China is securing energy resources. A potential threat to Europe and U.S. interests.

Posted on December 11, 2017 by

Preface. China is vastly expanding its fleet of natural gas heavy-duty trucks to 700,000 in 2018 and similar or more amounts after that.  They are building pipelines to Russia and other Central Asian countries to keep the gas coming.  I vote them to be Richard Heinberg’s “Last Nation Standing”. With the Russians second, the U.S. third, and Europe among the many energy resource deprived nations to fall first.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

***

House 113-160. May 21, 2014. The development of energy resources in Central Asia. U.S. House of Representatives.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Natural resources including gas and oil are the building blocks of a nation’s economic strength and we all depend on these energy resources to power industry, heat homes, bring us our food and other goods.  The planet’s scarce resources are distributed unevenly around the globe, so history is filled with accounts of nations, states, and businesses engaged in power plays and maneuvers to secure and to move and to utilize and to sequester natural resources.

A contest of resources is playing out right now in Central Asia.

And so this hearing asks the question, what does the future hold for energy resources in Central Asia? To highlight the importance of this topic, it was just announced today that Russia and Communist China agreed on a natural gas deal worth $400 billion. This is a significant development that takes more gas off the market, and of course this gas otherwise might go to supply Europe.

I have been warning about the growing military and economic power of Communist China for years. China has grown to become the world’s largest energy consumer. This makes Central Asia’s oil and gas essential to the Chinese Communist Party and their plans. The Communist Party rules their country with an iron fist and it also threatens their neighbors.

The Communist regime is now actively engaged in expanding its influence beyond its western borders and throughout Central Asia. Their aim is to secure the access to energy resources through long term contracts, investment loans, and building pipelines back to China and perhaps bribes. Make no mistake, these deals favor the corrupt leaders of the Communist Chinese party, it solidifies their grip, and will not necessarily benefit the vast majority of the people of Central Asia. During the last decade, trade between China and the region has increased 30-fold and continues to climb. This is happening as the spectacle of China’s worldwide effort to fence off critical natural resources from the West through bribes and intimidation’s continue. This is quite evident.

 

Mr. KEATING. Today’s hearing topic provides us with an opportunity to examine the global impact of climate change and expanding world population and accompanying social unrest.

In March 2013, for the first time Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, listed competition and scarcity involving natural resources as a national security threat on a par with global terrorism, cyber war, and nuclear proliferation.

Central Asian states have long been pressured by Russia to yield large portions of their energy wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing export pipelines. Further, Chinese interest in the region is growing as well. Over the past decade, China has dramatically increased its imports from the region. Today, China imports over half of its gas from Turkmenistan. And last week, the Turkmen President presided over the opening of a new processing plant that will further increase the flow of Turkmen gas to China.

 

DENNIS C. SHEA, CHAIRMAN, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

Over the last decade, China’s engagement with its Central Asian neighbors has grown significantly. In a region with a long history of Russian control and influence, China is now the most powerful economic actor and is poised eventually to surpass the United States and Russia as Central Asia’s preeminent foreign power.

The Chinese Government is increasing its economic ties with Central Asia particularly in the energy sector for two main strategic reasons. First, Beijing is expanding its energy relationship with Central Asian states as part of a long term energy security strategy designed to diversify the types and sources of energy in an effort to reduce the risk of disruption of supply. Some Chinese policy makers believe this strategy could mitigate China’s so-called Malacca dilemma, or vulnerability to other countries imposing a blockade on Chinese trade at critical maritime chokepoints. However, Chinese growth in oil demand is such that the share of seaborne imports will increase even if all China’s planned overland energy routes are realized. Second, Beijing seeks to promote the security and development of its Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Beijing judges increased economic ties between China’s westernmost region and Central Asia will raise the welfare of the ethnic Uyghurs thereby helping to rein in ethnic unrest in Xinjiang.

Chinese companies own so many projects in Kazakhstan that experts estimate China controls between 25 and 50% of the country’s oil production. Turkmenistan accounts for more than half of China’s natural gas imports, and its future share of imports will likely increase with plans to elevate imports from 20 billion cubic meters per year in 2013 to 65 billion cubic meters by 2016.

Many Central Asian governments welcome China’s increasing economic engagement. Chinese investment, trade deals, and loans have enabled economic growth and development. However, Chinese economic engagement in Central Asia can be a double-edged sword. The region’s overreliance on energy exports to sustain growth can slow the development of competitive industries and democratic institutions. Additionally, at the local level allegations of poor business behavior by Chinese companies have led to protest and violence against Chinese workers and businesses.

The rise of Chinese influence in Central Asia at the expense of Russia coupled with the probable decline in overall U.S. interests in the region after the planned withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan will likely result in a major shift in the balance of power between the major external actors in favor of China.

 

CHARLIE SANTOS, CHAIRMAN, UZBEKISTAN INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.

While we sacrificed more than 3,000 lives and spent more than $1 trillion on a nation-building exercise in Afghanistan, China sought to fill our policy vacuum, focusing on energy and pipelines in Central Asia, taking a page literally out of our policy playbook. So far they have constructed two pipelines, a third to be finished this year, and a fourth expected in 2017.

Our allies in Europe, with even more at stake in pursuing gas resources in countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, followed the U.S. lead even when it meant losing the possibility of greater energy supply diversification. This has led to greater dependence on Russian gas. With the withdrawal from Afghanistan and growing East-West tensions, 2014 has demonstrated that our disengagement from Central Asia has left the U.S. and its European allies doubly exposed.

Finally, there is no single way to solve Europe’s energy dependency or bring stability to the region, particularly Afghanistan. But ignoring the importance of Central Asia, particularly the key countries that border Afghanistan and forgetting our initial insights about the region will surely make matters worse. When we ignore building broader strategic relationships, as we have during the past 12 years, we make our country and our allies more vulnerable. The confluence of the Afghan withdrawal and growing tension in Europe this year is giving us a chance to refocus our policies to help build a stronger and more independent Central Asia. It is an opportunity we should not squander.

 

DAVID MERKEL, former director, Europe & Eurasia, National Security Council

If we are going to decouple Central Asia from Russia or the growing influence in China, we need to join it up with Europe through Azerbaijan.

We need to have a higher level of engagement in the region. No sitting President has visited the region. Through bilateral and multilateral engagements, the Presidents of China and Russia meet almost on a monthly basis. We shouldn’t try and compete with that, we don’t need to. But if we had a meeting in Baku with the President of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and President Aliyev, it would send a clear signal that the United States is supportive not of bypassing Russia, not of punishing anybody, but a very strong message for competition.

 

JEFFREY MANKOFF, deputy director & fellow, Russia & Eurasia program Center for strategic and international studies

The major beneficiary of the struggles that both the United States and Russia have faced in this region has of course been China. And the reasons for China’s success are not hard to grasp. It is a growing market with exponentially expanding energy demand.

China state-owned energy companies do not face the same financial constraints as Western firms. Flush with cash, comparatively insulated from the need to make an immediate return on their investments, they are less sensitive to political and economic risk and more responsive to political direction. China’s emergence into the Central Asian energy game represents both an opportunity and challenge. While the West has talked for two decades about new pipelines, China builds them and is pouring significant amounts of money into Central Asia in the process thereby reducing Russia’s hold on the region’s economies.

The influx of Chinese state-directed investment does not come with the same demands for transparency and rule of law that Western investors seek. This in turn further entrenches Central Asia’s corrupt, patrimonial political systems.

For now, Chinese investment also gives the Central Asian states an alternative to their dependence on Russia. In the future though the danger exists that these states will end up having traded dependence on Moscow for dependence on Beijing. Under the circumstances, U.S. options are somewhat limited.

Posted in Natural Gas, U.S. Congress Energy Dependence, U.S. Congress Energy Policy | Tagged , | 1 Comment

If we really cared about CO2, we’d reduce car size and weight, not make electric cars

Posted on December 8, 2017 by

Inline image 1

Preface. Since my book “When trucks stop running: Energy and the future of transportation makes the case that it’s trucks that need to be electrified to keep civilization going, since biofuels don’t scale up, natural gas and liquefied coal are finite, hydrogen is a net energy sink from start to end. Only transportation that keeps supply chains going matters, and trucks, rail, and ships nearly all run on diesel. As for why trucks can’t be electrified, in addition to my book, see posts here.

The authors had a rebuttal in the Financial times that accused this article of cherry-picking the data by an “apples-to-oranges comparison, pitting a luxury, high-power electric model against a subcompact, low-power petrol one”.  Although that may be true, I have a rebuttal to their rebuttal after the financial times article below.  I feel like it was a huge waste of my team to read the original paper, because the premises and assumptions are absurd — that batteries will continually improve even they’ve only improved 5-fold over 210 years but need to improve 50-100 fold to match gasoline, that 30 to nearly 100% of electric power will be renewable from 2030 to 2050, the monetary price including subsidies rather than energy costs, and using CO2 as the main criteria by which to judge cars.  And the fact that energy decline from peak fossils will do far more to reduce CO2 than EV ever could. Conventional oil peaked in 2005 (90% of our oil), and any day now the plateau could end and decline begin.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

McGee, P. November 7, 2017. Electric cars’ green image blackens beneath the bonnet. Financial Times.

The humble Mitsubishi Mirage has none of the hallmarks of a futuristic, environmentally friendly car. It is fuelled by petrol, runs on an internal combustion engine and spews exhaust emissions through a tailpipe.

But when the Mirage is assessed for carbon emissions throughout its entire lifecycle — from procuring the components and fuel, to recycling its parts — it can actually be a greener car than a model by Tesla, the US electric vehicle pioneer, in regions with particularly high carbon emissions from electricity.

According to data from the Trancik Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Tesla Model S P100D saloon driven in the US Midwest produces 226 grams of carbon dioxide (or equivalent) per kilometer over its life-cycle — a significant reduction to the 385g for a luxury 7-series BMW. But the Mirage emits even less, at just 192 g.

The MIT data substantiate a study from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology last year: “Larger electric vehicles can have higher lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than smaller conventional vehicles.”

The point of such comparisons is not to make the argument for one technology over another, or to undermine the case for “zero-emission” cars. But they do raise a central issue about the industry: are governments and ca rmakers asking the right questions about the next generation of vehicles?

Policymakers are pushing the car industry toward a new era, but neither Europe, America nor China have actually set up the appropriate regulatory apparatus to differentiate among electric vehicles and judge their environmental merits. The idea that some combustion engine cars can be greener than some “zero-emission” electric vehicles simply does not make sense in the current regulatory environment.

From a government standpoint, all electric vehicles are equally green — regardless of whether they are big or small, produced efficiently or with great waste, or powered by electricity generated by solar energy or coal.

Although multiple studies show that electric vehicles to be greener than comparable combustion engine cars, many components of the electric car life-sycle are left out. To capture electric cars’ full environmental impact, regulators need to embrace life-cycle analysis that takes into account car production, including the sourcing of rare earth metals that are part of the battery, plus the electricity that powers it, and the recycling of its components. Life-cycle studies show that the idea of “zero emissions” is misleading. Too much energy is consumed in the manufacturing process of lithium-ion batteries, and to recharge them, for the environmental impact to be nil.

Also, the lack of regulation differentiating between electric vehicles encourages car makers to sell cars with bigger batteries and longer ranges — features that sound great but are at odds with electric vehicles’ green image, given the amount of lithium and cobalt used in the batteries.

However, the problem for makers of electric vehicles is that their efforts to limit emissions in the supply chain can only go so far. The uncomfortable reality is that battery manufacturing plays a bigger role in life-cycle emissions than anything else the car maker does.

A decade ago, this was not such a problem. Researchers could assume electric vehicles were small cars such as the Smart fortwo, which weighs less than a tonne. But Tesla upended these assumptions with the Model S, its roomy saloon which can weigh up to 2,250kg because of a massive battery that powers its impressive range.  These bigger batteries could damage the green credentials of electric vehicles, even if power grids are fueled by less coal and more renewables, given the poor environmental and ethical standards involved in procuring metals such as cobalt, 60 per cent of which comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Tesla has been credited with accelerating a broader shift into battery-powered cars, but one result of its appeal is that average electric vehicle batteries will double from 20 kilowatt hours today to 40 kWh by 2025, according to UK investment bank Liberum. Peter Mock, managing director for Europe at the International Council on Clean Transportation, says many electric vehicles produced today feature a range that is too high, and the trend is towards even bigger batteries.

Inline image 2

The average electric vehicle sold today offers a range of less than 250km, according to EV Volumes, a data provider. But the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance announced plans in September to create 12 electric vehicles with at least 600km of range by 2022.

“For 90% of the vehicles it just doesn’t make sense to have such a big battery,” Mr Mock says. “Maybe it’s useful now in the transition phase . . . But rationally it doesn’t make sense. Most of us drive less than 100 km a day.”

Inline image 3
 Regulators should take weight into account by taxing heavier vehicles and creating incentives for smaller models in both electric and traditional vehicles.

Mr Meilhan points out that petrol-engine cars weighing just 500kg — such as the French Ligier microcar or some popular “kei cars” in Japan — emit less lifecycle emissions than a mid-sized electric vehicle even when driven in France, where carbon-free nuclear power generates three-quarters of electricity.

“If we really cared about CO2,” he adds, “we’d reduce car size and weight.”

My rebuttal of the authors rebuttal in the FT (can be found here).

The original paper is here.  Miotti, M., et al. 2016. Personal Vehicles Evaluated against Climate Change Mitigation Targets. Environ. Sci. Technol 50:10795-10804.

What a waste of time.  This paper evaluates fossiled versus EV using the wrong evaluation criteria.

  • Vehicle cost shouldn’t be in a scientific study of energy efficiency.
  • Only energy use per mile and energy used over the life cycle.
  • Nor should EV subsidies be used in the cost, the Republicans or next financial crash will end or lower them.

Secondly, the paper assumes that the electric grid will continually use more renewable power.  But since conventional oil, the master resource that makes all others possible, including solar and wind contraptions over their entire life cycles, peaked in global production in 2005, the electric grid cannot long outlast declining fossil fuels, and their life expectancy is only 20 years (wind turbines) to 30 years (solar). So even if we doubled and doubled and doubled the solar and wind generation of today, we’d have to stop making these contraptions at some point of oil decline – oil will be rationed to agriculture and other essential services, like heavy-duty trucks of all kinds, since they can’t run on electricity (see posts here).  And they aren’t doubling every year as you’ll see below, in fact at current rates of increase they won’t even be 10% of generation by 2030, and likely less since the best, most profitable sites are already taken (NREL 2013).

Solar and wind contribute a tiny fraction of electricity. So far in 2017, solar provided 0.95%, in 2016, 0.7 %, 2015 0.48%, 2014 0.38%, 2013 0.27%, and so on. In all cases the difference in increases was from one-tenth of 1% to a quarter of 1%. Not the doubling required.  But these low percentages belie the fact that for half of the year solar (fall and winter) the percent declines by half those months (see posts here). Most of the U.S. has very little solar power, even though it’s subsidized, because they are too far north.  Solar power is highly skewed:  California has 60% of solar generation, Arizona 24% (see post here). It can’t grow much more, the best spots are already built out. Sure, there are a lot of sunny places left, but it costs tens of millions to build the transmission lines to them (EIA 2017). And that cost isn’t ever included in the cost of solar electricity or solar plant construction. It is a huge free subsidy and substantially lowers the true cost of solar and wind electricity.

Wind contributed more than solar, but still a trivial amount of overall electricity generation: 1.9% in 2014, 2.0% in 2015, 2.5% in 2016, and 2.6% so far in 2017 (through August) (EIA 2017).  But the best sites for wind are already built out as well.  Wind is also highly seasonal, doesn’t blow at commercial scales across most of America in the summer, and never at commercial scale year-round in the South East (see posts here).  We are far from having a national grid, so you’ll need a horse or bicycle to get your groceries half of the year just about anywhere you live.

Another consequence of peak oil the study doesn’t acknowledge is that declining oil (coal, and natural gas) will reduce CO2 far more than EVs ever could.

Just at it is absurd to assume the grid will be 30% renewable power by 2030, it is also absurd to assume that batteries will grow more and more energy dense.  The energy density of batteries has only increased 5-fold over the past 210 years, but need to be 50-100 times more energy dense to come close to matching gasoline. That means that batteries will always be too heavy for diesel vehicles, and too expensive for 90% of consumers. The reason it is so damned hard to make batteries more energy dense are here and here.

Worse yet, comparisons are made on the basis of vehicle costs, with the assumption that EV costs will grow lower over time. Ridiculous! We’ve reached nearly all limits to growth, and lithium is certainly finite (lots of it but mostly embedded in minerals for which the chemical and/or heat energy is too high). Vehicle cost shouldn’t be in a scientific study of energy efficiency. Only energy use per mile and the energy used over the life cycle to make and operate the car, from mining to recycling.  And especially not subsidies, the Republicans or next financial crash will end or lower them.

EIA. Monthly Energy Review. November 2017. U.S. Energy Information Administration Office of Energy Statistics U.S. Department of Energy. https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf

NREL. 2013. Beyond renewable portfolio standards: An assessment of regional supply and demand conditions affecting the future of renewable energy in the west. Golden: National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

Posted in Automobiles, Electrification | Tagged , , , | 14 Comments

Will the Navy go out with a whimper instead of a bang?

Posted on December 5, 2017 by

Preface. This house hearing is about the continuing decline of the Navy There are fewer and fewer ships. The remaining ships are overused, some past their normal lifespan, and under-maintained.

As the U.S. descends into fascist plutocracy enabled by the descent of Americans into the ignorant, conspiratorial, biblical, fake news, and new age myths over 70% of Americans subscribe to, including President Trump,  I can think of nothing better than letting the Navy atrophy, of going out with a whimper instead of an atomic bang.

Why spend trillions on ships that will be rusting and mothballed 15+ years from now as oil continually declines?  If they need to build ships, make then sailing ships, which will also help to keep supply chains going.

Long-term American national security depends far more on stopping topsoil erosion and aquifer depletion than our navy.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

***

House 113-7. February 26, 2013. The future of seapower. U.S. House of Representatives.

In January, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving a fleet of 306 ships, a reduction from the previous goal of 313 ships. The fiscal year 2013–2017 5-year shipbuilding plan contains a total of 41 ships, which is 16 ships less than the 57 ships projected for the same period in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. Of this 16-ship reduction, 9 ships were eliminated and 7 ships were deferred to a later time. It should be noted that at its current strength of 286 ships, under the 30-year shipbuilding plan submitted to Congress, the Navy will not achieve its goal of 306 ships until fiscal year 2039. Even worse, the Navy will experience shortfalls at various points in cruisers, destroyers, attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines, and amphibious ships. One would think the number of required ships would have increased instead of decreased with the Navy now bearing the brunt of missile defense missions and the announced rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.

The Navy has been operating in a sustained surge since at least 2004. We have been burning out our ships more quickly because the demand has been high. Indeed, in the past 5 years roughly 25% of destroyer deployments have exceeded the standard deployment length.

And given our past record of meeting long-term goals, I seriously question the viability of the shipbuilding plans presented in the out-years of the 30-year plan.

Another area of concern is the cost of the plan. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that in the first 10 years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan that the cost will be 11 percent higher than the Navy’s estimate.

In addition to new construction of ships, I also have concerns on the sustainment of ships already in the fleet. After years of maintenance challenges the Navy has now been forced to cancel numerous ship maintenance availabilities.

A key tenet in the shipbuilding plan is an assumed ship service life for most ships of 35 years. If ships do not get the planned shipyard repairs, attaining this service life will be problematic and ships will be retired prematurely.

In fiscal year 2012, the existing force structure only satisfied 53% of the total combatant commander demand. It has been estimated that to fully support the combatant commander requirements would necessitate a fleet size in excess of 500 ships. Without an increase in force structure this trend would only get worse.

Finally, I think that our Navy needs to place more emphasis on undersea warfare and long-range power projection as part of a strategy to prevent potential adversaries from achieving the benefits offered by anti- access/aerial denial strategies.

JOHN LEHMAN, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

First you have to reestablish the commonsense framework for why we need a Navy and where we need it and what kind of a Navy to carry out the task. It was relatively easy for the Reagan administration with a bipolar world in the Cold War. The Soviet threat clarified the mind wonderfully and made our task relatively easy. Today you could argue that the world is a more dangerous place because it is so multi-polar, there are now so many more potential disturbers of the peace all over the world, and yet we are more dependent ever in our history on the free flow of energy and of commerce through the Pacific, Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, Caribbean, and so forth.

We have to have the capability to maintain stability and freedom of the seas wherever our vital interests are involved. We should not be the world’s policeman, but we must be able to give the rest of the world the confidence to know that we are able to maintain the free flow of a global community of commerce and freedom of travel, and that we don’t have today. We don’t need a 600-ship Navy, as we did when we faced the entire Soviet fleet, but we certainly need a good deal more than the 280 ships we have today.

But even more disturbing is what is going on now in the overuse of the assets we have. It is very unfortunate that the institutional memory in the executive branch and in Congress is so short, because we have been down this road before. Both Admiral Roughead and I were in the Navy when we had the exact same situation in the 1970s, and we ran the fleet into the ground. We made deployments, added 50% to deployments time from 6 months to 9 months, just as the Administration has decided to do now. And we did not put—we, the U.S. Government—did not put the money into repairs and overhaul. And as a result the Navy dropped to the lowest readiness ever, where the former chief of naval of operations testified to this committee that we would lose a war if we ended up going into a conflict, and that was not an assessment lightly taken.

ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN (RET.), FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

As we look at the world today, while it is generally conducive to our interests, it is still a messy place, with disorder and disruption in more areas than just 10 or 15 years ago. And as we look out over that world and as the only global navy, you do have to ask yourself what is the size, what is the capability that you want resident in the Navy that is to be provided and maintained by the Congress. I think it is important as we look at building and maintaining a navy that you can’t decouple it from the industrial base of the Nation. And I think that all too often is overlooked. I think the messiness of the world is spreading. We have been able in recent years to essentially be absent in the Mediterranean. I believe the future is not going to give us that luxury. I think North Africa and the Arab awakening, the Levant, Israel, Syria, energy deposits that are expected to be found in the Eastern Mediterranean are going to inject some friction and potential conflict and a presence will be required there.

Even though we talk about a rebalanced Asia, we are not turning away from the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf and the importance that that geographic area has on the global economy. And in a few years the Arctic is going to open, and the Arctic is an ocean. I refer to it as the opening of the fifth ocean. And so what sort of a force do you need there, what are the numbers that you need there? And all of that needs to be taken into account.

In the Air Force the average age of an airplane is something like 28 years.

Mr. LEHMAN. I would not pick a specific risk, because I think when you have to stretch as thin as we are now already stretched, when we can’t meet deployments that everyone, every combatant commander believes is minimally necessary, that we can’t protect all of our ships, commercial ships in the Indian Ocean, for instance, the first time in history that the U.S. Navy has told ships they have to stay 600 miles away from the east coast of Africa because we can’t protect you. So the danger is when you are stretched that thin, an incident happens, and because you have the number of submarines deploying with a Marine amphibious group, that some North Korean submarine happens to get a shot off the way they did to the South Koreans and sinks an entire aircraft carrier of marines and equipment, that is catastrophic. What that would that do to world markets, to our economy, we would be in the tank overnight. Nobody sleeps well if they are depending on the North Koreans or the Iranians not doing anything irresponsible. We are there now, so I wouldn’t say that you could pick a time where it gets worse. Obviously the fewer ships we have the more that makes us vulnerable to unforeseen events. And they happen. As any student of history knows, they will happen.

We clearly are already at the tipping point, best expressed in the book by Lee Kuan Yew. He is one of the wisest global viewers of this century or last century. And he says the U.S. is declining and that people in his neighborhood do not believe they can rely on the U.S. as they have in the past. But the perception in Asia is that we are not going to be able to do much in the future, which begets the temptation of disturbers of the peace like North Korea to go beyond prudent risk. So we are already there.

Currently the Navy has 286 ships. In order to pay for even drastically reduced current operations, the Administration will be retiring a score or more of modern combat ships (cruisers and amphibious vessels and frigates) well before their useful life. In order to reach a 350-ship fleet in our lifetime, we would need to increase shipbuilding to an average of 15 ships every year. The latest budget the administration has advanced proposes buying just 41 ships over five years. It is anything but certain that the administration’s budgets will sustain even that rate of only eight ships per year, but even if they do, the United States is headed for a Navy of 240-250 ships at best. So how is the Obama administration getting to a 300-ship Navy? It projects a huge increase in naval shipbuilding beginning years down the road, most of which would come after a second Obama term. In other words, the administration is radically cutting the size and strength of the Navy now, while trying to avoid accountability by assuming that a future president will find the means to fix the problem in the future. This compromises our national security. The Navy is the foundation of America’s economic and political presence in the world. Other nations, like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, are watching what we do-and on the basis of the evidence, they are undoubtedly concluding that America is declining in power and resolution. Russia and China have each embarked on ambitious and enormously expensive naval buildups with weapons designed specifically against American carriers and submarines.

The Department of Defense acquisition process is seriously broken. Under the current system, it takes decades, not years, to develop and field weapons systems. Even worse, an increasing number of acquisition programs are plagued by cost over runs, schedule slips and failures to perform. The many horror stories like the F-35, the Air Force tanker scandal, the Navy shipbuilding failures and the Army armor disasters are only the visible tip of an iceberg. The major cause has been unbridled bureaucratic bloat (e.g.690,000 DoD civilians, 250 uniformed Joint task forces) resulting in complete loss of line authority and accountability. As the House Armed Services Committee formally concluded: “Simply put, the Department of Defense acquisition process is broken. The ability of the Department to conduct the large scale acquisitions required to ensure our future national security is a concern of the committee. The rising costs and lengthening schedules of major defense acquisition programs lead to more expensive platforms fielded with fewer numbers. That is, of course, an understatement. We are really engaged in a form of unilateral disarmament through runaway costs. Unless the acquisition system is fixed it will soon be impossible to maintain a military of sufficient size and sophistication with which to secure our liberties and protect the national interest.

MILITARY COMPENSATION Just as entitlements are steadily squeezing out discretionary spending in the Federal budget, personnel costs in the Pentagon are squeezing out operations and modernization. There has not been a comprehensive overhaul of military compensation, retirement, and medical care since the original Gates Commission during the Nixon Administration. It is long overdue.

 

 

Posted in Infrastructure & Fast Crash, Transportation Infrastructure | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment

Is Peak Oil dead? Not by a long shot! Remember Ladyfern?

Posted on December 2, 2017 by

Preface. Oil is finite. Period. Don’t be fooled by news stories that peak oil is dead, or we have reached peak demand.  They’re all nonsense. Gail Tverberg at ourfiniteworld.com is especially good at explaining this.

Worse yet, what we have left has been and is not being drained as quickly as possible to pay the capital back, and that increases the amount of oil that will be left in the ground forever, which could have been produced with more responsible methods.  But the very nature of capitalism is profits now, not 10 years from now.

This article makes the case that there are lessons to be learned today from the gigantic 2001 giant Ladyfern natural gas reserves in Northeastern British Columbia.

But due to the tragedy of the commons, where too many companies exploited this reservoir too quickly, much less was produced than could have been.  Like shale gas today, a gigantic amount of production drove gas prices down, thanks to the “stupid” middle class money financing companies that were already bankrupt (the banks prefer to get some money rather than none, and besides, it’s not their money).  Whether the gas bubble will be as bad as the subprime mortgage crisis waits to be seen.

Initially Ladyfern was thought to have a trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves, but in the end had 400-billion-cubic-feet (bcf).  Some of the “missing” 600 bcf that could have been obtained was lost to greedy drilling, though most of this was probably due to overestimating the size of the reserve.  I’ve cut and paraphrased much of the article below (select the link in the title to see the original article).

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

***

Terry Etam. January 19, 2016. The Ladyfern legend: huge reserves, frenzied drilling, and no one made money. Sound familiar? BOE report.

Is shale oil and gas too good to be true? History provides examples of the dangers of getting too starry-eyed by banking on seemingly endless natural gas reservoirs.  The historical cautionary tale that follows usually involves a gold-rush mentality that results in efforts to extract the entire reservoir all at once!

As an example, consider the legendary Ladyfern field in British Columbia, and whose story has an ugly lesson worth remembering.

The Ladyfern field was a giant gas reservoir estimated to contain up to a trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves. There were wells that produced at initial rates of 70 million cubic feet per day. It’s worth remembering that those rates were from vertical wells without 50 stage fracking technology. The cost of producing this conventional natural gas was very cheap. After the initial discovery, companies raced to buy up mineral rights in the area, and once secured, the race was on.

What happened next can be best described as a ‘tragedy of the commons’. Companies acting in their own self-interest harmed all parties. The Ladyfern reservoir saw corporate beasts devour a beautiful gas reservoir like wild pigs upending a garden.

The problem was competitive drainage. Because the Ladyfern reservoir was so porous and prolific, it was in a company’s best interest to drain their reserves as fast as possible or lose them to competitors. As noted in the linked article above, had one company owned all the mineral rights, the reservoir would most likely have been developed more cautiously, or at the very least with a plan. If the competitive drainage phenomena were to have been avoided, reserve recoveries would most certainly have been higher and with far less capital investment.

Maximizing recoveries from a reservoir should be the primary concern, not booming discovery wells that generate hysteria and a “shoot first, aim later” mentality.

This lesson should not be lost on shale gas drillers today now that the latest Utica production test results are bringing levels of excitement akin to the Ladyfern era.

While there are obvious differences in reservoir characteristics between shale formations and the Ladyfern, the mechanics and philosophy of ultimate recovery remain the same. In particular, in new fields or non-homogenous fields being explored and developed, paying attention to the overall field recovery should be one of the most important considerations. But this parameter can quite easily be forgotten by (or fail to even enter the minds of) executives under pressure to deliver production growth and/or meet quarterly expectations. What’s worse, with the current extreme duress in industry, pressure mounts to keep drilling wells and bringing them on to shore up reserve bases to keep bankers happy. While this strategy can serve as  a useful short term survival tactic, more often it equates to bad news in the long run. But on the other hand, it may be the only option for companies that are trying to stay alive until the next price spike.

Posted in Oil & Gas Fracked, Peak Natural Gas | Tagged , , , | 1 Comment

Here’s how NASA thinks society will collapse

Posted on November 27, 2017 by

Preface.  NASA  says that the way to avoid collapse is having the population reach a steady state at the maximum carrying capacity and reducing the rate of depletion of nature to a sustainable level by equitably distributing resources.

They don’t seem to realize that we have way overshot the planets carrying capacity, the maximum isn’t what it is today, or the 10 billion expected by 2050, but far less since we’ve depleted fisheries, aquifers, topsoil, forests, and pretty much everything else.  A very rosy, simplistic view, but hey, it’s NASA, which the public trusts and has even heard of.

But they are not ecologists.  The best warnings come from 1,700 scientists in 1992 who signed the first warning to humanity here, and the 15,000 scientists from 184 countries who signed the second notice in 2017 here.  A more detailed understanding of the patterns of collapse throughout human history can be found here:Peter Turchin

 — Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

Brown, A. 2014. Here’s How NASA Thinks Society Will Collapse. Too much inequality and too few natural resources could leave the West vulnerable to a Roman Empire-style fall. The Atlantic. (select link above to see article).

***

Few think Western civilization is on the brink of collapse — but it’s also doubtful the Romans and Mesopotamians saw their own demise coming either.

If we’re to avoid their fate, we’ll need policies to reduce economic inequality and preserve natural resources, according to a NASA-funded study that looked at the collapses of previous societies.

“Two important features seem to appear across societies that have collapsed,” reads the study. “The stretching of resources due to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity and the economic stratification of society into Elites and Masses.”

In unequal societies, researchers said, “collapse is difficult to avoid…. Elites grow and consume too much, resulting in a famine among Commoners that eventually causes the collapse of society.”

As limited resources plague the working class, the wealthy, insulated from the problem, “continue consuming unequally” and exacerbate the issue, the study said.

Meanwhile, resources continue to be used up, even by the technologies designed to preserve them. For instance, “an increase in vehicle fuel efficiency technology tends to enable increased per capita vehicle miles driven, heavier cars, and higher average speeds, which then negate the gains from the increased fuel-efficiency,” the study said.

The researchers used what they termed a Human And Nature DYnamical (HANDY) formula to reach their conclusions. The formula uses factors such as birth rates, resources, and income classes to create a mathematical equation to project outcomes.

The study was sponsored by NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center and headed by the National Science Foundation’s Safa Motesharrei.

For those who think modern society is immune from the problems that brought down ancient civilizations, a “brief overview of collapses demonstrates not only the ubiquity of the phenomenon, but also the extent to which advanced, complex and powerful societies are susceptible to collapse,” the study said.

So how do we save ourselves? “Collapse can be avoided, and population can reach a steady state at the maximum carrying capacity, if the rate of depletion of nature is reduced to a sustainable level, and if resources are distributed equitably,” reads the report.

References

Lessig, L. 2015. Republic, Lost: Version 2.0. Twelve.

Posted in Scientists Warnings to Humanity | Tagged , | 4 Comments

“World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice”

Posted on November 24, 2017 by

Preface. I’m sure anyone reading this post knows it is too late to do anything but eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow …  Although this warning was widely published, it was left out of over half of the top circulation newspapers, such as the New York Times. Not that it would matter.  Most people don’t read newspapers, don’t understand science, are full of mindless optimism from sci-fi TV and movies, don’t want to read depressing articles, or think The Rapture is coming any day now so it doesn’t matter.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

***

Ripple et al. 2017. World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice. BioScience.

Over 15,000 scientists from 184 countries signed the second notice.

The first warning (here) was made in 1992, when more than 1,700 scientists — including a majority of the living Nobel laureates at the time — signed a “World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity” published by the Union of Concerned Scientists. They stated that humans were on a collision course with the natural world from our current, impending, or potential damage to Earth via ozone depletion, freshwater availability, marine fishery collapses, ocean dead zones, forest loss, biodiversity destruction, climate change, and continued human population growth. The authors of the 1992 declaration feared that humanity was pushing the Earth’s ecosystems beyond their capacities to support the web of life. They described how we are fast approaching many of the limits of what the planet can tolerate without substantial and irreversible harm.

This second warning is even more urgent about changes needing to be made because conditions have worsened since 1992 significantly.

“Soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out. We must recognize, in our day-to-day lives and in our governing institutions, that the Earth with all its life is our only home.”

Among the negative trends are:

Declining Freshwater availability: Per capita freshwater availability is less than half of levels of the early 1960s with many people around the world suffering from a lack of fresh clean water. Much of this decrease in available water is due to an accelerated pace of human population growth and increases in agricultural water use. It is likely that climate change will have an overwhelming impact on the freshwater availability through alteration of the hydrologic cycle and water availability. Future water shortages will be detrimental to humans, affecting everything from drinking water, human heath, sanitation, and the production of crops for food.

Unsustainable marine fisheries: In 1992, the total marine catch was at or above the maximum sustainable yield and fisheries were on the verge of collapse, peaking in 1996 at 130 million tons in 1996 and has been declining ever since , despite an increase in fishing effort

A 75 % increase in the number of ocean dead zones. Coastal dead zones which are mainly caused by fertilizer runoff and fossil-fuel use, are killing large swaths of marine life. Dead zones with hypoxic, oxygen-depleted waters, are a significant stressor on marine systems and identified locations have dramatically increased since the 1960s, with more than 600 systems affected by 2010.

Deforestation. A loss of nearly 300 million acres of forestland, much of it converted for agricultural uses. Between 1990 and 2015, total forest area decreased from 4,128 to 3,999 million hectares, a net loss of 129 million hectares, approximately the size of South Africa.

Dwindling biodiversity. The world’s biodiversity is vanishing at an alarming rate and populations of vertebrate species are rapidly collapsing. Global ly,fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals declined by 58% between 1970 and 2012.  Freshwater, marine, and terrestrial populations declined by 81%, 36%, and 35% respectively.

Continuing significant increases in global carbon emissions and average temperatures

Overpopulation. Over 2 billion people have been born since 1992 – a 35 % rise in human population.

We have unleashed a mass extinction event, the sixth in roughly 540 million years, wherein many current life forms could be annihilated or at least committed to extinction by the end of this century.

Humanity is now being given a second notice as illustrated by these alarming trends (figure 1). We are jeopardizing our future by not reining in our intense but geographically uneven material consumption and by not perceiving continued rapid population growth as a primary driver behind many ecological and even societal threats (Crist et al. 2017). By failing to adequately limit population growth, reduce greenhouse gases, incentivize renewable energy, protect habitat, halt deforestation, and constrain invasive alien species, humanity is not taking the urgent steps needed to safeguard our imperiled biosphere.

As most political leaders respond to pressure, scientists, media influencers, and lay citizens must insist that their governments take immediate action, as a moral imperative to current and future generations of human and other life. With a groundswell of organized grassroots efforts, dogged opposition can be overcome and political leaders compelled to do the right thing. It is also time to re-examine and change our individual behaviors, including limiting our own reproduction (ideally to replacement level at most) and drastically diminishing our consumption of fossil fuels, meat, and other resources.

Posted in Biodiversity, Deforestation, Fisheries, Scientists Warnings to Humanity | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments

Given the laws of physics, can the Tesla Semi really go 500 miles, and what will the price be?

Posted on November 21, 2017 by

Preface: Most people think that electric truck makers need to tell us the specs — the battery kWh, price, performance, and so on — before we can possibly know anything about their truck. But that’s simply not true.  We know what lithium-ion batteries are capable of. And we know the kWh, size, and weight of the battery needed to move a truck of given weight a certain number of miles. 

That makes it possible for scientists to work backwards and figure out how many kWh the battery would need to be to go 300 to 500 miles, what it would weigh, and the likely price for the battery needed for a truck at the maximum road limit of 80,000 pounds. S. Sripad and V. Viswanathan (2017) at Carnegie Mellon have done just that.  They published a paper in the peer-reviewed American Chemical Society Letters at the following link: Performance metrics required of next-generation batteries to make a practical electric semi truck. 

In addition, there simply aren’t enough minerals on earth to make a transition to electric trucks and cars:

Tesla Semi in the news:

2022-12-8 Tesla Semi 500-Mile Trip Video Shows Truck May Have Had a Lower GVW Than 81,000 Lb “In the Semi delivery event, Musk did not answer how much the Semi costs, when other customers will receive their vehicles, how much it weighs, how many trucks Pepsico received, how big the battery pack is, and several other reasonable questions any other truck maker would be willing to solve. In the video, all we see is an accelerated trip. It would be great if the original video presented the Semi being weighed, which would make it more believable that it really tipped the scale at 81,000 lb (36,741 kilograms). The footage makes us wonder precisely about that”…..

2022-1-27: Tesla Cybertruck, Roadster, Semi delayed until 2023

2022: Frito Lay, a division of Pepsico, has “bought” 15 Tesla Semi trucks (pdf).  I put “bought” in quotes, because the California Air Resources Board and matching funds contributed $30.76 million dollars to buy these 15 Tesla heavy-duty battery electric tractors, as well as 6 Peterbilt electric trucks, 3 BYD battery electric yard trucks, 12 Crown lithium-ion battery electric forklifts and so on.  Hey!  That’s my California tax dollars at work, subsidizing the very large $199 billion market cap Pepsico  corporation and giving them a free “Clean and Green!” reputation.  How much did they pay for each Tesla?  What is the cost of charging them?  How many miles a day do they go?  Am I getting my money’s worth?  Who knows, or will ever know since they’re a private company and don’t have to disclose what they choose not to.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com Women in ecology  author of 2021 Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy best price here; 2015 When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Podcasts: Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity

* * *

Authors S. Sripad and V. Viswanathan felt compelled to write their paper because there are so many guesstimates of the likely cost and performance of an electric class 8 semi-truck in the media. But these hasty calculations don’t take into account critical factors like the specific energy density of the battery pack, vehicle weight, drag, rolling resistance, battery kwH to go a given distance, and weight of the batteries given current Li-ion battery technology.

The average class 8 truck, empty, weighs around 31,000 to 37,000 pounds. The tractor (the cab in front) weighs around 17,000 to 20,000 pounds.  If you subtract 4,000 pounds of power-train weight (diesel engine, cooling system, transmission, and accessories), the cab of the truck, where the driver sits, is about 13,000 to 17,000 pounds. The authors agree: they estimate “the average empty truck weight is 6,000 to 8,000 kg (13,228 to 17,637 pounds) without the weight of the engine”.  They also imply that the empty truck weighs 13 to 17,000 pounds later on when they point out that the battery for a 600 mile range would weigh 18 tons (36,000 pounds), “twice as much as the empty vehicle”.

But oops! They forgot to add on the weight of the empty container and chassis where the payload is.  That adds another 16,000 pounds (8,000 pound empty 40 foot container, 8,000 to 10,000 pound trailer, i.e. chassis).

So my weight estimate of 29,000 pounds is closer to what a class 8 electric truck will weigh. This is why my estimates of payload are always about 10,000 pounds less than the authors.

Authors: 900 miles payload of 8,000 pounds, my payload minus 3,000 (it’s overweight by 3,000 pounds).

Authors 600 miles payload of 24,000 pounds, my payload 15,000 pounds.

Authors: 300 miles payload 44,000 pounds, my payload 33,000 pounds.

If the authors are also using the average payload, which is 75% of the maximum payload, which is what I use, that would further explain the difference. I think the maximum should be used because in the future, both electricity and diesel are likely to be more expensive, or even rationed.  To maximize efficiency businesses will have to stop just-in-time delivery with half full trucks, and turn to full loads and inventories to stay in business.  And a lot less packaging so products don’t “cube out”, fill up the truck before a maximum weight can be achieved.

Nor can electric trucks be made lighter with aluminum or carbon fiber. They’re too expensive.

Unlike cars, where the average income of an electric car buyer is $148,158 (NRC 2015), and the amount of aluminum needed to light-weight the car is a small fraction of what a truck would require, the trucking industry is a cut throat business with razor thin profits.  Light-weighting is out of the question.

The maximum weight of a truck allowed on the road is 80,000 pounds, so if the body weight of a diesel truck is the minimum 33,000 pounds, then the maximum amount of cargo that can be carried by a diesel truck is 47,000 pounds.

Since an electric truck weighs 4,000 pounds less, that ought to shoot up to 51,000 pound payloads.  But it doesn’t because the battery packs weigh so much. For example, the authors found that the weight of the battery pack needed for a truck to go 900 miles is 54,000 pounds. There goes the payload: 54,000 + 29,000 truck weight is 83,000 pounds, over the 80,000 pound road limit. And this truck that can not haul cargo will set you back $500,000 to $650,000 dollars for the battery alone.

A 600 mile range isn’t commercial either. For starters, the battery pack would cost $320,000 to $420,000 dollars, and on top of that you’ll need add another $100,000 for the body of the truck.

To move a truck 600 miles requires a 36,000 pound battery + 29,000 pound truck weight and the truck can only carry 15,000 pounds, which is 32,000 pounds less than a diesel truck can carry. Musk claims the range of the Tesla semi truck can be as much as 500 miles.  Based on the figures in Table 1, that means the battery would cost $267,000 to $350,000 (also add on $100,000 for the truck body), and the battery will weigh 30,000 pounds + 29,000 pound truck weight and be able to carry only 21,000 pounds of cargo, which is 26,000 pounds less than a diesel truck.

Even if the range is on the low end of 300 miles, the battery will still be very heavy, with a battery weight of 18,000 pounds + 29,000 pounds truck weight and and only be able to carry 33,000 pounds of cargo, which is 14,000 pounds less than a diesel truck.

The bottom line according to the authors, is that a 600 to 900 mile range truck will use most or all of their battery power to move the battery itself, not the cargo. The cost of the battery is $160,000 to $210,000 plus $100,000 for the truck cab and trailer (minus powertrain), so overall $260,000 to $310,000, which is $140,00 to $190,000 more than a new $120,000 diesel truck and considerably more than used diesel class 8 truck, which can cost as little as $3,000.

If anyone in the trucking industry is reading this, I’d like to know if a 300 mile range with just 18,000 pounds of cargo is acceptable.  I suspect the answer is no, because the Port of Los Angeles explored the concept of using an all-electric battery drayage (short-haul) truck to transfer freight between the port and warehouses, but rejected these trucks because the 350 kWh battery weighed 7,700 pounds and reduced cargo payload too much.

Nor was the 12 hours or more to recharge the battery acceptable. Ultra-fast 30 min recharging was considered too risky since this might reduce battery lifespan, and bearing the cost of replacing these expensive batteries was out of the question (Calstart 2013). Even if a way has been found to charge a truck in half an hour without reducing battery life, the amount of power needed to do that is huge, so new transmission, voltage lines, upgrading many substations with more powerful transformers, and new natural gas generating power plants will need to be constructed.  Across the nation that’s many billion dollars.  Who will pay for that?

It shouldn’t be surprising that a truck battery would weigh so much.  Car batteries simply don’t scale up — they make trucks too heavy.  The authors calculated that a 900 mile electric class 8 truck would require a battery pack 31 times the size and weight of a 100 kWh Tesla Model S car not only because of weight, but all the other factors mentioned above (aerodynamics, rolling resistance, etc).

If the Tesla Semi or any other truck maker’s prototype performs better than this, there are additional questions to ask.  For example, new diesel trucks today get 7 miles per gallon. But the U.S. Super Truck program has built trucks that get 12 mpg. But those trucks are not being made commercially.  I don’t know why, but it could be because this achievement was done by making the prototype truck with very light weight expensive materials like carbon fiber or aluminum, costly tires with less rolling resistance, and other expensive improvements that were too expensive to be commercial.

Performance can also be gamed – a diesel truck going downhill or on level ground, with less than the maximum cargo weight, going less than 45 miles per hour with an expert driver who seldom brakes, can probably get 12 mpg even though they’re not driving a Super Truck.

Who’s going to buy the Tesla Semi, Cummins EOS, Daimler E-FUSO, or BYD all-electric semi-trucks?

Most trucking companies are very small and can’t afford to buy expensive trucks: 97% of the 1.3 million trucking companies in the U.S. own 20 trucks or less, 91% have six or fewer. They simply aren’t going to buy an electric truck that costs roughly 2.5 times more than a diesel truck, carries half the weight, goes just 300 miles (diesel trucks can go 1,800 miles before refueling).

Nor will larger, wealthier trucking companies be willing to invest in electric trucks until the  government pays for and builds the necessary charging stations. This is highly unlikely given there’s no infrastructure plan (Jenkins 2017), nor likely the money to execute one, given the current reverse Robin Hood “tax reform” plan.

With less money to spend on infrastructure, charging stations might not even be on the list. The big companies that have bought hybrid electric class 4 to 6 trucks so far only did so because local, state, and federal subsidies made up the difference between the cost of a diesel and (hybrid) electric truck.  And these smaller trucks that stop and start a lot which can recharge the battery a little make much more sense than a hybrid long haul truck, where trucks brake as little as possible.

The same will likely be true of any company that makes class 8 long-haul trucks. I constructed Table 1 to summarize the averages of figure 2 in this paper, which has the estimated ranges of required battery pack sizes, weights, cost, and payload capacities of a 300, 600, or 900 mile truck.

Range (miles) Battery kWh required Battery Pack Cost at $160-$210 per kWh Battery Weight kg / tons Max Payload
300 1,000 $160 – 210,000   8,200 /   9 8.5
600 2,000 $320 – 420,000 16,000 / 18 5.5
900 3,100 $500 – 650,000 24,500 / 27 0

Table 1. All electric truck data from figure 2 of Sripad (2017).  

A diesel truck Max payload is 23.5 tons.  The max payload (cargo weight) is derived from the max truck road weight of 40 tons, minus battery weight, minus weight of the truck (17.5 tons).

Even if the Tesla semi’s are built in 2022 (the latest estimate), we won’t know until 2027 if charging in just half an hour, cold weather, and thousands of miles driven reduces driving range and battery life, if the battery can withstand the rough ride of trucks, and be certain that lithium is still cheap and easily available. The only thing going for the Tesla Semi is that electricity is cheap, for now.  But at some point finite natural gas will begin to decline and become very expensive, even potentially unaffordable for the bottom 90%.  As natural gas declines exponentially continues, all the solar and wind power in the world does no good because the electric grid requires natural gas to balance their intermittent power.

There is no other kind of energy storage in sight.  Utility-scale batteries are far from commercial.  Although compressed air energy storage and pumped hydro storage dams are commercial, there are so few places to put these expensive alternatives that they can make little, if any meaningful contribution, ever.

It may be that Elon Musk is banking on government subsidies, like the $9 million State of California award to the BYD company for 27 electric trucks — $333,000 per truck (ARB 2016), and the Ports of Los Angeles and San Pedro who will subsidize a zero emission truck that can go at least 200 miles. There are many other news stories very skeptical of Tesla’s claims and why he’s making them.  One of the best, which has additional issues than those I wrote about above is here (Randall, T; Lippert J. November 24, 2017. Tesla’s Newest Promises Break the Laws of Batteries Elon Musk touted ranges and charging times that don’t compute with the current physics and economics of batteries. Bloomberg).

References

ARB. 2016. State to award $9 million for zero-emission trucks at two rail yards, one freight transfer yard in Southern California. California Air Resources Board.

Calstart. 2013. I-710 project zero-emission truck commercialization study. Calstart for Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 4.7

Jenkins, A. 2017. Will anybody actually use Tesla’s electric semi truck? Fortune.

Kane M (2021) Tesla Delays (Again) Semi Launch To 2022. InsideEVS.com

McCarthy, N. September 23, 2016. Survey: 69% Of Americans Have Less Than $1,000 In Savings. Forbes.

NRC. 2015. Overcoming barriers to deployment of plug-in electric vehicles. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Sripad, S.; Viswanathan, V. 2017. Performance metrics required of next-generation batteries to make a practical electric semi truck.  ACS Energy Letters 2: 1669-1673.

Vartabedian, M. 2017. Exclusive: Tesla’s long-haul electric truck aims for 200 to 300 miles on a charge. Reuters.

 

 

 

Posted in Efficiency, Electric & Hydrogen trucks impossible, Lithium-ion, Trucks: Electric | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 16 Comments

Overview of the renewable fuel standard, U.S. House hearing 2013

Posted on November 18, 2017 by

House 113-61. June 26, 2013. Overview of the renewable fuel standard: Government perspectives. House of Representatives.

[Excerpts from the 104 page transcript follow]

Key points:

  • The implicit premise that cellulosic and other advanced biofuels would be available in significant quantities at reasonable costs within 5 to 10 years following adoption of the 2007 targets has not been borne out.
  • Ethanol faces some major demand and distribution system challenges that make it difficult to increase its use as a motor fuel.  Since gasoline usage has declined the past 5 years, there is less need for ethanol, not more, making it unlikely E-15 can be justified.
  • Feed grain prices have helped net cash income for row crop producers, but have raised feed costs and lowered profit margins for livestock, dairy and poultry producers. Feed costs make up 51% of expenses for dairy, 19% for beef cattle, 42% for hogs, and 35% for poultry
  • We have seen the expansion of corn ethanol increase corn prices by 36 percent from 2000 to 2009. CBO estimated that the use of ethanol for fuel accounted for about a 28 to 47 increase in the price of corn and a 10 to 15 percent increase in food prices. And it is important to note that these increases occurred during a time when the U.S. harvested a record 13.1 billion bushels of corn.
  • There are about 11 million flex-fuel vehicles on the road but consumers are not using them to buy E85. Only 100 million gallons of E85 were sold last year, because some owners don’t know they have got a flex-fuel vehicle, or live in states with few E85 stations (Texas has just one), or are reluctant to pay the high E85 price.

ED WHITFIELD, KENTUCKY: The topic of today’s hearing is an ‘‘Overview of the Renewable Fuel Standard: Government Perspectives.’’ As you know, this is one of those issues where we have a lot of different viewpoints on this important issue. And we have not really revisited the Renewable Fuel Standard since it was last expanded in 2007.

We have learned firsthand how the RFS implementation would be affected by drought that reduced corn yields, that occurred last summer.

Perhaps the biggest unexpected development has been the decline in gasoline usage over that past 5 years. As a result, we are facing the challenge of mixing the specified volumes of renewable fuels into a significantly smaller pool of gasoline. This has led to a number of issues we will address today, including the so-called blend wall and the approval of E–15. We have also learned, first hand, how the RFS implementation would be affected by a drought that reduced corn yields, as occurred last summer.

Mr. BARTON. The current law, as it is, is unworkable and unsustainable, and I support total and full repeal. I think it has outlived its usefulness.

BOBBY L. RUSH, ILLINOIS: Members of both sides of the aisle touted the potential benefits of enacting a Renewable Fuel Standard, which included reducing U.S. dependence on oil, enhancing energy security, bolstering the agricultural economy, and addressing the challenges of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector. Today, I believe the RFS has been successful in meeting each of these objectives while also helping to drive job creation and economic investment.

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA. As long as our transportation system relies exclusively on fossil fuels, we will continue to make climate change worse. Fuel efficiency alone will not achieve the 80 percent reduction in climate pollution that we need by 2050 to avoid catastrophic climate change.

The shift to hybrids and electric vehicles is a big part of the solution. But low-carbon renewable fuels can also contribute significantly. And for some transportation sectors, such as aviation and shipping, low-carbon liquid fuels are the only option, besides efficiency.

But the RFS is not without flaws. As our gasoline consumption goes down and the renewable fuel mandates increase, we could reach the blend wall where adding more ethanol to the fuel supply could damage some engines. Drop-in biofuels offers one solution, but they are still being developed.

Mr. SIEMINSKI, EIA. The RFS program is not projected to come close to achieving the legislated target of 36 billion gallons of renewable motor fuels by 2022. Substantially increasing the use of biofuels can only occur in forms other than the low-percentage blends of ethanol and biodiesel that account for nearly all of their current use. Of the potential alternative pathways—one, increased use of higher ethanol blends; two, the advent of drop-in biofuels; or three, the development of compatible renewable fuel components such as biobutanol—of those, so far none have achieved a significant market role. The implicit premise that cellulosic and other advanced biofuels would be available in significant quantities at reasonable costs within 5 to 10 years following adoption of the 2007 targets has not been borne out.

Ethanol potentially has three distinct roles in motor fuels markets: one, as an octane source; two, as a volume enhancer; and three, as a provider of energy content. So an important behavioral question arises with the use of higher percentage blends, such as E15 and E85, and that is whether the shorter range provided by a tankful of fuel due to ethanol’s lower energy content per gallon will affect consumers’ buying decisions. In Brazil, where a high percentage of ethanol fuels are sold, consumers do indeed consider energy content pricing rather than simply buying the cheapest fuel.

Ethanol faces some major demand and distribution system challenges that make it difficult to increase its use as a motor fuel regardless of its source. Although the use of E15 in model year 2001 and newer light-duty vehicles is now allowed, very few gasoline retailers offer it out of concerns related to automobile warranties, potential liability for misfueling, infrastructure costs, and consumer acceptance. Ethanol blends above 15 percent, E85, are more widely available but can only be used in flex-fuel vehicles, which make up only about 5 percent of the light-duty fleet.

The complexity of refined product markets, of which biofuels are an important part, has led to a growing number of requests for EIA analysis. Last fall, we published a report, ‘‘Biofuels Issues and Trends’’—it is attached to my testimony—to provide an overview of the dynamics of production, consumption, trade in ethanol, biodiesel, and cellulosic fuels. We also hold regular workshops to solicit feedback on a variety of these subjects.

(For purposes of this figure and this testimony, RFS projections are discussed in terms of RFS credits, since biofuels receive credit towards the RFS targets on the basis of their energy content relative to ethanol rather than on a strict volumetric basis. For example, each gallon of biodiesel provides approximately 1.5 credits towards the overall RFS target.)

The RFS targets enacted in 2007 cannot be approached through the current low-percentage blending of ethanol and biodiesel into motor fuels. There are three potential alternative pathways (1) Increased use of higher ethanol blends, (2) the advent of drop-in biofuels, such as renewable gasoline or renewable diesel, that can be used as direct replacements for their petroleum-based counterparts, and (3) the development and use of new renewable fuel components, such as biobutanol, that might be more easily blended in increased volumes. To date, none of these options has achieved a significant market role.

The AE02013 Reference case projections assume continuing technology progress and cost reduction, but they do not assume any breakthroughs in transformational biofuels technologies, such as low-cost, scalable, algae biofuels.

Ethanol faces some major demand and distribution system challenges that make it difficult to increase its use as a motor fuel regardless of its source. While much of the wholesale distribution infrastructure is capable of handling ethanol, which to date has been moved by rail rather than pipelines, significant changes in the retail infrastructure would be needed to carry higher-ethanol blends of motor gasoline. The AE02013 Reference case anticipates some penetration of both E15 and E85, but not nearly enough to approach the legislated RF5 target. Although EPA has granted waivers allowing the use of E15 in model year 2001 and newer light-duty vehicles, very few gasoline retailers currently offer E15 for sale to the public due to concerns related to automobile warranties, potential liability for misfueling, infrastructure costs, and consumer acceptance. Also, E15 does not qualify for the one pound Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) waiver that was legislated for ElO, so it would not be an environmentally compliant fuel in summer months when made using most current gasoline blend stocks. E85 is more widely available at retail fuel stations, but can only be used in designated flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs). Currently, there are about 11.5 million FFVs in use, about 5.1 percent of the overall light duty vehicle fleet. Manufacturers built flex fuel capability into these vehicles in order to receive credits towards compliance with fuel economy standards under provisions that are being phased out under the implementation offuture Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) and greenhouse gas emissions standards promulgated by the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the EPA.

Without vehicle manufacturer incentives to produce additional FFVs and absent a strong consumer demand for them, which will depend on consistent E85 pricing that at least reflects its lower energy content, the potential for growth in the E85 will remain limited.

The present challenges facing the RFS program are reflected in the value of Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) that are used by EPA to implement the RFS. EPA has created several different varieties of RINs that correspond to the nested targets for different categories of biofuels in the RFS. The price of RINs which can only be used to satisfy the total RFS mandate (06 RINs) hovered close to zero through 2012, as the use of ethanol as an octane enhancer and volume enhancer, as previously discussed in my testimony, was more than sufficient for obligated parties to comply with the RFS program. Early this year, 06 RIN prices rose dramatically as the market reflected on the difficulty in meeting a rising RFS target given the difficulty of accommodating additional ethanol volumes within ElO gasoline. Since mid-March, the price of 06 (ethanol) RINs has closely tracked the price of 04 (biodiesel) RINs that can be used to meet the RFS targets for advanced biofuels and biodiesel as well as the overall target. The increase in the 06 RIN price provides an economic incentive for two changes in the market. First, a higher 06 RIN price tends to lower the cost of E85 gasoline relative to HO gasoline. Second, a 06 RIN price equal to or near the biodiesel RIN price may motivate blending of biodiesel that exceeds the biodiesel blending requirements that EPA announced in its proposed rulemaking for the 2013 RF5 program that has yet to be finalized. At the retail level, EIA expects diesel fuel prices to be most affected by higher RIN prices as typical biodiesel blending yields only about one-third ofthe RINs required and diesel fuel refiners who are obligated parties under the RFS program must make up for the shortfall by purchasing the now higher-priced RINs.

Over the last year, EIA held two workshops to engage the professional and academic communities on issues relating to biofuels projections. In August 2012, EIA held a workshop on advanced biofuels, which brought together around 90 representatives from government, national labs, research institutions, commercial biofuels producers, universities, non-profit organizations, and investment firms, so that they could share with us some of the opportunities and challenges of commercializing advanced biofuels technologies.

In March, we hosted a second workshop attended by over 200 people, over half via a live internet feed, to discuss results and solicit feedback on a variety of biofuels-related topics in preparation for future analysis.

CHRISTOPHER GRUNDLER. Although both ethanol and non-ethanol biofuels can be used to meet the RFS, ethanol has and will likely continue to be the predominant renewable fuel on the market for the foreseeable future.

As the statutory volume requirements of the RFS program increase, it becomes more likely that the volume of ethanol projected to meet those requirements will exceed the volume that can be consumed in the common blend of 10 percent ethanol and 90 percent gasoline, referred to as E10. Additional volume of ethanol would then need to be used at higher blend levels, such as E15 or E85, or significant volumes of non- ethanol would be needed to meet the targets. As a result, to the extent that ethanol is likely to be used to meet RFS volume requirements, the volume of ethanol that can be legally and practically consumed is a limiting factor in meeting the statutory volumes. This is commonly known as the blend wall.

JOSEPH GLAUBER. Corn ethanol production increased dramatically over the past decade from just over 2 billion gallons in 2002 to almost 14 billion gallons in 2011. Driven by favorable market forces and encouraged by government biofuel policies, including the RFS, that increase has spurred corn production and corn use for ethanol and has been a factor in the recent grain price boom and overall improvement in farm balance sheets, including record farm incomes over the past few years. This boom has not been shared equally by all segments of the ag sector, however. Livestock, dairy, and poultry producers have faced tighter margins due to higher feed costs.

The decline in corn use for feed has been partially offset by the increased availability of protein feeds, such as distillers’ dried grains, a co-product of the dry milling process. Nearly one-third of a bushel of corn used for ethanol production is returned in the form of DDGs.

The decline in U.S. Corn exports have been offset in world markets by increased exports from foreign suppliers, principally Brazil. Over the years 2000 to 2005, the U.S. exported on average 1.9 billion bushels of corn and accounted for about 60 percent of total world corn exports. By 2011/2012, U.S. corn exports had fallen to 1.5 billion bushels and accounted for 37 percent of total world exports. With drought-related reduced supplies in 2012/2013, U.S. corn exports are projected to fall to 700 million bushels, less than 20 percent of total world exports. U.S. corn exports are projected to recover to 1.3 billion bushels in 2013/2014, but they are projected to account for about a third of total world exports.

By contrast, livestock, dairy, and poultry producers have faced more uneven, in some cases declining returns since 2006. In general, higher feed grain prices have helped net cash income for row crop producers, but have also raised feed costs at lowered profit margins for livestock, dairy, and poultry producers. Feed costs make up about 51 percent of expenses for dairy, 19 percent for beef cattle, and 42 percent for hogs, and 35 percent for poultry farm business. Price-feed rations for most species show a decline throughout most of the period since 2006. Looking forward, increases in demand for corn to produce ethanol are expected to slow due to constraints on domestic ethanol consumption—as has been mentioned previous here, the so-called blend wall—increases in blending efficiency, and nearing the 15 billion gallon cap on conventional ethanol in the RFS, and finally, due to increased supply of ethanol from other feedstocks. Those will mitigate pressures on corn prices.

Com feed and residual disappearance declined by 26 percent from marketing year 2005/06 to 2011/12 while com exports declined by 28% over the same period. However, the decline in com use for feed has been partially offset by the increased availability of protein feeds such as distillers’ dried grains (DDGs), a co-product of the ethanol dry milling process. Nearly one-third of a bushel of com used for ethanol production is returned in the form of DDGs. The decline in U.S. com exports have been offset in world markets by increased exports from foreign suppliers, principally Brazil (see figure 4). Over (the trade marketing) years 2000/01 to 2005/06, the United States exported, on average, 47.8 million metric tons of com (1.9 billion bushels) and accounted for over 60 percent of total world com exports. By 2011112, U.S. com exports had fallen to 38.4 million tons and accounted for 37 percent of total world exports. With drought reduced supplies in 2012/13, U.S. com exports are expected to fall to 18.5 million tons, less than 20 percent of total world exports, and while U.S. com exports are projected to recover to 33 million tons in 2013114, they are projected to account for only 32 percent of total world exports.

Agricultural prices declined in real terms (that is, adjusting for inflation) throughout most of the 50 or so years following the end of World War II (see figure 5) reflecting strong gains in agricultural productivity over the period. Prices began to increase in real terms around 2000 with increasing population growth, rapid economic expansion in developing countries, and rising per capita meat consumption globally along with rising energy prices (see Trostle 2008). Those factors coupled with the rapid expansion of ethanol production following the phase out of MTBE 5 increased demand for com, for conversion into ethanol and for animal feed and pushed prices for com higher (see Collins 2006). Prices spiked in 2007/08, in 2010/11, and most recently in 2012 as supply shortfalls coupled with strong global demand saw inventory levels for major grains and oil seeds fall to low levels. Some studies suggested that the main factor for those spikes was increased ethanol production. For example, Mitchell (2008) attributed almost 75 percent of the increase in commodity prices during the 2007/08 price spike to the increase in biofuel production. Studies also examined whether com demand for ethanol production is less price responsive (under current economic and policy conditions), compared to other uses such as feed use or to meet export demand, which could exacerbate price volatility, particularly when stock levels are low (see for example Collins, 2006 and Wright, 2010).

More recently, the increase in U.S. ethanol production was estimated to account for about 36 percent of the increase in com prices over the period from 2006 to 2009 (see Babcock and Fabiosa 2011). More recent studies have found similar results (see recent reviews of econometric analyses of the impact of ethanol on corn prices can be found in Condon et al. 2013 and Hochman et al. 2013).

Higher corn and soybean prices are passed through to the consumer largely through higher fat and oil prices and indirectly through higher feed costs.

In general, higher feed grain prices have helped net cash income for row crop producers, but have also raised feed costs that lowered profit margins for livestock, dairy and poultry producers. Feed costs make up 51% of expenses for dairy, 19% for beef cattle, 42% for hogs, and 35% for poultry farm business. Price-feed ratios for most species show a decline throughout most of the period since 2005/06 (see figure 6). 8 Productivity gains, such as increased pigs per litter and increased milk production per cow, have helped offset higher feed costs, along with increased availability of DDGs as mentioned previously. Moreover, feeding of DDGs has replaced as much as 80 percent of the calories lost through the reduction of com fed to livestock, while adding to the overall protein content of feeds (Ferris 2013).

Ethanol production is primarily concentrated in the com producing states of the Midwest and much of it is transported to the coasts which represent the bulk of motor fuel demand.

Current penetration rates would imply a blend wall of less than 13.4 billion gallons for ethanol. Ethanol produced in excess of that amount must be held as stocks or exported. Lastly, while export markets have in the past welcomed U.S. ethanol production, current export prospects are reduced because of increased competition from Brazil and anti-dumping duties imposed on U.S. exports to the European Union. Indeed, EIA projects net imports of ethanol increasing over the next 5 years, rising to 1 billion gallons in 2018. Projecting trade of ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil remains highly uncertain and will depend on biofuel policies in both countries as well as fuel prices.

Examples of next generation fuels from materials that are not associated with food production include biomass, algae, and crop residues. Demonstration plants have been constructed to assess various conversion technologies that can produce next generation biofuels, such as cellulosic ethanol, butanol, biojet fuel, and Fischer-Tropsch diesel. The production costs associated with the development of these fuels remains high.

In order to get beyond the blend wall, there has been considerable investment in drop-in fuels, which are substantially similar to gasoline, diesel and jet fuels and therefore have less blending constraints than ethanol and can help, along with additional biodiesel use, overcome the blend wall. These fuels can be made from a variety of biomass feedstocks and are designed to “drop-in” to existing infrastructure. The Department has entered a partnership with the Department of Energy and U.S. Navy to invest up to $510 million during the next three years to produce advanced, drop-in aviation and marine biofuels to power military and commercial transportation.

Mr. GLAUBER. Well, I think, you know, it is clear that, as I said in my opening statement, that increased ethanol production has precipitated a large increase in corn production and a large increase in corn demand. With that, you see increased prices. Now, a lot of other factors are out there in the world that affect prices. There is a whole list of things that people typically talk about. But things like we had some fairly serious droughts over the period. We have had, you know, increase in foreign demand, a number of things have affected price. But most of the studies that we have looked at show that ethanol has contributed to some share of that increase. And I think my own study showed about 30 percent. That is similar to a lot of other studies that have been out there.

Mr. TERRY. Help me grasp this, so because cellulosic hasn’t really gotten out of the pilot to mass production yet, you were able to just waive that portion that was designated for this cellulosic growth? Mr. GRUNDLER. That is correct. We adjusted the volume down something like 98, 99 percent, based on our estimate about what that volume would be in the forthcoming year.

Mr. DOYLE. Dr. Grundler, I see the President’s Council of Economic Advisers is warning us that increasing production of food-based fuel, such as ethanol, not only increases the demand for agricultural feedstocks but may also make demand less elastic, through such measures as biofuel blending requirements, and as such, the integration of food and energy markets can cause shocks in one market that get transmitted to the other. We have seen the expansion of corn ethanol increase corn prices by 36% from 2000 to 2009. CBO estimated that the use of ethanol for fuel accounted for about a 28 to 47% increase in the price of corn and a 10 to 15% increase in food prices. And it is important to note that these increases occurred during a time when the U.S. harvested a record 13.1 billion bushels of corn. Grocery bills have been rising 3 to 4% every year, and they will rise by the same margin in 2013. In 2011, retail food costs rose 3.7 percent according to the USDA. After increasing corn ethanol mandate in 2007, the consumer price index for meat, poultry, fish, and eggs accelerated by 79 percent. The doubling of the ethanol mandate in 2007 caused a 30 percent increase in the price of corn from 2006 to 2010, according to economists. And the USDA is warning us that corn shortages, caused in part by the ethanol mandate, will drive up U.S. food prices by another 3 to 4 percent in 2013.

As we are moving from E10 to E15, what can you do to make sure that that space is not entirely filed by corn ethanol that can negatively affect feed prices and for farmers and food prices for consumers?

Mr. GRUNDLER. Well, sadly in addition to all the innovations that the RFS policy has inspired in terms of new technology, it has also inspired a lot of innovation in the criminal mind. And we have discovered what can only be called as counterfeiters, and we discovered this through our enforcement arm at the agency, through hotlines and tip lines. And as I hope you can appreciate, it takes a while to build a criminal case and to gather the evidence to make the prosecution. But the good news is that the United States achieved several convictions already with extended jail time, prison time for these counterfeiters as well as very high fines and confiscated private jets and luxury automobiles in the process.

The bad result that you are no doubt alluding to is this did create a chill in the marketplace.

Mr. Pompeo: Mr. Grundler, you have got a difficult challenge. You have got to implement not only this RFS but the CAFE and GHG standards for cars and trucks. The RFS last revised in 2007, we have got new CAFE and GHG rules. Have the CAFE and GHG rules affected compliance with the RFS in a material way?

Mr. GRUNDLER. What they have done is reduced the demand for gasoline in the country and that makes the blending challenge that much harder. So with respect to that, I don’t think it has affected it yet, but it has certainly accelerated this blend wall phenomena faster than anyone expected in 2007.

Mr. POMPEO. So we have got two sets of rules and we are now trying to mix too many renewable fuels into too little gasoline, that is the mathematical challenge you face is that correct?

Mr. GRUNDLER. Essentially. There is no doubt that consumers have not demanded high amounts of E85, and it is likely because of the way the product is priced. It is not today priced consistent with its energy content and I think consumers, some consumers have figured that out. And I would just say you are right, no one is going to put in infrastructure unless they have—are going to make those investments themselves unless they can see recouping those investments.

Mr. OLSON. This clearly is a very passionate issue that crosses party lines. But we owe the American people a thorough review of the RFS for one simple reason: The American energy outlook that drove the creation of ethanol tax subsidies in RFS is in the dustbin of history. Tax preferences for corn-based ethanol were created last century and mutated into RFS this century. Why the spur of government activity? Because we thought we hit peak gas. Meaning that to feed our ever-growing demand for gasoline we had to buy more and more oil from foreign sources that weren’t reliable. Our production was going down every single day. But the American innovator, with new technology, has pushed peak oil back to the next century. And while I think the best solution to this problem is to repeal RFS, my mind is not closed.

Yes or no: Does the EIA expect a spike in the use of either E15 or E85? Spike E15, E85, next couple years. Mr. SIEMINSKI. In production volumes?

Mr. OLSON. Production volume, use in automobiles, transportation.

Mr. SIEMINSKI. No, we are seeing a lot of difficulty in producing those fuels.

Mr. OLSON. So I think that is a no; no spike there. Yes or no: Does EIA expect sudden widespread production of advanced biofuels in the next few years?

Mr. SIEMINSKI. Not without a technological breakthrough.

Mr. OLSON. There we go. So in your opinion, these facts bode well for compliance with the RFS as it stands today?

Mr. SIEMINSKI. As my testimony said, the RFS as it is currently constituted simply can’t be met.

Mr. ENGEL. I first want to say that there has been a lot said, both good and bad, obviously, regarding the Renewable Fuel Standard. And the most important information I think to remember is that the RFS reduces our dependence on foreign oil and reduces our carbon emissions. And we will have to see whether or not it will be a success or a failure. But I think there are things we can do now to help strengthen the RFS, decrease our reliance on foreign oil, and improve our national security. For many years, and I just recently introduced the bill for this Congress, I call it the Open Fuel Standard Act, which I believe is a complement to the RFS. I introduced it in a bipartisan way,

And what the legislation essentially does is requires auto manufacturers to build cars that can run on alternative fuels in addition to gasoline. Mr. Shimkus and I have in previous Congresses teamed together to push this. This could include ethanol, methanol, natural gas, electricity, biodiesel, hydrogen, or a new technology. It would empower consumers to make a choice about which fuel was best for them. And I hope that we would take up this legislation.

Mr. GRUNDLER. Currently there are somewhere between 10 and 12 million flex-fuel vehicles on the road right now. But it appears, based on the evidence, that consumers are not using them to buy E85. I think roughly 100 million gallons of E85 was sold last year. Perhaps Mr. Sieminski has got a better number. And it is likely that is due to a number of factors. Some owners don’t know they have got a flex-fuel vehicle. Some owners have these flex-fuel vehicles but they may live in Texas where there might be one station selling E85. And some are discouraged by the price of E85. So if there were more flex-fuel vehicles available I doubt that would change this pricing dynamic.  Ford and General Motors are roughly making 40% of their vehicles as flex-fuel; and Chrysler is making a significant percentage as well. So they are on track to meet their commitment of 50% of production. And yet the evidence to date shows that consumers have not been choosing to use the higher blend ethanols.

As you probably know, Congress, in developing the RFS, came up with basically two different categories of fuels and chose to grandfather any facility that hadn’t commenced construction at the time of passage. So corn-based ethanol, most of that volume is, in fact, grandfathered, and so it is not required by law to meet the 20% greenhouse gas reduction threshold. We know over time that there are a number of economic incentives to improve the efficiency of your operation to look for cheaper crops, seek higher yield feedstocks. So we expect that that efficiency will improve. And, in fact, in our analysis of new plants and future plants out in 2022, when we did the impact analysis, did determine that those new plants would achieve the 20 percent reduction.

Mr. MATHESON. But the current plants, because they are grandfathered, are not.

Mr. GRUNDLER. Well, it depends. It was going to be a plant-specific thing. For example, those plants that may have switched from coal to natural gas would be more efficient.

 

Mr. WELCH. I have sat through this hearing because I have come to the conclusion that corn ethanol is a bad environmental policy, bad energy policy, bad food policy. And that is largely because of two things that I have been hearing over and over again from everyday Vermonters, first farmers, who have just been hammered with the increase in the feed cost that is associated in part with the corn-based ethanol. And then, secondly, a lot of the small engine repair people are absolutely convinced that the ethanol is detrimental to these engines. And if I didn’t believe it, my own chain saw got wrecked, and I am pretty upset about it, let me tell you.

Last year when we had the worst drought in 50 years, more than 70 percent of the cattle country was impacted. Ten Governors, 156 Members of Congress, including me, in a broad coalition of farm and food groups requested an EPA waiver. And that was denied. But in denying the waiver, the EPA appears to have created a stricter standard than Congress had, at least that is how I read it, rejecting harm to States or regions and instead determining that the agency needed to show that RFS implementation would severely harm the entire U.S. Economy. So I need some clarification on that, because the spike in feed prices certainly hurt us. It hurt every agricultural activity associated with livestock. So I am wondering what it would take from the perspective of where you sit for a waiver to have a valid factual basis for you to act.

References

Coyle, W.T. 2010. Next-Generation Biofuels: Near-Term Challenges and Implications for Agriculture, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, May 2010. www.ers.usda.gov/publicationslbio-bioenergy/bio-O 1-0 I.aspx#. UcCzuNiSJIO Energy Policy Research Foundation, inc.

(EPRINC). 2012. Ethanol’s Lost Promise: An Assessment of the Economic Consequences of the Renewable Fuels Mandate. Washington, DC. Ferris, J. 2013. “Impacts of the Federal Energy Acts and Other Influences on Prices of Agricultural Commodities and Food.” Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics. Staff Paper 2013-02.

Ferris, J. 2013. “Impacts of the Federal Energy Acts and Other Influences on Prices of Agricultural Commodities and Food.” Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics. Staff Paper 2013-02.

 

 

Posted in Renewable fuel standard RFS, U.S. Congress Transportation | Comments Off on Overview of the renewable fuel standard, U.S. House hearing 2013

Mining: Waste, Pollution, Destruction from Ugo Bardi’s “Extracted”

Posted on November 15, 2017 by

Preface. I’ve reworded/shortened some of the wording at times from this excellent book. Here are 7 other posts from this great book:

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Bardi, Ugo. 2014. Extracted: How the Quest for Mineral Wealth Is Plundering the Planet. Chelsea Green Publishing.

Mountain top removal consists of blasting away entire mountains to get the underlying coal seams or other mineral deposits. Forests, streams, and wildlife are destroyed as well, with the tailings smothering landscapes and waterways.

Coal is just one of the minerals that generates vast amounts of solid waste that must be disposed.

Copper is as well.  We produce 15 million tons of copper a year from ores that are only 0.5% copper, which means 3 billion tons of waste ore – even more than the total mass of concrete produced a year globally.

Now think of all the waste generated by all mining – surely tens of billions of tons of rock.  And as the best ores are used up, the less concentrated ores remain, which produce even more solid waste.

Worse yet, this waste isn’t just piles of rock – chemicals and other reactive substances such as cyanide, and arsenic.

  • Gold mining uses mercury
  • Extraction of uranium uses hydrogen peroxide and sulfuric acid.
  • Fracked oil and gas are laced with acids, solvents, and other chemicals that can contaminate water sources
  • underground coal fires can smolder for decades sending massive amounts of toxic gases into the air

In the end the products made are “consumed” and destroyed or discarded. Every stage in-between also generates waste: manufacturing leads to industrial waste, consumption of products to urban waste.

Mining products don’t have to be poisonous or reactive to do harm – sheer volume is enough. For example concrete decays and a huge fraction of the world’s land surface – 0.5 to 3% – is covered with roads, parking lots, buildings, commercial centers, and so on. That’s 700,000 to 3,000,000 square kilometers (270270 to 1.16 million square miles).

Furthermore, much of this is built on top of prime farmland, the best soil for growing food. In Holland, 13.2% of their nation is covered in permanent structures, and Belgium 9.8%, mainly on flat areas that could have grown food.

Topping all other waste as a threat to humanity is radioactive waste.  Plutonium is one of the most poisonous substances in existence. It takes so long to decay that even 100,000 years from now, 6% of it will still exist. From an ethical point of view, we are doing future generations a tremendous disservice. We are passing onto them heavy loads of dangerous materials, and it is not at all obvious that they’ll have the scientific and technological tools to deal with the problem, or even that they will be able to recognize that it exists.

Heavy metals are also often toxic, and exist in such huge quantities now that they harm entire ecosystems. Although they may be in landfills, there’s no guarantee that centuries or even sooner they won’t contaminate aquifers and cause other harm, such as the Love Canal landfill in New York which homes were built on top of leading to cancer, nervous disorders, birth defects, and other health problems.

Heavy metals are also being dispersed world-wide as fine particulates and volatile compounds that can be inhaled or eaten, sometimes as a result of incineration, since no filter is 100% efficient. Nano-sized particles are suspected of being the most damaging kind for our health, and enter the air via smokestacks. Incineration gives us the illusion we’ve gotten rid of waste, but may in fact be transforming it into more dangers and difficult compounds that the original ones.

Most of it is probably from industrial combustion though, especially coal burning. Coal has both heavy and radioactive metals that are emitted into the atmosphere as small particles after they’re burned. Heavy metals are also transformed into powders as a result of abrasion, corrosion, and other industrial, unavoidable processes affecting most metallic objects.

And when metals are dispersed this way, their concentrations are so low that they can’t be recovered.

Mercury is one of the most toxic metals known, and so far we’ve produced about 500,000 tons of it.  In addition, coal plants generate 1,500 tons a year roughly, of which probably a few hundred thousand tons have been dispersed into the atmosphere.  Where did the 500,000 tons go?  Perhaps 50,000 tons are still in the industrial system (thermometers, fluorescent lamps, batteries, dental fillings, etc.). Much is landfilled, incinerated, or dumped somewhere.  About 200,000 tons are present in the first 15 centimeters of soil (6 inches). Even more is in the oceans as dispersed powder or soluble compounds.

Mercury has a half-life of 3,000 years, so even if we stopped mercury production it would remain for thousands of years.  Meanwhile we are accumulating it by breathing, drinking, and eating. Since we’re at the top of the food chain, we’re probably the species most at risk from mercury accumulation.

Mercury is a neurotoxin, damaging the nervous system, as well as the liver and more. It continues to be released, but we don’t know how this will affect us.  Some recent studies who that the great Permian extinction 250 million years ago was associated with high levels of mercury resulting from volcanic eruptions.

The 4 most toxic substances are mercury, arsenic, lead, and cadmium, which are also being released by mining and industry. Chromium-3 is common in the earth’s crust and needed for human metabolism, but when transformed by industry to make chromium plating into chromium-6, it’s highly carcinogenic.

The problems generated by single substances are compounded and amplified by their combinations. We are not exposed to chemicals one at a time and for limited spans of time but in combinations of tens or even hundreds of them, continuously, in our daily lives.  The number of chemical substances registered for industrial uses is 100,00 in the EU and 84,000 in the U.S. We inhale, eat, and artificial chemicals with no idea what they will do to us long-term.

 

Posted in Chemicals, Hazardous Waste, Mining, Nuclear Waste, Pollution, Ugo Bardi | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity 1992

Posted on November 12, 2017 by

On November 18, 1992 approximately 1700 scientists from around the world, and the majority of the Nobel Prize laureates in the sciences, signed the document titled ‘World Scientist’s Warning to Humanity‘.

WORLD SCIENTISTS’ WARNING TO HUMANITY

Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources.  If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know.  Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring about.

THE ENVIRONMENT

The environment is suffering critical stress:

The Atmosphere

Stratospheric ozone depletion threatens us with enhanced ultra-violet radiation at the earth’s surface, which can be damaging or lethal to many life forms.  Air pollution near ground level, and acid precipitation, are already causing widespread injury to humans, forests and crops.

Water Resources

Heedless exploitation of depletable ground water supplies endangers food production and other essential human systems.  Heavy demands on the world’s surface waters have resulted in serious shortages in some 80 countries, containing 40% of the world’s population. Pollution of rivers, lakes and ground water further limits the supply.

Oceans

Destructive pressure on the oceans is severe, particularly in the coastal regions which produce most of the world’s food fish.  The total marine catch is now at or above the estimated maximum sustainable yield.  Some fisheries have already shown signs of collapse.  Rivers carrying heavy burdens of eroded soil into the seas also carry industrial, municipal, agricultural, and livestock waste — some of it toxic

Soil

Loss of soil productivity, which is causing extensive Land abandonment, is a widespread byproduct of current practices in agriculture and animal husbandry.  Since 1945, 11% of the earth’s vegetated surface has been degraded — an area larger than India and China combined — and per capita food production in many parts of the world is decreasing.

Forests

Tropical rain forests, as well as tropical and temperate dry forests, are being destroyed rapidly.  At present rates, some critical forest types will be gone in a few years and most of the tropical rain forest will be gone before the end of the next century.  With them will go large numbers of plant and animal species.

Living Species

The irreversible loss of species, which by 2100 may reach one third of all species now living, is especially serious.  We are losing the potential they hold for providing medicinal and other benefits, and the contribution that genetic diversity of life forms gives to the robustness of the world’s biological systems and to the astonishing beauty of the earth itself.

Much of this damage is irreversible on a scale of centuries or permanent.  Other processes appear to pose additional threats. Increasing levels of gases in the atmosphere from human activities, including carbon dioxide released from fossil fuel burning and from deforestation, may alter climate on a global scale.  Predictions of global warming are still uncertain — with projected effects ranging from tolerable to very severe — but the potential risks are very great.

Our massive tampering with the world’s interdependent web of life — coupled with the environmental damage inflicted by deforestation, species loss, and climate change — could trigger widespread adverse effects, including unpredictable collapses of critical biological systems whose interactions and dynamics we only imperfectly understand.

Uncertainty over the extent of these effects cannot excuse complacency or delay in facing the threat

POPULATION

The earth is finite. Its ability to absorb wastes and destructive effluent is finite. Its ability to provide food and energy is finite.  Its ability to provide for growing numbers of people is finite. And we are fast approaching many of the earth’s limits.  Current economic practices which damage the environment, in both developed and underdeveloped nations, cannot be continued without the risk that vital global systems will be damaged beyond repair.

Pressures resulting from unrestrained population growth put demands on the natural world that can overwhelm any efforts to achieve a sustainable future.  If we are to halt the destruction of our environment, we must accept limits to that growth.  A World Bank estimate indicates that world population will not stabilize at less than 12.4 billion, while the United Nations concludes that the eventual total could reach 14 billion, a near tripling of today’s 5.4 billion.  But, even at this moment, one person in five lives in absolute poverty without enough to eat, and one in ten suffers serious malnutrition.

No more than one or a few decades remain before the chance to avert the threats we now confront will be lost and the prospects for humanity immeasurably diminished.

WARNING

We the undersigned, senior members of the world’s scientific community, hereby warn all humanity of what lies ahead.  A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it, is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated.

WHAT WE MUST DO

Five inextricably linked areas must be addressed simultaneously:

1. We must bring environmentally damaging activities under control to restore and protect the integrity of the earth’s systems we depend on.

We must, for example, move away from fossil fuels to more benign, inexhaustible energy sources to cut greenhouse gas emissions and the pollution of our air and water. Priority must be given to the development of energy sources matched to third world needs — small scale and relatively easy to implement.

We must halt deforestation, injury to and loss of agricultural land, and the loss of terrestrial and marine plant and animal species.

2. We must manage resources crucial to human welfare more effectively.

We must give high priority to efficient use of energy, water, and other materials, including expansion of conservation and recycling.

3. We must stabilize population. This will be possible only if all nations recognize that it requires improved social and economic conditions, and the adoption of effective, voluntary family planning.

4. We must reduce and eventually eliminate poverty.

5. We must ensure sexual equality, and guarantee women control over their own reproductive decisions.

The developed nations are the largest polluters in the world today. They must greatly reduce their overconsumption, if we are to reduce pressures on resources and the global environment.  The developed nations have the obligation to provide aid and support to developing nations, because only the developed nations have the financial resources and the technical skills for these tasks.

Acting on this recognition is not altruism, but enlightened self-interest: whether industrialized or not, we all have but one lifeboat.  No nation can escape from injury when global biological systems are damaged.  No nation can escape from conflicts over increasingly scarce resources. In addition, environmental and economic instabilities will cause mass migrations with incalculable consequences for developed and undeveloped nations alike.

Developing nations must realize that environmental damage is one of the gravest threats they face, and that attempts to blunt it will be overwhelmed if their populations go unchecked.  The greatest peril is to become trapped in spirals of environmental decline, poverty, and unrest, leading to social, economic and environmental collapse.

Success in this global endeavor will require a great reduction in violence and war.  Resources now devoted to the preparation and conduct of war — amounting to over $1 trillion annually — will be badly needed in the new tasks and should be diverted to the new challenges.

A new ethic is required — a new attitude towards discharging our responsibility for caring for ourselves and for the earth.  We must recognize the earth’s limited capacity to provide for us.  We must recognize its fragility.  We must no longer allow it to be ravaged. This ethic must motivate a great movement, convince reluctant leaders and reluctant governments and reluctant peoples themselves to effect the needed changes.

The scientists issuing this warning hope that our message will reach and affect people everywhere. We need the help of many.

We require the help of the world community of scientists — natural, social, economic, political;

We require the help of the world’s business and industrial leaders;

We require the help of the worlds religious leaders; and

We require the help of the world’s peoples.

We call on all to join us in this task.

==================================

NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS
Philip Anderson, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Christian Anfinsen, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; USA
Werner Arber, Nobel laureate, Medicine; Switzerland
Julius Axelrod, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
David Baltimore, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Baruj Benacerraf, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Georg Bednorz, Nobel laureate, Physics; Switzerland
Sune Bergstrom, Nobel laureate, Medicine; Sweden
Hans Bethe, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Michael Bishop, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Konrad Bloch, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Nicholaas Bloembergen, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Baruch Blumberg, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Norman Borlaug, Agricultural Scientist, Nobel laureate, Peace; USA & Mexico
Adolph Butenandt, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Fmr. President, Max Planck Inst.; Germany
Georges Charpak, Nobel laureate, Physics; France
Stanley Cohen, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
E. J. Corey, Nobel laureate, Chemistry, USA
John Cornforth, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Great Britain
Jean Dausset, Nobel laureate, Medicine; France
Gerard Debreu, Nobel laureate, Economics; USA
Pierre-Gilles de Gennes, Nobel laureate, Physics; France
Johann Deisenhofer, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Germany & USA
Renato Dulbecco, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Manfred Eigen, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Germany
Gertrude Elion, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Richard Ernst, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Switzerland
Val Fitch, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
William Fowler, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Jerome Friedman, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Kenichi Fukui, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Japan
Carleton Gajdusek, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Murray Gell-Mann, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Donald Glaser, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Sheldon Glashow, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Roger Guillemin, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Herbert Hauptman, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; USA
Dudley Herschbach, Nobel laureate, Chemistry, USA
Gerhard Herzberg, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Canada
Antony Hewish, Nobel laureate, Physics; Great Britain
George Hitchings, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Great Britain
Roald Hoffman, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; USA
Robert Holley, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Francois Jacob, Nobel laureate, Medicine; France
Jerome Karle, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Henry Kendall, Nobel laureate, Physics; Chairman, Union of Concerned Scientists; USA
John Kendrew, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Great Britain
Klaus von Klitzing, Nobel laureate, Physics; Germany
Aaron Klug, Nobel laureate, Chemistry, Great Britain
Leon Lederman, Nobel laureate, Physics; Chr., Amer. Assn. Adv. Sci.; USA
Yuan T. Lee, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; USA
Jean Marie Lehn, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; France
Wassily Leontief, Nobel laureate, Economics; USA
Rita Levi-Montalcini, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA & Italy
William Lipscomb, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
James Meade, Nobel laureate, Economics; Great Britain
Hartmut Michel, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Germany
Brenda Milner, Neurologist, Academy of Sciences, Canada
Cesar Milstein, Nobel laureate, Medicine; Argentina & Great Britain
Franco Modigliani, Nobel laureate, Economics; USA
Nevill Mott, Nobel laureate, Physics; Great Britain
Joseph Murray, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Louis Neel, Nobel laureate, Physics; France
Erwin Neher, Nobel laureate, Medicine; Germany
Marshall Nirenberg, Biochemist; Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
George Palade, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Linus Pauling, Nobel laureate, Chemistry & Pence, USA
John Polanyi, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Canada
George Porter, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Great Britain
Ilya Prigogine, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Belgium
Edward Purcell, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Tadeus Reichstein, Nobel laureate, Medicine; Switzerland
Burton Richter, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Frederick Robbins, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Carlo Rubbia, Nobel laureate, Physics, Italy & Switzerland
Abdus Salam, Nobel laureate, Physics; President, Third World Academy of Sciences, Pakistan & Italy
Frederick Sanger, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Great Britain
Melvin Schwartz, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Julian Schwinger, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Glenn Seaborg, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
Kai Siegbahn, Nobel laureate, Physics; Sweden
Herbert Simon, Nobel laureate, Economics; USA
George Snell, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Roger Sperry, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Jack Steinberger, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA & Switzerland
Donnall Thomas, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Jan Tinbergen, Nobel laureate, Economics; Netherlands
Samuel C. C. Ting, Nobel laureate, Physics; USA
James Tobin, Nobel laureate, Economics; USA
Alexander Todd, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Great Britain
Susumu Tonegawa, Nobel laureate, Medicine; Japan & USA
Simon van der Meer, Nobel laureate, Physics; Netherlands & Switzerland
John Vane, Nobel laureate, Medicine; Great Britain
Harold Varmus, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
George Wald, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
E. T. S. Walton, Nobel laureate, Physics, Ireland
James Watson, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Thomas Weller, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Torsten Wiesel, Nobel laureate, Medicine; USA
Maurice Wilkins, Nobel laureate, Medicine; Great Britain
Geoffrey Wilkinson, Nobel laureate, Chemistry; Great Britain

PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS AMONG MORE THAN 1,500 SIGNATORIES

Anatole Abragam, Physicist; Fmr. Member, Pontifical Academy of Sciences; France
Carlos Aguirre President, Academy of Sciences, Bolivia
Walter Alvarez Geologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Viqar Uddin Ammad, Chemist, Pakistani & Third World Academies, Pakistan
Claude Allegre, Geophysicist, Crafoord Prize, France
Michael Alpers Epidemiologist, Inst. of Med. Research, Papua New Guinea
Anne Anastasi, Psychologist, National Medal of Science, USA
How Ghee Ang, Chemist, Third World Academy, Singapore
Mary Ellen Avery, Pediatrician, National Medal of Science, USA
Michael Atiyah, Mathematician; President, Royal Society; Great Britain
Howard Bachrach, Biochemist, National Medal of Science, USA
John Backus, Computer Scientist, National Medal of Science, USA
Achmad Baiquni, Physicist, Indonesian & Third World Academies, Indonesia
H. A. Barker, Biochemist, National Medal of Science, USA
Francisco J. Barrantes, Biophysicist, Third World Academy, Argentina
David Bates, Physicist, Royal Irish Academy, Ireland
Alan Battersby, Chemist, Wolf Prize in Chemistry, Great Britain
Germot Bergold, Inst. Venezolano de Investigaciones Cientificas, Venezuela
Daniel Bes, Physicist, Argentinean & Third World Academies, Argentina
Arthur Birch Chemist, Australian Academy of Science, Australia
David Mervyn Blow, Wolf Prize in Chemistry, Great Britain
Bert Bolin, Meteorologist, Tyler Prize, Sweden
Frederick Bormann, Forest Ecologist; Past President, Ecological Soc. of Amer.; USA
Raoul Bott, Mathematician, National Medal of Science, USA
Ronald Breslow, Chemist, National Medal of Science
Ricardo Bressani, Inst. of Nutrition, Guatemalan & Third World Academies, Guatemala
Hermann Bruck, Astronomer, Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Great Britain
Gerardo Budowski, Natural Resources, Univ. Para La Paz, Costa Rica
E. Margaret Burbidge, Astronomer, National Medal of Science, USA
Robert Burris, Biochemist, Wolf Prize in Agriculture, USA
Glenn Burton, Geneticist, National Medal of Science, USA
Sergio Cabrera, Biologist, Univ. de Chile, Chile
Paulo C. Campos, Medical scientist, Philippine & Third World Academies, Philippines
Ennio Candotti, Physicist; President, Brazilian Soc. Adv.of Science; Brazil
Henri Cartan, Wolf Prize in Mathematics, France
Carlos Chagas, Biologist; Univ. de Rio de Janeiro; Fmr. President, Pontifical Academy of Sciences; Brazil
Sivaramakrishna Chandrasekhar, Center for Liquid Crystal Research, India
Joseph Chatt, Wolf Prize in Chemistry, Great Britain
Shiing-Shen Chern, Wolf Prize in Mathematics, China & USA
Christopher Chetsanga, Biochemist, Affican & Third World Academies, Zimbabwe
Morris Cohen, Engineering, National Medal of Science, USA
Stanley N. Cohen, Geneticist, Wolf Prize in Medicine, USA
Mildred Cohn, Biochemist, National Medal of Science, USA
Hector Croxatto, Physiologist, Pontifical & Third World Academies, Chile
Paul Crutzen, Chemist, Tyler Prize, Germany
Partha Dasgupta, Economist, Royal Society, Great Britain
Ogulande Robert Davidson, Univ. Res. & Dev. Serv., African Acad., Sierra Leone
Margaret Davis, Ecologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Luis D’Croz, Limnologist, Univ. de Panama, Panama
Frederica de Laguna, Anthropologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Paul-Yves Denis, Geographer, Academy of Sciences, Canada
Pierre Deligne, Mathematician, Crafoord Prize, France
Frank Dixon, Pathologist, Lasker Award, USA
Johanna Dobereiner, Biologist, First Sec., Brazilian Academy of Sci.; Pontifical & Third World Academies, Brazil
Joseph Doob, Mathematician, National Medal of Science, USA
Heneri Dzinotyiweyi, Mathematician, African & Third World Academies, Zimbabwe
Samuel Eilenberg, Wolf Prize in Mathematics, USA
Mahdi Elmandjra, Economist; Vice President, African Academy of Sciences; Morocco
Paul Ehrlich, Biologist, Crafoord Prize, USA
Thomas Eisner, Biologist, Tyler Prize, USA
Mohammed T. El-Ashry, Environmental scientist, Third World Academy, Egypt & USA
Aina Elvius, Astronomer, Royal Academy of Sciences, Sweden
K. O. Emery, Oceanographer, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Paul Erdos, Wolf Prize in Mathematics, Hungary
Vittorio Ersparmer, Pharmacologist, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Italy
Sandra Faber, Astronomer, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Nina Federoff, Embryologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Herman Feshbach, Physicist, National Medal of Science, USA
Inga Fischer-Hjalmars, Biologist, Royal Academy of Sciences, Sweden
Michael Ellis Fisher, Physicist, Wolf Prize in Physics, Great Britain & USA
Daflinn Follesdal, President, Norwegian Academy of Science;Norway
Otto Frankel, Geneticist, Australian Academy of Sciences, Australia
Herbert Friedman, Wolf Prize in Physics, USA
Konstantin V. Frolov Engineer; Vice President, Russian Academy of Sciences; Russia
Madhav Gadgil, Ecologist, National Science Academy, India
Mary Gaillard, Physicist, National Academy of Sciences. USA
Robert Gallo, Research Scientist, Lasker Award, USA
Rodrigo Gamez ,Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad, Costa Rica
Antonio Garcia-Bellido, Biologist, Univ. Auto. Madrid, Royal Society, Spain
Leopoldo Garcia-Collin, Physicist, Latin American & Third World Academies, Mexico
Percy Garnham, Royal Society & Pontifical Academy, Great Britain
Richard Garwin, Physicist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Georgii Georgiev, Biologist, Lenin Prize, Russia
Humam Bishara Ghassib, Physicist, Third World Academy, Jordan
Ricardo Giacconi, Astronomer, Wolf Prize in Physics, USA
Eleanor J. Gibson, Psychologist, National Medal of Science, USA
Marvin Goldberger, Physicist; Fmr. President, Calif. Inst. of Tech., USA
Maurice Goldhaber, Wolf Prize in Physics, USA
James Gowans, Wolf Prize in Medicine, France
Roger Green, Anthropologist, Royal Society, New Zealand
Peter Greenwood, Ichthyologist, Royal Society, Great Britain
Edward Goldberg, Chemist, Tyler Prize, USA
Coluthur Gopolan, Nutrition Foundation of India, Indian & Third World Academies, India
Stephen Jay Gould, Paleontologist, Author, Harvard Univ., USA
Herbert Gutowsky, Wolf Prize in Chemistry, USA
Erwin Hahn, Wolf Prize in Physics, USA
Gonzalo Halffter, Ecologist, Inst. Pol. Nac. ,Mexico
Kerstin Hall, Endocrinologist, Royal Academy of Sciences, Sweden
Mohammed Ahmed Hamdan, Mathematician, Third World, Academy, Jordan
Adnan Hamoui, Mathematician, Third World, Academy, Kuwait
A. M. Harun-ar Rashid, Physicist; Sec., Bangladesh, Academy of Sci., Bangladesh
Mohammed H. A. Hassan, Physicist; Exec. Sec., Third World Academy of Sciences; Sudan & Italy
Ahmed Hassanli, Chemist, African Academy of Sciences, Tanzania & Kenya
Stephen Hawking, Mathematician, Wolf Prize in Physics, Great Britain
Elizabeth Hay, Biologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Nick Holonyak, Electrical Engineer, National Medal of Science, USA
Lars Hormander, Wolf Prize in Mathematics, Sweden
Dorothy Horstmann, Epidemiologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
John Houghton, Meteorologist; Chairman, Science Working Group, IPCC; Great Britain
Sarah Hrdy, Anthropologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Kenneth Hsu, Geologist, Third World Academy, China & Switzerland
Kun Huang, Physicist, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
Hiroshi Inose, Electrical Engineer; Vice President, Engineering Academy; Japan
Turner T. Isoun, Pathologist, African Academy of Sciences, Nigeria
Carl-Olof Jacobson Zoologist; Sec-Gen., Royal Academy of Sciences; Sweden
Dorothea Jameson, Psychologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Daniel Janzen, Biologist, Crafoord Prize, USA
Cecilia Jarlskog, Physicist, Royal Academy of Sciences, Sweden
Louise Johnson, Biophysicist, Royal Society, Great Britain
Harold Johnston, Chemist, Tyler Prize, USA
Victor A. Kabanov, Chemist, Lenin Prize in Science, Russia
Robert Kates, Geographer, National Medal of Science, USA
Frederick I. B. Kayanja, Vice-Chnclr., Mbarara Univ., Third World Academy, Uganda
Joseph Keller, Mathematician, National Medal of Science, USA
Elisabeth Kessler, Royal Academy of Sciences, Sweden
Maung-U Khin, Pediatrician, Third World Academy, Myamnar &  USA
Gurdev Khush, Agronomist, International Rice Institute, Indian Natl. Sci. Academy, India & Philippines
Susan Kieffer, Geologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
E. F. Knipling, Agricultural Researcher, National Medal of Science, USA
Walter Kohn, Physicist, National Medal of Science, USA
Janos Kornai, Economist, Hungarian Academy of Science, Hungary
Aderemi Kuku, Mathematician, African & Third World Acads., Nigeria
Ikuo Kushiro, Geologist, Japan Academy, Japan
Devendra Lal, Geophysicist, National Science Academy, India
Gerardo Lamas-Muller, Biologist, Museo de Historia Natural, Peru
Torvard Laurent, Physiological chemist; President, Royal Academy of Sciences; Sweden
Sang Soo Lee, Physicist, Korean & Third World Academies, Rep. of Korea
Susan Leeman PharmacologistX National Academy of Sciences,USA
Luna Leopold, Geologist, National Medal of Science, USA
Louis Leprince-Ringuet, Physicist, French & Pontifical Academies, France
Vladilen Letokhov, Physicist, Lenin Prize in Science, Russia
Li Chang-lin, Environmental Sciences, Fudan University, China
Shan Tao Liao, Mathematician, Chinese & Third World Academies, China
Jane Lubchenco, Zoologist; President-Elect, Ecological Soc. of Amer.;  USA
Christopher Magazda, Limnologist, African Academy of Sciences, Zimbabwe
Lydia Phindile Makhubu, Chemist, Third World & African Academies, Swaziland
Khursheed Ahmad Malik, Microbiologist, Pakistan & Third World Academies, Pakistan & Germany
Lynn Margulis, Biologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Paul Marks, Oncologist, National Medal of Science, USA
George Martine, Inst. for Study of Society, Population, & Nature; Brazil
Frederico Mayor, Biochemist; Dir. Gen., UNESCO, Spain & France
Ernst Mayr, Zoologist, National Medal of Science, USA
Maclyn McCarty, Wolf Prize in Medicine, USA
James McConnell, Physicist, Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Ireland
Digby McLaren, Past President, Royal Society of Canada; Canada
Jerrold Meinwald, Chemistry, Tyler Prize, USA
M. G. K Menon, Physicist; President, International Council of Scientific Unions; India
Gennady Mesiatz, Physicist; Vice President, Russian Academy of Sciences; Russia
Jan Michalski, Biologist, Polish Academy of Science, Poland
Andrei Monin, Oceanologist, State Prize, Russia
Marcos Moshinsky, Physicist, Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Mexico
Teruaki Mukaiyama, Chemist, Japan Academy, Japan
Walter Munk, Geophysicist, National Medal of Science, USA
Anne Murray, Ethnographer, Royal Academy of Sciences, Sweden
Noreen Murray, Biologist, Royal Society, Great Britain
Lawrence Mysak, Meteorologist; Vice President, Academy of Science, Royal Society of Canada; Canada
Jayant Vishnu Narlikar, Astrophysicist, Indian & Third  World Academies, India
Anwar Nasim, Biologist, Third World Academy, Saudi Arabia
Kim Nasmyth, Biologist, Royal Society, Great Britain & Austria
James Neel, Geneticist, National Medal of Science, USA
Yuval Ne’eman, Physicist, Natl. Acad. of Sci. & Humanities, Israel
Oleg M. Nefedov, Chemist; Vice President, Russian Academy of Sciences; Russia
Yasutomi Nishizuka, Biochemist, Lasker Award, Japan
John S. Nkoma, Physicist, Third World Academy, Botswana
Paul Nchoji Nkvvi, Anthropologist, African Academy, Cameroon
Howard Odum, Ecologist, Crafoord Prize, USA
Bede Nwoye Okigbo, Agricultural Scientist; Dir., U.N. Unv.Pgm. Natrl. Res. in Afr.; Nigeria & Kenya
Ayub Khan Ommaya, Neurobiologist, Third World Academy, Pakistan & USA
Cyril Agodi Onwumechili, Physicist, Fmr. Pres., Nigerian Acad. of Sciences, Nigeria & Great Britain
Mary Jane Osborn, Microbiologist, National Academy of Scientists, USA
Yuri Ossipyan, Physicist; Vice President, Russian Academy  of Sciences; Russia
Autzr Singh Paintal, Physiologist, Fmr. President, Indian National Science Academy, India
George Pake, Physicist, National Medal of Science, USA
Mary Lou Pardue, Biologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Barbara Pearse, Molecular Biologist, Royal Society, Great Britain
Muhammed Abed Peerally, Biologist, Third World Academy, Mauritius
Manuel Peimbert, Astronomer, Univ. Nac. Aut. de Mexico, Mexico
Roger Penrose, Mathematician, Wolf Prize in Physics, Great Britain
John Philip, Agricultural Science, Australian Academy of Science, Australia
Lilian Pickford, Physiologist, Royal Society, Great Britain
John R. Pierce, Electrical Engineer, National Medal of Science, USA
Giampietro Puppi, Physicist, Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Italy
Atta ur-Rahman, Chemist, Pakistani & Third World Academies, Pakistan
G. N. Ramachandran, Mathematician, Inst. of Science, India
Tiruppattur Ramakrishnan, Physicist, Indian & Third World Academies, India
Chintamani Rao, Inst. of Science, Indian and Pontifical Academies, India
Eduardo Rapoport, Ecologist, Third World Academy, Argentina
Marianne Rasmuson, Geneticist, Royal Academy of Sciences,  Sweden
Peter Raven, Director, Missouri Botanical Garden; National Academy of Sciences, USA
Martin Rees, Astronomer, Royal Society & Pontifical Academy, Great Britain
Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, Anthropologist, Columbian & Third World Academies, Columbia
Frederick Reines, Physicist, National Medal of Science, USA
Alexander Rich, Biologist, National & Pontifical Academies, USA
Ralph Riley, Wolf Prize in Agriculture, Great Britain
Claude Rimington, Inst. for Cancer Research, Norwegian Academy of Science, Norway
Gustavo Rivas Mijares, Engineer; Fmr. President, Academy of Sciences, Venezuela
Wendell Roelofs, Entomologist, National Medal of Science, USA
Betty Roots, Zoologist, Academy of Sciences, Canada
Miriam Rothschild, Biologist, Royal Society, Great Britain
Sherwood Rowland, Chemist; President, American Assoc for the Advancement of Science; USA
Janet Rowley, Physician, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Vera Rubin, Physicist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Yuri Rudenko, Energy Research Inst., State Prize laureate, Russia
Elizabeth Russell, Jackson Laboratory, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Albert Sabin, Virologist, National Medal of Science, USA
Carl Sagan, Astrophysicist & Author, USA
Roald Sagdeev, Physicist, Russian & Pontifical Academies, Russia & USA
Ruth Sager, Geneticist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Farrokh Saidi, Surgeon, Third World Academy, Iran
Jose Sarukhan, Biologist, Third World Academy, Mexico
Berta Scharrer,Neuroscientist, National Medal of Science, USA
Richard Schultes, Botanist, Tyler Prize, USA
Michael Sela, Weizmann Inst., Pontifical Academy of Science, Israel
Arne Semb-Johansson, Entomologist, Norwegian Academy of Science, Norway
Salimuzzaman Siddiqui, Chemist, Pontifical & Third World Academies, Pakistan
Thomas Silou, Biochemist, African Academy of Sciences, Congo
Alexej Sitenko, Physicist, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Ukraine
Jens Skou, Biophysicist, Royal Academy of Sciences, Denmark
Charles Slack, Agricultural Science, Royal Society, New Zealand
Alexander Spirin, Biologistn Lenin Prize, Russia
Earl Stadtman, Biochemist, National Medal of Science, USA
Thressa Stadtman, Biochemist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Ledyard Stebbins, Geneticist, National Medal of Science, USA
Janos Szentgothai, Fmr. President, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Hungary
Tan Jia-zhen, Geneticist, Shanghai Univ., China
Andrezej Tarkowski, Embryologist, Polish [text missing]
Valentine Telegdi, Wolf Prize in Physics, Switzerland
Kirthi Tennakone, Physicist, Third World Academy, Sri Lanka
Walter Thirring, Physicist, Austrian & Pontifical Academies, Austria
Cheng Kui Tseng, Oceanologist, Chinese & Third World Academies, China
Hans Tuppy, Biochemist, Austrian & Pontifical Academies, Austria
James Van Allen, Physicist, Crafoord Prize, USA
Martha Vaughan, Biochemist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Henrik Wallgren, Zoologist, Society of Science & Letters, Finland
Prawase Wasi, Hematologist, Third World Academy, Thailand
Gerald Wasserburg, Geophysicist, Crafoord Prize, USA
Victor Weisskopf, Wolf Prize in Physics, USA
Diter von Wettstein, Physiologist, Royal Academy of Sciences, Denmark
Fred Whipple, Astronomer, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Gilbert White, Geographer, Tyler Prize, USA
Jerome Wiesner, Physicist, Fmr. President, Mass. Inst. of Tech., USA
Richard Willems, Geneticist, Estonian Biocentre, Estonia
Edward O. Wilson, Biologist, Crafoord Prize, USA
Lawrence A. Wilson, Agricultural Science, Third World Academy, Trinidad
Evelyn Witkin, Biologist, National Academy of Sciences, USA
Yang Fujia, Physicist, Chinese & Third World Academies, China
Alexander L. Yanshin, Geologist, Karpinsky Gold Medal, Russia
Yongyuth Yuthavong, Biochemist; Director, National Sci. & Tech. Devl. Agency, Thailand
Zhao Zhong-xian, Physicist, Chinese & Third World Academies, China
Zhou Guang-zhao, Physicist; President, Chinese Academy of Sciences;, China
Solly ZuckerInan, Zoologist, Royal Society, Great Britain

=========================================================

Over 1,500 members of national, regional, and international science academies have signed the Warning.  Sixtynine nations from all parts of Earth are represented, including each of the twelve most populous nations and the nineteen largest economic powers.  The full list includes a majority of the Nobel laureates in the sciences.  Awards and institutional affiliations are listed for the purpose of identification only.  The Nobel Prize in medicine is for physiology or medicine.

Posted in Scientists Warnings to Humanity | 3 Comments