Murphy & Hall 2011 Adjusting the economy to the new energy realities of the second half of the age of oil

[ Below are excerpts from this 5 page paper, slightly rearranged, go here to see all of the text, figures, and tables.   Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation, 2015, Springer]

Murphy, D.J., Hall, C.A.S.  2011. Adjusting the economy to the new energy realities of the second half of the age of oil. Ecol. Model. doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2011.06.022

fig 8 peak era model of the economy

Fig 8 Peak era model of the economy

Is Growth still Possible?

Due to the depletion of conventional, and hence cheap, crude oil supplies (i.e. peak oil), increasing the supply of oil in the future would require exploiting lower quality resources (i.e. expensive),and thus will most likely occur only at high prices. This situation creates a system of feedbacks where economic growth, which requires more oil, would require high oil prices that will undermine that economic growth. We conclude that the economic growth of the past 40 years is unlikely to continue unless there is some remarkable change in how we manage our economy.

Numerous theories have been posited over the past century that have attempted to explain business cycles, or to generate some means of accelerating a return to rapid growth during slow or non-growth times. Many offer a unique explanation for the causes of and solutions to recessions. They include ideas based on: Keynesian Theory, the Monetarist Model, the Rational Expectations Model, Real Business Cycle Models, Neo- Keynesian models, etc. (Knoop, 2010).

Yet, for all the differences amongst these theories, they all share one implicit assumption: that there will be a return to a growing economy, i.e. growing GDP. Historically, there has been no reason to question this assumption as GDP, incomes, and most other measures of economic growth have in fact grown steadily over the past century.

But if we are entering the era of peak oil, then for the first time in history we may be asked to grow the economy while simultaneously decreasing oil consumption, something that has yet to occur in the U.S. for 100 years.

Oil more than any other energy source is vital to today’s economies because of its ubiquitous application as nearly the only transportation fuel, as a portable and flexible carrier and as feedstocks for manufacturing and industrial production.

Historically, spikes in the price of oil have been the primary cause of most recessions. On the other hand, expansionary periods tend to be associated with the opposite oil signature: prolonged periods of relatively low oil prices that increase aggregate demand and lower marginal production costs, all leading to, or at least associated with, economic growth.

By extension, for the economy to sustain real growth over time there must be an increase in the flow of net energy (and materials) through the economy. Quite simply economic production is a work process and work requires energy. This logic is an extension of the laws of thermodynamics, which state that: (1) energy cannot be created nor destroyed, and (2) energy is degraded during any work process so that the initial inventory of energy can do less work as time passes. As Daly and Farley (2003) describe, the first law places a theoretical limit on the supply of goods and services that the economy can provide, and the second law sets a limit on the practical availability of matter and energy. In other words, the laws of thermodynamics state that to produce goods and services, energy must be used, and once this energy is used it is degraded to a point where it can no longer be reused to power the same process again. Thus to increase production over time, i.e. to grow the economy, we must either increase the energy supply or increase the efficiency with which we use our source energy. This is called the energy-based theory of economic growth, which was advanced significantly by the work of Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen (GeorgescuRoegen, 1971), amongst many others (Costanza, 1980; Cleveland et al., 1984; Ayres, 1999; Hall et al., 2001; Daly and Farley, 2003; Ayres and Ware, 2005; Hall and Day, 2009).

An energy-based theory of economic growth

This energy-based theory of economic growth is supported by data: the consumption of every major energy source has increased with GDP since the mid-1800s at nearly the rate that the economy has expanded (Fig. 1). Throughout this growth period, however, there have been numerous oscillations between periods of growth and recessions.

Fig 1 energy production and GDP for the world from 1830 to 2000

 

Fig. 1. Energy production and GDP for the world from 1830 to 2000.

Cleveland et al. (2000) analyzed the causal relation between energy consumption and economic growth and their results indicate that, when they adjusted the data for quality and accounted for substitution, energy consumption caused economic growth. Other subsequent analyses that adjusted for energy quality support the hypothesis that energy consumption causes economic growth, not the converse (Stern, 1993, 2000).

In sum, our analysis indicates that about 50% of the changes in economic growth over the past 40 years are explained, at least in the statistical sense, by the changes in oil consumption alone. In addition, the work by Cleveland et al. (2000) indicates that changes in oil consumption cause changes in economic growth. These two points support the idea that energy consumption, and oil consumption in particular, is of the utmost importance for economic growth. Yet changes in oil consumption are rarely used by neoclassical economists as a means of explaining economic growth. For example, Knoop (2010) describes the 1973 recession in terms of high oil prices, high unemployment and inflation, yet omits mentioning that oil consumption declined 4% during the first year and 2% during the second year. Later in the same description, Knoop (2010) claims that the emergence from this recession in 1975 was due to a decrease in both the price of oil and inflation, and an increase in money supply. To be sure, these factors contributed to the economic expansion in 1975, but what is omitted, again, is the simple fact that lower oil prices led to increased oil consumption and hence greater physical economic output. Oil is treated by economists as a commodity, but in fact it is a more fundamental factor of production than either capital or labor (Hall et al., 2001).

Thus we present the hypothesis that higher oil prices and lower oil consumption are both precursors to, and indicative of, recessions. Likewise, economic growth requires lower oil prices and simultaneously an increasing oil supply. The data support these hypotheses: the inflation-adjusted price of oil averaged across all expansionary years from 1970 to 2008 was $37 per barrel compared to $58 per barrel averaged across recessionary years, whereas oil consumption grew by 2% on average per year during expansionary years compared to decreasing by 3% per year during recessionary years (Figs. 2 and 4). Although this analysis of recessions and expansions may seem like simple economics, i.e. high prices lead to low demand and low prices lead to high demand, the exact mechanism connecting energy, economic growth, and business cycles is rather more complicated. Hall et al. (2009) and Murphy and Hall (2010) report that when energy prices increase, expenditures are re-allocated from areas that had previously added to GDP, mainly discretionary consumption, towards simply paying for the more expensive energy. In this way, higher energy prices lead to recessions by diverting money from the economy towards energy only. The data show that recessions occur when petroleum expenditures as a percent of GDP climb above a threshold of roughly 5.5% (Fig 5).

  1. [Every] time the U.S. economy emerged from a recession over the past 40 years, there was always an increase in the use of oil while a low oil price was maintained.
  2. Oil is a finite resource.

In light of these two realities, the following two questions become particularly germane: What are the implications for economic growth if (1) oil supplies are unable to increase with demand, or (2) oil supplies increase, but at an increased price?

There is a clear trend in the literature on energy return on (energy) invested (EROI) of global oil production towards lower EROIs. Gagnon et al. (2009) report that the EROI  for global oil extraction declined from about 36:1 in the 1990s to18:1 in 2006. This  downward trend results from at least two factors: first, increasingly supplies of oil are  originating from sources that are inherently more energy-intensive to produce simply  because firms have developed cheaper resources before expensive ones. For example, in  the early 1990s fewer than 10% of oil discoveries were located in deep water areas. By  2005 the number jumped to greater than 50%.

Enhanced oil recovery techniques are being implemented increasingly in the world’s largest conventional oil fields. For example, nitrogen injection was initiated in the once supergiant Cantarell field in Mexico in 2000, which boosted production for four years, but since 2004 production from the field has declined precipitously. Although enhanced oil recovery techniques increase production in the short term, they also increase significantly the energy inputs to production, offsetting much of the energy gain for society.

Roughly 60% of the oil discoveries in 2005 were in deep water locations (Fig. 6). Based on estimates from Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA, 2008), the cost of developing that oil is between $60 and $85 per barrel, depending on the specific deep water province. Oil prices therefore, at a minimum, must exceed roughly $60 per barrel to support the development of even the best deep water resources. But the average price of oil during recessionary periods has been $57/bbl, so it seems that increasing oil production in the future will require oil prices that are associated with recessionary periods.

All of this data indicates that an expensive oil future is necessary if we are to expand our total use of oil. In other words, growing the economy will require oil prices that will discourage that very growth.  Indeed, it may be difficult to produce the remaining oil resources at prices the economy can afford, and, as a consequence, the economic growth witnessed by the U.S. and globe over the past 40 years may be a thing of the past.

EROI and the price of fuels

EROI is a ratio comparing the energy produced by an extraction process to that used to produce that energy (Murphy and Hall, 2010). As such it can be used as a proxy to estimate generally whether the cost of production of a particular resource will be high or low, and it also is probably a good determinant of the monetary costs of various energy resources. For example, the oil sands have an EROI of roughly 3:1, whereas the production of conventional U.S. crude oil has an average EROI of about 12:1 and Saudi crude probably much higher

The production costs for oil sands are roughly $85 per barrel compared to roughly $40 for average global oil and perhaps $20 (or less) per barrel for Saudi Arabian conventional crude (CERA, 2008). As we can see from this data there is an inverse relation between EROI and price, indicating that low EROI resources are generally more expensive to develop whereas high EROI resources are on average relatively inexpensive to develop (Fig. 7). As oil production continues, we can expect to move further towards the upper right of Fig. 7. In summary, relatively low EROI appears to translate directly into higher oil prices.

It is important to emphasize that these models assume that society will continue to pursue business-as-usual economic growth, i.e. the models assume that business persons will continue to assume that oil demand will continue to increase indefinitely in the future (whether or not they understand the role of the oil).

For the economy of the U.S. and any other growth-based economy, the prospects for future, oil-based economic growth are bleak. Taken together, it seems clear that the economic growth of the past 40 years will not continue for the next 40 years.

Summary

The main conclusions to draw from this discussion are:

  • Over the past 40 years, economic growth has required increasing oil consumption.
  • The supply of high EROI oil cannot increase much beyond current levels for a prolonged period of time.
  • The average global EROI of oil production will almost certainly continue to decline as we search for new sources of oil in the only places we have left: deep water, arctic and other hostile environments.
  • Increasing oil supply in the future will require a higher oil price because mostly only low EROI, high cost resources remain to be discovered or exploited, but these higher costs are likely to cause economic contraction.
  • Using oil-based economic growth as a solution to recessions is untenable in the long-term, as both the gross and net supplies of oil has or will begin, at some point, an irreversible decline.

Due to the depletion of high EROI oil the economic model for the peak era, i.e. roughly 1970-2020, is much different from the  pre-peak model, and can be described by the following feedbacks ( Fig. 8): (1) economic growth increases oil demand, (2) higher oil demand increases oil production from lower EROI resources, (3) increasing extraction costs leads to higher oil prices, (4) higher oil prices stall economic growth or cause economic contractions, (5) economic contraction leads to lower oil demand, and (6) lower oil demand leads to lower oil prices which spur another short bout of economic growth until this cycle repeats itself.

This system of insidious feedbacks is aptly described as a growth paradox: maintaining business as usual economic growth will require the production of new sources of oil, yet the only sources of oil remaining require high oil prices, thus hampering economic growth. This growth paradox leads to a highly volatile economy that oscillates frequently between expansion and contraction periods, and as a result, there may be numerous peaks in oil production. Campbell (2009) has referred to this as an undulating plateau. In terms of business cycles, the main difference between the pre and peak era models is that business cycles appear as oscillations around an increasing trend in the pre-peak model while during the peak-era model they appear as oscillations around a flat trend. It is important to emphasize that these models assume that society will continue to pursue business-as-usual economic growth, i.e. the models assume that businesspersons will continue to assume that oil demand will continue to increase indefinitely in the future (whether or not they understand the role of the oil).

But what if economic growth was no longer the goal? What if society began to emphasize energy conservation over energy consumption? Unlike oil supply, oil demand is not governed by depletion, and incentivizing populations to make incremental changes that decrease oil consumption can completely alter the relation between oil and the economy that was described in the aforementioned model. Decreasing oil consumption in the U.S. by even 10% would release millions of barrels of oil onto the global oil markets each day.

For the economy of the U.S. and any other growth-based economy, the prospects for future, oil-based economic growth are bleak. Taken together, it seems clear that the economic growth of the past 40 years will not continue for the next 40 years unless there is some remarkable change in how we manage our economy.

References

  • Ayres, R., Ware, B., 2005. Accounting for growth: the role of physical work. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 16, 181–209.
  • Ayres, R.U., 1999. The second law, the fourth law, recycling and limits to growth. Ecological Economics 29, 473–483.
  • Campbell, C., 2009. Why dawn may be breaking for the second half of the age of oil. First Break 27, 53–62.
  • CERA, 2008. Ratcheting Down: Oil and the Global Credit Crisis. Cambridge Energy Research Associates.
  • Cleveland, C.J., Costanza, R., Hall, C.A.S., Kauffmann, R., 1984. Energy and the U.S. economy: a biophysical perspective. Science 225, 890–897.
  • Cleveland, C.J., Kaufmann, R.K., Stern, D.I., 2000. Aggregation and the role of energy in the economy. Ecological Economics 32, 301–317.
  • Costanza, R., 1980. Embodied energy and economic valuation. Science 210, 1219–1224.
  • Daly, H.E., Farley, J., 2003. Ecological Economics: Principles and Applications. Island Press.
  • Faber, M., Manstetten, R., Proops, J., 1996. Ecological Economics: Concepts and Methods. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Federal, R., 2009. St. Louis Federal Reserve.
  • Gagnon, N., Hall, C.A.S., Brinker, L., 2009. A preliminary investigation of the energy return on energy invested for global oil and gas extraction. Energies 2, 490–503.
  • Georgescu-Roegen, N., 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
  • Hall, C.A., Balogh, S., Murphy, D.J., 2009. What is the minimum EROI that a sustainable society must have? Energies 2, 1–25.
  • Hall, C.A.S., Day, J.W., 2009. Revisiting the limits to growth after peak oil. American Scientist 97, 230–237.
  • Hall, C.A.S., Lindenberger, D., Kummel, R., Kroeger, T., Eichhorn, W., 2001. The need to reintegrate the natural sciences with economics. Bioscience 51, 663–673.
  • Hayward, T., 2010. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Report, British Petroleum. Jackson, P.M., 2009. The Future of Global Oil Supply. Energy Research Associates, Cambridge.
  • Knoop, T.A., 2010. Recessions and Depressions: Understanding Business Cycles. Praeger, Santa Barbara.
  • Murphy, D.J., Hall, C.A.S., 2010. Year in review – EROI or energy return on (energy) invested. New York Annals of Science 1185, 102–118.
  • NBER, 2010. US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions. National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Smil, V., 2010. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Praeger, Santa Barbara, CA.
  • Stern, D.I., 1993. Energy use and economic growth in the USA, a multivariate approach. Energy Economics 15, 137–150. S
  • Stern, D.I., 2000. A multivariate cointegration analysis of the role of energy in the US macroeconomy. Energy Economics 22, 267–283.
Posted in Charles A. S. Hall, EROEI Energy Returned on Energy Invested, How Much Left | Tagged , , | 2 Comments

U.S. House hearing on how to get Central Asian oil before Russia and China do, 2006

[ Make no mistake: one of the main focuses of the U.S. government is to keep crude oil flowing, because without oil, civilization as we know it collapses. This is because the transportation that matters most – heavy-duty diesel-engine trucks (tractors, harvesters, 18-wheelers, cranes, construction, logging, etc), rail, and ships, don’t run on electricity.  They run on oil. This hearing focuses on Central Asia.  As Zeno Baran, director at the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute notes:  “On the United States energy interests in Central Asia, I think we see Central Asia energy infrastructure and resources once again becoming a source of competition for great powers”.  

October 12, 2017: I put my notes from the following hearing below the 2006 hearing. It is full of energy independence talk. Yeah, right.

House 113–169. June 11, 2014. Assessing energy priorities in the Middle East and North Africa. House of Representatives. 41 pages.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

House 109-219. July 25, 2006. Assessing energy and security issues in Central Asia. House of Representatives.   86 pages.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The developments in Central Asia are of a tremendous significance to United States energy and security interests in the region. Since gaining their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, United States focus on Central Asia has increased dramatically, as indicated by American efforts to protect the sovereignty, freedom and democracy of these newly independent states.

Unfortunately, the region’s ability to profit from their energy resources in the past has been limited by Russia’s monopoly over transporting Central Asia’s oil and gas. By continuing to support diversification of pipelines, we will ensure a free flow of energy supplies to Western consumers and expand Central Asia’s economy through investment and development. We will ask our witnesses today to describe the range of U.S. energy concerns and energy interests in the region, in themselves, and their relationship to broader U.S. strategic objectives and needs.

Russia and China have intensified their efforts to isolate the United States politically, militarily and economically from Central Asia. Moscow and Beijing were successful in convincing the Uzbek leadership that the United States sought to overthrow their government. This resulted in the closing of an American military base in Uzbekistan last year. Though unsuccessful, similar efforts were made by Russia and China to pressure Kyrgyzstan to close a strategic United States air base in its country that is currently being used in the counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan.

If we allow ourselves to be marginalized by Moscow and Beijing, we could lose our influence in the region and could fail in achieving our immediate security goals and protecting our energy interests in Central Asia.

Gary Ackerman of New York.  As energy demand continues to increase globally, the strategic importance of Central Asia will become clearer than it is today. In truth, the development of the former Soviet republics into more important energy exporters is probably the only region that has received much attention, inadequate as it may be.

To understand why Central Asia hasn’t been on the radar screen in Washington political circles, I think we should recall the glib promises that were made about the abundance of Iraqi oil that were promised in a post-Saddam utopia. There is no way to deny that our misadventure in Iraq has distracted our Government from a host of issues that have not gone away, while our attention has been fixed on the bloody train wreck that amounts to Bush Administration policy in Iraq.

While Washington has been distracted, Iran and China have made greater inroads in Central Asia, seeking commercial and security agreements that ensure the flow of petroleum and natural gas to be used or refined and resold. Russia, too, has been active in trying to establish by commerce the dominance it used to enjoy by force. Russia’s appetite for control of petroleum resources in the region is barely concealed. The reality is that most Central Asia petroleum—after transit through Russia—is on its way to the West, and in light of the winter cutoff of Ukraine, this fact should give us some pause for thought. Moreover, the regimes that have emerged since the end of the Soviet Union are, broadly speaking, friendly kleptocracies. Every one of them has adopted a government model built around what is politely referred to as a ‘‘strongman,’’ a position commonly known as a dictator.

Mr. CARNAHAN.  Issues related to energy and security have become increasingly intertwined in recent years. Though we need to decrease our dependence on foreign oil, we must also make certain that investments in U.S. energy resources are protected throughout the world. Moreover, we need a firm hand to ensure that Iran does not further infiltrate Central Asia, which would have a direct impact on United States and international security.

STEVEN R. MANN, Principal deputy assistant secretary, BUREAU OF SOUTH & CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. This discussion of engaging Central Asian countries on energy cooperation is very timely as the world confronts tight oil markets and as we consider ways to deepen energy security nationally and globally. This hearing’s focus on Central Asia is particularly appropriate given the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline on July 13.

U.S. policy for the development of oil and gas reserves in Central Asia is predicated on the use of best commercial standards and transparency to ensure that energy resources are developed efficiently and for the benefit of the countries concerned. In line with this, we have pursued a policy of encouraging multiple pipelines to afford the countries of the region options for export of their oil and gas. The completion of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline from Kazakhstan to Novorossiisk on the Black Sea in Russia and the inauguration of the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey are signal successes of this policy. We all can be especially proud of the role that American firms have played in these endeavors. BTC in particular represents a new environmental, social, and design benchmark for energy transport worldwide. The construction of the South Caucasus Pipeline will bring Azerbaijani natural gas to European markets and, ultimately, Turkmen and Kazakhstani gas may cross the Caspian and share this route.

In line with these promising developments, the United States welcomes the June 16 signing by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan of an agreement to facilitate access of Kazakhstani oil to the BTC pipeline. Such an agreement provides Kazakhstan additional capacity to export the large volumes of crude that will need to reach markets starting in 2009–10, when the Kashagan field is slated to come on stream.

U.S. firms are among the biggest investors in Central Asia’s energy sector, and this is a welcome development in many ways. Major U.S. oil and gas firms such as Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil have extensive investments in the Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan fields. In addition, U.S. oil services companies and equipment providers such as Parker Drilling, McDermott, and Baker Hughes Services International have found promising opportunities. When speaking of oil and gas development, we must keep in mind that regionally Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan hold the largest reserves. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have significant hydroelectric resources, but little oil and gas. Uzbekistan is largely closed to Western companies and has more limited potential.

The extent of Turkmenistan’s gas reserves remains unclear, and Turkmenistan is completely dependent on the Russian pipeline system to bring its gas to market. A proposed trans-Caspian pipeline foundered in 2000 when the parties could not reach an acceptable commercial agreement, and little has changed since then.

With the completion of the first phase of the East-West Energy Corridor, we must now press on with the second phase of supporting new energy routes out of Central Asia.

Countries bordering the Caspian Sea—Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan—are significant oil and gas suppliers to world markets, and their importance is growing. The countries of the north Caspian have reached delimitation agreements, but Iran and Turkmenistan have not yet joined these agreements, among other reasons, because of Iranian insistence on its claim to one-fifth of the Sea. Lack of agreement has impeded exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources in disputed waters, and there remains the potential for conflict in the southern Caspian where promising offshore deposits of oil and gas remain to be developed.

Kazakhstan—Energy.   Given the scope of the energy supply and demand challenges we face today and in years ahead, Kazakhstan can play a very helpful role in addressing the world’s energy needs. Kazakhstan and the entire North Caspian region have tremendous resources. At Tengiz, Kashagan, and other fields, nearly 30 billion barrels of reserves are proven; there is potential for up to 100 billion barrels. Natural gas reserves generally range from 65–70 trillion cubic feet, and could be as high as 100 trillion cubic feet. We strongly support the work of U.S. energy companies and their international partners, who are now focused on ramping up production and improving transportation to markets. U.S. energy companies were among the first non-CIS foreign investors in Kazakhstan; we expect American companies to be active in the region for many years to come.

Overall, Kazakhstan produced about 1.29 million barrels of oil per day (b/d) in 2005, and exported, through CPC and other routes, about one million b/d. The Kazakhstani Government expects production to increase to about 3 million b/d by 2015, especially as the huge Kashagan field comes into production. Moreover, Kazakhstan has expanded production of natural gas in recent years, and expects to reach 570 billion cubic feet this year. A lack of export infrastructure—plus a focus on oil—has limited gas production in Kazakhstan; previously, gas had been flared or re-injected into oil wells to maintain production pressure.

The United States and Kazakhstan enjoy a vigorous strategic partnership with a constant stream of high-level visitors. Energy Secretary Bodman met with President Nazarbayev and Energy Minister Izmukhambetov in March,Vice President Cheney met with President Nazarbayev in May, Secretary Rice saw Foreign Minister Tokayev on July 6.  We have made progress on enabling countries in Central Asia to bring their energy resources to world markets. Much remains to be done, however, and continued robust U.S. engagement is required to push forward the next phase of energy development

LANA EKIMOFF, DIRECTOR, Office of Russian & Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy.

I will focus on the opportunity that Central Asia presents for enhancing energy security by adding supply and diversity to world markets.  Data on oil and gas reserves for the Central Asia-Caspian region vary widely. The EIA indicates proven oil reserves are between 17 and 50 billion barrels [my note: the world burns 30 billion barrels a year]. The regions natural gas production is expected to nearly double from 14 bcf per day in 2005 to 24 bcf in 2010.

The countries in this region run the gamut on energy wealth. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are endowed with oil and gas resources. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are resource-poor except for hydropower. These countries provide 2 million barrels of oil per day to the global market and are expected to add 4 million barrels by 2010. Their gas production is expected to increase by 60 percent in 2010. However, the full resource potential of this region is still unknown, and reserve figures vary widely. Better data will become available as more exploration takes place.

Developing resources in this region is not without obstacles. There is a lack of export outlets, and we have supported the development of new transit projects.

Our goal is to promote regional partnerships among producing and transit countries. It is important that the countries take responsibility for encouraging the development of new, commercially viable export routes and find ways together, and with commercial entities, to create a win-win situation. We also consistently support the creation of sound legal, fiscal and regulatory policies that will encourage investment in the energy sector.

The Department of Energy maintains ongoing dialogues with officials from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Energy Secretary Bodman recently visited Kazakhstan, where he met with President Nazerbayev and the energy minister. He and Deputy Secretary Sell recently met separately with Azerbaijani President Aliyev in Washington and Istanbul. Their discussions focus on advancing our energy cooperation and recognizing the important role it plays in the global energy market.

The Department has formal dialogues with both countries. As these bilateral dialogues have matured, we have changed the focus from oil and gas issues and expanded our cooperation to a broad range of technologies—energy efficiency, renewable power, nuclear power and environmental concerns. It is important that these countries understand that we are not just interested in their oil and gas contribution to global markets, but also share a common goal of building an energy sector in these countries that is diversified, cost-effective and secure to support their growing economies.

What are our next steps? We will continue to work with countries in the region to facilitate the development of commercially viable oil and gas export infrastructure. We will encourage more surveys to better understand the resource potential in the region, which will help attract investment. We support the full involvement of Kazakhstan and the BTC pipeline, now that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have completed an intergovernmental agreement and they begin negotiations on host government agreements with the companies.

We also plan to hold formal energy dialogues this fall in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to broaden and deepen our energy cooperation.

Ms. BERKLEY. This is a part of the world that, until recently, I knew so little about and now realize how strategically important it is to our country and, I believe, security in many very sensitive parts of the world. I have also come recently to appreciate how vast their oil and gas reserves are, and how extraordinarily important that is to our economic well-being and security needs. Can you give me some idea of where we fit into this? What would their natural inclination be as a region? Would they gravitate toward Muslim countries? Would they be more interested in coming into the American orb and being stronger allies of ours? Are these issues being determined by their governments on pure economic basis? Are they factoring in other security needs, religious needs? Give me some idea of what is happening there and what is the best-case scenario for the United States and how we can go about achieving that scenario. Because, lately, we are not doing well achieving any best-case scenario anywhere in the world.

Ambassador MANN. Kazakhstan is a good friend of the United States. Overall, there is a powerful Soviet imprint. The countries were Soviet republics for 70 years. Russian, in those years, was the language of the educated, the language of the elites. There is a powerful Soviet legacy, also an infrastructure, not just in oil and gas pipelines, but the rail routes, the air routes, telecommunications, so much of it still links through Moscow and the Russian heartland. That is a fact that just exists in Central Asia. Now, what the countries have said to us in so many ways is: we have greater opportunities now. We want not merely to be a part of the USSR as we were, we want to link to the global economy. The United States, in so many ways, has done this; not to create a sphere of our own, we reject that approach. But what we believe very strongly in is working with the governments and the people to strengthen their independence, strengthen their decision-making autonomy, strengthening their sovereignty and assisting in a process of stable development. One of the other aspects of this Soviet legacy was a forced atheism on the countries that had been Muslim for so many centuries. What we have now in Central Asia, fundamentally, are secular governments. So I think that is what they are left with after those Soviet years.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What goes on in Kazakhstan stays. Let me ask you about your thoughts on continued military assistance in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Do you believe that it is a priority to help these two countries strengthen their capabilities so that they can independently defend the Caspian Sea energy platforms and interest? In my last question, I wanted to ask you about Iranian influence. You had talked about how close geographically these countries are. To what extent do you believe that the embrace of the Iranian regime in Shanghai implies a degree of legitimacy for and a Russian and Chinese acceptance of Tehran’s current policy? So, Iranian influence and also the United States military assistance to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

Ambassador MANN. In each of those two countries, I think we have a good program of military cooperation and training; and a good part of that is strengthened at precisely that issue you have identified, Caspian security. It is not Central Asia per se, but I will say that I know it is a concern for Azerbaijan, which, in the summer of 2001, had oil field workers chased off of the Alov deposit by an Iranian gunboat. So it is a lively concern for the Azerbaijanis.

ZENYO BARAN, Director, Center for Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute. On the United States energy interests in Central Asia, I think we see Central Asia energy infrastructure and resources once again becoming a source of competition for great powers. In this new rush, the two most important regional players are China and Russia. Energy-hungry China is actively working to reach long-term oil and gas agreements, and has billions of dollars to spend in order to obtain them. Russia is also spending considerable sums in the region in order to ensure it can maintain its monopoly over Caspian gas transportation to Western markets.

The U.S., however, is missing in action. In the 1990s, the United States had a very successful Caspian energy policy and identified the region as an important non-OPEC source of oil. The United States policy also correctly identified the direct transportation of Central Asian gas to new markets, rather than via the Russian monopoly Gazprom network or through a potential Iranian pipeline, as the best strategy for the region’s energy transportation future. To this end, the United States has already supported several non-Russian and non-Iranian oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea, one of which, as we just heard, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, was just recently inaugurated. Securing the East-West flow of Caspian gas has been much more difficult and, so far, efforts have not been successful.

Russia clearly won the first round of Central Asian gas competition. While the United States backed a trans-Caspian gas pipeline to transport Turkmen gas via an undersea pipeline to Azerbaijan and, from there, via Georgia, Turkey and onwards to European markets, Russia was able to finalize a gas pipeline agreement with Turkey to send its gas via Turkey via the Blue Stream gas pipeline underneath the Black Sea.

In part, because of the authoritarian rule of Turkmen President Niyazov until recently, the United States had abandoned its Central Asian gas strategy. The standard arguments were that the U.S. should not engage in energy dialogue with Niyazov until and unless he made improvements to the democracy of the human rights situation in the country. Given that he is not likely to do so, it was deemed best to wait him out and begin energy talks with his successor, no matter how far in the future. This policy was clearly not working. In fact, while the United States waited, we see the Chinese and the Russians have moved in to fill the vacuum. More recently, the trans-Caspian gas pipeline idea was revived by the United States Administration, but this time starting with Kazakhstan.

According to the new strategy, Turkmen gas will be added only later if at all. The logic is that there is already plenty of flared gas in Kazakhstan that could be transported to Western markets. Given Kazakhstan’s pragmatic energy development policy and demonstrated interest in the East-West corridor, this option seems to be a good way forward. Yet, this too may not materialize unless the United States is seriously committed to changing the energy dynamics in Eurasia, which ultimately means confrontation with Russia’s regional energy strategy. To come up with a coherent and pragmatic strategy, it is necessary to look at the broader Eurasian energy picture, specifically at the activities and plans of Gazprom.

While many have wanted to turn a blind eye to the possibility that United States and Russia may not have a win-win option in Central Asian energy, it is clear that Russia is playing it all.

For the United States to ensure its energy and security interests in Central Asia a new framework is needed. In the short term the U.S. will not have much influence in the democratic reform process in the region. The carrots the United States and EU can offer the Central Asians will simply not be attractive enough for them to bite, while the sticks the West can use will not be painful to induce change. We need to recognize also that

There is no win-win strategy possible with Russia and Central Asia regarding energy given the Kremlin’s use of energy as a political weapon and Gazprom’s need to obtain as much of the Central Asian gas as it can to keep Russian domestic gas prices low and to provide uninterrupted gas supply to its European consumers. The United States has two options, it can either give up, which is not advisable, or it can become directly engaged at the top levels on this issue.,

Anti-American developments.   These sentiments are a by-product of two factors, first, competition for energy resources with China and Russia, competition with Russia over the construction of new pipelines, and second, the perceived American promotion of democratic revolutions throughout the region. While its partners all have shared security concerns about the so-called three evils of separatism, terrorism and radicalism, it is of course ironic that Russia and China seem to disregard the longer term impact of their anti-American stand in Central Asia. By opposing the U.S. the way they do, they are effectively bolstering the position of the Islamists.

STEVEN BLANK, PH.D., Research Professor of National Security Affairs,  U.S. ARMY War college.

Today American interests in Central Asia, a region of growing strategic importance, are under attack from three sources: Russia, China, the authoritarian misrule of the Central Asian rulers themselves in many cases, and thirdly from the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Victory in Afghanistan there is the only option for us. If we lose then we will be facing another terrorist upsurge like we did 5, 7 years ago which will threaten all of Central Asia.

Because the security of Central Asia has become connected to the vital security interests of the United States, our presence in Central Asia in all of its dimensions, economic, military, political and so on, is regarded by Moscow and Beijing and to a lesser degree Tehran as a threat to their vital interests and they have spared no effort to try to oust us from Central Asia.

Russia, as has been noted here, has attempted to create a gas monopoly. They failed to create an oil pipeline monopoly, but the gas monopoly is vital to Russian politics in general.

At the same time the Russians have their own military bloc, the CSTO, which I alluded to, and they are also trying to exclude us from the Caspian by creating what they call a CASFOR, a naval force under Russian domination that would exclude non-littoral states from any participation in the defense of the area, defense of world platforms, counter-proliferation and counter-smuggling operations.

We need a broader economic policy than simply ensuring energy access. While we have been successful in energy access with regard to oil in Kazakhstan, we have failed with gas.

Secretary Rice’s initiative with regard to linking up South Asian and Central Asian electricity networks is a commendable example of what needs to be done, but it needs to be thought of in terms of a comprehensive economic policy involving not just the United States Government but the EU and international financial institutions. Similarly, military assistance and training through the Partnership for Peace and getting our allies’ support in Afghanistan, and the situation in Afghanistan is quite critical at the moment, is also an essential aspect of policy because if we fail in Afghanistan we put the whole of Central Asia at risk.

In conclusion I would say that we are facing a coordinated attack on our policies in energy with regard to democratization, with regard to defense and security in Central Asia from Moscow, Beijing and to a lesser degree Tehran, as well as from the Taliban in Afghanistan and their supporters, and also facing obstacles due to the authoritarian misrule or fragility of several, if not all, of the Central Asian Governments.

This makes the obstacles to our policy quite considerable in their extent and scope, but because of the fact that Central Asia is so important strategically and in energy terms, it is essential that we find and devise policy mechanisms and frameworks which will enable us to overcome those challenges in the near and long-term future.

Since 9/11/2001 a second vital interest for the United States has appeared, namely defense of the United States and of Europe from Islamic terrorism personified by Bin Laden and expressed by the Taliban and their allies. Consequently victory in Afghanistan is an unconditional vital interest which must be achieved just as much if not more than as in Iraq. The other important interests of the United States apply first of all to what might be called an open door or equal access for U.S. firms in regard to energy exploration, refining, and marketing. To the extent that these states’ large energy holdings are restricted to Russia due to the dearth of pipelines or oil and gas, they will not be able to exercise effective economic or foreign policy independence.

Today all these interests are under attack and the U.S. policy in Central Asia is embattled and under siege. Moscow and Beijing, as well as to a lesser degree Tehran, view our political and strategic presence in Central Asia with unfeigned alarm. Despite their protestations of support for the U.S. war on terrorism, in fact they wish to exclude us from the area and fear that we mean to stay there militarily as well as in all other ways indefinitely.

Russia has also waged a stubborn campaign to prevent Central Asian states from affiliating either with the U.S. or Western militaries. It seeks to gain exclusive control of the entire Caspian Sea and be the sole or supreme military power there while states like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan rely upon Western, and especially American assistance to help them develop forces that could protect their coastlines, exploration rigs, and territories, from terrorists, proliferation operations, and contraband of all sorts. Second, Russia has formed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to prevent local states from aligning with NATO or getting too involved with its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Another purpose of the CSTO is to create legal-political grounds for permanently stationing Russian forces and bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and possibly Uzbekistan ostensibly to defend these regimes against terrorism. And the CSTO, under Russian leadership is constantly seeking to augment the scope of its missions in Central Asia in order to cement a Russian dominated security equation there. So in reality these forces are there to defend Russian interests and/or keep the current authoritarian regimes in power. Despite Russia’s relative military weakness and unbroken military decline in 1991–2000, Russia now has bases in 12 of the former Soviet republics and the expansion of its capability to project power into these areas if not beyond is one of the leading drives of current Russian military policy. Similarly another key drive of Russian military policy is the effort to develop, sustain, and project the land, sea (Caspian), and air capabilities needed to prevent local governments from either receiving U.S. weapons and assistance or allowing U.S. military bases in their territories. For example this program is the driving force behind Russia’s proposals for a Caspian Sea Force (CASFOR). The practical outcome of so exclusive a force made up only of littoral states would be to confirm the littoral states as dependencies of Russia, put Iran in a subordinate position in the Caspian, and exclude foreign military or energy presence there.

Simultaneously, Moscow and Beijing have also waged an unrelenting campaign beginning in 2002 to impose limits on the duration and scope of America’s presence in Central Asian bases and more generally in the region. They succeeded in Uzbekistan thanks to our misconceived policies there and are constantly bringing enormous pressure on Kyrgyzstan to force us out of the base at Manas. Probably the combination of our deep pockets, high-level intervention by Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld, and renewed fighting in Afghanistan has allowed us to stay at Manas on condition of paying ever higher rents for its use. Russia has also sought to forestall these states from buying Western equipment by selling them Russian weapons at subsidized prices. And in return for their debts it has sought to restore the Soviet defense industrial complex by buying equity in strategic defense firms located there. Russia and China have also engaged in training programs for Central Asian officers.

Most significantly Moscow and Beijing have utilized the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a platform for a collective security operation in Central Asia, sponsoring both bilateral and multilateral Russian and Chinese exercises with local regimes and with each other on an annual and expanding basis since 2003. The SCO’s utility to Moscow and Beijing does not end here. While there are significant differences between Russia and China and among the other members and observers (India, Pakistan, Iran, Mongolia) as to what the SCO’s primary purpose and function ought to be, i.e. whether its main function should be promotion of trade and economic development; or to be a provider of hard security and another energy forum that Russia would dominate; or to be a genuine basis for regional cooperation as Kazakhstan and the smaller states would prefer, it clearly has been envisioned by Beijing and Moscow as a basis for attempting to unite Central Asian governments in an anti-American regional security organization. There are also divisions among the members as to whether its membership should expand to include the new observer states of Iran, Pakistan, India, and Mongolia. Nevertheless, Beijing openly and consistently proclaims the SCO to be a model for what it is trying to do in regard to Asian security in Southeast Asia and beyond, i.e. replace the U.S.-led alliance system in Asia with one of its own creation that is attuned to its rather than to our and our allies’ stated values and interests. Therefore we should take this organization and its development seriously as a template for China’s and Russia’s, if not Iran’s broader foreign policy objectives.

Thus U.S. policies in regard to security, energy access, and democratization are all under attack in Central Asia from the local dictators, Presidents Putin, and Hu Jintao, and their governments. Adding to the difficulties are the facts that we face a resurgent Taliban, backed up with enormous drug revenues, Pakistani support, and an inconsistent international effort to rebuild Afghanistan while its government remains weak and unsure of itself. As a result, we have lost the base at Karshi Khanabad, face constant pressure in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere, and are fighting a revived and strengthened Taliban under conditions that are in many ways less favorable than in 2001.

The State Department emphasizes democracy as its main priority.   While such statements make powerful rhetoric; in Central Asia, according to expert observers, they are empty and irrelevant. Moreover, they contribute to the undermining of our security objectives because they feed the belief that we are seeking to unseat reigning rulers, and second, since they believe that the only real opposition is Islamic terrorists, our position fuels their belief that we neither understand the region nor their interests. If democratization is our first priority here than we have given the region over to Russia and China for we have convinced local leaders that these aforementioned beliefs of theirs are correct whatever the real truth might be.

Our utter lack of a viable information policy that is tailored to this region’s mores, cultures, and special needs, has reinforced all those previous negative feelings while also leaving the Russians and Chinese to operate with total freedom in support of retrogressive rulers or corrupt dictators.

We have failed to foresee what might happen in states that are so misgoverned that violence is likely, either through economic distress, or through a succession crisis. Thus our reactions have been uncoordinated and haphazard with resulting negative consequences for U.S. policy that we can all see today. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are likely to be failed states when the present rulers leave the scene and in Uzbekistan we have already seen, as has the Uzbek government, that it is vulnerable to both violent incitement and to outbreaks of pubic violence.

NATO’s continuing dilatoriness about sending troops to Afghanistan and giving them sufficiently robust rules of engagement has slowed our ability to counter the Taliban resurgence, especially as we are reducing the number of troops there. Since it appears that more troops might be needed, this is again a wrong sign. Eighth, we have failed to press the international community sufficiently strongly to make good its pledges to Afghanistan, without which reconstruction there will be greatly prolonged if it even is successful.

The State Department’s office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, under Ambassador Herbst, must be directed, if it not already doing so, to begin planning for contingencies having to do with the real possibility of state failure in Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. If and when that occurs it will usher in violent responses to that condition of state failure. And we cannot allow this chaos to go on in uncontrolled fashion or to abdicate our real interests in the region. Adequate forecasting, and rapid response policies, not only military ones either, must be thought through and implemented so that we are ready to move here on a moment’s notice if necessary.

ARIEL COHEN, PH.D., SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, HERITAGE FOUNDATION.  In the last 5 years real and present danger to U.S. national security, especially Islamist terrorism and threats to energy supply, have affected United States policy in Central Asia.  What is needed in Central Asia is a policy that allows the United States to continue to diversify its energy supplies, station its military forces in close proximity to most immediate threats, Afghanistan,

The aim of this testimony is to outline Central Asia’s strategic importance, particularly in terms of energy security, and to assess how our energy issues fit into wider United States strategic interests in the region.

The hydrocarbon reserves are concentrated in the Caspian region. As such, a discussion of Central Asian hydrocarbon resources would be incomplete without including Azerbaijan, which has considerable oil and gas resources in its own right and is central to non-Russian energy transit from Central Asia to points west.

The bulk of Central Asian Caspian hydrocarbons are located in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and to a lesser degree Uzbekistan with a lot of gas in Turkmenistan. Both Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic have limited reserves of oil and gas, but in amounts that thus far have not warranted much attention from foreign investors.

The outlook for Western investment in Central Asia is mixed. Especially the gas sector, investment was low. The leaders of the biggest gas producing countries are not friendly to the United States and their investment climates can be characterized as abysmal.

The Central Asian national gas sector has seen very little outside investments until recently and Russia continues to benefit from the bulk of gas exports from Central Asia as it buys Central Asian gas at prices as low as one-quarter to one-third of market prices in Europe, then resells at market rates. To put things in perspective, it must be noted that Caspian Sea production levels even in their peak will be much smaller than the OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, combined output. Production levels are expected to reach 4 million barrels a day in 2015 compared to 45 million barrel a day for OPEC countries in that year. Clearly Central Asia is not the largest source of oil and gas nor it’s most successful.

Despite all these difficulties, investors and governments are rushing to lay claim to hydrocarbon reserves of Central Asia.

Geopolitical location is a keen concern as Central Asia continues to evolve as a highly important strategic area, especially for Russia, United States, China, Iran and India. Political instability in other major oil and gas production locations is very much in the news, the Middle East, Venezuela, where President Hugo Chavez just visited Belarus and is signing a $1 billion arms agreement with Russia, including the sale of sophisticated Soho 30 fighter bombers and building of a Kalashnikov machine gun factory in Venezuela.

All these factors of instability are fueling the drive to claim a share of Central Asian resources.

The role of the United States focusing on numerous factors that I mentioned before is also preventing the United States from being a hegemonistic power in the region. The more we are involved, the more Russia and China and Iran are resisting our presence there.

Even if the U.S. has the capacity to limit the presence of other large powers in the region, to do so would be an error, just as it was a mistake for the United States to support an oil and steel embargo on Japan in the 1930s, triggering its southern expansion of the Pacific. The U.S. and other great powers share the goals of stability, economic development and preventive religious radicalization of terrorism.

The United States does not want to openly antagonize China, Russia or India over their involvement in Central Asia but is likely to derive benefits from regional cooperation with them in the region.

Mr. COHEN. If Iran joins SCO or, even without that, if Iran and Russia get together to create what they call a gas OPEC, that will be a step in the wrong direction because they will be controlling together massive production capacity. I do not remember off the top the top of my head after Russia, which is number one, which one is number two in terms of reserves. Either Qatar or Iran. It is Iran. So if you think about a number one and number two producers of gas getting together, it is like Russia and Saudi Arabia getting together. That says it all. In terms of Iran being part of SCO, I think also it is going to be geopolitically a step in a wrong direction, directly affecting American interests if you take Russia and China and Iran to the west, to the east, and to the south because it will be a step to creating a geopolitical bloc essentially aimed at the United States. So we need to fight that.

House 113–169. June 11, 2014. Assessing energy priorities in the Middle East and North Africa. House of Representatives. 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida. The Middle East and North Africa region produces over 35% of the world’s oil supply and over 20% of the global natural gas production. We know that energy resources are vital for the region, and as such, they play an important role in the shaping of the geopolitical landscape that impacts our foreign policy.  We also know that the Middle East and North Africa is one of the world’s most volatile regions, prone to unrest, instability, political upheaval, and conflict. In Libya, we saw armed groups occupying many of the strategically important oil fields and export terminals for nearly a year until a partial agreement was reached in April. And in Iraq, we have only recently begun to see that country tap the potential of its proven oil reserves, which is the source of 90% of its budget. But now that Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, fell this week to al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, and the increased deterioration of the security situation in that country, there is no telling what the future has in store for its energy sector.

But that just highlights the problem. Most of these countries rely heavily on the sale of oil or gas as their main driver for their economies, and anything that upsets the delicate balance can be extremely detrimental to their economic outlook and has the potential to upend the global energy market.

The instability in Egypt over the last few years, coupled with the large energy subsidies provided to Egyptians, has seen overconsumption in Egypt and has harmed its energy outlook. Both Israel and Jordan had been reliant on gas from Egypt, but now that Israel has the potential to export large sums of gas that Jordan needs, this could be an opportunity for those nations to strengthen their ties.

Israel’s potential could also transform its relationship with Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries as they look for regional solutions to their energy needs. Yet Israel’s natural gas boon hasn’t just affected its relationship in the Middle East and North Africa region, it has also seen a promising and expanding relationship with Greece and Cyprus. The recent discoveries of large hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean has helped forge an emerging and strategic relationship between these three countries, and this relationship has the potential to completely alter the political, economic, and security situation in the region. Their cooperation has the potential to increase the global supply of energy from friendly, more stable nations, and reduce the world’s dependence on some of these rogue regimes.

And by rogue regimes, we always mean Iran.

Theodore E.  Deutch, Florida.   For decades oil was synonymous with the Middle East. Energy resources and needs have long had a significant impact on the state of play in the region. According to OPEC, its member countries control 81% of the world’s proven oil reserves, with 66% of that coming from the Middle East. But developments over the past several years have dramatically altered the world’s energy supply. For many years, critics of American foreign policy accused the United States of being beholden to certain Middle East oil producers because of our reliance on imports for our energy needs. The discovery of significant energy finds here in our own country have set us on the course toward energy independence. The International Energy Agency predicts the U.S. will be oil independent by 2035.

To help offset the reduction in Iranian oil, Saudi Arabia has increased its production, pledging to make up the difference to avoid a shock to oil prices. The Saudis sit on 25% of the world’s oil reserves and produce roughly 8 billion barrels per day. We hope to see a return to prewar levels in Libya’s output, yet continued fighting and instability has production levels at 10 percent of capacity.

In a stunning development, Israel, long dependent on imports, has found itself sitting on a tremendous amount of hydrocarbons. For years, Israel received most of its gas from the Egyptian pipeline in the Sinai. As a result of the turmoil in Egypt, the pipeline has been attacked 15 times since 2011. The finds in the Tamar and Leviathan offshore fields now stand to make Israel energy independent within 20 years. Last year, the Israeli Government voted to mark 40% of Israel’s gas lines for export. Now, it is Israel that finds itself in the position of being the supplier to its more vulnerable neighbors. Israel and Jordan recently signed a deal for Jordan to receive $500 million worth of gas over 15 years from the Tamar field, which started producing last year. Jordan has faced a serious energy crisis, compounded by the state of affairs in its biggest supplier, Egypt, and the increased strain placed on resources by the influx of over 600,000 Syrian refugees. Jordan is set to begin receiving Israeli gas in 2016. The Leviathan field, which has yet to come on line, is said to be twice as big as Tamar.

Steve Chabot, Ohio.  Political unrest and unstable energy supplies in the Middle East and North Africa will have a serious impact global energy markets. This is only intensified by an enormous growing demand for energy in Asia and an uncertain supply of energy in Europe. I hope this hearing will address the changing energy sector in the Middle East and its effect on U.S. policy in the region. I am particularly interested in how the administration plans to improve Iraq’s reliability in the production of oil, especially with some of the political instability going on there. Secondly, what progress has been made in resolving the maritime disputes between Lebanon and Israel and the energy claims in the East Mediterranean. And thirdly, Iran is limited to a million barrels of production of oil a day under the Joint Plan of Action. They are producing 1.3.

Mr. CONNOLLY.   The shift going on here in the United States toward energy independence, really, we are going to rival Saudi Arabia as a producer, what impact does that have on the region? How does that change U.S. foreign policy from being dependent on Middle East oil to now being a net exporter potentially ourselves. And what are we doing to help our allies identify alternative supplies and suppliers? You look at Turkey, 65% of its crude oil comes from 3 countries, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia; 74% of its natural gas comes from Russia and Iran. How are we helping allies like Turkey look toward alternative sourcing for political stability purposes?

Amos J. Hochstein, Deputy Assistant secretary for Energy Diplomacy, Bureau of Energy Resources,  U.S. Department of State. Energy resources play a critical role in the Middle East and North Africa. As you have mentioned, for decades the fortunes of governments and societies in the region have been closely tied to the availability of energy resources and their ability to bring them to market. Today we find ourselves living in a transformational era for energy markets and the geopolitics of energy, and the capacity of any country to be dynamic and play in this changing global context will determine its success going forward.

I would like to address how countries in the Middle East and North Africa fit into this global energy puzzle and how the United States, in particular the State Department, is working to encourage the development of global LNG markets, build energy linkages in the Eastern Mediterranean, stabilize Libya’s oil and gas sector, and support commercial opportunities in countries such as Algeria.

Energy demand around the world is changing rapidly. Consumption growth has shifted away from the traditional OECD markets and consuming countries and moved increasingly toward the world’s emerging economies. Even as Europe, North America, and the advanced economies in Asia reach increasing levels of efficiency in use of energy, high growth rates in China and India and elsewhere have led to rises in energy consumption. Increasingly, we are in a world where prices and commodity flows are driven by the demands of emerging non-OECD consumers. Around the world new energy suppliers are entering the market. We are moving from a world with a small number of well-defined producers, many of them in OPEC, to a world that welcomes new supplies and production increases from North America, Africa, Asia, and South America. New technology and improved production methods have unlocked previously inaccessible energy resources, fundamentally altering the energy landscape. North America has seen major increases in oil production, as has West Africa, and recent discoveries in East Africa and the Mediterranean are frontier areas with bountiful new energy and gas resources. New suppliers are emerging, including countries such as Israel, that were until very recently assumed to be bereft of energy resources. As all of you keenly are aware, the United States is in the heart of this supply shift around the world. We have added 2 million barrels a day of oil production just in the last 2 years, an amount greater than Nigeria’s crude oil production in total. We have become the world’s largest producer of natural gas and now anticipate that we will become a net exporter of LNG in 2016 and an overall net exporter of natural gas by 2018.

Our relations and interests in the Middle East have always been and will continue to be strong, multifaceted, deep, complex, and strategic. We live in an international global economy with interdependent energy markets, and even if all products we at home consume would originate beneath our own soil and oceans, we would still not be ‘‘independent.’’ A disruption anywhere in the world would have consequences everywhere, including here at home. The American economy is intricately linked to the global market, and we are dependent on the prosperity of others, as they are on us.

Developing frontier resources is a risky and capital-intensive undertaking, and companies will be deterred from making necessary investments if they believe that risk is too high. When investments can be made in places like North Dakota with little or no political risk, it becomes very difficult to convince boards of directors to approve investment in high-risk areas. In North Africa, Algeria is pursuing the next phase of development in its oil and gas fields and producing from its offshore and unconventional resources, but it has to get that investment climate right for that to work and to encourage companies to come and invest.

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. From an economic perspective, two LNG facilities in Egypt that are basically running dry at the moment because Egypt has taken all its gas destined for exports and using it for domestic, it makes sense, if you have the infrastructure already built and the capital investment is there, to use that. Can the geopolitics manage it is the next question. On Turkey, there are only two ways to get a pipeline from offshore Israel to Turkey. One would have to go through the EEZ of Lebanon and Syria, which is less than likely at the moment, or go through the EEZ of Cyprus. So for that there are other geopolitical hurdles that have to be reached. I think we have to sometimes take a step back from enormous amount of statements and conferences and books that are being written about the potential and agree on one thing. The cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, energy is a huge boost for that, and that is the way that this region will monetize and capitalize on these new resources. But it is going to take a lot of work and it is going to take a lot of effort and creative thinking to be able to get there.

Condensates are not oil, they are not crude oil, and that is why we don’t count them together. They are a liquid product that you get when you extract natural gas. Some countries are importers of condensate only and they don’t import crude oil, and they use it because they need it for the refining in gasoline, to create gasoline, when they are using crude oil from something else. Some countries develop gas that is very dry gas. Israel is a good example. Their gas doesn’t include much condensate. The United States has a lot of condensate in our gas.

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Unfortunately, as I said in my testimony, I think that the term ‘‘independent’’ that is used often, in my opinion misused often, in natural gas we are becoming self-reliant and we have become a net exporter. In oil, we are still an importer. But even if we were not, if there was a crisis anywhere in the world that created a major disruption, whether it was a national security disruption, such as a closure of a strait, or a natural one, if Macondo in the Gulf Coast happened in the Persian Gulf, that would have a significant impact on the global markets. Any impact such as those on the global markets will have the same impact here at home. Even if we are producing all that we consume here, you will still have a price shock in the United States. We are an integrated market, and oil and gas are commodities.

Mr. YOHO. Is there a way to mitigate that or soften that if we were to team up with Canada more and Mexico to where we could supply this region that would be more isolated from a world market? And I understand we are all tied together, but it seems like it would soften that more. Because every time we see a spike in gas prices diesel goals up, everything on the shelves of the grocery stores goes up. Is there were a way, if we were to team and have a consortium between Canada and Mexico, the North Americas, to where we supplied the demand for our continent, in this region, we would be less affected by Middle Eastern conflicts.

Mr. HOCHSTEIN.  Condensates are not a crude oil or a product of crude oil. They are a product of natural gas. They are a liquid product of natural gas. They are exported mostly separately and occasionally they are exported together with crude oil. That does not make them the same product.

Mr. WEBER. Coming from Texas, LNG, lots of Petro-Tex Chemical in my district. Liquid gas, ethanes, propanes, propylenes, methanes, products that are used to produce plastic products. And that has ramifications for plastic explosives, by the way.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Could you talk a little bit about how does the growing independence, the growing self-reliance, because of a huge exponential increase in domestic production here in the United States, how does that shift affect your job? I mean, when we look down the road, how will U.S. energy policy in the Middle East be different, say, 15 years from now, 10 years from now than it is today? Clearly, that has got to have some impact in our relations in the region with respect to energy policy.

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. Without a doubt, we are in a new world, not only around the world, but in the United States. And as we look to transition from a major consumer to an exporter, that changes not only the dynamic of our own energy economy at home, but the position that we have broadly and globally.

I think that people are drawing the wrong conclusions from that, as you have heard around in the media and even today in this hearing, that we are somehow changing or reducing our engagement in the Middle East. As I said before, nothing could be further from the truth. We have very complex and strong relations in the Middle East and they will continue. But that is true globally. What we can do, what we are in the position to do today, in the years to come as we become an exporter, is think about how that provides part of the answer to some of the questions that we are seeing playing out. We would like to see a world where no country is reliant on a single source of energy. And if we can be helpful in diversifying the energy mix for countries and sources, I think that will benefit not only those countries, but our own national security and global economic security. And that is true whether we are talking about Europe or whether we are talking about nearer to home in Central America and the Caribbean. The reliance on a single source creates great political difficulties, as we have seen played out over the last 3 months, and the United States is going to be part of that as we start exporting.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. A noble goal, and I am thinking of Turkey as an example as I think I said in my opening statement. But, so what does that mean? Does that mean the United States is going to try to help build alternative pipelines? Does it mean the United States is going to find alternative shipments, LNG, or whatever it may be to try to assist these countries to diversify and lessen their reliance on sole or primary sources of energy?

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. We have and will continue to strengthen our work with countries to identify what other kind of infrastructure and mechanisms within their own regulatory systems that would allow and to ease that pressure and to make them more secure.

Mr. WEBER.   In Texas we have lots of LNG and lots of oil obviously. Things are just bigger and better in Texas, and so we are very honed in and keen on energy and the kinds of benefits that it gives to our country and I would say internationally. With the current prevailing attitude that somehow fossil fuels are bad, and I want to make the distinction that I understand the difference between petroleum products, as I kind of laid out, and natural gas products. We see natural gas products, as you know, in plastic bags, plastic bottles, as I say even plastic explosives they have raifications.

 

Mr. WEBER. But they do make money by exporting things, those liquids, those ethanes, methanes, propylenes, propanes, everything that we named, they are able to make money when they export that stuff to help underpin their economy. True or not?

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. No.

Mr. WEBER. How is that? They sell those products and they don’t get paid for them?

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. They get paid into accounts that are in banks in foreign countries.

Mr. WEBER. The assets are frozen?

Mr. HOCHSTEIN. The assets then can only be used in very restricted ways and cannot underpin their economy.

Mr. WEBER. Do you think that if America becomes totally energy independent, self-sufficient, it makes for better international security around the world?

Mr. HOCHSTEIN.   I do think it would enhance security, yes.

 

 

Posted in U.S. Congress Energy Dependence, U.S. Congress Energy Independence, U.S. Congress Energy Policy | Tagged , | Comments Off on U.S. House hearing on how to get Central Asian oil before Russia and China do, 2006

The electromagnetic pulse EMP Threat: House of Representatives hearing 2005

[ Related articles:

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

Some notable statements from the hearing:

George Baker, Professor Emeritus, James Madison University:

  • I’ve been to some EMP meetings in Britain, where they actually are protecting their grid. I heard a member of Parliament say it’s 3 days to total anarchy once you lose the electricity.
  • “The long-term term effects without the electric power grid, we’re talking about certainly within a year, you would lose at least half the American population. I have seen estimates as high as 90% of the American population would be at risk over a projected 1-year period”.
  • “Although EMP does not affect every system, widespread failure of limited numbers of systems will cause large-scale cascading failures of critical infrastructure systems and system networks because of the interdependencies among the failed subsystems and the interlinked electrical/electronic systems not directly affected by the EMP”

PETER VINCENT PRY, Executive Director, Task force on National and Homeland Security:

  • What we must understand about the threat is that it is not merely theoretical, it is a real [asymmetrical] threat. The military doctrines of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran call for a Blitzkrieg combining nuclear weapons, cyber-attack, and physical sabotage.  Failed states like Iran or North Korea [or terrorists] could theoretically defeat and destroy a highly advanced society like our own [in such an asymmetric attack].
  • “There are 2,000 extra high voltage transformers that are basically the technological foundation of our electronic civilization. They are vulnerable to EMP. They should be protected. We don’t even make them in this country anymore”.

Mike Caruso, Director of Government and Specialty Business Development ETS-Lindgren.

“It is my sincere belief that we, as a nation will someday, in the not too distant future, face an EMP attack.  I have lectured and given workshops in both South Korea and Israel where they are certain that they will face an EMP attack and they are taking very active steps towards protection. I urge you to consider and pass legislation to address the EMP threat that I believe has been overlooked for far too long”.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

House 114-42. May 13, 2015. The EMP Threat:  the state of preparedness against the threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event.  House of Representatives. 94 pages.

Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chariman subcommittee on National Security. The state of preparedness against the threat of an electromagnetic pulse is the subject of today’s hearing. An electromagnetic pulse could be created through an attack from a missile, nuclear weapon, radio frequency weapon, or geomagnetic storm caused by the sun. Fallout from an EMP event, either man-made or natural, could be extremely significant ranging from the loss of electrical power for months, which would deplete energy sources of power such as emergency batteries and backup generators have cascading consequences for supplying basic necessities such as food and water, and result in loss of life.

The electrical grid is necessary to support critical infrastructure, supply and distribution of food, water, and fuel, communications, transportation, financial transactions and emergency and government services. Significant damage to the electrical grid during an EMP event would quickly and significantly degrade the supply of these basic necessities.

EMPs can also be caused by solar storms, also referred to as geomagnetic disturbances, which are basically an everyday occurrence, they just doesn’t always hit the Earth. Two significant storms that did enter the earth’s atmosphere occurred in 1859 and 1921, respectively. Given the limited use of electricity in the mid-19th and early 20th centuries, the impact on society was relatively minimal. Today however, society depends heavily on a variety of technologies that are vulnerable to the effects of intense solar storms.

Scientists predict that these storms impact the Earth once every 100 to 150 years. So it’s not a question of if, but a question of when.

The occurrence today on an event like the 1921 storm could result in large scale and prolonged blackouts affecting more than 100 million people. The National Academy of Sciences estimates the cost of damage from the most extreme solar weather at $1 to $2 trillion with a recovery time of 4 to 10 years. The cost from even short-term blackouts are significant.

In July of 1977, a blackout in New York that lasted only one day resulted in widespread looting and the breakdown of law through many New York neighborhoods. The blackout cost approximately $346 million and nearly 3,000 people were arrested during a 26-hour period. In August of 2003, more than 200 power plants shut down as a result of the electricity cut off caused by cascading failure. The blackout affected Ohio, New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Michigan and parts of Canada. Although relatively short in duration, the blackout’s economic cost was between $7 billion and $10 billion due to food spoilage, lost production, overtime wages and other related costs.

The Department of Defense recently decided to move the North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD back inside Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado because the mountain is EMP hardened and would allow the military to sustain communications and homeland defense operations despite an EMP event.

Not only is the Federal Government still operating under sequestration, but unfortunately, Congress recently passed a budget blueprint that contemplates cutting non-defense spending, including our Homeland Security budget that could be helpful on this issue by nearly $500 billion below sequestration level spending caps.

While government officials, scientists and other experts may disagree on the imminence of Electromagnetic Pulse event, the EMP Commission established by Congress in 2001 to assess the threat of an EMP attack reported that our national electric grid and other U.S. Critical infrastructure could be significantly disrupted by a sudden and high-intensity energy field burst. Now as the chairman noted, this could be large in scale and produced by nuclear explosion, it could also be created through the use of batteries, reactive chemicals and other nonnuclear devices, or be the product of a natural magnetic storm.

Dr. George Baker, Professor Emeritus at James Madison University and CEO of BAYCOR.  I see three reasons why we are not making progress at present on these. The first is there are many misconceptions about EMP and GMD threats.

  • Only major nuclear powers, such as Russia and China with high- yield thermonuclear devices could effectively execute an EMP attack. In fact, low yield devices obtained by emerging nuclear powers such as North Korea and Iran can produce catastrophic EMP effects.
  • A nuclear EMP attack would burn out every exposed electronic system. In fact, based on government tests, we know that smaller self-contained, self-powered systems such as vehicles, handheld radios, disconnected portable generators are often not affected.
  • EMP effects on critical infrastructure will be limited to non-severe, nuisance-type effects. In fact, wide area failure of just a few systems, could cause cascading infrastructure collapse, in highly interconnected networks. One example is the 2003 electric blackout of the northeast was precipitated by a single high-voltage line touching a tree, and then proceeded to cascade to the entire northeast.

So, when you extend this concept to a wide area of failures and infrastructure networks, including the Internet, you can see that EMP is an existential threat that we must take very seriously.

A recent cost study by the Foundation for Resilient Society shows that significant EMP protection could be achieved for an investment in the range of $10 to $30 billion.

But we aren’t making progress because the stakeholders are in a state of denial. Concerns about cost makes stakeholders, the government and the private sector reluctant to admit EMP vulnerabilities. Actions to date have been limited and ineffective. An example is the joint effort of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, that is, FERC, and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, that is NERC, to set reliability standards for wide area electromagnetic impacts on the electric grid.

The NERC-developed and FERC-approved standards that we have exclude nuclear EMP, despite the opportunity to protect against both GMD and EMP using the same equipment. NERC standards rely on operational procedures that require no physical protection of the electric grid. The largest measured storms are a factor of 10 higher than their benchmark for protection. A sceptic might suspect that NERC’s main objective was to avert liability rather than to protect the American public.

Another reason we aren’t making progress is there is no one in charge. There’s no single point of responsibility to develop and implement a national protection plan. When I ask NERC officials about EMP protection, they informed me we don’t do EMP, that’s DOD’s responsibility. The Department of Defense tells me, EMP protection for civilian infrastructure is DHS’s responsibility. And then when I talk to DHS, I get answers that the protection should be done by the Department of Energy, since they are the infrastructure’s sector-specific agency. So we have EMP and GMD protection as finger-pointing exercises at present.

PETER VINCENT PRY, Executive Director, Taskforce on National and Homeland Security.

Also see Pry’s full testimony here: The EMP Commission estimates a nationwide blackout lasting one year could kill up to 9 of 10 Americans through starvation, disease, and societal collapse

What we must understand about the threat is that it is not merely theoretical, it is a real threat. In the military doctrines of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, they plan to make a nuclear EMP attack against the United States. We have seen North Korea and Iran exercise this, including by launching ballistic missiles off of a freighter at sea, which would enable the possibility of an anonymous EMP attack.

During the nuclear crisis we had with North Korea in 2013, it was the worst nuclear crisis we ever had with Kim Jong Un was threatening to make nuclear missile strikes against the United States in the aftermath of their third illegal nuclear test.  In the midst of that crisis North Korea orbited a satellite over the south pole that passed over the territory of the United States on the optimum trajectory and altitude to both evade our national missile defenses, and, had that been a nuclear warhead, to place an EMP field over all 48 contiguous United States that would have had catastrophic consequences. That was the KSM 3 satellite; that satellite stills passes over us, it’s still in orbit and passes over us with regularity.

Another thing that must be understood is that EMP is part of their military doctrine that they consider a revolution in military affairs, a combined arms operation with cyber-attacks, physical sabotage, nonnuclear EMP weapons, and nuclear EMP weapons all used together and coordinated in a new Blitzkrieg, except one that’s waged in cyberspace to basically bring a civilization down to its knees so that a failed state like an Iran or North Korea could theoretically defeat and destroy a highly advanced society like our own.

This would be unprecedented in history where you would have a situation where a state like Iran or North Korea or even a sub national actor like a terrorist group if they could get hold of that one nuclear bomb and do it in combination with cyber-attacks and physical sabotage to crash our critical infrastructures, especially the electric grid and basically destroy our civilization. But they write about it; they exercise it; they are serious about it. And we actually see this being practiced in real life in some countries back in June of last year while ISIS was sweeping over northern Iraq, al Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula blacked out the entire electric grid in the state of Yemen, put 18 cities and 24 million people into the dark.

That is the first time in history that a terrorist group has blacked out a whole country. And it so destabilized Yemen that look what happened to them. They have gone from being a U.S. ally, so now we have lost one of our most important allies in the Middle East already to this kind of an attack.

On January 25, 2016 a terrorist group blacked out 80% of the grid in Pakistan. We don’t know what they are up to, but Pakistan is a nuclear weapons State. So the idea that 80% of the grid could be blocked out in Pakistan for purposes unknown is extremely disturbing.   Was it an attempt to get their hands on nuclear weapons in Pakistan?

About a week before the Washington blackout happened, 80 percent of Turkey was put into blackout by a cyber-attack by Iran. These were not EMP attacks, but they are experiments of the doctrine to combine all these things and we have seen in the case of North Korea and Iran experiments with the nuclear EMP option as well.

The greatest progress we made in this country was when the EMP Commission was around and, you know, with the absence of the Commission, well we have seen that no progress has been made.

And last, the NERC/FERC relationship, I completely agree with Dr. Baker. It’s extremely dysfunctional, it doesn’t work. It needs to be reformed. I’m not sure that you can actually reform those institutions. I would actually advocate abolishing both FERC and NERC and starting with something else, a different kind of institution, something similar to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that has real regulatory power, and that understands that its stakeholder, its customer is not the electric power industry first, but it’s the American people first. And the responsibility is first not to the profits of the utilities, but it’s to America’s national security.

George Baker, Professor Emeritus, James Madison University, CEO of Baycor.

I’ve been to some EMP meetings in Britain, where they actually are protecting their grid. I heard a member of Parliament say it’s 3 days to total anarchy once you lose the electricity.

Although EMP does not affect every system, widespread failure of limited numbers of systems will cause large-scale cascading failures of critical infrastructure systems and system networks because of the interdependencies among the failed subsystems and the interlinked electrical/electronic systems not directly affected by the EMP.

The electric grid is the foundation for all other infrastructures. DHS has listed 16 critical infrastructure sectors, and the one sector that drives everything else is the electric power. The other thing about the electric power, it is the most critical infrastructure, and yet the most vulnerable to EMP because you measure EMP in volts per meter, so the longer the line, the larger the voltage it will be induced on the line. So it is ironic that our most critical infrastructure is also the most vulnerable, and that’s why we have to be so serious about protecting the grid. But without the electric grid, basic life services: The ability to pump drinking water, the ability to heat and cool our homes—

I’ve been to some EMP meetings in Britain, where they actually are protecting their grid. I heard a member of Parliament say it’s 3 days to total anarchy once you lose the electricity.

Although EMP does not affect every system, widespread failure of limited numbers of systems will cause large-scale cascading failures of critical infrastructure systems and system networks because of the interdependencies among the failed subsystems and the interlinked electrical/electronic systems not directly affected by the EMP.

Moreover, for many systems, especially computer controlled machinery and unmanned systems, upset is tantamount to permanent damage ¡V and may cause permanent damage including structural damage in some cases, to systems due to interruption of control. Examples include:

  • Upset of generator controls in electric power plants
  • Upset of robotic machine process controllers in manufacturing plants
  • Lockup (and need for reboot) of long-haul communication repeaters
  • Upset of remote pipeline pressure control SCADA system

 

Mr. DESANTIS. And in terms of the some of the casualties, because people have surmised  that if terrorists can get their hands on a nuclear device, detonate an American city, obviously that would be very devastating. And someone said, yes it would be, but their best bet to do the most damage would be to try to launch it over the country and explode it and create an EMP. And the casualty estimates I’ve seen are really, really high if they were able to cripple our entire electrical grid. Is that your understanding that you are talking about potentially millions of people?

Mr. BAKER. That’s my understanding. The long-term term effects without the electric power grid, we’re talking about certainly within a year, you would lose at least half the American population. I have seen estimates as high as 90 percent of the American population would be at risk over a projected 1-year period.

 

Mike Caruso, Director of Government and Specialty Business Development ETS-Lindgren.

It is my sincere belief that we, as a nation will someday, in the not too distant future, face an EMP attack.

I have lectured and given workshops in both South Korea and Israel where they are certain that they will face an EMP attack and they are taking very active steps towards protection. I urge you to consider and pass legislation to address the EMP threat that I believe has been overlooked for far too long.

In addition to critical infrastructure, I’ve hardened military and government facilities for 32 years.  What’s required to harden a facility is to create a 6-sided electromagnetic shield around the equipment that’s intended to be protected. The six-sided metal shield has to be constructed so it basically has no openings in it except those that are absolutely necessary to have. And all of those openings are technically considered to be points of entry. So you start out by building a six-sided metal box with no openings, and then you start adding openings for things like the electrical power, communications and air exchanges and cooling systems. And all of those points of entries are handled in a very, very special and particular way in order to ensure that you are attenuating any EMP signal that might be broadcast in the atmosphere, but also any signals that are being brought in, conducted on the electrical lines or communication lines. A surge protector on steroids.

Eighteen states have ongoing initiatives to require electric utilities to address the protection of the electrical grid from the dangers of an EMP or a solar storm. Electromagnetic energy from an EMP can disrupt Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems on which the electrical grid relies. The States currently taking a proactive stand are: Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, New Mexico Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Washington. I have recently testified at the Texas State House in support of Bills introduced by State Representative Tan Parker, State Representative Tony Tinderholt and State Senator Bob Hall. Texas is aggressively pursuing passage of EMP Legislation including a State appropriation to get Critical Infrastructure Segments started in the evaluation process. To my knowledge, there are only three Electric Utilities in the U.S. that have taken steps in hardening their Operational Control Centers and Substation Control Buildings. I am prohibited by non-disclosure agreements, from directly identifying their names or locations. However, I can discuss the hardening process and costs of a recently completed facility.

 

Mr. DESANTIS. What percentage of the electrical grid is prepared for an EMP threat?

Mr. CARUSO. Currently, there’s only one control center in the entire country that I’m aware of that is protected.

 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts. What we’re saying here is that because of the interconnectivity of our society today, the great reliance and connectivity to the Internet, so much of every aspect of our lives is wired now, that that fact will actually amplify the impact of a EMP event. Is that basically what you’re saying, Mr. Baker?

Mr. BAKER. That’s right.  The only substantive response to the EMP recommendations has been within the Department of Defense, where they are actually providing an annual report to Congress on the steps they are taking to meet the EMP Commission recommendations. But as far as the civilian infrastructure, I’m not aware of any progress.

 

Mr. PRY.  There are 2,000 extra high voltage transformers that are basically the technological foundation of our electronic civilization. They are vulnerable to EMP. They should be protected. We don’t even make them in this country anymore.  The Commission had a rather long list of recommendations, basically a plan that could be implemented to protect the civilian critical infrastructure at affordable cost. It’s not hard to do, the technology isn’t the problem, the money isn’t the problem, it doesn’t cost that much to do it, it’s the politics that has been the problem. As George Baker has said, nobody has responsibility for doing this, those you would think would have responsibility,  such as the Department of Defense, for example. When you talk about it, DOD will say they have no jurisdiction over the civilian critical infrastructure, or that it could be caused by a geomagnetic storm and that’s not their department’s responsibility.  It’s a foreign threats, so that’s the Department of Homeland Security’s job. But DHS will say it is a nuclear weapon, that’s the DOD’s job. In the end, nobody has been in charge.

And then, where it counts the most, there is a very dysfunctional relationship between the NERC, the North American Electric Liability Corporation that represents the 3,000 utilities that is supposed to partner with U.S. FERC in providing for grid security. But the political reality is that that relationship is dysfunctional and it has not resulted in not only in increasing our security where EMP is concerned, but even against tree branch problems, for instance. It took NERC a decade to come up with a vegetation management plan to better manage tree branches so that we won’t have a repeat of the great Northeast Blackout of 2003. They are falling down on job on very pedestrian threats, let alone cyber threats and EMP attacks and the like. It’s just the system isn’t working, and that needs to be fixed by somebody.

CYNTHIA M.  LUMMIS, Wyoming, Chairman of the subcommittee on the Interior.   Dr. Pry [you say] the relationship between NERC and FERC is dysfunctional. You mention the possibility of doing away with both. So if you were dictator for a day, and you could do exactly that, either combine NERC and FERC or do away with them and replace them with something else that would solve the dysfunction you’ve identified, as well as address this electromagnetic pulse issue responsibly, what would that look like?

Mr. PRY. That would look like the kind of relationship that the Federal Aviation Administration has with the airline industry. What I think isn’t understood is that the electric power industry is the only critical infrastructure that still operates basically in something that’s close to a 19th century regulatory environment. The Federal Aviation Administration has the power and has independent inspectors. If they find metal fatigue in the wings of an airline, they can ground that whole fleet and order the airline industry to not fly those planes until they are fixed. When there is a disaster and an airplane crashes, the industry doesn’t get to investigate and figure out what went wrong, not by themselves. It’s the Federal Aviation Administration that drags those things into a hangar. And why do we do that? Because we want an objective actor whose first priority is public safety, because hundreds of lives are at stake when airplanes fly and so we don’t take lightly the lives of the American people when it comes to that. If we go to the Food and Drug Administration or any other industry, I would like that same kind of regulatory relationship with the electric power industry.

Let me describe to you a little bit about what the current regulatory environment is like, because it’s not really what we would consider a regulatory environment. The U.S. FERC does not have the power to tell NERC — the industry — what they shall do to protect the grid. It can order them to come up with a plan and then NERC can take as much time as it likes to come up with a proposed plan. And then if the U.S. FERC has objections that plan, the whole plan has to be scrapped, and the process starts all over again.

That’s why it took 10 years to get a plan for vegetation management so we wouldn’t have a repeat of the great Northeast Blackout of 2003. Industry takes its time dragging its feet and can use the process to escape doing what it’s supposed to do. NERC is supposed to partner with the U.S. FERC in providing for the security of the American people, but it doesn’t.

And I don’t think combining them or keeping the same will work.  There are some good people in these institutions, where George and I have served on NERC’s Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force.  But while we were there, we saw them engage in junk science, dishonest practices in terms of the science to try to mislead people. In my written testimony, I describe a very disturbing example of where the NERC came up with a hollow standard for the natural EMP created by the sun.  They were dragged, kicking and screaming and resisted for years said that the threat from the sun does not affect the electric grid, which was completely untrue. Eventually they were forced to come up with a standard, but the standard is so low that it doesn’t provide any real protection.

 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, MICHIGAN.  This issue is one of great importance to me and to our country. The congressional EMP Commission issued a report in 2008 identifying 16 segments of our infrastructure that could suffer severe damage if not protected. Today, 7 years later, the testimony continues to echo those concerns. Has anything changed since this last report regarding the protection of the grid?

Mr. CARUSO. I don’t believe anything significant has changed.   I have worked with several financial institutions, including insurance companies. I’ve worked with electric utilities and have done some work counseling, the gas and electric industry as well, but other than that, nothing real significant has happened. My recommendation really falls in line with those of Dr. Pry and Dr. Baker in that someone needs to be in charge, and especially as it’s related to the 16 critical infrastructure segments in terms of providing real protection, and at least addressing the issue to ask the question what if, what happens if we lose the electrical power?  I like to use the example of the waste treatment systems. You would not only lose the electrical power, but the control systems that control the wastewater filtration and pumping stations throughout an area. If that goes down in a major city, you have 2 or 3 days before the city is just on its knees.

 

JODY B. HICE, GEORGIA. Dr. Pry, what Federal agency do you believe is best suited to lead a preparedness effort for this? Is it Homeland Security? Is it Energy?

Mr. PRY. I think the Department of Homeland Security, that it naturally falls under their jurisdiction because they’re supposed to be responsible for critical infrastructure protection in the first place.  Since DHS and the Department of Defense are also supposed to have a cooperative relationship when it comes to providing for homeland security, DHS should have the lead, but there’s a lot of expertise in the Department of Defense. And the Department of Defense is also dependent on the civilian critical infrastructure.

 

TED LIEU, CALIFORNIA.  Let’s say an EMP device was exploded over the U.S. What is the geographic area that it would affect? Is it the size of D.C.? Of Maryland? Of Virginia? Smaller? Larger?

Mr. BAKER. A low-yield weapon, if it’s detonated at the optimum altitude would affect a circle with a diameter of 1,200 miles.

Mr. LIEU. And then, based on the way our electrical power grid is constructed in the U.S., could you take power from another part of the country and route it through the affected area?

Mr. BAKER. That would depend upon the size of the circular diameter. It would be difficult to do that because you’re looking at areas that are crossing, you know, State boundaries and the boundaries of the different power companies.  It could be difficult. And we don’t have grid control centers in most cases that span that large of an area.

 

Mr. LIEU.  To harden the United States to a place you think is sufficient, are we talking about $50 million, $50 billion, $500 billion?

Mr. PRY. It depends on how much protection you want to buy.  It’s sort of like asking how much will it cost to buy fire protection for my house. Some plans are very inexpensive. It can be as simple as buying a smoke alarm which would cost you very little. Others might want to put a fire extinguisher in every room and put a sprinkler system in, which is going to cost a lot.

John Kappenman, who was on our commission, had a plan, that would cost $200 million that would protect the 200 most important extra-high-voltage transformers, the ones that service the major metropolitan areas.   John wouldn’t say this was adequate, but would give you a fighting chance of saving millions of people from starving to death, because the transformers would be saved.

The EMP Commission had a more ambitious plan that cost about $2 billion to protect all of the transformers and generators.  It was a much better plan and would give you much greater resiliency and confidence in being able to recover society quickly from an EMP.

George Baker had an even better plan that went beyond that.

It sort of depends on how much do you want to put into prevention. Just like in protecting your house, you can spend more money to protect your house and be safer, or you can decide to spend less money and be less safe.

 

Mr. DUNCAN. I’m glad to hear that some States are taking individual initiatives. I hope that keeps growing.

Mr. PRY. But it is harder to do when NERC claims they’ve adopted a GMD standard and not to worry about it, they’re on top of the problem, which they also say about cyber and things like that, which is not true. And that takes away the incentive for States to protect themselves when NERC convinces them that they are already solving the problem. And I’d like to make one last statement, because you asked if are we getting more vulnerable. We are getting more vulnerable all the time because of the advance of technology.  Just as our semiconductor technology gets better and faster and runs on lower voltages, it becomes more and more vulnerable to the EMP effect, which is why we’re so vulnerable now.

Back in 1962, Starfish Prime test, when that happened, the vacuum tube technology of the day was 1 million times less vulnerable to EMP. Still, the lights went out in Hawaii even though they were 1 million times less vulnerable. About every 10 years we have a 10-fold increase in the capabilities of our semiconductor technology. That makes us 10-fold more vulnerable to EMP. So this problem is getting worse and worse. It’s not just standing still while we do nothing.

 

Mr. DUNCAN.  We over sensationalize a lot of these threats because of a 24-hour news cycle and because so many people in companies make money off of threats that are exaggerated. But, in my opinion, this is one that’s not being exaggerated and that we need to do a little bit more. And I appreciate what you all are trying to do.

 

Mike Caruso. In 2014, ETS-Lindgren was part of a multi-disciplinary team that successfully completed construction of the first large, private-sector SCADA facility in the United States that includes EMP protection. The building is a new-construction, 2-Story 105,000 square foot concrete tilt-up building with:

  • 44,000 square feet of EMP protected space
  • Emergency generators and cooling systems protected
  • Approximately 40 to 60 occupants in the protected space „h Approximately $50MM building construction cost (building only)
  • Total project cost approximately $100MM (including equipment)
  • Approximate EMP Protection cost $8MM (including additional subcontract costs)
  • EMP protection was1-year on-site (concurrent with general construction)
  • Average additional ¡§total project costs¡¨ of 8% ($182.00/sqft)
  • 2 million homes and businesses served
  • 5,000 square-mile service area
  • Less than $1.00 per year per customer (spread over 5-years)
  • Performance certified by Little Mountain Test Facility (U.S. Air Force, Hill AFB)

While the optimum scenario is to include EMP protection in a new building, retrofitting existing buildings for EMP protection is somewhat more complicated and costly, but certainly achievable. I recently led a five-man team in an evaluation of two control centers (primary and back-up) for an electric utility in a major U.S. City. I am prohibited, by non-disclosure agreements, from directly identifying their names or locations. As you might imagine, existing facilities have legacy equipment and systems that were never intended to be EMP protected. This condition makes these facilities tremendously vulnerable to EMP. The existing interconnecting wiring, conduits and mechanical systems provide excellent pathways to conduct the EMP directly to the critical equipment. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of the facility must first be conducted to identify the “must have” functionality and equipment in the case of an EMP event. As an example, in this case, it was determined that the large system display board did not have to remain operational because the individual operators would be able to see their sector status on their individual monitors. Therefore it was only necessary to address the protection of the individual stations and a cost savings could be realized. The most critical equipment must be grouped and isolated in individual interconnected enclosures to accommodate functionality. In addition, the existing back-up power systems, cooling systems and communication systems that support the critical equipment must be protected. In some cases this will involve creating new dedicated support systems due to the complexity of the existing systems.

The estimated Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) costs for retrofitting an existing facility of a similar size as the previously discussed new-building is:

  • 44,000 square feet of EMP protected space
  • Emergency generators and cooling systems protected
  • Approximately 40 to 60 occupants in the protected space
  • Approximately $10MM building construction cost (building only)
  • Total project cost approximately $26MM (including equipment)
  • Approximate EMP Protection cost $16MM (including additional subcontract costs)
  • EMP protection 18 to 24 months on-site (concurrent with general construction)
  • Average additional “total project costs” ($364.00/sq ft)
  • 2 million homes and businesses served
  • 5,000 square-mile service area
  • Less than $2.00 per year per customer (spread over 5-years)

While, in my opinion, EMP protection of electric utilities is the primary concern, due to the survival dependency we have on electrical power, all other segments of our nation’s critical infrastructure must be addressed. Some proactive forward thinking electric utilities have either instituted EMP protection programs or have at least begun to consider implementing protection. However, critical infrastructure segments such as; financial, waste water, drinking water, transportation, food distribution, healthcare and emergency services have not.

 

George Baker, Professor Emeritus, James Madison University, CEO of Baycor

The costs to protect roughly the transmission and distribution system and half of the U.S. generation capacity are provided in the table below:

Resilient Societies Cost Projections

  • Electric Generation Plants $23,0000M
  • Electricity Transmission & Distribution $2,300M
  • Electric Grid Control Centers $1,390.M
  • Telecommunications $1,480M
  • Natural Gas System $640M
  • Railroads $1,380M
  • Blackstart Plant Resiliency $80M

TOTAL $30,270M

Using the $30,270 bottom line EMP and GMD protection cost estimate and a levelized annual revenue requirement of 20% ($6B), assuming there are ~150 million rate payers in the United States, the estimated annual cost per rate payer would be $3.30 per month. There are strong arguments for protecting selected subsets of the grid. For example, a top priority to ensure situational awareness following a GMD or EMP event would be to protect major grid control centers. Estimates to protect these are in the $1.4 billion ballpark. If a Phase 1 EMP/GMD program operated in 2016-2020 at a five year cost of $1.4 billion, or $280 million per year, and all the extra costs were passed through to retail customers, the extra cost would be approximately $0.16 per electric customer per month.

We also might put priority on ensuring the survivability of major grid components that would take months to replace –or years if large numbers suffer damage. A primary example would be high voltage transformers which are known to irreparably fail during major solar storms and are thus also vulnerable to failure during an EMP event. Protection of these large transformers would save valuable time in restoring the grid and the life-support services it enables. The unit cost for HV transformer protection is estimated to be $350,000. The total number of susceptible units range from 300 – 3000 (further assessment is required to establish an exact number.) Doing the math, the protected cost for protecting 3000 of these longest replacement lead-time components of the grid is $ 1 billion – a small fraction of the value of losses (Lloyds of London estimates are in the trillions of dollars2 for GMD alone) and long-term recovery costs should they fail.

Stakeholder Reluctance.

Concern about costs and liabilities makes stakeholders in government and the private sector reluctant to admit vulnerabilities. A major impediment to action on protecting the grid against GMD and EMP effects has been that government and industry are (understandably) swayed by the familiar, the convenient, and the bottom line. Like it or not, familiarity and profitability are the touchstones of acceptability – strategic advantage goes to the convenient. Thus, the tendency exists to downplay the likelihood of EMP and GMD and their associated consequences. The prevalent misconceptions (factor 1) have also contributed to stakeholders’ ability to downplay the seriousness of EMP and GMD effects to avoid action.

In cases where stakeholders have decided to take action to improve infrastructure survivability, the actions have been limited and ineffective. A primary case in point is the NERC effort to set reliability standards for wide-area electromagnetic effects. Responding to FERC’s inquiries for protection standards, the NERC formed a GMD task force. When several task force participants asked why EMP could not be part of the task force deliberations, NERC leadership explained that EMP was a national defense concern and therefore not their responsibility – rather that DoD should take the lead.

The standards ultimately developed by NERC include a set of operational procedures requiring no physical protection of the electric grid and a scientifically-flawed benchmark GMD threat description that enables most U.S. utilities to avert installing physical protection based on their own paper modeling studies. The benchmark GMD threat description is based on solar storm statistics over the last 25 years during which there were no “Carrington Class” 100-year solar superstorms. The Carrington-class storm GMD levels are an order of magnitude higher than the largest storms in the NERC 25 year data window. NERC’s benchmark event is admissible only if we assume that all eleven-year solar cycles are the same, an assumption known to be incorrect. A skeptic might suspect that the NERC standard’s main objective was to avert liability rather than protect the public from serious GMD consequences.

The outcome of the NERC operational procedures standard, now approved by FERC, is that the public will not be protected from EMP and the industry will deal with GMD effects using operational work-around procedures such as shedding load and spinning up reserve generation capacity. The operational procedure-based solutions that have been offered by NERC in their recently adopted EOP-010-01-1 standard are ineffective for a number of reasons. A non-exhaustive list of ten pitfalls accompanying reliance on operational procedures to protect the electric power grid follows.

  1. GMD operating procedures are based on the premise that operators can and will prevent large-scale grid collapse by shedding load. Due to insurance rules, grid operators will be reluctant to shed load to customers, even though load-shedding procedures reduce the probability of grid collapse and damage to EHV transformers. Utility companies know that if customer electric power is lost due to geomagnetic disturbance (GMD), they will not be liable for losses; but if customer power is lost due to intentional human action to deenergize the grid or portions of it, power companies can be held liable. (Reference the Lloyds of London report on GMD effects and liabilities and statements by insurance company representatives at 2012 Electric Infrastructure Security Summit at UK Parliament).
  1. The 15-45 minute warning time earlier provided by the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) satellite and now supported by the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) successor will be inadequate for grid operators to confer while executing required operational procedures. Participants in the 2011 National Defense University-Johns Hopkins University GMD response exercise indicated that they would be hard-pressed even to get all the players to the table within such a short time interval. And, once hit, the grid would fail quickly. We note that, in 1989, during a moderate solar storm GMD, the electric power grid of the entire Province of Quebec went dark in 92 seconds. The August 2003 Northeast Blackout evolved much more slowly (1:31pm – 4:10pm) with much more time available to take action. Nonetheless, even with a span of hours available, power companies were unable to react fast enough to prevent grid collapse.
  1. Grid operators will not have adequate information on the state of the grid to implement correct operational procedures. Because most of the grid is not monitored for Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC), operators will be “flying blind” with respect to the state of the grid. Operators will not know which portions need remedial action and what actions will be optimal. Information gaps will exist as in August 2003 – where operators were unaware of the initiating tree contact. Sensors needed to monitor GMD/EMP stressors on critical grid components were not required by NERC standards and have not been installed. And this lack of visibility has led and will lead to errors in executing operational procedures.
  2. There is no control center with large enough visibility to control operational procedure response on a national scale. Lack of information on neighboring interconnections impairs proper procedural response. A national control/coordination center does not exist. And in the Eastern Interconnection, there is no single authority over the nine American regional Reliability Coordinators. Because the geographic coverage of solar storm GMD and nuclear EMP can be continental in scale, super-regional control visibility and authority are necessary. At this point, only the federal government, using Presidential authority, can fulfill this role.
  1. Operational procedures have not been adequate to address the much simpler causes of previous large-scale blackouts. For instance, operational procedures proved ineffective in preventing the 2003 Northeast blackout that was precipitated by a single failure point – tree contact with a transmission line. Recent grid models indicate that GMD and EMP will cause hundreds to thousands of failure points. The complexity and rapidity of grid failure during a Carrington-class event will overwhelm the ability of electric utilities to respond and to prevent grid failure using any suite of operational procedures, no matter how wellconceived and practiced. During Hurricane Sandy, grid physical damage outstripped the effectiveness of procedural protection efforts. Physical damage to grid components will be a factor in GMD/EMP events as well.
  1. Unforeseen grid equipment malfunctions have greatly impaired grid operators’ ability to respond during major blackouts in the past. Operational procedures during the 2003 Northeast blackout were greatly impaired by computer control system malfunctions and software problems. Critical grid state monitoring, logging and alarm equipment failed. The control area’s SCADA and emergency management systems malfunctioned. The shut-down of hundreds of generators over multiple states was unanticipated as was the failure of tens of transmission lines. Confusion and inoperative control systems led to many frantic phone calls. As these events, show, any early failure of major grid components caused by the GMD or EMP environment will impede implementation of subsequent operational procedures.
  1. EMP and GMD will affect the communication systems necessary for coordination of operational procedures. Long-line internet and telecommunications networks will experience large overvoltages from GMD and EMP E1/E3 environments, likely causing their debilitation. GMD and EMP also impede signal propagation of HF/VHF/UHF radio systems and GPS systems. Thus grid communication and control systems necessary to execute operational procedures cannot be relied on – just when they will be needed the most.
  1. It is not possible to anticipate all grid failure point combinations and time sequences during GMD/EMP events in order to adequately plan, exercise, and test GMD/EMP operational procedures. Normal grid failures are not indicative of GMD/EMP failures. Operators are familiar with commonly occurring single equipment failures but when multiple points fail near simultaneously under GMD/EMP stress, and the failures interact and cascade, operators will have difficulty understanding and responding to prevent further damage. In most complex human-machine systems, the interactions literally cannot be seen. Prof. Charles Perrow of Yale defines ‘normal accidents’ in complex infrastructure systems as involving system interactions that are not only unexpected, but are incomprehensible for some critical period of time. For example, it took an expert NERC investigation team three months to determine the exact combination and sequence of system failures that led to the 2003 Northeast blackout.
  1. In the Eastern Interconnection, Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISO’s) don’t have cross-jurisdictional authority to enforce shutdown of neighboring grids, sometimes required to avoid large scale blackouts, as in the August 2003 Northeast Blackout. There is no overall supervisor for the Eastern Interconnection. During the 2003 Northeast blackout, First Energy was asked to shed load by its neighboring grid operators but First Energy declined. According to the NERC afteraction report, load shedding would have prevented the ensuing Northeast blackout.
  1. Draft NERC GMD operational procedures recently approved by FERC (Order No. 797, June 2014) are not comprehensive and not specific. The plans generator operators and load balancing authorities from mitigation responsibilities. The NERC operational procedures also exempt portions of the grid operating below 200kV. In the August 2003 blackout, failure of 125 kV lines played a major role in the collapse of the Northeast grid.

The GMD operational procedures and solar storm benchmark event approved by FERC are ineffective and allow the electric power industry to continue with no significant upgrades to their physical assets, leaving the grid vulnerable to 100 year solar superstorms and EMP. It is worth noting that while GMD fields are more intense at northern latitudes, E3 fields increase at more southerly latitudes relative to the locus of a high altitude EMP event. Utilities that require no protection against GMD because of their southerly latitude under the newly operative standard would be experience higher E3 fields in the event of an EMP event than their northerly counterparts. The bifurcated “stove-pipe” threat approach being pursued to protect the electric power grid is cost- and outcome-ineffective. We need to develop a unified, all-threat approach to this challenge which leads to the third and final impediment to progress:

 

 

Posted in Blackouts, Electric Grid & EMP Electromagnetic Pulse, Nuclear spent fuel fire | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment

The Devil’s Scenario – near miss at Fukushima is a warning for U.S.

[ The most likely event to trigger a loss of power long enough to cause a spent fuel pool zirconium fire meltdown and release of radioactive particles into the atmosphere is a nuclear or natural geomagnetic storm electromagnetic pulse (see Dr. Pry’s testimony at the U.S. House of Representatives on May 13, 2015 at a hearing titled “The EMP Threat:  the state of preparedness against the threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event”.  The EMP Commission estimates a nationwide blackout lasting one year could kill up to 9 of 10 Americans through starvation, disease, and societal collapse.

Dr. Pry states that “Seven days after the commencement of blackout, emergency generators at nuclear reactors would run out of fuel. The reactors and nuclear fuel rods in cooling ponds would meltdown and catch fire, as happened in the nuclear disaster at Fukushima, Japan. The 104 U.S. nuclear reactors, located mostly among the populous eastern half of the United States, could cover vast swaths of the nation with dangerous plumes of radioactivity“.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Stone, R. May 27, 2016. Near miss at Fukushima is a warning for U.S. Science  Vol. 352, Issue 6289, pp. 1039-1040 

Japan’s chief cabinet secretary called it “the devil’s scenario.” Two weeks after the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami devastated the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, causing three nuclear reactors to melt down and release radioactive plumes, officials were bracing for even worse. They feared that spent fuel stored in pools in the reactor halls would catch fire and send radioactive smoke across a much wider swath of eastern Japan, including Tokyo.

Thanks to a lucky break detailed in a report released last week by the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Japan dodged that bullet. But the report warns that spent fuel accumulating at U.S. nuclear plants is also vulnerable. The near calamity “should serve as a wake-up call for the industry,” says Joseph Shepherd, a mechanical engineer at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena who chaired the academies committee that produced the report.

A major spent fuel fire at a U.S. nuclear plant “could dwarf the horrific consequences of the Fukushima accident,” says Edwin Lyman, a physicist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nonprofit in Washington, D.C., who was not on the panel. Unpublished modeling from one panel member presents chilling scenarios for a hypothetical spent fuel fire at the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. “We’re talking about trillion-dollar consequences,” says Frank von Hippel, a nuclear security expert at Princeton University, who led the modeling.

After spent fuel is removed from a reactor core, the radioactive fission products continue to decay, generating heat. All nuclear power plants store the fuel in deep pools for at least 4 years while it cools. To keep it safe, the academies panel recommends that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and plant operators beef up systems for monitoring the pools and topping up water in case a facility is damaged. The panel also says plants should be ready to tighten security after a disaster. “Disruptions create opportunities for malevolent acts,” Shepherd says.

At Fukushima, the earthquake and tsunami cut power to pumps that circulated coolant through the reactors and cooled the water in the spent fuel pools. The pump failures led to the meltdowns; in the pools, located in all six of Fukushima’s reactor halls, they allowed water temperatures to rise dangerously. Of preeminent concern were the pools in reactor units 1 through 4: Explosions had heavily damaged three of those buildings in the days after the tsunami.

The “devil’s scenario” nearly played out in Unit 4, where the reactor was shut down for maintenance. The entire reactor core—all 548 fuel assemblies—was resting in the Unit 4 pool along with another 783 assemblies, shedding vast amounts of heat. When an explosion blew off Unit 4’s roof on 15 March, operators assumed the cause was hydrogen—and they feared it had come from fuel in the pool that had been exposed to air.

Confirmation was impossible because the power loss on 11 March had disabled the pool’s water level indicators. (Analysts now concur that the hydrogen had come not from exposed spent fuel, but from the melted reactor core in the adjacent Unit 3.) Concerns abated after a helicopter overflight on 16 March captured video of sunlight glinting off water in the pool. But the crisis was actually worsening: The water was evaporating away because of the hot fuel. As the level fell perilously close to the top of the fuel assemblies, something “fortuitous” happened, Shepherd says. As part of routine maintenance, workers had flooded Unit 4’s reactor well, where the core normally sits. Separating the well and the spent fuel pool is a gate through which fuel assemblies are transferred. The gate leaked, allowing water from the well to partly refill the pool.

Without that leakage, the panel’s modeling predicts that the tops of the fuel assemblies would have been exposed by early April 2011, and the odds of the assemblies’ zirconium cladding catching fire would have skyrocketed. Only good fortune and makeshift measures to pump water into all the spent fuel pools averted that disaster, the academies panel notes.

A similar scenario could play out at a U.S. nuclear plant if a pool lost water via evaporation or leakage. At most plants, spent fuel is densely packed in pools, heightening the fire risk. NRC has estimated that a major fire at the Peach Bottom nuclear plant’s pool would displace 3.46 million people from 31,000 square kilometers of contaminated land, an area larger than New Jersey. But Von Hippel and others think that NRC has grossly underestimated the scale and societal costs of such a fire.

nightmare scenario pennsylvania contamination cs-137

Figure 1 nightmare scenarios.  Models of a hypothetical spent fuel fire at a pennsylvania nuclear plant.  Depending on weather the Cs-137 plume displaces up to 41 million people (1 July) and contaminates up to 274,000 square kilometers (1 October)

NRC used a program called MACCS2 for modeling the dispersal and deposition of radioactivity from a Peach Bottom fire. Princeton’s Michael Schoeppner and Von Hippel instead used HYSPLIT, a program able to craft more sophisticated scenarios based on historical weather data for the whole region.

In their simulations, the Princeton duo focused on Cs-137, a radioisotope with a 30-year half-life that has made large tracts around Chernobyl and Fukushima uninhabitable. They assumed a release of 1600 petabecquerels, which is the average amount of Cs-137 that NRC estimates would be released from a fire at a densely packed pool, and approximately 100 times the Cs-137 spewed at Fukushima. They simulated such a release on the first day of each month in 2015.

The contamination from such a fire on U.S. soil “would be an unprecedented peacetime catastrophe,” the Princeton researchers conclude in a paper to be submitted to the journal Science & Global Security. For a fire on 1 January 2015, with the winds blowing due east, the radioactive plume would sweep over Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and nearby cities (Figure 1 nightmare scenarios). For a fire on 1 July 2015, shifting winds would deposit Cs-137 over much of the mid-Atlantic. Averaged over 12 monthly calculations, the area of heavy contamination—exceeding 1 megabecquerel per square meter, the level that would trigger a relocation—is 101,000 square kilometers. That’s more than three times NRC’s estimate and would force the relocation of 18.1 million people on average, about five times NRC’s estimates.

NRC’s first look at the academies report “did not identify any safety or security issues that would require immediate action,” says spokesperson Scott Burnell in Washington, D.C. The agency has long mulled whether to compel the nuclear industry to move most of the cooled spent fuel in densely packed pools to concrete containers called dry casks, which would reduce the consequences and likelihood of a spent fuel fire. As recently as 2013, NRC concluded that the projected benefits do not justify the roughly $4 billion cost of a wholesale transfer. But the benefits of expedited transfer to dry casks are fivefold greater than NRC has calculated, the academies found. “NRC’s policies have underplayed the risk of a spent fuel fire,” Lyman says.

The academies panel recommends that NRC “assess the risks and potential benefits of expedited transfer.” Burnell says that NRC’s technical staff “will take an in-depth look” at the issue and report to NRC commissioners later this year.

Posted in Nuclear Power Collapse, Nuclear spent fuel fire, Nuclear Waste, Scientists Warnings to Humanity | Tagged , , , , , | 1 Comment

After collapse: plunder or feudalism?

 

IWW poster “Pyramid of Capitalist System” (c. 1911), depicting an anti-capitalist perspective on statist/capitalist social structures

Preface. In this post an anonymous author looks at what will happen if society collapses and we have to suddenly go back to pre-industrial agriculture, and most likely, nomadic groups will plunder the countryside. That’s what happened when Rome fell.

But I vote for feudalism. The National guard will prevent mass migrations and those who get through will encounter local checkpoints that stop them. Bill Gates, the Microsoft co-founder and a billionaire, is the biggest private farmland owner in the country and other billionaires are buying farmland too. Some will staff them with well paid armed guards and enslaved farmers in exchange for their lives (the ultimate form of capitalism).

This really angers me, my biggest hope of preparing for peak oil and everything else was a government sponsored back to the land movement where young folks under 30 would be recruited to become organic farmers on their own land. Instead we’ll likely get feudalism, check out this NYT article:

Qiu L (2022) Farmland Values Hit Record Highs, Pricing Out Farmers. Small farmers are now going up against deep-pocketed investors, including private equity firms and real estate developers. New York Times.

In South Dakota farmland values surged 18.7% from 2021 to 2022,and nationwide, values increased by 12.4% to $3,800 an acre, the highest since 1970, with cropland at $5,050 an acre and pastureland at $1,650 an acre. High prices for commodity crops like corn, soybeans and wheat; a robust housing market; low interest rates until recently; and an abundance of government subsidies — have converged to create a “perfect storm” for farmland values. As a result, small farmers are going up against deep-pocketed investors, including private equity firms, pension funds, and real estate developers.

Young farmers named finding affordable land for purchase the top challenge in 2022 in a September survey by the National Young Farmers Coalition, a nonprofit group.

Already, the supply of land is limited. About 40% of farmland in the United States is rented, most of it owned by landlords who are not actively involved in farming. And the amount of land available for purchase is extremely scant, with less than 1% of farmland sold on the open market annually.

The booming housing market has bolstered the value of farmland, particularly in areas close to growing city centers, which ripples out to land farther and farther away. Government subsidies to farmers have also soared in recent years, amounting to nearly 39% of net farm income in 2020. On top of traditional programs like crop insurance payments, the Agriculture Department distributed $23 billion to farmers hurt by President Donald J. Trump’s trade war from 2018 to 2020 and $45.3 billion in pandemic-related assistance in 2020 and 2021. Those payments, or even the very promise of additional assistance, increase farmland values as they create a safety net and signal that agricultural land is a safe bet, research shows.

What’s happening now is “digital feudalism” for aspiring working farmers who can’t afford to buy their own farms as wealthy landowners drive up prices, and then hire them to work the farms they wanted to buy, locking would-be farmers int a new kind of serfdom where they work land that will never be theirs.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Author unknown. March 3, 2016. The Neopaleolithic: Hunter-Gatherers of the 21st century. thesenecaeffect.wordpress.com

The Seneca Effect: Decline is faster than growth.

There’s a common perception that as our society reaches a peak to the degree of complexity it can sustain, we will gradually return to a lower level of complexity that preceded it.  However, for us to be able to return to a lower level of complexity typically requires us to have maintained the technologies that enabled the previous level of complexity, as well as relevant knowledge of the skills we utilized to sustain the previous level of complexity.

Population.  One major problem we face is that most people simply don’t live in places where food is grown to feed them. Saudi Arabia imports 80% of its food, Kuwait 91%, Qatar 97%. Japan’s caloric self-sufficiency is estimated at 39%. It’s simply not possible, without mass migration across continents, for people to live in those places where their food is produced and participate in food production. This would require mass migration to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Russia.

Urbanization.  An estimated 49% of people lived in cities in 2005, up from 13% in 1900. This figure continues to rise. It’s questionable whether people are better off in cities or outside of them. It might seem self-evident that the countryside would be preferable, but it’s likely that critical infrastructure in cities can be sustained longer than it can be in more rural places.
Economic decline so far seems to lead to a rise in urbanization, rather than the opposite, as rural places become increasingly expensive to inhabit. What causes urbanization is a reduction in dependence on physical labor in agriculture. So far there seems to be no reversal in this trend.

The Dutch Method: Greenhouses

The Dutch method of food production is characterized by its complete unsustainability. The Netherlands produces 17% of its own need for grains, but a massive 241% of its own need for vegetables. Incredibly, this country produces 290% of its own need for tomatoes, a tropical crop native to central America, where it grows as a perennial. The vast majority of this (80+%) is exported to other countries

How is all of this achieved? Through the use of greenhouses. In the Netherlands yield per hectare of greenhouses lies almost ten times higher than in similar greenhouses in Spain, allowing this country to be a world-leading food producer, despite its lack of farmland.

Various unsustainable technological methods are used in this process.

Rest-heat and captured CO2 from fossil fuel based power plants is routed to the greenhouses, to keep tropical crops like the tomato at the temperature needed for optimal growth. At least 90% of greenhouses are artificially heated.  Other greenhouses burn their own fuel, raising temperatures and creating an environment of elevated carbon dioxide in the greenhouse, typically of 1000 parts per million, to further stimulate growth beyond what heat alone can accomplish. An estimated 7% of natural gas use in the Netherlands is used directly by greenhouses to deliver carbon and heat to plants. A fuel crisis, whether through logistical problems or fossil fuel depletion, thus inevitably also means a food crisis.

Other nations are heavily dependent on greenhouses too, though few of these greenhouses are as completely dependent on modern technology as the Dutch ones. Globally, 473,466 hectares of greenhouses are used, out of which slightly more than 10,000 hectare is found in the Netherlands. A stagnation in greenhouse production is visible in the Netherlands, whereas on a global scale growth continues very rapidly.

Even the windows of the greenhouses are dependent on petroleum. An estimated 90% of greenhouses in the Mediterranean don’t use glass but transparent plastic instead that allows the desired wavelengths to pass through the greenhouse.

Pesticide dependence.  Individual studies tend to find a relatively small decrease in yield for farmers who don’t use pesticides. These estimates can’t be reliably extrapolated however, as such farmers inevitably benefit indirectly from other farmers who do use pesticides on their crops, thereby never allowing pests to gain a foothold in the first place.  Because of the international scale of modern agriculture and our industrial food system as well as a drastic reduction in biodiversity in our plants, a variety of plant pathogens have managed to spread to different species and continents. This has necessitated a growing cocktail of a wide variety of different pesticides, the health effects of which are largely unknown.  Growing plants in greenhouses in particular is nearly impossible without pesticides, due to a variety of factors. Ultraviolet light, which is blocked by glass, harms certain pathogens, but also causes plants to produce compounds that reduce their sensitivity to pathogens. The reduced day-night temperature variation and relatively high humidity also makes greenhouse plants more vulnerable to a variety of pathogens than traditional food production systems.

Irrigation.  Places like Israel depend on desalination for water, which is only accomplished by use of high amounts of energy. Israel also depends on water that is relatively high in salt, so to avoid salt building up in the soil, sprinkler installations are used that require very little water to effectively treat the plants.  Using pre-industrial methods instead, like building irrigation canals, would cause salt to build up in the soil due to evaporation, whereas a lack of irrigation would drastically reduce yields and require a switch to completely different crops.

Nitrogen and Phosphorus.  The two main nutrients we use as fertilizer are nitrogen and phosphorus. Nitrogen is removed from the atmosphere through the Habers-Bosch process, which consists for 80% of nitrogen. This requires the use of natural gas, an estimated 3-5% of global natural gas production is used for this purpose alone. Nearly 80% of nitrogen found in our body originates from this process.

Phosphate is mined from phosphate rock. Because the world’s grasslands are losing phosphorus through various processes, it’s estimated that phosphate application on grassland will have to quadruple between 2005 and 2050, to increase production by the 80% expected to be necessary over that time period.

In total, it’s thought that phosphorus production will have to more than double by 2050 compared to 2005, just to keep up with demand. It’s not clear how much further phosphate rock production can grow. Some estimates are that phosphate rock production will peak by 2027, even as depletion of our soils will merely get worse.

Because rising CO2 concentrations increase the growth rate of plants, places that are currently in phosphorus balance may become gradually depleted as a result and ultimately dependent on phosphorus application by humans. This happens to peripheral regions, where the fertility of land is extracted as the land is valued less than in regions that are highly populated and seen as economically valuable.

While many regions witness phosphorus depletion, places like the Netherlands are victim to over nourishment. Crops are shipped from marginal lands in places like Brazil to factory farm animals in the Netherlands, where animals defecate and the phosphorus is released in excessive amounts into our soils and waters. This is enabled by industrial agriculture’s international orientation, without which minerals like phosphorus would be recycled in a local ecosystem in a more sustainable fashion.

Peak farmland

Today we have less fertile land around the world, due to factors like those outlined above. Some places that used to be farmed have become burdened by too many heavy metals and other pollutants to still be capable of reliably producing food. In China, 19.4% of arable land is estimated to be contaminated with heavy metals. This share will continue to rise in the coming years, as well as the degree of contamination.

It is estimated that the world lost a third of its arable land between 1975 and 2015. Factors that are important here are not just chemical contamination, but also erosion of fertile soils by wind and water, as well as the covering of fertile farmland with human infrastructure. Climate change also contributes to making soils more vulnerable to erosion.  Thus today we find ourselves having to feed more people, with less arable land. What proved possible for our ancestors won’t be possible for us, simply because you can’t go back to farming arable land that no longer exists.

Soil compaction is a harmful process that damages the fertility of our soils. Depending on the depth at which the compaction takes place, the compaction is often practically irreversible.  Unfortunately, governments have a tendency to use poor metrics to estimate soil compaction. It’s estimated for example, that individual humans lead to greater soil compaction than large machinery, simply because the weight of such machinery can be spread out further across the soil through use of big wide tires.

The difference here however, is that topsoil compaction is far less harmless than subsoil compaction. The impact of humans and other animals takes place mostly at the topsoil, because humans and other animals put high pressure at small locations.

Heavy machinery like tractors on the other hand, execute far higher pressure when measured over a broader area. The average tractor has increased in weight from 2 tons in 1950 to 7 tons today, which is more than the largest elephants. The broad tires of the machinery might lead to less harm to the topsoil, but causes greater harm to the subsoil.
The topsoil is quite rapidly restored by earthworms, moles and other lifeforms, who dig through the ground and loosen the soil, allowing roots to penetrate the soil again. The subsoil on the other hand takes much longer to recover when compacted, because the subsoil is home to comparatively few lifeforms.

This prohibits roots from growing into the subsoil and redistributing scarce nutrients up into the higher soils, as well as preventing the subsoil from retaining water, often creating puddles of water above the soil that end up damaging the plants.

In the short term (up to around six years), yields are greatly reduced by subsoil compaction, but there are also smaller more persistent effects that linger for decades. One study estimated a permanent reduction in yield for wheat of 1.5% and 6% for two different fields respectively, as a result of the use of heavy machinery.

Effects are likely to be worse today, due to the even heavier machinery now in use. In addition, plants that naturally root deeper than wheat, like many edible nut species, would have even worse effectively permanent reductions in yield than wheat. Subsoil compaction represents a long-term reduction in the diversity of life that a plot of land could harbor otherwise.

Irreversible transitions.  The problems seen above are a consequence of the general rule of thumb with most technologies that it’s easier to adapt to them than to let go of them again. Our innovations in agriculture are no exception, they’re schoolbook examples.  This transition to modern technology in agriculture produces long-term consequences, that can be concealed in the short-term through use of more new technologies. For example, rising CO2 concentrations make plants more vulnerable to pathogens, but farmers who happily spray pesticides probably don’t realize this until they suddenly have to return to growing crops without pesticides.

Land consolidation.  The number of farms in existence today has decreased drastically, as many people have quit the farming business due to scale advantages that effectively allowed just a few farm business to survive. Whereas formerly people would have guarded the crops growing in their backyard, today farmland is often in the hands of nameless corporations. In the event of a food shortage, the theft of food crops will thus be increasingly difficult to prohibit.

A scenario for the future: Marauding 21st century Hunter-Gatherers

Ownership and control over food producing resources will probably prove difficult to enforce in many places. Even people who own small plots of land will have difficulty growing crops and keeping the harvest for themselves if they do not live on the land.

A scenario where people grow their own food appears to be far less likely than a scenario where nomadic groups of people begin to plunder the countryside. This is what effectively seems to have happened in the Roman empire, where nomadic tribes invaded and local bands of Roman citizens known as Bagaudae began pillaging the countryside.

Eventually, as food that can be plundered from homes and fields begins to run out, people would be forced to depend solely on whatever grows in the countryside. Our changing climate means that this may prove to be a more viable strategy than we might expect.

In Europe, some Middle Eastern refugees already appear to be adapting to a migratory lifestyle, incorporating wild foods into their diet. A spike in mushroom poisoning cases has been seen in Germany as a consequence of refugees eating wild mushrooms.

It seems to me that we should expect to see a lot more of this in the years ahead. Our food production system has evolved in a fashion that is difficult to roll back even when it becomes necessary. It appears more likely to cease working altogether than to become less complex.

Posted in Peak Food | Tagged , , , , , | 6 Comments

Why railroads are against running locomotives on natural gas

Since oil is finite, natural gas was seen as a fuel that could extend how long oil lasted by being a “bridge” fuel.  Since natural gas is finite also, and would lead to dependence on unstable foreign nations, the plan was that this would “bridge” us to hydrogen fuel cells. Needless to say, that’s never going to happen.

Railroads are adamantly against being pushed towards using natural gas driven locomotives.  Here are a few of the reasons why:

  1. Railroads have experimented with alternative fuels since 1935 and they haven’t worked out
  2. Natural gas emissions are much worse than emissions from a diesel locomotive
  3. LNG locomotives are more expensive than diesel equipment to operate, and a completely new fueling infrastructure would be needed.
  4. Since only one locomotive is sold for every 211 Class 8 trucks, manufacturers are unlikely to do the necessary research required to build an LNG locomotive
  5. Line-haul locomotives need a tremendous amount of fuel – 10 times more than the switch locomotives that re-arrange rail cars in yards.  LNG line-haul locomotives would not go as far, not have enough power, and require a huge amount of on-board fuel storage, which is very impractical and expensive.
  6. In a derailment or accident, LNG is likely to be far more dangerous than diesel

Building LNG locomotives would be really stupid given that fracked natural gas production in America will peak roughly 2016-2020 and decline at an alarming rate, given the 60% per year decline rate of fracked natural gas wells (conventional natural gas reserves have been declining for over a decade), and we have few LNG import terminals.

If railroads stopped running, within a month or two coal electric power plants would shut down, due to lack of coal deliveries, since trains deliver over two-thirds of coal, and refineries would be impacted by trains unable to deliver 759,000 barrels per day (Chase 2014), 8% of USA oil production.

I’ve got two documents below about why railroads do not want to use natural gas fueled locomotives.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation, 2015, Springer

BNSF, et al. 2007. An Evaluation of Natural Gas-fueled Locomotives. BNSF & Union Pacific RR, Assoc of American railroads, California Env  Assoc.  94 pages.

New locomotives must meet a wide range of railroad company, customer, and community requirements, including:

  • safety
  • exhaust emissions performance
  • extensive range
  • high horsepower
  • high tractive effort
  • fuel economy
  • reliability

The principal line-haul locomotive builders, General Electric (GE) and Electro-Motive Diesel, Inc. (EMD), continue to meet these requirements through clean diesel engine enhancements, not through the commercialization of natural gas-fueled locomotives.

The Railroads’ position on natural gas

Some members of the regulatory, engine supply, and fuel supply communities believe the railroads have an opportunity to use natural gas as a locomotive fuel to help meet emissions and performance goals. Except for some potential niche applications, the Railroads disagree. Decades of research and development activities and over-the-rail locomotive prototype demonstrations have given the Railroads a great deal of information about the practicality of using natural gas-fueled locomotives.

Locomotives use a diesel-electric drive system where the output from a combustion engine is used to generate electric power. That electric power is then used to drive an electric motor to provide the high torque required for the locomotive. Locomotives are rated based on tractive horsepower available to drive the wheels of the locomotive.

The emission standards are based on the brake horsepower developed by the combustion engine on the locomotive. Unless stated otherwise, all references in this report to horsepower refer to the tractive horsepower of the locomotive.

A “gen-set” is a self-contained modular package of power generating equipment consisting of a diesel or gas engine coupled to an electrical generator.

Green Goats for both Railroads have been returned to the manufacturer for modification to resolve an equipment malfunction that causes engine fires. One Green Goat for UP is already back in limited service, and the remaining UP Green Goats should be back by the end of the year. BNSF’s Green Goats are still with the manufacturer.

Figure 1 timeline of railroad research activities

Figure 1: Timeline of Railroad Research Activities

The Railroads currently know of one commercially available, proven and tested natural gas-fueled line-haul locomotive product available for the North American locomotive market. It is available only as a retrofit or conversion product. It would convert an approximately 25-year-old, EMD645-E3 3,000 hp diesel locomotive to run on natural gas. Comparing the exhaust emissions of this converted locomotive with those of EPA certified Tier 2 compliant diesel locomotives shows that the new diesel locomotives outperform the natural gas-fueled locomotive on emissions (see Table 1).

Table 1 comparing natural gas-fueled line-haul locomotive converstion and certified tier 2 diesel

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1– Comparing Natural Gas-fueled Line-haul Locomotive Conversion and Certified Tier 2 Diesel Line-haul Locomotives

There is no NOx benefit from using this natural gas-fueled locomotive, and all other criteria pollutant emissions are higher—including particulates, which are four to five times greater.

Compared to the operation of the same locomotive on diesel fuel, natural gas is less energy efficient and produces more greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalent). Also, a locomotive using this natural gas conversion kit will likely have higher emissions of some toxic air contaminants, especially formaldehyde.

Niche opportunities may exist There may be niche opportunities to use natural gas in certain locomotive applications, such as the liquefied natural gas (LNG) rail yard switch locomotives in service in Los Angeles

However, because of the relatively small amount of fuel consumed by yard switchers and the possible use of diesel particulate filters on gen sets, there may be little improvement in emissions by using natural gas as a fuel in these engines, and it begs the question as to what advantage there would be in using natural gas given the requisite infrastructure costs that accompany it.

Cost Savings Claims

Claims that natural gas-fueled locomotives will be less expensive to operate than diesel equipment are unfounded.

Moreover, support of natural gas-fueled locomotives will require significant investments in new fueling infrastructure that are duplicative to established diesel based infrastructure. These infrastructure investments and their associated operating costs must be accounted for in any evaluation of cost effectiveness.

Given the small size of the locomotive market (approximately one locomotive is sold for every 211 Class 8 trucks) and given manufacturers’ personnel and financial constraints, it is highly doubtful the builders can simultaneously pursue further improvements in diesel locomotive technology and natural gas-fueled locomotive development.

The following factors should be considered when evaluating natural gas-fueled locomotives:

Locomotive Type. There are significant differences between switch and line-haul locomotives. The differences include: the size and horsepower of the engine that powers the locomotive, the amount of tractive effort the locomotive produces, the duty cycle of the locomotive, the fueling infrastructure requirements, and the range of operations. Switch locomotives spend their time in one location (such as a rail yard), whereas line-haul locomotives crisscross North America and often operate interchangeably on different rail company lines. Due to its greater power rating and higher load factor, a line-haul locomotive will burn up to ten times the fuel compared to a switch locomotive.

What is sensible for one locomotive type may not be for another. For example, spark ignited LNG-fueled locomotives are inhibited by low fuel storage capacity, range, and power density, thus making them impractical for line-haul use, but they could be potentially practical for switch duty if the locomotive can stay close to a fueling source and if high power output is less important.

High locomotive utilization is critical to ensure that the locomotive asset provides an adequate economic return. To achieve this requirement, high horsepower line-haul locomotives must be interchangeable with other railroad fleets (other railroads must be able to fuel, maintain, and operate these locomotives); be highly reliable so as to minimize maintenance requirements and avoid breakdown events; and have the ability to operate over a long range to minimize refueling events. With the possible exception of switch locomotives, creating captive fleets of unique locomotives serving small geographic regions works against these requirements and will decrease locomotive asset utilization and greatly impair the economic competitiveness of the rail industry. This in turn would alter the competitive landscape within the goods movement system, drive additional cargo to heavy-duty trucks, and worsen air quality.

The duty cycle of the locomotive refers to the percentage of time it is operated at different power settings. Locomotives have eight power settings called “notches”. There are also settings for idling and dynamic braking.

The growing practice of run through trains where locomotives interchange from one company’s system to another increases locomotive asset utilization. UPRR, for example, reports that up to 12% of the locomotives operating on its system at any given time are locomotives owned by other railroad companies. This level and frequency of interchange and degree of interoperability keeps the nation’s railroads operating efficiently. New engine and locomotive technology that cannot integrate into this operations paradigm will drive up costs, create emissions inefficiencies, and impair goods movement on rail.

This fact increases the importance of uniformly applied federal emission standards. The devolution of locomotive emissions standards into separate regional or state programs would most certainly lead to higher costs and program inefficiencies to the extent that they presume static and increasingly outdated assumptions about locomotive asset ownership and operational patterns.

A run through train is a train that travels from one company’s track to another without changing locomotives.

When the Tier 3 and Tier 4 standards are adopted, the railroads expect this will make LNG locomotive technologies less favorable to new clean diesel locomotives, not more.

Care must also be taken in reviewing emission benefits for specific projects using natural gas locomotives where the benefits do not come from the fuel change, but come from switching freight to rail. For example, railroads have consistently noted the environmental benefits of replacing truck freight by rail freight. Here the appropriate comparison is the difference between two scenarios: 1) the emissions from truck freight, and 2) the emissions from carrying the same amount of freight by rail. Statements from a California consortium evaluating the use of natural gas-fueled locomotives to replace diesel-fueled trucks provides an example where this type of scenario comparison is both useful and, at the same time, potentially misleading. The consortium’s website indicates that the planned conversion of four EMD SD40-2 locomotive engines to natural gas using the ECI 1SDT dual-fuel, low pressure injection conversion package result in emission reductions of 68.7 tons of NOx and 3,434 pounds of PM annually.” According to materials on file with the SCAQMD, the cause of this reduction appears to be both the replacement of truck freight by rail freight and the potential use of natural gas-fueled locomotives.

As shown in Figure 2, the locomotive builders sell a total of around 1,000 new locomotives to the North American market per year.

Can the natural gas engine technology be packaged into the space constraints of a modern locomotive? (See Figure 3)

  • Can the natural gas engine technology “scale” to meet broad operational requirements?25
  • Can a locomotive with the natural gas engine match the power delivery requirements of newer diesel engine locomotives?
  • Is the natural gas-fueled locomotive sufficiently reliable and durable?
  • What is the fuel economy? How is this measured? How does this fuel economy compare to diesel?
  • Are there fuel supply reliability considerations?

Applications

  • Is the natural gas engine technology applicable to new locomotives, existing locomotives, or both?
  • What is the expected use (e.g., switch, local service, passenger, or freight line-haul) and how does the application-specific duty cycle affect emissions?
  • Are there safety-related issues associated with the natural gas engine locomotives, the fueling stations and infrastructure, or with the fuel delivery process?

Scale relates to how the technology is deployed in practice versus how it performs in limited test or demonstration modes. An example is the current method of fueling the LNG switch locomotives operating in the Los Angeles area. These locomotives are fueled by tanker trucks dispatched from an Arizona processing facility. This fueling method would not reasonably scale to meet broad operational requirements because the volume of fuel required would be too great. There could be similar issues around track and facility space requirements where scaling to meet broad operational requirements is impossible.

The existence of natural gas engines in a variety of stationary and on-road applications identified [by the report authors] does not, however, mean that LNG technology: (a) can be transferred to a variety of locomotive classes operating in all types of service conditions, (b) can meet NOx and other criteria pollutant emission reduction requirements and (c) can meet the railroads’ operating requirements for high horsepower, reliability, and overall fuel efficiency.

This section explains the basic approach to using natural gas as a locomotive fuel. The 1995 EF&EE Report correctly pointed out that there are three methods of burning natural gas in large-bore, heavy-duty engines: spark-ignited, low pressure, and high-pressure injection with diesel pilot ignition (where the fuel is ignited by compression ignition of a small quantity of diesel fuel introduced into the cylinder).

Burlington Northern CNG Effort (1983-1987) In 1983, the Burlington Northern Railroad tested a modified EMD GP-9 locomotive (a 1954-era 1,750 HP switch-sized locomotive with a two-stroke, 16-cylinder 567C model engine) to run the locomotive diesel engine on CNG in a spark-ignited mode. The CNG fuel was stored in compressed gas cylinders mounted on an over-the-road truck trailer placed on a flat car coupled to the experimental GP9 locomotive. The Burlington Northern performed on-the-rail tests for two years in the upper Midwest. It concluded that the low energy density of the CNG made it impractical for wide scale railroad use because of its low range between fueling events.

This effort showed that the energy content of CNG vs. LNG vs. diesel is an important consideration in the evaluation of each fuel. Because of the differences in energy content for each fuel, locomotives utilizing these fuels will have different ranges for a given volume of fuel storage.

For a given fuel volume. an LNG-fueled locomotive will have 2.4 times the range of a CNG-fueled locomotive. Assuming equal engine efficiencies, the diesel-fueled locomotive will have 4.3 times the range as a CNG-fueled locomotive and 1.75 times the range of the LNG-fueled locomotive for equivalent volumes of fuel storage.

Figure 7: Fuel Energy Densities. Energy Content – Btu/gal: CNG 30,100    LNG 73,100    Diesel No. 2 128,100

In addition to the requirement for a new fueling infrastructure, the lower CNG or LNG energy densities would require new fueling infrastructure and operational strategies for locomotives. This includes the use of fuel tender cars and the creation of captive locomotive fleets whose operational ranges are restricted to specific geographic regions. The use of tender cars reduces the number of revenue freight cars and increases the train weight, thus increasing the cost of moving freight. Also, fuel tenders and the locomotives they supply must be kept coupled together increasing equipment asset utilization and difficulties. An LNG locomotive consist (i.e. several locomotives coupled and controlled as a unit) would require one to two LNG tenders at approximately $1 million each.

Other important questions that should be considered for this and other similar projects in the future include:

  • How reliable are the locomotives? For example, should the locomotives experience an in-route break down, diesel locomotives will have to be dispatched to help complete the train movement and bring the non-functioning locomotive to a repair shop. This would impact emissions.
  • Where will the locomotives be maintained and by whom?
  • Where will the locomotives be inspected for Federal Railroad Administration safety inspections?
  • What company will provide the train crews?
  • Over whose tracks will the locomotives operate?
  • Will these locomotives and the revenue service contribute towards the upkeep of the rail infrastructure?
  • How will safety issues be addressed in the event of a derailment?

Answers to these questions and others go to the heart of understanding the Railroads’ arguments about the critical importance of maintaining locomotive interoperability throughout the North American rail network system. While a technology may be effective in a pilot program or small scale, it must be able to be “scaled up” to operate seamlessly within the existing national rail system to maintain operating efficiencies. The Class I railroad companies cannot be competitive operating small fleets of locomotives that are captive to specific regions.

The comparative costs of natural gas and diesel fuel play a large role in determining the potential feasibility of deploying natural gas-fueled locomotives and the cost-effectiveness of any resulting air quality emission reductions. All else being equal (i.e. emissions, thermal efficiency, reliability, etc.), the delivered cost of natural gas would have to be much less expensive than diesel fuel to justify a conversion to its use due to the significant investment required in new and/or retrofit locomotives, duplicative fueling infrastructure, and related operational support costs.

Presently the four LNG switch locomotives that the BNSF leases and operates in Southern California are fueled by LNG that is refined and liquefied in Arizona and is delivered to the locomotive along the right-of-way by truck. According to a BNSF representative, the fuel is delivered “every few days” and each locomotive’s 1,300 gallon fuel tanks are topped off during each refueling. While this is practical for these four locomotives, any appreciable sized fleet of locomotives that use LNG would require a nearby, sizeable, and reliable source of LNG.108 By the end of 2005, California had 40 LNG fueling facilities scattered throughout the state and primarily located near major thoroughfares and serving on-the-road vehicle operators.109 These facilities are not sized or located to support Railroad operations. Furthermore, how this infrastructure might be expanded is unknown.

Decades of research and development activities and over-the-rail locomotive prototype demonstrations have given the Railroads a great deal of information about the practicality of using natural gas-fueled locomotives. Figure 16 below highlights the main Western Class I Railroad research efforts since 1935.

Below is from http://www.siliconinvestor.com/readmsg.aspx?msgid=29524960

  • Freight railroads and the basic economics of fuel choice Major U.S. railroads, known commonly as Class 1 railroads, are defined as line-haul freight railroads with certain minimum annual operating revenue. Currently, that classification is based on 2011 operating revenue of $433.2 million or more [1]. While there are 561 freight railroads operating in the United States, only seven are defined as Class 1 railroads. The Class 1 railroads account for 94% of total freight rail revenue [2]. They haul large amounts of tonnage over long distances, and in the process they consume significant quantities of diesel fuel. In 2012, the seven Class 1 railroads consumed more than 3.6 billion gallons (gal) of diesel fuel [3], amounting to 10 million gal/day and representing 7% of all diesel fuel consumed in the United States. The two largest consumers of diesel fuel among the Class 1 railroads—Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and Union Pacific—consumed more than 1 billion gal each in 2012. The cost to Class 1 railroads of consuming such large quantities of diesel fuel was more than $11 billion in 2012, representing 23% of their total operating expense (Table IF3-1).Table IF3-1. Class 1 railroad diesel fuel consumption, fuel cost, and fuel cost share of operating expense, 2012column 1 Class 1 railroad (2012)
  • column 2 Diesel fuel consumption (gallons)
  • column 3 Fuel cost thousand 2012 dollars)
  • column 4 Percent fuel cost share of total operating expense
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 1,335,417,552 $4,273,779 29%
Union Pacific 1,108,029,359 $3,505,671 24%
CSX Transportation 490,902,017 $1,542,747 18%
Norfolk Southern 462,466,433 $1,437,178 18%
Canadian National Grand Trunk 101,555,124 $326,303 16%
Canadian Pacific Soo 71,575,774 $231,211 16%
Kansas City Southern 64,078,412 $195,428 22%
Total 3,634,024,671 $11,512,317 23%
Source: Class 1 Railroad diesel fuel consumption, fuel cost, and fuel cost share of operating expense, 2012: U.S. Departmentof Transportation, Surface Transportation Board, “Annual Report Financial Data,” stb.dot.gov.

 

Challenges for liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a freight rail fuel (Chase 2014)

While simple economic calculations involving the comparison of fuel cost savings to additional upfront cost are relatively straightforward, other factors, including operational, financial, regulatory, and mechanical challenges, also affect fuel choices by railroads. One of the most challenging factors raised by the switch to LNG locomotives by Class 1 railroads is the effect on operations. Switching from diesel fuel to LNG would require a new delivery infrastructure for locomotive fuel. Natural gas would need to be delivered to fuel depots, either by truck in smaller quantities, as LNG [4],or perhaps by pipeline. Larger quantities of natural gas would require liquefaction before delivery to tender cars for use in locomotives. Building the new infrastructure would require a large financial investment in addition to the large investments made in locomotives and tender cars.

The building of LNG refueling infrastructure could also complicate the inter-operability of the rail network, depending on how quickly modifications could be made to accommodate refueling at multiple points around the nation. Impeding the ability of the rail network system to move goods because of a lack of fuel availability could drive up costs and lead to reductions in network flexibility and operational efficiency [5]. In addition, operations could be further affected by fuel switching because of the cost of training staff at refueling depots and in maintenance shops, updating maintenance facilities to handle LNG locomotives and tenders, and managing more extensive logistics [6]. Further, LNG locomotives and tender cars could require more maintenance than their diesel counterparts. All of these operational changes would create a duplicative infrastructure [7], because many diesel-fueled locomotives still would be in service at least for some significant period, and compression-ignited LNG locomotives still require at least some diesel fuel for combustion ignition.

Replacing the current stock of diesel locomotives with LNG locomotives and tender cars would represent a significant financial investment by Class 1 railroads. In 2012, there were 25,174 locomotives in the service of Class 1 railroads, the vast majority of which were line-haul locomotives [8]. A new diesel line-haul locomotive costs about $2 million [9], and rebuilt locomotives cost about half that amount. With a new LNG locomotive and tender costing about $1 million more than a diesel counterpart, the cost to replace the entire diesel locomotive stock with LNG locomotives and tenders would be tens of billions of dollars, not including additional infrastructure, training, logistics, and a potential increase in maintenance costs. Moreover, much of the cost of the transition, such as purchases of locomotives and tender cars, potentially would occur over a much shorter time period than a fuel payback period.

The financing requirement of large capital expenditures complicates the rather straightforward calculation of locomotive fuel economics. The amount of capital available to Class 1 railroads, either on hand or raised in capital markets, is an important factor in determining whether, or to what extent, railroads can take advantage of fuel cost savings over time. The decision to switch from diesel fuel to LNG is also influenced by the facts that railroads are a highly capital-intensive industry [10] with complete responsibility for maintaining the physical rail network, that they face many competing needs for financial investment, and that they must ensure adequate return on investment for their shareholders.

On the regulatory side, LNG rail cargos currently are not permitted without a waiver from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) rules. The development of standard LNG tenders and regulations is underway, with issues related to safety, crashworthiness, and environmental impact, including methane leakage, under consideration [11].

Finally, LNG locomotives currently are undergoing extensive testing and demonstration to determine their fuel consumption, emissions, operational performance, and range under real-world conditions. Locomotives and tenders will be evaluated to ensure mechanical performance of such components as connections between tender and locomotive. Several Class 1 railroads are planning to start LNG locomotive demonstration projects to provide better understanding of the obstacles to an LNG fuel switch.

Chase, N. April 14, 2014. Potential of liquefied natural gas use as a railroad fuel. United States Energy Information Administration.

Posted in LNG Liquified Natural Gas, Natural Gas Vehicles, Railroads | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments

EROI explained and defended by Charles Hall, Pedro Prieto, and others

[ If you found this post interesting, the following posts are even better (more detailed and in-depth):

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

Questions about EROI at researchgate.net 2015-2017

Khalid Abdulla, University of Melbourne asks:  Why is quality of life limited by EROI with renewable Energy? There are many articles explaining that the Energy Return on (Energy) Invested (EROI, or EROEI) of the sources of energy which a society uses sets an upper limit on the quality of life (or complexity of a society) which can be enjoyed (for example this one).  I understand the arguments made, however I fail to understand why any energy extraction process which has an external EROI greater than 1.0 cannot be “stacked” to enable greater effective EROI.  For example if EROI for solar PV is 3.0, surely one can get an effective EROI of 9.0 by feeding all output energy produced from one solar project as the input energy of a second? There is obviously an initial energy investment required, but provided the EROI figure includes all installation and decommissioning energy requirements I don’t understand why this wouldn’t work. Also I realise there are various material constraints which would come into play; but why does this not work from an energy point of view?

Charles A. S. Hall replies:  As the person who came up with the term  EROI in the 1970s (but not the concept: that belongs to Leslie White, Fred Cotrell, Nicolas Georgescu Roegan and Howard Odum) let me add my two cents to the existing mostly good posts.  The problem with the “stacked” idea is that if you do that you do not deliver energy to society with the first (or second or third) investment — it all has to go to the “food chain” with only the final delivering energy to society.  So stack two EROI 2:1 technologies and you get 4:2, or the same ratio when you are done.

The second problem is that you do not need just 1.1:1 EROI to operate society.  We (Hall, Balogh and Murphy 2009) studied how much oil would need to be extracted to drive a truck including the energy to USE the energy.  So we added in the energy to get, refine and deliver the oil (about 10% at each step) and then the energy to build and maintain the roads, bridges, vehicles and so on.  We found you needed to extract 3 liters at the well head to use 1 liter in the gas tank to drive the truck, i.e. an EROI of 3:1 was needed.

But even this did not include the energy to put something in the truck (say grow some grain)  and also, although we had accounted for the energy for the depreciation of the truck and roads,  but not the depreciation of the truck driver, mechanic, street mender, farmer etc.: i.e. to pay for domestic needs, schooling, health care etc. of their replacement.    Pretty soon it looked like we needed an EROI of at least 10:1 to take care of the minimum requirements of society, and maybe 15:1 (numbers are very approximate) for a modern civilization. You can see that plus implications in Lambert 2014.

I think this and incipient “peak oil” (Hallock et al.)  is behind what is causing most Western economies to slow or stop  their energy and economic growth.   Low EROI means more expensive oil (etc) and lower net energy means growth is harder as there is less left over after necessary “maintenance metabolism”. This is explored in more depth in Hall and Klitgaard book  “Energy and the wealth of Nations” (Springer).

Khalid Abdulla asks: I’m still struggling a little bit with gaining an intuition of why it is not possible to stack/compound EROI. If I understand your response correctly part of the problem is that while society is waiting around for energy from one project to be fed into a second project (etc.) society needs to continue to operate (otherwise it’d all be a bit pointless!) and this has a high energy overhead.  I understand that with oil it is possible to achieve higher external EROI by using some of the oil as the main source of energy for extraction/processing. Obviously this means less oil is delivered to the outside world, but it is delivered at a higher EROI which is more useful. I don’t understand why a similar gearing is not possible with renewables.  Is it something to do with the timing of the input energy required VS the timing of the energy which the project will deliver over its life?

Charles A. S. Hall replies: Indeed if you update the QUALITY of the energy you can come out “ahead”.  My PhD adviser Howard Odum wrote a lot about that, and I am deeply engaged in a discussion about the general meaning of Maximum Power (a related concept) with several others.  So you can willingly turn more coal into less electricity because the product is more valuable.   Probably pretty soon (if we are not already) we will be using coal to make electricity to pump out ever more difficult oil wells….

I have also been thinking about EROI a lot lately and about what should the boundaries of analysis be.  One of my analyses is available in the book “Spain’s PV revolution: EROI and.. available from Springer or Amazon.

To me the issue of boundaries remains critical. I think it is proper to have very wide boundaries. Let’s say we run an economy just on a big PV plant. If the EROI is 8:1 (which you might get, or higher, from examining just the modules) then it seems like you could make your society work. But let’s look closer. If you add in security systems, roads, and financial services and the EROI drops to 3:1 then it seems more problematic. But if you add in labor (i.e. the energy it takes to make the food, housing etc that labor buys with its salaries, calculated from national mean energy intensities times salaries for all necessary workers) it might drop to 1:1. Now what this means is that the energy from the PV system will support all the purchases of the workers that are building/maintaining the PV system, let’s say 10% will be taken care of, BUT THERE WILL BE NO PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES for the rest of the population. To me this is why we should include salaries of the entire energy delivery system (although I do not because it remains so controversial). I think this concept, and the flat oil production in most of the world, is why we need to think about ALL the resources necessary to deliver energy from a project/ technology/nation.”

Khalid Abdulla: My main interest is whether the relatively low EROI of renewable energy sources fundamentally limits the complexity of a society that can be fueled by them.

Charles A. S. Hall replies: Perhaps the easiest way to think about this is historical: certainly we had lots of sunshine and clever minds in the past.  But we did not have a society with many affluent people until the industrial revolution, based on millions of years of accumulated net energy from sunshine. An affluent king, living a life of affluence less than most people in industrial societies now, was supported by the labor of thousands or millions of serfs harvesting solar energy.  The way to get rich was to exploit the stored solar energy of other societies through war (see Plutarch or Tainter’s the collapse of complex societies).

But most renewable energy (good hydropower is an exception) are low EROI or else seriously constrained by intermittency. Look at all the stuff required to support “free” solar energy. We (and Palmer and Weisbach independently) found EROIs of about 3:1 at best when all costs are accounted for.

The lower the EROI the larger the investment needed for the next generation: that is why fossil fuels with EROIs of 30 or 50 to one have led to such wealth: the other 29 or 49 have been deliverable to society to do economic work or that can be invested in getting more fossil fuels.  If the EROI is 2:1 obviously half has to go into the next generation for the growth and much less is delivered to society.   One can speculate or fantasize about what one can do with some future technology but having been in the energy business for 50 years I have seen many come and go.  Meanwhile we still get about 75-80% of our energy from fossil fuels (with their attendant high EROI).

Obviously we could have some kind of culture with labor intensive, low energy input systems if people were willing to take a large drop in their life style.  I fear the problem might be that people would rather go to war than accept a decline in life style.

Lee’s assessment of the traditional  !Kung hunter gatherer life style implies an EROI of 10:1 and lots of leisure (except during droughts–which is the bottleneck).  Past agricultural societies obviously had a positive EROI based on human labor input — otherwise they would have gone extinct.  But it required something like a hectare per person.  According to Jared Diamond cultures became more complex with agriculture vs hunter gatherer.

The best assessment I have about EROI and quality of life possible is in:  Lambert, Jessica, Charles A.S. Hall, Stephen Balogh, Ajay Gupta, Michelle Arnold 2014 Energy, EROI and quality of life. Energy Policy Volume 64:153-167 http://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0301421513006447 — It is open access.  Also our book:  Hall and Klitgaard, Energy and the wealth of nations.   Springer

At the moment the EROI of contemporary agriculture is 2:1 at the farm gate but much less, perhaps one returned for 5 invested  by the time the food is processed, distributed and prepared (Hamilton 2013).

As you can see from these studies to get numbers with any kind of reliability requires a great deal of work.

Sourabh Jain asks: Would it be possible to meet the EROI goal of, say for example 10:1, in order to maintain our current life style by mixing wind, solar and hydro? Can we have an energy system various renewable energy sources of different EROI to give a net EROI of 10:1?

Charles A. S. Hall replies:  Good question.  First of all I am not sure that we can maintain our current life style on an EROI of 10:1, but let’s assume we can (Hall 2014, Lambert 2014).  We would need liquid fuels of course for tractors , airplanes and ships — I cannot quite envision running those machines on electricity.

The problem with wind is that it tends to blow only 30% of the time, so we would need massive storage.  To the degree that we can meet intermittency with hydro that is good, although it is tough on the fish and insects below the dam.  The energy cost of that would be huge, prohibitive with respect to batteries, huge with respect to pumped storage, and what happens when the wind does not blow for two weeks, as is often the case?

Solar PV may or may not have an EROI of 10:1 (I assume you know of the three studies that came up with about 3:1: Prieto and Hall, Graham Palmer, Weisbach — but there are others higher and certainly the price and hence presumed energy cost is coming down –but you should also know that many structures are lasting only 12, not 25 years) — — this needs to be sorted out ).  But again the storage issue will be important.   (Palmer’s rooftop study included storage).

These are all important issues.  So I would say the answer seems to be no, although it might work well for let’s say half of our energy use.   As time goes on that percentage might increase (or decrease).

Jethro Betcke writes: Charles Hall: You make some statements that are somewhat inaccurate and could easily mislead the less well informed: Wind turbines produce electricity during 70 to 90% of the time. You seems to have confused capacity factor with relative time of operation.  Using a single number for the capacity factor is also not so accurate. Depending on the location and design choices the capacity factor can vary from 20% to over 50%.  With the lifetime of PV systems you seem to have confused the inverter with the system as a whole. The practice has shown that PV modules last much longer thatn the 25 years guaranteed by the manufacturer. In Oldenburg we have a system from 1976 that is still producing electricity and shows little degradation loss [1]. Inverters are the weak point of the system and sometimes need to be replaced. Of course, this would need to be considered in an EROEI calculation. But this is something different than what you state. [1] http://www.presse.uni-oldenburg.de/download/einblicke/54/parisi-heinemann-juergens-knecht.pdf

Charles A. S. Hall replies: I resent your statement that I am misleading anyone.   I write as clearly, accurately and honestly as I can, almost entirely in peer reviewed publications, and always have. I include sensitivity analysis while acknowledging legitimate uncertainty (for example p. 115 in Prieto and Hall).  Some people do not like my conclusions. But no one has shown with explicit analysis that Prieto and Hall is in any important way incorrect.  At least three other peer reviewed papers) (Palmer 2013, 2014; Weisbach et al. 2012 and Ferroni and Hopkirk (2016) have come up with similar conclusions on solar PV.  I am working on the legitimate differences in technique with legitimate and credible solar analysts with whom I have some differences , e.g. Marco Raugei.  All of this will be detailed in a new book from Springer in January on EROI.

First I would like to say that the bountiful energy blog post is embarrassingly poor science and totally unacceptable. As one point the author does not back his (often erroneous) statements with references. The importance of peer review is obvious from this non peer-reviewed post.

Second I do not understand your statement about wind energy producing electricity 70-90 percent of the time.  In England, for example, it is less than 30 percent (Jefferson 2015).

Third your statement on the operational lifetime of actual operational PV systems is incorrect. Of course one can find PV systems still generating electricity after 30 years.  But actual operational systems requiring serious maintenance (and for which we do not yet have enough data) often do not last more than 18-20 years, For example Spain’s “Flagship ” PV plant (which was especially well maintained) is having all modules replaced and treated as “electronic trash” after 20 years : http://renewables.seenews.com/news/spains-ingeteam-replaces-modules-at-europes-oldest-pv-plant-538875    Ferroni and Hopkirk found an 18 year lifespan in Switzerland.

Pedro Prieto replies: The production of electricity of wind turbines the 70-90% of time is a very inaccurate quote. Every wind turbine has a nominal capacity in MW. The important factor is not how many hours they move the blades at any working regime, but how many EQUIVALENT peak hours they work at the end of the year. That is, to know how much real energy they generate within one year. This is what the industry uses as a general and accurate measurement and it is the load factor or capacity factor.

Of course, this factor may change from the location or the design choices, but there is an incontrovertible figure: when we take the total world installed wind power in MW (435 Gw as of 2015) from January 2004 up to December 2015 and the total energy generated in Twh (841 Twh as of 2015) in the same period and calculate the averaged capacity factor, the resulting figure slightly varies around 15% AT WORLD LEVEL. This is REAL LIFE, much more than your unsupported theoretical figures of 20 to over 50% capacity factor in privileged wind fields for privileged wind turbines.

Interesting enough, some countries like the US, United Kingdom or Spain have capacity factors reaching 20% in the last years, but the world total installed capacity has not really improved so much in the last ten years, despite of theoretically much efficient wind turbines (i.e. multipole with permanent magnets), very likely for the reasons that good wind fields in some countries were already used up. Other countries like China, India or France show, on the contrary very poor capacity factors even in 2015.

 

With respect to the lifetime of the PV systems, nor Charles Hall neither myself have confused the inverter lifetime with the solar PV system as a whole. The practice has not shown that modules have lasted more than 25 years in general over the world installed base. The fact that one single system is still working after more than 30 years of operation, if it was carefully manufactured with high quality materials, and was well cared, cleaned and free from environmental pollutants, like several modules we have also in Spain, does not mean AT ALL that the massive deployments (about 250 GW as of 2015) are going to last over 25 years.

I have to clarify also a common mistake: almost all main world manufacturers guarantee a maximum of 25 years (NOT 30) to the modules, but this is the “power” guarantee. This means that they “guarantee” (assuming they will be still alive as companies in 25 years from the sales period, something which is rather difficult for many of the manufacturers that went out of business in shorter periods of time than the guarantee of their modules. Of course, this guarantee is given with the subsequent module degradation specs over time, which in many cases has been proved be higher than specified.

But not only that. Most of the module manufacturers have a second guarantee: the “material’s guarantee”. And this is offered for between 5 and 10 years. This is the one by which the manufacturer guarantees the module replacement if it fails. Beyond that date, if the module fails, the buyer has to buy a new one (if still being manufactured, with the same specs power and size), because the second guarantee SUPERSEDES the first one.

Last but not least, there is already quite a large experience in Europe (Germany, France, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, etc.) of the number of faulty modules that have been decommissioned in the last years (i.e. period 2010-2015) as for instance, accounted by PV-Cycle, a company specialized in decommission and recycling modules in Europe. As the installed base is well known in volumes per year, it is relatively easy to calculate, in a very conservative (optimistic) mode the percentage over the total that failed and the number of years that lasted in this period and the average years for that sample that died before the theoretical 25-30 years lifetime and make the proportion on the total installed base.

The study conducted by Ferroni and Hopkirk gives an approximate lifetime for the installed base of lower than 20 years. And this is Europe, where the maintenance is supposed to be much better made than in the rest of the developing world. And the figures of failed modules given by PV-Cycle did not include the many potential plants that did not deliver their failed modules to this company for recycling

What it seems impossible for some academic people is to recognize that perhaps the “standards” they adhered to (namely IEA PVPS Task 12 in this case) and through which they published a big number of papers, should be revisited, because they lacked some essential measurements that could help to understand why renewables are not replacing fossils at the required speed, despite having claimed for years that they reached grid parity or that their Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) is cheaper than coal, nuclear or gas. 

I am afraid that peer reviewed authors are not immune to having preconceived ideas even more difficult to eradicate. Excessive pride, lack of humility, considerable distance between the academy (i.e. imagined solar production levels versus real data from actual solar PV plants and lack of a systemic vision due to an excess of specialization are the main hurdles. Of course in my humble opinion.

References

  • Hall, C.A.S., Balogh, S., Murphy, D.J.R. 2009. What is the Minimum EROI that a Sustainable Society Must Have? Energies, 2: 25-47.
  • Hall, Charles  A.S., Jessica G.Lambert, Stephen B. Balogh. 2014.  EROI of different fuels  and the implications for society Energy Policy Energy Policy. Energy Policy, Vol 64 141-52
  • Hallock Jr., John L., Wei Wu, Charles A.S. Hall, Michael Jefferson. 2014. Forecasting the limits to the availability and diversity of global conventional oil supply: Validation. Energy 64: 130-153. (here)
  • Hamilton A , Balogh SB, Maxwell A, Hall CAS. 2013. Efficiency of edible agriculture in Canada and the U.S. over the past 3 and 4 decades. Energies 6:1764-1793.
  • Lambert, Jessica, Charles A.S. Hall, et al.  Energy, EROI and quality of life.  Energy Policy
Posted in Charles A. S. Hall, EROEI Energy Returned on Energy Invested, Pedro Prieto | Tagged , , , | 3 Comments

Coal power plants depend on railroads to deliver coal

coal trains

[ The extract of a Senate hearing below is mostly spent on testimony by utilities bashing the railroads for not delivering enough coal due to a disaster in the Powder River Basin, Wyoming area, where coal dust infiltrated the stone ballast due to unusually wet weather, creating drainage problems that ultimately led to derailments which took several months to fix. Railroads deliver 72% of coal to coal power plants.

But it turns out the utilities are equally to blame. They’ve been reducing their coal stockpiles.  According to the EIA: “Coal stockpiles at electric power plants have generally been declining for years: end-of-year stocks declined from 135.9 million tons in 1989 to 101.2 million tons in 2005, down 26%, although coal-fired generation and coal consumption both increased during this period. The long-term us due to power plant operators trying to minimize their coal inventory holding costs.

What’s interesting to me about this hearing is how vulnerable our system is due to this interdependency. If trains can’t deliver coal, then coal plants can’t make electricity, which would make it impossible to refuel trains (pumps are electric).  Climate change is likely to buckled rail (extreme heat), wash away tracks (extreme storms and flooding), leading to even more unreliable coal delivery. Now natural gas and nuclear can still step in to keep the grid up, but as natural gas and uranium ores decrease, and up to half of nuclear power plants retire by 2030 with few new ones built, the electric grid will grow increasingly fragile, until it isn’t always up most of the time.

In 2006 reliance on coal for electricity, and soon COAL-TO-LIQUID (CTL) TRANSPORTATION FUEL, were expected to grow in the future because there wasn’t as much natural gas as hoped for.  And now again, there still isn’t — fracked gas did buy us an extra 10 years or so, but it is about to rapidly decline sometime between now and 2020.   When CTL hearings are heard again (the last ones were held 2005-2007), you’ll know the energy crisis is back with a vengeance.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

Senate 109-601. May 25, 2006. Coal-based generation reliability. Senate hearing.

PETE V. DOMENICI, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO.  The purpose of today’s oversight hearing is to receive testimony on the reliability of coal-based electric generation in the short term and in the future. According to the EIA, coal has fueled about half of this Nation’s electricity for the past 50 years, and the use of coal is expected to grow. The EIA estimates coal will supply 57% of our electricity needs by the year 2030. That is substantially up. Coal is a resource that this country has in abundance, with 25% of the total world reserves. The United States has been dubbed the Saudi Arabia of coal.  In order to maintain coal as a reliable resource, we must be able to move coal from the mines to the generating plants. More and more, the country is relying on low sulfur coal from the Powder River Basin in Wyoming and Montana to meet Clean Air Act requirements. Rail transportation is responsible for moving the coal for a majority of this load. With last year’s train derailments, the dependence on a reliable transportation system was highlighted. Some utilities were caught with low stocks of supplies and were forced to dramatically curtail generation. This, in turn, led to expensive replacement power, with the cost passed on to the end customer.

CRAIG THOMAS, U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING.  Half of our generation for electricity now is done by coal, and about 40% of that comes from the Powder River Basin, much of it from Wyoming. So that is even better. Sixty percent of the price paid for coal is transportation cost, and so we are going to be faced with making some changes and some ideas for getting more transportation available. Are we going to have to do more mine mouth generation and other kinds of things?

HOWARD GRUENSPECHT, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.   For the past 50 years coal has fueled roughly half the Nation’s electricity generation. Between 1989 and 2005, net generation from coal increased by 27%, while total coal-fired generation capacity grew by only 3%. The average capacity factor or utilization rate of coal-fired plants increased from 60 percent to 72 percent over this period.

Rail shipments in 2005 accounted for 72% of all coal delivered to electric power plants. National average rail transportation costs, which now represent about 40 percent of delivered coal costs, increased from 51 cents per million Btu in 2004 to about 63 cents per million Btu early this year.  Contract rail transportation represented about 60 percent of the average total cost of rail-delivered Western subbituminous coal, which is primarily produced in the Powder River Basin, and only 25 percent of the average total cost of rail delivered Eastern bituminous coal.

Days of burn, a measure of the number of days a plant or group of plants can operate using only on-site inventories for supply, is a way of representing coal stockpiles of power plants in relation to anticipated use. At the national level, days of burn increased from 38 days to 40 days between February 2005 and February 2006. However, the increase has not been uniform. Stocks of bituminous coal increased 23 percent over that period, but inventories of subbituminous coal, again the vast majority of which comes from the PRB, dropped 7 percent over that period.

In addition to a draw down of inventories, the shortfall in shipments over the past year has led to some reduction in utilization at some coal-fired plants. To compensate, electric power companies bought power from other generators or relied more heavily on other plants within their systems. Under recent market conditions, substitution of power generated at natural gas-fired plants in lieu of coal-fired power can be an expensive option

Our Annual Energy Outlook projects that coal-based generation will continue to be the dominant source of the Nation’s electricity supplies through 2030. Reliance on all types of coal is projected to increase over time, but particularly the Powder River Basin coal, suggesting a requirement for increased capacity throughout the Nation’s rail transportation system.

Although coal-fired generation has grown by 27% since 1989, the coal consumption measured in tons increased by 34% (from 782 million tons to 1,051 million tons). Consumption of coal outpaced the growth in generation because of increasing use of subbituminous coal produced in the PRB. This subbituminous western coal has less energy content per ton than eastern and Midwestern bituminous coal, so more tons are needed to produce an equivalent amount of electricity. Western subbituminous coal is generally lower in sulfur and less expensive to produce than bituminous coal, which often makes subbituminous coal a preferred option for environmental and economic reasons despite its lower energy content.

Coal stockpiles at electric power plants have generally been declining for years: end-of-year stocks declined from 135.9 million tons in 1989 to 101.2 million tons in 2005, down 26%, although coal-fired generation and coal consumption both increased during this period. The long-term us due to power plant operators trying to minimize their coal inventory holding costs. Over the past several years, however, operators at times have found it difficult to maintain stockpiles because of intermittent disruptions in coal production and transportation. Concerns over coal deliveries and reduced stockpiles have grown over the past year due to problems with shipments of coal from the PRB.

RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION ISSUES.  In the PRB, a number of disruptions occurred in planned coal shipments during 2005. Structural failures in the rail roadbeds caused two major train derailments on the weekend of May 14. The roadbed failures were triggered by unusually wet weather for the region. Accumulated coal dust infiltrated the road foundations (stone ballast) and created drainage problems which led to the derailments.

This affected all three mainlines in the Joint Line shared by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) and Union Pacific Railroad (UP) used to move coal unit trains in and out of the PRB. Normally, the Joint Line operates 365 days a year, 24 hours per day and moves three loaded coal trains per hour out of the basin.

After the derailments, BNSF and UP replaced more than 100 miles of roadbed, including new concrete railroad ties and new tracks to facilitate trains passing. Rebuilding continued, as scheduled, through November 2005 and was restarted with the spring thaw in 2006. During this entire period, rail traffic in and out of the PRB has been disrupted at times, but it is now moving more fluidly, even though the reconstruction project is not yet quite complete. BNSF and UP have invested heavily over the past 20 years in rail infrastructure and equipment to serve the PRB coal market. Both railroads continue to make additional capital improvements throughout their respective rail systems: adding parallel tracks, upgrading classification yards, alleviating bottlenecks, and generally improving capacity for all types of rail traffic. On May 8, 2006, the UP and BNSF announced that they would spend $100 million over the next 2 years to construct more than 40 miles of third and fourth main line tracks on the PRB Joint Line. This follows the addition of 14 miles of third line track in 2005 and 19 miles currently under construction in 2006. The railroads believe the completion of these projects will raise Joint Line capacity to at least 400 million short tons per year, compared with the record 325 million short tons hauled in 2005.

The capacity of natural-gas-fired power plants (including oil-burning plants that can also use natural gas) more than doubled, from 165.9 to 409.2 gigawatts between 1989 and 2005. Most of this capacity is not fully utilized, but using it in lieu of coal-fired power can be an expensive option.

At the average cost of delivered natural gas to the electric power sector in January 2006, a new, efficient natural-gas-fired combined-cycle plant can produce electricity at a fuel cost of roughly 6.4 cents per kilowatthour. The comparable cost for a conventional coal-fired plant at the January 2006 national average delivered price was less than a third as much, about 1.5 cents per kilowatthour.

Because of the complex and (currently) capacity-constrained PRB operations and delivery schedules, it will take some time to rebuild sub-bituminous stocks. With the supply chain for PRB coal as fully committed and finely tuned as it is, any future weather, equipment or infrastructure failure has the potential to reverberate through the entire system.

Hardly a month goes by that delivery of PRB coal somewhere in the supply chain is not interrupted by a derailment, freezing, flooding, or other natural occurrence. In most cases, the events are small compared with the amount of PRB coal delivered each year, and the rail system and inventories are capable of absorbing them, unless the events are particularly severe or occur simultaneously.

The situation in the East is somewhat different. The primary eastern railroads, Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) and CSX Transportation (CSXT), divided and absorbed Conrail’s assets in 1998. Both railroads experienced a number of customer complaints related to slow deliveries in the years following the Conrail acquisition. The impact of population density and geography mean the eastern railroads must contend with more traffic per mile of track, more congested routes and delivery areas, steeper grades and narrower, winding right-of-ways and routes than the western railroads. Recent increases in the export coal market have further congested rail lines in the East. Therefore, deliveries of bituminous coal to eastern power plants may also have been disrupted, to some degree, by hauls to export docks.

It is important to note that railroad capacity constraints nationwide entail more than just the infrastructure improvements at important coal origins and destinations. Other parts of the rail system are also increasingly constrained in their capacity to handle all rail traffic, not just coal. Nationwide rail capacity is constrained in part because of growth in demand in other freight sectors, including agricultural products, consumer goods, and especially, intermodal shipments (trailers or containers on flat cars). Use of these has been growing as an alternative to long-haul trucking which has been impacted by a shortage of drivers and higher diesel fuel costs. Future economic growth and the possibility that railroads will reacquire market share for shipments previously lost to truck and barge will continue to challenge the railroads to provide sufficient capacity.

THE FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR COAL.   Over the next 25 years, EIA expects significant growth in the use of coal for the generation of electricity and the rail transportation system will need to be expanded to accommodate it. Over the same time period, coal use in the industrial sector is expected to grow as coal is used to produce liquid fuels together with electricity.

The wide-spread availability and relatively low cost of coal make it very economical for electricity generation. As a result, in the reference case in EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2006 (AE02006), total coal consumption is projected to increase from 1.1 billion short tons in 2004 to 1.3 billion short tons in 2015 and 1.8 billion short tons in 2030.

The increase in coal use over the next 5 to 10 years is driven primarily by greater use of existing coal plants, while in the longer term, a large number of new plants are expected to be added. The current average utilization rate of approximately 72% is projected to increase to 80% by 2013. In addition, over the 2004 to 2030 time period, 174 gigawatts of new coal-fired electricity generation capacity, including 19 gigawatts of coal-to-liquids capacity, are projected to be added. Most of the projected new coal plants, 126 gigawatts, are expected to be added after 2020, and a little over half of them are expected to be integrated gasification combined-cycle (IGCC) plants.

To meet the growing demand for coal, most coal supply regions, particularly those in the West, are projected to increase their annual production volumes. The exceptions to this are the Central and Southern Appalachia regions where mining difficulties and reserve depletion are projected to contribute to lower production levels in 2030 compared to 2004. In contrast, the PRB has large, productive surface mines that are able to produce coal at a comparatively low cost. In 2030, the PRB is projected to produce 719 million short tons, 298 million tons higher than in 2004, accounting for 52 percent of the total increase in annual coal production between 2004 and 2030.

As with all long-term projections, there are significant uncertainties. With respect to coal markets, key areas of uncertainty include future economic growth, long-term productivity improvements that influence coal prices, competing natural gas prices, the development of competing technologies such as nuclear, and the possibility of new policies to curb the growth in CO2 emissions.

The EIA has projected that by 2030 Powder River will produce 719 short tons of coal. This year’s Annual Outlook was first to include a significant amount of coal to liquid production.  The amount of the coal used for coal to liquids production would be about 150 million tons out of the 719. So it is pretty substantial by 2030.

Senator BURNS. In some areas, we got reports of coal being imported from offshore when they had those big drawdowns, and that sort of concerns me. I would hate to get as dependent on foreign coal as we do on oil. Should we be concerned, from a domestic energy production standpoint, about some increased need of imported coal due to delivery system breakdowns?

Dr. GRUENSPECHT. We import and export coal. We export a lot of metallurgical coal and we import some coal mostly for power production, as you pointed out. Both the imports and the exports are pretty small in relation to our domestic production and consumption, on the order of 3 to 4%. And the imports and exports balance out. My understanding is that a lot of the imports come into Eastern and Southern ports. I think Colombia is our biggest source of coal imports, and we import some from Canada as well.  I do not think we are headed toward a situation in coal like the situation we have in oil.

Robert ‘‘Mac’’ McLennan, vice president of external affairs, for the Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association.   As a 24% owner in Laramie River Station in Wheatland Wyoming, we have a significant interest in what has happened there, as members have to date faced both increased rates and reduced coal shipments. In order to maintain efficiency, coal-based plants like Laramie River Station, or LRS, are run almost continuously. Maintaining full generation requires a train and a half a day. In addition to the train and a half a day, we try to maintain a 30-day supply of coal in the stockpile. Earlier this year we actually got to 6 days. If the stockpile had depleted any further, we would have been forced to curtail generation at a significant cost to our members. We would have had to either use natural gas, which as a fuel source is five to seven times more expensive than the underlying coal, or purchase off the purchase power market, if available, at much higher prices.

STEVEN JACKSON, DIRECTOR, POWER SUPPLY, MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA, GA.   MEAG Power’s primary purpose is to generate and transmit reliable and economic wholesale power to 49 Georgia communities—including approximately 600,000 citizens and many large and small businesses. BNSF provides the initial portion of the PRB haul under separate contract. The plant is approximately 2,000 miles (4,000 miles roundtrip) from the Powder River Basin and coal is delivered by thirty-seven sets of privately owned 124 car unit trains. These train sets are constantly in motion cycling from the PRB to our plants and back.

DAVID WILKS, PRESIDENT OF ENERGY SUPPLY, XCEL EN- ERGY, MINNEAPOLIS, MN, ON BEHALF OF THE EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE AND CONSUMERS UNITED FOR RAIL EQUITY.   Xcel Energy is a major electric and natural gas company, with annual revenues of $10 billion. Xcel Energy generates 78.6 GWhs of electricity annually, 72% from coal-fired generation, 100% of the coal is supplied by rail.

Today, most coal moves in unit trains between the mines and the power plants. These trains typically consist of 100-130 cars owned or provided by the utility, with 100-120+ tons of coal per car, which shuttle continuously from the coal mine to the power plant without ever being uncoupled.

Unfortunately, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain adequate coal stockpiles, especially over the last couple of years.  Because of recent rail delays and other rail service problems, many utilities have been forced to reduce outputs from coal-fired generating plants—requiring greater reliance on natural gas-fired generation and some have even resorted to importing coal from overseas sources as far away as Indonesia, in order to meet the demand for electricity.

Like most utilities in the West and Midwest, Xcel receives most of its coal by rail from the Powder River Basin (PRB) coal seam of Wyoming and Montana. The PRB is the most significant coal producing region in the United States, with approximately 40% of all U.S. coal production mined there. PRB coal has been particularly attractive to electric utilities because of its relatively lower price and low sulfur content.

Two railroads, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and the Union Pacific (UP), move all of the coal out of the PRB, much of it over a Joint Line they operate together. In the spring of 2005, two derailments occurred on the Joint Line, significantly reducing rail deliveries of coal by 15 to 20 percent. While significant repairs have been underway for months and are scheduled to be completed by the end of the year, train speeds remain reduced to avoid further derailments. Delivery levels have not yet recovered, and some utility coal stockpiles remain significantly lower than desired levels. In the case of Xcel, we have several plants that are struggling to maintain even 10 days of coal on the ground. At a minimum, the situation appears to bring into serious question whether the carriers are meeting their common carrier obligation to provide service to the public.

The significant additional costs resulting from rail service failures have put additional upward pressure on consumers’ electricity rates. In order to replace an estimated 20 million ton shortfall in PRB coal deliveries in 2006, electric generators may be forced to use approximately 340 billion cubic feet of natural gas, costing at least $2 billion more than the coal that will not be delivered this year.

In some cases, the situation has become so bad that utilities have found it necessary to sue the railroads for damages resulting from delivery shortfalls. For instance, Entergy Arkansas is involved in litigation against the Union Pacific over the failure of the rail carrier to meet its coal delivery obligations last year. The utility had to cut back production from two coal-fired plants, forcing it to increase its power purchases in the wholesale market. Also, Entergy is one of a handful of utilities that have taken the extraordinary step of importing foreign coal—in this case from Colombia—due to the inability of the railroads to move adequate amounts of domestic coal in a timely manner.

ROBERT K. SAHR, CHAIRMAN, SOUTH DAKOTA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, PIERRE, SD, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS.   In 2005, coal plant operators experienced reduced coal deliveries under firm contract by an estimated 10 to 25%. Coal reserve levels at plants in the upper Midwest dropped below 10 days at times, as we heard earlier, where typically 30 days is considered prudent.  This crisis is endangering our energy security. Dangerously low reserves make plants more vulnerable to weather, rail accident, terrorist attacks, and other disruptions.

GAS VS. COAL-GENERATED ELECTRICITY.   Recently, the nation has experienced record high prices for natural gas, which has dramatically increased the cost of both natural gas and electricity service to the millions of business and residential customers in this country. Currently, the fuel cost component of producing electricity at gas-fired power plants can be as much as five times higher than the fuel component of producing electricity at a coal-fired power plant. As a prudent business practice, one would expect that, given existing gas prices, electricity producers would be seeking to utilize existing coal-fired electric generation as much as possible in lieu of gas-fired generation in order to produce electricity more economically and to avoid upward pressure on natural gas prices.

In March, the Big Stone Power Plant stockpile dwindled to a 10-day supply while the plant waited for their rail service provider to deliver the needed coal, Some of the coal at the bottom of the stockpile has been stored on open ground, exposed to the elements for 20 years in some cases, and can only be used as a last resort. According to Basin Electric Power Cooperative, a co-owner of Laramie River Station, using this coal also brings other issues of concern. The coal at the bottom of the Laramie River Station stockpile has significantly reduced BTU value and includes rocks that are being run through the plant’s turbines. Plant staff members are now cleaning the pulverizers on a daily basis, where in normal operation it is done every two to three weeks.

EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS.  I am very pleased that the hearing is being held today and not last May. Last May, our ability to ensure reliability on coal shipments was certainly being challenged. That happened for several reasons. First and foremost, in May of last year, a heavy rainfall in Wyoming, combined with an accumulation of coal dust on the roadbed and a spring snowstorm put moisture into the track structure, causing instability and resulting in two derailments on a heavily used Powder River Basin rail line. The derailments and the subsequent repairs disrupted coal shipments out of the PRB for months afterward.

Later in the year, as Senator Landrieu knows, hurricanes Katrina and Rita created backups and congestion that affected the entire rail network. For example, much of Midwestern and Northern Plains grain had to move by rail rather than by barge down the Mississippi. Finally, in October, a deluge dumped a foot of rain in Kansas City, disrupting rail service on several major coal-carrying routes for about 2 weeks.

Second, demand for rail transportation in general was much higher in 2005 than in previous years, creating capacity constraints on important parts of the U.S. rail network. It is not just the Powder River Basin lines that are important here. It is the entire rail network, as these coal trains move 1,500-2,000 miles across country. Third—and this is a key point, Mr. Chairman—this entire supply chain is not just railroads. It is the production capability of the mines. It is our ability to move it. It is barge ability to move it, and it is what happens at the utility end, at the delivery end. As the EIA testimony indicates, between 1980 and 2000, utilities consciously reduced their inventories, their stockpiles by two-thirds, thereby cutting the zone of what they could rely on. Some would argue that they cut that stockpile much too fast, much too far. Fourth, the system was exacerbated by a dramatic increase in the price of natural gas, leading to an unprecedented increase in demand for coal-fired electricity generation. Now, this was a reversal of what had been happening. As you can see by the chart, during the previous 5 years, electric utilities brought nearly 200,000 megawatts of new natural gas generation capacity on line compared with almost null, about 1,200 new megawatts of coal generating capacity, and this continued the trend of the previous years. Utilities had shown their preference for natural gas and that that was the fuel of choice, and railroads and, undoubtedly, the mining companies as well developed their capital plans accordingly.

The vast majority of coal in the United States is used to generate electricity, with smaller amounts used in industrial applications like fueling cement kilns or producing coke. Coal accounted for 50 percent of U.S. electricity generation in 2005, far more than any other fuel.

The amount of electricity generated by coal in the United States rose from 1.6 billion megawatthours in 1990 to 2.0 billion megawatthours in 2005—an increase of 420 million, or 26%. But because overall U.S. electricity generation rose 33% during this period, coal’s share of total generation actually fell, from 52.5% in 1990 to 49.9% in 2005.

By contrast, natural gas’s share of U.S. electricity generation rose from 12.6% in 1990 to 19% in 2005. In fact, during the 1990s and into the first half of this decade, virtually no new coal-fired electricity generation capacity and no new nuclear facilities were built, but huge amounts of gas-fired capacity were added.

Natural gas was the fuel of choice for new capacity for several reasons. Gas plants could be constructed relatively quickly and enjoyed an easier permitting process, and thus were less expensive to build. They were also considered to be ‘‘environmentally friendly.’’ Perhaps most importantly, though, it was assumed that natural gas would remain cheap and plentiful.

This, of course, did not happen. Over the past few years, the price of natural gas to utilities has skyrocketed, making gas-fired generation less competitive and sparking increased demand for electricity generated from other fuels, including steam coal. In contrast to the delivered price of natural gas, the delivered price of coal to utilities has remained basically flat, and on a per-Btu basis is far below the comparable figure for natural gas. In addition, demand for metallurgical coal rose sharply because of a boom in steelmaking worldwide.

This unexpectedly strong increase in the demand for coal, which occurred at the same time that demand for rail transportation overall was rising sharply (discussed further below), has in some cases exceeded the capability of coal producers to supply the coal and coal transporters to haul it. That’s not surprising, especially since utilities, by their actions, had long been disfavoring coal in favor of natural gas, and neither coal suppliers nor coal transporters have unlimited spare capacity on hand ‘‘just in case.’’

Coal-fired power plants have been reducing their coal stockpiles since the early 1980s. A typical electric utility held nearly two months of full-load burn in the early 1980s; by the late 1990s, this had fallen to near one month.  According to EIA data, coal stocks at electric power producers as a percentage of coal consumption fell from more than 30% in 1980 to 10% by 2000. The decision to reduce stockpiles was part of a deliberate utility effort to shift to just-in-time inventory practices to limit capital tied up in fuel stocks. With inventory reduced to this degree, utilities eliminated a traditional buffer to withstand supply disruptions (like the May 2005 PRB derailments noted below).

Going forward, one of the root causes of the weather-related problems of 2005—coal dust ‘‘blow off’’—must be aggressively addressed. Just as with other coal delivery chain issues, the mines, utilities, and railroads must collectively identify, agree upon, and implement the best method to combat ‘‘blow off’’ so that the premature wear of rail infrastructure in the PRB can be eliminated.

OUTLOOK FOR COAL.  U.S. coal production and consumption will almost certainly continue to grow. In its Annual Energy Outlook 2006, released in December 2005, the EIA projects that U.S. coal production in 2015 will total 1.27 billion tons, a 140-million ton increase (12%) over the 1.13 billion produced in 2005. The EIA expects U.S. coal consumption to increase from 1.13 billion tons in 2005 to 1.28 billion tons in 2015, a 147-million ton increase. DOE’s National Energy Technology Laboratory reports that 140 coal-fired generating plants in 41 states representing 85 gigawatts have been announced or are in development. If ultimately built, this new generation would increase annual U.S. coal requirements by some 300 million tons.

Coal is by far the highest-volume single commodity carried by rail, and railroads are moving more coal today than at any time during their history. In 2005, Class I carriers originated 7.20 million carloads of coal (23 percent of total carloads), equal to 804 million tons (42 percent of total tonnage). Coal has long been a major source of rail revenue as well. Class I gross revenue from coal in 2005 was $9.4 billion, or 20 percent of total gross revenue. Coal is also carried by dozens of non-Class I railroads.

In light of current capacity and service issues, some shippers and others have inappropriately blamed railroads for not having enough infrastructure, workers, or equipment in place to handle the surge in traffic. Perhaps railroads and their customers could have done a better job of forecasting and preparing for the sharply higher traffic volumes of recent years. But to contend that railroads can afford to have significant amounts of spare capacity on hand ‘just in case’—or that shippers would be willing to pay for it, or capital providers willing to finance it—is completely unrealistic. Like other companies, railroads try to build and staff for the business at hand or expected to soon be at hand. ‘‘Build it and they will come’’ is not a winning strategy for freight railroads.

In part, this is because long-lived rail infrastructure installed long ago was often designed for types and quantities of traffic, and origin and destination locations, that are dramatically different than those that exist today. For example, only within the last two decades has Powder River Basin coal taken on

Similarly, the explosive growth of rail intermodal traffic is mainly a phenomenon of the past 20 years.

When business is unexpectedly strong, railroads cannot expand capacity as quickly as they might like. Locomotives, for example, can take a year or more to be delivered following their order; new entry-level employees take six months or more to become hired, trained, and qualified; and it can take a year or more to plan and build, say, a new siding. And, of course, before investments in these types of capacity enhancements are made, railroads must be confident that traffic and revenue will remain high enough to justify the enhancements for the long term, and that the investment will produce benefits greater than the scores of alternative possible investment projects.

STEVEN JACKSON. Our experience suggests that the supply chain is very fragile and any event weather related or otherwise that disrupts this supply line could quickly cause a major reduction in supply and inventory levels during the time of greatest needs and highest replacement costs.

Posted in Blackouts, Coal, Interdependencies, Railroads, Transportation Infrastructure | Tagged , , , , , , | Comments Off on Coal power plants depend on railroads to deliver coal

Do taxes cover the cost to maintain your street?

From: http://mapstoryblog.thenittygritty.org/costofstreets/ 

Are Your Taxes Paying for the Cost of Your Street?

Believe it or not, almost everywhere in the country, people are not paying for the cost of the street right in front of their own properties. I made a map of my home town to illustrate – you can hover over any property and see for yourself (click on the image below to open). I was recently interviewed about this on the Strong Towns podcast. This is the first in a series of maps and mapstories I’ll be making that show how city budgets are spread across cities. This map took a bit of ingenuity, which I have documented on a separate page if you want all the technical details.

So how are streets being built, if they’re not being paid for?

It’s simple – here’s how it works:
*Say a community is built in Year 1.
*The community’s streets need to be rebuilt every 30 years.
*In Year 30 a new, identical community is built. Now twice the amount of taxes are coming, and so for time being the property owners only need to pay half the amount.
*And 30 years later, in Year 60, two new communities are built; as long as the number of properties and property taxes are doubling every 30 years, they can continue to pay half the amount.

Most people don’t even know this is going on, even in city governments. Yet some people only need to look around and think – my Dad actually always used to say that there is no way we are paying for the cost of all the streets around us. It was years later that I finally read about this “Growth Ponzi Scheme” in the Strong Towns Blog. If you like real world examples like I do, the second part of the series is a must-read. As I wrote in the map description, make no mistake – except in our most dense cities, what you see in this map of Ames is happening everywhere, if not much worse. Ames is a remarkable town, tops many lists including being one of the most educated cities in the world; yet being a college town, even boasting a major Community and Regional Planning (CRP) college, like in most of academia, very little of its education is put into useful practice. If anything, modern city planning has brought about its own demise through its pseudo-intellectual hubris that Jane Jacobs compared to bloodletting.

The Calculations

Now with my mapping skills, I figured I could put my Dad’s intuition to the test, and apply those examples across a whole town. For the cost of streets, I simply asked a civil engineer what the typical range is of the costs of repairs and the typical lifecycle of streets. Now, many people might jump up and down and say “that varies”… the thing is, numbers like these hardly vary outside an average. If the cost of something like streets varied infinitely, then we would never be able to plan ahead. Really, if 80% of the time the numbers don’t vary by much more than 20%, then we’re fine. I used the upper end of the lifecycles to be conservative.

Average cost of streets per square foot:
*Asphalt = $17.77/sq ft, 25-30 yrs
*Bituminous Seal Coat = $18.10/sq ft, 25-30 yrs
*Concrete = $15.22/sq ft, 35-40 years
*Composite = averaging cost of Concrete and Asphalt = $16.50, 35-40 years

The overall cost of a street, using my own parents house, the house I grew up in:
*Street frontage: 82.88 ft
*Road width: 26 ft
*Pavement type: Asphalt
*Expected lifecycle: 30 years
*Cost: 82.88 ft x (26 ft /2) x $17.77/sq ft = $19,146.11
*Cost per year: $19,146.11 /30 years = $638.20

Then I looked into how we pay for streets. Many people, even in city government, are under the assumption that local streets are paid for by the gas tax. This is wrong, this is only the case with state and federal roads. As the following map illustrates, of the 250 miles of streets in Ames, 90% of them are local, and are either handled by the City of Ames via property taxes (brown lines, 200 miles) or Iowa State University (most of the gold lines, 25 miles).

ames_roads

What is being paid for streets, in the case of my parents:
*Property taxes: $2,601
*Street Levy: 2.18924 per $1,000 valuation
– can be seen on Page 310 of the City of Ames 2015-15 Budget
*Value of property: $310,200
*Residential rollback: 0.557335
*Amount of taxes going to streets: 2.18924 /1,000 *310,200 *0.557335 = $378.49

And finally, the portion of the overall cost (this is what you see on the map):
*$378.49 /$638.20 = 60%

Now, this is only for what is right in front of each property; a lot of streets are not directly in front of any property, and they have to be added to each property’s shared costs: these include the streets leading up to circles, intersections, additional streets along corner lots, and collector and arterial roads. I made two separate buttons in the upper-right, one for the lane right in front of each property, the other adding these shared costs. For my parents’ property, that adds another $326.51 of shared costs, which brings the total up to: $964.71, which is about $378.49 /$964.71 = 40% of its costs.

And that’s still above average – for the whole city, our annual liability is about $15.9 million, and the total property taxes going towards streets is about $4.7 million, or 30% of what our streets actually cost.

In conclusion – we are all deadbeats. We are earning money from our children and children’s children. My parents and their parents did not intend for this, but there it is, it’s happening. And the richer deadbeats are the bigger deadbeats. We are financing our own unraveling, using our wealthier inner cores to finance our outward expansion. If you think the value of properties in the newer, richer parts of town say otherwise – wait another generation – just like how people fled one suburb for another, it will happen again, unless we get our act together.

The Choices Ahead

The solution? This comes down to math, and there are 3 options or a combination thereof:

(1) Pay more taxes. In the case of Ames:
– how much we need: $15.9 million – $4.7 million = $11.2 million
– how much we have: $26 million in property taxes (2015-16 Adopted Budget)
– how much we would need to increase property taxes: $11.2 million /26 million = 43%

(2) Adjust the balance sheet – increase expenses to meet future liabilities, and reduce expenses on other things. This would mean vast cuts. Most of the property taxes that don’t go towards paying debts goes into the general fund. I made a nice Sankey Diagram of our general fund, below using a nice free online program. The General Fund is $30 million, and moving $11.2 million out of it would mean cutting most general government expenditures by about a third on average – including law enforcement, fire, inspections, parks and rec and the public library.

By the way – as you can see, Sankey Diagrams are awesome; if you find this diagram impressive, I plan on doing this for the whole City budget, and hope to help develop an application where someone can explore any budget, and exactly where their taxes go.

general_fund

(3) Reduce our liabilities. This means halting any and all sprawl going forward, growing in and not out, and reducing our public infrastructure by reducing the number, length, width, and material needs of streets. This is what makes the most sense, and will bring the bulk of change.

In the map, you’ll notice that there are areas that are green. I marked some in blue which provide much more than they require – in most cases these are correct, but in some cases are mistakes in the data. In any case the green and blue areas are providing vast surpluses compared to the rest of the city. Now check out the map I made below, which was inspired by Strong Towns’ incredible Curbside Chat – this shows height by property value (and thus also property taxes) per square foot. As you can see, there are three areas of Ames that tower above all others. The tallest is Campustown, the second is downtown, and the third is actually a New Urbanist subdivision called Somerset, which is a recent development that is an attempt to get back to the way things once were. These three areas are barely financing their own infrastructure, and what surpluses they provide are lost across the rest of the city, which like all cities in America, is growing like a cancer.

We do need to adjust our finances a bit, but really, we need to grow intelligently, like we always did. And don’t be mistaken by the surpluses run by our mall or our “miracle mile” strip mall that was built in a floodplain, or our industrial park or research park – as you can see, the surpluses these provide are spread out, and they could have very easily been built in the city, where they would create vital, thriving communities as our traditional areas have from their beginning. One tech company, Kingland Systems, decided not to build in the ISU Research Park and instead decided to stay in Campustown – they will soon be providing the largest bang for the buck to the city, by orders of magnitude. On the other hand, our largest single taxpayer – Barilla Pasta – provides the lowest value per square foot to the city; it could have been built on a much smaller lot in a better location, if only things were zoned that way. I produced this map to be used in Google Earth, with a time slider that I used as  a “data slider”, that divides everything into 0.1-percentiles; you can download and play around with the file, in both 2D and 3D versions. One day we will use data sliders like this in MapStory as well.

ames_taxbase_sq_ft

First and foremost, we need to abolish the laws that caused this all to happen. Yes, that’s right – all of this was required to happen, by law. Many people think that sprawl is a free market phenomenon, and they are exactly wrong. Sprawl is caused by the following policies – I call these Sprawl Laws; you can find them for yourself in your local city code (for the most succinct explanation, see this paper):

*Zoning
*Setbacks
*Minimum parking requirements
*Minimum lot sizes
*Maximum units per lot
*Minimum road widths

And these laws were in turn were driven by none other than our Federal Government in the postwar era, particularly the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which to this day continues to require all mortgages they insure (over 95% of all mortgages in the US) to be unmixed with commercial and other uses. This in turn creates a cookie-cutter financial industry and building industry that is made in the image of generations of regulations and repetitive know how. And on top of this, there is the vast spending on all levels on roads, roads, roads as opposed to more efficient and convenient modes of transportation.

As noted in the Growth Ponzi Scheme, city governments regard new infrastructure like it’s free. I experienced this personally with the Intermodal Facility in Ames – a large parking structure that was funded a few years ago by federal stimulus money to benefit the city and university. To this day, the public portion of the multi-million dollar facility is empty, simply because it lacks signs that say “Public Parking”, and when I asked the City whose liability the structure is, the City’s or Iowa State’s, they actually told me that they hadn’t decided that yet. This same lack of accountability that comes from not paying for your own things is repeated every day in Ames and in every city in America, where the building of infrastructure has been financed by governments further up the hierarchy, leaving us all pathetically dependent. We need to adjust our attitude and have the self-respect to remain solvent by paying for our own things, within our own means.

We need to go back to how all the best places in our country were built. In any area of town where over 80% of the buildings were built before 1940, you can take a look around – it is mixed, and the area is probably actually worth caring about, or at least has a lot of potential. As Ames is the pilot project for MapStory Local, you can see how we grew for yourself in the video below – the first few seconds show what was there before our city and country’s postwar development policy, and they are the only parts of town that are really worth visiting:

A lot is changing for the better – people are moving back into cities by the millions, fed up with the soullessness of suburban monotony. In Ames, there is an enormous demand for housing in the urban cores, which is in disrepair after decades of neglect. Unfortunately, many developers, like Kingland Systems, which I mentioned earlier, are demolishing entire blocks of historic buildings that have local businesses, and replacing them with chains that they can easily line up, again in a cookie-cutter fashion. To avoid these harsh ironies and to make real change, we need to make leaps in the right direction, just like how we made a leap in the postwar era, in the wrong direction. Luckily, we won’t be going too much out on a limb, because this has already been done forever. Problem is, we have to relearn what our ancestors have done forever, and it really goes against the way we think in the modern world. While a lot has been done by the New Urbanists in this regard, I personally lean towards the work of Christopher Alexander, who has studied the way towns grew organically, and has successfully shown how development can take place by adopting age old principles. I will be helping launch some community efforts in Ames to adopt his ideas, which I’ll be documenting as they unfold.

What’s Next?

As with everything I do with MapStory, next I need to create a “mapstory”, or animated version of this map, showing how this financial situation changed over time. Imagine the mapstory you see above of Ames growing, with properties shaded like in the map featured here. I’m imagining it looking like a bomb of debt going off, with the city spreading further out and turning deeper red. To collect historic data will mean going into the history of property values for properties, and how much of the owners’ property taxes were going to streets, as well as the historic costs of street construction. While the City of Ames handed over their assessment records to the Ames Historical Society, which only appear to go back to the 1960s (examples below), I’m not sure what it has as far as its historic financial records. It would be sad if this was all thrown away, which would not be surprising – more useful data is deleted every day than burned in the libraries of Alexandria (perhaps not always as useful). There may be something as far as bond records however, which can perhaps be used to determine what has been paid over time. As for the cost of street construction, that would require reading up on how tech has changed, and perhaps digging into historic capital improvement records.

All of this will be daunting, but perhaps I can just get a general idea to start. Perhaps I can start with a single property or a sample of assessment records and determine what portion of their taxes went to streets. Or perhaps find information that’s even more general. As of now, I’m even having a little trouble even finding the history of municipal finance – I’m guessing that in the early days, everything was done with savings, and financial instruments like general obligation bonds became popular and standardized over time. All is yet to be seen, and if anyone can provide help, it would be much appreciated. Once a mapstory is told, it will do much more than this map to demonstrate how we got to the place we are today financially, and convey a deep lesson that we can hopefully add to our wisdom going forward.

In addition to the one below, examples:
*1960s to 1980s: Front | Back
*1980s to recent: Front | Back
*Multiple Listing Service (MLS)

New Doc 38_3

 

Posted in Roads, Transportation What To Do | Tagged , | 1 Comment

Book review of “Empires and Barbarians: the fall of Rome and the birth of Europe”

[ After these introductory comments is my book review of Heather’s “Empires and Barbarians: the fall of Rome and the birth of Europe.

What follows is from Ward-Perkins “The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization” about the role barbarians played.  Keep it in mind as you read Heather’s account, and the parallels with illegal immigration and refugees in Europe today.  In the past migrations were driven both by a desire for a better life and fear of the “terrorist” Huns, likewise today (except now it’s ISIS):

 “What the empire required was a concerted and united effort against the Goths (then marching through much of Italy and southern Gaul, and sacking Rome itself in 410), and against the Vandals, Sueves, and Alans (who entered Gaul at the very end of 406 and Spain in 409). What it got instead were civil wars, which were often prioritized over the struggle with the barbarians…these invading armies were able to pick up and assimilate other adventurers, ready to seek a better life in the service of a successful war band.”   Especially with “fleeing Gothic slaves, but also by miners escaping the harsh conditions of the state’s gold mines and by people oppressed by the burden of imperial taxation.”

These Goths on entering the empire left their homelands for good. They were, according to circumstance (and often concurrently), refugees, immigrants, allies, and conquerors, moving within the heart of an empire that in the early fifth century was still very powerful. Recent historians have been quite correct to emphasize the desire of these Goths to be settled officially and securely by the Roman authorities. What the Goths sought was not the destruction of the empire, but a share of its wealth and a safe home within it, and many of their violent acts began as efforts to persuade the imperial authorities to improve the terms of agreement between them.

The incoming peoples were not ideologically opposed to Rome–they wanted to enjoy a slice of the empire rather than to destroy the whole thing. Emperors and provincials could, and often did, come to agreements with the invaders. For instance, even the Vandals, the traditional ‘bad boys’ of this period, were very happy to negotiate treaty arrangements, once they were in a strong enough negotiating position. Indeed it is a striking but true fact that emperors found it easier to make treaties with invading Germanic armies who would be content with grants of money or land than with rivals in civil wars-who were normally after their heads.

Because the military position of the imperial government in the fifth century was weak, and because the Germanic invaders could be appeased, the Romans on occasion made treaties with particular groups, formally granting them territory on which to settle in return for their alliance.

Is it really likely that Roman provincials were cheered by the arrival on their doorsteps of large numbers of heavily armed barbarians under the command of their own king?  The interests of the center when settling Germanic peoples, and those of the locals who had to live with the arrangements, certainly did not always coincide. The granting to some Alans of lands in northern Gaul in about 442, on the orders of the Roman general Aetius, was resisted in vain by at least some of the local inhabitants. All this, as our text makes very clear, cost the locals a very great deal. But the cost to the central government was negligible or non-existent, since it is unlikely that this area of Gaul was any longer providing significant tax revenues or military levies for the emperor. If things went well (which they did not), the settlement of these Alans might even have been a small step along the path of reasserting imperial control in northern Gaul. The imperial government was entirely capable of selling its provincial subjects downriver, in the interests of short-term political and military gain.

European scholars have come to the conclusion that the fall of the Western Roman Empire was mainly due to barbarian invasions.  These invasions, just as in 1177 BC, broke vital supply chains, which were far more complex than most people realized until recently, though certainly nowhere near as complex as today:

“We sit in tiny productive pigeon-holes, making our minute and highly specialized contributions to the global economy and we are wholly dependent for our needs on thousands, indeed hundreds of thousands, of other people spread around the globe, each doing their own little thing. We would be quite incapable of meeting our needs locally, even in an emergency. The ancient world had not come as far down the road of specialization and helplessness as we have…The enormity of the economic disintegration that occurred at the end of the empire was almost certainly a direct result of this specialization. The post-Roman world reverted to levels of economic simplicity, lower even than those of immediately pre-Roman times, with little movement of goods, poor housing, and only the most basic manufactured items.

The sophistication of the Roman period, by spreading high-quality goods widely in society, had destroyed the local skills and local networks that, in pre-Roman times, had provided lower-level economic complexity. It took centuries for people in the former empire to reacquire the skills and the regional networks that would take them back to these pre-Roman levels of sophistication.”

You may also enjoy reading Ugo Bardi’s 2009 “Civilization: The fall of the Roman Empire” here

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

Heather, Peter. 2009. Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe. Oxford University Press.

Wealthy Rome at the birth of Christ was a “politically sophisticated, economically advanced and culturally developed civilization, a world of philosophy, banking, professional armies, literature, stunning architecture and rubbish collection.

Rome didn’t invade Europe because it was too poor

Poor Europe had subsistence-level farmers, organized in small-scale political units. Much of it was dominated by Germanic-speakers, who had some iron tools and weapons, but who worked generally in wood, had little literacy and never built in stone. The further east you went, the simpler it became: fewer iron tools, less productive agriculture, and a lower population density. A dominant Mediterranean circle lorded it over an undeveloped northern hinterland. This area was still heavily wooded, and the primitive farming techniques there couldn’t produce as much food as today on thick clay soils.  Less food production meant less agricultural surplus and fewer warriors, smiths producing metalwork, and other craftsmen.  Their poverty is one reason the Romans left them alone – the potential taxes weren’t enough to pay for the cost of invasion or garrisoning Roman troops afterwards.

The old view of Rome’s Collapse

Before WW II, migration was seen as a phenomenon of overwhelming importance in the transformation of barbarian Europe [when] large-scale Germanic migration in the 4th and 5th centuries brought down the western Roman Empire.  They were succeeded by more Germans and, above all, Slavs, whose activities put many more pieces of the European national jigsaw in place. Still more immigrants from Scandinavia and the steppe, towards the end of the period, completed the puzzle. Quarrels over details were fierce, but no one had any doubt that the mass migration of men and women, old and young, had played a critical role in the unfolding saga of Europe’s creation.

Migration, particularly in the form of the mass replacement of one population group by another, thus became the characteristic means by which observable changes to archaeological remains were explained.  In modern parlance, although the term had not yet been coined, the peopling of Europe was envisaged as being driven forward by one massive episode of ethnic cleansing after another, in what has been evocatively dubbed the ‘invasion hypothesis’ view of the past.

Thinking of archaeological cultures as ‘peoples’ carried within it a powerful tendency to explain major archaeological change in terms of migration. Given that each people had its own ‘culture’, when you suddenly found a new ‘culture’ on top of another, you then might well think that one ‘people’ must have replaced another.

The new view began in the 1960s.  Migrations weren’t easy. Transport costs in the past were huge.  Emperor Diocletian’s Edict on Prices (from c.300 AD) stated that the cost of a wagon of wheat doubled for every fifty miles it was carried.  That expense limited the ability of people to migrate as well.  Information didn’t spread widely, making it hard to know where a better place to live might even be.

Instead of one people replacing another, new artifacts found by archeologists may reflect new skills learned from another culture, or obtained in trade, not necessarily conquest followed by ethnic cleansing.

In the last generation or so, scholarly consensus around these big ideas has broken down because they have been shown to have been far too simple. No new overview has emerged, but the overall effect of a wide variety of work has been massively to downgrade the role of migration in the emergence of at least some of those distant first-millennium ancestors of the modern nations of Europe. It is now often argued, for instance, that only a few people, if any, moved in the course of what used to be understood as mass migrations.  From a position of overwhelming dominance before the 1960s, migration has become the great Satan of archaeological explanation.

We have now reached a point that is the mirror image of where we were 50 years ago. But while this is satisfyingly symmetrical as an intellectual progression, is it convincing history? Should migration be relegated to such a minor, walk-on part in the history of barbarian Europe in the first millennium AD?

The middle path (Heather’s theory)

Ambitious leaders and warriors naturally were attracted by Rome’s wealth.  Successful small raiding parties would have attracted increasing numbers of warriors, many of whom had migrated from somewhere else in the past who were used to moving onward for better land and greater wealth.  This eventually snowballed with their families and tens of thousands of others in the region migrating in large numbers to the border regions of the Roman Empire.   A billiard-ball view of group X entirely replacing group A, has been replaced by a snowball. Instead of large, compact groups of men, women and children moving with determination across the landscape, many now think in terms of demographic snowballs: originally small groupings, probably composed largely of warriors, who, because of their success, attracted large numbers of recruits as they traveled.

At times the migration members were mainly elite warriors, who replaced the old elite, sparing peasants and slaves from slaughter so they could continue to grow food.  The classic example of this phenomenon in medieval history is the Norman Conquest of England, where a few thousand Norman landholding families replaced their slightly more numerous Anglo-Saxon predecessors at the top of the 11th-century English heap.

The invasion hypothesis is dead and buried. No longer would we even want to litter prehistoric and first-millennium Europe with a succession of ancient ‘peoples’ carving out their chosen niches via a lethal cocktail of large-scale movement and ethnic cleansing.

The rise of Hunnic power was responsible for two bouts of mass migration into the Roman Empire before this (in 376-80 and 405-8).  These migrants then proceeded to generate huge disruptions on Roman territory, but it wasn’t until Attila the Hun died in 452 that so many migrated to the Roman territory that the empire collapsed.  This happened because the ethnic tribes the Huns had conquered were able to break away and migrate into Roman territory in the chaos and civil war that erupted after Atilla the Huns died.  If not for this, the Roman military could have held in check smaller migrations happening years apart from overwhelming the empire.

By the 460s, the Empire’s central authorities had lost control of much of their tax base, with the result that its power was in terminal decline. In Gaul, this manifested itself in an increasing difficulty in exercising control over both the Empire’s own army commanders and the various groups of outsiders (such as Alaric’s Visigoths) who had already been settled there.

As Europe evolved over the next 500 years, migration lessened as empires grew.  So much wealth lay in the stone structures of churches, homes, buildings, and productive farms, it made no sense for mass migrations into unknown or partially known territories with no certainty of success in gaining more wealth.  Social elites could gain wealth without relocating.  And the less they moved, the less likely there were to move, unlike centuries earlier, when farmers moved every generation after exhausting the soil and raiding could likely be profitable.  Everyone, elites and peasants alike became rooted in their localities.

Why empires don’t last forever

Even without the Huns the political and economic development of societies outside of the Roman world would eventually have undermined the Roman Empire. This is because living next to a militarily more powerful and economically developed imperial neighbor promotes a series of political changes in the societies on the periphery, which eventually enables them to fend off imperial aggression. In the first millennium, this happened twice. First in the emergence of Germanic client states of the Roman Empire in the 4th century, and again in the rise of the new Slavic states of the 9th and 10th. This repeated pattern is not accidental and provides a fundamental reason why empires, unlike diamonds, do not last forever. The way that empires behave, the mixture of economic opportunity and intrusive power inherent in their nature, prompts responses from those affected which in the long run undermine their capacity to maintain the initial power advantage that originally made them imperial.

Not all empires suffer the equivalent of Rome’s Hunnic accident and fall so swiftly to destruction. In the course of human history, many more have surely been picked apart slowly from the edges as peripheral dynasts turned predator once their own power increased. The exercise of imperial power generates an opposite and equal reaction among those affected by it, until they so reorganize themselves as to blunt the imperial edge. Whether you find that comforting or frightening, I guess, will depend on whether you live in an imperial or peripheral society, and what stage of the dance has currently been reached. The existence of such a law, however, is one more general message that exploring the interactions of emperors and barbarians in the first millennium AD can offer us today.

Conclusion

Migration played a major role in this unfolding story. And the Hunnic ‘accident’ threw enough more organized Germanic groupings on to Roman soil in a short enough space of time both to undermine the central Roman state and to generate a massive collapse in the old power structures of barbarian central Europe. This in turn allowed for an extraordinary Slavic diaspora whose cultural effects – the widespread Slavicization of central and Eastern Europe – remain a central feature of the European landmass to this day.

But aside from particular and unusual moments like the Hunnic or Avar accidents, patterns of migration were entirely dictated by and secondary to patterns of development. It was only when nomadic intruders became politically organized that migration was able to undermine both the west Roman state and Germanic Europe in one fell swoop.

In thinking about the transformation of barbarian Europe in the first millennium in overall terms, there is no doubt that development played a profoundly more important role in the process than migration.

Much more important than these occasional moments of arrival, many of which led precisely nowhere, were the dynamic interactions between the imperial powers of more developed Europe and the barbarians on their doorstep: Germanic, largely, in the first half of the millennium, then Slavic, largely, in the second. It was these interactions, not acts of migration, that were ultimately responsible for generating the new social, economic and political structures which brought former barbarian Europe much more to resemble its imperial counterpart by the end of the millennium.

The kinds of large-scale predatory migration flow studied in this book – essentially combining peasants and elites within the same migrating groups, where the later Middle Ages saw them move separately – were equally appropriate to their own area. In the first millennium, highly disparate patterns of development then combined with a lack of agricultural rootedness and relatively low agricultural outputs. This meant that the economy of barbarian Europe could support only very few military specialists, so that it was necessary and possible for ambitious leaders to put together large and hence necessarily broad-based expeditions to secure wealth-generating positions on the fringes of more developed, imperial Europe.

This in turn generated forms of migration that were different from those operating in the central Middle Ages, and different again from those we are used to in the modern world.

There is every reason to respond to the limitations of the old invasion-hypothesis model not by rejecting migration as an important explanatory factor in first-millennium history, but by bringing a series of more complex migration models back into the picture. Migration then ceases to be a catch-all, simplistic alternative to ‘more complex’ lines of explanation focusing on social, economic and political change. Understood properly, and this is the central message screaming out from the comparative literature, migration is not a separate and competing form of explanation to social and economic transformation, but the complementary other side of the same coin. Patterns of migration are dictated by prevailing economic and political conditions, and reflect existing inequalities, and sometimes even help to equalize them, and when viewed from this perspective the real significance of migratory phenomena can begin to emerge. So historians should not be too quick to reject predatory migration as a periodic contributor to the evolution of Europe. If predatory forms of migration in the first millennium were generated by geographical proximity between zones of highly disparate levels of development, combined with the existence of societies where those who farmed also fought and were not deeply rooted in one particular patch of soil, then these conditions likely existed in many other ancient contexts with periodic predatory migration could expected as a natural consequence.

As currently construed, elite replacement fails to distinguish the particularity of a case such as the Norman Conquest, where the invading elite could fit easily into existing socio-economic structures, leaving them intact, and any broader effects on the total population remain correspondingly small, if not so minimal as those wanting to undermine the importance of migration might think.  But this kind of elite replacement applies only when the incoming elite was of broadly the same size as its indigenous counterpart, and I strongly suspect, even if I could never prove it, that, over the broad aeons of human history, this will have been true only in a minority of instances.

Certainly the first millennium AD throws up more examples of a different kind of case, where the intruding elite, if still a minority – and even quite a small one – compared to the totality of the indigenous population, was still too numerous to be accommodated by redistributing the available landed assets. This kind of elite migration could not but have huge socioeconomic consequences, and potentially also much greater cultural ones as the indigenous population came into intense contact with an intrusive elite, which was more numerous than its old indigenous counterpart.

Different again were cases of only partial elite replacement, particularly common in more Mediterranean regions of the old Roman west in the fifth and sixth centuries. Here there was some economic restructuring to accommodate the intruders – Goths, Vandals, Burgundians and others – but considerable elements of the old Roman landowning elites survived. In the longer term, it was the immigrants in these cases who struggled to hold on to their existing culture, and long-term linguistic change moved in the other direction.

The disappearance in the medium to longer term of large-scale, centrally organized taxation of agricultural production, and the consequent weakening of state structures in the post-Roman west, are best explained in terms of the militarization of elite life that followed the creation of those structures at the hands of intrusive new elites.

Goods and ideas can move without being attached to people, and if what you observe archaeologically is no more than a limited transfer of either, it will always be possible to explain it in terms of something other than population displacement. But the fact that it will always be possible to do this does not mean that it will necessarily be correct to do so, and the inherent ambiguity of archaeological evidence is sometimes misinterpreted. Ambiguity means exactly that. If the archaeological evidence for any possible case of migration is ambiguous – which it usually will be – then it certainly does not prove that migration played a major role in any observable material cultural change – but neither does it disprove it. What all this actually amounts to is that archaeological evidence alone cannot decide the issue. It is important to insist on this point because there has been a tendency in some recent work to argue that ambiguous archaeological evidence essentially disproves migration, when it absolutely does not. Overall, of course, this forces us back on to the historical evidence. How good a case can be made from historical sources for the importance of large, organized and diverse groups of invaders on the move in the first millennium? The answer has to be complex.

The final modification that must be made to the old invasion-hypothesis model of large-group migration concerns its supposition that large-scale intrusions drove out existing populations. There are several good examples of large-scale invasion in the first millennium, but none where the evidence suggests mass ethnic cleansing. Indigenous populations were often faced with a choice between accepting subjugation or moving on, a choice which would have felt particularly brutal to indigenous elites who had most to lose from the arrival of a new set of masters. But there is no convincingly documented case where the response to this choice led to the complete evacuation of an extensive landscape. At the very least, indigenous populations supplied good agricultural labor, and many of our immigrant groups anyway had lower social-status categories into which newly subjugated indigenous populations could easily be slotted. These alterations are important, but they remain modifications rather than denials of the basic proposition that the evidence for large, mixed, and organized migrant groups from the first millennium is convincing.

Nationalist visions of whole ancestral ‘peoples’ clearing out new landscapes for themselves to enjoy can be consigned to the recycle bin of history. The groups documented in our sources were political entities, which could grow or fragment, which contained individuals occupying lesser- and higher-status categories, and which inserted themselves in correspondingly complex ways into new but already thoroughly inhabited environments.

Kindle Notes

Barbarians. Archaeologically, the picture of the inhabitants of these wooded and forested zones of eastern Europe around the birth of Christ is reasonably straightforward. As Tacitus’ comment about permanent settlements implies, it was a world of farmers, but farmers with an extremely simple material culture, less developed even than that prevailing further west in Germanic Europe. The remains of its pottery, tools and settlement are so simple, in fact, that they frustrate any attempt at stylistic or even chronological categorization, being extremely slow to change before the second half of the first millennium AD.

With only a little simplification, therefore, barbarian Europe at the start of our period can be divided into three main zones. Furthest west and closest to the Mediterranean was the most developed, with the highest levels of agricultural productivity and a material culture that in its pottery and metalwork was already rich and sophisticated. This had long been controlled largely by Celtic-speakers, and much of it had just been brought under Roman rule. Further east lay Germanic-dominated Europe, where agriculture was less intensive, and which consequently lacked the same richness of material culture. Even Germanic Europe practiced a relatively intensive agriculture, however, compared with the inhabitants of the woods and forests of eastern Europe, whose material culture has left correspondingly minimal remains. Nothing in this brief survey is really controversial, except, perhaps, where Slavs might be found. What has become highly disputable, however, is the role played by migration in the astounding transformation of barbarian Europe which unfolded over the next thousand years.

The Details (if you’re interested): History of the barbarian invasion

In 452, after a decade of mayhem stretching from Constantinople to Paris, Attila the Hun died from the after-effects of one too many wedding nights. Following the odd drink or two, the great conqueror retired to bed, burst a blood vessel and died. This sudden demise fired the starting gun on a frenzied race for power among his sons, which quickly degenerated into outright civil war. Events then took a yet more dangerous turn. Attila’s Empire consisted not just of Huns but large numbers of non-Hunnic subjects besides.

The vast majority of these non-Huns, like the Huns themselves, were living in and around the Middle Danube c.450 AD. But many of them had not occupied land in the Middle Danube in the 4th century, and neither would they in the 6th. Not only did the Huns themselves move west into the heart of Europe, but they seem to have been responsible in some way for gathering many other groups together on the Great Hungarian Plain, most of whom subsequently left as Attila’s Empire collapsed.

Of all the migrants featured in this book, the Huns are perhaps the most mysterious. They wrote absolutely nothing themselves, but that’s pretty much par for the first-millennium course. More problematic is the fact that very little appears about them even in Roman sources until the time of Attila, or perhaps half a generation before: the later 420s onwards, but above all the 440s. By that date, profound transformations had distanced the Hunnic world from its counterpart of c.370, when the region north of the Black Sea first felt the weight of Hunnic assault. The reason for this dearth of information is not hard to deduce. From a Roman perspective, the crises of 376–80 and 405–8 both saw the Huns push other groups across the imperial frontier. As a result, our ignorance of the Huns is astounding.  We do not know what language the Huns spoke, and probably never will.

The Huns did not just meander around the Great Eurasian Steppe until they happened to come across its western edge north of the Black Sea and take a liking to it. The decisions to switch their centers of operation westwards – in two distinct stages separated by about a generation – must have been taken for specific reasons, and carefully calculated. The potential gains of these moves had always to be balanced against the dangers of failing to find, or – more likely – establish, rights over sufficient grazing for their flocks at the new destinations. But no easy answers are available.

One of the possible factors is climate change. Around the year 400 AD, Western Europe was basking in a climatic optimum, with long hot summers and plenty of sunshine. But what was good for western Europeans was less good for the world beyond the Don, where the same climatic optimum meant that there was less summer rainfall to make the grass grow. The trouble with applying this argument to the fourth century, however, is that, for the moment at least, it is impossible to know how severe or, indeed, limited the effects of fourth-century climate change actually were. There are no precise data.

Also, Huns under ecological pressure could have moved in any of several directions.

The other possible factor is political revolution. At least two of the nomadic groups that followed the Huns out of the steppe into Europe in the later first millennium did so, in part, because they were under political and military pressure from other nomadic groups to their east. The 6th-century Avars were on the run from the Empire of the Western Turks, while the 9th-century Magyars moved from north of the Black Sea to the Great Hungarian Plain because of the attacks of Petchenegs. In the absence of specific information about the western steppe in the 4th century, it would be foolish to rule out the possibility that the Huns too were facing this kind of pressure.

From c.390 and particularly the 420s onwards, we find Huns engaged in a variety of activities in relation to the Roman world. Sometimes they raided it.  Sometimes Huns served the Empire as mercenaries.

With the arrival of Huns in large numbers in central Europe from c.410 onwards, however, mercenary service reached its apogee. They were possibly already providing major military support to the de facto ruler of the western Empire, Flavius Constantius, in the 410s, but it was in the time of Aetius, from the 420s, that they became a crucial bulwark of the western Empire. Not only did Aetius use their support to keep himself in power against Roman rivals, but they were also deployed to keep in check the aggressive ambitions of the other barbarian groups now well established on western imperial territory: most notably in major campaigns against the Visigoths and the Burgundians in the 430s. Then, finally, as Hunnic power grew in the time of Attila, the Huns turned from raiding and mercenary service to large-scale invasion. Two massive attacks on the east Roman Balkans, in 442 and 447, were followed by invasions of Gaul and Italy in 451 and 452.

What all of these activities had in common was that they were different methods of tapping into the greater wealth available within the more developed economy of the Mediterranean-based Roman world. Raiding, obviously enough, was all about movable shiny stuff and other forms of negotiable booty, and this too was the point of mercenary service. For all of Aetius’s Hunnic connections, the Huns did not fight for him without receiving generous payment. And even Attila’s invasions were undertaken with cash in mind. We have very detailed accounts of the diplomatic contacts that preceded and followed these attacks, and Attila’s central concern was always the size of the diplomatic subsidy he could secure. Extra territory and other types of gain were of only marginal interest. If it is legitimate to import this vision of the Huns’ basic attitude towards the Roman Mediterranean back to the 370s then the Huns’ decisions to move westwards in two stages make complete sense. Increased proximity to the political centers of the Roman world in northern Italy and Constantinople meant greater opportunities for extracting a share of Roman wealth. The Huns were acting like the Goths and the other largely Germanic-speaking predators of the third century AD: their migrations were a response to fundamental inequalities of wealth. Like the Goths, they were moving from the less developed outer periphery of the Empire, and perhaps from beyond even that, into richer inner zones where there was a wide variety of wealth-generating opportunities available to groups able, like themselves, to deploy military force of sufficient potency.

The evidence suggests that Hunnic migration into Europe was similar to reasons it happened in the 3rd century.  It began when war bands raided the richer Roman lands on the periphery to get rich, not to migrate there.  But when the war band activity proved highly profitable, larger and more organized groups became involved, probably aiming to maximize the amount of wealth that could be extracted by actually seizing total control of the landscape. In this case, the Huns’ later actions suggest that the attraction was not the land of the Middle Danube in terms of its agricultural, but the fact that it was conveniently placed for maximizing profits via closer ties of various kinds with the Roman world. As a result, small-scale raiding north of the Black Sea elided into a population flow of steadily increasing momentum, until large-scale group migration emerged as the logical mechanism for maximizing profits by seizing control of the Great Hungarian Plain.

Like the nineteenth-century Boers, the Huns enjoyed a telling advantage in military hardware. One of their characteristic weapons was the composite reflex bow, long known on the steppe. Now, however, they employed a longer bow – up to 150 centimeters rather than the usual 100 – than had previously been seen on the western steppe. This gave them longer-range hitting power whose effects are visible in the rhetoric of Roman sources. These report Huns able to devastate the ranks of their Gothic opponents while themselves staying safely out of range.

The Huns large-scale predatory migration eventually involved women and children. The numerous dependents of large military forces assembled from non-professional sources cannot be left behind in safety when the military activity encompasses any intent to migrate. As with so many of the other immigrants we have encountered, moreover, the Huns had established traditions of mobility which, all the comparative evidence again emphasizes, must have greatly facilitated their decision to respond to potential gains to be had from the Roman world by upping sticks and moving closer towards it. The biannual migrations common to the nomadic lifestyle meant that the Huns had a greater than usual capacity to organize large-group movement.

Another major reason for the substantial chronological gap between the two main phases of Hunnic intrusion into Europe must have been the need to build up geographical knowledge about the new possibilities that opened up for them after they had displaced Goths and Alans from regions north of the Black Sea. From this perspective, the massive Hunnic raid launched into the Roman and Persian Empires through the Caucasus in 395 can be seen as part of a learning curve. This caused huge disruption and attracted a great deal of coverage in Roman sources, not least because one group of raiders even got close to the Holy Land. But the raiders suffered heavy losses, and the experiment was never repeated.  Its relative failure may well have played a role in their eventual decision to move further west on to the Hungarian Plain rather than in any other direction

When Olympiodorus visited them in 411/12 he encountered a political structure based on a series of ranked kings, which was highly appropriate for a nomadic society. Economic logistics require nomad populations to be relatively dispersed. Bunched populations with herds would quickly lead to exhausted grazing and economic disaster. At the same time, subgroups need their own organization for matters such as settling disputes, and the larger group has to be able to act decisively as one on occasion, above all to protect the grazing rights upon which all depend. Well-organized devolution rather than centralized rule is a natural political form for nomadic societies, therefore, and a kingly hierarchy fits the bill nicely.

But when a second east Roman historian and diplomat – the famous Priscus – visited the Huns in the mid-440s in the time of Attila, the system of ranked kings had disappeared. Attila was surrounded by many great men, and although he had originally shared power with his brother, there were no other individuals of royal rank to be seen.

This relates to migration for the following reasons. What went on was that one leader came to monopolize the political support that used to be divided between several. This requires the successful leader to have access to unprecedented wealth so as to outbid his rivals in the patronage stakes and win over enough of their supporters, in the process forcing them either to leave the group or to accept more junior, non-royal positions. In the case of the Huns, the source of that new wealth was the profits that flowed from the new relationships they were able to develop with the Roman Empire. Putting yourself by hook or by crook in charge of distributing the combined profits flowing from a potent mixture of raiding, mercenary service and diplomatic subsidy was the shortest path to political triumph. Hunnic migration to the Middle Danube naturally brought political revolution in its wake.

There is not the slightest doubt that the Huns’ intrusion into Europe in the later 4th and early 5th centuries must be considered mass migration. It was a flow of gradually increasing momentum, not a sudden, single migratory pulse.

It may well be correct that it was the wealth of the Roman Empire’s periphery that first sucked in the Hunnic raiders, and that migration momentum built up slowly from that point. New information on climate change or on political developments may transform this view in due course, but for the moment, the attractions of the wealthy imperial periphery seem the best option.

The Hunnic Empire was not something that people joined voluntarily. Evidence for this is plentiful and consistent. Non-Huns became part of the Empire through conquest and intimidation.  All of our evidence indicates that the ranks of Attila’s subjects were filled not with volunteers, but with those who had failed to get out of the way in time. This suggests that relations between the Huns and their subjects are unlikely to have been that harmonious.

In the 420s, for instance, the east Romans stripped away a large body of Goths from Hunnic control when they expelled the Huns from parts of Pannonia. The Goths were transferred to Thrace and seem to have served loyally thereafter in the east Roman military. On other occasions, the subjects took the initiative themselves: When Rua was king of the Huns, the Amilzuri, Itimari, Tounsoures, Boisci and other tribes who were living near to the Danube were fleeing to fight on the side of the Romans.

This records how the separate contingents in a mixed force of Goths and Huns was brought to blows by a Roman agent provocateur. He did so by reminding the Gothic contingent of exactly how the Huns generally behaved towards them: These men have no concern for agriculture, but, like wolves, attack and steal the Goths’ food supplies, with the result that the latter remain in the position of slaves and themselves suffer food shortages.

For most people, the reality of becoming part of the Hunnic Empire was a nasty experience of military conquest followed by economic exploitation, spiced up from time to time by being marched out to fight Attila’s wars.

This is where it differed so markedly from the Roman Empire – the Hunnic Empire lacked the governmental capacity to run the affairs of its subject peoples at all closely. Famously, the Hunnic bureaucracy consisted of one Roman secretary supplied by Aetius, the de facto ruler of the western Empire, and a Roman prisoner who could write letters in Latin and Greek. What this meant in practice is that, once conquered, subject groups still had to be left largely to run their own day-to-day affairs themselves. This does not mean that everything carried on absolutely as before. Hunnic supervision often involved preventing the emergence of overall rulers among the larger concentrations of their defeated subjects. By suppressing the rise of an overall leader by stimulating political competition within a group, the possibility of mounting effective resistance was lessened.

Gold, it should be stressed, is a rare find in Germanic archaeological remains before the Hunnic period, so the amount of new wealth that became available as Attila ransacked the Roman world can hardly be over-stressed. Alongside military domination, then, he clearly also used the distribution of booty captured in his campaigns against the Romans to give subject leaders a further incentive to consent to his rule, just as the Romans granted annual gifts even to barbarian leaders they had just defeated or otherwise subdued.

The Hunnic Empire was certainly multicultural, but, as is often the case in multicultural societies, this did not mean that group identities within it were either infinitely malleable or easily eroded. Because being a Hun meant higher status, the Empire’s multicultural character effectively erected barriers around Hunnic identity. The Huns’ lack of bureaucratic capacity left their subjects with at least their intermediate leaderships intact, thereby perpetuating the structures around which their existing sense of group identity might survive. At the same time, the exploitation they had to endure gave them the incentive to maintain these identities, since they were the only vehicle through which they might be able to overthrow Hunnic domination, either by escaping into the Roman Empire or at some point regaining their political independence by force. Neither of these options would be possible for a group that fragmented and lost all capacity for group action. There is every reason, then, why old identities should not have slipped easily away under Hunnic rule.

Recitach’s assassination thus completed an astonishing process of amalgamation. Theoderic’s uncle Valamer had probably been the first member of the family to achieve an unusual pre-eminence by killing, subduing and forcing out rival Gothic warband leaders in order to unite the Amal-led Goths: manoeuvrings that occurred either in Ukraine before the Goths’ move to Pannonia, or in the Middle Danube after Attila’s death (if these Goths were already established there). None of these warbands can have numbered much more than a thousand fighting men, and perhaps even only several hundreds. Within two lifetimes, therefore, uncle and nephew had taken the Amal line from one among a set of warband leaders to pre-eminent Gothic kings commanding in excess of twenty thousand warriors. It was this much larger force, complete with women, children and wagon train and amounting to between fifty and a hundred thousand souls, that took the road for Italy in the autumn of 488. There’s more you’d like to know, of course, but for the mid-first millennium this is pretty decent evidence. It also gives us some parameters for considering the other forces that came and went from the Middle Danube as the Hunnic Empire rose and fell, and it’s instantly clear that none of the other population groups on the move in this period was quite as big as this truly monstrous force.

In 473 several tens of thousands of people left Hungary for the Balkans, possibly the same group that had moved to Hungary from Ukraine about twenty years before; and in 488 an even larger group, close to a hundred thousand souls if you add in the Thracian Goths and the refugee Rugi, set off from the Balkans for Italy. Other moves were made by smaller population groups, refugees from the military defeats that had dismantled old hegemonies, notably the Huns and Sciri in the 460s, the Rugi in the 480s and the various groups of Heruli after 508. And to complete the picture, the period also saw one predatory flow of migration of the kind we have met before, in the form of the Lombards.

In broad terms, the demographic effect of the Hunnic Empire was to suck large numbers of militarized groups into the heart of central Europe. Once the constraining influence of Hunnic power had disappeared, such a concentration of military potential could not but generate intense competition in which some of the smaller entities lost their independence, but which, overall, prompted many of the groups to leave the region quite as quickly as they had entered it.

The Huns built their war machine in the Middle Danube region because it was a conveniently situated base from which to launch the raids and protection rackets that would give them a share of the wealth of the Mediterranean as mobilized by the taxation structures of the Roman Empire.  Attila’s demands really were all about cash. Holding the Huns’ war machine together would have been quite impossible without Roman wealth. Variations in the prevailing levels of economic development also dictated, after Attila’s death, the general directions of the moves made by the various groups who wanted to opt out of the competition. The vast majority, as we have seen, moved south, attracted, again, by the wealth of the Mediterranean.

The rise of Frankish power under the Merovingian dynasty was essentially a phenomenon of Roman imperial collapse.  At this point, like so many Germani all along Rome’s European frontiers, the different Frankish groups were the Empire’s semi-subdued clients. Individual Franks were regularly recruited into the Roman army, some rising to top commands, while whole auxiliary contingents occasionally served on particular campaigns. Yet at the same time, campaigning was periodically required to keep them from raiding the Empire too successfully and too often; or even, when opportunity presented itself, from seeking to annex pieces of Roman territory.

With the decline of the western Empire in the fifth century, this balance of power was undermined, and the Frankish cat leapt vigorously out of the bag.

It was in these centuries, too, that the history of the British Isles took a decisive turn with the arrival of Anglo-Saxon immigrants from Denmark and northern Germany. Of greater importance still, arguably, was Slavic migration. Slavic origins were always hotly debated, but, wherever they came from, there was no doubting the fact that from relative obscurity in the 6th century Slavic-speakers spread across vast tracts of central and eastern Europe over the next two hundred years. Substantial parts of this landscape had previously been dominated by Germanic-speakers, so the rise of the Slavs represented a huge cultural and political shift. It created the third major linguistic zone of modern Europe alongside the Romance and Germanic tongues, and the boundaries between the three have remained little altered since they were first created. Scandinavian migration in the ninth and tenth centuries then completed a millennium of mass migration. In the Atlantic, entirely new landscapes were colonized for the first time in Iceland and the Faroes, while Viking migrants in western Europe established Danelaw in England and the Duchy of Normandy on the continent. Further east, other Scandinavian settlers played a key role in creating the first, Kievan, Russian state, whose limits established and delineated the boundaries of Europe down to the modern era.  No single view of any of these migrations and their significance ever won universal acceptance. Many of the details, as we shall see in the chapters that follow, have always been and will remain highly controversial.

The kinds of national identities that came to the fore in 19th-century Europe were created in historical time, and did not represent the re-emergence of something fundamental but long submerged. Without the kind of mass communications that became available in the 18th and 19th centuries, it would have been totally impossible to bind together numerically huge and geographically dispersed populations into national communities. Group identity simply did not function in the same way in earlier eras without canals, railways and newspapers, a world where ‘country’ meant ‘county’, for instance, for the vast majority of the British population. The creation of modern nationalism also required the conscious input of intellectuals, who created national dictionaries, identified national costumes, and collected the dances and folktales which were then used to ‘measure’ ethnicity. These same individuals then also generated the educational programs that solidified the elements of national culture that they had identified into a self-reproducing cultural complex which could be taught at school, and by that means reach a still larger body of humanity in an era when mass primary education was rapidly becoming – for the first time – a European norm. The emergence of nationalism is a great story in itself, and has rightly attracted a lot of attention in the last generation or so of scholarship. The point for us, though, is straightforward. Europe has not been peopled since the first millennium by large blocks of population conscious of distinct nationalist affiliations which fundamentally shaped their lives and activities. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century affiliations cannot be imposed on the deeper past.

Major material cultural changes can have causes other than outside invasion. Since patterns of observable archaeological similarity can be generated for a variety of reasons – trade, social interaction, shared religious belief or anything else you can think of – then changes in one or more of any number of these areas might be responsible for an observable change. Changes do not have to reflect the arrival of a new social group but might be caused by any substantial alteration in the system that originally created it. Indeed, it was deep dissatisfaction with the intellectual limits of the invasion hypothesis, overemployed as a monolithic model of change, as much as the impact of the new understandings of group identity, that drove a whole generation of archaeologists in the English-speaking world to reject its tenets in the 1960s, and in many other parts since. For very good reasons, therefore, archaeologists have increasingly looked beyond the invasion hypothesis to other types of explanation altogether, since the 1960s. These new approaches have been highly fruitful, and in the process undercut much of the broader sweep of the old Grand Narrative. Up to about 1960, European prehistory was envisaged as one population group after another using their new skills – in farming technology or metallurgy – to establish dominance over the landmass and expel their predecessors. Nowadays, much of the evolution of central-western European society between the Bronze Age and the Roman Iron Age (roughly the last two millennia BC) can be convincingly explained without recourse to mass migration and ethnic cleansing. Instead of one set of invaders after another overthrowing each other, the European past is now peopled with human beings who could learn new skills and, over time, develop new economic, social and political structures.

Anyone dealing with the geographical displacement of archaeologically observable artefact types or habits, who wants to produce an account of the past that is at all ‘subtle’ or ‘complex’, should avoid migration at all costs. The tables have turned.

So convinced now are some historians that large, mixed migration units could never have been a feature of the past that they have started to argue that the handful of historical sources that apparently report the opposite – the source of the invasion-hypothesis model of migration – must be mistaken. Graeco-Roman sources, it has been suggested, are infected with a migration topos, a cultural reflex that made Mediterranean authors describe any barbarians on the move as a ‘people’, whatever the real nature of the group. A European history composed of long-distance, large-scale population moves is being replaced by a history of small-scale mobile groupings, gathering in followers as they went.

Two alternatives to the invasion-hypothesis model of mass migration have consequently come into use. The first is the ‘wave of advance’ model. Applicable to small migration units, it provides an alternative view of how a group of outsiders might take over a landscape. It has been applied in particular to the spread across Europe of its first proper farmers in the Neolithic period, and shows how, even with individually undirected moves, farming populations might nonetheless have come to dominate all suitable points in that landscape.  According to this model, Neolithic farmers did not arrive en masse and oust the hunter-gatherers in an invasion. Rather, the farmers’ capacity to produce food in much greater quantities meant that their population numbers grew so much more quickly that, over time, they simply swamped the hunter-gatherers,

Even more popular among archaeologists, because of its greater range of potential applications, is the ‘elite transfer’ model. Here, the intrusive population is not very large, but does aggressively take over a territory by conquest. It then ousts the sitting elite of the target society and takes over its positions of dominance, while most of the underlying social and economic structures which created the old, now expelled or demoted, elite are left intact.

Again the vision of migration suggested by this model is much less dramatic than that envisaged under the invasion hypothesis. It retains the latter’s intentionality, and some violence, but because we’re talking only of one elite replacing another, with broader social structures left untouched, this is a much less nasty process than the ethnic cleansing that was central to the old model. And because it is merely a question of swapping a few elites around, the outcome is likewise much less dramatic and in one sense less important, since all the main existing social and economic structures are left in place, as they were in England by the Norman Conquest.

The changes that took place in Germanic society in the early Roman era have another dimension: we can discern in them the first glimmers of the overarching process that would eventually even out the massive regional disparities in development characteristic of the European landscape at the beginning of the first millennium. Well beyond those regions that had fallen under direct Roman control, contact with the Empire on every level unleashed forces whose cumulative effect was to transform Germanic society. The result by the fourth century  was that much more substantial political structures had come to hold sway over a much larger population. These forces were felt most intensely close to the frontier, but they had some effects beyond, most obviously because some of the economic networks – those producing amber and slaves, for instance – extended long tendrils.

Barbarian Migration and the First Millennium. That some migration occurred within and out of barbarian Europe in the first millennium would be accepted by everyone.

This was the era when Goths from the northern Black Sea littoral moved over 1200 miles to south-western France in three discrete leaps over a thirty-five-year period (c.376–411 AD). Vandals from central Europe went nearly twice that distance and crossed the Mediterranean to end up, again after three discrete moves, in the central provinces of Roman North Africa. This took 33 years (c.406–39), including a lengthy sojourn in Spain (411–c.430).

Of still greater importance was the appearance of a richer inner periphery, surrounding the Roman Empire proper, which generated a tendency towards predatory migration into it from the regions beyond. Thus, much more than a thin client strip around Rome’s European frontiers now fell within range of wider-ranging processes of transformation that would eventually undermine the Mediterranean’s dominion. Even by the late Roman period, however, vast areas of east-central and eastern Europe remained unaffected. This would change when the new political order of client states created by the second-and third-century migration flows was thrown into tumult in the later fourth century. And if migration had so far played a secondary role to development that too was about to change. The era of the Huns had begun.

MIGRATION AND FRONTIER COLLAPSE

By the late summer of 376, the majority of the Gothic Tervingi, the Empire’s main clients on the Lower Danube frontier for most of the 4th century, turned up on the northern banks of the river asking for asylum. They were led by Alavivus and Fritigern, who had broken away from the confederation’s overall ruler Athanaric. The equally Gothic Greuthungi, who had previously lived further from the frontier, east of the River Dniester, soon followed them. Both Tervingi and Greuthungi had been established south and east of the Carpathian Mountains for at least three generations, so it is not surprising that their sudden displacement towards the Danube was associated with a broader wave of regional unrest. After some thought, the east Roman Emperor Valens decided to admit the Tervingi into the Empire, offering them assistance across the Danube, but to exclude the Greuthungi. The latter, however, soon found an opportunity to cross the river without help or permission, and were quickly joined by other uninvited guests: Taifali plus some Huns and Alans in 377, more Alans in 378, and some of Rome’s Middle Danubian Sarmatian clients in 379. Long-established inner clients like the Tervingi, Taifali and Sarmatians, outer clients such as the Greuthungi and Alans, and previously unknown Hunnic intruders were battling it out for control of the zone north of Rome’s east European frontier, and the struggle had spilled over on to imperial territory. About a generation after 376, the established order beyond Rome’s central European frontier – the Middle Danube basin west of the Carpathians – suffered an equally spectacular collapse.

Four major groupings of barbarians figured in the action. A largely Gothic group, first of all, led by a certain Radagaisus, crossed the Alps into Italy in 405/6. These were followed at the end of 406 by a mixed force of Vandals, Alans and Sueves, who crossed the Rhine into Gaul and cut a swathe of destruction through to Spain. Shortly afterwards, a mixed force of Huns and Sciri crossed into the east Roman Balkans, capturing the fortress of Castra Martis in the province of Dacia. Finally, Burgundians elbowed their way past their western neighbors, the Alamanni, to establish themselves on and over the River Rhine around Speyer and Worms. We don’t know when the Burgundians did this, exactly, but it was sometime between 406 and 413. In fourth-century terms, this again represented a mixture of established frontier clients (Sueves), groups who were occasionally part of Rome’s diplomatic web (Burgundians and Vandals), and complete outsiders to the Middle Danubian region (Alans).

From a Roman perspective, sequential collapse of its eastern and central European frontiers was not the end of the misery. The Tervingi and Greuthungi who crossed the Danube in 376 eventually made a kind of peace with the Roman state in 382, after six years of warfare which, famously, had seen them destroy the Emperor Valens and two-thirds of his field army on 9 August 378. Some of them gathered round the leadership of Alaric and his successors. This force moved first around the Balkans, then into Italy – twice – and finally on to Gaul, where another agreement rooted them more firmly this time, in Aquitaine, from 418. From this settlement eventually emerged the Visigothic kingdom: a first-generation successor state to the western Roman Empire. A similar capacity for continued movement was shown by some of the groups bound up in the central European frontier collapse. Most famously, some of the Vandals and Alans who had ended up in Spain from 409 took ship, twenty years later, for North Africa, where they too eventually established an independent kingdom. And in the meantime the Burgundians too moved on, if in less dramatic fashion. After a heavy defeat at the hands of the Huns, many were resettled by the Roman state around Lake Geneva in the later 430s. From this settlement eventually emerged a third successor state to the old Roman west.

Some of the distances here are extraordinary. The extended trek of the Tervingi and Greuthungi from the north-west corner of the Black Sea to Aquitaine totaled about two and a half thousand kilometers, even just as the crow flies (and as the Goths didn’t). The Vandals went from Slovakia or thereabouts to Tunisia, via Spain and Morocco, not far short of four thousand kilometers, and the Alans who accompanied them even further.

In traditional accounts of the first millennium, these tumultuous events on Rome’s European frontiers and beyond were heralded as the beginning of the great Germanic Völkerwanderung: literally, ‘the movement of peoples’ (even if not all of those involved were Germanic-speakers). The Goths, Vandals, Burgundians and many others who feature in the two chapters that follow were thought of as complete populations of both genders and all ages who had long-standing group identities and deliberately moved in compact groups from one piece of territory to the next. In the process, they destroyed the power of the Roman state in western Europe, and in some accounts of the action this represented the denouement of a struggle that had begun as long ago as 9 AD when Arminius’ coalition destroyed Varus and his three legions in the Teutoburger Wald. And if this were not a big enough story, the events associated with Roman frontier collapse had, as we have seen, a still bigger role to play in understandings of the creation of Europe. The model they seemed to provide – of entire peoples on the move – was applied wholesale to European pre-history, which was all explained in terms of migration, invasion and ‘ethnic cleansing’. The frontier intrusions of the late Roman period thus provide a crucial test case. Were they undertaken by large population aggregates, mixed in age and gender, or were they not?

Several contemporary sources mention the arrival of the Goths on the Danube in 376. All share the same basic view that its ultimate cause was the emergence of a new force on the fringes of Europe: the mysterious Huns (of whom more in a moment). One even puts a figure on the number of refugee Goths gathered on the riverbank: two hundred thousand people of all ages and both genders.

The scale and character of the migration flows of 376 are not out of step with modern case studies. For, as Ammianus and all our sources unanimously report, the underlying cause of the Goths’ move to the river was political and negative. The Huns were undermining the stability of the entire north Pontic region, and the Goths were looking to remove themselves to a safer locale. In Ammianus’ formulation, the Goths had two motives in mind: the attractions of Roman territory and a desire to escape the insecurity of life north of the Danube.

FIGHTING FOR SURVIVAL. The histories of all the major groups who crossed into the Empire at the two moments of frontier collapse followed a similar course. Their initial – overwhelmingly uninvited – penetrations of Roman territory were followed by periods of armed struggle. They had to force the Empire to accept that they could not be defeated, and that its normal policies for the subjugation and integration of immigrants could not be imposed upon them. For the Tervingi and Greuthungi, these initial struggles lasted for about six years until the negotiation of a compromise peace agreement with the Roman state, which came into force on 3 October 382. That the Empire was willing to agree to such a deal was entirely due to the Goths’ military capacity, in particular their successive defeats of two Roman emperors – Valens, most famously, at Hadrianople on 9 August 378, then Theodosius in Macedonia in the summer of 380. Other, smaller migrant groups of the period – Taifali, Sarmatians and isolated Gothic subgroups – who failed this initial military test received much harsher treatment, their defeats being followed by total loss of identity, as group members were distributed as unfree labor to Roman landowners.

The history of the migrants involved in the crisis of 405–8 is similar. Again uninvited, they had to fight, initially, to carve out new homes for themselves. Some failed. Many of the followers of Uldin and Radagaisus, as we have seen, met with disaster, killed or distributed again as unfree labor, though some elements of each group managed to do a deal with the Roman authorities. Initially at least, the Vandals, Alans and Sueves were more fortunate. After a career of wild violence in Gaul, in 409 or 410 they forced their way over the Pyrenees into Roman Spain, which offered them new opportunities. In 412, six years after their initial crossing, they divided up the bulk of its provinces between them. The Siling Vandals took Baetica, the Hasdings most of Gallaecia, the Sueves north-western Gallaecia, and the Alans, underlining that they were the largest component of the force at this stage, the richer provinces of Lusitania and Carthaginensis. There is no evidence that this partition was authorized by the central Roman authorities, but it would seem to represent a more ordered exploitation of economic assets, beyond mere looting.

History shows that migrants into the Roman Empire could – and did on occasion – come in large blocks of organized military manpower with their families in tow. If they entertained ambitions that went beyond mere integration into the Roman system as military cannon fodder or agricultural labor, this kind of migratory unit was essential. Only by recruiting well outside military retinues could enough military manpower be put together for expeditions likely to stand any chance of success. Equally important, the better evidence indicates that the immigrants could and did engage in repeat migrations. The vast majority had a well-established tradition of movement even before they crossed into Roman territory, and repeat migration, alongside a renegotiation, under Roman pressure, of group identity which steadily increased overall numbers, provided a two-pronged strategy for long-term survival on Roman soil.

The inclusion of freemen warriors and their social and familial dependents made for major migrant groups numbering several tens of thousands of individuals. The migrations were also mass in the qualitative sense used in migration studies, in that the flow administered a distinct political shock at its points of departure or arrival, or indeed both. The migrants who brought down Rome’s east and central European frontiers quickly stacked up between them one emperor dead on a battlefield along with his army, a forced reversal of standard imperial policies towards migrants, and the extraction of some key provinces from full imperial control. The shock in the lands they left behind is equally marked.

Migration Mechanics.  The crucial importance of active fields of information in dictating precise destinations is just as prominent in the first millennium as in later eras. Germanic expansion towards the Black Sea in the third century was clearly exploiting information about the region which had built up through the operations of the Amber Route. Slavic groups first came to know the Roman Balkans as raiders before exploiting that knowledge to turn themselves into settlers as and when political conditions permitted. Scandinavian expansion to the west in the Viking era likewise operated on the back of intelligence acquired by participation in the emporia trading networks of the eighth century, while those working to the east took a generation or so to find their way down the river routes of western Russia to the great centers of Islamic demand for northern goods, having originally opened up the eastern hinterland of the Baltic to feed western markets. To these entirely uncontroversial examples, I would also add some others. A major contributory factor to the apparently odd stop/start migratory patterns of some of the groups entering Roman territory either side of the year 400 was the need to acquire information about further possible destinations before hitting the road again. The Goths, especially the Tervingi who entered the Empire in 376, already knew about the Balkans, for instance, but not about Italy and Gaul, to where they moved on in the next generation. It took twenty years (and their participation in two Roman civil wars that took some of them lengthy distances in that direction) before they were ready to take the next step.

Likewise the Vandals and Alans: Spain marked the end of their original migratory ambitions, and it again took twenty years and some exploratory sea raids before they were prepared to venture across the Straits of Gibraltar to North Africa. The phenomenon of migration flows of increasing momentum is clearly a product of growing knowledge. It was precisely the fact that exploratory expansionary ventures into a new region produced profitable outcomes for the pioneers that encouraged others to participate.

In the cases of large-group migration reported in any detail in our sources, there is no instance where the decision to move did not generate some kind of split among the affected population group. The same is true, only more so, of the more extended migration flows. For all the Germani of Polish origin who ended up by the Black Sea in the third century, there were many others who stayed behind, shown by the fact that the Wielbark and Przeworsk cultural systems continued to operate. Likewise, many Angles and Saxons did not relocate to England in the 5th and 6th centuries, and Scandinavia was not emptied in the Viking period.

All modern migration flows see substantial numbers of immigrants returning to their original homelands.  The initial phases of Scandinavian expansion were all about gathering wealth, whether by raiding or trading, or both. Having gathered their wealth, different individuals then made different choices about how to invest it. Some chose, even early on, to stay put at their points of destination in the east and west (as shown by the early settlements in northern Scotland and the isles), whereas others chose to take their new wealth back home to Scandinavia, eventually prompting a massive shake-up in Baltic politics.

At least two of the broader population flows, those of the Wielbark and Przeworsk Germani in the second and third centuries, and of the early Slavs three hundred years later, involved populations whose farming techniques were then insufficient to maintain the fertility of any individual piece of arable land for more than a generation or two. A general, periodic local mobility was simply a fact of life for these populations, and there is every reason to suppose that this facilitated the eventual transformation of a more random wave-of-advance-type expansion into a channeled migration flow when information began to filter back about the opportunities available at an entirely new set of longer-distance destinations.

The fourth-century Gothic Tervingi are probably most famous for the fact that a majority of them decided to seek asylum inside the Roman Empire in 376. That decision was greatly facilitated, however, by active memories of recent migrations. This same Gothic group had taken possession of their existing lands in Wallachia and Moldavia between the Lower Danube and the River Dniester only in the decades either side of the year 300, and a generation or so later, in the 330s, had attempted to move bodily to new locations on the fringes of the Middle Danube region. It was the children of those who had moved into Moldavia and Wallachia who were on the move again in the 330s, and their children and older grandchildren who decided to seek a new life inside the Roman Empire in 376.

The willingness of some Norse to move on to Iceland and Greenland in the later 9th century was likewise facilitated by the fact that they were the immediate descendants of Viking immigrants to Scotland and the isles.

Aside from the emotional costs of migration, financial ones were also a major factor in any migrant’s calculations. Most first-millennium migration that we know anything about was a question, more or less, of walking and wagons. It involved no major transportation costs, apart from wear and tear to animals, peoples and wheels, and participation was consequently open to many. It nonetheless involved many indirect costs, above all the potential food shortages that were bound to result when movement disrupted normal agricultural activity. As a result, food stocks had to be maximized before moving, unless circumstances were completely overwhelming, and this meant that autumn was the classic moment to make a move – just after the current year’s harvest had been gathered and while there was still a chance of some grass growing to feed the oxen pulling the wagons and other animals. Alaric’s Goths moved into Italy in both 401 and 408 in the autumn, Radagaisus’ Goths in autumn 405. The Vandals, Alans, and Sueves who crossed the Rhine at the very end of 406 likewise presumably began their trek from the Middle Danube in the autumn of that extended periods of movement left groups particularly vulnerable in economic terms. Flavius Constantius was able to bring Alaric’s Goths – now led by Athaulf and Vallia – to heel by starving them out in 414/15. By that date, they had been living off the land without planting crops for six or seven years.

Later in the fifth century, similarly, after the collapse of the Hunnic Empire, the surviving sources give us just a little insight into the logistic strategies adopted by Theoderic the Amal. His grouping journeyed around the Balkans with wagonloads of seedcorn in the 470s, and one dimension of its diplomatic negotiations with the Roman state involved providing it with agricultural land. Even on the march, noticeably, this group always sought to establish more regular economic relationships with Balkan communities, rather than merely robbing them. This meant that the communities could keep on farming and producing surpluses, from which the Goths could siphon off a regular percentage, whereas destroying them by pillage would only have fed Theoderic’s followers once.

Mass access to sea transport did not even become a possibility until the advent of steerage class in the enormous transatlantic liners of the later nineteenth century. Before that point, travel costs necessarily limited participation in any kind of maritime-based expansion. Again, the Viking period provides the best-documented first-millennium example. Ships were highly expensive, and even specialist cargo ships could carry only limited numbers of people and their goods. Thus Viking raiding required the less well-off to come to some kind of joint arrangement for funding the purchase or hire of a ship (though how many ship owners, I wonder, would be willing to hire out shipping for raiding ventures?), or to attach themselves to a leader of higher status.11 Logistic limitations figured even more strongly when it came to the settlement phases, when so many more types of people and a wider range of bulky farming equipment were required.

Logistics may also have limited the number of Scandinavian women who participated in the Norse migration flow compared to the other land-based movements of our period. Modern DNA patterns suggest that only one-third of immigrant women to Iceland came all the way – directly or indirectly – from Scandinavia, with the rest moving a shorter distance from the British Isles. This may reflect the fact that it was too expensive for more than a minority of warriors to bring their Scandinavian sweethearts with them.

Comparative studies provide two basic points of orientation when thinking about the likely causes of any observable migration flow. First, it is overwhelmingly likely that a substantial difference in levels of economic development between adjacent areas will generate a flow between the two, from the less-developed towards its richer neighbor.

In the vast majority of cases, the precise motivation of any individual migrant will be a complex mixture of free-will and constraint, of economic and political motives. There are exceptions, not least when political refugees are driven forward by fear of imminent death, but most migrants are motivated by some combination of all four factors.

Comparative migration studies would lead you to expect flows of population from less developed regions to the more developed (i.e. in broadly southerly and westerly directions). And in the Roman period – the first three centuries AD – this is essentially what occurred. The economic and sociopolitical structures of more developed Roman Europe sucked in population from its less developed neighbors in a variety of forms, particularly from adjacent, largely Germanic-dominated post-Jastorf Europe. Many individuals entered the Empire as voluntary recruits for Roman armies or involuntary slaves. These population flows are well known. But the larger and more contentious Germanic population flows of the second and third centuries also fall into line with this pattern, in the general sense that they too moved broadly south and west towards more developed Europe.

The military and political structures of the Roman Empire fundamentally explain the geographically asymmetrical outcome of Germanic expansion in these years. The forces behind the expansion seem to have been operating very generally in Germanic-dominated central Europe, but the resulting population flows had much more dramatic effects in the south-east, and particularly north of the Black Sea, than in the south-west. Where Germanic immigrants took over no more than the Agri Decumates in the south-west, further east Dacia was abandoned and political structures north of the Black Sea were entirely remade. There may have been some difference in the scale of the migratory flows in operation in each direction, but this, too, was reflective of the more fundamental cause of the different scale of outcome. Flows south and east were operating against the clients of Rome’s inner frontier zone, rather than directly against the military power of the Empire itself. As a result, the likelihood of success was that much greater than in the south-west, where the Empire’s military power had to be tackled directly.

Not only was it militarily much less dangerous for the leaders of Germanic expansion to restrict their operations to areas beyond the imperial frontier, but two centuries of interaction with the Empire, and the subsequent accumulations of wealth, had made the frontier zone an attractive target for predatory expansion in its own right. Before these processes had unfolded, there would have been little point for ambitious Germanic warlords in moving, say, from northern central Europe to southern central Europe, or from north of the Carpathians to the south-east, since the potential material gains for such efforts would have been minimal.  The best opportunities to benefit from the new wealth-generating interactions with the Roman Empire were all limited geographically to the immediate frontier zone, so it is therefore hardly surprising that raiding gave way to migration in the second and third centuries as more ambitious leaders and followings from the outer periphery looked to win control of the new Rome-centered wealth flows operating in barbarian Europe.

But by the end of the first century AD, there was no potentially lucrative spot along the frontier that was not already occupied by a warlord of some kind, and no sitting tenants were likely to surrender their highly advantageous position without a fight. Any permanent relocation towards Rome’s frontier therefore necessarily required the destruction of existing political structures, and this explains why the second- and third-century migration flows eventually encompassed substantial military forces numbered in the thousands, rather than war bands of just one or two hundred men. War bands might raid effectively enough, but their power was insufficient to remake an entire political structure, so that ambitious wannabes from the outer periphery had no choice but to recruit larger expeditionary forces to achieve their aims.

It is worth pausing to consider this pattern of migratory expansion in the light of more recent and better-documented examples. This kind of intentional, predatory intrusion on the part of thousands of armed individuals is not generally seen in the modern world, and this is sometimes put forward as an objection to supposing that it ever occurred in the past. Half of the answer to this objection is that, though not common, this kind of activity has indeed been seen in the relatively modern world: it is exactly the same basic kind of migratory pattern observable among the Boers of the Great Trek. In that case, the intrusive units could be smaller because the Boers enjoyed a massive advantage in firepower over their Zulu and Matabele opponents. In the second and third centuries, any technological advantage was probably more likely to have lain with the groups of the inner periphery being targeted, since they may well have been buying Roman weaponry, so that the intrusive forces from the outer periphery had to be more or less as large as those deployed by the sitting kings of the frontier region.

All the economies of first-millennium Europe were essentially agricultural, and extremely low-tech. As a result, even in the developing periphery of the Roman Empire, they did not offer many well-paid jobs for individual migrants, except for a few who could attach themselves to the military followings of frontier kings. For those with ambitions to unlock the wealth of this world on a much larger scale, coming as an individual immigrant, or merely within a small group, was a pointless exercise. In such a context, you had to arrive with enough force to defeat the sitting tenant, and prompt the Empire to identify you now as its preferred trading and diplomatic partner on your particular sector of the frontier. Although this kind of migrant group is not commonly seen in the modern world, it actually accords with the fundamental principles behind all observed migration flows. Large-scale predatory intrusion was as appropriate to wealth acquisition via migration in the first millennium, as individual movement is now.

Levels of development also explain the other fundamental oddity of these 2nd and 3rd-century population flows: that many of the warriors were accompanied by women and children. Germanic-dominated Europe of the early centuries AD was a world of low-tech, small-scale farms producing only limited food surpluses. As a result, the economy could not support large warrior retinues; the kind of food renders available even to 4th-century kings could support only one or two hundred men. Again like the Boers, therefore, the kind of larger military expeditions that were required to take over a revenue-producing corner of the Roman frontier could never have been mounted using just the small numbers of military specialists that existed in the Germanic world. Recruits were required from a broader cross-section of society, many of whom already had dependents. These participants would obviously not have wanted to leave their dependents behind in the long term – aside, perhaps, from a few of the younger teenage ones – but even to have left them in the short term, while the expedition reached a hopefully successful conclusion, would have been to expose them to substantial risks. In context again, therefore, it was only natural for Germanic expeditionary forces of more than one or two hundred men to be accompanied by numerous familial dependents.

Völkerwanderung and Beyond. The evolving patterns of development and migration unfolding in the Roman era came to a head in the Völkerwanderung. In the later 4th and 5th centuries, documented European history is marked by the appearance of a whole series of migrant groups comprising 10,000 or more warriors and a large number of dependents, which were powerful enough to survive direct confrontation with the military and political structures of the Roman imperial state. Seen in the broadest of terms, these extraordinary pulses of large-group migration were produced by the intersection, at a critical moment, of a number of related lines of development. First, by the mid- to late fourth century, processes of economic and political development among the Germani had reached a point where political structures had sufficient strength to hold together such enormous groups of warriors and their dependents within a reasonably solid edifice. But, second, these structures had been generated by the expansionary processes of the second and third centuries, and were close enough in time to those events to retain a tradition of migration that could be mobilized when circumstances were appropriate or demanded it. And, third, perhaps the other side of the same coin, their economic structures were not yet so rooted in the arable cultivation of any particular landscape that it was impossible for them to conceive of shifting their center of operations to another locality.

The existence and activities of these very large migrant groups are certainly explicable, but that should not take away from the extraordinary nature of the action. For, though larger and more cohesive than their counterparts of the first century, none of the groups that initially emerged from the imperial periphery was in itself large enough to confront the Roman Empire with success, and yet the aggregate outcome of their collective activities, as we have seen, was the destruction of the west Roman state.

First, it took the unintentional stimulus provided by the Huns to get sufficient numbers of these largely Germanic groups from beyond Rome’s Rhine and Danube frontiers moving on to Roman soil at broadly the same time to make it impossible for the Roman state merely to destroy them. Had these groups – even given that they were larger and more cohesive – arrived separately on Roman territory, the result would eventually have been their destruction, and there were still far too many of them to organize any unified plan for the Empire’s destruction. The key element missing from the Germanic world of the imperial periphery, as opposed to its Arab counterpart, was the lack of a Muhammad to provide an alternative and unifying ideology to that of the Roman state. But, second, once established on Roman soil, the processes of political amalgamation that had been unfolding over the long term beyond the frontier reached a relatively swift climax. This key point was missed in much of the traditional nationalist historiography. By insisting on treating the groups who eventually founded successor states to the western Roman Empire as ancient and unchanging ‘peoples’, this historiography missed the fact that most of them were explicitly documented as new coalitions which formed on Roman territory out of several groups – usually three or four – and who had been independent of one another beyond the frontier. Visigoths and Ostrogoths, Merovingian Franks, the Vandal–Alan coalition – all represented a further step-change in the organization of barbarian political structures, and it was this further evolution which really produced groups that were large enough (deploying now 20,000 warriors and more) to destroy the western Empire.

Contingent as much of this was – there is no sign that there would have been such an influx on to Roman soil without the intrusion of the Huns – one dimension of the action was far from accidental. The new and much larger political formations that became the basis of the successor states could not have come into being on the far side of the frontier. The level of economic development prevalent in the periphery of the Empire in the fourth century did not produce sufficient surplus to allow political leaderships enough patronage to integrate so many followers in that context. Only when the economy of the Empire could be tapped directly for extra wealth, and when the Roman state was providing extra political stimulation towards unification in the form of a real outside threat, was there a sufficient economic and political basis for these larger entities to come into existence. Political structures were the product of, and limited by, prevailing levels of development, and the new state-forming groups could not have emerged in a purely barbarian context.

The epicenter of supra-regional power in western Europe shifted decisively north around the year 500, the second half of the millennium being marked not by Mediterranean-based imperial power, but a series of broadly Frankish dynasties whose prominence was based on economic and demographic assets located north of the Alps between the Atlantic and the Elbe. Again, this can be seen as a culmination of trends of development set in place in the Roman period. The fact that the new imperial power of western Europe should be based on a combination of a chunk of former Roman territory with a substantial part of its ex-periphery is a clear sign of how profoundly that periphery had been transformed by its interaction with Roman power in the preceding centuries. At the birth of Christ, this landscape on either side of the Rhine could never have supported an imperial power, not being remotely wealthy or populous enough, but Roman-era development on both banks of the river radically transformed this situation.

The militarization of its landed elites, meant that this new imperial state was different in kind to its Roman predecessor. Lacking the power to tax agricultural production systematically, it was a less dominant and less self-sufficient kind of entity, which required the profits of expansion to provide its rulers with enough patronage to integrate its constituent landowners. And when broader circumstances did not allow for expansion, fragmentation followed, with power quickly seeping away from the center to the peripheral localities. Periods of great central authority and external aggression – the hallmarks of empire – thus alternated with others of disunity in the second half of the millennium, where Roman imperialism had previously presented a more consistently cohesive face.

At this point, a second nomadic ‘accident’ bent existing processes of development substantially out of shape, and acted as a crucial catalyst in the further transformation of barbarian Europe. Like the Huns, the Avars swiftly built a powerful military coalition in central Europe, one of whose main effects was to siphon off still larger amounts of Mediterranean-generated wealth into now largely Slavic-dominated central Europe. This, of course, further stimulated the competition for control of that wealth, which had already been producing a new kind of military kingship in the Slavic world even before the Avars appeared. Equally important, and just like the Huns, the Avars lacked the governmental capacity to rule their large number of subject groups directly, operating instead through a series of intermediate leaders drawn in part from those subject groups. We lack much in the way of detailed information, but there is every reason to suppose that this would have had the political effect of cementing the social power of chosen subordinates, further pushing at least their Slavic subjects in the direction of political consolidation. The third major effect of the Avars was both to prompt and to enable a wider Slavic diaspora, as some Slavic groups moved further afield to escape the burden of Avar domination. Large-scale Slavic settlement in the former east Roman Balkans – as opposed to mere raiding – only became possible when the Avar Empire (in combination with the Persian and then Arab conquests) destroyed Constantinople’s military superiority in the region. But at least some of these Slavs were as much negatively motivated by a desire to escape Avar domination as they were by a positive desire to move on to Roman territory. Elsewhere we lack historical narratives, but the same desire to escape Avar domination surely played a substantial role in the widespread further dispersals of Slavic groups from c.550 onwards: westwards towards the Elbe, northwards to the Baltic, and even eastwards into the heart of Russia and Ukraine. It remains unclear to what extent this eastern expansion represented the first intrusion of Slavic-speakers into western Russia, or whether we are really looking at the expansion of particular groups of Slavic-speakers who had been made more politically organized and militarily potent through their interactions with the East Romans and Avars, and were thus able to assert their dominance over fellow Slavic-speakers who had not participated in the same process.

Either way, the process of Slavicization – the establishment of the dominance of Slavic-speaking groups across vast areas of central and eastern Europe – again combined processes of migration and development in intimate embrace. Interaction with the Roman Empire’s more developed economy generated new wealth flows which prompted political consolidation and militarization among at least some Slavs. But the groups who benefited from this new wealth were only able to do so because they had already physically moved into a tighter Roman orbit after the collapse of the Hunnic Empire, presumably in order to make precisely these kinds of gain. The sociopolitical revolution they experienced as a consequence then pre-prepared them, especially under the extra stimulus provided by the Avars, to spread their domination by further migration across broad swathes of central and eastern Europe. Some of this certainly involved the absorption of the clearly numerous indigenous populations that had survived the processes of Germanic collapse. Some of that absorption will have been peaceful, as some east Roman sources suggest, but at the same time many Slavic groups were becoming increasingly militarized, and the results of Slavicization were strikingly monolithic.

The Birth of Europe

East Roman wealth and Avar interference marked only the beginning of a much broader development process, which unfolded right across the vast area of Slavic-dominated Europe in the second half of the millennium. By the tenth century, this had produced the first state-like dynastic structures that much of northern and eastern Europe had ever seen.

Much bigger in geographical scale than the Germanic client states that emerged on the fringes of the Roman Empire in the fourth century, they were also capable of greater acts of power. They built more and bigger buildings, supported larger, better-equipped, and more professional armies, and quickly adopted some of the cultural norms of more developed, imperial Europe: above all the Christian religion.

Everything suggests that the transformative mechanisms that produced these new entities were similar in nature to those that had generated the larger Germanic client states of the fourth-century Roman periphery. In both cases, a whole range of new contacts – via trading, raiding, and diplomacy – led to unprecedented flows of wealth into the non-imperial societies. The internal struggle to control these flows of wealth then led to both militarization and the emergence of pre-eminent dynasts, who eventually used their domination of this wealth to generate permanent military machines that could institutionalize their authority by destroying and/or intimidating pre-existing, more local authority structures. As a result, potential rivals were steadily eliminated and power was increasingly centralized.

The other obvious explanation for the faster development of Slavic Europe is the impact of the new military technologies of the last two centuries of the millennium – notably armored knights and castles – which made it much easier for those dynasts who could establish control over the new wealth flows to intimidate potential opponents. For even if the new states all encompassed less intensively governed peripheries, the power that they could exercise in dynastic core territories is (horribly) impressive. The brutal power inherent in the destruction of old tribal strongholds and their replacement with new dynastic ones – in both Bohemia and Poland – emerges strikingly from the dramatic archaeological evidence that has become available in recent years

For the purposes of this study, however, the processes of development are more immediately important for the role they played in bringing to an end the kind of conditions that had generated the large-scale often predatory forms of migration, whether in the concentrated pulse form of the Völkerwanderungen or the more usual flows of increasing momentum, which had been a periodic feature of first-millennium Europe. Inequalities of development across the European landmass had not completely disappeared, but they had been greatly reduced. Essentially, the new trade networks, combined with more general agricultural expansion (the latter still very much a work in progress), meant that politically organized power structures in central and eastern Europe were now able to access wealth in large quantities in their existing locations. Agricultural and broader economic development also meant that they were busy entrenching themselves in some entirely new ways in some specific geographical zones of operation, at least in their core territories.

Migration was never an easy or universally prevalent option in first-millennium Europe, but rather a strategy that was sometimes adopted when the gains were worth the stress of mounting expeditions into only partly known territory with no absolute guarantees of success. Once social elites could access wealth without the extra insecurity of relocation, they became much less likely to resort to that strategy. And, of course, the less they did so in practice, the less they were ever likely to, as previously ingrained migration habits unwound both among themselves, and among the broader population under their control as more intense patterns of arable farming were generating more permanent patterns of cultivation. Overall, both elites and broader populations within barbarian Europe were becoming much more firmly rooted in particular localities, and, as a result, were much less likely to respond by migration even when faced with powerful stimuli that might in other circumstances have led them to shift location.

Where many Goths and other Germani (though certainly not all) responded to the Hunnic menace, and the Slavs to its Avar counterpart, by seeking new homes elsewhere, the arrival of the nomadic Magyars on the Great Hungarian Plain engendered no known secondary migration. The actions, nature and eventual fate of the Moravian state encapsulate the difference. Rather than run away, the Moravians stood and fought the Magyars, just like the armies of Frankish imperial Europe. They lost, but the fact that the Moravians stayed put reflects the deeper roots they had sunk in their own particular locality, and the fundamentally different nature of political power in barbarian Europe as it had developed by the end of the first millennium. Earlier, the prevailing limitations of agricultural technique in barbarian Europe generated a broad local mobility, and large disparities in levels of wealth and development had encouraged the more adventurous periodically to attempt to take over some more attractive corner of the landscape, closer, usually, to imperial sources of wealth. The Moravians, by contrast, built castles and churches in stone, on the back of wealth generated by more intense agricultural regimes and wider exchange networks. With so much invested where they stood, it was not going to be easy to shift their center of operations. The same was true of the other new dynasties of the late first millennium too. All were much more firmly fixed in particular localities than their earlier counterparts, both because of developing agricultural technique and because trade networks made other types of wealth available well beyond the imperial borderlands. In overall terms, processes of development had both eliminated the massive inequalities that had previously made long-distance, large-group migration a reasonably common option for Europe’s barbarians, and rooted central and east European populations more deeply in particular landscapes.

This is what really spelled the end of migration. Some human beings are always on the move in search of greater prosperity or better conditions of life, and European history from the 10th century onwards is still marked by migration on a periodically massive scale. From late in the first millennium onwards, however, medieval migration generally took one of two characteristic forms. On the one hand, we see knight-based elite transfers. The Norman Conquest is a particularly large-scale and successful example of this phenomenon. Much more usual were bands of one or two hundred well-armed men looking to establish small principalities for themselves by ousting sitting elites and/or establishing their rights to draw economic support from a dependent labor force.  The productive rootedness of peasantry and the empowering effect of new military technologies were key factors in dictating the characteristics of this particular migratory form. Castles and armor allowed them to establish a form of local domination based on quite small numbers of men that was extremely hard to shift.

The other common form of migration was the deliberate recruitment of peasantry to work the land, with lords offering attractive tenurial terms to provide the incentive, and employing agents to run recruiting campaigns. Again, new patterns of development were of crucial importance here, since the extra agricultural productivity of the new arable farming technologies being put into practice in the late first millennium made it highly desirable for the masters of the landscape to secure sufficient labor to maximize agricultural outputs.

Though they had come a long way, the new Slavic states still lagged behind western and southern Europe in levels of economic development. They therefore figured among the chief customers for the new peasant labor being mobilized from more developed parts of Europe where higher population levels reduced opportunities for ambitious peasants to get more land on better terms. As a result, hundreds of thousands of peasants from west-central Europe would be attracted eastwards by the offer of land on much better terms than could be secured at home, and the Slavicization of much of old Germanic Europe that had occurred in the early Middle Ages was partly reversed by an influx of Germanic-speaking peasants.

The prevalence of these different forms in a later era, however, is no objection to the broader argument of this book, that larger-scale, socially more broadly based predatory forms of migration than knight-based expansion had played a hugely important role in the making of Europe in the first millennium. The later migratory forms were entirely appropriate to the economic and political conditions prevailing across the Europe of the central Middle Ages.

Note: The Barbarian Europe of this book is the non-Roman, non-imperial world of the east and north and the word barbarian is not being used in a moral sense, since certainly the Romans would be considered barbarians for feeding people to animals for entertainment.

 

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