he was fine with Putin staying in charge; he just wanted to be a good minority partner. He also seemed dialed in to the foreign policy game afoot in Russia.

In the ExxonMobil-Rosneft megadeal, ExxonMobil was giving as well as it was getting. Rosneft received 30% stakes in a handful of ExxonMobil’s projects in North America, from Alberta, Canada, to the Gulf of Mexico. In exchange, ExxonMobil was getting a crack at unlocking all that hard-to-get oil and gas in the tight formations in Siberia, in the Black Sea, and, most important and most difficult, in the Arctic waters of the Kara Sea. The up-front costs would be enormous. The project could be on line for more than twenty years. Total spending might well run into the hundreds of billions.

The arctic in 2008, “accounts for about 22% of the undiscovered, technically recoverable resources in the world. The Arctic accounts for about 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30% of the undiscovered natural gas, and 20% of the undiscovered natural gas liquids.” A lot of that potential hydrocarbon haul—maybe most of it—resided in Russian territory. But it wasn’t going to be easy to get,

What the Russians brought to the oil and gas game north of the Arctic Circle in 2012 was sheer brute force. Which was much needed. Almost any maritime operation in the Arctic promised a punishing battle against the harshest nature can offer. The Northern Sea Route from Murmansk, Russia (up near the northern coast of Finland), through the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the East Siberian Sea, the Chukchi Sea, and out through the Bering Strait was navigable only a few months a year because of ice.

Americans like to think the dueling-superpower thing ended conclusively with the Cold War, with the United States now the undisputed winner in every conceivable matchup between the two countries. But in ice water? Turns out Russia still ruled. In 2011, a tanker chartered by Russia, the STI Heritage, made the quickest Northern Sea Route run of that year—just eight days—with two nuclear-powered, fresh-vegetable-producing icebreakers clearing the way. Russian-escorted tankers filled with tens of thousands of tons of iron, jet fuel, and gas condensate had made the Arctic transit more than thirty times that year. The Russian Federation was already writing big checks to manufacture four even larger and more powerful icebreakers to lead the fleet. Three of them double-reactor nuclear. Which meant the Russians would be able to plow out to offshore Arctic drilling sites and to deliver crude oil and liquid natural gas from that icy domain to almost any country in the world, for years to come.

But here was the problem: despite its unrivaled ice-busting prowess, Russia didn’t bring much to the actual offshore drilling operations in the frozen north. Russian companies, for instance, offered little in the way of useful drilling rigs or equipment of any kind—not even basics like subsea wellheads. In 2012, having made Russia’s economy and its power in the world almost entirely dependent on oil and gas, Putin faced a serious conundrum: his ability to maintain Russia’s place as an “energy superpower” depended almost entirely on availing himself of the expertise and technology of major Western oil companies. Russia had oil companies, sure, but they were gangster economy creations, and not one of them was technically or even financially competent.

They all wanted in, of course. The potential profits were ginormous. But success in the Russian Arctic would require overcoming two very difficult challenges. First, some Western oil major would have to figure out the proper care and feeding of Vladimir Putin, given the desperately high stakes of oil and gas for his presidency. Look at the ashes of Yukos; look at the chewed-up remains that Putin and Sechin spit out from what used to be BP’s “joint venture” in the country. This was going to be a delicate thing. What Western company would be willing to put itself in service to the Russian government, in service to Putin? Whose shareholders, whose home country, would stand for it? Which executives could stomach making that kind of arrangement?  And then there was the second difficult prospect for this potential partnership. No one much liked to talk about it. But, um, were the Western oil majors actually capable of drilling up in the Arctic? They said they were, but could they really do it?

Exxon had in fact sunk a ton of money into this potentially globally transformational project. It could change Exxon’s future, and Russia’s, and the world’s. One immediate problem it faced, though, was the weather in the Arctic. The Exxon-Rosneft team had a window of about 70 days before the ice floes closed in on the drilling platform.

Tillerson’s efforts on behalf of President Putin to lift sanctions after his invasion of Ukraine were not merely secondhand, or sotto voce. At a public forum that spring, Rex insisted rather churlishly that sanctions were rarely effective—because they were, as a rule, poorly implemented. Tillerson was apparently not at all concerned that he might be undermining a critical and very delicate U.S. foreign policy strategy, that threats of economic isolation from the U.S. government would not be quite so worrisome to Putin if the head of the biggest U.S. oil company was simultaneously jumping into his lap. He just kept jumping. Tillerson assured his shareholders at ExxonMobil’s annual meeting that the upcoming drilling campaign in the Russian Arctic was still a go.

Introduction

Thank God for Russia. Thank God for the honeypot of known oil reserves in western Siberia, not to mention the vast untapped reserves off Russia’s Arctic shelf. Lukoil had five Arctic-ready, icebreaking oil tankers on order at that very moment

There was already a plan afoot, worked out among the energy pooh-bahs of the Bush and Putin administrations. U.S. companies would help finance a new pipeline from the oil fields in western Siberia to the Russian port city of Murmansk, as well as new storage tanks there and improved deep-water facilities commodious enough for big tankers to maneuver in and out.

Putin thought that Russia could be supplying 10% of U.S. oil imports before George W. Bush finished his second term in office. Maybe more.    “It’s not just oil,” Bush’s deputy secretary of energy had said on a reconnaissance visit to Murmansk. “Natural gas is also going to be an important factor in our energy relations.

The future U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul—was just beginning to take the measure of the new Russian president and had already warned of the risk that Putin would evolve into an autocrat who monopolized control of government and the economy behind the window dressing of democratic institutions.

Hopes for a world-changing American-Russian partnership—the canopy to protect us all from the vagaries of the international and political weather—have long since crumbled. As has the idea of Vladimir Putin as a force for global stability.

His efforts to restore Russia as a world-stage superpower no longer depend on capacity and know-how. They depend on cheating. Putin and his minions cheat at the financial markets. They cheat at the Olympics. They cheat at their own fake democracy. They cheat other people out of their democracies.

I do not propose to discount or minimize the powerful and positive effects the producers of our hydrocarbons have had on our own country and on the world at large. I like driving a pickup and heating my house as much as the next person, and the through line between energy and economic growth and development is as clear to me as an electric streetlight piercing the black night.

I also want to be clear: the oil and gas industry is essentially a big casino that can produce both power and triumphant great gobs of cash, often with little regard for merit. That equation invites gangsterism, extortion, thuggery, and the sorts of folks who enjoy these hobbies.

Russia’s one essential industry today has to keep up even with the West, even with the democracies. Putin knows Russia can’t do it alone, but it also won’t do it together—not if it has to be on the West’s terms. And so the West’s terms must be changed. Behold the new world disorder. Behold the foreign trolls in your Facebook feed.

How Putin rose to power

Yeltsin did manage to install his own replacement on his way out of office: a little-known pol who appeared both willing and able to shield the Yeltsin family from criminal prosecution—forty-seven-year-old Vladimir Putin. A trained Soviet KGB operative then heading its successor outfit, the FSB, Putin had done the sitting Russian president the memorable favor of successfully derailing the criminal investigation into the Yeltsin clan. He did so by blackmailing Russia’s prosecutor general with a fake sex tape. Putin made sure the grainy tape of an actor playing the prosecutor general and two prostitutes (playing themselves) was broadcast on Russian television. The poor quality of the video rendered it unconvincing, but Putin made an appearance at the TV studio that night to personally vouch for the tape’s authenticity. His word sufficed.

The prosecutor resigned, and the case against Yeltsin was abruptly closed. Yeltsin had rewarded the FSB boss’s intrepidity by nominating him to be the next prime minister. So when Yeltsin stepped aside on the final day of the twentieth century, Vladimir Putin was the next man up for the Russian presidency

Putin and his security-minded retinue had learned a few tricks for exercising power after branching off from spying into politics to run Russia’s second city, St. Petersburg, in the early 1990s. Like the Yeltsin-made oligarchs, they found that democracy and capitalism, harnessed just so, could still deliver personal benefits just like the old communist regime did. Putin’s team installed and managed a vigorous kleptocracy from their offices at city hall. The citizens of St. Petersburg might suffer from want of food and electricity and decent wages, but Deputy Mayor Putin and his key aides made out splendidly.

Putin’s St. Petersburg clan relied on graft, financial manipulation, and violence as needed. There was no government or civil institution powerful enough to check them. The courts and the legal system were not instruments of justice in siloviki hands but instruments of power, or vlast. “For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law,” the saying went. Putin and his siloviki carried these tools from St. Petersburg to Moscow in 1996 (at Yeltsin’s invitation)

The Russian people got a less soothing picture of exactly what Putin meant to accomplish in the days leading up to his inauguration, when a leading liberal newspaper in Moscow published the secret siloviki manifesto Reform of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. The document was tidy, easy to understand, and uncommonly forthright. Control over the economy and politics would once again devolve to a central authority, that is, the president’s office. The legislature of the Russian Federation, the Duma, would be rendered impotent, as would local governors, administrators, and politicians—no matter how seemingly friendly. Key media outlets would be bought and controlled by the Russian government, to help provide “active agitation and propaganda” in support of Putin, and to actively discredit and undermine any opposition to the same. Who would be in charge of the state’s new modern adventure in securing permanent, unitary, unchallenged power? The institution Putin most trusted: the FSB. “All of the special and secret activities of the Directorate relating to counteracting the forces of opposition to the President,” read the manifesto, “will be entirely in the hands and under the control of the special services.

The toughest nut for Putin to crack when he first took office was the question of the oligarchs Yeltsin left behind (and their powerful gangster counterparts). A few months into his new regime, President Putin called them all, including Khodorkovsky, to a meeting at Stalin’s old dacha just outside Moscow, still outfitted with the desk and daybed from which Stalin dreamed up his Great Purge of enemies and elites. With that unsubtle setting as an ambient cue, Putin laid down the new law, or more precisely, the new balance of vlast. They could hold on to their ill-gotten gains, Putin told them, and operate as they had for the last decade, as long as they offered no opposition to the new regime in the Kremlin.

All this might have been forgiven, considering the extraordinary tax revenue Yukos was adding to the Russian government till (as much as 5% of the annual government take, according to Gessen), but Putin believed by then that Khodorkovsky was also in the middle of entering into a pact that was something near treason. It wasn’t just the noise about promoting anti-Putin political parties; it was worse: Putin learned he was negotiating the deal with Lee Raymond and Raymond’s number two, Rex Tillerson, that would give ExxonMobil 30% of Yukos—a deal that might one day permit the American company to gain controlling ownership of the most able and impressive company in the single crucial industry in Russia. Russia might not have been a superpower anymore, it might not have had a first-world military or economy or anything else anymore, but by God Russia had oil. And now Russia was supposed to willingly give that up, too? The thought, to Vladimir Putin, must have been somewhere between nauseating and enraging. Khodorkovsky’s great meritocratic free-market ride came to a screeching halt.

J. P. Morgan joined Morgan Stanley as one of the four joint global coordinators and book runners while Goldman Sachs signed on as a senior co–lead manager. To put it bluntly, Rosneft’s IPO campaign ended up making the world complicit in Putin’s theft of Yukos and spread the shame of it around the globe. The markets knew the Russian government had ripped off that company and framed its leader, flat out stealing billions from Yukos shareholders. But Morgan Stanley and the markets and the investors in those markets chose to look the other way because the potential payoff was too enticing.

Putin could imagine the world lining up to pay respects at his doorstep, according to The New York Times, in spite of his gangster behavior and in spite of the fact that the Russian oil and gas industry he controlled was known for its “tumbledown” machinery and technological deficiencies. “President Vladimir V. Putin has elevated energy to a central position in Russia’s foreign policy,” the newspaper wrote in 2006, “giving Moscow influence and respect in world affairs not seen since the demise of the Soviet Union, as consuming nations court the Kremlin for access to ever scarcer energy.

Oil Corrupts

The basic problem is that oil doesn’t happily coexist with other industries upon which you might build a reasonably stable national economy. That’s true in the third world, the first world, and even in the world in between, e.g. Russia. It creates such large, up-front, sweat-free gains for connected elites that no one wants to do anything else but chase the oil jackpot. And as oil crowds out other industries, the profits don’t ever seem to end up redounding to the nation at large. Extracting oil takes a lot of up-front capital investment, but that expensive initial, physical investment doesn’t create anything utile for any other purpose.

Oil extraction is much more capital-intensive than it is labor-intensive—which means it doesn’t produce a lot of lasting jobs.

Even with less rapacious political elites, there’s still the baseline problem that oil is a tradable commodity subject to wild international winds; with big swings in the price of oil, any effort at long-term, sane budgeting and investment for the population’s basic needs is impossible in a country newly dependent on oil revenues for its cash.

Russia’s power and wealth comes from oil and gas

While the median household in the oil exporter Norway enjoyed an income of more than $50,000, and Saudi Arabia about $25,000, the median household income in Russia was less than $12,000. Oil exporters such as Algeria, Venezuela, Qatar, Kuwait, and of course Saudi Arabia held back enough crude that their citizens at least got fuel at rock-bottom prices. Russians received no such break. And even if a Russian could afford an entire tank of full-price petrol, the state of the roads made driving dicey. A trip on any of the major thoroughfares connecting Moscow’s international airport to downtown was an obstacle course of potholes.

At a state visit in Berlin in September 2005, Putin persuaded the German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, to sign on to a partnership to build a new 750-mile pipeline under the Baltic Sea to carry Gazprom gas into Germany. Gazprom would then take large ownership stakes in the new Nord Stream pipeline and new storage facilities across Europe. The European Commission nodded in approval of Nord Stream, especially after proposals to extend the pipeline into the Netherlands, Britain, Sweden, and Finland. News of the deal came as a relief to Western Europe, where natural gas reserves were dwindling so fast there was fear they’d be entirely depleted in five years. Europeans desperately wanted and needed that plentiful Russian gas to heat their homes and run their factories.

On New Year’s Day 2006, Putin offered Europe a little demonstration of just how vital was his proposed new pipeline and just how desperate things could get if it went unbuilt. That day, as the frigid season was setting in across Europe, Gazprom made sudden drastic cuts in its supply of gas into Ukraine, which at that time held the only extant pipelines from Russia into the rest of Europe. Ukraine predictably siphoned off the gas it needed from the supply transiting through its landscape into other European countries. Gas deliveries into Austria dropped by a third the next day; gas deliveries to Hungary fell by 40% on the day following. Slovakia, also down 40%, declared a national emergency. Industrial output in Bulgaria and Romania ground to a stop. While these and other European nations shivered in panic, the Russians pointed the finger at Ukraine for stealing the natural gas bound for them, and insisted Gazprom customers could not rely on Ukraine to play fair with EU-bound gas. By the time the Russians made peace with Ukraine and turned the spigot back on, the new Nord Stream (which bypassed the allegedly pilfering Ukrainians entirely) was the talk of Europe.

By the time the Nord Stream project broke ground in 2010, Team Putin had proposed a second and longer pipeline, South Stream, which would carry gas from Russia across the Black Sea and then as far as Austria and Italy. Nord Stream had been on line for almost six months in March 2012, when Putin won a third presidential term. Russia was supplying the European Union 40% of its natural gas imports while cutting Ukraine out of the deal. Gazprom supplied every single cubic meter of imported natural gas up the line to EU members Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. It supplied about a third of Germany’s natural gas imports (as well as a third of its oil imports). Add to that, Russia had completed a new pipeline for pumping oil into China, the country with the fastest-growing economy and the fastest-growing energy needs

To discerning eyes in 2012, a map of the two pipelines transiting much of the continent appeared like a pair of giant pincers with which Russia would squeeze Europe.

More Russian corruption

Putin’s record $12 billion Winter Games budget had ballooned to $50 billion, according to the report. This made the final price tag for Sochi the biggest ever for an Olympic Games, winter or summer. Almost ten times the cost of the immediately previous 2010 Vancouver Games. More than the cost of the previous 21 Winter Olympics combined. Nemtsov generously pointed out that major budgetary overruns are the rule in these projects. Vancouver’s final bill, for instance, was a little more than double the original estimate. But that was nothing like what happened in Sochi. The cost of constructing the new thirty-mile highway and rail line leading from the Black Sea into the snowy mountains had run to more than three times the cost of the recent American space program to send a rover to the planet Mars (which is 34 million miles away). A new natural gas pipeline, built by the same Kremlin-favored Russian company that had built the inexplicably expensive Russian side of the Nord Stream pipeline, came in at five times the average cost of a European pipeline. Labor costs did not account for any markups. Pay was lousy and spotty on every project. Workers who complained aloud were silenced with firings or even beatings.

Kremlin contractors simply imported foreigners who were willing to work 80-hour weeks and didn’t whine when their lousy, $2-an-hour wages were delayed or never paid. Putin’s builders had pocketed somewhere between $25 billion and $30 billion in “embezzlement and kickbacks.  More than 90 percent of the money spent on the Games came right out of the Russian Federation’s government accounts. “The money stolen,” read the report, “could have paid for 3,000 high-quality roads, housing for 800,000 people or thousands of ice palaces and soccer fields all over Russia.

The flow of goods and cash into Sochi set off a full-on organized crime war that left a trail of dead gangsters.

Putin was the proud owner of a new compound as well, this one in the mountains outside Sochi. “It is called Lunnaya Polyana, or Moon Field, a reference to the barren landscape upon which it sits,” wrote Forrest. “It is protected by some of the 30,000 Spetsnaz special-forces troops that Russian military has dispersed into the mountains, there to live in tents until the Olympics are over. Putin has built himself two massive chalets, two helipads, a power station, and two ski lifts, servicing surrounding peaks.” Smack in the middle of what was supposed to be a protected national park, “the Russian state built a private dacha on a UNESCO site under the guise of conducting meteorological research.

Russia vs Ukraine

In the aftermath of his forcible annexation of Crimea, Putin was enjoying an enormous surge in popularity inside Russia. This first step in the advent of what he called Novorossiya (New Russia)—restoring the lost territory and the old glory of a faded empire—had caused Putin’s personal approval ratings to jump into the mid-80s by the summer of 2014. The approval numbers among his long-standing base constituency of poor, rural, less-educated Russians had ticked up to around 90%. The approval numbers among the urban intelligentsia, meanwhile, soared from below 50 to 75%. Russians had suddenly decided—after ten years of saying otherwise—that they would rather be struggling citizens of a superpower nation with swagger than struggling citizens of a beat country.

The international community was alarmed, if not outright horrified, that the Russian putsch hadn’t stopped there. Putin’s military had also massed soldiers, tanks, and artillery on the Ukrainian border as a sign of encouragement to separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, a region known as the Donbas. Somewhere between a quarter and a third of the population in those two oblasts had voiced support for annexation to Russia. Putin’s commanders explained they had moved military assets to the border in case they were called to sweep in and protect the Russian-speaking population in these oblasts from the depredations of Ukrainian leaders who had taken charge of the federal government in Kyiv.

The area nearby also accounted for something near 90 percent of Ukraine’s oil and gas production, and fracking technology promised to open new fields.

Ukraine had been a founding member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the early twentieth century, but a conflicted one. The citizenry’s sense of itself as a separate and sovereign nation was never extinguished, and when it finally got the chance in 1991, the industrialized nation of fifty million chose independence, with an exclamation point. Nine in ten Ukrainians voted “yes” in the world-changing Act of Independence referendum that year. Even in Ukraine’s largely Russian-speaking oblasts on the Russian border like Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea, voters overwhelmingly picked independence. Three years later, the new Ukrainian government traded in its nuclear arsenal—the third largest in the world behind the United States and Russia at the time—for “security assurances.” The United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia signed on to the Budapest Memorandum in December 1994. Ukraine handed over its 176 long-range missiles and its nearly 2,000 nuclear warheads, and in return the other major nuclear powers agreed to respect Ukraine’s existing borders and its sovereignty.

The West chipped in with a large aid package. Cash-poor Russia promised what it could, and what it could promise was a robust and ongoing supply of cheap energy.

Ukraine had a mammoth appetite for gas—for Russian gas. The country consumed more fuel as a percentage of its GDP than any nation in the world, and its fuel of choice was natural gas. The country bought three-quarters of its supply through Russia’s state-controlled monopoly, Gazprom; it also made money transiting Russian gas through pipelines to Gazprom customers in Europe. So even after the Orange Revolution and the election of Yushchenko, Russia still managed to keep a hold on the reins of Ukraine’s economy, and its politics—which was perfect, as far as Putin was concerned. The infinitely corruptible energy business allowed Putin to pick and choose who would be rich and who would be powerful in Ukraine. He had learned this system well in St. Petersburg and then in Moscow, and it fast became Putin’s strategy for projecting Russian power beyond its borders. The biggest threat he had to keep at bay was the prospect of strong, rich, stable, Western-oriented democracies in Russia’s near abroad. That sort of thing could not only challenge or constrain Russia’s regional power; it could conceivably—the horror—inspire the Russian people themselves, leading them to demand a democratic say in their own government as well.

There was fantastical corruption at the very heart of the Ukrainian state, and so would the prospect of all the richest and most powerful and influential people in Ukraine being dependent on Russia’s every whim. It cost Gazprom a pretty penny—straight out of Russian government coffers—but it was worth it. Firtash (as well as some of Putin’s other Ukrainian oligarchs) would have plenty of cash to spread around to shape their country in ways that Putin would appreciate. Some of that cash went back to Moscow as tribute. Even more of it went to prop up Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, which meant a whole bunch of it passed through or ended up in the offshore bank accounts of the mercenary American political operative Paul Manafort, who was always available to help his friend Yanukovych, for a price. The price ended up being about $75 million over the course of a decade.

Manafort was clearly quite taken with Dmitry Firtash, the source of much of that cash. He went so far as to set up a handful of business entities designed to help folks like Dmitry, and most particularly Dmitry, get money out of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and into U.S. or international real estate holdings. “The advantages of a single investor,” wrote Manafort, “include less exposure, more flexibility, less reporting requirements and the ability to organize off-shore to maximize the return of the investor.

Tymoshenko was a particular threat to Moscow’s influence in Ukraine. She had made herself the front-runner in the 2010 presidential election by seizing on Firtash’s sweetheart gas deal and promising to end it. She made a good case: Why on earth should RosUkrEnergo be allowed to siphon off $800 million in a single year by playing a middleman nobody needed?

One of Yanukovych’s first acts as president was to sic a rabid state prosecutor on Yulia Tymoshenko. Lock her up! Yanukovych’s prosecutor charged Tymoshenko with the crime of abusing her official powers by “illegally” arranging the new Firtash-free gas deal with Russia without the required bureaucratic sign-offs. Tymoshenko had a lot of sympathy in the United States and Europe, so Manafort got right to work on the public relations front. According to reporting by Luke Harding in The Guardian—later corroborated in legal filings by Robert Mueller’s special prosecution team—Manafort engaged a sleazy PR firm run by American expats to draw up an energetic media operation to smear Tymoshenko.

Despite FBC’s best efforts, Tymoshenko’s conviction in October 2011—she was sentenced to seven years in prison, ordered to pay $194 million in restitution, and barred from running in the next presidential election—was seen in government offices across the West for what it was: a hit job by Yanukovych on his most able political opponent. So Manafort’s dirty trickster public relations team kept at it. They got excellent help from emerging alt-right media sites like Breitbart News, which tossed a guilt-by-association anti-Semitism spray grenade.

Corruption-wise, things were going along pretty swimmingly in Ukraine. With Tymoshenko stashed in prison, trashed by American PR firms and law firms and anything else Manafort could cook up, Russia’s man in Ukraine—Dmitry Firtash—got back into the gas deal, which was better than ever. His company’s operating profit for the years 2012 and 2013 added up to nearly $4 billion. With that kind of money available for corrupting any actual governance in the interests of the people in Ukraine, Putin’s natural gas supplier monopoly hovered over the heads of the Ukrainian people like a sword.

Ukrainian companies were ratcheting up their own production in the country’s oil and gas fields, signing production deals with the major Western oil companies. They could frack, too! Ukraine had almost 400 million barrels of proven oil reserves, and God only knew how much natural gas once the serious fracking got going. Ukrainian officials were already talking about being able to produce every cubic meter of natural gas the country needed, inside the country. And to be able to export gas to Europe at a profit. This was revolting to Putin, whose lifeblood income came from Russia’s natural gas sales in Europe and whose gravitational pull over countries in his orbit was the control, corruption, and cash that energy supplies afforded him.

Putin was done trying to make nice. He had had it with the United States meddling on his turf. He figured the United States had put $5 billion into moving Ukraine into the Western win column. Vice President Joseph R. Biden had been in and out of Kyiv for years, insisting the Obama administration would protect Ukraine from Russian aggression. “We do not recognize—and I want to reiterate it—any sphere of influence,” Biden reminded.

Privately, American officials were even tougher on Russia’s decline—pointing to the increasing death rates among the country’s younger set, its rampant alcoholism, its military’s decline into second-tier status, and its rampant corruption. Hey, just saying, it can’t be easy being a former superpower

In less than three weeks, Putin ripped Crimea from Ukraine and took it for Russia. The “exit of Crimea from Ukraine,” the Kremlin claimed, was the result of “complex international processes.” It was the first time since World War II that one country had rewritten another’s borders by force and seized an entire landmass and its people for itself. Putin had blatantly violated Russia’s vow to respect Ukrainian sovereignty, and he didn’t seem content to stop at Crimea. He was already moving his forces toward other oblasts in the east of Ukraine, which also happened to be the oblasts with promising fields of oil and gas.

The move left Western leaders in a pickle; they were clearly shaken and uncertain of the proper response. The wrong move could easily tip into regional or even global disaster. Europe was hugely dependent on Gazprom’s natural gas. “There is no sensible alternative to Russian gas to meet Europe’s energy needs,” Germany’s economy minister, Sigmar Gabriel, said at the time. “Many people acted as if there [were] plenty of other sources from which Europe could draw its gas, but this is not the case.

The United States and the European Union drew up a list of Russian oligarchs and Kremlin officials, froze their assets in the West, and declared them off-limits for American and European businesses. The people on the list had one thing in common: they were Putin’s most trusted consiglieri. Among them were Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, Russian Railways’ president, Vladimir Yakunin. And Igor Sechin.

the newly inaugurated Poroshenko got to work on behalf of Ukrainians. One of his first acts as president was to sign the official Association Agreement with the European Union that his Russian-tool predecessor had tried to back out of. “This is a really historic date for Ukraine,” Poroshenko said at the signing ceremony. He then further exasperated Putin by expressing his hopes that Ukraine would one day be a full member of the EU. Poroshenko also defied Putin in an even more aggressive way; he mounted a serious military counteroffensive in the Donbas, using the national army to reinforce the pro-Ukrainian militia groups who had formed in the long weeks of absence of help from Kyiv.

June and July turned out to be very, very bad months for President Putin. There was a surge in the number of dead Russian soldiers being shipped back home from the Donbas. The corpses arrived in Russia under the cover of secrecy, cryptically marked “Cargo 200.” The Putin critic and political opponent Boris Nemtsov saw it happen and immediately began a campaign to catalog a name-by-name record of the casualties for public release. Nemtsov understood there was a limit to how many husbands, wives, sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters Russians were willing to sacrifice for another chunk of Ukraine. Officials in the Kremlin and the Russian military understood that too. Survivors of the dead received terse and pointed messages that suggested they keep their grief concerning these “volunteer” soldiers confined to the family circle.

On July 16, 2014, with Putin showing no signs of backing down in the face of Ukraine’s assertion of its sovereignty and the defense of its borders, the United States announced another round of sanctions. This new set, for the first time, included Rosneft. American companies were given license to go ahead with existing projects, but in the future there could be no new deals with Russia’s oil giant. European Union leaders were wary about supporting the United States on the new sanctions, because they were scared of backing the volatile Putin into a corner. Not only did EU countries do ten times more trade with Russia than did the United States, but they were dependent on Russia for much of their energy.

The spotters in the Russian brigade likely mistook the jet for a Ukrainian military plane. (The Russians had been shooting Ukrainian jets and helicopters out of the sky, with abandon, for well over a month by then.) There were almost 300 people on the flight, and more than 200 citizens of the EU.

The Kremlin denied responsibility, to little effect. Western Europe finally swung into Ukraine’s corner. Within two weeks, the EU had joined with the United States to take an even bigger bite out of Putin’s hide, and from the part he actually cared about. The new sanctions would specifically bar the sale or transfer of advanced engineering systems that Russia needed to drill new oil fields. “In the energy sector, new precision-guided restrictions will make it difficult for Russia to access the technology and equipment needed to produce oil from deep water, Arctic or shale deposits,” explained Jason Bordoff, who had just left his job as staff director in charge of energy and climate change at the National Security Council, and Elizabeth Rosenberg, a former senior sanctions adviser at the Treasury Department.

“These are precisely the complex, challenging projects that Russia will have difficulty achieving without the technology of Western energy firms. The measures are designed to make it more difficult and costly for Russian energy companies to invest in replacing declining conventional oil output and meeting future production goals.

He was also incensed by news from the international arbitration court in The Hague, which had chosen this particular moment to issue its verdict on Rosneft’s disputed grab of Yukos a dozen years earlier. The court ordered that Russia owed $50 billion in recompense and damages to Yukos shareholders and named Putin himself as a bad actor in the scheme. “Each step against Russia he [Putin] now believed to be a cynical, calculated attack against him,” Myers writes in The New Tsar. “He simply no longer cared how the West would respond. The change in Putin’s demeanor became acute after the downing of Flight 17, according to his old friend Sergei Roldugin. ‘I noticed that the more he is being teased the tougher he becomes….

Putin’s indifference and unwillingness to compromise turned pretty damn aggressive, pretty damn fast. Staging areas on Russia’s western border filled with more than 40,000 Russian soldiers and weapons (including land mines, mortars, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles, 152-millimeter howitzers, anti-tank guided missiles, and actual battle tanks). Russian soldiers were ordered to scrub all insignia and identifying markings from their uniforms and equipment and vehicles, hand over their cell phones, and head west into eastern Ukraine.

Most of the Russian soldiers who crossed the border were not rabid partisans for Putin’s fight, according to reporters on the ground from The Guardian. Typical among them was a recent recruit who signed up because there were no other paying jobs

The Ukrainian regular army and militia units were no real match for even poorly motivated Russian artillery and tank units. The former president Yanukovych had pretty well hollowed out the Ukrainian military while in office. The Russians killed more than a thousand Ukrainian fighters in the early stages of their new offensive and began winning back substantial chunks of the Donbas.

The Russian military, he insisted, had nothing to do with it. As did Lavrov, his foreign minister, who had made a habit of hurt and angry denial, even when presented with the half a dozen regular Russian soldiers captured in Ukraine, or with satellite images of Russian troops and weapons on the march in the Donbas. These were, he lied, “just images from computer games.

The United States, meanwhile, unleashed a very specific new sanction it had been threatening for months. The wiggle room allowed for dealing with Rosneft and the rest of the Russian oil industry was officially closed. Prior deal or no, the Obama administration declared that all American companies had to cease operations in Russia.

It didn’t take an oracle to see where this was headed. Yevtushenkov’s arrest was widely reported. It didn’t even matter that Yevtushenkov, unlike Yukos’s boss, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, had never uttered a syllable of challenge to Putin’s political authority. This time around, it was simply about business or, more precisely, power. Here was a jewel of the Russian oil industry, and its principal owner, its Russian principal owner, seemed to be forgetting his company’s first duty was to the Russian state and Vladimir Putin (and Igor Sechin). Especially now, when the future of the Russian Federation was in the balance. Bashneft, like Yukos and Lukoil and every other oil-producing company in Russia, was first and foremost a “strategic asset” of the state;

On September 27, 2014, Rosneft announced that the West Alpha rig had struck oil 7,000 feet beneath the floor of the Kara Sea. Imagine the luck! It happened right inside the window that the U.S. government had afforded ExxonMobil to pack up its things, close off the well. Turns out, ExxonMobil had used the time to just kept drilling. The hydrocarbon trap Exxon drillers had tapped was believed to hold about a billion barrels of oil and oil equivalent. This represented one of the largest single finds in years, anywhere in the world.

While Yevtushenkov was in stir, remember, a judge in Moscow “nationalized” the billionaire’s shares in Bashneft, which meant that his shares in his own company were handed over to the Russian state. In three months, Yevtushenkov had been robbed by Vladimir Putin and Igor Sechin to the tune of about $8 billion, the vast majority of his net worth. Not to mention, of course, control of the best-run and most remunerative oil company in one of the biggest oil-producing countries on earth.

Igor Sechin’s Kremlin-assisted “purchase” of a majority stake of Bashneft was concluded on remarkably favorable terms—he got the company for a pittance. Then, for a little icing on the cake, he found a court in Russia that would force Yevtushenkov to pay Rosneft $1.7 billion, for supposedly stripping Bashneft of its assets. So Putin and Sechin took his company, and then they made him pay them for the trouble of taking it. Gangster-style.

One unexpected piece of collateral damage in Sechin’s new crocodile act was the serious injury to the standing of the economic development minister at the Kremlin, Alexei Ulyukayev. Minister Ulyukayev had had the temerity to voice his opinion that Bashneft should go to the highest bidder on the open market. And Rosneft should stay out of it. For my enemies…Sechin invited Ulyukayev to his home and, truly gangster-style, presented him with a gift basket of his famous homemade sausages, some fine wine, and, unbeknownst to his guest, $2 million worth of rubles, in cash, stuffed into the bottom of the parcel. Sechin then had the minister arrested on the spot (the FSB gendarmes were conveniently there, at the ready) for soliciting and receiving a bribe. Ulyukayev was sentenced to eight years in prison and ordered to pay a $2.2 million fine. That takes care of him.

When the people of Ukraine stand up and make a rational decision for themselves, and toss out the fantastically corrupt Viktor Yanukovych and Putin’s other henchman in Kyiv, the natural gas middleman Dmitry Firtash, all Putin knows to do is turn to a different type of corruption. He attacks with lies and disinformation, because those are the only cards he has to play to prevent the Ukrainian people from making rational decisions in their own national interest.

In truth, a critical subtext of the Moscow Trump Tower project—which Mueller assessed could have been worth hundreds of millions of dollars to Trump—was dropping U.S. sanctions on Russia.  No deal could have happened through them as long as sanctions remained in place.  All of the potential financing entities described in conjunction with the Trump Tower Moscow deal were under sanctions. With sanctions in place, such a deal could never happen.

With an economy completely dependent on oil and gas, and an oil and gas industry completely dependent on someone else’s expertise, the sanctions that preclude Russia from getting that expertise were like a tourniquet around the neck. Sanctions were the entire ballgame for the Russians, and they had made that abundantly clear to Team Trump by the time it entered the White House.

Investigative journalist Michael Isikoff was the reporter who first ferreted out that Trump hit the ground running with a day-one concerted effort to try to unilaterally get rid of the sanctions. “Unknown to the public at the time, top Trump administration officials, almost as soon as they took office, tasked State Department staffers with developing proposals for the lifting of economic sanctions, the return of diplomatic compounds, and other steps to relieve tensions with Moscow,” reported Isikoff for Yahoo News. State Department veteran Dan Fried told him that in the first few weeks after Trump was inaugurated, he received “panicky” calls from officials who told him they had been “directed to develop a sanctions-lifting package and imploring him, ‘Please, my God, can’t you stop this?’

He could, actually. Fried and Tom Malinowski and other State Department old hands broke the emergency glass and sounded the alarm on both sides of the aisle in Congress that the Russia sanctions needed to be made statutorily binding—stat. Incredibly, it worked. With Democrat Cardin and Republican John McCain in the lead in the Senate, Congress moved with uncharacteristic agility and swiftness to pass legislation to codify the sanctions and make it harder for Trump to undo them on his own say-so. The national legislature did it at lightning speed, even after Tillerson begged members to soft-peddle the new law. “I would urge allowing the president the flexibility to adjust sanctions to meet the need in what is always an evolving diplomatic situation,” the secretary of state said as the bill was hurtling toward passage. Trump squeaked like an unoiled hinge over how much he hated the legislation and didn’t want to sign it. It was only when his hand was effectively forced by a veto-proof majority (98–2 in the Senate, 419–3 in the House) that he finally relented.

Nemtsov challenges Putin

Nemtsov became one of the president’s most vocal and most popular opponents, and a relentless burr under Putin’s saddle. He co-authored a no-holds-barred study of the Kremlin’s venality and mismanagement in its running of Gazprom in 2008. And in 2012, he publicly praised the Magnitsky Act, which permitted the U.S. Congress to mete out real economic punishment on specific individuals in Russia who committed gross human rights violations. Unlike Carter Page, who decried the Magnitsky Act as latter-day McCarthyism, Nemtsov hailed it as the way to finally nick the “crooks and abusers” among Russian businessmen and officials.

In 2015, while the battle for eastern Ukraine rumbled on, Boris Nemtsov, who had become the most fearless critic of Putin’s illegal annexation of Crimea and his illegal war in the Donbas, sat for a long interview with the Polish edition of Newsweek. He was due to lead a massive antiwar demonstration in Moscow two days later. Nemtsov understood it was likely to take decades to chip away at Putin and authoritarian rule in Russia, but he wasn’t giving up, and he was driven by a sense of urgency. “I have no doubt that the struggle for the revival of Russians will be tough,” he told the Newsweek interviewer. Putin “implanted them with a virus of inferiority complex towards the West, the belief that the only thing we can do to amaze the world is use force, violence and aggression….[Putin and his siloviki] operate in accordance with the simple principles of Joseph Goebbels: Play on the emotions; the bigger the lie, the better; lies should be repeated many times….Unfortunately, it works. The hysteria reached unprecedented levels, hence the high level of support for Putin. We need to work as quickly as possible to show the Russians that there is an alternative.

Later the next evening, walking home after a dinner out with his girlfriend, Nemtsov was gunned down on a suddenly and strangely traffic-less side of a bridge across the Moscow River, steps from the Kremlin grounds. The assassination appeared to have been meticulously planned and executed by a team of two or even three dozen people. The Kremlin fingered a group of Chechen terrorists and continues to block independent investigations into Boris Nemtsov’s murder.

And where was ExxonMobil’s chieftain, Rex Tillerson, in all this? He was standing by, waiting for the unfortunate geopolitical cloud to disperse.

Russian spying – the Illegals (TV show “The Americans” based on this)

The Illegals had gleaned, well, pretty much nothing they couldn’t have gotten reading their local newspapers. Putin’s best spies in America seem to have never really had their heart in the mission. The New Yorker’s Keith Gessen, a Russian-born American journalist and novelist who came to the United States when he was six years old, found the entire episode “sad and touching….Sad because, according to the F.B.I. affidavit, the information requested by the Russian government (‘Moscow Center,’ as it’s called) is so mundane, and some of it merely trade secrets, unbefitting a mighty state and redolent too of the central planning that once turned the U.S.S.R. into an economic basket case. Touching because the other information they are said to have sought—American plans for fighting terrorism; American plans for Iran; Obama’s hopes for last summer’s summit in Moscow—seems to dance around the real issue. Like a kid in the presence of his new crush, asking, ‘Do you like movies?,’ ‘What’s your favorite color?,’ Russia really wanted to ask America: What do you think of me?

Despite the public boasts about their heroic victory in Moscow, the Illegals were demonstrably bumbling, even slipshod. The group was under close and constant surveillance for nearly ten years, with footage and photographs and audio recordings to prove it. Their countersurveillance efforts had bordered on gross negligence. Their homes were searched and their cars tagged with GPS trackers, and the Illegals never knew. The best of the spies, Heathfield/Bezrukov, was for years kept under the watchful and unseen eye of the U.S. lead agent Peter Strzok—the G-man later torched by the Trump administration and congressional Republicans for his role in investigating the Russia scandal surrounding the U.S. 2016 presidential election. The Illegals had repeated contact with FBI agents posing as fellow Russians. “Are you ready for this [next] step?” one undercover agent asked Anna Chapman. “Shit,” she replied, “of course.

Then she unwittingly handed over her laptop to the American undercover agent, and then she bought a burner phone and a Tracfone calling card, and then she dumped the receipt into a public trash can where it was fished out by the FBI.

Richard Murphy was barely even trying. “He had a thick Russian accent and an incredibly unhappy Russian personality,” she said. “I knew he wasn’t American. I knew it was very odd.” Or as one of Richard Murphy’s Marquette Road neighbors told a reporter a few days after the arrest, as the tumblers were beginning to fall into place, “It was suspicious that he had a Russian accent and an Irish last name. Who does that?…He must have been the worst spy ever.

Posted in Corruption, Corruption & Finance, Oil shock collapse, Peak Oil | Tagged , , , , | 2 Comments

Can you grow enough fruit and vegetables to be self-sufficient?

Preface. If you want to try to feed yourself, buy John Jeavons excellent book “How to Grow More Vegetables, Ninth Edition: (and Fruits, Nuts, Berries, Grains, and Other Crops) Than You Ever Thought Possible on Less Land with Less Water Than You Can Imagine”. If you’re really serious, go to http://www.growbiointensive.org/ to find out where you can take a course. When I took it in 2004 Jeavons told us that in our area of Northern California, we could probably get by on half an acre per person because our benign climate allows three crops a year. But we don’t get enough rain to do that, so massive water storage is required as well.

Cities will someday be a bad place to be as energy grows scarce and supply lines break down because trucks don’t have diesel fuel. This is why the younger you are the more you should consider moving to an agricultural area where your muscle power, your own yard, and local food can keep you fed after oil decline.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Wong, J. 2020. Can you really grow enough fruit and veg to be self-sufficient? Newscientist.com.

There’s been a surge in people wanting to grow fruit and vegetables, but the path to self-sufficiency isn’t as easy as some may have you think.

how realistic are the promises that such efforts will help you along your way to self-sufficiency? Let’s do the maths.

If your goal is to feed yourself, it would be hard to find a better crop than potatoes. In terms of calories per unit of land, they are easily the most productive crop that can be grown, at least in the UK. Potatoes grow best in cool, well-drained, loose soil that is about 45° to 55°F (7° to 13°C) with full sun of at least 6 hours of sunlight each day.

Churning out yields of approximately 8.8 pounds on 1.2 square yards (4 kilos per square meter) on farms with these ideal conditions can produce more than three times the calories of wheat. Spuds also happen to be one of the crops with the most balanced nutrition, meaning humans can survive for at least a year eating very little else, according to the International Potato Center in Peru.

Based on an average intake of 2250 calories a day (2000 women, 2500 men), you’ll need to grow 821,250 calories a year. That’s around a tonne of spuds, requiring 2860 square feet / 318 square yards / 0.066 acre / 266 square meters of land. Now multiply by the number of people in your household.

Perhaps by self-sufficiency they don’t mean calorie-wise, but just in terms of fruit and veg requirements? Working on World Health Organization guidelines stating that adults need at least 14 ounces (five 80-gram servings) of fresh produce a day to maintain health would mean each of us requires 320 pounds (146 kilograms) every year. While vegetable yields vary, for a family of four, this would mean a minimum of 292 square metres for lower weight crops like lettuce (.072 acre / 350 square yards) and about 100 square yards (84 square meters / 0.02 acre) for heavier ones like apples.

But let’s not forget, these crops are highly seasonal, and storing them to last the whole year will be tough. Even with some of the world’s best experts at post-harvest storage and vast climate-controlled warehouses, millions of tonnes of food is lost by industrial agriculture each year. A rack in your garage or a fancy chest freezer simply can’t compete.

Is growing your own great exercise, a chance to get fresh air and a welcome distraction in these uncertain times? A resounding yes. Does it teach invaluable lessons about where our food comes from, while giving an edible bonus? 100 per cent. But is it likely to provide beginners with even a passing semblance of self-sufficiency, as the headlines promise? I’m afraid not. So enjoy your garden (if you have one) for all the benefits it provides.

Posted in Farming & Ranching | Tagged | 4 Comments

The Golden Age of Russian Oil Nears an End

Preface.  One huge factor in Russia’s future oil decline not mentioned below is how incredibly corrupt and inefficient Russia’s oil and gas companies are, as Rachel Maddow describes in her book “Blowout”. A few quotes:

The Russian oil and gas industry Putin controlled was known for its “tumbledown” machinery and technological deficiencies, coasting on the assets inherited from the Soviet Union. Virtually all of Russian oil comes from fields that were already known in Soviet times. There have been very few new discoveries that are producing today. The drama of this situation is that the inheritance is now starting to run down. What’s left is offshore arctic and tight shale, both difficult and expensive to get.

Russia isn’t capable of doing offshore drilling operations in the frozen north, with little in the way of useful drilling rigs or equipment of any kind–not even basics like subsea wellheads. In 2012, having made Russia’s economy and its power in the world almost entirely dependent on oil and gas, Putin faced a serious conundrum: his ability to maintain Russia’s place as an “energy superpower” depended almost entirely on availing himself of the expertise and technology of major Western oil companies, because Russian oil companies were gangster economy creations, and not one of them was technically or even financially competent.

Gazprom wasn’t able to keep up with all the new European demand, because its production capabilities sucked. The company hadn’t invested in new technologies, because as a state-sanctioned monopoly propped up by the Russian government and therefore free from competition, it really hadn’t needed to. Dig deep enough in the company accounting ledgers and you’d find that Gazprom lost about $40 billion a year to corruption and waste. That’s a loss nearly equal to its annual profits.

Gazprom lost money in other ways, buying a TV station for example. Why? Well, why not? Gazprom was better understood not as an energy company but as a big battering ram President Putin used to get stuff he wanted. So inefficient, money-bleeding, crappy Gazprom owned a television station and a bunch of other media properties, but only because Putin had arranged it in order to silence one of the few remaining critical voices in the Russian press. Vladimir used his security forces to arrest and to intimidate the critic who owned the media company, and then he used Gazprom as the piggy bank to buy the company at a steep jailhouse discount. Independent television journalism in Russia was thus dealt another blow, and Putin would instead have another reliable mouthpiece for the Kremlin’s party line.

Nord Stream was a pipeline project that was built from both sides at once—from Russia and from Germany. Same pipeline, same materials, same building standards. But the Russian side of the construction project (led by the Rotenberg brothers of St. Petersburg, and remember them) cost three times as much, per mile of pipeline, as the German side did. That money was not going into the pension and health fund of the Russian pipe fitters’ union; it went into the pockets of Putin and his pals. The founder of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, James Grant, sized up Gazprom and rated it, simply, “the worst managed company on the planet.”

Putin had been gangstering up the Russian oil industry for years. Eschewing competition that might encourage innovation and meritocratic success, Putin instead just smashed and grabbed any homegrown enterprises that proved resourceful or entrepreneurial or attractive to legitimate investors-goodbye, Yukos. He harassed foreign interlopers, too.

Russian oil decline in the news:

2021-11-24 oilprice.com Russia’s Oil Reserves Are Becoming Increasingly Hard To Recover

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Stratfor. 2020. The Golden Age of Russian Oil Nears an End.

Highlights

  • In the next 10-20 years, Russian oil will become more expensive as extraction from less accessible basins becomes necessary to maintain current export levels.
  • Internal inefficiencies within Russia’s oil sector, as well as the remote locations of remaining reserves and potential shifts in future oil demand, add up to a murky future for the country’s energy-reliant economy.
  • Moscow may adjust its budget to ensure plummeting oil prices don’t cut into its government spending, but proper economic diversification away from energy remains a complex and unlikely process.
  • Russia prices will continue to rise as total output becomes more reliant on difficult extraction further away from population centers (Moscow, for example, is closer to London than it is to the oil reserves locked underneath East Siberia).

Russia’s easily accessible oil reserves have long been the cornerstone of its economy. But these conventional fields are depleting, leading to the need to invest and expand into more untapped sources. This transformation will not be easy or cheap, as various factors have led to a poorly optimized oil sector that’s ill-equipped to soften the blow of rising costs. The key to maintaining a strong energy market, and securing the capital needed to develop new and expensive fields, will instead rest on whether Moscow can secure its foothold in China’s increasingly oil-hungry market. In any case, Russia may have little choice but to accept that its glory days of oil dominance and high profit margins are nearing an end.

Russia’s days of cheap and easy-to-access oil are numbered. As active reserves shrink, energy producers will eventually be forced to shift extraction to lower-margin, higher-cost areas.  These compounding hardships will not be limited to the oil industry, however, as the coupling of energy rents and government expenditure will radiate the damage throughout Russian society.

In the mid-2000s, West Siberian conventional fields revitalized the Russian economy, producing vast sums of low-cost oil at a time of rapidly rising global demand. But 15 years on, many of these fields have since plateaued or begun to decline. New fields have the potential to largely offset this decline, but developing these areas come with higher upfront costs and will also eventually progress to a stage of declining production sometime in the 2030s.

To maintain supply, Russian oil producers will thus be forced to explore new avenues of “unconventional” production in the years ahead, generally situated in the following two categories:

  1. Hard-to-recover reserves in the Caspian, Black and White sea regions, as well as deep drilling in the Arctic (currently curbed by sanctions) and East Siberian fields. Accessing these reserves, however, require considerable upfront investment or hefty tax incentives.
  2. Shale reserves are perhaps more prevalent in Russia than anywhere in the world, with key areas being the Bazhenov and Domanik formations. But Russia’s lack of tools to efficiently extract the resource due to sanctions, combined with poor inter-industry competition, has led to a measly output of 15,000 barrels of tight oil per day at a steep price tag.

Russia is pessimistic about its future.  In a draft of its 2035 Energy Strategy, the best case scenario has oil production remaining unchanged, with pessimistic reports projecting a 12-40 percent plunge in production. 

Shale oil is already three times as expensive as conventional oil. 

Failure to Optimize Production

Russia’s current energy sector is also ill-equipped to soften the blow of rising costs due to the following key factors:

  • Russia’s inefficient and poorly integrated refinery network has led to higher demand from key markets for bulk crude in lieu of more profitable finished products. For environmental and efficiency reasons, Europe prefers to refine oil exports themselves. But the continental market’s preference for Russian crude instead of finished products has likely strained the longevity of West Siberian fields. In recent years, Russia has exported crude volumes on par with Saudi Arabia, despite possessing a third as many known reserves in less accessible basins. The inability to lengthen this supply has expedited the need to enter harder-to-access areas. While neither Russia’s style of export or price-taking has been too pernicious when production is cheap, rising costs will magnify these weaknesses.
  • A lack of globally respected financial institutions has robbed Russia of the economic alpha gained from national marketplaces, exacerbating its reliance on Brent pricing and dollar-denominated oil.
  • International sanctions have prevented the sale of advanced oil extraction equipment (99% which Russia imports), limiting Russia’s ability to take full advantage of offshore reserves or shale deposits. While backdoors to sanctions exist, Russia remains intensely reliant on international support to prop up advanced extraction. Western restrictions will thus continue to hamper Russia’s ability to crack the true potential of its remaining assets.
  • The lack of competition in Russia’s oligopoly oil market has edged out small-scale innovation: Large producers have already licensed nearly all (95.7%) of the country’s proven reserves, and 88 percent of its estimated reserves.
Posted in How Much Left, Peak Oil | Tagged , | 3 Comments

Far out #3: Sugar power

Preface. No, you object, sugar in the gas tank will destroy the engine. Not true. Snopes.com says that won’t happen because sugar doesn’t dissolve in automotive fuel or caramelize, and so it does not turn into the debilitating gunk this well-known revenge calls for. Also, the sugar can’t reach the engine because of protective filters, though it can clog the fuel filter or fuel injector, which would stop the car.  The “breakthrough” below is for a sugar fuel cell, so no worries at all.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Riordan, T. June 21, 2004. A Sweet Way to Fuel Cars. For a group of researchers at Sandia National Labs, sugar in the gas tank isn’t such a bad idea. New York Times.

You may not be able to refuel your car with corn syrup or charge your computer by plugging it into a bottle of Coca-Cola anytime soon. But to Stanley H. Kravitz and a group of researchers at Sandia National Laboratories, sugar looks like the new oil.

Dr. Kravitz and his colleagues have begun to apply for patents covering ways to convert glucose, a basic form of sugar, into energy.

Glucose seems an obvious potential source for fuel. Unlike hydrogen, for example, it is renewable, cheap and abundant.

”The problem with hydrogen is that it isn’t just found in the air or lying around,” Dr. Kravitz said. ”You have to do something quite energy-intensive to break apart some molecule in order to get hydrogen.” So why aren’t other researchers trying to power their fuel cells with glucose rather than hydrogen? Glucose molecules, it turns out, are not easily persuaded to give up their energy.

Over time, naturally occurring enzymes have turned mammals into glucose-burning machines. The human body, for example, metabolizes glucose in a delicately choreographed dance. Twelve different enzymes partner in succession with the glucose molecule, each enzyme sending two electrons spinning offstage into cellular power sources and thereby fueling the body. (If the body does not need this energy when it is made, the body stores it as fat.)

One approach that Sandia researchers are taking is to genetically engineer enzymes that mimic those in the human body. ”If evolution figured it out, we should be able to figure it out,” Dr. Kravitz said.

Another approach is nonbiological, using metals like platinum to liberate electrons.

Early potential applications of glucose fuel cells would require only small amounts of energy. For example, security systems to detect movement or the presence of chemicals could use sensors that would be plugged into trees, siphoning glucose from sap for energy.

Sandia researchers are ”making electricity for electricity’s sake — as a power source.”

Dr. Kravitz and fellow Sandia researchers are developing an array of tiny glass needles, as slim and sharp as a mosquito’s proboscis, that could, for example, be imperceptibly ”plugged in” to a soldier’s arm and used to convert glucose from the human body into energy.

”Suppose you could make a patch that went on the arm and had little micro needles that didn’t hurt,” Dr. Kravitz said. ”Now the soldier just needs to eat an Oreo cookie to keep his radio going.”

So this research could solve both the world’s energy problem and the obesity epidemic simultaneously? ”That’s sort of a wild and crazy idea,” Dr. Kravitz said. ”But then again, maybe not.”

”The efficiency stinks right now,” Dr. Kravitz acknowledged, noting that so far Sandia researchers were able to produce power in the milliwatt range, enough to power a tiny light-emitting diode — while a car would require kilowatts of power.

”We’ve increased the efficiency by a factor of a thousand in a period of three years,” he said. ”But we need to go up by a factor of a million.”

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Yet another researcher proposes to hydrogen from a water sugar mixture at 86 Degrees F with a mix of natural enzymes in just 5 to 10 years, which was said back in 2008, so like most promised breakthroughs, don’t hold your breath (Velasquez-Manoff 2008).

References

Velasquez-Manoff. 2008. Sugar-powered cars. Christian Science Monitor

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Limits to growth: Oil & Gas Fracking sand

Preface.  Below is an excerpt about fracking sand from Beiser’s 2018 book “The World in a Grain. The Story of Sand and How It Transformed Civilization”.

In 2022 fracking sand has gotten so expensive it’s a factor in why production isn’t increasing: 2022-3-23 Sand for fracking is now 3 times as expensive as it was last year, and it’s one of several reasons US oil production isn’t increasing. Fracking sand now costs between $40 and $45 per ton, nearly 185% higher than last year. While some of the frac sand used by drillers in Texas and New Mexico is sourced locally, a lot is actually shipped in from Wisconsin via rail. In either case, shortages of labor and transportation capacity have been complicating drillers’ efforts

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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Vince Beiser. 2018. The World in a Grain. The Story of Sand and How It Transformed Civilization. Riverhead Books.

Fracking sand

The fracking boom in the United States has created a voracious hunger for
what’s known as “frac sand. It happens that there are huge deposits of just
that kind of sand in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Result: the fracking rush in
North Dakota has sparked a frac sand rush in the Upper Midwest. Thousands of acres of fields and forests have been stripped away so that miners can get their hands on those rare grains.

Thanks to the fracking boom, which kicked into high gear in 2008, the United States has overtaken Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the world’s biggest oil and gas producer. None of this could happen without sand. America’s fracking fields are the latest front to which we have deployed armies of sand to maintain our lifestyle.

By shooting a highly pressurized mix of water, chemicals, and sand into a well bore, drillers shatter the surrounding shale, spider-webbing it with tiny cracks through which the hydrocarbons can flow. They need the sand to keep the cracks open, holding fast against the pressure of the surrounding rock that wants to close them back up.

Every one of those wells needs sand, and lots of it. A single well can use as much as 25,000 tons—enough to fill more than two hundred railroad cars. But like members of a specialized combat unit, frac sand grains need to meet a list of highly specific physical requirements. They must be hard enough to withstand all that pressure, which means they must be at least 95 percent quartz.4 That eliminates most common construction sand, shrinking the pool to the silica sands used for glassmaking. But frac sand must also have the right shape: small enough to fit snugly into the frack cracks and rounded enough to let the hydrocarbons slide easily around them.

Most quartz grains, you’ll recall, are angular; there aren’t many places where you can find grains with such high purity and low angularity. The quartz sands under the ground of western and central Wisconsin have just that rare combination. These are ancient grains that were eroded, transported, then buried and uplifted again. Generally speaking, the older a grain is, the more rounded it is, thanks to however many extra million years of having its angles and edges worn down. Wisconsin also happens to have an excellent rail network and relatively lax environmental regulations. And so the fracking boom has sparked a frac-sand boom in the Badger State. Thousands of acres of the state’s farmland and forest are being torn up to get at the precious silica below.

In 2010, there were ten frac sand mines and processing plants in Wisconsin; four years later, that number had shot up to 135.6 The state produced around 25 million tons of frac sand in 2014, worth nearly $2 billion.

Production is likely to continue growing, since oil and gas operators have learned that increasing the amount of sand they shoot into a well increases the yield of oil or gas. New frac sand mines are also being opened in Texas as producers seek sources closer to the oil fields.

Nationwide, the legions of silica sand used for fracking have grown tenfold since 2003.7 They now dwarf those used for glassmaking and all other purposes, including silicon chips. By 2016, total silica sand production stood at nearly 92 million tons per year, almost three-quarters of which was used for fracking. Only 7 percent went to the glass industry.

The first step, he explained, is for excavating machines to scrape off the “overburden”—the plants, trees, topsoil, and unwanted miscellaneous rock lying on top of the sandstone that is their target. One reason Wisconsin silica sand is so desirable is because it lies very close to the surface, requiring relatively little digging to get at it.10 The topsoil is piled somewhere out of the way; it will be needed to help reclaim the land once the mine is tapped out, as required by law.

Once the sandstone is exposed, blasting experts drill a grid of holes into it, pack them with explosives, and simply blow a chunk of the hillside to smithereens. The sandstone shatters and collapses in a heap of . . . well, sand and stones. Front-end loaders dump the raw sand into trucks. After the “raw pile” is cleared away, excavators tear off another swatch of overburden and the process starts again, the hill disappearing slice by slice.

Down on the mine floor, the trucks haul the sand a few hundred yards to another pile, from where it’s fed into a complicated behemoth of a machine, a forty-foot-high Frankenstein of pipes, tanks, ladders, catwalks, and conveyor belts. A series of belts haul the sand up some thirty feet to a sorting screen, where jets spray it with water to turn it into a slurry. This sand-water mixture is then pumped onto a series of vibrating metal screens, which separate out first the miscellaneous rocks, then the oversize grains, shuffling these unwanted bits into a waste pile. Once everything bigger than .8 millimeters has been screened out, the remaining slurry is pumped up through corrugated pipe into a kind of upside-down pyramid called a hydrosizer. One hundred jets blast down into the cone, creating a carefully calibrated rising current that carries the lighter grains up and over the top into a trough, while the heavier ones sink to the bottom. By controlling the strength of the jets, you control the size of the grains that sink.

That sand is then run through a series of four attrition tanks—basically giant washing machines that spin the slurry, making the grains grind against one another, washing off silt or other impurities that might coat them. Last stop is a dewatering screen, a mesh of tiny slots measuring .01 millimeters, big enough for water to get through but not sand.

The sand is taken next to the drying plant, a vast warehouse-style building a few hundred yards away. Trucks load the washed sand into a metal hopper that feeds it onto another series of rising conveyor belts that carry it up to a doorway in the dryer plant, some twenty feet above the ground. Inside is a cavernous space, untouched by natural light, filled with another set of machines. The sand gets one more sifting, to filter out any stray rocks that might have gotten in on the journey from the pile, and then is fed through a long cylindrical tank.

A series of ducts underneath the tank blows hot air upward, drying the sand, while smokestack-like chimneys whisk away stray silica dust. “That’s the bad shit,” says Losinski. “That’s the stuff you don’t want to breathe.” Crystalline silica dust is sharp and jagged, especially when it’s freshly formed—like that found at sand mines and processing sites—and it can wreak havoc on the lungs. It’s been known for decades that too much exposure can cause silicosis, an especially severe lung disease.

A final relay of vibrating screens separates the sand into three size grades. Those are then hauled up a hundred feet in bucket elevators, vertical conveyor belts fitted with dozens of fiberglass buckets, and dumped into one of the 3,000-ton silos atop which Losinski and I stood. Trucks drive right up to the silos, fill up, and haul the product to the nearest rail station in Winona, Minnesota. From there, it’s off to the fracking fields.

There are a number of potentially serious risks to be concerned about. The first is water. The mines need lots of it to create their slurry and to wash the sand; a single mine can run through as much as 2 million gallons per day. The miners get a lot of it from high-capacity wells, which pump more than 70 gallons a minute from underground aquifers. “There’s a lot of concern about whether that will affect groundwater and trout streams fed by these headwaters

There’s also the question of what to do with wastewater that has been used to wash and process the sand. Typically the wastewater gets pumped into settling ponds; this is where the flocculants Pat Popple worries about are added in. Flocculants help remove particles suspended in the water, which is good. But they also contain acrylamide, a neurotoxin and carcinogen, which is bad.

That compound could potentially leach from the ponds into groundwater or surface water, warns a 2014 report

 

Posted in Limits To Growth, Oil & Gas Fracked, Peak Sand | Tagged , , | 1 Comment

Heavy-duty hydrogen fuel cell trucks a waste of energy and money

FCEV Heavy truck: PEM hydrogen fuel cell on-board reforming. U.S. Department of Energy Vehicle Technologies Program, Estimated for 2020. Source (DOE 2011).

Figure 1. FCEV Heavy truck: PEM hydrogen fuel cell on-board reforming. U.S. Department of Energy Vehicle Technologies Program, Estimated for 2020. Source (DOE 2011).

Preface. There are 3 articles that I summarize below:

  1. ARB. November 2015. Medium- and heavy-duty fuel cell electric vehicles. Air Resources Board, California Environmental Protection Agency.
  2. NRC. 2003. Energy and Transportation: Challenges for the Chemical Sciences in the 21st Century. National Research Council
  3.  NACFE. 2020. Making sense of heavy-duty hydrogen fuel cell tractors. North American council for freight efficiency. It has additional information in hydrogen fuel cell (FCEV) trucks.

Figure 1 reveals why hydrogen fuel cell trucks are incredibly inefficient. Turning hydrogen back into electricity with a fuel cell is only 24.7 % efficient (.84 * .67 * .54 * .84 * .97) as shown in figure 1. There are multiple stages where energy is lost due to inefficiencies at each step: Natural gas upstream and liquefaction, hydrogen on-board reforming, fuel cell efficiency, electric motor and drive-train losses, and aerodynamic/rolling resistance.

Since fuel cell electric trucks are terrible at acceleration, they always have a second propulsion system, usually a battery, making them orders of magnitude more expensive than an equivalent diesel truck, $1,300,000 versus $100,000 respectively.

Hydrogen is not a renewable, since 96 to 99% of hydrogen is made from natural gas using natural gas, but at least it can be made cheaply around the clock that way.

Hydrogen generated with solar power could only be made 10 to 25% of the time (the capacity factor) when the sun is up, and electrolysis of water is so expensive it is only made for applications that require extremely pure hydrogen, mainly NASA.  The amount of space rebuildable contraptions like solar and wind take up is a problem as well. To use wind power to produce 700 Terrawatt hours of hydrogen would require wind turbines taking up 40,154 square miles (Ford 2020).

Hydrogen pipelines are too expensive to build at length, since they are corroded and embrittled by hydrogen.  Yet delivery would require a $250,000 canister truck weighing 88,000 pounds (40,000 kg) delivering a paltry 880 (400 kg) of fuel, enough for 60 cars and just a few trucks. A diesel truck can carry 10,000 gallons of gas, enough to fill 800 cars. The hydrogen delivery truck cannibalize much of its energy: over a distance of 150 miles, it will burn the equivalent of 20% of the usable energy in the hydrogen it is delivering (Romm 2005).

Trucks don’t use hydrogen tanks because they take up 10% of payload weight (DOE 2011), or fuel cells, because the best only last 2500 hours but need to keep on going at least 14,560 hours in long-haul trucks and 10,400 in distribution trucks (den Boer 2013).

For a full discussion of why hydrogen will not solve our problems, see Hydrogen: The dumbest & most impossible renewable and other related articles listed at the end.

The few FCEV that exist are heavily subsidized by agencies like the California Air Resources Board Hybrid & Zero emission truck voucher incentive program (HVIP) of up to $288,000 per truck (CASEY 2023)

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

***

ARB. November 2015. Medium- and heavy-duty fuel cell electric vehicles. Air Resources Board, California Environmental Protection Agency.

Medium- and heavy-duty Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEV) are far from being commercial due to many barriers:

  1. Vehicle cost (bus): $1,300,000
  2. Vehicle cost (truck): even higher due to heavier payloads
  3. Cost of hydrogen fuel
  4. Cost of fuel cell power plant. At $3,000/kW for a 150 kW fuel cell system, the power plant cost is $450,000
  5. Cost of 40-50 kg fuel tank, frame, and mounting system is $100,000
  6. Service station costs of $5,000,000 and O&M costs of $200,000/year
  7. Distribution of hydrogen fuel (corrodes pipes, distributed by diesel-burning trucks now)
  8. More frequent fueling (the fueling infrastructure for FCEV medium and heavy-duty trucks is not known since there aren’t any commercial MD/HD trucks yet)
  9. Lack of hydrogen service stations
  10. Significantly higher costs for FCEV than diesel trucks
  11. Hydrogen tanks weigh a lot
  12. Hydrogen tanks take up a lot of space
  13. Tank weight and size reduce range
  14. Hydrogen is more expensive than diesel fuel
  15. The only public hydrogen stations in California are for light duty cars. Because of the high pressure at which they dispense hydrogen, as well as different fueling protocols and nozzles, they are not compatible for use with current fueling protocols for medium- or heavy-duty vehicles.
  16. FCEV can’t handle acceleration well so there is always a 2nd propulsion system like batteries, which adds to their cost
  17. Tanks can go on the roof of buses, but trucks do not have enough space for a tank (though there is room for the fuel cell which is roughly equal to a conventional diesel engine with a similar power rating)
  18. Only PEM fuel cells with low operating temperatures, high power density, and so on are suitable, but they are too fragile to endure the rough ride of a truck
  19. FCEV use too much platinum metal group elements which are limited and expensive

What is an FCEV? A FCEV is a vehicle with a fuel cell system that generates electricity to propel the vehicle and to power auxiliary equipment. Hydrogen fuel is consumed in the fuel cell stack to produce electricity, heat, and water vapor—no harmful pollutants are emitted from the vehicle. FCEVs are typically configured in a series hybrid design where the fuel cell is paired with a battery storage system. Together, the fuel cell and battery systems work to meet performance, range, efficiency, and other vehicle manufacturer goals. FCEVs have higher efficiencies, quieter operation, comparable range between fill-up, and similar performance to conventional vehicles.

Most suitable applications.  Vehicles that are centrally fueled, operated, and maintained, returning to the same base at the end of the day.

NRC. 2003. Energy and Transportation: Challenges for the Chemical Sciences in the 21st Century. National Research Council

Excerpts about hydrogen fuel cells:

The most important part of a fuel cell is the membrane, which must be an ion conductor, an electronic insulator, an impermeable gas barrier and also possess good mechanical strength. However, the key issues in making a practical fuel cell are non-electrochemical. These include the acts of delivering the gases to the fuel cell membrane, removing the water, removing the heat from around the system, and controlling humidity and pressurization of gases. There are still many challenges for electrochemists, chemists, and chemical engineers. For example, a membrane that is more tolerant of environmental conditions for gases of varying pressures will allow for the elimination of various system components, which can be very expensive due to their use of stainless steel. The technical challenge is in fabricating a membrane to be thin enough so that the hydrogen side of the gas supply does not need to be humidified. However, as membranes get thinner, reliability over long periods of time becomes an issue due to faradaic losses. If the membrane is too thick, additional components must be added to humidify the hydrogen.

In a vehicle fuel cell stack, which has over 400 cells in series, the situation is even more complicated. Well over 90% of fuel cell industry funds are not spent on the membrane but on moving these gases in and out of the fuel cell stack, managing the system, and creating the environment where the membrane can do its job. Fuel cell research, however, is mainly performed in a lab where gases are supplied at exactly the right humidity, pressures, and so on. The actual commercial problem, development of a fuel-cell-powered vehicle that has a life of 15 years and 150,000 miles under terrible external environmental conditions, has not been approached.

Tolerances are also not well understood. A fuel cell stack with over 400 cells operating in this environment contains sealant, which is literally miles long. Seals will start to fail after the fuel cell is bumped and jostled on the highway and while temperature shifts between hot and cold, and the cell is turned off and on. With zero tolerance for safety failures, hydrogen leaks cannot occur with these vehicles. Additionally, every cell has to be identical or the system cannot be managed. Unfortunately, that kind of tolerance control is not yet available.

An ideal fuel cell system will have minimal components outside of the stack and will operate using ambient, unhumidified hydrogen. Although fuel cells are very efficient, they do not release much heat through the exhaust. Even though they generate less heat than an internal combustion engine, the system requires the addition of cooling components due to the generated heat in the cooling stack. However, if this stack can generate less heat, then radiators, pumps, and coolant will not be required.

The standard for a modern vehicle requires it to start within 2 seconds at worst. A fuel cell starts well within 1 second. However, fuel cells, including hydrogen fuel cells, do not operate well at subfreezing temperatures. This is because fuel cells are basically a liquid interface device and need liquid-phase water to operate. Running the system under the conditions of a highway environment is possible, but the current cost is too great for commercialization.

Practical use of hydrogen in vehicles may never happen until there is a better method to store hydrogen, especially since onboard reforming of hydrogen at a reasonable cost may not be a possibility.

The use of hydrogen requires additional infrastructure for production and transportation. One method is to use electrical energy to produce hydrogen, but power grids are very inefficient. Another is the use of a natural gas pipeline, which is also wasteful since it involves the liquefying and re-evaporation of gases.

End note: Sir William Robert Grove invented the hydrogen fuel cell or “gas battery” in the 1840s. The first practical fuel cells were not built until the Gemini and Apollo space programs in the 1960s and are still used in space today. The difference between building a successful fuel cell and a commercially successful fuel cell, however, is the same difference between putting a man on the moon and putting 10,000 men on the moon every day at an affordable price.  We’re running out of time to invent a good hydrogen fuel cell, they’ve been around 180 years, and peak oil may have occurred in 2018 (Patterson 2019).

NACFE. 2020. Making sense of heavy-duty hydrogen fuel cell tractors. North American council for freight efficiency.

A few bits and pieces from this document.

Currently there are less than 8,573 hydrogen fuel cars, 48 buses, and 20 prototype trucks, most of them in California, where there are 15 retail hydrogen stations.

Estimates of an electric future with both battery electric and fuel cell vehicles will need anywhere from 2X to 8X the amount of electric energy produced today. Similarly, little of today’s hydrogen production is used for transportation. The production of both electricity and hydrogen will need to aggressively increase; and in lockstep, the demand for both will need to dramatically increase.

Today there are only a handful of prototype fuel cell demonstrator trucks in existence, each built to be successful for certain applications.  Since there are only pilot vehicles, mainly in Switzerland, this report can’t say much about how they operate in real life.  The costs of hydrogen, vehicles, and hydrogen production all must come down significantly to make hydrogen economically competitive with alternatives.

In order for trucks to use hydrogen, all of the following must be in place:  H2 production plants need to be built and produce H with economies of scale 2) There has to be a demand for H (market penetration), 3) A distribution network must exist from production facilities to end users, 4) The delivery technology to quickly deliver high pressure H fuel in volume needs to be developed 5) Storage technology to safely and efficiently store hydrogen for distribution, fueling, and onboard the vehicle in place 6) H technology must be reliable, 7) Cheap electricity is required for electrolysis, 8) Battery cell costs must come down and energy density increase, 8) H must be safe and technicians, drivers, and emergency personnel trained to deal with problems 9) The Green H must be sustainable, available, and affordable

Quickly ramping up both electricity supply and demand, in the matter of a couple decades or less, is challenging. Application of funding can only do so much. Innovations will be required across a range of technologies.

Hydrogen colors

  • Green: electrolysis of water with electricity from renewable resources. Zero carbon emissions
  • Turquoise: thermal splitting of natural gas, instead of CO2 solid carbon produced
  • Pink / purple / red: produced by nuclear power electrolysis
  • Black / gray: from natural gas using steam-methane reforming
  • Yellow: electrolysis with grid electricity
  • Brown: from fossil fuels, usually coal, with gasification
  • Blue: gray or brown with CO2 sequestered or repurposed
  • White: byproduct of industrial processes

The truck manufacturing marketplace is entirely about supply and demand. The annual trucking market demand for new vehicles and the annual trucking manufacturing output range from 150,000 to 300,000 vehicles per year.  In 2020 there were zero Class 8 fuel cell trucks produced.

In 2030, 30% of new Class 8 vehicles would optimistically be approximately 100,000 vehicles a year. There are an estimated 1.8 million Class 8 trucks hauling freight trailers in the United States today. In total, there may be up to 4 million Class 8 vehicles registered in the United States with the lives of those vehicles ranging from 12 to 20 years or more.

Trucks are long-term capital investment tools. Commercial vehicle populations change slowly. The vehicles have long life spans. It can take 20 years or more for a new technology to completely supplant an existing one through normal market attrition.

Hydrogen fuel cell trucks can be superior to Battery electric trucks if  

  • Zero emission at tailpipe important
  • Tractor tare weight critical to maximizing payload
  • Long distance routes over 500 miles common
  • Winter conditions significant
  • Green or blue H available
  • Incentivized Hydrogen use
  • Less mountainous

As Steve Hanley of CleanTechnica summarized, “Making electricity to electrolyze hydrogen which is then used in fuel cells to power vehicles is not as efficient as making electricity and using it to power vehicles directly in the first place. Every time energy gets converted from one form to another, there are losses. The more transformations there are, the more losses occur.”

How do Heavy-duty Hydrogen Fuel Cell tractors (FCEV) vehicles work?

In all cases, FCEV also need to have batteries.

A battery dominant FCEV uses the fuel cell to charge the onboard batteries. The batteries then directly power the electric motors. As the batteries deplete running the motors, the fuel cell provides some replacement of energy, but the battery dominant system expects that the duty cycle will reduce the state of charge (SOC). Sized correctly for the duty cycle, the vehicle ends it shift before the battery SOC is completely depleted. Complete depletion generally means some low SOC cutoff typically around 20% SOC [3]. The fuel cell then recharges the parked truck prior to its next shift.

A fuel cell dominant vehicle will use both the fuel cell and the battery pack to power the electric motors. The battery pack serves to handle short demand peaks, like accelerations or short hills, while the fuel cell is sized to provide continuous power to the motors for a typical average duty cycle load. There is a balance between planned typical loads and peak loads that dictates how much battery and how much fuel cell is required for the expected duty cycles. Designers need to statistically predict nominal and off-nominal loads to properly size the systems for the end user. A dedicated route with predictable freight loads and repeatable traffic and weather conditions can allow smaller battery packs for a fuel cell dominant system. Variable routing with a wide variety of payloads and complex traffic and weather conditions may require a more battery dominant system with greater battery capacity to compensate for the unpredictable duty cycles. Conversely, this variable route also might be served by having larger fuel cell(s) rather than battery packs

Hydrogen tanks

While spherical hydrogen tanks are the optimum for the weight-to-strength ratio, they do not package well on trucks. Long, constant diameter cylinders with rounded ends are the primary shape to consider. These shapes are very similar to those evolved for CNG-based trucks where they are typically packaged behind the cab in modular units.  Placing the tanks behind the cab increases the wheelbase. Placing the tanks in this region also requires maintaining adequate swing and dip clearances to trailers, so trailer gaps need to be maintained.

Ballard said, “Using an estimated specific density of 36kg tank weight per 1kg of hydrogen yielded a tank weight of 3910kg (8,600 lbs.)” in its report on the potential of applying fuel cells to NACFE’s Run on Less Regional demonstration fleet diesel vehicles. The net weight impact was estimated by Ballard “to weigh 7,750 lbs. (3,520kg) more than a diesel truck.” A gauge for estimating relative weight impact of fuel cell tractors is that current CNG trucks are approximately 1,500-2,000 lbs. heavier than their diesel counterparts, the added weight due to the net impact of the tanks, plumbing and frame length versus the parts removed from emission systems. The current prototype battery electric drayage trucks are approximately 7,000 to 10,000 lbs. heavier than diesel, NACFE learned from consultations with a variety of sources operating these early prototype vehicles. Fuel cell tanks will be somewhat heavier than their CNG counterparts in order to deal with the higher pressures.

Carbon fiber has become a material of choice to use in hydrogen tanks for vehicles. Carbon fiber has the strength of steels yet is 10%-30% lighter for the same performance. They can be three to five times more energy intensive to fabricate than conventional steel, according to the DOE group that evaluates and promotes lightweight material manufacturing and use, the Advanced Manufacturing Office (AMO). There are cost increases with using carbon fiber over steel, as lightweight materials generally carry cost premiums since they are more expensive in energy, time and effort to make.

Fuel Cell buses

There are 14 operating today, with an average cost of $1,920,000 ($1,270,000 to $2,400,000). They are not yet at the commercial stage, but in the technology demonstration state.  Class 8 trucks are significantly more demanding than buses, which will require many years of development to reach the commercial stage.  heavy-duty trucks see 80,000 miles to more than 140,000 miles per year pulling heavy loads in all weather and traffic conditions. Where buses have known dedicated routes and conditions, with generally slower speeds and passenger friendly stopping and accelerations, heavy-duty trucks see highway speeds and urban travel with more demanding stops and starts due to their 60,000- to 80,000- lb. vehicle weights. It’s not that automotive and bus technology cannot migrate to trucks, but the systems that do migrate must go through significantly greater validation to achieve reliability, environmental and performance requirements as outlined in NACFE’s Defining Production report [33].

Efficiency:  While the vehicle fuel efficiency is an important indicator, a whole system perspective is also needed — what is termed well-to-wheel (WTW) as opposed to tank-to-wheel (TTW) or well-to-tank (WTT)

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is Wel-to-wheel-versus-well-to-tank.jpg

Well to wheel (WTS) versus tank-to-wheel (TTW) and well-to-tank (WTT)

WTW quantifies the entire system from extracting oil in the ground, to transporting it to a refinery, to refining it into diesel fuel, to transporting the diesel fuel to a truck stop, storing it and ultimately delivering the fuel into a truck’s fuel tank, and then finally consuming the fuel to move the truck down the road. Efficiencies for the total system are much more challenging to measure because details of all intermediate steps are not always visible and quantifying them through prorating can be complex.

From a public policy perspective, the real killer for H2FC cars is their wind-to-wheel (or solar-to-wheel) inefficiency. Driving a small family car 100km, whether H2FC or BEV, uses 15kWh of motive energy at the wheels. For the BEV, taking into account losses on the grid and in the battery cycle and drive train, that translates into a need to generate 25kWh at the plant where the electricity is generated. The equivalent for the H2FC car, given losses in electrolysis, compression, transport, storage and reconversion of hydrogen, is at least 50kWh. Put simply, hydrogen cars are half as efficient as BEVs – and there is no reason in physics to think that will change. There is reason why [Teslas’s] Elon Musk calls them “fool cell” cars. BEVs are 2X to 3X more efficient than hydrogen fuel cells on a WTW basis

Safety

Hydrogen-based tractors may not be viable for all routes in the U.S. or Canada due to unacceptable levels of risk in locations such as the Eisenhower Tunnel in Colorado or other tunnels and enclosed spaces like warehouses or underground facilities. The challenge is that transporting highly combustible fuels is sometimes restricted on routes. Fuel haulers have additional rules to follow. A hydrogen fuel cell truck is hauling not only a highly combustible fuel, it is hauling a 10,000 psi storage container.  A further modern element of concern is intentional use of these vehicles as weapons in terrorism. This risk is likely similar to that faced by fuel haulers, which may necessitate additional driver certification and background checks for hydrogen powered tractors.

Emissions

Adding to the complexity of defining the system is that physically making the vehicle and the infrastructure to support it also factors into the net system emissions. For example, while a wind turbine spinning in Texas is emission free in providing energy, prior to that point, fabricating, shipping and installing the wind turbine blades and parts are not emission free, and typically require fossil fuel energy expenditures to get the raw materials and then to manufacture (under business as usual). These wind turbines are capital investments which wear out in use, and parts must be disposed of, again requiring energy expenditures and having environmental considerations.

Related Articles

Read more posts about hydrogen here, especially Hydrogen: The dumbest & most impossible renewable.

Hydrogen trucks also need finite platinum group elements, precious elements, and rare earth elements.  And a battery, but there are many challenges batteries must overcome.

The battery must be charged, the hydrogen electrolyzed, yet it won’t in the long term, because the electric grid can’t stay up without utility scale energy storage of at least a month of electricity to compensate for seasonal deficits (see When Trucks Stop Running Chapter 17 The Electric Blues: Energy Storage for Calm and Cloudy Day). Natural gas fulfills that role now, but it is finite. The electric grid could crash from a weapon or solar flare electromagnetic pulse and be down for a year or more. Electric trucks are impossible. Without trucks, civilization fails. Manufacturing uses over half of all fossil fuels, and depends on the high heat only they can generate (also see Chapter 9 of my book Life After Fossil Fuels).

References

Calstart. 2013. I-710 project zero-emission truck commercialization study. Calstart for Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 4.7.

Casey T (2023) For Fuel Cell Trucks, Nikola Cooks Up Hydrogen Fueling Station On-The-Go. https://cleantechnica.com/2023/01/28/for-fuel-cell-trucks-nikola-cooks-up-hydrogen-fueling-station-on-the-go/

den Boer, E. et al. 2013. Zero emissions trucks. Delft.

DOE. 2011. Advanced technologies for high efficiency clean vehicles. Vehicle Technologies Program. Washington DC: United States Department of Energy.

Ford, J. 2020.  The world must look beyond sun snd wind for hydrogen. We need lots of the gas, and cheaply, if it is to help replace liquid carbon fuels. Financial times

ICCT. July 2013. Zero emissions trucks. An overview of state-of-the-art technologies and their potential. International Council for Clean Transportation.

Patterson, R. 2019. Was 2018 the peak for crude oil production? oilprice.com

Romm, J. J. 2005. The Hype About Hydrogen: Fact and Fiction in the Race to Save the Climate. Island Press.

Posted in Batteries, Electric & Hydrogen trucks impossible, Hydrogen, Trucks: Electric | Tagged , , , , , | 3 Comments

A billion new autos by 2030 will kill climate change

Preface. The article below argues that electric cars aren’t going to replace gas and diesel vehicles enough to lessen greenhouse emissions.

The average electric vehicle requires 30 kilowatt-hours to travel 100 miles — the same amount of electricity an average American home uses each day to run appliances, computers, lights and heating and air conditioning. If electric cars expand, a U.S. Department of Energy study found that increased electrification across all sectors of the economy could boost national consumption of electricity by as much as 38% by 2050, in large part because of electric vehicles  (Brown 2020).

I would argue that since two-thirds of electricity is still generated with natural gas and coal, emissions will certainly go up.  Wind and solar won’t put much of a dent in that 66% fossil usage in the future either, because the best areas for solar and wind power have already been built, and the new transmission lines cost far more than the solar and wind power generated in more distant unexploited areas.  Also, when natural gas and coal are burned to generate electricity, two-thirds of the energy contained in them is lost as heat, so only one-third of their energy makes it onto the transmission grid, where another 6 to 10% is lost over the wires, so as little as 23% of the fossil energy reaches your electric socket. Better to just burn the natural gas directly in cars perhaps.

And finally, until we have massive energy stored in batteries and pumped hydropower, we simply have to have natural gas to balance intermittent wind and solar power or they’ll bring the grid down.

Do the math: expensive electric cars that only the top 5% can afford are not replacing natural gas and coal.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Jolly, D. December 7, 2015. Despite Push for Cleaner Cars, Sheer Numbers Could Work Against Climate Benefits. New York Times.

The number of automobiles on the world’s roads is on pace to double — to more than two billion — by 2030. And more likely than not, most of those cars will be burning carbon-emitting gasoline or diesel fuels.

That is because much of the expansion will be propelled by the rise of the consumer class in industrializing parts of the globe, especially in China and India, as hundreds of millions of new drivers discover the glory of the open road. Those populous and geographically sprawling countries might be hard pressed any time soon to assemble the ubiquitous electricity grid required for recharging electric vehicles; and much of the electricity China and India will produce in coming decades will come from coal-fired power plants that are some of the planet’s biggest emitters of carbon dioxide.

Given the limitations of electric cars so far — including their limited range between charges — many experts predict that most of the billion additional cars predicted to be on the road in 2030 will have internal combustion engines that spew greenhouse gases.

But virtually everyone who studies the issue understands that transportation, which is still 95% reliant on petroleum, is the world’s fastest-growing energy-based contributor to greenhouse gases. About three-quarters of the total comes from motor vehicles.

But optimists argue that even in the case of cars with internal-combustion engines, carbon dioxide emissions can be cut significantly by measures like increasing fuel economy and introducing smart-driving technologies to make cars move about with greater efficiency.

The countries with the most cars today have set aggressive goals for improving fuel mileage. The United States, under President Obama’s fleetwide standards for carmakers, is aiming for an average of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, up from about 30 m.p.g. now. China is aiming for 50.1 miles per gallon, and the European Union 60.6.

Still, the math is daunting. If the number of cars doubles, and the average mileage improves by only 50%, all of the fuel-economy gains would be offset by the emissions from the new vehicles.

And that assumes the auto industry does its part to comply with the new standards and that national regulators diligently enforce them. Recent revelations that Volkswagen, for one, deliberately misled regulators, and that European Union air-quality standards and enforcement have been far from rigorous, do not inspire confidence.

“But the automakers are attacking these standards as we speak, both in Congress and through a review of the program they demanded from the Obama administration,” Mr. Becker said. “Similar attacks are underway in the E.U.”

Congress, in an effort to make the United States more energy independent, passed a law in 2007 mandating a 35 m.p.g. auto-fleet standard by 2020. But before that, there had been no official change to American fuel-economy standards in more than 30 years.

“The U.S. auto industry was successful between 1975 and 2007 in preventing any improvement for mileage standards for CO2 emissions,” Mr. Becker said. “They exploit every loophole in the standards, making more SUVs, pickups and other light duty trucks than cars because trucks have weaker standards than cars, and more large vehicles because large vehicles have weaker standards than smaller vehicles.”

But Mr. Becker, at the Safe Climate Campaign, points out that electric vehicles are only as environmentally friendly as the electricity that recharges them. China, though it is rapidly adopting nuclear power plants, is still heavily reliant on coal-fired electrical plants.

And India, where the biggest growth in automobile ownership is expected to occur as the country industrializes and its population surpasses China’s by 2030, might actually increase its reliance on coal-fired electrical power plants between now and then.

“At the end of the day, when you talk about transport emissions for transport in general, including for freight transport, they increase when the economy is growing,” he said. “So what are we going to say, we’re going to stop the economy to stop emissions?”

References

Brown, A. 2020. Electric cars will challenge state power grids. Boston.com

Posted in Automobiles, Climate Change | 13 Comments

Methane apocalypse? Not likely.

Preface. The four articles below explain why methane from permafrost or hydrates are not likely to erupt abruptly and send Earth into a hothouse hell.  In addition, here are some posts debunking Guy McPherson who believes the world will end in a methane apocalypse:

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Dyonisius, M. N., et al. 2020.  Old carbon reservoirs were not important in the deglacial methane budget. Science 21: 907-910

Researchers studied methane emissions from a period in Earth’s history partly analogous to the warming of Earth today. Their research, published in Science, indicates that even if methane is released from these large natural stores in response to warming, very little actually reaches the atmosphere in large quantities.

This finding suggests that methane emissions from future warming will likely not be as large as some have suggested.

This is due to several natural buffers. In the case of methane hydrates, if the methane is released in the deep ocean, most of it is dissolved and oxidized by ocean microbes before it ever reaches the atmosphere.

If the methane in permafrost forms deep enough in the soil, it may be oxidized by bacteria that eat the methane, or the carbon in the permafrost may never turn into methane and may instead be released as carbon dioxide.

Mooney, C. 2013. How Much Should You Worry About an Arctic Methane Bomb? Mother Jones.

A popular theory of a giant methane burp as the killer is known as the “clathrate gun” hypothesis  posits a sudden and massive release of methane hydrates from the land, on ocean shelves, and the depths of the ocean.  There are many reasons to question this though:

  1. Majorowicz (2014) found methane hydrate reservoirs would have melted over 100 to 400 thousand years in the hothouse Permian world, long before the first extinction pulse
  2. Hydrates only form in cool oceans, like those of today, and there isn’t much carbon in them, somewhere between 500 and 2500 GtC (Milkov 2004). Yet this is far more than what would have existed in Permian oceans, and just a small fraction of the overall 24,000 to 46,000 GtC Siberian Trap emissions.
  3. Ocean hydrates would have also been far less extensive than they are today because super continent Pangea had far fewer miles of hydrate-containing continental shelves than the shelf length of our multiple continents today (Wignall 2017).
  4. Methane is a far more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, but doesn’t last long in the air because it oxidizes to CO2 and water vapor in about 9 years
  5. It is not likely deep water methane hydrates would reach the atmosphere since they’d be oxidized in the water column (Rupple 2011).

Even if there were a methane hydrate burp in the first killer pulse, a new suspect has to be found for the second killing pulse, since there was no cooling in the 200,000 year interval between them.  It takes millions of years of cold water for methane hydrates to form again after they’ve melted.

Milkov (2004) concludes “A significantly smaller global gas hydrate inventory implies that the role of gas hydrates in the global carbon cycle may not be as significant as speculated previously.

References

  • Majorowicz, J., et al. 2014. Gas hydrate contribution to Late Permian global warming. Earth and Planetary Science Letters 393:243-253.
  • Milkov, A. 2004. Global estimates of hydrate-bound gas in marine sediments: How much is really out there? Earth-Science Reviews 66: 183-197.
  • Rupple, C. D. 2011. Methane Hydrates and Contemporary Climate Change. Nature Education Knowledge.
  • Wignall, P. B.  2017. The Worst of Times: How Life on Earth Survived Eighty Million Years of Extinctions. Princeton University Press.

SBC. June 2015. Gas Hydrates. Taking the heat out of the burning-ice debate. Potential and future of Gas Hydrates. SBC energy institute.

Recent studies (e.g. Whiteman et al) have raised the alarm that methane emissions could occur in the Arctic, especially over the East Siberian Shelf and in Siberian Lakes (e.g. Shakhova et al). However, there is a vigorous academic debate on the origin and potential impact of these emissions. As acknowledged by the IPCC: “How much of this CH4 originates from decomposing organic carbon or from destabilizing hydrates is not known. There is also no evidence available to determine whether these sources have been stimulated by recent regional warming, or whether they have always existed since the last deglaciation. More research is therefore urgently needed.

The first uncertainty is the amount of gas hydrates stored on Earth. Global gas-in-place estimates range over an order of magnitude 1,000-20,000 tcm, with most estimates around 3,000 tcm. Estimates are even more uncertain at the regional level. For instance, there are no models for Antarctic reservoirs, and estimates for Arctic permafrost have only been done recently.

In the permafrost, additional uncertainty arises from the origin of methane emissions, whereas in the case of ocean sediments, the mechanisms by which methane is released and its ability to reach the atmosphere are also disputed. So are the biochemical and chemical consequences that gas-hydrate releases would have on oxidation mechanisms e.g. there may be resource limitations hindering methane oxidation in the ocean.

Since gas hydrates are only stable under high pressures and at low temperatures, there have been concerns that climate change could result in gas-hydrate dissociation and the release of methane into the atmosphere. The response of gas hydrates to climate change has only been investigated recently. Modelling in this field is in its infancy and faces major uncertainties. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that gas-hydrate dissociation is likely to be a regional phenomenon, rather than a global one, and more likely to occur in subsea permafrost and upper continental shelves than in deep-water reservoirs, which make up the majority of gas hydrates. Indeed,the later are relatively well insulated from climate change because of the slow propagation of warming and the long ventilation time of the ocean. Moreover, the release of methane from gas-hydrate dissociation should be chronic rather than explosive, as was once assumed;and emissions to the atmosphere caused by hydrate dissociation should be in the form of CO2 because of the oxidation of methane in the water column.

no MH apocalypse Thermal diffusivity and ocean thermal

Graphs adapted from Archer (2007), “Methane hydrate stability and anthropogenic climate change”. In the graph on the right, ventilation timescale corresponds to the timescale required by temperature (heat), pressure and solutes such as methane to diffuse through the sediments

Ocean thermal response varies according to depth, as highlighted in the graph above (left), but also from place to place, especially in deep-water locations, due to ocean currents. In sediments, the diffusion of heat towards deeper layers takes time and varies primarily according to depth, but also according to the composition of the sediment and to the geothermal gradient.  Heat can diffuse approximately 100 meters in about 300 years (point A). Solutes such as dissolved methane diffuse even more slowly (100 meters in about 30,000 years), point B), while pressure perturbation (e.g. following a sea-level rise) diffuses more quickly (100 meters in about 3 years), point C.

As a result of thermal inertia, heat diffusion and the melting of permafrost take time, and should be slow enough to insulate most hydrate deposits from expected anthropogenic warming over a 100-year timescale. Nevertheless, temperature increases in high latitudes, such as the Arctic, are expected to be much higher than increases in the mean global temperature, and are therefore more likely to affect gas-hydrates reservoirs. Rises in sea level would result in pressure increases at the seafloor that may mitigate further dissociation of offshore gas-hydrate deposits. However, it is likely to be insufficient to negate the warming.

Even if warming were to reach the gas hydrate stability zone, the fate of any methane released would be uncertain.Gas could escape if the pressure exceeded the sediment’s lithostatic pressure, but it might also remain in place. In addition, since gas-hydrate dissociation will start at the edge of the stability zone, even if gas were able to migrate, it might subsequently be trapped in newly formed hydrates.

Finally, even if methane were able to migrate towards the seafloor, it would probably not reach the atmosphere. Most methane is expected to be oxidized in the water column rather than released by bubble plumes or other “transport pathways” directly into the atmosphere as methane. Nevertheless, the oxidation of methane produces CO2, which will have an impact on ocean acidification and will remain in the atmosphere.

The susceptibility of gas-hydrate deposits to climate-change-induced dissociation varies significantly, according to reservoir location

The susceptibility of gas-hydrate deposits to climate-change-induced dissociation varies significantly, according to reservoir location. (1) Moridis et al.2011. Challenges, uncertainties and issues facing production from gas hydrate deposits.

The risk of climate change causing gas-hydrate dissociation and methane leaks varies significantly by location.This can be explained by depth differentials, the existence of mitigation mechanisms such as water-column oxidation, or by the exposure of gas-hydrate deposits to varying regional warming phenomena. High-latitude warming is expected to be much greater than global-mean-temperature warming.

As a rule-of-thumb, gas hydrates held within subsea permafrost on the circum-Arctic ocean shelves and on upper continental slopes are the most prone to dissociation. Subsea permafrost, which were flooded under relatively warm waters due to sea level rises thousands of years ago, have been exposed to dramatic rises in temperature that have led to a significant degradation both of subsea permafrost and t he gas hydrates within it.The latter are believed to store a greater quantity of gas hydrates than the former, but methane releases are less likely to reach directly the atmosphere because of oxidation in the water column.

However, it is very unlikely that climate warming will disturb gas-hydrate deposits that are held in deep-water reservoirs around 95% of all deposits on a millennial timescale. Finally,
gas hydrates in seafloor mounds may also dissociate as a result of warming, overlying water or pressure perturbation, but these account for a very limited share of gas hydrates in place.

The sensitivity of gas-hydrate deposits in onshore permafrost,especially at the top of the hydrate stability zone, is more uncertain and subject to greater debate

Archer et al. calculated that between 35 and 940 GtC of methane could escape as a result of global warming of 3° C, with maximum consequences of adding a further 0.5° C to global warming. On top of the uncertainty reflected in the range above, there are other considerable uncertainties, notably concerning the effectiveness of mitigation mechanisms and the long-term outlook, since methane will continue to be released, even if warming stops.

Reagan and Moridis (2007), “Oceanic gas hydrate instability and dissociation under climate change scenarios”;
Maslin et al. (2010), “Gas hydrates: past and future geohazard?”;
Shakhova et al. (2010), “Predicted Methane Emission on the East Siberian Shelf”;
Whitemann et al. (2013), “Climate science: Vast costs of Arctic change”

Ananthaswamy, A. May 20, 2015 Methane apocalypse? Defusing the Arctic’s time bomb. NewScientist.

Do the huge craters pockmarking Siberia herald a release of underground methane that could exceed our worst climate change fears?  They look like massive bomb craters. So far 7 of these gaping chasms have been discovered in Siberia, apparently caused by pockets of methane exploding out of the melting permafrost. Has the Arctic methane time bomb begun to detonate in a more literal way than anyone imagined?

The “methane time bomb” is the popular shorthand for the idea that the thawing of the Arctic could at any moment trigger the sudden release of massive amounts of the potent greenhouse gas methane, rapidly accelerating the warming of the planet. Some refer to it in more dramatic terms: the Arctic methane catastrophe or methane apocalypse.

Some scientists have been issuing dire warnings about this. There is even an Arctic Methane Emergency Group. Others, though, think that while we are on course for catastrophic warming, the one thing we don’t need to worry about is the so-called methane time bomb. The possibility of an imminent release massive enough to accelerate warming can be ruled out, they say. So who is right?

Few scientists think there is any chance of limiting warming to 2 °C, even though many still publicly support this goal. Our carbon dioxide emissions are the main cause of the warming, but methane is a significant player.

Methane is a highly potent greenhouse gas – causing 86 times as much warming per molecule as CO2 over a 20-year period. Fortunately, there’s very little of it in the atmosphere. Before humans arrived on the scene there was less than 1000 parts per billion. Levels started rising very slowly around 5000 years ago, possibly to due to rice farming. They’ve gone up more since the industrial age began: the fossil fuel industry is by far the single biggest source, followed by farting farm animals, leaking landfills and so on. Only a tiny percentage comes from melting Arctic permafrost.

The level in the atmosphere is now nearing 1900 ppb, but that’s still low. CO2 levels were much higher to start with, around 270,000 ppb before the industrial age. They have now shot up to 400,000 ppb today. The main reason is that CO2 persists for hundreds of years, so even small increases in emissions lead to its buildup in the atmosphere, just as water dripping into a bath with the plug left in can fill the bath eventually.

Methane, by contrast, breaks down after just 12 years, so its level in the atmosphere can only increase if there are big ongoing emissions.

So for methane to cause a big jump in global warming there not only has to be a massive source, it has to be released very rapidly. Is there such a source?

Yes, claim a few scientists. They point to the Arctic permafrost, and specifically to the East Siberian Arctic shelf. This vast submerged shelf underlies a huge area of the Arctic Ocean, which is less than 100 meters deep in most places. During past ice ages, when sea level dropped 120 meters, the land froze solid.

This permafrost was covered by rising seas as the ice age ended around 15,000 years ago. The upper layer has been slowly melting as the relative warmth of the seawater penetrates down. But the frozen layer is still hundreds of meters thick. No one doubts that there is plenty of carbon locked away in and under it. The questions are, how much is there, how much will come out in the form of methane, and how fast?

Natalia Shakhova of the International Arctic Research Center at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, has been studying the East Siberian Arctic shelf for more than two decades. Her team has made more than 30 expeditions to the region, in winter and in summer, collected thousands of water samples and tons of seabed cores during four drilling campaigns and made millions of measurements of ambient levels of methane in the air.

Her team has estimated that there is a whopping 1750 gigatons of methane buried in and below the subsea permafrost, some of it in the form of methane hydrates – an ice-like substance that forms when methane and water combine under the right temperature and pressure. What’s more, they say that the permafrost is already beginning to thaw in places. “Our results show that… [the] subsea permafrost is perforating and opening gas migration paths for methane from the seabed to be released to the water column,” says Shakhova.

Her team’s work hit the headlines in 2010, when in a letter in the journal Science they reported finding more than 100 hot spots where methane was bubbling out from the seabed. But as others pointed out, it was not clear whether these emissions were something new or had been going on for thousands of years.

More sensational stuff was to follow. In another 2010 paper, the team explored the consequences of 50 gigatons of methane – 3% of their estimated total – entering the atmosphere (Doklady Earth Sciences, vol 430, p 190). If this happened over five years methane levels could soar to 20,000 ppb, albeit briefly. Using a simple model, the team calculated that if the world was on course to warm 2 °C by 2100, the extra methane would lead to additional warming of 1.3 °C, so temperatures would hit 3.3 °C by 2100.

This study appeared in an obscure journal and did not get much attention at the time. But then Peter Wadhams of the University of Cambridge and colleagues decided to see how much difference a huge methane release between 2015 and 2025 would make when added to an existing model of the economic costs of global warming. “A 50-gigaton reservoir of methane, stored in the form of hydrates, exists on the East Siberian Arctic shelf,” they stated in Nature, citing Shakhova’s paper as evidence. “It is likely to be emitted as the seabed warms, either steadily over 50 years or suddenly. Understandably, this was big news.

But in reality the idea that 50 gigatons could suddenly be released, or that there’s a store of 1750 gigatons in total, is very far from being accepted fact. On the contrary, Patrick Crill, a biogeochemist at Stockholm University in Sweden who studies methane release from the Arctic, says it is simply untenable. He wants Shakhova’s team to be more open about how they came up with these figures. “The data aren’t available,” says Crill. “It’s not very clear how those extrapolations are made, what the geophysics are that lead to those kinds of claims.

Shakhova now says, “We never stated that 50 gigatons is likely to be released in near or distant future.” It is true that the 2010 study explores the consequences of the release of 50 gigatons rather than explicitly claiming that this will happen. However, it has certainly been widely misunderstood both by other scientists and the media. And her team’s papers continue to fuel the idea that we should be worried about dramatic and damaging releases of methane from the Arctic.

But other researchers disagree. “The Arctic methane catastrophe hypothesis mostly works if you believe that there is a lot of methane hydrate,” says Carolyn Ruppel, who heads the gas hydrates project for the US Geological Survey in Woods Hole, Massachusetts. And her team estimates that there are only 20 gigatons of permafrost-associated hydrates in the Arctic (Journal of Chemical and Engineering Data, vol 60, p 429). If this is right, there’s little reason for concern.

The issue is not just how much methane hydrate there is, but whether it could be released rapidly enough to build up to high levels.

This could happen soon only if the hydrates are shallow enough to be destabilized by heat from the warming Arctic Ocean.

But David Archer of the University of Chicago says that hydrates could only exist hundreds of meters below the sea floor. That’s far too deep for any surface warming to have a rapid impact. The heat will take thousands of years to work its way down to that depth, he calculated last year, and only then will the hydrates respond (Biogeosciences Discussions, vol 12, p 1). “There is no way to get it all out on a short timescale,” says Archer. “That’s the crux of my position.

This concerted push back against the idea of an impending methane bomb has led to something of a feud. Commenting on Archer’s paper, for instance, Shakhova said he clearly knew nothing about the topic. She has repeatedly pointed out that her team has actual experience of collecting data in the East Siberian Ice shelf, unlike her detractors.

But there is skepticism about Shakhova’s actual measurements, too. For instance, her team has reported that methane levels above some hotspots in the East Siberian shelf were as high as 8000 ppb. Last summer, Crill was aboard the Swedish icebreaker Oden, measuring levels of methane over the East Siberian shelf. Nowhere did he find levels this high. Even when the Oden ventured near the hotspots identified by Shakhova’s team, he never saw levels much beyond 2000 ppb. “There was no indication of any large-scale rapid degassing,” says Crill.

It’s not clear why other teams are finding lower levels than Shakhova’s. But to find out if a catastrophic release of methane is imminent, there is another line of evidence we can turn to. Thanks to ice cores from places like Greenland, we have a record of past methane levels going back hundreds of thousands of years. If there are lots of shallow hydrates in the Arctic poised to release methane as soon it warms up a little, they should have done so in the past, and this should show up in the ice cores, says Gavin Schmidt of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York.

Around 6000 years ago, although the world as a whole was not warmer, Arctic summers were much warmer thanks to the peculiarities of Earth’s orbit. There is no sign of any short-term spikes in methane at this time. “There’s absolutely nothing,” says Schmidt. “If those methane hydrates were there, they were there 6000 years ago. They weren’t triggered 6000 years ago, so it’s unlikely they’d be triggered imminently.

During the last interglacial period, 125,000 years ago, when temperatures in the Arctic were about 3 °C warmer than now, methane levels rose a little, as expected in warmer periods, but never exceeded 750 ppb. Again, there’s no sign of the kind of spike a large release would produce.

There is, then, no solid evidence to back the idea of a methane bomb and past climate records suggest there is no cause for alarm. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof, otherwise it’s going to undermine credibility and slow down our ability to actually make the decisions that we are going to have to make as a society.

No one is saying methane is not a concern. Levels are now the highest they’ve been for at least 800,000 years and climbing. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s worst-case emissions scenario assumes a big rise in methane, to as much as 4000 ppb by 2100.

What about the gaping craters? They are certainly spectacular and scary-looking. The latest idea is that they are caused by the release of pockets of compressed methane as ice seals melt. But the amount of methane released per crater is minuscule in global terms. Around 20 million craters would have to form within a few years to release 50 gigatons of the gas.

Posted in CO2 and Methane, Methane Hydrates | Tagged , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Super heavy trucks ruin roads

Preface. I’m writing a book now which concludes that only biomass and biofuels can replace diesel and other fossil fuels.  But 3 billion people are expected to arrive by 2050, consuming a good chunk of the biomass, plus it will be needed to replace half a million products made from fossil fuels, generate heat for homes and buildings, generate electricity, and dozens of other fossil fuel uses.  Rural roads will take even more of a beating than they already are.

There are two articles below, the first about rural roads falling apart, and the second excerpts from a 302 page National Research Council study of Super Heavy commercial trucks that can weigh 2 million pounds.  Ouch. Though after reading the whole damn thing, I never did found out the cost we taxpayers shoulder.  But I did find what these super heavy objects were of interest, and show some of them below. 

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

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Cohen, P. 2020. The struggle to mend America’s rural roads. As supersize vehicles bear heavier loads, maintenance budgets can’t keep up. New York Times.

Picture this:  County highway workers in bright safety vests pour scalding liquid rubber bandages on the road to cover the worst gashes. From above, it looks like skywriting — as if the bandages on the highway were spelling out a message for readers in the clouds.

The roads look like losers in a barroom brawl. Thick, jagged cracks run down the asphalt like scars, interrupted at points by bruised bumps. In some places, guardrails are tilted off their moorings like a pair of glasses knocked askew.

Rural roads are falling apart in small agricultural counties and towns across the Midwest and South, with eroding shoulders dangerous to the 80,000 pound trucks full of soybeans careening down the road. Reconstruction costs $300,000 per mile, and short-term patching $17,000 per mile.

Two-thirds of U.S. freight originates in rural areas where traffic volume has increased from heavy supersized tractor-trailers and farm equipment.  In the spring thaw, melting will create soft spots easily damaged by heavy trucks.

These behemoths can produce 5,000 to 10,000 times the road damage of one car (TIC 2020). Although only 19% of American’s live in rural areas, they have 68% of total road miles.

Asphalt roads only have a lifespan of 30 years.  Some county’s have roads far older than that.

The result is emergency closings and weight limits. Sometimes a farmer can’t easily move equipment from one field to another.  Truckers have to make long detours to deliver feed and fertilizers.  Trucks break down with broken axles, wrecked suspension systems, and flat tires.

States often don’t have the money to fix roads.  For example, in Wisconsin the gas tax hasn’t gone up since 2006.   Often there’s no state or federal assistance either.

Reference

TIC. 2020. How vehicle loads affect pavement performance. Transportation Information Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

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NRC. 2015. Practices for Permitting Superheavy Load Movements on Highway Pavements. National Research Council, National Academies Press. 

Maximum allowed superheavy vehicle weight. 1 kip = 1,000 pounds

Maximum allowed superheavy vehicle weight. 1 kip = 1,000 pounds

 

This report documents the practices followed in issuing permits for overweight and superheavy commercial vehicles (SHCVs) or “superloads.” These are trucks that exceed the thresholds set for overweight vehicles allowed to operate with annual permits throughout state highway networks. This synthesis collected detail on the practices that U.S. states and Canadian provinces use. It focuses on SHCV issues related to pavements.

The GVW of the heaviest SHCV ever permitted by some agencies exceeds 2 million pounds

570,000 pound vehicle carrying an electrical anode used in the copper refining process. It was subjected to a bridge analysis, but not to a pavement analysis. It traveled from Nevada to Miami through Arizona

570,000 pound vehicle carrying an electrical anode used in the copper refining process. It was subjected to a bridge analysis, but not to a pavement analysis. It traveled from Nevada to Miami through Arizona

 

900,000 pound water purification vessel used in oil refining

900,000 pound water purification vessel used in oil refining

A massive 900,000 pound water purification vessel used in oil refining was transported from its manufacturing origin in Portland through Oregon, Idaho, and Montana to its final destination in Alberta, Canada. The fee levied was just $4.26/mile for the entire vehicle. No seasonal restrictions were placed on the movement of this load because it was determined that the subgrade soil conditions encountered were relatively dry and therefore not susceptible to frost heave and/or spring thaw. The move took place in November 2013, during which frost and non-frost conditions were encountered. The vessel was delivered by Columbia River barge to Umatilla, Oregon, traveled for a short distance east on I-84, and then followed secondary roads south to the Idaho border near Ontario, Oregon. The vehicle had an overall length of 375 ft, 4 in. and a width of 22 ft, 2 in.  Its GVW was 900 kips and its maximum tandem axle load was 44.75 kips. It was equipped with 32 axles and its maximum tire unit load was 604 lb/in. It was propelled by two pusher tractors and one pull tractor. No pavement analysis was conducted for its impact on the I-84 continuous reinforced concrete pavement.

1.2 million pound transformer moving on Texas roads

1.2 million pound transformer moving on Texas roads

This 1.2 million pound truck is hauling a transformer from East Houston to Flat Rock, Texas, in August 2014. It had a total of 31 axle assemblies and measured 320 ft, 4 in. in length and 20 ft, 3 in. in width. The picture was taken on FM Road 3009 in Bexar County, Texas. Each trailer axle assembly consisted of two 4-tire axles side-by-side, taking the width of two adjacent roadway lanes. The heaviest axle assembly of this vehicle was 48,000 lb divided among eight tires. The move involved flag vehicles and police escorts. The permit fee charged for this vehicle was $935 and stipulated that the hauler is liable of any infrastructure damage.

The practices of permitting superheavy commercial vehicles (SHCVs) in the United States varies widely between agencies in terms of both the criteria used to define them, the analysis details for evaluating their impact on pavements, and the fees levied for permitting them.

The gross vehicle weight (GVW) thresholds used to define SHCVs vary from 120 kips to 254.3 kips. Axle load limits by configuration also vary, ranging from 20 to 29 kips for single axles on dual tires, from 34 to 60 kips for tandem axles on 8 tires, and from 50 to 81 kips for tridem axles on 12 tires. In addition, some agencies set limits on the tire weight per unit width (i.e., it varies between 500 and 800 lb/in.), whereas others do not. This obvious lack of uniformity in weight regulations reduces the weights of SHCVs traveling through multiple jurisdictions to the least common set of rules in effect through the jurisdictions involved and imposes a considerable administrative burden on shipping companies.

The literature review also suggests that SHCV single-trip fees vary considerably among the 62 jurisdictions in North America (i.e., 50 states, the District of Columbia, ten Canadian provinces, and the Yukon Territory): • Twenty-three (37%) levy SHCV permit fees that are a function of weight-distance, typically in the form of $/ton/ mile for GVW exceeding a certain value. Interestingly, some of the states that use weight-distance taxes do not use the same approach for levying SHCV permit fees. This fee ranges from $0.006/ton/mi to $0.2/ton/mi with an average value of about $0.049/ton/mi. • Fifteen (24%) levy SHCV permit fees that are related to GVW per axle weight alone and do not consider the distance traveled by the vehicles. • Eight (13%) levy a flat SHCV permit fee that ranges from $5 to $550, regardless of any pavement usage indicators, that is the weight of the vehicle or the distance traveled. • Seven (11%) levy a processing fee and may add an infrastructure usage fee after studying SHCVs on a case-bycase basis. • Two jurisdictions (3%) levy a flat fee and the cost of repairing the infrastructure from any damage rather than the cost infrastructure utilization from SHCV movement.

Thirty-eight agencies responded as to whether or not they conduct pavement analysis as part of their SHCV permit process. Of those, five (13%) always do (Delaware, Missouri, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Vermont), 15 (40%) do so depending on the circumstances (Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington State, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Texas, Virginia, British Columbia, and Ontario), whereas the remaining 18 agencies (47%) never perform such an analysis. The majority of the agencies that perform pavement analysis do so when dealing with a vehicle exceeding their definition of a SHCV. Details of pavement analysis performed were provided by 15 states. Their majority uses either their own in-house developed mechanistic empirical pavement analysis approach or the mechanistic methods developed by industry (i.e., Asphalt Pavement Association and Portland Cement Association). Several agencies indicated that they use the 1993 AASHTO Guide for the Design of Pavement Structures and characterize the truck loads in terms of equivalent single axle loads. None of the responding agencies uses the Mechanistic-Empirical Pavement Design Guide for analyzing the impact of SHCV. Additional details on the pavement analysis performed by the 15 responding states suggest that their majority uses representative thickness and layer/subgrade moduli, and consider the entire length of the SHCV. About half consider only one wheel path and the actual number of tires in the wheel path and the tire inflation pressure, while approximately 25% consider the actual vehicle speed. Furthermore, only four of the 15 responding agencies consider the stability of the pavement subgrade and of those one indicated using a Mohr– Coulomb type of analysis and another using a slope-stability numerical method type of analysis. The number of SHCV permits issued annually varies between agencies and to a large extent depends on their definition of SHCVs. The range is from fewer than 100 to more than 10,000 per year.

There have been regional efforts to establish uniform heavy truck permitting regulations in the United States, whereby a permit issued by one state is accepted for travel in other states. Twelve western states, under the auspices of the Western Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (WASHTO), Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington, agreed on a uniform set of truck weight regulations that allow trucks permitted in one of these states to legally operate throughout the rest. In summary, these limits consist of a GVW of 160 kips; tire weights of 600 lb/in. of width; overall consecutive axle weight limits governed by the Bridge Formula; and axle configuration weight limits of 21.5, 43, and 53 kips for single, tandem, and tridem axles, respectively.

The literature review suggests that SHCV single-trip fees vary widely between the 62 jurisdictions in North America (i.e., 50 states, the District of Columbia, ten Canadian provinces, and the Yukon Territory): • Twenty-three (37%) levy SHCV permit fees that are a function of weight-distance, typically in the form of $/ton/mile for GVW exceeding a certain value. Interestingly, some of the states that use weight-distance taxes do not use the same approach for levying SHCV permit fees. This fee ranges from $0.006/ton/mi to $0.2/ton/mi, with an average value of about 0.049/ton/mi. • Fifteen (24%) levy SHCV permit fees that are related to GVW/axle weight alone and do not consider at all the distance traveled by the vehicles. • Eight (13%) levy a flat SHCV permit fee that ranges from $5 to $550 regardless of any pavement usage indicators; that is, the weight of the vehicle or the distance traveled. • Seven (11%) levy a processing fee and may add an infrastructure usage fee after studying SHCVs on a case-by-case basis.

Two jurisdictions (3%) levy a flat fee and the cost of repairing the infrastructure from any damage rather than the cost infrastructure utilization from SHCV movement.

The definition of a SHCV or “superload” varies significantly among jurisdictions. Sixteen of the responding agencies (41%) define SHCV in terms of GVW alone, five (13%) use GVW and axle loads regardless of axle spacing, and another five (13%) use GVW and axle loads as a function of axle spacing. Interestingly, the remaining 13 responding agencies (33%) use an alternative definition involving vehicle size, tire loading, axle spacing, and roadway condition.

Thirty-eight agencies responded as to whether or not they conduct pavement analysis as part of their SHCV permit process. Of those, five (13%) always do (Delaware, Missouri, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Vermont), 15 (40%) do so depending on the circumstances (Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Texas, Virginia, British Columbia, and Ontario), whereas the remaining 18 agencies (47%) never perform such an analysis. The majority of the agencies that perform pavement analysis do so when dealing with a vehicle exceeding their definition of a SHCV. Details on the pavement analysis performed were provided by 15 states. Their majority uses either their own in-house developed mechanistic-empirical pavement analysis approach or the mechanistic methods developed by industry. Several agencies indicated that they use the 1993 AASHTO Guide for the Design of Pavement Structures and characterize the traffic in terms of equivalent single axle loads. None of the responding agencies uses the Mechanistic-Empirical Pavement Design Guide for analyzing the impact of SHCVs.

Additional details on the pavement analysis performed by the 15 responding states suggest that the majority use representative thickness and layer/subgrade moduli and consider the entire length of the SHCV. About half of them consider only one wheel path, the actual number of tires in the wheel path, and the tire inflation pressure, while approximately 25% consider the vehicle speed. Furthermore, only four of the 15 responding agencies consider structural failure of the pavement layers and subgrade as part of the SHCV permitting analysis. Only two of these four states gave details on the actual method used for analyzing the structural stability of the pavement layers.

The results of the survey questionnaire confirmed the findings of the literature review on the various methodologies agencies use for computing SHCV permit fees. Fifteen of the 46 responding agencies (33%) use a GVW-distance-traveled approach (Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, British Columbia, and Ontario), two use a pavement damage-distancetraveled approach (Arizona and Oregon), another two use a number of axles-distance-traveled approach (Idaho and New Jersey), while 19 (41%) use a different methodology.

The findings of this study suggest that the practice of permitting SHCVs could be significantly improved through further study of their impact on pavements and implementation of the results in establishing equitable permit fees that cover pavement utilization and/or damage.

INTRODUCTION

There is an increasing demand for highway transport of very large non-divisible shipments that not only exceed legal gross vehicle weight (GVW) and axle weight limits, but also exceed the special provisions that allow overweight vehicles to operate with routine annual permits. Such vehicles are typically allowed to operate under single-trip permits following an engineering analysis of their impact on the pavement infrastructure (pavements and bridges) on a specific route.

State and provincial practices on permitting such vehicles, henceforth to be referred to as superheavy commercial vehicles (SHCVs) or “superloads,” have a significant impact on both transportation efficiency and infrastructure condition.

The condition of the pavement infrastructure is affected where the fees collected for SHCV permitting do not cover the pavement damage cost caused by these vehicles.

The differences in weight limits between jurisdictions, even those that have common borders, are substantial. For example, a vehicle with a GVW between 150 and 199 kips crossing the Florida–Georgia border would require a SHCV permit review in Georgia but not in Florida, and would be required to have a unit tire weight of less than 550 lb/in. only in Florida, since Georgia does not have this requirement.

Similarly, a vehicle with a GVW between 144 and 191 kips crossing the Minnesota–Wisconsin border would require a SHCV permit review in Minnesota but not in Wisconsin, and would face different maximum permitted axle weights (e.g., tandem axle weights of 40 versus 60 kips and tridem axle weights of 60 versus 81 kips, respectively).

Clearly, there is a lack of uniformity in weight regulations for SHCVs between jurisdictions.

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Congress recently authorized a Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Limits Study (1) under MAP-21 funding (Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act; Section 32801), with the following objectives: • Address the differences in safety risks, infrastructure impacts, and the effect on levels of enforcement between trucks operating at or within federal truck size and weight limits and trucks legally operating in excess of federal limits; • Compare and contrast the potential safety and infrastructure impacts of alternative configurations (including configurations that exceed current federal limits) to the current federal truck size and weight law and regulations; and • Estimate the effects of freight diversion resulting from these alternative configurations.

DEFINITION OF SUPERHEAVY COMMERCIAL VEHICLES

This section summarizes the survey results related to background questions and the way SHCVs are defined and permitted in each jurisdiction. 16 of the responding agencies (41%) define SHCV in terms of a maximum GVW alone. They vary widely from 120 to 500 kips, with the most frequent value being 200 kips.   Five of the responding agencies (13%) reported that they define SHCV in terms of GVW and axle group limits regardless of axle spacing.  The wide range of GVW and load limits is again evident; GVW limits range from 80 kips to 350 kips and tandem axle loads, for example, range from 34 kips to more than 60 kips.  Another five of the responding agencies (13%) define SHCV in terms of GVW and axle group limits as a function of axle spacing. The distribution of these GVW limits, the axle group load limits, and the corresponding minimum axle spacings.  In this case, GVWs vary from 100 to 254 kips, tandem load limits from 40 to 50 kips, whereas minimum tandem axle spacings vary from 6 to 12 feet.

 

 

 

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