GAO asks Congress to prepare for Peak Oil

[The Department of Energy (DOE) asked Robert Hirsch to come up with a peak oil risk management and mitigation plan which was published in 2005.  Nothing happened, so in 2007 the Government Accountability Office asked Congress to prepare for Peak oil because of the many risks that could suddenly force a sudden and steep decline of oil in addition to geological depletion. The GAO states that “according to DOE, there is no formal strategy for coordinating and prioritizing federal efforts dealing with peak oil issues, either within DOE or between DOE and other key agencies. While the consequences of a peak would be felt globally, the U.S., as the largest consumer of oil and one of the nations most heavily dependent on oil for transportation, may be particularly vulnerable. Therefore, to better prepare the United States for a peak and decline in oil production, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy take the lead, in coordination with other relevant federal agencies, to establish a peak oil strategy. ” 

It is easy to forget with the low oil prices we have today that Peak Oil hasn’t gone away. Low prices are actually alarming, it means that drilling and future exploration are stopping, setting us up for an even more dramatic oil shock in the future. Peak oil forces a shrinkage in economies, yet our system is predicated on endless growth of credit and debt paid back in an ever growing economy.  Shrinkage is highly deflationary. Credit disappears, oil companies can’t borrow to drill, and customers are so poor that oil at any price is too expensive, and demand drops.  The underlying biophysical reality is that the energy returned on invested is too low to run civilization. 

Alice Friedemann at www.energyskeptic.com]

GAO. 2007. Uncertainty about future oil supply makes it important to develop a strategy for A Peak and decline in oil production. U.S. Government Accountability Office. 82 pages

Key Points

The U.S. economy depends heavily on oil, particularly in the transportation sector. World oil production has been running at near capacity to meet demand, pushing prices upward. Concerns about meeting increasing demand with finite resources have renewed interest in an old question: How long can the oil supply expand before reaching a maximum level of production—a peak—from which it can only decline?

In the United States, alternative fuels and transportation technologies face challenges that could impede their ability to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, unless sufficient time and effort are brought to bear. There is no coordinated federal strategy for reducing uncertainty about the peak’s timing or mitigating its consequences.

Peaking risks for reasons other than geological

The potential for disruptions in key oil-producing regions of the world, such as the Middle East, and the yearly threat of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico have also exerted upward pressure on oil prices.

Without sustained high oil prices, efforts to develop and adopt alternatives may fall by the wayside.

Political Conditions Create Uncertainties about Oil Exploration and Production

In many countries with proven reserves, oil production could be shut down by wars, strikes, and other political events, thus reducing the flow of oil to the world market. If these events occurred repeatedly, or in many different locations, they could constrain exploration and production, resulting in a peak despite the existence of proven oil reserves. Countries with medium or high levels of political risk contained 63 percent of proven worldwide oil reserves, on the basis of Oil and Gas Journal estimates of oil reserves.

Investment Climate Creates Uncertainty about Oil Exploration and Production

85 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves are in countries with medium-to-high investment risk or where foreign investment is prohibited

Foreign investment in the oil sector could be necessary to bring oil to the world market. but many countries have restricted foreign investment. Lack of investment could hasten a peak in oil production because the proper infrastructure might not be available to find and produce oil when needed, and because technical expertise may be lacking. lack of technical expertise could lead to less sophisticated drilling techniques that actually reduce the ability to recover oil in more complex reservoirs

National oil companies may have additional motivations for producing oil, other than meeting consumer demand. For instance, some countries use some profits from national companies to support domestic socioeconomic development, rather than focusing on continued development of oil exploration and production for worldwide consumption. Given the amount of oil controlled by national oil companies, these types of actions have the potential to result in oil production that is not optimized to respond to increases in the demand for oil.

OPEC countries might decide to limit current production to increase prices or to preserve oil and its revenue for future generations.

The rate of decline after a peak is an important consideration because a decline that is more abrupt will likely have more adverse economic consequences than a decline that is less abrupt.

In the United States, alternative transportation technologies have limited potential to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, at least in the near term, because they face many challenges that will take time and effort to overcome. If the peak and decline in oil production occur before these technologies are advanced enough to substantially offset the decline, the consequences could be severe.

The price of soybean oil is not expected to decrease significantly in the future owing to competing demands from the food industry and from soap and detergent manufacturers. These competing demands, as well as the limited land available for the production of feedstocks, also are projected to limit biodiesel’s capacity for large-volume production, according to DOE and USDA. As a result, experts believe that the total production capacity of biodiesel is ultimately limited compared with other alternative fuels.

Ultimately, however, the consequences of a peak and permanent decline in oil production could be even more prolonged and severe than those of past oil supply shocks. Because the decline would be neither temporary nor reversible, the effects would continue until alternative transportation technologies to displace oil became available in sufficient quantities at comparable costs.

Furthermore, because oil production could decline even more each year following a peak, the amount that would have to be replaced by alternatives could also increase year by year.

Consumer actions could help mitigate the consequences of a near-term peak and decline in oil production through demand-reducing behaviors such as carpooling; teleworking; and “eco-driving” measures, such as proper tire inflation and slower driving speeds. Clearly these energy savings come at some cost of convenience and productivity, and limited research has been done to estimate potential fuel savings associated with such efforts. However, DOE estimates that drivers could improve fuel economy between 7 and 23 percent by not exceeding speeds of 60 miles per hour, and IEA estimates that teleworking could reduce total fuel consumption in the U.S. and Canadian transportation sectors combined by between 1 and 4 percent, depending on whether teleworking is undertaken for 2 days per week or the full 5-day week, respectively.

Uncertainty about future oil prices can be a barrier to investment in risky alternative fuels projects. Recent polling data also indicate that consumers’ interest in fuel efficiency tends to increase as gasoline prices rise and decrease when gasoline prices fall.

Federal agency efforts that could reduce uncertainty about the timing of peak oil production or mitigate its consequences are spread across multiple agencies and generally are not focused explicitly on peak oil.

For example, efforts that could be used to reduce uncertainty about the timing of a peak include USGS activities to estimate oil resources and DOE efforts to monitor current supply and demand conditions in global oil markets and to make future projections. Similarly, DOE, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) all have programs and activities that oversee or promote alternative transportation technologies that could mitigate the consequences of a peak.

However, officials of key agencies we spoke with acknowledge that their efforts—with the exception of some studies—are not specifically designed to address peak oil. Federally sponsored studies we reviewed have expressed a growing concern over the potential for a peak and officials from key agencies have identified some options for addressing this issue. For example, DOE and USGS officials told us that developing better information about worldwide demand and supply and improving global estimates for non-conventional oil resources and oil in “frontier” regions that have yet to be fully explored could help prepare for a peak in oil production by reducing uncertainty about its timing. Agency officials also said that, in the event of an imminent peak, they could step up efforts to mitigate the consequences by, for example, further encouraging development and adoption of alternative fuels and advanced vehicle technologies.

However, according to DOE, there is no formal strategy for coordinating and prioritizing federal efforts dealing with peak oil issues, either within DOE or between DOE and other key agencies. While the consequences of a peak would be felt globally, the United States, as the largest consumer of oil and one of the nations most heavily dependent on oil for transportation, may be particularly vulnerable. Therefore, to better prepare the United States for a peak and decline in oil production, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy take the lead, in coordination with other relevant federal agencies, to establish a peak oil strategy. Such a strategy should include efforts to reduce uncertainty about the timing of a peak in oil production and provide timely advice to Congress about cost-effective measures to mitigate the potential consequences of a peak. In commenting on a draft of the report, the Departments of Energy and the Interior generally agreed with the report and recommendations.

Federal agency efforts that could contribute to reducing uncertainty about the timing of a peak in oil production or mitigating its consequences are spread across multiple agencies and are generally not focused explicitly on peak oil issues. Federal agency-sponsored studies have expressed a growing concern over the potential for a peak, and officials from key agencies have identified options for reducing the uncertainty about the timing of a peak in oil production and mitigating its consequences. However, there is no strategy for coordinating or prioritizing such efforts.

Agencies Have Options to Reduce Uncertainty and Mitigate Consequences, but Lack a Coordinated Strategy

In addition to these actions reducing the uncertainty about the timing of a peak, agency officials also told us that they could take additional steps to mitigate the consequences of a peak. For example, DOE officials reported that they could expand their efforts to encourage the development of alternative fuels and advanced vehicle technologies. These efforts could be expanded by conducting more demonstrations of new technologies, facilitating greater information sharing among key industry players, and increasing cost share opportunities with industry for research and development. Agency officials told us such efforts can be essential to developing and encouraging the technologies. Although there are many options to reduce the uncertainty about the timing of a peak or to mitigate its potential consequences, according to DOE, there is no formal strategy to coordinate and prioritize federal programs and activities dealing with peak oil issues—either within DOE or between DOE and other key agencies.

[Extracts from this study below]

Corn ethanol production is technically feasible, it is more expensive to produce than gasoline and will require costly investments in infrastructure, such as pipelines and storage tanks, before it can become widely available as a primary fuel. Key alternative technologies currently supply the equivalent of only about 1 percent of U.S. consumption of petroleum products, and the Department of Energy (DOE) projects that even by 2015, they could displace only the equivalent of 4% of projected U.S. annual consumption.

In such circumstances, an imminent peak and sharp decline in oil production could cause a worldwide recession.

If the peak is delayed, however, these technologies have a greater potential to mitigate the consequences. DOE projects that the technologies could displace up to 34% of U.S. consumption in the 2025 through 2030 time frame, if the challenges are met. The level of effort dedicated to overcoming challenges will depend in part on sustained high oil prices to encourage sufficient investment in and demand for alternatives.

Since 1983, world consumption of petroleum products has grown fairly steadily. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Energy Information Administration (EIA) states in a 2006 report that world consumption of petroleum had reached 84 million barrels per day in 2005.1 EIA also projects that world oil consumption will continue to grow and will reach 118 million barrels per day in 2030.2 About 43% of this growth in oil consumption will come from the non-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Asian countries, including China and India, but the United States will remain the world’s largest oil consumer. In 2005, the United States accounted for just under 25% of world oil consumption.

World oil production has been running at near capacity in recent years to meet rising consumption, putting upward pressure on oil prices. The potential for disruptions in key oil-producing regions of the world, such as the Middle East, and the yearly threat of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico have also exerted upward pressure on oil prices. These conditions have renewed interest in a long-standing question: Will oil supply continue to expand to meet growing demand, or will we soon reach a maximum possible level of production—a peak—beyond which oil supply can only decline?

According to a 2005 report prepared for DOE, without timely preparation, a reduction in world oil production could cause transportation fuel shortages that would translate into significant economic hardship.3

In this context, we (1) examined when oil production could peak, (2) assessed the potential for transportation technologies to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, and (3) examined federal agency efforts that could reduce uncertainty about the timing of peak oil production or mitigate the consequences.

More than 60% of world oil reserves, on the basis of Oil and Gas Journal estimates, are in countries where relatively unstable political conditions could constrain oil exploration and production.

In the United States, alternative transportation technologies face challenges that could impede their ability to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, unless sufficient time and effort are brought to bear. For example:

  • Ethanol from corn is more costly to produce than gasoline, in part because of the high cost of the corn feedstock. Even if ethanol were to become more cost-competitive with gasoline, it could not become widely available without costly investments in infrastructure, including pipelines, storage tanks, and filling stations.
  • Advanced vehicle technologies that could increase mileage or use different fuels are generally more costly than conventional technologies and have not been widely adopted. For example, hybrid electric vehicles can cost from $2,000 to $3,500 more to purchase than comparable conventional vehicles and currently constitute about 1 percent of new vehicle registrations in the United States.
  • Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles are significantly more costly than conventional vehicles to produce. Specifically, the hydrogen fuel cell stack needed to power a vehicle currently costs about $35,000 to produce, in comparison with a conventional gas engine, which costs $2,000 to $3,000.

The level of effort dedicated to overcoming challenges to alternative technologies will depend in part on the price of oil; without sustained high oil prices, efforts to develop and adopt alternatives may fall by the wayside.

Political Conditions Create Uncertainties about Oil Exploration and Production

In many countries with proven reserves, oil production could be shut down by wars, strikes, and other political events, thus reducing the flow of oil to the world market. If these events occurred repeatedly, or in many different locations, they could constrain exploration and production, resulting in a peak despite the existence of proven oil reserves. For example, according to a news account, crude oil output in Iraq dropped from 3.0 million barrels per day before the 1990 gulf war to about 2.0 million barrels per day in 2006, and a labor strike in the Venezuelan oil sector led to a drop in exports to the United States of 1.2 million barrels. Although these were isolated and temporary oil supply disruptions, if enough similar events occurred with sufficient frequency, the overall impact could constrain production capacity, thus making it impossible for supply to expand along with demand for oil. Using a measure of political risk that assesses the likelihood that events such as civil wars, coups, and labor strikes will occur in a magnitude sufficient to reduce a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate over the next 5 years,16 we found that four countries—Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela—that possess proven oil reserves greater than 10 billion barrels (high reserves) also face high levels of political risk.

These four countries contain almost one-third of worldwide oil reserves. Countries with medium or high levels of political risk contained 63 percent of proven worldwide oil reserves, on the basis of Oil and Gas Journal estimates of oil reserves. (See fig. 7.)17

16 The political risk measure comes from Global Insight’s Global Risk Service. Global Insight is a worldwide consulting firm headquartered in Massachusetts. The Global Risk Service political risk score is a summary of probabilities that different political events, such as civil war, will reduce GDP growth rates. The subjective probabilities are assessed by country analysts at Global Insight, on the basis of a wide range of information, and are reviewed by a team to ensure consistency across countries. The measures are revised quarterly; the measure we used comes from the second quarter of 2006.

Investment Climate Creates Uncertainty about Oil Exploration and Production

Foreign investment in the oil sector could be necessary to bring oil to the world market, according to studies we reviewed and experts we consulted, but many countries have restricted foreign investment. Lack of investment could hasten a peak in oil production because the proper infrastructure might not be available to find and produce oil when needed, and because technical expertise may be lacking. The important role foreign investment plays in oil production is illustrated in Kazakhstan, where the National Commission on Energy Policy found that opening the energy sector to foreign investment in the early 1990s led to a doubling in oil production between 1998 and 2002.

Direct foreign investment in Venezuela was strongly correlated with oil production in that country, and that when foreign investment declined between 2001 and 2004, oil production also declined.

LACK OF EXPERTISE

Industry officials told us that lack of technical expertise could lead to less sophisticated drilling techniques that actually reduce the ability to recover oil in more complex reservoirs. For example, according to industry officials, some Russian wells have difficulties with high water cut—that is, a high ratio of water to oil—making oil difficult to get out of the ground at current prices. This water cut problem stems from not using technically advanced methods when the wells were initially drilled.

We have previously reported that the Venezuelan national oil company, PDVSA, lost technical expertise when it fired thousands of employees following a strike in 2002 and 2003.

In contrast, other national oil companies, such as Saudi Aramco, are widely perceived to possess considerable technical expertise. According to our analysis, 85% of the world’s proven oil reserves are in countries with medium-to-high investment risk or where foreign investment is prohibited, on the basis of Oil and Gas Journal estimates of oil reserves. (See fig. 8.) For example, over one-third of the world’s proven oil reserves lie in only five countries—China, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela—all of which have a high likelihood of seeing a worsening investment climate. Three countries with large oil reserves—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Mexico—prohibit foreign investment in the oil sector, and most major oil-producing countries have some type of restrictions on foreign investment. Furthermore, some countries that previously allowed foreign investment, such as Russia and Venezuela, appear to be reasserting state control over the oil sector, according to DOE.

GAO, Oil and Gas Development: Increased Permitting Activity Has Lessened BLM’s Ability to Meet Its Environmental Protection Responsibilities, GAO-05-418 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005). 1

According to IEA, infrastructure investment in exploration and production would need to total about $2.25 trillion from 2004 through 2030. This investment will be needed to expand supply capacity and to replace existing and future supply facilities that will be closed during the projection period. National Commission on Energy Policy, Ending the Energy Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America’s Energy Challenges (December 2004), available at www.energycommission.org. 21GAO, Energy Security: Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production, GAO-06-668 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2006). Figure 8: Worldwide Proven Oil Reserves, by Investment Risk

Foreign investment in the oil sector also may be limited because national oil companies control the supply.

National oil companies may have additional motivations for producing oil, other than meeting consumer demand. For instance, some countries use some profits from national companies to support domestic socioeconomic development, rather than focusing on continued development of oil exploration and production for worldwide consumption. Given the amount of oil controlled by national oil companies, these types of actions have the potential to result in oil production that is not optimized to respond to increases in the demand for oil.

OPEC countries might decide to limit current production to increase prices or to preserve oil and its revenue for future generations.

Uncertainty about the rate of decline is illustrated in studies that estimate the timing of a peak. IEA, for example, estimates that this decline will range somewhere between 5 percent and 11 percent annually. Other studies assume the rate of decline in production after a peak will be the same as the rise in production that occurred before the peak. Another methodology, employed by EIA, assumes that the resulting decline will actually be faster than the rise in production that occurred before the peak. The rate of decline after a peak is an important consideration because a decline that is more abrupt will likely have more adverse economic consequences than a decline that is less abrupt.

Alternative Transportation Technologies Face Challenges in Mitigating the Consequences of the Peak and Decline

In the United States, alternative transportation technologies have limited potential to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, at least in the near term, because they face many challenges that will take time and effort to overcome. If the peak and decline in oil production occur before these technologies are advanced enough to substantially offset the decline, the consequences could be severe. If the peak occurs in the more distant future, however, alternative technologies have a greater potential to mitigate the consequences.

Development and Adoption of Technologies to Displace Oil Will Take Time and Effort

Development and widespread adoption of the 7 alternative fuels and advanced vehicle technologies we examined will take time, and significant challenges will have to be overcome, according to DOE. These technologies include ethanol, biodiesel, biomass gas-to-liquid, coal gas-to-liquid, natural gas and natural gas vehicles, advanced vehicle technologies, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles.

Widespread use of ethanol would require a turnover in the vehicle fleet because most current vehicle engines cannot effectively burn ethanol in high concentrations.

Biodiesel is a renewable fuel that has similar properties to petroleum diesel but can be produced from vegetable oils or animal fats. It is currently used in small quantities in the United States, but it is not cost-competitive with gasoline or diesel. The cost of biodiesel feedstocks— which in the United States largely consist of soybean oil—are the largest component of production costs. The price of soybean oil is not expected to decrease significantly in the future owing to competing demands from the food industry and from soap and detergent manufacturers. These competing demands, as well as the limited land available for the production of feedstocks, also are projected to limit biodiesel’s capacity for large-volume production, according to DOE and USDA. As a result, experts believe that the total production capacity of biodiesel is ultimately limited compared with other alternative fuels.

Biomass gas-to-liquid (biomass GTL) is a fuel produced from biomass feedstocks by gasifying the feedstocks into an intermediary product, referred to as syngas, before converting it into a diesel-like fuel. This fuel is not commercially produced, and a number of technological and economic challenges would need to be overcome for commercial viability. These challenges include identifying biomass feedstocks that are suitable for efficient conversion to a syngas and developing effective methods for preparing the biomass for conversion into a syngas. Furthermore, DOE researchers report that significant work remains to successfully gasify biomass feedstocks on a large enough scale to demonstrate commercial viability. In the absence of these developments, DOE reported that the costs of producing biomass GTL will be very high and significant uncertainty surrounding its ultimate commercial feasibility will exist.

Coal gas-to-liquid (coal GTL) is a fuel produced by gasifying coal into a syngas before being converted into a diesel-like fuel. This fuel is commercially produced outside the United States, but none of the production facilities are considered profitable.

DOE reported that high capital investments—both in money and time—deter the commercial development of coal GTL in the United States. Specifically, DOE estimates that construction of a coal GTL conversion plant could cost up to $3.5 billion and would require at least 5 to 6 years to construct. Furthermore, potential investors are deterred from this investment because of the risks associated with the lengthy, uncertain, and costly regulatory process required to build such a facility.

An expert at DOE also expressed concern that the infrastructure required to produce or transport coal may be insufficient. For example, the rail network for transporting western coal is already operating at full capacity and, owing to safety and environmental concerns, there is significant uncertainty about the feasibility of expanding the production capabilities of eastern coal mines. Coal GTL production also faces serious environmental concerns because of the carbon dioxide emitted during production.

Natural gas is an alternative fuel that can be used as either a compressed natural gas or a liquefied natural gas. Demand for natural gas in other markets, such as home heating and energy generation, presents substantial competitive risks to the natural gas vehicle industry. Production costs for natural gas vehicles are also higher than for conventional vehicles because of the incremental cost associated with a high-pressure natural gas tank. For example, light-duty natural gas vehicles can cost $1,500 to $6,000 more than comparable conventional vehicles, while heavy-duty natural gas vehicles cost $30,000 to $50,000 more than comparable conventional vehicles. Regarding infrastructure, retrofitting refueling stations so that they can accommodate natural gas could cost from $100,000 to $1 million per station, depending on the size,

Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles

A hydrogen fuel cell vehicle is powered by the electricity produced from an electrochemical reaction between hydrogen from a hydrogen containing fuel and oxygen from the air. In the United States, these vehicles are still in the development stage, and making these vehicles commercially feasible presents a number of challenges. While a conventional gas engine costs $2,000 to $3,000 to produce, the stack of hydrogen fuel cells needed to power a vehicle costs $35,000 to produce. Furthermore, DOE researchers have yet to develop a method for feasibly storing hydrogen in a vehicle that allows a range of at least 300 miles before refueling. Fuel cell vehicles also are not yet able to last for 120,000 miles, which DOE believes to be the target for commercial viability. In addition, developing an infrastructure for distributing hydrogen—either through pipelines or through trucking—is expected to be complicated, costly, and time-consuming. Delivering hydrogen from a central source requires a large amount of energy and is considered costly and technically challenging. DOE has determined that decentralized production of hydrogen directly at filling stations could be a more viable approach than centralized production in some cases, but a cost-effective mechanism for converting energy sources into hydrogen at a filling station has yet to be developed.

Consequences Could Be Severe If Alternative Technologies Are Not Available

Because development and widespread adoption of technologies to displace oil will take time and effort, an imminent peak and sharp decline in oil production could have severe consequences. The technologies we examined currently supply the equivalent of only about 1% of U.S. annual consumption of petroleum products, and DOE projects that even under optimistic scenarios, these technologies could displace only the equivalent of about 4% of annual projected U.S. consumption by around 2015. If the decline in oil production exceeded the ability of alternative technologies to displace oil, energy consumption would be constricted, and as consumers competed for increasingly scarce oil resources, oil prices would sharply increase. In this respect, the consequences could initially resemble those of past oil supply shocks, which have been associated with significant economic damage. For example, disruptions in oil supply associated with the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 and the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 caused unprecedented increases in oil prices and were associated with worldwide recessions. In addition, a number of studies we reviewed indicate that most of the U.S. recessions in the post-World War II era were preceded by oil supply shocks and the associated sudden rise in oil prices.

Ultimately, however, the consequences of a peak and permanent decline in oil production could be even more prolonged and severe than those of past oil supply shocks. Because the decline would be neither temporary nor reversible, the effects would continue until alternative transportation technologies to displace oil became available in sufficient quantities at comparable costs. Furthermore, because oil production could decline even more each year following a peak, the amount that would have to be replaced by alternatives could also increase year by year.

Consumer actions could help mitigate the consequences of a near-term peak and decline in oil production through demand-reducing behaviors such as carpooling; teleworking; and “eco-driving” measures, such as proper tire inflation and slower driving speeds. Clearly these energy savings come at some cost of convenience and productivity, and limited research has been done to estimate potential fuel savings associated with such efforts. However, DOE estimates that drivers could improve fuel economy between 7 and 23 percent by not exceeding speeds of 60 miles per hour, and IEA estimates that teleworking could reduce total fuel consumption in the U.S. and Canadian transportation sectors combined by between 1 and 4 percent, depending on whether teleworking is undertaken for 2 days per week or the full 5-day week, respectively.

Uncertainty about future oil prices can be a barrier to investment in risky alternative fuels projects. Recent polling data also indicate that consumers’ interest in fuel efficiency tends to increase as gasoline prices rise and decrease when gasoline prices fall.

Federal Agencies Do Not Have a Coordinated Strategy to Address Peak Oil Issues

Federal agency efforts that could contribute to reducing uncertainty about the timing of a peak in oil production or mitigating its consequences are spread across multiple agencies and are generally not focused explicitly on peak oil issues. Federal agency-sponsored studies have expressed a growing concern over the potential for a peak, and officials from key agencies have identified options for reducing the uncertainty about the timing of a peak in oil production and mitigating its consequences. However, there is no strategy for coordinating or prioritizing such efforts.

Agencies Have Options to Reduce Uncertainty and Mitigate Consequences, but Lack a Coordinated Strategy

In addition to these actions reducing the uncertainty about the timing of a peak, agency officials also told us that they could take additional steps to mitigate the consequences of a peak. For example, DOE officials reported that they could expand their efforts to encourage the development of alternative fuels and advanced vehicle technologies. These efforts could be expanded by conducting more demonstrations of new technologies, facilitating greater information sharing among key industry players, and increasing cost share opportunities with industry for research and development. Agency officials told us such efforts can be essential to developing and encouraging the technologies. Although there are many options to reduce the uncertainty about the timing of a peak or to mitigate its potential consequences, according to DOE, there is no formal strategy to coordinate and prioritize federal programs and activities dealing with peak oil issues—either within DOE or between DOE and other key agencies.

Conclusions

The prospect of a peak in oil production presents problems of global proportion whose consequences will depend critically on our preparedness. The consequences would be most dire if a peak occurred soon, without warning, and were followed by a sharp decline in oil production because alternative energy sources, particularly for transportation, are not yet available in large quantities. Such a peak would require sharp reductions in oil consumption, and the competition for increasingly scarce energy would drive up prices, possibly to unprecedented levels, causing severe economic damage.

While these consequences would be felt globally, the United States, as the largest consumer of oil and one of the nation’s most heavily dependent on oil for transportation, may be especially vulnerable among the industrialized nations of the world.

Automotive fuel efficiency could be improved. Alternatives will require large investments, and in some cases, major changes in infrastructure or break-through technological advances. In the past, the private sector has responded to higher oil prices by investing in alternatives, but investment is determined largely by price expectations, so unless high oil prices are sustained, we cannot expect private investment in alternatives to continue at current levels.

While public and private responses to an anticipated peak could mitigate the consequences significantly, federal agencies currently have no coordinated or well-defined strategy either to reduce uncertainty about the timing of a peak or to mitigate its consequences. This lack of a strategy makes it difficult to gauge the appropriate level of effort or resources to commit to alternatives to oil and puts the nation unnecessarily at risk.

For investment risk in the oil and gas sectors, the factors are: investment/maintenance risk, input risk, production risk, sales risk, and revenue/repatriation risk. We compared political and investment risk with Oil and Gas Journal oil reserves estimates.

Oil sands are deposits of bitumen, a thick, sticky form of crude oil, which is so heavy and viscous that it will not flow unless heated or diluted with lighter hydrocarbons. It must be rigorously treated to convert it into an upgraded crude oil before it can be used by refineries to produce gasoline and diesel fuels. While conventional crude flows naturally or is pumped from the ground, oil sands must be mined or recovered “in-situ,” or in place. During oil sands mining, approximately 2 tons of oil sands must be dug up, moved, and processed to produce 1 barrel of oil. During in-situ recovery, heat, solvents, or gases are used to produce the oil from oil sands buried too deeply to mine. The largest deposit of oil sands globally is found in Alberta, Canada—accounting for at least 85 percent of the world’s oil sands reserves.

Heavy and extra-heavy oils are dense, viscous oils that generally require advanced production technologies, such as EOR, and substantial processing to be converted into petroleum products. Heavy and extra-heavy oil reserves occur in many regions around the world, with the Orinoco Oil Belt in Eastern Venezuela comprising almost 90% of the total extra-heavy oil in the world. In the United States, heavy oil reserves are primarily found in Alaska, California, and Wyoming, and some commercial heavy oil production is occurring domestically. The cost of producing heavy and extra-heavy oil is greater than the cost of producing conventional oil, due to, among other things, higher drilling, refining, and transporting costs. The 2005 Venezuelan extra-heavy oil production was estimated to be 600,000 barrels of oil per day and is projected to at least sustain this production rate through 2030. Development of the heavy oil resource in the United States faces environmental, economic, technical, permitting, and access-to-skilled-labor challenges.

Oil shale refers to sedimentary rock that contains solid bituminous materials that are released as petroleum-like liquids when the rock is heated. To obtain oil from oil shale, the shale must be heated and the resultant liquid must be captured, in a process referred to as “retorting.” Oil shale can be produced by mining followed by surface retorting or by in-situ retorting. The largest known oil shale deposits in the world are in the Green River Formation, which covers portions of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. Estimates of the oil resource in place range from 1.5 trillion to 1.8 trillion barrels, but not all of the resource is recoverable. In addition to the Green River Formation, Australia and Morocco are believed to have oil shale resources. At the present time, a RAND study reported there are economic and technical concerns associated with the development of oil shale in the United States, such that there is uncertainty regarding whether industry will ultimately invest in commercial development of the resource. Infrastructure costs for oil shale production include the following: additional electricity, water, and transportation needs. A RAND study expects a dedicated power plant for the production of oil shale to exceed $1 billion. Examples of key challenges facing the development of oil shale include the following: (1) controlling and monitoring groundwater, (2) permitting and emissions concerns associated with new power generation facilities, (3) reducing overall operating costs, (4) water consumption, and (5) land disturbance and reclamation.

Coal and Biomass Gas-to-Liquids Gas-to-liquid (GTL) alternatives include the production of liquid fuels from a variety of feedstocks, via the Fisher-Tropsch process. In the FischerTropsch process, feedstocks such as coal and biomass are converted into a syngas, before the gas is converted into a diesel-like fuel. The diesel-like fuel is low in toxicity and is virtually interchangeable with conventional diesel fuels. Although these technologies have been available in some form since the 1920s, and coal GTL was used heavily by the German military during World War II, GTL technologies are not widely used today. Currently, there is no commercial production of biomass GTL and the only commercial production of coal GTL occurs in South Africa, where the Sasol Corporation currently produces 150,000 barrels of fuel from coal per day. Extensive research and development, however, is currently under way to further develop this technology because automakers consider GTL fuels viable alternatives to oil without compromising fuel efficiency or requiring major infrastructure changes.

Potential Production • Coal. Experts project that, at most, 80,000 barrels per day could be produced by 2015 and 1.7 million barrels per day by 2030.

Greene 2006 (also wrote this study, cited in the report: David L. Greene, Janet L. Hopson, and Jai Li, Running Out Of and Into Oil: Analyzing Global Oil Depletion and Transition Through 2050, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Department of Energy (2003)

The debate is important because a sudden, unanticipated and permanent decline in world oil production would severely damage world economies, probably for a decade or longer. In addition, the transition from oil to some other source of energy for transportation is almost certain to have important economic, environmental and security implications. A transition to more carbon intensive fossil energy sources would increase the likelihood of major climate changes. As several have pointed out, the longer- term problem of climate change depends on the world’s decision to burn or not to burn the world’s vast fossil resources of coal and unconventional oil and gas and release the carbon to the atmosphere.

Posted in Congressional Record U.S., Peak Oil | Tagged , , , , , | Comments Off on GAO asks Congress to prepare for Peak Oil

U.S. Senate 2006 hearing on energy independence

[This is one of the most important hearings on U.S. Energy Policy I’ve read so far.  The title should have been Energy Dependence though.

Senator Lieberman has many important points to make, too long to excerpt in this introduction, and here are a few more quotes from this hearing:

R. James Woolsey, former director of the CIA: “Deep-water drilling and other opportunities for increases in supply of conventional oil may provide important increases in supply but are unlikely to change this basic picture. If world production of conventional oil has peaked or is about to, this of course further deepens our dilemma and increases costs sooner. Even if other production comes on line, e.g. from unconventional sources such as tar sands in Alberta or shale in the American West, their relatively high cost of production could permit low-cost producers of conventional oil, particularly Saudi Arabia, to increase production, drop prices for a time, and undermine the economic viability of the higher-cost competitors, as occurred in the mid-1980’s”.

Frank Verrastro, Director at Energy Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies: “We cannot ignore preparations for transitioning to the inevitable post-oil world, a transition which former Energy and Defense Secretary, Jim Shlesinger, has characterized as the greatest challenge this country and the world will face outside of war….current consumption trends are simply unsustainable in the long term”. 

Amory Lovins, CEO Rocky Mountain Institute: “I have studied the White House Fact Sheet on the Advanced Energy Initiative with some puzzlement. The stated purpose is ‘‘to help break America’s dependence on foreign source of energy.’’ This can only mean oil: the U.S. does not import coal, uranium is in surplus, and natural gas imports are small (although Administration policy is to increase them by several-fold, creating a new dependence). However, the section on ‘‘diversifying energy sources’’ is all about electricity, which has almost nothing to do with oil. This confusion between oil and electricity, conflating them both into ‘‘energy,’’ bemuses energy experts the world over who assume that responsible U.S. officials must understand these fundamentals; yet such jumbled formulations persist.  Energy independence is not only about oil. Many sources of LNG raise similar concerns of security, dependence, site vulnerability, and cost. I do not expect that Iran and Russia would be more reliable, long-run sources of gas than Persian Gulf states are today of oil. Coal and nuclear generation of electricity have virtually nothing to do with displacing oil, which is the nub of the Nation’s energy security problem”.

Now in 2016 the oil and gas bubble is bursting because oil and gas companies borrowed about $300 billion more than they earned, thanks mainly to clueless middle-class investors who bought high-yield bond and mutual funds, suckered yet again by Wall Street. If only they’d followed shalebubble.org, resilience.org, energyskeptic.com, and the news media links I’ve put at the bottom of this post. 

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer]

Senate 109-412. March 7, 2006. Energy Independence. U.S. SENATE Committee on energy & natural resources. U.S. Senate Hearing. 103 pages.

Excerpts:

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Please accept my thanks for the opportunity to submit this statement as part of the record of today’s hearing in the issue of oil dependence—or, as President Bush put it, our ‘‘addiction’’ to oil. Let me be clear that I am under no illusions that our economy can be completely energy independent in the literal sense of that term. We can, however, ensure that our economy grows while becoming less and less oil-intensive. We have the technology to do it, we have the homegrown fuels to do it and, more and more, I believe we have the will to do it. And, if we succeed we will be making our economy more and more resilient against the dangers and shocks of the global oil system, while freeing our national security and our foreign policy from the very real threats and distortions that our oil-dependence imposes.

While geologists and economists can debate when the oil supply will ‘‘peak,’’ what is indisputable is that demand is now exploding as developing nations such as India and China increase consumption.

According to the IEA, global demand for oil—now about 85 million barrels a day— will increase by more than 50% to 130 million barrels a day between now and 2030 if nothing is done. The industrialized world’s dependence on oil heightens global instability. The authors of the IEA report note that the way things are going ‘‘we are ending up with 95% of the world relying for its economic well-being on decisions made by five or six countries in the Middle East.’’ The recent attack on the Abqaiq oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia reminds us not only of our dangerous dependence on foreign oil, but that that vulnerability is recognized by our enemies. Besides the Mideast, I would add that Nigeria is roiled by instability, Venezuela’s current leadership is hostile to us and Russia’s resurgent state power has ominous overtones.

We are just one well-orchestrated terrorist attack or political upheaval away from a $100-a-barrel overnight price spike that would that would send the global economy tumbling and the industrialized world, including China and India, scrambling to secure supplies from the remaining and limited number of oil supply sites. History tells us that wars have started over such competition.

Left unchecked, I fear that we are literally watching the slow but steady erosion of America’s power and independence as a nation—our economic and military power and our political independence. We are burning it up in our automobile engines and spewing it from our tailpipes because of our absolute dependence on oil to fuel our cars and trucks. We need to transform our total transportation infrastructure from the refinery to the tailpipe and each step in between because transportation is the key to energy independence.

That dependence on oil—and that means foreign oil because our own reserves are less than 1% of the world’s oil reserves—puts us in jeopardy in three key ways—a convergence forming a perfect storm that is extremely dangerous to America’s national security and economy.

We must depend for our oil on a global gallery of nations that are politically unstable, unreliable, or just plain hostile to us. All that and much more should make us worry because if we don’t change—it is within their borders and under their earth and waters that our economic and national security lies. Doing nothing about our oil dependency will make us a pitiful giant—like Gulliver in Lilliput—tied down by smaller nations and subject to their whims. And we will have given them the ropes and helped them tie the knots.

The structure of the global oil market deeply affects—and distorts—our foreign policy. Our broader interests and aspirations must compete with our own need for oil and the growing thirst for it in the rest of the world—especially by China and India. As a study in the journal Foreign Affairs makes clear, China is moving aggressively to compete for the world’s limited supplies of oil not just with its growing economic power, but with its growing military and diplomatic power as well.

We can take on this problem now and stand tall as the free and independent giant we are by reducing America’s dependence on oil.

I can almost hear colleagues murmur, So, Senator Lieberman, what else is new? We’ve been hearing this for years and nothing has happened. I can’t blame you if you are skeptical. The struggle for oil independence has been going on at least since Jimmy Carter was President.

But things have changed since the days of Jimmy Carter and even since last summer. There is a new understanding of the depth of the crisis that our oil dependence is creating. Last summer’s doubling of gasoline and crude oil prices hit tens of millions of Americans with the global reality of oil demand and pricing. And Hurricane Katrina reminded us how vulnerable our supplies can become. This reality is bipartisan.

We will push harder for more and quicker production and commercialization of biomass-based fuels.

As always, there is a do-nothing crowd that says the ever-rising price of gasoline and crude oil are the cure—that with higher prices people will reduce consumption and the market will respond with greater investments in the supply of oil to bring prices down. But all that would do is perpetuate the problem. Market-driven oil-dependency is still dependency on foreign oil, driving us further down the current path toward national insecurity and economic and environmental troubles.

Some say that we can ease the crisis through greater domestic drilling—in places like the Arctic Refuge and other public lands or off our shores. But that won’t make a dent in the problem. In the world of oil, geology is destiny and the U.S. today has only 1 percent of the world’s oil reserves.

And that small new supply wouldn’t matter much in the global market, since the price of oil produced within the United States rises and falls with the global market, regardless of where it is produced. We just don’t have enough oil in the U.S. anymore. And no matter how much more we drill, we will still be paying the world price of oil—not an American price.

 

FRANK VERRASTRO, Director & Senior Fellow, Energy Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies

We cannot ignore preparations for transitioning to the inevitable post-oil world, a transition which former Energy and Defense Secretary, Jim Shlesinger, has characterized as the greatest challenge this country and the world will face outside of war.

Analysis performed by EIA and the National Renewable Energy Lab estimates that even under optimistic assumptions, alternative transport fuels, excluding electric hybrid plug-ins, can be expected to displace or replace a maximum of 10% of conventional liquid transport fuels by 2030, leaving petroleum-based fuels, new technologies, conservation, and improved efficiency gains to deal with the remaining 90%.

For purposes of comparison, a billion gallons of alternative fuels per year roughly translates to 65,000 barrels a day of conventional gasoline and maybe less depending on energy content. And we currently consume over nine million barrels a day of gas every day. So while contributions from alternate fuels will help meet increased demand, petroleum-based fuels are likely to remain the overwhelming fuel of choice for at least the next 20 years.

To the extent practicable, every effort should be made to pursue policies and changes that fully take into account investment in market practices and utilize as much as possible existing infrastructure and currently available technologies.

And fuels alone are not the answer. We need radical changes to our motor vehicles, both in terms of energy and design and construction material, as well as to the way we transport goods and people.

We frequently speak about politically unstable sources of supplies from around the globe, but the largest protracted losses of global oil and gas output in both 2004 and 2005 were the results of hurricanes in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico.

my professional background also includes a variety of energy policy positions in the White House, and the Departments of Interior and Energy, as well as senior executive positions dealing with both upstream and downstream issues in the energy sector, first as Director of Refinery Policy and Crude Oil Planning for TOSCO Corporation, and more recently as a Senior Vice President at Pennzoil Company.

My concern over the continued ability of this nation to secure energy supplies from an increasing list of inaccessible, high risk or less than reliable parts of the world has prompted policymakers to once again raise the issues of both the desirability and achievability of energy independence.

Consumers have come to both enjoy and expect a healthy domestic economy, which is underpinned by an energy supply that is at once available, affordable, secure, and environmentally benign. In this new world are those criteria able to be satisfied or are they just beyond the reach of current energy paradigms and policies? Global energy demand is projected to increase by 50% over the next 25 years, yet the relative shares of the 5 major fuel groups—oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear and renewables—are expected to remain remarkably constant, with fossil fuel consumption still accounting for over 85% of total energy demand in 2025. In the developing world, that figure exceeds 90%, carrying obvious consequences for consumer competition and the environment. As we consider our energy options, I would strongly urge that we not forget the substantial contributions that conservation and improved efficiency can make to achieving our future energy goals.

In the power generation sector, it currently takes 3 to 4 units of primary energy to produce one unit of delivered electricity. Conservation, efficiency and infrastructure delivery improvements coupled with additional contributions from renewable energy sources can obviate the need for additional, incremental production of fossil fuels for power generation purposes.

Analyzing this forecasted future leads to 2 inescapable conclusions. The first is that absent major technological breakthroughs, significant changes in consumption patterns and policies, or massive dislocations that alter the course of events, current consumption trends are simply unsustainable in the long term. Even with a significant contribution from a wide range of alternative fuels, conventional energy sources will continue to dominate the landscape for at least the next several decades.

For the past 30 years, U.S. oil policy initiatives have centered around 4 major themes: increasing and diversifying sources of conventional and unconventional energy supplies both at home and abroad; encouraging, wherever practicable and politically achievable, the adoption of improvements in conservation and fuel efficiency; the expansion of the strategic petroleum reserve; and reliance on Saudi Arabia to balance oil markets and moderate prices.

For the most part, in an era of surplus supply, this strategy has largely worked. Times and market conditions, however, may well be changing. Global demand for all energy forms is accelerating, and resources are increasingly controlled by national players, whose primary national objectives may not conform to traditional market practices or concerns.

It took the world:

  • 18 years (from 1977-1995) to grow global oil demand from 60 to 70 million barrels per day (mmb/d)
  • 8 years to grow from 70 to 80 mmb/d 
  • 4 years at current growth rates to reach over 90 mmb/d by 2010.

Forecasts for oil consumption in 2030 approximate 115-120 mmb/d—roughly half again as much as we currently consume. Setting aside the debate about resource availability or so called ‘‘peak oil,’’ market growth of that magnitude will require huge investments, place enormous strains on transportation and infrastructure needs, and carry significant implications for security, global geopolitics and the environment.

In addition, the entry of new market players, like China and India, with growing energy appetites and expanding economies may pose competitive threats to America’s market dominance. Added to that are heightened security concerns about threats to infrastructure and facilities posed by terrorist groups and insurgents. Taken together, these changing circumstances have the potential to re-order the marketplace and fundamentally alter the geopolitical balance that has governed the past half century. Such changes may also warrant a thoughtful recalibration of our economic, security, environmental, energy and foreign policy calculations and policy choices.

The United States is currently the world’s largest producer, consumer, and net importer of energy. We are home to roughly 5% of the world’s population and produce 17% of the total energy supplied. Yet in the process of generating some 30% of global GDP, America consumes nearly a quarter of the world’s energy.

Projected supplies of LNG IMPORTS [Now many in Congress want to EXPORT LNG] assume that additional re-gasification capacity will be permitted and constructed either within the United States or in areas proximate to U.S. borders—an uncertain assumption. In addition to environmental, safety, competition, and siting issues, opponents of additional LNG re-gas projects increasingly cite security and foreign policy concerns about exposing the U.S. electric grid system to reliance on imports from countries, many of which are oil exporters found in troubled regions of the world.

Biomass. Since only a portion of the plant material can be used to produce ethanol, issues have been raised about how to handle the residual waste material—e.g., stalks, leaves and husks. A partial answer to this dilemma has resulted in research into what is called cellulosic ethanol, but transportation and energy content issues still remain to be resolved. For example, since a gallon of ethanol contains less energy than a comparable gallon of gasoline, poorer mileage ratings and more frequent fuel stops are impediments that need to be overcome. Additionally, cold weather start problems and transport in carriers other than pipelines may complicate gasoline substitution on a national scale.

Based on current government data, the capital investment costs for most, if not all, of these synthetic fuel technologies is considerably more than that required for a traditional crude oil refinery (see page 57, of EIA’s 2006 Annual Energy Outlook). Further, for purposes of comparison, EIA estimates that there is currently some 300,000 b/d of installed corn ethanol capacity in the United States and an additional 12,000 b/d of biodiesel capacity. Additionally, excluding ‘‘pilot’’ facilities, the latest EIA statistics indicate that there are currently no commercial BTL, GTL or CTL plants in the United States. In contrast, U.S. refining capacity currently exceeds 17,000,000 barrels per day and domestic gasoline demand averages over 9,000,000 barrels per day.

Absent significant policy and regulatory changes to promote increased fuel efficiency, major technological breakthroughs, and substantial changes in consumer/ driver behavior (based on environmental, security or foreign policy considerations), petroleum based fuels will remain the overwhelming fuel of choice for at least the next 20-30 years.

Given projections for increasing fuel demand, the inescapable conclusion is that oil imports will also be with us for decades to come. In that context, we would do well to ratchet down the political rhetoric surrounding the notion of achieving energy independence and instead refocus our efforts to deal with an inter-dependent energy future and simultaneously prepare for the (longer term) transition to a post-oil world, a transition which former Energy and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has characterized as ‘‘. . . the greatest challenge this country and the world will face—outside of war.’’

U.S. OIL IMPORTS—SOURCES AND CONCERNS. In his State of the Union address, President Bush advanced the challenge of reducing this nation’s ‘‘addiction to oil’’ and reducing by 75% our reliance on oil imports from the Middle East. At best, this line was a thinly veiled attempt to drum up domestic political support for a valiant yet difficult effort to reduce petroleum consumption. At worst, it showed a decided lack of understanding of U.S. import sources, global oil markets and reserve holders.

PITFALLS AND WARNINGS. As with any transformational change, issues surrounding the approach, time horizon and levers designed to accomplish the objective remain keys to success. Dealing with an energy transition is no less daunting. To the extent practicable, every effort should be made to pursue policies and changes that fully take into account investment and market practices and utilize as much as possible existing infrastructure and currently available technologies. Minimizing uncertainty, avoiding conflicting or contradictory policy signals, and evaluating/selecting options based on economic efficiency and merit rather than political efficacy are also are highly recommended.

Changing market and political conditions may complicate America’s policy agenda going forward, and these include:

  1. Energy security, broadly defined in terms of attacks on infrastructure, and greater vulnerability to imported energy supply threats, either physical or financial, due to growing production concentration;
  2. Market developments, particularly in alternative fuels and with respect to climate change. In the future, markets may drive policy more than policy drives markets;
  3. Less multilateral cooperation in the international oil trading and investment market places as governments pursue specific narrow interests;
  4. Increased vulnerability to supply disruptions due to growing natural gas import dependence in the power sector; and
  5. Political hostility to U.S. policy in specific regions as allies and friends abandon the United States to ensure their own political survival.

This almost inevitable growth in reliance on foreign supplies would seem to be a call to action, to define and implement policies that would both expand domestic supplies while setting demand management efforts in motion. To do so, however, requires a certain political will on the part of both the U.S. consumer and the government. And, to date, despite higher energy prices, real and threatened interruptions in supply, environmental damage, hurricanes and blackouts, that critical ingredient remains lacking.

All energy producer/exporters and consumer/importers are bound together by a mutual interdependency. All are vulnerable to any event, anywhere, at any time, which impacts on supply or demand. This means that the U.S. energy future likely will be shaped, at least in part, by events outside of our control and beyond our influence. Calls for energy independence, absent major technological breakthroughs and a national commitment, ring hollow, and in the near term are both unrealistic and unachievable.

In the absence of decisive political will to undertake those steps necessary to improve efficiency, promote conservation, encourage the development of domestic energy resources and renewable energy forms, learning to manage the risks accompanying import dependency may be the only reasonable course of action.

 

HON. EVAN BAYH, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

United States dependence on oil is the preeminent challenge of our generation. U.S. oil consumption affects more than just prices at the pump; it impacts our national security, our economy, our fiscal health and our environment. The United States uses 25% of the world’s oil but controls only 3% of the world’s proven oil reserves. As of right now, our demand from oil is only expected to grow, from nearly 21 million barrels a day now to 28 million barrels per day in 2030, of which nearly 70% will be imported. While demand in the U.S. will grow by approximately 25%, demand in China, India and other developing countries is projected to grow by 66%. To meet the projected world demand, global output would have to expand by 57% in 2025.

The Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) most recent forecast states that the price of crude is expected to remain high at $57 per barrel in 2030. The International Energy Agency (IEA) price forecast is even more dire. According to the IEA, if oil producing countries in the Middle East and Africa do not make immediate investments to increase production, the price will rise to $86 barrel in 2030. Even if the region does make the necessary investments, prices could average $65 a barrel.

These forecasts assume the current projections for supply and demand but do not address the consequences of a supply disruption caused by terrorism, political unrest or weather. Last summer, the National Commission on Energy Policy and Securing America’s Energy Future conducted a simulation called Oil Shock Wave to explore the potential security and economic consequences of an oil supply crisis. The event started by assuming that political unrest in Nigeria combined with unseasonably cold weather in North America contributed to an immediate global oil supply shortfall. This sent prices to over $80 barrel. The simulation then assumed that 3 terrorist attacks occur in important ports and processing plants in Saudi Arabia and Alaska which sent oil prices immediately soaring to $123 a barrel and $161 barrel 6 months later. At these prices, the country goes into a recession and millions of jobs are lost as a result of sustained oil prices.

This simulation almost became reality with the failed attack on Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia last month. Had the attack been successful, it would have removed 4to 6 million barrels per day from the global market sending prices soaring around the world and would likely have had a devastating impact on our economy.

One of the lessons from September 11th is that we can no longer be so dependent on places like Saudi Arabia, Russia and Venezuela for our energy supply. Yet we are more dependent on foreign oil from hostile countries today than we were on September 11th—making us more vulnerable and putting the United States in a uniquely disturbing position of bankrolling both sides in the War on Terror. This goes to the heart of our security and our sovereignty. As the world confronts the prospect of a nuclear Iran, our leverage is dramatically limited by the fact that Iran is the second largest exporter of oil. We and our allies are vulnerable to energy blackmail. A few months ago, the Russians decided they weren’t pleased with the Ukrainian elections, so they simply decided to stop exporting natural gas to them— nearly causing an economic crisis in the region.

How can we be sure that the radicals and America-haters who control the oil will never do that to us? Our economy is vulnerable to the price volatility of the oil market and we must do what we can to build resilience into our economy. Decreasing the oil intensity of our economy will help us weather price shocks and make us more secure. We can reduce oil intensity by reducing our demand for oil.

The risks faced above ground by depending on unstable suppliers and good weather are too great and to a certain extent out of our control. If the attack on Abqaiq would have been successful, there is little that we could do to moderate its impact on our economy and lower the prices which is why it is urgent that Congress and the President act now to start reducing our dependence on oil. There is no magic bullet to address a major shock to the oil market and we must take the steps necessary to reduce our dependence on oil which will make our nation stronger. We must bring the same urgency to energy security that we have on the War on Terror.

The Vehicle and Fuel Choices for American Security Act (VFCASA makes significant reductions in our oil use. We chose this title because nothing less than our national security is at stake. This bill would reduce projected oil use by 2.5 million barrels per day in 2016 and 7 million barrels per day in 2026. It also provides tools to meet these aggressive targets by improving the efficiency of vehicles and increasing the production and use of biofuels. VFCASA includes new approaches for manufacturers, the federal government, scientists and consumers, all designed to encourage greater energy security.  Other Senators are Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, Sam Brownback of Kansas, Norm Coleman of Minnesota, Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Bill Nelson of Florida, Richard Lugar of Indiana, Barack Obama of Illinois, Johnny Isakson of Georgia and Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island. I hope that in the future we all look back on the day this bill was introduced as the beginning of a major shift in our national security strategy. I hope that history will say we saw a challenge to our national security and prosperity and then met it and mastered it.

The legislation requires that in 2012, 10% of vehicles manufactured be flexible fuel vehicles, alternative fueled vehicles, hybrids, plug-in hybrids, advanced diesels and other oil saving vehicle technologies. This percentage rises each year until 50% of the new vehicle fleet will be one of these oil saving technologies. It also provides tax incentives for U.S. manufacturing facilities to retool existing facilities to produce advanced technology vehicles which will help shift the vehicle fleet to more efficient vehicles while minimizing the job impact of an increased market share of advanced technology vehicles. The bill builds on the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005 by expanding the number of consumers that can take advantage of the tax credit available for the purchase of more efficient vehicles. It offers a tax credit to private fleet owners who invest in more efficient vehicles.

VFCASA contains robust research provisions in the areas of electric drive transportation, including battery research, lightweight materials and cellulosic biofuels. Each of these technologies hold great potential to play a key role in reducing our dependence on oil. For instance, lightweight materials, such as carbon composites and steel alloys, hold the promise of being able to double automotive fuel economy while improving safety without increasing the cost of the vehicle. Cellulosic biofuels, which the President mentioned in the State of the Union, have the promise to be cheaper than gasoline and produce 7 to 14 times more energy than is used in its production. My bill doubles the funding for bioenergy research contained in EPAct and provides additional funding for production incentives for the production of cellulosic biofuels. The average American automobile might remain in operation for 15 years or more. This means that it is essential that we begin immediately to deploy oil saving technologies.

Addressing our dependence on oil is a challenge that we can no longer ignore. Events in the world from September 11th to Hurricane Katrina to the recent attempted terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia continue to show us how urgent it is that we act immediately. I hope that this hearing today is the only the Committee’s first step in tackling the challenge of American oil dependence.

 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, U.S. SENATOR from California (raise fuel economy, close SUV/light-truck loophole)

The amount of oil imported into the United States has climbed from 6 million barrels of oil per day in 1973 to 12 million barrels per day in 2004 (Energy Information Administration). And the percentage of foreign oil consumed in the U.S. has climbed from 35% in 1973 to 59% in 2004.

So while there has been a lot of talk about decreasing our nation’s dependence on foreign oil, most of it has been empty rhetoric. This week’s cover story of BusinessWeek is ‘‘The New Middle East Oil Bonanza.’’ With oil prices so high, partially due to fear of oil production disruptions in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and elsewhere, billions of dollars are going into the coffers of oil-producing nations.

I am seriously concerned about the impacts of America’s overdependence on foreign oil. This cannot continue. For foreign policy and for environmental reasons, the overdependence on oil is a real problem. With 5% of the world’s population, we cannot continue to use 25% of the world’s oil supply. Especially not with India and China developing at their current pace. There are things we could do today to reduce our dependency on oil, and yet we need the political will to get them accomplished. Specifically, we must raise the nation’s fuel economy standards. The Consumer Federation of America estimates that increasing the fuel economy of our domestic fleet by 5 miles per gallon would save about 23 billion gallons of gasoline each year, reducing oil imports by an estimated 14%. A fleet-wide increase of 10 miles per gallon would save 38 billion gallons, cutting imports by almost 20%. That is why I have introduced a very modest bill for the past three Congresses that would close a loophole in current law that allows SUVs and other light trucks to meet less stringent fuel economy standards than other passenger vehicles.

If the SUV loophole were closed, the savings would be rather dramatic. More than 480,000 SUVs were sold in the first quarter of 2005. If those SUVs achieved an average fuel economy of 27.5 miles per gallon, we would reduce gasoline use by more than 81 million gallons of a year. And that’s just for SUVs sold in the first quarter of 2005. If this bill were to pass, the United States would save 1 million barrels of oil a day and decrease foreign oil imports by 10%. Yet the automobile manufacturers continue to fight this proposal tooth and nail and for reasons I cannot understand. The technology to make these vehicles more efficient is available today and American auto companies are making vehicles to meet fuel economy standards in other countries. China, for instance, has issued fuel efficiency standards that are more stringent than ours. If American auto companies hope to make cars that will compete in China, then they will need to make them more fuel efficient. I hope the representative from Ford will be able to address this issue in her statement. If the Federal Government is not going to act, Congress should not stop the States from acting.

 

James Woolsey, former director of the CIA, VP Booz Allen Hamilton

I believe that energy independence is principally an issue of oil and conventional oil. The dangers of petroleum dependence and the urgency, I think, are guided by many factors.

  1. The current transportation infrastructure is committed to oil and oil-compatible products. So major investments, whereas they may be wise, in electricity generation of different types, whether it is renewables, nuclear, or whatever, has very little impact today on oil use. They are important for other reasons, but not particularly with respect to oil use. 
  2. The greater Middle East is going to continue to be the low-cost and dominant petroleum producer for the foreseeable future and hold two-thirds of the world’s proven reserves.
  3. The growth we expect in China and India and elsewhere is going to keep demand up for a substantial time and put the greater Middle East and particularly Saudi Arabia more and more in the driver’s seat.
  4. Petroleum infrastructure is very vulnerable to terrorist attacks and other types of potential cut-offs. Ten days ago, we had the attack at Abqaiq. We have hurricane damage possible in the gulf coast. We have the possibility of regime change in the Middle East. There was almost a coup in Saudi Arabia in 1979. This reliance on this part of the world is going to be a problem for us for a long time.
  5. The possibility exists not only of a regime change and terrorist attacks, but also of financial disruption as a result of how much we are borrowing to finance our oil habits.

We borrow approximately a billion dollars every working day, $250 billion a year, about a third of our overall trade deficit, in order to import oil.

And over the last 30 years, some $70 to $100 billion of that has been provided by Saudi Arabia as a government and certainly more by individuals to causes such as the Wahhabi schools in Madras and Pakistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East. We found when I was chairman of the Board of Freedom House, even mosques here in the United States, very, very strongly hate literature. We are paying for that, and that is essentially the same set of beliefs that are propagated by al Qaeda. The only difference between the Wahhabis and al Qaeda is who should be in charge. But the underlying hatred of other religions, democracy and the rest, we pay for in no small measure through our borrowing for oil.

For many developing countries, oil debt is a huge share of their national debt and, therefore, of their problem of poverty. We suggest, and these suggestions were stated by former Secretary of State, George Schultz, and I in a piece last summer—we co-chaired the committee on the present danger—that one should focus on making changes that can be made within the existing infrastructure, can be made relatively soon, and which use cheap or even waste products as feedstocks. And those are the reasons why in the last several pages of testimony, Mr. Chairman, that I suggest that we concentrate—even though there are other worthy things to do—we concentrate on such things as biofuels, particularly ethanol from cellulose, which in the long run is going to be much cheaper than making it from corn or other starches, that we concentrate on diesel from waste products of all kinds, which is coming to be technologically quite feasible.

I served as Director of Central Intelligence, 1993-95, one of the four Presidential appointments I have held in two Republican and two Democratic administrations; these have been interspersed in a career that has been generally in the private practice of law and now in consulting.

Energy security has many facets—including particularly the need for improvements to the electrical grid to correct vulnerabilities in transformers and in the Supervisory Control and Data (SCADA) systems. But energy independence for the U.S. is in my view preponderantly a problem related to oil and its dominant role in fueling vehicles for transportation.

These dangers in turn give rise to two proposed directions for government policy in order to reduce our vulnerability rapidly. In both cases it is important that existing technology should be used, i.e. technology that is already in the market or can be so in the very near future and that is compatible with the existing transportation infrastructure. To this end government policies in the United States and other oil-importing countries should: (1) encourage a shift to substantially more fuel-efficient vehicles within the existing transportation infrastructure, including promoting both battery development and a market for existing battery types for plug-in hybrid vehicles; and (2) encourage biofuels and other alternative and renewable fuels that can be produced from inexpensive and widely-available feedstocks—wherever possible from waste products.

PETROLEUM DEPENDENCE, THE DANGERS:

1. The current transportation infrastructure is committed to oil and oil-compatible products. Petroleum and its products dominate the fuel market for vehicular transportation. This dominance substantially increases the difficulty of responding to oil price increases or disruptions in supply by substituting other fuels.

Substituting other fuels for petroleum in the vehicle fleet as a whole has generally required major, time-consuming, and expensive infrastructure changes. One exception has been some use of liquid natural gas (LNG) and other fuels for fleets of buses or delivery vehicles, and the use of corn-derived ethanol mixed with gasoline in proportions up to 10 per cent ethanol (‘‘gasohol’’) in some states. Neither has appreciably affected petroleum’s dominance of the transportation fuel market.

There are imaginative proposals for transitioning to other fuels for transportation, such as hydrogen to power automotive fuel cells, but this would require major infrastructure investment and restructuring. If privately-owned fuel cell vehicles were to be capable of being readily refueled, this would require reformers (equipment capable of reforming, say, natural gas into hydrogen) to be located at filling stations, and would also require natural gas to be available there as a hydrogen feed-stock. So not only would fuel cell development and technology for storing hydrogen on vehicles need to be further developed, but the automobile industry’s development and production of fuel cells also would need to be coordinated with the energy industry’s deployment of reformers and the fuel for them. Moving toward automotive fuel cells thus requires us to face a huge question of pace and coordination of large-scale changes by both the automotive and energy industries. This poses a sort of industrial Alphonse and Gaston dilemma: who goes through the door first? (If, instead, it were decided that existing fuels such as gasoline were to be reformed into hydrogen on board vehicles instead of at filling stations, this would require on-board reformers to be developed and added to the fuel cell vehicles themselves—a very substantial undertaking.)

It is because of such complications that the National Commission on Energy Policy concluded in its December, 2004, report ‘‘Ending The Energy Stalemate’’ (‘‘ETES’’) that ‘‘hydrogen offers little to no potential to improve oil security and reduce climate change risks in the next twenty years.’’ (p. 72) To have an impact on our vulnerabilities within the next decade or two, any competitor of oil-derived fuels will need to be compatible with the existing energy infrastructure and require only modest additions or amendments to it.

2. The Greater Middle East will continue to be the low-cost and dominant petroleum producer for the foreseeable future Home of around two-thirds of the world’s proven reserves of conventional oil—45% of it in just Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran—the Greater Middle East will inevitably have to meet a growing percentage of world oil demand.

One need not argue that world oil production has peaked to see that this puts substantial strain on the global oil system. It will mean higher prices and potential supply disruptions and will put considerable leverage in the hands of governments in the Greater Middle East as well as in those of other oil-exporting states which have not been marked recently by stability and certainty: Russia, Venezuela, and Nigeria.

Deep-water drilling and other opportunities for increases in supply of conventional oil may provide important increases in supply but are unlikely to change this basic picture. If world production of conventional oil has peaked or is about to, this of course further deepens our dilemma and increases costs sooner. Even if other production comes on line, e.g. from unconventional sources such as tar sands in Alberta or shale in the American West, their relatively high cost of production could permit low-cost producers of conventional oil, particularly Saudi Arabia, to increase production, drop prices for a time, and undermine the economic viability of the higher-cost competitors, as occurred in the mid-1980’s.

3. The petroleum infrastructure is highly vulnerable to terrorist and other attacks. The radical Islamist movement, including but not exclusively al Qaeda, has on a number of occasions explicitly called for worldwide attacks on the petroleum infrastructure and has carried some out in the Greater Middle East. A more well-planned attack than the one that occurred ten days ago at Abquaiq—such as that set out in the opening pages of Robert Baer’s recent book, Sleeping With the Devil, (terrorists flying an aircraft into the unique sulfur-cleaning towers at the same facility)—could take some six million barrels per day off the market for a year or more, sending petroleum prices sharply upward to well over $100/barrel and severely damaging much of the world’s economy. Domestic infrastructure in the West is not immune from such disruption. U.S. refineries, for example, are concentrated in a few places, principally the Gulf Coast.

Last summer’s accident in the Texas City refinery—producing multiple fatalities—points out potential infrastructure vulnerabilities, as of course does this past fall’s hurricane damage in the Gulf. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline has been subject to several amateurish attacks that have taken it briefly out of commission; a seriously planned attack on it could be far more devastating. In view of these overall infrastructure vulnerabilities policy should not focus exclusively on petroleum imports, although such infrastructure vulnerabilities are likely to be the most severe in the Greater Middle East. It is there that terrorists have the easiest access, and the largest proportion of proven oil reserves and low-cost production are also located there. But nothing particularly useful is accomplished by changing trade patterns. To a first approximation there is one worldwide oil market and it is not generally helpful for the U.S., for example, to import less from the Greater Middle East and for others then to import more from there. In effect, all of us oil-importing countries are in this together.

4. The possibility exists, both under some current regimes and among those that could come to power in the Greater Middle East, of embargoes or other disruptions of supply. It is often said that whoever governs the oil-rich nations of the Greater Middle East will need to sell their oil. This is not true, however, if the rulers choose to try to live, for most purposes, in the 7th century. Bin Laden has advocated, for example, major reductions in oil production and oil prices of $200/barrel or more. As a jihadist Web site has just stated in the last few days: ‘‘[t]he killing of 10 American soldiers is nothing compared to the impact of the rise in oil prices on America and the disruption that it causes in the international economy.’’ Moreover, in the course of elaborating on Iranian President Ahmedinejad’s threat to destroy Israel and the U.S., his chief of strategy, Hassan-Abbassi, has recently bragged that Iran has already ‘‘spied out’’ the 29 sites ‘‘in America and the West’’ which they (presumably with help from Hezbollah, the world’s most professional terrorist organization) are prepared to attack in order to ‘‘destroy Anglo-Saxon civilization.’’ One can bet with reasonable confidence that some of these sites involve oil production and distribution. In 1979 there was a serious attempted coup in Saudi Arabia. Much of what the outside world saw was the seizure by Islamist fanatics of the Great Mosque in Mecca, but the effort was more widespread. Even if one is optimistic that democracy and the rule of law will spread in the Greater Middle East and that this will lead after a time to more peaceful and stable societies there, it is undeniable that there is substantial risk that for some time the region will be characterized by chaotic change and unpredictable governmental behavior. Reform, particularly if it is hesitant, has in a number of cases in history been trumped by radical takeovers (Jacobins, Bolsheviks). There is no reason to believe that the Greater Middle East is immune from these sorts of historic risks.

5. Wealth transfers from oil have been used, and continue to be used, to fund terrorism and Its ideological support. Estimates of the amount spent by the Saudis in the last 30 years spreading Wahhabi beliefs throughout the world vary from $70 billion to $100 billion. Furthermore, some oil-rich families of the Greater Middle East fund terrorist groups directly. The spread of Wahhabi doctrine—fanatically hostile to Shi’ite and Suffi Muslims, Jews, Christians, women, modernity, and much else—plays a major role with respect to Islamist terrorist groups: a role similar to that played by angry German nationalism with respect to Nazism in the decades after World War I. Not all angry German nationalists became Nazis and not all those schooled in Wahhabi beliefs become terrorists, but in each case the broader doctrine of hatred has provided the soil in which the particular totalitarian movement has grown. Whether in lectures in the madrassas of Pakistan, in textbooks printed by Wahhabis for Indonesian schoolchildren, or on bookshelves of mosques in the U.S., the hatred spread by Wahhabis and funded by oil is evident and influential. On all points except allegiance to the Saudi state Wahhabi and al Qaeda beliefs are essentially the same. In this there is another rough parallel to the 1930’s—between Wahhabis’ attitudes toward al Qaeda and like-minded Salafist Jihadi groups today and Stalinists’ attitude toward Trotskyites some sixty years ago (although there are of course important differences between Stalin’s Soviet Union and today’s Saudi Arabia). The only disagreement between Stalinists and Trotskyites was on the question whether allegiance to a single state was the proper course or whether free-lance killing of enemies was permitted. Stalinist hatred of Trotskyites and their free-lancing didn’t signify disagreement about underlying objectives, only tactics, and Wahhabi/Saudi cooperation with us in the fight against al Qaeda doesn’t indicate fundamental disagreement between Wahhabis and al Qaeda on, e.g., their common genocidal fanaticism about Shia, Jews, and homosexuals. So Wahhabi teaching basically spreads al Qaeda ideology

6. The current account deficits for the U.S. and a number of other countries create risks ranging from major world economic disruption to deepening poverty, and could be substantially reduced by reducing oil imports. The U.S. in borrows about $2 billion every calendar day from the world’s financial markets to finance the gap between what we produce and what we consume. The single largest category of imports is the approximately $1 billion per working day, or $250 billion a year, borrowed to import oil. The accumulating debt increases the risk of a flight from the dollar or major increases in interest rates. Any such development could have major negative economic consequences for both the U.S. and its trading partners.

If such deficits are to be reduced, however, say by domestic production of substitutes for petroleum, this should be based on recognition of real economic value such as waste cleanup, soil replenishment, or other tangible benefits.

Government policies with respect to the vehicular transportation market:

Encourage improved vehicle mileage, using technology now in production The following three technologies are available to improve vehicle mileage substantially. [We should] take advantage of diesels’ substantial mileage advantage over gasoline-fueled internal combustion engines. Heavy penetration of diesels into the private vehicle market in Europe is one major reason why the average fleet mileage of such new vehicles is 42 miles per gallon in Europe and only 24 mpg in the U.S. Although the U.S. has, since 1981, increased vehicle weight by 24% and horsepower by 93%, it has actually somewhat lost ground with respect to mileage over that near-quarter century. In the 12 years from 1975 to 1987, however, the U.S. improved the mileage of new vehicles from 15 to 26 mpg.

Hybrid gasoline-electric vehicles now on the market generally show substantial fuel savings over their conventional counterparts.

Light-weight carbon composite construction. Constructing vehicles with inexpensive versions of the carbon fiber composites that have been used for years for aircraft construction can substantially reduce vehicle weight and increase fuel efficiency while at the same time making the vehicle considerably safer than with current construction materials.

Encourage the commercialization of alternative transportation fuels that can be available soon, are compatible with existing infrastructure, and can be derived from waste or otherwise produced cheaply. Biomass (cellulosic) ethanol The use of ethanol produced from corn in the U.S. and sugar cane in Brazil has given birth to the commercialization of an alternative fuel that is coming to show substantial promise, particularly as new feedstocks are developed.

Senator DORGAN. I think a dispassionate observer living off of our planet seeing that we use 84 million barrels a day with one quarter of that used in the United States, which imports 60% of that oil from other parts of the globe, most of them covered with sand, would ask: How could they not have been concerned about that? Why didn’t they take dramatic action, because tonight or tomorrow or next Saturday or God forbid next month a terrorist action or some other cataclysmic action could just simply throw this country’s economy flat on its back?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I think it’s extremely urgent, Senator Dorgan. I think that this could collapse on us at any time. There was almost a coup in Saudi Arabia in 1979. And Iran could cut us off for a while for its own reasons of pursuing its nuclear program, terrorist attacks in a number of places. This is something that we need to fix and we need to fix now. In my view reducing our dependence on conventional oil is an integral part of the war on terror. I believe we will be in this war for decades, much like the Cold War, and that one key to winning it is to cease funding the ideology of hatred that our enemies feed upon. We borrow $250 billion/year to import oil—an increasing share it will come from the Middle East as the years go on. The Saudis then, to take one example, provide around $4 billion/year to the Wahhabis who then use much of it to run, e.g., madrassas in Pakistan and elsewhere that teach this hatred. Indeed one could say that, other than the Civil War, this is the only war the U.S. has fought in which we pay for both sides.

Nuclear energy may be one good way to produce electricity, especially because it does not emit global warming gases. But it is largely irrelevant to the question oil addiction because only 2-3% of our electricity comes from oil.

 

AMORY B. LOVINS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE

I have studied the White House Fact Sheet on the Advanced Energy Initiative with some puzzlement. The stated purpose is ‘‘to help break America’s dependence on foreign source of energy.’’ This can only mean oil: the U.S. does not import coal, uranium is in surplus, and natural gas imports are small (although Administration policy is to increase them by several-fold, creating a new dependence). However, the section on ‘‘diversifying energy sources’’ is all about electricity, which has almost nothing to do with oil. This confusion between oil and electricity, conflating them both into ‘‘energy,’’ bemuses energy experts the world over who assume that responsible U.S. officials must understand these fundamentals; yet such jumbled formulations persist.

Energy independence is not only about oil. Many sources of LNG raise similar concerns of security, dependence, site vulnerability, and cost. I do not expect that Iran and Russia would be more reliable, long-run sources of gas than Persian Gulf states are today of oil.

Coal and nuclear generation of electricity have virtually nothing to do with displacing oil, which is the nub of the Nation’s energy security problem.

I don’t think we need to spend more (although more well-targeted energy R&D would certainly be valuable), but we definitely need to spend smarter. The lion’s share of both current and new energy R&D funding is going, as usual, to the least promising but most politically powerful technologies—coal and nuclear—that can by their nature contribute virtually nothing to getting America off oil. This and the ill-conceived subsidies in last year’s Energy Policy Act don’t simply divert Federal funds from best buys; they also leverage untold sums of private capital into non-solutions. These mistaken Federal energy priorities in the 1980s, in practical effect, created today’s oil crisis because of what they didn’t do and what they dissuaded private investors from doing. Today’s repetition of this policy error is setting the stage for another, longer, worse oil crisis.

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is useful, though I’ve heard disturbing recent reports about its ability to sustain maximum output, and I remain concerned about the vulnerability of its centralized facilities to disruption by hurricanes or terrorism.

I’d prefer greater emphasis on distributed stockpiles of refined products rather than crude oil, rotated as needed to guard against deterioration. The oil system used to have much larger product stockpiles close to its customers than it does today, because bean-counters have wrung out inventory as mere carrying-cost overhead, sapping its societal value for private gain.

Europe is generally ahead in this regard; many governments require market actors, both suppliers and major customers, to carry refined-product stocks that are already in the form and at the place where they’d be needed by final customers. With so many simultaneous disruptions in the world oil system, and strong incentive to cause more, I think the case for such distributed product stocks (duly protected against attack) is now unassailable. So is the even more powerful case for efficient use of oil. This gives the most bounce per buck by stretching existing stocks and buying more time to mend what’s broken or improvise substitutes.

The grave security problems I identified 27 years ago in our Nation’s energy infrastructure should have been fixed, but instead, most of them have been worsened. These self-inflicted vulnerabilities are an attractive nuisance for Al Qa’eda, and we should at least stop multiplying them. Current Federal energy policy perpetuates American’s expanding oil dependence, because it ranges from modest support (advanced biofuels) to inaction (natural-gas and electric efficiency) to opposition (seriously improving light-vehicle efficiency). The resulting oil dependence funds both sides of the war, impugns U.S. moral standing, has bailed out the nearly empty Iranian and Saudi treasuries, has created (in effect) such leaders as Ahmadinejad, Chavez, El-Bashir, and Putin, systematically distorts foreign policy and postures, poisons foreign attitudes, weakens competitiveness, and enhances vulnerability and fragility.

Meanwhile, Federal policy strongly favors overcentralized system architecture, as seen in Katrina’s damage and in bigger, more frequent regional blackouts. It creates terrorist targets, from LNG and nuclear facilities to Iraqi infrastructure. Its centerpiece, ANWR drilling, would create an all-American Strait of Hormuz in a world that already has one such chokepoint too many. It lavishly supports expansion of nuclear power and reverses the Ford-Cheney reprocessing moratorium, thus worsening proliferation. On top of that, it sacrifices what’s left of the nonproliferation regime, painfully built over a half century, to support the nuclear bureaucracy that makes 3% of India’s electricity, while ignoring the vastly greater and cheaper potential to improve the peaceful 97%.

The Japanese have been on a steady course to conserve energy and reduce their dependence on imported energy while their GDP continues to grow. They’re turning down their thermostats and shutting off their idling car and truck engines to save energy. Opinion polls show that more than 75% of Japan’s citizens view energy conservation as a personal responsibility. Many are willing to shell out extra cash for efficient appliances and office equipment. Do you think that Americans can gain energy independence without feeling a little pain? Are American consumers willing to accept some financial pain for energy independence gain? I think most Americans hunger for leaders who engage their patriotic personal involvement in a great national project to shed our oil burden. Winning the Oil Endgame showed how to do this through entrepreneurship and innovation rather than through cost, pain, or sacrifice. But those interested—and there are many— in changing careless habits should be welcomed too, because markets work better when they’re mindful. Just please don’t confuse efficiency (which is widely called ‘‘conservation’’ in the Pacific Northwest but nowhere else in the country) with curtailment (which is what many Americans from other regions think ‘‘conservation’’ means): they should be discussed separately and in unambiguous language, not interchangeably.

We should worry not only about already attacked Saudi oil choke points like Abqaiq and Ras Tanura but also about the all-American Strait of Hormuz proposed in Alaska.

DOE policy that did not undercut DOD’s mission would shift from brittle energy architecture, the next major failure inevitable, to more efficient, resilient, diverse, dispersed, renewable systems that make it impossible. It would avoid electricity investments that are meant to prevent blackouts, but instead make them bigger and more frequent. It would stop creating attractive nuisances for terrorists from vulnerable LNG and nuclear facilities to over-centralized U.S. and Iraqi electric infrastructure. And it would acknowledge the nuclear proliferation correctly identified by the President as the gravest threat to national security is driven largely by nuclear power.

The key to wringing twice the work from our oil is tripled efficiency, cars, trucks, and planes, integrating the best 2004 technologies for ultra-light steels or composites, better aerodynamics in tires, and advanced propulsion can do this with 2-year paybacks.

I believe the shortest path to an energy policy that enhances security and prosperity is free-market economics, letting all ways to save or produce energy compete fairly at honest prices, no matter which kind they are, what technology they use, where they are, how big they are, or who owns them.

Bigger power plants sending bigger bulk power flows through longer transmission lines tend to make the grid less stable (id.). Leading engineering analysts of electric-grid theory are reaching similar conclusions, e.g., http://www.ece.wisc.edu/~dobson/PAPERS/carrerasHICSS03.pdf

Gasoline taxes are a pretty good signal to drive less if you have alternatives, but they are a very weak signal to buy an efficient car because that price signal in the fuel is diluted many fold by the other costs of buying and running a car and then heavily discounted at consumer discount rates. So consumers really only look at the first 2 or 3 years of fuel savings. CAFE standards, are pretty well gridlocked. We found that a more effective method would be to take each size class of light vehicles and institute forward a feebate system. That is a combination of a fee and a rebate, so that within each size class separately, the less efficient vehicles pay a fee according to how inefficient they are and the more efficient vehicles get a rebate paid for by the fees according to how efficient they are. So you would have an incentive within each size class to buy a more efficient vehicle, but no incentive to buy a different size than you wanted.

I would say tripled efficiency, cars, trucks, and planes, and a diverse dispersed, decentralized resilient, invulnerable electric system [are best]. If you are asking on a policy level, I would say size and revenue-neutral feebates and encouraging the States to reward gas and electric utilities for cutting your bill, not for selling you more energy. That would free up half the gas in the country and a lot of that could be substituted back for oil.

 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Lovins, in looking at your testimony as well as some of the backup documentation that you have provided with it, you are arguing against producing more oil from Alaska basically from the security perspective. And I keep reading with interest the same phrase you have used, the all-American Strait of Hormuz, as well as the reference to this world’s biggest chapstick. We realize that it is a long silver thread running through the State providing a valuable resource to the country. Do you have the same issues in terms of security for a natural gas pipeline to meet that energy need for this country that you have indicated in your comments about oil?

Mr. LOVINS.   I think many of the details would differ. The gas pipeline would not be hot and would not have to be above ground and very exposed. You would not have the coal restart problem that a hot oil pipeline does. That is the source of the chapstick comment. I would call your attention to the more recent article originally entitled ‘‘The Alaskan Threat to National Energy Security’’ that’s cited toward the end of footnote 5 in my prepared testimony, and it was published just weeks before 9/11 with a title change by the editor. And the annotated version of that, which is cited, details that the security issues I described have not gone away. You’ll find the scariest episode in the 30-year record you refer to, Senator, is not the drunk taking a potshot at the line. Rather it is the disgruntled engineer who was very fortunately caught months before blowing up three critical and very hard to fix parts of the line with 14 bombs he had already built and cold weather tested. And he was caught only because he involved someone else in the plot who turned him in. He was not aiming to hurt the United States. He intended to make money in the oil future’s market. But as Mr. Woolsey and I wrote in the Christian Science Monitor in 2002, that guy was an amiable bungler compared to our al Qaeda adversaries.

Basing Federal policy on sound market principles and ‘‘best buys first’’ would be a propitious change from recent tendencies. So would a clear focus on oil, rather than confusing oil with electricity.

Senator Domenici: How do you respond to those, like me, who say that an economy run entirely without oil by the 2040’s is quite difficult to believe?

Lovins: First, I would respectfully invite you to examine the analysis we presented on 20 September 2004 in Winning the Oil Endgame and its Technical Annexes, all posted free at www.oilendgame.com. Our scenario achieves half its oil displacement by substituting saved natural gas and advanced biofuels for oil.

Most R&D has been and still is mis-allocated to favored technologies that are already mature or show no hope of becoming competitive. The money seems to be allocated more by pork-barrel politics than by risk-adjusted public return. Second, total federal energy R&D is far too small for its actual and rhetorical priority.

I’d add that the Federal government is doing far too much to distort private markets, deliberately causing huge mis-allocations of private capital. I’d love to see a thorough, transparent, and defensible compilation of Federal energy subsidies—

My Institute did the first thorough analysis of Federal energy subsidies, summarized in ‘‘Hiding the True Costs of Energy Sources,’’

Nuclear power in FY84 got 34% of the subsidies (excluding Price-Anderson) but delivered 1.9% of the energy; each of its subsidy dollars delivered 1/80th as much as a dollar of subsidies to renewables and efficiency. The latest analyses by the top contemporary independent scholar in this field, Doug Koplow (www.earthtrack.net), confirm that Federal energy subsidies are still large and probably even more distortive. There is little point developing new technologies if such massive market interventions favoring rivals continue to suppress their adoption.

Alaska’s onshore methane hydrates may bubble out of the thawing tundra on their own, causing a global climate disaster. I haven’t seen a convincing argument that onshore or offshore methane hydrates can be extracted without a substantial risk of major uncontrolled releases of methane. Lacking such grounds for confidence that the operation could avoid making our planet more like Venus, I hope the hydrates stay right where they are. And we don’t need them if, more cheaply, we use energy in a way that saves money.

Regrettably, current Federal policy has only limited relevance to eliminating oil dependence, and much of its content that is relevant is unhelpful. Most of the public policy initiatives that are both relevant and helpful are coming from the States.

Coal gasification is a feasible but costly way to produce gas or liquids. It is quite carbon-intensive as normally conceived. All carbon-sequestered ‘‘clean coal’’ innovations are in my view a 4th-best approach, after energy efficiency, renewables, and combined-heat-and-power (co-, tri-, and polygeneration), so I’d give it a lower overall priority in energy R&D than it currently has. Having a lot of coal is in my view a less important reason to use it than whether it can provide energy services at least cost. R&D should be driven by cost-effectiveness, not resource bases.

If it’s possible to stop mandating and subsidizing sprawl, or otherwise to advance the smart-growth agenda, that too would bear huge longer-term dividends by reducing vehicle-miles travelled,

Electricity reforms can save almost no oil, they are extremely important to creating a resilient national energy system—including the ability to get power to filling stations so customers can pump gas! [pumpheads are electric now, they used to be a manual  handcrank socket; so when Florida had a prolonged power outage surface transportation stopped too]

Senator FEINSTEIN. The Bush administration found that 99% of flexible-fuel vehicles on the road today never use a drop of E-85 ethanol. As a result, the administration found that this loophole actually increases America’s oil dependence by 14 to 17 billion gallons of gasoline per year. As I understand it, Ford uses its fuel economy credits for these flex-fuel vehicles to lower fuel economy standards for the rest of the automobiles so that we are not really doing much to increase vehicle economy. What would you suggest we do to really increase fuel economy? I had a bill just to bring SUVs over 10 years up to the fuel economy of the sedans which the fleet number, as you said, is 27 miles per gallon as opposed to the SUV at 20 miles per gallon. And it went down because there is really no support for that. Detroit opposes it very strongly. What do we do that Detroit could support to really rapidly increase fuel economy standards?

Ms. CISCHKE. We have to be very sensitive to what the consumers want to buy. Right now in the auto industry, over 30 vehicles get better than 30 miles per gallon in fuel economy, yet it accounts for less than 5% of our sales. So we have a challenge in terms of putting vehicles out there that nobody wants to buy. And that is a real problem for all the auto companies.

When you mentioned the E-85 usage, this is kind of a chicken and the egg type situation. We need the fuel in order to make the vehicles run on E-85, but the fuel is not going to be there unless there is enough volume of vehicles. We have to address to what our consumers are demanding and we have got to find a way to make them want to buy more fuel-efficient vehicles.

 

Mr. VERRASTRO. Flexible-fuel vehicles run on about 10 to 15% ethanol, not 85%. E-85 is a totally different bird. There are evaporative emissions issues in terms of the environment. There are also massive transportation and distribution issues. You cannot put it in a pipeline. In our country on the coast, we have the greatest demand for fuels. If you grow corn or use cellulosic ethanol and then transport it to the coast and you cannot put it in pipelines, you have to find a different distribution system. Clearly in Europe, the oil companies have taken to incorporate biodiesel and biomass and other fuels at their retail stations. It is the cost of a tank and a pump. But this transition to move to E-85, I am not sure that that is the answer. Brazil, as Jim Woolsey just said, is kind of the poster child for ethanol. And over the weekend, they reduced the content of the ethanol in their fuel from 25 percent to 20 percent because they cannot produce enough of it. So to think that we are going to grow our way crop-wise into an energy solution, I think is far reaching.

 

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE. API is a national trade association representing more than 400 companies involved in all aspects of the oil and natural gas industry, including exploration and production, refining, marketing and transportation, as well as the service companies that support our industry.

We live in an energy interdependent world, and complete energy independence is probably unachievable and certainly undesirable.

We can no longer afford to place off limits vast areas of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico, off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and offshore Alaska. Similarly, we cannot afford to deny Americans consumers the benefits that will come from opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and from improving and expediting approval processes for developing the substantial resources on federal, multi-use lands in the West. In fact, we do have an abundance of competitive domestic oil and gas resources in the U.S. According to the latest published estimates, there are more than 131 billion barrels of oil and more than 1000 TCF of natural gas remaining to be discovered in the United States.

Much of these oil and gas resources—78% of the remaining to be discovered oil and 62% of the gas—are expected to be found beneath federal lands and coastal waters. Natural gas, which fuels our economy—not only heating and cooling homes and businesses but also generating electricity. It is used by a wide array of industries—fertilizer and agriculture; food packaging; pulp and paper; rubber; cement; glass; aluminum, iron and steel; and chemicals and plastics. And, natural gas is an essential feedstock for many of the products used in our daily lives—clothing, carpets, sports equipment, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, computers, and auto parts.

Unlike oil, natural gas imports in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are limited by the lack of import terminals. There are only 5 operating in the United States. A number of additional terminals have been proposed but many have run into not-in-my-backyard opponents and complex permitting requirements.

There is a misperception by some about the time and costs involved in any transition to the next generation of fuels. Consider what would be involved in replacing the dominant role of oil with a substitute like hydrogen or solar power. Most experts agree that such a transition would require dramatic advances in technology and massive capital investments—and take several decades to accomplish, if at all.

Based on various studies, the energy savings from corn-based ethanol are moderate—3 to 20%—because production from corn requires significant energy input. And, judging from this past year, ethanol is higher-priced than gasoline and, measured on a BTU basis, considerably more expensive. In addition, some have estimated that the total amount of ethanol that could be produced by converting the entire 2005 U.S. corn crop into ethanol would be about 31.1 billion gallons—an amount equal to just 22.2 percent of U.S. gasoline consumption last year.

We hope that people will better understand that, in today’s global energy marketplace, U.S. ‘‘energy independence’’ is impossible.

We hope they come to see that, instead, ‘‘energy interdependence’’ is essential. We hope consumers will come to recognize that their interests are best served when we can source fuels from multiple providers located both in the U.S. and throughout the world. Sourcing flexibility is one of our most powerful energy security tools. We also want others to understand that we can operate only where governments permit us to do so.

AMORY LOVINS. We are particularly concerned that FERC is making America’s power system more prone to regional blackouts by continuing to push larger, longer bulk power flows through more and bigger transmission lines, rather than allowing or, preferably, requiring fair competition (whether market or administrative) by demand-side and distributed options so as to achieve a least-cost system solution

FERC is the last bastion of central planning in the Federal Government, and last year gained new authority to site supply-side resources, or override state and local objections to them, without having to consider cheaper alternatives, ranging from end-use efficiency and demand response to micropower. This will probably result in further construction of vulnerable, terrorist-magnet, and uneconomic LNG terminals, with potentially catastrophic consequences for nearby communities and increased financial risks for investors.

Another desirable focus for FERC’s attention would be ensuring that as utilities automate distribution systems, their topology should be made bidirectional, so that distribution shifts from a tree structure (distributing centrally generated electrons to dispersed customers) to a web structure (gracefully handling power flows any which way). This is largely a State regulatory matter, but Federal standards would probably help, and State attention to this issue could be encouraged in many ways.

Still another area for FERC reform would remove the transmission roadblock facing wind developers, especially in and near the Dakotas. In essence, the incumbent lignite operators in that region aren’t allowing fair transmission access, and FERC has not yet intervened to promote it, so a cheap, climate-safe, domestic resource exceeding 300 GWe just on tribal lands in the Dakotas remains virtually unexploited. Broadly, I think State Commissions should follow Texas’s example (under then PUCT Chairman Pat Woods’ and Governor Bush’s leadership) of allowing distributed generators to ‘‘plug and play’’ freely: if the inverter meets IEEE 1547, UL, and local building code requirements, no other approval or procedure should be required. Federal policy should encourage this outcome uniformly, and should encourage State Commissions to remove artificial constraints as to feed-in generators’ unit size, the symmetry of TOU vs. flat-rate payments vs. charges, and other accounting arrangements to ensure a level playing-field for distributed resources. Federal policy should give no preference to big over small or to supply-side over demand-side resources; all should compete fairly as a central principle of Federal energy policy.

Hybrid and fuel-cell cars are worthy, and plug-in hybrids may be, but they’d all work better and cost less if combined with an apparently missing element: advanced materials that eliminate half the car’s weight and fuel use, improve its safety, and doesn’t raise its production cost.

I hope the Congress will note that much of the recent troubles at NREL—not a place one should be trying to divert or demoralize during an energy crisis—arose from ~15% of its budget’s being, in effect, hijacked by Congressional earmarks. If NREL is to do its job and retain its excellent people, such raids must cease.

I’m gratified by the Pentagon’s increasing focus on radically reducing fuel-logistics footprint in theater: if seriously implemented, this could create the industrial base that can lead the civilian vehicle industries off oil, just as DoD research transformed the civilian economy by inventing for military purposes the Internet, GPS, and the jetengine and chipmaking industries—all foundations of America’s and especially California’s economy.

It’s vital that in all countries, biofuels be done in an environmentally and socially sustainable way—unlike some recent destruction of tropical forests to make way for palm-oil plantations to produce biodiesel. Even more important is to share and greatly accelerate developing countries’ adoption of advanced end-use efficiency in all sectors. .

The most comprehensive threat to national energy security today is national energy policy. This Committee should reexamine its approach, and stop energy policy from undercutting DoD’s mission.

Roughly 4-8% of U.S. gasoline or 2-4% of crude oil could be quickly saved by:

  • reducing speed limits for all non-Class 8 vehicles to 60 mph in zones now above this limit under Federal (and if possible State) jurisdiction
  • changing EPA rules so that HOV lanes and preferential parking now available only to Alternative Fuel Vehicles are also available to hybrid and all-electric vehicles (EPA’s inaction on this is frustrating many States that wish to make this change)
  • giving so-called double-tax-credit to State and local nonprofit vehicle buyers such as public safety agencies for adopting high-efficiency hybrids
  • authorizing all citizens to deduct mass transit costs on IRS Schedule A
  • providing for universal approval of ‘‘parking cash-out’’ (as long practiced in Southern California) and perhaps requiring it for large employers
  • for a few years, extending the Federal tax credit for AFVs, hybrids, and all-electric vehicles to far more than the current 60,000 per manufacturer
  • eliminating continuing loopholes in CAFE rules
  • clarifying that NHTSA does have authority to extend to cars its 23 August 2005 proposed decision to base future light-truck CAFE rules on size, not weight

Roughly 12-18% of diesel fuel could be rapidly saved by heavy-truck reforms proposed in Winning the Oil Endgame and in our memo for Senator

  • Roughly 4-6% of gasoline and diesel fuel could be promptly saved by:
  • immediately switching all Federal civilian (and non-tactical military) road vehicle procurement to the top 5%, or at worst 10%, of efficiency in their subclass
  • saving ~3% through proper tire inflation, including rental and commercial fleets as well as individual owners
  • exerting Federal pressure to improve traffic-light timing on major urban streets and to speed adoption of electronic tolling (with careful controls to protect personal privacy) and of ‘‘urban box’’ congestion charges
  • encouraging proper engine tuning and air-filter replacement, as well as EPA’s other gas mileage tips
  • having NHTSA clarify that manufacturers and sellers of hybrid cars are allowed to advise buyers how to drive them for optimal efficiency (thus reversing the false impression, spread chiefly by Consumer’s Reports, that hybrids are inherently much less efficient than they actually are if properly driven)
  • DoD initiatives to make military-platform (and -facility) energy efficiency a high priority—in doctrine, requirements-writing, acquisition, design pedagogy and practice, operations, and reward systems—should be strongly encouraged.

Targeted military science and technology investments in ultralight materials and their low-cost manufacturing could create the advanced-materials industrial cluster that is the most important single manufacturing innovation for getting off oil.

We would also like to see greater investment in improved road traffic management infrastructure in order to reduce congestion and save fuel.

The integrated approach aims at producing clear and quantifiable reductions in CO2 through a range of options (e.g. vehicle technology, alternative fuels, taxation, eco-driving, gear shift indicators, consumer information and labeling, consumer behavior and congestion avoidance).

Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles are seen by Ford and the industry as a long-term alternative transportation solution. They are clean and efficient, with zero tailpipe emissions, and use a renewable fuel source. Although FCVs are in development today, much work remains to meet the functionality, durability, and affordability demands of automotive consumers.

Automobile fuel economy has been mandated via the CAFE program for about 30 years. Most industry and government experts agree that the program has not been an effective way to reduce petroleum consumption, and that it has had dramatic competitive and economic impacts. For one thing, it takes a long time for the vehicle fleet to turn over. New CAFE standards take time to implement, and their effects take even more time to make their way through the vehicle fleet. Another problem is that higher fuel economy simply makes it cheaper for people to drive more. Vehicle miles traveled have increased substantially over the life of the CAFE program and tend to overwhelm improvements in fuel economy. Addressing our dependence on foreign oil must include taking steps to reduce vehicle miles traveled. We support

Automakers are already producing more than 100 models that achieve 30 mpg or more on the highway; however, the consumer demand for these vehicle models is low.

Coal gasification, followed by synthesis to liquids that are suitable for transportation fuels, is a known technology. These are large plants with substantial investment, and their long-term commercial operation must be certain. A related technology, recovery of remote natural gas with synthesis to liquid fuels (Gas-to-Liquids, GTL) is now considered economical in select cases, and several large GTL plants are now planned for Qatar, with diesel fuel to be supplied to Europe, where diesel demand now exceeds supply. Gasification of coal (Coal-to-Liquids, CTL) adds a substantial processing step compared with natural gas as the resource. So the overall efficiency of CTL will be less than GTL, with a corresponding increase in CO2 as a byproduct. The GTL path will be an issue for total CO2 emissions unless carbon capture and sequestration is implemented with the GTL plant. Carbon capture and sequestration trial projects are proceeding with good success.

 

At the end of this year, Ford will have already put nearly 2,000,000 Flexible Fuel Vehicles on the nation’s roads. However, applying technologies too broadly, too fast, and too soon (even those already on other vehicle lines in the fleet) can result in poor performance and ultimately customer rejection of promising technologies. Ford’s typical engineering practices require that new technologies be phased into production over several years such that there is a cycle of manufacturing and customer service experience in the field. In the case of E85 FFVs, this experience has been limited due to the lack of fuel availability. Moreover, because ethanol is a unique fuel with unique properties, these vehicles require unique hardware and engineering. For example, fuel tanks with low permeation characteristics are required. It also requires a special fuel pump and fuel lines to deliver the fuel to the engine. Unique injectors introduce the fuel into the engine where special calibrations programmed into the on-board computer determine how much ethanol is in the fuel and how best to set spark timing and fuel flow to ensure the engine operates properly and meets emission standards on all ethanol and gasoline mixtures. Because there is more than one fuel calibration within an FFV, costly development and certification testing is doubled. Many of the FFV parts and processes are patented by Ford and are the result of innovative ideas by our best engineers, and we’re proud of them. The bottom line . . . making an FFV is a significant investment for auto manufacturers.

 

CRAIG THOMAS, U.S. SENATOR from WYOMING (COAL-to-liquids)

We’ve been saying for decades that we need to decrease our dependence on foreign supplies of energy. The first major calls for action followed the oil embargo of 1973. In that year, we imported approximately 28% of the oil we consumed. A restriction of supply by a group of hostile nations caused prices to increase by an average of 40% during that embargo and introduced a new weapon in global conflict. In 2005, we imported roughly 59% of the oil we consumed. This trend of increased dependence is a troublesome one.

Wyoming produces roughly 10% of the nation’s primary energy, with far less than 1% of the nation’s people. We have oil, natural gas, uranium, and wind resources to name a few.

We also have coal—a resource with enormous potential for increasing our energy independence. Coal is economical and abundant. It constitutes roughly half of the electricity generated in the United States. Advancement of coal gasification technologies, carbon sequestration, and improved mining techniques reduce many of the environmental concerns that people have had in the past. And greater use of cheaper Western coal makes this fuel a much more attractive choice going forward. We have coal here in the United States and we need to use it. We continue to develop wind, we have hydroelectric dams, and we will hopefully see the construction of new nuclear plants in the near future.

We consume roughly two thirds of the oil we use in the transportation sector. Because of its large share of consumption, policy changes affecting the transportation sector can have a significant impact on reducing foreign dependence. Increased mileage standards, elimination of boutique fuels, lowered speed limits, and greater use of alternative fuels are just a few of the many ideas that have been advanced to decrease the transportation sector’s consumption of oil. I contend that coal can make a difference in the transportation sector as well. Wyoming recently announced plans to construct a coal-to-liquids plant. The National Mining Association believes that continued use of this technology could replace as much as 2 million barrels per day of oil and 5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas per day by 2025.

I believe that the bill introduced by the Chairman and Ranking Member for lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico’s Area 181 is exactly the sort of thing we need in the short term.

 

NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA (biofuels, ethanol, E85)

It is time we stopped treating foreign oil dependence as another abstract statistic whose consequence is far removed from Americans’ daily lives. The United States is going to have to face the reality that we must break our foreign energy dependence or risk losing our autonomy. Our nation’s energy dependence is undeniably one of the greatest threats to our national security and our freedom.

By 2025 it is estimated that nearly 75% of America’s oil supply will be imported. Also consider that two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are in the Middle East and that terrorists have identified oil as a strategic vulnerability—increasing attacks against oil infrastructure worldwide. One can just imagine what would happen if OPEC, which currently accounts for well over 50% of our oil supplies, shut off the oil spigot. Beyond the national security implications, oil dependence also carries serious economic consequences. The total economic penalty of our oil dependence, including loss of jobs, output, and tax revenue, is estimated to exceed $300 billion annually.

One facet of this plan to reach 2.5 million barrels per day of oil savings is to promote the development and use of advanced and alternative fuel efficient vehicles. Key pieces include tax credit incentives for advanced technology motor vehicles, expansion of the consumer tax credits for advanced vehicles, loan guarantees and grants for hybrid vehicle projects, and a new federal commitment to hybrid vehicle technologies and materials. The national fuel savings generated by this bill will be immense, but if we want to free ourselves from foreign oil dependence, we must produce more fuel here at home.

I believe we need a national energy policy that increases availability of flex fuel vehicles, invests heavily in E-85 infrastructure, includes a sugar-to-ethanol program, and sets a national mandate for ethanol that matches our energy independence ambitions.

 

JAMES M. TALENT, U.S. SENATOR from MISSOURI

I have been a longtime supporter of ethanol and biodiesel. I know that I would rather get fuel from farmers in Missouri and across the country than import it from foreign countries. I believe that the greatest provision of the energy bill was the Renewable Fuels Standard which mandated the use of ethanol in our nation’s fuel supply. The amount of biofuels to be mixed with gasoline sold in the United States is mandated at increases annually up to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. Since the passage of the bill, 34 new ethanol plants are under construction, with 8 existing U.S. plants being expanded. And, there are more than 150 new plants in the planning stages. This construction and investment in farming will create thousands of new jobs while making us less reliant on foreign sources of oil.

While hydrogen vehicles are exciting—they are a long way off.

 

PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO. It is clear that the United States needs to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy. We particularly need to reduce our reliance on oil from unstable regions of the world whose values and priorities are often in conflict with America’s initiatives and place in the world. Last year, U.S. net imports equaled 59% of our demand, with 41% of our total imports came from OPEC countries, which is 27% of the total U.S. consumption.

Dependence to this extent can determine our national security, our economic strength, and our foreign policy. In order to make necessary changes, we have to be realistic about what is possible in the near term, but certainly we have to look with real energy and enthusiasm toward the long-term. Making energy self-sufficiency the immediate goal would deny the reality of this situation and only invite discouragement and failure. This would be akin to putting all of our resources in the hopes of finding an elusive cure for a disease at the expense of taking important steps to treat and alleviate the symptoms in the interim. To that end, I have said on a number of occasions that while I support the advancement of science technology to reduce our dependence on foreign energy sources, I think we must also build a bridge to that age by accessing the oil and gas resources available in our country and we must reasonably and responsibly conserve our energy.

For example, I believe we should have acted on ANWAR a long time ago. The majority of the Senate believes that ANWAR brings us closer to achieving energy security and I would venture to say that not a single member of this body believes that continuing to block ANWAR strengthens our energy security. Blocking progress is not a substitute for substantive policy.

In my first year in the Senate, President Nixon set a goal of energy self-sufficiency by 1980. I do not know if any of you remember that. Since that time, successive administrations, scores of members of Congress from both parties, including me, have set similar goals. I believe that energy self-sufficiency is attainable, but I do not believe it is in the short term. Nonetheless, we must pursue it as a goal in my opinion vigorously.

 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, NEW JERSEY. I was not at all pleased to see the budget that came out less than a week later. A budget that did not take the serious steps towards the new technologies that we need to end that addiction. A budget that shortchanges vital energy efficiency efforts such as the weatherization program that helps reduce energy costs for our low-income families and seniors. A budget that cuts funding for some promising forms of renewable energy, cuts funding for research into vehicle technologies, and even cuts funding for a program designed to make the federal government more energy efficient. Quite simply, the president has failed to match his rhetoric with real action. OCS Even more disheartening is the continuing efforts of the administration to dig and drill their way out of dependence on foreign oil. Shortly after the budget was released, the Interior Department’s Minerals Management service unveiled their new proposed 5-year plan for the outer continental shelf, which included a plan to begin drilling off the Virginia coast. This is flatly unacceptable for my own state of New Jersey, because the ocean knows no borders, and an environmental catastrophe off the coast of Virginia would not stay confined to the waters of Virginia. The area to be leased is less than 75 miles off the southern tip of New Jersey, more than close enough to put our beaches and vital tourism industry at serious risk. The plan also shows that instead of seriously confronting our addiction, the administration would rather simply tap another vein.

CAFÉ standards. As many of our witnesses have said in the past, and will be expressing again today, the most effective way to confront our energy problems is through efficiency. We have made excellent strides in the past few decades to make our country more energy efficient, and one of the keys to that success has been Corporate Average Fuel Economy, or CAFE, standards. According to statistics compiled by the Rocky Mountain Institute, between 1977 and 1985 our oil use went down 17% and our oil imports went down 50%, and the biggest factor in that drop was the 7.6 mile-per-gallon improvement in new domestic cars over that time. But in the 20 years since then, our overall vehicle fleet has actually become less efficient. The CAFE standard for passenger cars has been stagnant for the past two decades, and the standard for light trucks is barely 1 mile-per-gallon higher than it was in 1987. Increasing fuel economy standards should be part of the energy independence solution and part of our national energy policy.

Another federal efficiency program that is part of the solution is Weatherization, which provides grants to states to allow them to make the homes of low-income families and seniors more energy efficient. This has a two-fold benefit. First, it lowers energy costs, which makes it easier for people to pay their heating or cooling bills, and reduces the amount of money that we need to spend on essential assistance programs like LIHEAP. Second, it reduces our overall energy needs. According to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, every $1 invested in the weatherization program returns $3.81 in energy and non-energy benefits, and because of the program the country saves the equivalent of 15 million barrels of oil each year. And yet, despite this track record of success, the administration has proposed cutting the program by 33%, denying over 30,000 families—families that are on the lowest rung of the economic ladder and most desperately need help—the ability to get their homes weatherized.

We also need to shift from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy. My own state of New Jersey has become a national leader in this field, recently enacting new incentives for the use of solar, wind, and other renewable energies, and moving towards enacting a robust renewable portfolio standard—20% by 2020. The state has put its money where its mouth is, giving over $43 million of incentives for new solar power installations over the past five years.

 

 

Senator THOMAS. I think we have a real opportunity to convert coal, which is our largest fossil resource, to diesel fuel, for example. We can do that very shortly. What do we do in the next 4 of 5 years?

Mr. WOOLSEY. Well, Senator, cellulosic ethanol is now coming on the market, Iogen in Canada, backed by Shell oil, diesel from waste products such as turkey carcasses from a Canagra slaughter house——

Senator THOMAS. Tell me about the volume of that, however. Oil from turkey carcasses obviously is not going to amount to much of anything.

Mr. WOOLSEY. No.

LISA MURKOWSKI, ALASKA. For years we’ve heard that energy independence is a pure pipe dream given that America—not counting ANWR—has just over 20 billion barrels of proven conventional oil reserves (1.6% of known world reserves), while the Middle East has 57% of the world’s known supply of conventional oil and nearly as much gas. But with rises in both oil and natural gas prices because of the exhaustion of much of the cheap ‘‘conventional oil and gas,’’ because of sharp increases in demand for energy from developing nations and because of environmental fears, we may well be moving into a period when unconventional fuels and new technology, including alternative fuels, can increase our domestic energy production and dare we say permit energy ‘‘independence.’’ The Pentagon last year began seriously funding research efforts to promote bio and synthetic fuel development to meet military needs. The Energy Policy Act of last summer provided research funding, tax incentives and policy changes to spur biofuels like ethanol, and hybrid vehicle sales to cut consumption; increased oil and gas recovery from heavy oil deposits and by use of carbon dioxide to produce more fuel from aging fields.

JIM BUNNING, KENTUCKY. I think that with energy prices at these highs, we can see clearly that our national security is threatened by our continued reliance on imported oil. I think one of our top priorities should be on our most abundant domestic fossil fuel: Coal. New technologies will make burning coal both cleaner and more efficient. We are even developing coal-to-liquid technology that can create a synthetic transportation fuel from coal. American coal reserves will be our best tool to overcome our reliance on Middle East oil. We also have other domestic energy reserves, like ANWR and the Outer-Continental Shelf. I believe we can tap these oil and natural gas reserves in an environmentally sound way. I also think we need to develop our renewable fuels, especially stimulating biodiesel and ethanol production. Many of you have focused on biodiesel and transportation fuels, but coal is our most abundant domestic fossil fuel and accounts for half of our electric generation. I believe we can lessen our dependence on imports by using clean coal power and nuclear energy to replace the imported natural gas and oil that currently goes to producing electricity.

From “In the Media” at shalebubble.org

 

 

 

Posted in Limits To Growth, U.S. Congress Energy Dependence, U.S. Congress Energy Policy | Tagged , , , , , | 1 Comment

We’ll all be Flint Michigan someday: U.S. water infrastructure is falling apart

NRC. 2006. Drinking Water Distribution Systems: Assessing and Reducing Risks Committee on Public Water Supply Distribution Systems: Assessing and Reducing Risks.  National Research Council, National Academies Press.

[ According to this Free National Research Council report, most water systems and distribution pipes will be reaching the end of their expected life spans in the next 30 years.

With nearly a million miles of utility water infrastructure, 5 million miles of private home and building infrastructure, 154,000 storage facilities, and more,  it will be hard to replace within 30 years, and the EPA estimated the cost would be over $205 billion dollars.

And since this 2006 report, in 2015 the EPA projected even higher costs:  $384 billion over 20 years to maintain the nation’s existing drinking water systems, which will require tens of thousands of miles of replacement pipe and thousands of new or renovated plants. The American Water Works Association, an industry-backed group, puts the price even higher — $1 trillion to replace all outdated pipes and meet growth over the next quarter-century.

This is important because one of the main reasons lifespan rose above 50 years last century was clean drinking water.  Residents in Flint who drank lead-poisoned water may not only have their lifespan shortened, but their quality of life reduced as well. Being able to harvest your own rainwater and store it is one way to protect yourself. Excerpts from this 404 page document follow. They are not in order. ]

U.S. Water infrastructure is falling apart (my title)

TABLE 4-7 Material Life Expectancies

Distribution System Component Typical Life Expectancies,

years

Concrete & metal storage tanks 30
Transmission pipes 35
Valves 35
Mechanical valves 15
Hydrants 40
Service Lines 30
SOURCE: EPA (2004). EPA’s Note: These expected useful lives are drawn from a variety of sources. The estimates assume that assets have been properly maintained.

The extent of water distribution pipes in the United States is estimated to be a total length of 980,000 miles (1.6 x 106 km), which is being replaced at an estimated rate of once every 200 years. Rates of repair and rehabilitation have not been estimated.

There is a large range in the type and age of the pipes that make up water distribution systems. The oldest cast iron pipes from the late 19th century are typically described as having an expected average useful lifespan of about 120 years because of the pipe wall thickness.

In the 1920s the manufacture of iron pipes changed to improve pipe strength, but the changes also produced a thinner wall. These pipes have an expected average life of about 100 years.

Pipe manufacturing continued to evolve in the 1950s and 1960s with the introduction of ductile iron pipe that is stronger than cast iron and more resistant to corrosion. Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes were introduced in the 1970s and high-density polyethylene in the 1990s. Both of these are very resistant to corrosion but they do not have the strength of ductile iron. Post-World War II pipes tend to have an expected average life of 75 years.

In the 20th century, most of the water systems and distribution pipes were relatively new and well within their expected lifespan. However, as is obvious from the above paragraph and recent reports, these different types of pipes, installed during different time periods, will all be reaching the end of their expected life spans in the next 30 years. Indeed, an estimated 26 percent of the distribution pipe in the country is unlined and in poor condition. For example, an analysis of main breaks at one large Midwestern water utility that kept careful records of distribution system management documented a sharp increase in the annual number of main breaks from 1970 (approximately 250 breaks per year) to 1989 (approximately 2,200 breaks per year). Thus, the water industry is entering an era where it must make substantial investments in pipe repair and replacement.

An EPA report on water infrastructure needs predicted that transmission and distribution replacement rates will rise to 2%/year by 2040 in order to adequately maintain the water infrastructure, which is about four times the current replacement rate.

These data on the aging of the nation’s infrastructure suggest that utilities will have to engage in regular and proactive infrastructure assessment and replacement in order to avoid a future characterized by more frequent failures, which might overwhelm the water industry’s capability to react effectively. Although the public health significance of increasingly frequent pipe failures is unknown given the variability in utility response to such events, it is reasonable to assume that the likelihood of external distribution system contamination events will increase in parallel with infrastructure failure rates.

Corrosion and leaching of pipe materials, growth of biofilms and nitrifying microorganisms, and the formation of Disenfectant By-Products (DBPs) are events internal to the distribution system that are potentially detrimental. Furthermore, most are exacerbated by increased water age within the distribution system. External contamination can enter the distribution system through infrastructure breaks, leaks, and cross connections as a result of faulty construction, backflow, and pressure transients.

Repair and replacement activities as well as permeable pipe materials also present routes for exposing the distribution system to external contamination.

All of these events act to compromise the integrity of the distribution system.

The physical integrity of the distribution system is always in a state of change, and the aging of the nation’s distribution systems and eventual need for replacement are growing concerns. Maintaining such a vast physical infrastructure is a challenge because of the complexity of individual distribution systems, each of which is comprised of a network of mains, fire hydrants, valves, auxiliary pumping or booster disinfection substations, storage reservoirs, standpipes, and service lines along with the plumbing systems in residences, large housing projects, high-rise buildings, hospitals, and public buildings. This is further complicated by factors that vary from system to system such as the size of the distribution network for the population served, the predominant pipe material and age of pipelines, water pressure, the number of line breaks each year, water storage capacity, and water supply retention time in the system.

Risks from Drinking Water

  • Drinking water can serve as a transmission vehicle for a variety of hazardous agents: enteric microbial pathogens from human or animal fecal contamination (e.g., noroviruses, E. coli O157:H7, Cryptosporidium)
  • aquatic microorganisms that can cause harmful infections in humans (e.g., nontuberculous mycobacteria, Legionella)
  • toxins from aquatic microorganisms (such as cyanobacteria)
  • several classes of chemical contaminants (organic chemicals such as benzene, polychlorinated biphenyls, and various pesticides; inorganic chemicals such as arsenic and nitrates; metals such as lead and copper
  • disinfection byproducts or DBPs such as trihalomethanes
  • radioactive compounds

Contaminants in drinking water can produce adverse effects in humans due to multiple routes of exposure. In addition to risk from ingestion, exposure can also occur from inhalation and dermal routes. For example, inhalation of droplets containing respiratory pathogens (such as Legionella or Mycobacterium) can result in illness. It is known that DBPs present in drinking water may volatilize resulting in inhalation risk, and these compounds (and likely other organics) may also be transported through the skin (after bathing or showering) into the bloodstream. Reaction of disinfectants in potable water with other materials in the household may also result in indoor air exposure of contaminants; for example Shepard et al. (1996) reported on release of volatile organics in indoor washing machines. Thus, multiple routes of exposure need to be considered when assessing the risk presented by contaminated distribution systems.

It has been recognized for some years that consumers face risk from multiple hazards, and that action to reduce the risk from one hazard may increase the risk from other hazards given the same exposure.

Preface

The distribution system is a critical component of every drinking water utility. Its primary function is to provide the required water quantity and quality at a suitable pressure, and failure to do so is a serious system deficiency. Water quality may degrade during distribution because of the way water is treated or not treated before it is distributed, chemical and biological reactions that take place in the water during distribution, reactions between the water and distribution system materials, and contamination from external sources that occurs because of main breaks, leaks coupled with hydraulic transients, and improperly maintained storage facilities, among other things. Furthermore, special problems are posed by the utility’s need to maintain suitable water quality at the consumers tap, and the quality changes that occur in consumers’ plumbing, which is not owned or controlled by the utility. The primary driving force for managing and regulating distribution systems is protecting the health of the consumer, which becomes more difficult as our nation’s distribution systems age and become more vulnerable to main breaks and leaks.

Summary

Water distribution systems carry drinking water from a centralized treatment plant or well supplies to consumers’ taps. These systems consist of pipes, pumps, valves, storage tanks, reservoirs, meters, fittings, and other hydraulic appurtenances. Spanning almost 1 million miles in the United States, distribution systems represent the vast majority of physical infrastructure for water supplies,

The issues and concerns surrounding the nation’s public water supply distribution systems are many.

Of the 34 billion gallons of water produced daily by public water systems in the United States, approximately 63 percent is used by residential customers. More than 80 percent of the water supplied to residences is used for activities other than human consumption such as sanitary service and landscape irrigation. Nonetheless, distribution systems are designed and operated to provide water of a quality acceptable for human consumption. Another important factor is that in addition to providing drinking water, a major function of most distribution systems is to provide adequate standby fire-flow. In order to satisfy this need, most distribution systems use standpipes, elevated tanks, storage reservoirs, and larger sized pipes. The effect of designing and operating a distribution system to maintain adequate fire flow and redundant capacity is that there are longer transit times between the treatment plant and the consumer than would otherwise be needed.

The type and age of the pipes that make up water distribution systems range from cast iron pipes installed during the late 19th century to ductile iron pipe and finally to plastic pipes introduced in the 1970s and beyond. Most water systems and distribution pipes will be reaching the end of their expected life spans in the next 30 years.

External and internal corrosion should be better researched and controlled in standardized ways. There is a need for new materials and corrosion science to better understand how to more effectively control both external and internal corrosion, and to match distribution system materials with the soil environment and the quality of water with which they are in contact.

Corrosion is poorly understood and thus unpredictable in occurrence. Insufficient attention has been given to its control, especially considering its estimated annual direct cost of $5 billion in U.S. for the main distribution system, not counting premise plumbing.

Outbreak surveillance data currently provide more information on the public health impact of contaminated distribution systems. In fact, investigations conducted in the last five years suggest that a substantial proportion of waterborne disease outbreaks, both microbial and chemical, is attributable to problems within distribution systems.

Contamination from cross-connections and back-siphonage were found to cause the majority of the outbreaks associated with distribution systems, followed by contamination of water mains following breaks and contamination of storage facilities. The situation may be of even greater concern because incidents involving domestic plumbing are less recognized and unlikely to be reported. In general the identified number of waterborne disease outbreaks is considered an underestimate because not all outbreaks are recognized, investigated, or reported to health authorities.

Hydraulic Integrity

Maintaining the hydraulic integrity of distribution systems is vital to ensuring that water of acceptable quality is delivered in acceptable amounts. The most critical element of hydraulic integrity is adequate water pressure inside the pipes. The loss of water pressure resulting from pipe breaks, significant leakage, excessive head loss at the pipe walls, pump or valve failures, or pressure surges can impair water delivery and will increase the risk of contamination of the water supply via intrusion. Another critical hydraulic factor is the length of time water is in the distribution system. Low flows in pipes create long travel times, with a resulting loss of disinfectant residual as well as sections where sediments can collect and accumulate and microbes can grow and be protected from disinfectants. Furthermore, sediment deposition will result in rougher pipes with reduced hydraulic capacity and increased pumping costs. Long detention times can also greatly reduce corrosion control effectiveness by impacting phosphate inhibitors and pH management. A final component of hydraulic integrity is maintaining sufficient mixing and turnover rates in storage facilities, which if insufficient can lead to short circuiting and generate pockets of stagnant water with depleted disinfectant residual.

Positive water pressure should be maintained. Low pressures in the distribution system can result not only in insufficient firefighting capacity but can also constitute a major health concern resulting from potential intrusion of contaminants from the surrounding external environment. A minimum residual pressure of 20 psi under all operating conditions and at all locations (including at the system extremities) should be maintained.

Breaches in physical and hydraulic integrity can lead to the influx of contaminants across pipe walls, through breaks, and via cross connections. These external contamination events can act as a source of inoculum, introduce nutrients and sediments, or decrease disinfectant concentrations within the distribution system, resulting in a degradation of water quality. Even in the absence of external contamination, however, there are situations where water quality is degraded due to transformations that take place within piping, tanks, and premise plumbing. These include biofilm growth, nitrification, leaching, internal corrosion, scale formation, and other chemical reactions associated with increasing water age. Maintaining water quality integrity in the distribution system is challenging because of the complexity of most systems. That is, there are interactions between the type and concentration of disinfectants used, corrosion control schemes, operational practices (e.g., flow characteristics, water age, flushing practices), the materials used for pipes and plumbing, the biological stability of the water, and the efficacy of treatment.

Microbial growth and biofilm development in distribution systems should be minimized. Even though the general heterotrophs found in biofilms are not likely to be of public health concern, their activity can promote the production of tastes and odors, increase disinfectant demand, and may contribute to corrosion. Biofilms may also harbor opportunistic pathogens (those causing disease in the immunocompromised). This issue is of critical importance in premise plumbing where long residence times promote disinfectant decay and subsequent bacterial growth and release. Residual disinfectant choices should be balanced to meet the overall goal of protecting public health. For free chlorine, the potential residual loss and DBP formation should be weighed against the problems that may be introduced by chloramination, which include nitrification, lower disinfectant efficacy against suspended organisms, and the potential for deleterious corrosion problems.

Premise plumbing includes that portion of the distribution system associated with schools, hospitals, public and private housing, and other buildings. It is connected to the main distribution system via the service line. The quality of potable water in premise plumbing is not ensured by EPA regulations,

Virtually every problem previously identified in the main water transmission system can also occur in premise plumbing. However, unique characteristics of premise plumbing can magnify the potential public health risk relative to the main distribution system and complicate formulation of coherent strategies to deal with problems. These characteristics include:

  1. a high surface area to volume ratio, which along with other factors can lead to more severe leaching and permeation;
  2. variable, often advanced water age, especially in buildings that are irregularly occupied;
  3. more extreme temperatures than those experienced in the main distribution system
  4. low or no disinfectant residual, because buildings are unavoidable “dead ends” in a distribution system;
  5. potentially higher bacterial levels and regrowth due to the lack of persistent disinfectant residuals, high surface area, long stagnation times, and warmer temperatures. Legionella in particular is known to colonize premise plumbing, especially hot water heaters;
  6. exposure routes through vapor and bioaerosols in relatively confined spaces such as home showers;
  7. proximity to service lines, which have been shown to provide the greatest number of potential entry points for pathogen intrusion;
  8. higher prevalence of cross connections, since it is relatively common for untrained and unlicensed individuals to do repair work in premise plumbing;
  9. variable responsible party, resulting in considerable confusion over who should maintain water quality in premise plumbing.

Introduction

The first municipal water utility in the United States was established in Boston in 1652 to provide domestic water and fire protection. The Boston system emulated ancient Roman water supply systems in that it was multipurpose in nature. Many water supplies in the United States were subsequently constructed in cities primarily for the suppression of fires, but most have been adapted to serve commercial and residential properties with water. By 1860, there were 136 water systems in the United States, and most of these systems supplied water from springs low in turbidity and relatively free from pollution. However, by the end of the nineteenth century waterborne disease had become recognized as a serious problem in industrialized river valleys. This led to the more routine treatment of water prior to its distribution to consumers. Water treatment enabled a decline in the typhoid death rate in Pittsburgh, PA from 158 deaths per 100,000 in the 1880s to 5 per 100,000 in 1935

Similarly, both typhoid case and death rates for the City of Cincinnati declined more than tenfold during the period 1898 to 1928 due to the use of sand filtration, disinfection via chlorination, and the application of drinking water standards. It is without a doubt that water treatment in the United States has proven to be a major contributor to ensuring the nation’s public health.

DRINKING WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS: ASSESSING AND REDUCING RISKS

They span almost 1 million miles in the United States and include an estimated 154,000 finished water storage facilities. As the U.S. population grows and communities expand, 13,200 miles (21,239 km) of new pipes are installed each year.

Because distribution systems represent the vast majority of physical infrastructure for water supplies, they constitute the primary management challenge from both an operational and public health standpoint.

Their repair and replacement represent an enormous financial liability; EPA estimates the 20-year water transmission and distribution needs of the country to be $183.6 billion, with storage facility infrastructure needs estimated at $24.8 billion.

Infrastructure Distribution system infrastructure is generally considered to consist of the pipes, pumps, valves, storage tanks, reservoirs, meters, fittings, and other hydraulic appurtenances that connect treatment plants or well supplies to consumers’ taps. The characteristics, general maintenance requirements, and desirable features of the basic infrastructure components in a drinking water distribution system are briefly discussed below.

Pipes

The systems of pipes that transport water from the source (such as a treatment plant) to the customer are often categorized from largest to smallest as transmission or trunk mains, distribution mains, service lines, and premise plumbing. Transmission or trunk mains usually convey large amounts of water over long distances such as from a treatment facility to a storage tank within the distribution system. Distribution mains are typically smaller in diameter than the transmission mains and generally follow the city streets. Service lines carry water from the distribution main to the building or property being served. Service lines can be of any size depending on how much water is required to serve a particular customer and are sized so that the utility’s design pressure is maintained at the customer’s property for the desired flows. Premise plumbing refers to the piping within a building or home that distributes water to the point of use. In premise plumbing the pipe diameters are usually comparatively small, leading to a greater surface-to-volume ratio than in other distribution system pipes.

The three requirements for a pipe include its ability to deliver the quantity of water required, to resist all external and internal forces acting upon it, and to be durable and have a long life. The materials commonly used to accomplish these goals today are ductile iron, pre-stressed concrete, polyvinyl chloride (PVC), reinforced plastic, and steel. In the past, unlined cast iron and asbestos cement pipes were frequently installed in distribution systems, and thus are important components of existing systems

If premise plumbing is included, the figure for total distribution system length would increase from almost 1 million miles to greater than 6 million miles.

Inclusion of premise plumbing and service lines in the definition of a public water supply distribution system is not common because of their variable ownership, which ultimately affects who takes responsibility for their maintenance. Most drinking water utilities and regulatory bodies only take responsibility for the water delivered to the curb stop, which generally captures only a portion of the service line. The portion of the service line not under control of the utility and all of the premise plumbing are entirely the building owner’s responsibility.

A grid/looped system, which consists of connected pipe loops throughout the area to be served, is the most widely used configuration in large municipal areas. In this type of system there are several pathways that the water can follow from the source to the consumer. Looped systems provide a high degree of reliability should a line break occur because the break can be isolated with little impact on consumers outside the immediate area. Also, by keeping water moving looping reduces some of the problems associated with water stagnation, such as adverse reactions with the pipe walls, and it increases fire-fighting capability. However, loops can be dead-ends, especially in suburban areas like cul-de-sacs, and have associated water quality problems. Most systems are a combination of both looped and branched portions.

Transmission mains are spaced from 1.5 to 2 miles (2,400 to 3,200 m) apart with dual-service mains spaced 3,000 to 4,000 feet (900 to 1,200 m) apart. Service mains should be located in every street.

Storage Tanks and Reservoirs

Storage tanks and reservoirs are used to provide storage capacity to meet fluctuations in demand (or shave off peaks), to provide reserve supply for firefighting use and emergency needs, to stabilize pressures in the distribution system, to increase operating convenience and provide flexibility in pumping, to provide water during source or pump failures, and to blend different water sources. The recommended location of a storage tank is just beyond the center of demand in the service area. Elevated tanks are used most frequently, but other types of tanks and reservoirs include in-ground tanks and open or closed reservoirs. Common tank materials include concrete and steel. An issue that has drawn a great deal of interest is the problem of low water turnover in these facilities resulting in long detention times. Much of the water volume in storage tanks is dedicated to fire protection, and unless utilities properly manage their tanks to control water quality, there can be problems attributable to both water aging and inadequate water mixing. Excessive water age can be conducive to depletion of the disinfectant residual, leading to biofilm growth, other biological changes in the water including nitrification, and the emergence of taste and odor problems. Improper mixing can lead to stratification and large stagnant (dead) zones within the bulk water volume that have depleted disinfectant residual. As discussed later in this report, neither historical designs nor operational procedures have adequately maintained high water quality in storage.

Security is an important issue with both storage tanks and pumps because of their potential use as a point of entry for deliberate contamination of distribution systems.

Pumps

Pumps are used to impart energy to the water in order to boost it to higher elevations or to increase pressure. Pumps are typically made from steel or cast iron. Most pumps used in distribution systems are centrifugal in nature, in that water from an intake pipe enters the pump through the action of a “spinning impeller” where it is discharged outward between vanes and into the discharge piping. The cost of power for pumping constitutes one of the major operating costs for a water supply.

Valves

The two types of valves generally utilized in a water distribution system are isolation valves (or stop or shutoff valves) and control valves. Isolation valves (typically either gate valves or butterfly valves) are used to isolate sections for maintenance and repair and are located so that the areas isolated will cause a minimum of inconvenience to other service areas. Maintenance of the valves is one of the major activities carried out by a utility. Many utilities have a regular valve-turning program in which a percentage of the valves are opened and closed on a regular basis. It is desirable to turn each valve in the system at least once per year. The implementation of such a program ensures that water can be shut off or diverted when needed, especially during an emergency, and that valves have not been inadvertently closed. Control valves are used to control the flow or pressure in a distribution system. They are normally sized based on the desired maximum and minimum flow rates, the upstream and downstream pressure differentials, and the flow velocities. Typical types of control valves include pressure-reducing, pressure-sustaining, and pressure-relief valves; flow-control valves; throttling valves; float valves; and check valves. Most valves are either steel or cast iron, although those found in premise plumbing to allow for easy shut-off in the event of repairs are usually brass. They exist throughout the distribution system and are more widely spaced in the transmission mains compared to the smaller-diameter pipes. Other appurtenances in a water system include blow-off and air-release/vacuum valves, which are used to flush water mains and release entrained air. On transmission mains, blow-off valves are typically located at every low point, and an air release/vacuum valve at every high point on the main. Blow-off valves are sometimes located near dead ends where water can stagnate or where rust and other debris can accumulate. Care must be taken at these locations to prevent unprotected connections to sanitary or storm sewers.

Hydrants are primarily part of the firefighting aspect of a water system. Proper design, spacing, and maintenance are needed to insure an adequate flow to satisfy fire-fighting requirements. Fire hydrants are typically exercised and tested annually by water utility or fire department personnel. Fire flow tests are conducted periodically to satisfy the requirements of the Insurance Services Office or as part of a water distribution system calibration program. Fire hydrants are installed in areas that are easily accessible by fire fighters and are not obstacles to pedestrians and vehicles. In addition to being used for firefighting, hydrants are also for routine flushing programs, emergency flushing, preventive flushing, testing and corrective action, and for street cleaning and construction projects. Infrastructure Design and Operation The function of a water distribution system is to deliver water to all customers of the system in sufficient quantity for potable drinking water and fire protection purposes, at the appropriate pressure, with minimal loss, of safe and acceptable quality, and as economically as possible. To convey water, pumps must provide working pressures, pipes must carry sufficient water, storage facilities must hold the water, and valves must open and close properly. Indeed, the carrying capacity of a water distribution system is defined as its ability to supply adequate water quantity and maintain adequate pressure (Male and Walski, 1991). Adequate pressure is defined in terms of the minimum and maximum design pressure supplied to customers under specific demand conditions. The maximum pressure is normally in the range of 80 to 100 psi; for example, the Uniform Plumbing Code requires that water pressure not exceed 80 psi (552 kPa) at service connections, unless the service is provided with a pressure-reducing valve. The minimum pressure during peak hours is typically in the range of 40 to 50 psi (276–345 kPa), while the recommended minimum pressure during fire flow is 20 psi (138 kPa).

Residential Drinking Water Provision

Of the 34 billion gallons of water produced daily by public water systems in the United States, approximately 63 percent is used by residential customers for indoor and outdoor purposes. Mayer et al. (1999) evaluated 1,188 homes from 14 cities across six regions of North America and found that 42 percent of annual residential water use was for indoor purposes and 58 percent for outdoor purposes. Outdoor water use varies quite significantly from region to region and includes irrigation. Of the indoor water use, less than 20 percent is for consumption or related activities, as shown below:

  • Human Consumption or Related Use – 17.1 %……
  • Faucet use – 15.7 %
  • Dishwasher – 1.4 %
  • Human Contact Only – 18.5 %……………………
  • Shower – 16.8 %
  • Bath – 1.7 %
  • Non-Human Ingestion or Contact Uses – 64.3 %…
  • Toilet – 26.7 %
  • Clothes Washer – 21.7 %
  • Leaks – 13.7 %
  • Other – 2.2 %

Most of the water supplied to residences is used primarily for laundering, showering, lawn watering, flushing toilets, or washing cars, and not for consumption. Nonetheless, except in a few rare circumstances, distribution systems are assumed to be designed and operated to provide water of a quality acceptable for human consumption. Normal household use is generally in the range of 200 gallons per day (757 L per day) with a typical flow rate of 2 to 20 gallons per minute (gpm) [7.57–75.7 L per minute (Lpm)]; fire flow can be orders of magnitude greater than these levels, as discussed below.

Fire Flow Provision

Besides providing drinking water, a major function of most distribution systems is to provide adequate standby fire flow,

Fire-flow requirements for a single family house vary from 750 to 1,500 gpm

The duration for which these fire flows must be sustained normally ranges from 3 to 8 hours. In order to satisfy this need for adequate standby capacity and pressure, most distribution systems use standpipes, elevated tanks, and large storage reservoirs. Furthermore, the sizing of water mains is partly based on fire protection requirements set by the Insurance Services Office. (The minimum flow that the water system can sustain for a specific period of time governs its fire protection rating, which then is used to set the fire insurance rates for the communities that are served by the system.) As a consequence, fire-flow governs much of the design of a distribution system, especially for smaller systems. A study conducted by the American Water Works Association Research Foundation confirmed the impact of fire-flow capacity on the operation of, and the water quality in, drinking water networks. It found that although the amount of water used for firefighting is generally a small percentage of the annual water consumed, the required rates of water delivery for firefighting have a significant and quantifiable impact on the size of water mains, tank storage volumes, water age, and operating and maintenance costs. Generally nearly 75 percent of the capacity of a typical drinking water distribution system is devoted to fire fighting.

The effect of designing and operating a system to maintain adequate fire flow and redundant capacity is that there are long transit times between the treatment plant and the consumer, which may be detrimental to meeting drinking water MCLs. Snyder et al. (2002) recommended that water systems evaluate existing storage tanks to determine if modification or elimination of the tanks was feasible. Water efficient fire suppression technologies exist that use less water than conventional standards. In particular, the universal application of automatic sprinkler systems provides the most proven method for reducing loss of life and property due to fire, while at the same time providing faster response to the fire and requiring significantly less water than conventional fire-fighting techniques. Snyder et al. (2002) also recommended that the universal application of automatic fire sprinklers be adopted by local jurisdictions for homes as well as in other buildings. There is a growing recognition that embedded designs in most urban areas have resulted in distribution systems that have long water residence times due to the large amounts of storage required for firefighting capacity. More than ten years ago, Clark and Grayman (1992) expressed concern that long residence times resulting from excess capacity for firefighting and other municipal uses would also provide optimum conditions for the formation of DBPs and the regrowth of microorganisms. They hypothesized that eventually the drinking water industry would be in conflict over protecting public health and protecting public safety.

Because existing water distribution systems are designed primarily for fire protection, the majority of the distribution system uses pipes that are much larger than would be needed if the water was intended only for personal use. This leads to residence times of weeks in traditional systems versus potentially hours in a system comprised of much smaller pipes. In the absence of smaller sized distribution systems, utilities have had to implement flushing programs and use higher dosages of disinfectants to maintain water quality in distribution systems. This has the unfortunate side effect of increasing DBP formation as well as taste and odor problems, which contribute to the public’s perception that the water quality is poor. Furthermore, large pipes are generally cement-lined or unlined ductile iron pipe typically with more than 300 joints per mile. These joints are frequently not water tight, leading to water losses as well as providing an opportunity for external contamination of finished water.

From an engineering perspective it seems intuitively obvious that it is most efficient to satisfy all needs by installing one pipe and to minimize the number of pipe excavations. This philosophy worked well in the early days of water system development. However, it has resulted in water systems with long residence times (and their negative consequences) under normal water use patterns and a major investment in above-ground (pumps and storage tanks) and belowground (transmission mains, distribution pipes, service connections, etc.) infrastructure. Therefore as suggested in Okun (2005) it may be time to look at alternatives for supplying the various water needs in urban areas such as dual distribution systems.

However, the creation of dual distribution systems necessitates the retrofitting of an existing water supply system and reliance on existing pipes to provide non-potable supply obtained from wastewater or other sources. Large costs would be incurred when installing the new, small diameter pipe for potable water, disconnecting the existing system from homes and other users so that it could be used reliably for only non-potable needs, and other retrofitting measures.

The potential for cross connections or misuse of water supplies of lesser quality is greatly increased in dual distribution systems and decentralized treatment.

Water System Diversity

Water utilities in the United States vary greatly in size, ownership, and type of operation. The SDWA defines public water systems as consisting of community water supply systems; transient, non-community water supply systems; and non-transient, non-community water supply systems. A community water supply system serves year-round residents and ranges in size from those that serve as few as 25 people to those that serve several million. A transient, non-community water supply system serves areas such as campgrounds or gas stations where people do not remain for long periods of time. A non-transient, non-community water supply system serves primarily non-residential customers but must serve at least 25 of the same people for at least six months of the year (such as schools, hospitals, and factories that have their own water supply).

There are 159,796 water systems in the United States that meet the federal definition of a public water system (EPA, 2005b). Thirty-three (33) percent (52,838) of these systems are categorized as community water supply systems, 55 percent are categorized as transient, non-community water supplies, and 12 percent (19,375) are non-transient, non-community water systems. Overall, public water systems serve 297 million residential and commercial customers. Although the vast majority (98 percent) of systems serves less than 10,000 people, almost three quarters of all Americans get their water from community water supplies serving more than 10,000 people. Not all water supplies deliver water directly to consumers, but rather deliver water to other supplies. Community water supply systems are defined as “consecutive systems” if they receive their water from another community water supply through one or more interconnections

Some utilities rely primarily on surface water supplies while others rely primarily on groundwater. Surface water is the primary source of 22 percent of the community water supply systems, while groundwater is used by 78 percent of community water supply systems. Of the non-community water supply systems (both transient and non-transient), 97 percent are served by groundwater. Many systems serve communities using multiple sources of supply such as a combination of groundwater and/or surface water sources. This is important because in a grid/looped system, the mixing of water from different sources can have a detrimental influence on water quality, including taste and odor, in the distribution system.

Water supply systems serving cities and towns are generally administered by departments of municipalities or counties (public systems) or by investor owned companies (private systems). Public systems are predominately owned by local municipal governments, and they serve approximately 78 percent of the total population that uses community water supplies. Approximately 82 percent of urban water systems (those serving more than 50,000 persons) are publicly owned. There are about 33,000 privately owned water systems that serve the remaining 22 percent of people served by community water systems. Private systems are usually investor-owned in the larger population size categories but can include many small systems as part of one large organization. In the small- and medium-sized categories, the privately owned systems tend to be owned by homeowners associations or developers.

Infrastructure Viability over the Long Term

For the purposes of this report, distribution system integrity is defined as having three basic components: (1) physical integrity, which refers to the maintenance of a physical barrier between the distribution system interior and the external environment, (2) hydraulic integrity, which refers to the maintenance of a desirable water flow, water pressure, and water age, taking both potable drinking water and fire flow provision into account, and (3) water quality integrity, which refers to the maintenance of finished water quality via prevention of internally derived contamination. This division is important because the three types of integrity have different causes of their loss, different consequences once they are lost, different methods for detecting and preventing a loss, and different remedies for regaining integrity. Factors important in maintaining the physical integrity of a distribution system include the maintenance of the distribution system components, such as the protection of pipes and joints against internal and external corrosion and the presence of devices to prevent cross-connections and backflow. Hydraulic integrity depends on, for example, proper system operation to minimize residence time and on preventing the encrustation and tuberculation of corrosion products and biofilms on the pipe walls that increase hydraulic roughness and decrease effective diameter. Maintaining water quality integrity in the face of internal contamination can involve control of nitrifying organisms and biofilms via changes in disinfection practices.

Older industrial cities in the northeast and Midwest United States no longer have industries that use high volumes of water, and they have also experienced major population shifts from the inner city to the suburbs. As a consequence, the utilities have an overcapacity to produce water, mainly in the form of oversized mains, at central locations, while needing to provide water to suburbs at greater distances from the treatment plant. Both factors can contribute to problems associated with high water residence times in the distribution system.

Currently, 51 organic chemicals, 16 inorganic chemicals, seven disinfectants and disinfection byproducts (DBPs), four radionuclides, and coliform bacteria are monitored for compliance with the SDWA.   The SDWA does not directly address distribution system contamination for most compounds.

Water Security-related Directives and Laws

Although not a new issue, security has become paramount to the water utility industry since the events of September 11, 2001. The potential for natural, accidental, and purposeful contamination of water supply has been present for decades whether in the form of earthquakes, floods, spills of toxic chemicals, or acts of vandalism.

One of most common means of contaminating distribution systems is through a cross connection. Cross connections occur when a nonpotable water source is connected to a potable water source. Under this condition contaminated water has the potential to flow back into the potable source. Backflow can occur when the pressure in the distribution system is less than the pressure in the nonpotable source, described as backsiphonage. Conditions under which backsiphonage can occur include water main breaks, firefighting demands, and pump failures. Backflow can also occur when there is increased pressure from the nonpotable source that exceeds the pressure in the distribution system, described as backpressure. Backpressure can occur when industrial operations connected to the potable source are exerting higher internal pressure than the pressure in the distribution system or when irrigation systems connected to the potable system are pumping from a separate water source and the pump pressure exceeds the distribution system pressure.

Some states rely solely on plumbing codes to address cross connections and backflow, which is problematic because plumbing codes, in most cases, do not require testing and follow-up inspections of backflow prevention devices.

Houses are built to code but many fall out of compliance due to age and as the code changes. In addition there are no organizations that advise homeowners on how to maintain their plumbing systems such as when flushing is necessary, water temperature recommendations, home treatment devices, etc. (Chaney, 2005).

The barrier must be non-permeable since contaminants can enter through breaks or failures in materials as well as through the materials themselves. Table 4-1 gives examples of the infrastructure components that constitute this physical barrier, what they protect against, and the materials of which they are commonly constructed. A variety of components and materials make up this physical barrier. Four major component types are delineated and referred to repeatedly in this chapter: (1) pipes including mains, services lines, and premise plumbing; (2) fittings and appurtenances such as crosses, tees, ells, hydrants, valves, and meters;

TABLE 4-1 Infrastructure Components, What They Protect Against, and Common Materials

  • Pipe. Protects Against Soil, groundwater, sewer exfiltration, surface runoff, human activity, animals, insects, and other life forms. Materials: Asbestos cement, reinforced concrete, steel, lined and unlined cast iron, lined and unlined ductile iron, PVC, polyethylene and HDPE, galvanized iron, copper, polybutylene
  • Pipe wrap and coatings. Supporting role in that it preserves the pipe integrity. Material: Polyethylene, bitumastic, cement-mortar
  • Pipe linings. Supporting role in that it preserves the pipe integrity. Materials: Epoxy, urethanes, asphalt, coal tar, cement-mortar, plastic inserts
  • Service lines. Protects from Soil, groundwater, sewer exfiltration, surface runoff, human activity, animals, insects, and other life forms. Materials: Galvanized steel or iron, lead, copper, chlorinated PVC, crosslinked polyethylene, polyethylene, polybutylene, PVC, brass, cast iron
  • Premise (home and building) plumbing. Protects against Air contamination, human activity, sewage and industrial non-potable water. Materials: Copper, lead, galvanized steel or iron, iron, steel, chlorinated PVC, PVC, cross-linked polyethylene, polyethylene, polybutylene
  • Fittings and appurtenances (meters, valves, hydrants, ferrules). Protects against Soil, groundwater, sewer exfiltration, surface runoff, human activity, animals, insects, and other life forms. Materials: Brass, rubber, plastic
  • Storage facility walls, roof, cover, vent hatch. Protects against Air contamination, rain, algae, surface runoff, human activity, animals, birds, and insects. Materials: Concrete, steel, asphaltic, epoxy, plastics
  • Backflow prevention devices. Protects against Nonpotable water. Materials: Brass, plastic
  • Gaskets and joints. Protects against Soil, groundwater, sewer exfiltration, surface runoff, human activity, animals, insects, and other life forms. Materials: Rubber, leadite, asphaltic,

Cast iron pipe (lined or unlined) has been largely phased out due to its susceptibility to both internal and external corrosion and associated structural failures. Ductile-iron pipe (with or without a cement lining) has taken its place because it is durable and strong, has high flexural strength, and has good resistance to external corrosion from soils. It is, however, quite heavy, it might need corrosion protection in certain soils, and it requires multiple types of joints. Concrete, asbestos cement, and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plastic pipe have been used to replace metal pipe because of their relatively good resistance to corrosion. Polyethylene pipe is growing in use, especially for trenchless applications like slip lining, pipe bursting, and directional drilling. High-density polyethylene pipe is the second most commonly used pipe. It is tough, corrosion resistant both internally and externally, and flexible. The manufacturer estimates its service life to be 50 to 100 years

FACTORS CAUSING LOSS OF PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

Losses in physical integrity are caused by an abrupt or gradual alteration in the structure of the material barrier between the external environment and the drinking water, by the absence of a barrier, or by the improper installation or use of a barrier. These mechanisms are summarized in Table 4-2 (which shows that failure is cause by factors such as: Corrosion, permeation, too high internal water pressure or surges, shifting earth, exposure to UV light, stress from overburden, temperature fluctuations, freezing, natural disasters, aging and weathering.

Infrastructure components break down or fail over time due to chemical interactions between the materials and the surrounding environment, eventually leading to holes, leaks, and other breaches in the barrier. These processes can occur over time scales of days to decades, depending on the materials and conditions present. For example, plastic pipes can be very rapidly compromised by nearby hydrophobic compounds (e.g., solvents in the vadose zone that result from surface or subsurface contamination), with the resulting permeation of those compounds into the distribution system through the pipe materials. Both internal and external corrosion can lead to structural failure of pipes and joints, thereby allowing contaminants to infiltrate into the distribution system via leaks or subsequent main breaks. Materials failure can be hastened if the distribution system water pressure is too high, from overburden stresses on pipes, and during natural disasters. Indeed, hurricanes and earthquakes have caused extensive sudden damage to distribution systems, including broken service lines and fire hydrants, pipes disconnected or broken by the uprooting of trees, cracks in cement water storage basins, and seam separations in steel water storage tanks

A second major contributor to the loss of physical integrity is when certain critical components are absent, either by oversight or due to vandalism. For example, the absence of backflow prevention devices and covers for storage facilities can allow external contaminants to enter distribution systems.

Finally, human activity involving distribution system materials can allow contamination to occur such as through unsanitary repair and replacement practices, unprotected access to materials, or the improper handling of materials leading to unintentional damage. One must even consider the installation of flawed materials, which might, for example, be brought about because of a lack of protection of materials during storage and handling. Structural Failure of Distribution System Components Metallic pipe failures are divided generally into two categories: corrosion failures and mechanical failures. Common types of failures for iron mains include: • Bell splits or cracks that require cutting out the joint and replacing it with a mechanical fitting; these are typical for leadite joints • Splits at tees and offsets and other fittings that require replacement • Circumferential cracks or round cracks and holes, more typical in smaller diameter pipe (< 10 in.). These can result from a lack of soil support, causing the pipe to be called upon to act as a beam • Splits or longitudinal cracks or spiral cracks that will blow out. Longitudinal cracks are more common for larger pipe (> 12 in.) and can result from crushing under external loads or from excessive internal pressure • Spiral failures in medium diameter pipe • Shearing failures in large diameter pipe • Pinholes (corrosion hole) caused by internal corrosion • Tap or joint blowout • Crushed pipe

A simpler categorization can be found in Romer et al. (2004), who summarized three types of pipe failures as weeping failures, pipe breaks, and sudden failures. A weeping failure is where a leak allows an unnoticeable exchange of water to and from the surrounding soil. A pipe break includes a hole in the pipe or a disengagement of a bell-and-spigot joint. A sudden failure is the bursting of a pipe wall or shear of the pipe cross section, as would occur for a concrete pipeline, or a blow out, which refers to a complete break in a pipe. Pipe breaks can occur for a myriad of reasons such as normal materials deterioration, joint problems, movement of earth around the pipe, freezing and thawing, internal and external corrosion, stray DC currents, seasonal changes in internal water temperature, heavy traffic overhead including accidents that damage fire hydrants, changes in system pressure, air entrapment, excessive overhead loading, insufficient surge control (such as with water hammer and pressure transients), and errors in construction practices

One overriding factor in determining the potential for pipe failure is the force exerted on the water main. Contributors to this force include changes in temperature, which cause contraction and expansion of the metal and the surrounding soil, the weight of the soil over the buried main, and vibrations on the main caused by nearby activities such as traffic. An important consideration in this regard is the erosion potential of the supporting soil beneath the buried main. In the construction of a main, special sand and soil can be laid beneath it to help it bear external forces. But the movement of water in the ground beneath the main can wash away the finer material and create small or large caverns under the pipe. The force now bearing down on top of the pipe must be taken by the pipe itself, without the help of supporting material underneath. If these forces exceed the strength of the pipe, the main breaks. Most often these breaks occur at the weakest part of the main, i.e., the joint.

The factors that cause pipe failures can compound one another, hastening the process. For example, if a main develops small leaks because of corrosion, water within the distribution system can exfiltrate into the area surrounding the pipe, eroding away the supporting soil. Leakage that undermines the foundation of a water main can also occur from nearby sewer lines, go on essentially unnoticed, and eventually lead to water main collapse

Table 4-3 summarizes common problems that lead to pipe failures for pipes of differing materials. These are some of the principal factors, but they are not the only factors that act individually or in combination to lead to a main break. Other factors could include a street excavation that accidentally disturbs a water main and the misuse of fire hydrants.

Other components of distribution system also experience structural failure, although they have not historically received the attention afforded to pipes.

TABLE 4-3 Most Common Problems that Lead to Pipe Failure for Various Pipe Materials Pipe Material (common sizes) PVC and Polyethylene (4-36 in.) Problems Excessive deflection, joint misalignment and/or leakage, leaking connections, longitudinal breaks from stress, exposure to sunlight, too high internal water pressure or frequent surges in pressure, exposure to solvents, hard to locate when buried, damage can occur during tapping Cast/Ductile Iron (4-64 in,) (lined and unlined) Internal corrosion, joint misalignment and/or leakage, external corrosion, leaking connections, casting/manufacturing flaws Steel (4-120 in.) Internal corrosion, external corrosion, excessive deflection, joint leakage, imperfections in welded joints Asbestos-Cement (4-35 in.) Internal corrosion, cracks, joint misalignment and/or leakage, small pipe can be damaged during handling or tapping, pipe must be in proper soil, pipe is hard to locate when buried Concrete (12-16 to 144-168 in.) (prestressed or reinforced) Corrosion in contact with groundwater high in sulfates and chlorides, pipe is very heavy, alignment can be difficult, settling of the surrounding soil can cause joint leaks, manufacturing flaws

Corrosion as a Major Factor

Corrosion is the degradation of a material by reaction with the local environment. In water distribution systems, the term corrosion refers to dissolution of concrete linings and concrete pipe, as well as to the deterioration of metallic pipe and valves via redox reactions (e.g., iron pipe rusting). Degradation originating from the inside of the pipe via reactions with the potable water is termed internal corrosion. Degradation originating outside the pipe on surfaces contacting moist soil is referred to as external corrosion. Both internal and external corrosion can cause holes in the distribution system and cause loss of pipeline integrity. In some cases holes are formed directly in pipes by corrosion, as is the case with pinholes, but in many other instances corrosion weakens the pipe to the point that it will fail in the presence of forces originating from the soil environment. The type of corrosion and mode of failure causing loss of physical integrity are highly system specific. External corrosion can be exacerbated by a low soil redox potential, low soil pH, stray currents, and dissimilar metals or galvanic corrosion

Internal corrosion is influenced by pH, alkalinity, disinfectant type and dose, type of bacteria present in biofilms, velocity, water use patterns, use of inhibitors, and many other factors.

Some utilities have tried to avoid the issue by using plastic pipe. Even so, unprotected metal materials are regularly used at the present time, illustrating the water industry’s lack of attention to the problem. According to Romer et al. (2004), “approximately 72 percent of the materials reported in use for water mains are iron pipe, approximately two-thirds of the reported corrosion is in corrosive soils, and approximately two-thirds of the corrosion is on the pipe barrel.” In addition, metallic or cementitious pipe are often designed on the basis of their hydraulic capabilities first and foremost, and corrosion resistance is often a secondary consideration. The annual direct costs of corrosion are estimated to be $5 billio for the main distribution system (not counting premise plumbing).

Issues with Service Lines

Recent evidence indicates that service lines (the piping between the water main and the customer’s premises) and their fittings and connections (ferrules, curb stops, corporation stops, valves, and meters) can account for a significant proportion of the leaks in a distribution system

Many galvanized and lead pipe service lines are being replaced with copper or plastic pipe (chlorinated polyvinyl chloride or CPVC). CPVC and copper each have their benefits and weaknesses. Installation of CPVC requires less skill compared to installation of copper, although if workers are not careful installation can result in cracking and damage to CPVC pipe. CPVC is better for corrosive soils and waters, while copper is more resistant to internal biofilm growth. Buried CPVC pipe is difficult to locate compared to metal or copper pipe because it does not conduct electrical current for tracing. CPVC can impart a “plastic” flavor to water while the copper pipe can impart a “metallic” flavor. With CPVC, low levels of vinyl chloride can leach into the water.

Permeation refers to a mechanism of pipe failure in which contaminants external to the pipe materials and non-metallic joints compromise the structural integrity of the materials and actually pass through them into the drinking water. Permeation is generally associated with plastic pipes and with chemical solvents such as benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes (BTEX) and other hydrocarbons associated with oil and gasoline, all of which are easily detected using volatile organic chemical gas chromatography analyses. These chemicals can readily diffuse through the plastic pipe matrix, alter the plastic material, and migrate into the water within the pipe. Such compounds are common in soils surrounding gasoline spills (leaking storage tanks), at abandoned industrial sites, and near bulk chemical storage, electroplaters, and dry cleaners

Human Activities that Lead to Contamination. A second major cause of physical integrity loss is human activity surrounding construction, repair, and replacement that can introduce contamination into the distribution system. Any point where the water distribution system is opened to the atmosphere is a potential source of contamination. This is particularly relevant when laying new pipes, engaging in pipe repairs, and rehabilitating sites.

The average number of main repairs a year for a single utility ranges from 66 to 901 (which corresponds to 7.9–35.6 repairs per 100 miles of pipe per year), it is clear that exposure of the distribution system to contamination during repair is an inescapable reality.

TABLE 4-4 Potential for Contaminant Entry during Water Main Activities Activity Broken service line fills trench during installation Pipe gets dirty during storage before installation Trench dirt gets into pipe during installation Rainwater fills trench during installation Street runoff gets into pipe before installation Pipe is delivered dirty Trash gets into pipe before installation Vandalism occurs at the site Animals get into pipe before installation

The installation process for buried pipe is not the only place where contamination can occur. The storage of pipe, pipe fittings, and valves along roadways or in pipe yards prior to installation can expose them to contamination from soil, storm water runoff, and pets and wildlife. Damage to pipes prior to their installation is also possible, such as during pipe storage and handling or actual manufacturing defects such as surface impurities or nicks.

Similar issues surface for storage facilities that do not have adequate protection to prevent their contamination. There are 154,000 treated water storage facilities in the United States encompassing a variety of types including elevated tanks, standpipes, open and covered reservoirs, underground basins, and hydropneumatic storage tanks. Storage facilities are susceptible to external contamination from birds, insects, other animals, wind, rain, and algae. Indeed, coliform occurrences have been associated with birds roosting in the vent ports of covered water reservoirs. This is most problematic for uncovered storage facilities, although storage facilities with floating covers are also susceptible to bacterial contamination due to rips in the cover from ice, vandalism, or normal operation. Even with covered storage facilities, contaminants can gain access through improperly sealed access openings and hatches or faulty screening of vents and overflows.

The general rule is that there should be a horizontal separation of at least 10 ft (3 m) between water and sewer lines, and that the water line should be at least 1 ft (0.3 m) above the sewer (although variations to this general rule may occur from state to state). This rule, however, is fairly recent in comparison to the average age of the nation’s buried infrastructure.

Birds, and consequently bird excrement, are probably the biggest concern for storage tanks and reservoirs with floating covers. Sea gulls, for example, can be found roosting at storage facilities. Open reservoirs also offer the opportunity for detrimental changes in water quality because of exposure to the atmosphere or sunlight, such as changes in pH, dissolved oxygen, and algal growth. Even when covered, storage facilities can suffer from algal growth on the tops of floating covers that can gain entry into the tank through rips and tears or missing hatches. Algae can also be airborne or carried by birds and gain entry into storage tanks through open hatches and vents. Algae increase the chlorine demand of the stored water, reduce its oxygen content upon their degradation, affect taste and odor, and in some cases release byproducts. Chemical contaminants gain access to storage facilities via air pollution and surface-water runoff into open storage reservoirs. For example, accidental spills of chemicals during truck transport on highways adjacent to reservoirs are a potential threat, and can be very serious if the chemicals are present in a concentrated form and highly toxic. Surface-water runoff into open reservoirs can also introduce pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, silt, and humic materials from nearby land. The potential for chemical contamination of storage facilities continues to be overlooked in regulations in comparison to microbial contamination.

Even a water utility with a good program of corrosion control and pipe replacement can experience an annual pipe break rate of around 750 to 850 breaks per year

Hydraulic Integrity

The hydraulic integrity of a water distribution system is defined as its ability to provide a reliable water supply at an acceptable level of service—that is, meeting all demands placed upon the system with provisions for adequate pressure, fire protection, and reliability of uninterrupted supply (Cesario, 1995; AWWA, 2005). Water demand is the driving force for the operation of municipal water systems.

From an infrastructure perspective, a water distribution system is an elaborate conveyance structure in which pumps move water through the system, control valves allow water pressure and flow direction to be regulated, and reservoirs smooth out the effects of fluctuating demands (flow equalization) and provide reserve capacity for fire suppression and other emergencies. All these distribution system components and their operations and complex interactions can produce significant variations in critical hydraulic parameters, such that many opportunities exist for the loss of hydraulic integrity and degradation of service. This, in turn, may lead to serious water quality problems, some of which may threaten public health. One of the most critical components of hydraulic integrity is the maintenance of adequate pressure, defined in terms of the minimum and maximum design pressure supplied to customers under specific demand conditions. Low pressures, caused for example by failure of a pump or valve, may lead to inadequate supply and reduced fire suppression capability or, in the extreme, intrusion of potentially contaminated water. High pressures will intensify wear on valves and fittings and will increase leakage and may cause additional leaks or breaks with subsequent repercussions on water quality. High pressures will also increase external load on water heaters and other fixtures. Pipes and pumps must be sized to overcome the head loss caused by friction at the pipe walls and thus to provide acceptable pressure under specific demands, while sizing of control valves is based on the desired flow conditions, velocity, and pressure differential. A related need is to ensure that pressure fluctuations associated with surge conditions are kept below an acceptable limit. Excessive pressure surges generate high fluid velocity fluctuations and may cause resuspension of settled particles as well as biofilm detachment. A second element of hydraulic integrity is the reliability of supply, which refers to the ability of the system to maintain the desirable flow rate even when components are out of service (e.g., facility outage, pipe break) and is normally accomplished by providing redundancy in the system. Examples include looping of the pipe network and the development of backup sources to ensure multiple delivery points to all areas.

Pipe Deterioration

Pipe deterioration resulting in leaks or breaks can lead to a loss of hydraulic integrity because adequate pressures can no longer be maintained.

 

Aging pipe infrastructure and chronic water main breaks are a common problem for many water utilities. Analysis of water industry data showed that on average, main breaks occur 700 times per day in the United States

Pressure Transients and Changes in Flow Regime

Rapid changes in pressure and flow caused by events such as rapid valve closures or pump stoppages and hydrant flushing can create pressure surges of excessive magnitude. These transient pressures, which are superimposed on the normal static pressures present in the water line at the time the transient occurs, can strain the system leading to increased leakage and decreased system reliability, equipment failure, and even pipe rupture in extreme cases.

High-flow velocities can remove protective scale and tubercles, which will increase the rate of corrosion. Uncontrolled pump shutdown can lead to the undesirable occurrence of water-column separation, which can result in catastrophic pipeline failures due to severe pressure rises following the collapse of the vapor cavities.

Vacuum conditions can create high stresses and strains that are much greater than those occurring during normal operating regimes. They can cause the collapse of thin-walled pipes or reinforced concrete sections, particularly if these sections were not designed to withstand such strains. In less drastic cases, strong pressure surges may cause cracks in internal lining, damage connections between pipe sections, and destroy or cause deformation to equipment such as pipeline valves, air valves, or other surge protection devices. Sometimes the damage is not realized at the time, but may cause the pipeline to collapse in the future, especially if combined with repeated transients. Transient pressure and flow regimes are inevitable. All systems will, at some time, be started up, switched off, or undergo rapid flow changes such as those caused by hydrant flushing, and they will likely experience the effects of human errors, equipment breakdowns, earthquakes, or other risky disturbances

Gullick et al. (2004) studied intrusion occurrences in distribution systems and observed 15 surge events that resulted in a negative pressure. Most were caused by the sudden shutdown of pumps at a pump station because of either unintentional (e.g., power outages) or intentional (e.g., pump stoppage or startup tests) circumstances. Friedman et al. (2004) confirmed that negative pressure transients can occur in the distribution system and that the intruded water can travel downstream from the site of entry. Locations with the highest potential for intrusion were sites experiencing leaks and breaks, areas of high water table, and flooded air-vacuum valve vaults.

Examples of emergency situations include earthquakes, hurricanes, power failures, equipment failures, or transmission main failures. All these activities can result in a reduction in system capacity and supply pressure and changes to the flow paths of water within the distribution system.

Another function of SCADA is the ability to monitor and remotely control local conditions of water system components based on any desired range of operating conditions or set points. For example, a pump can be set to turn on or off automatically when the pressure at a critical location or the water level in a reservoir drops to a specified lower limit or goes above a specified upper limit. Alarms can be set to alert operators when a fault within the system equipment (e.g., equipment operating out of its normal range or overheating of a pump) and any breach in the system hydraulic integrity is detected. For example, extreme fluctuations in pressure and flow readings could result from pressure surges generated from a power failure at a pump station. SCADA could then divert water to the affected region from a different pump station, thus ensuring adequate supply and fire flow protection.

SCADA systems also contain pertinent system operational information required for water distribution network modeling (Cesario, 1995), such as the boundary conditions (e.g., tank water levels, valve and pump statuses and settings) for the network model as well as local flow and pressure conditions.

Water Quality Integrity

As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, breaches in physical and hydraulic integrity can lead to the influx of contaminants across pipe walls, through breaks, and via cross connections. These external contamination events can act as a source of inoculum, introduce nutrients and sediments, or decrease disinfectant concentrations within the distribution system, resulting in a degradation of water quality. Even in the absence of external contamination, however, there are situations where water quality is degraded due to transformations that take place within piping, tanks, and premise plumbing. Most measurements of water quality taken within the distribution system cannot differentiate between the deterioration caused by externally vs. internally derived sources.

An obvious risk to public health from distribution system biofilms is the release of pathogenic bacteria. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are instances where opportunistic pathogens have been detected in biofilms, including Legionella, Aeromonas spp., and Mycobacterium spp. Assessing risk from these organisms in biofilms is complicated by the potential for two modes of transmission. Aeromonas spp. causes disease by ingestion, while the other two organisms cause the most severe forms of disease after inhalation.

Coliform Bacteria. Total coliform bacteria (a subset of Gram-negative bacteria) are used primarily as a measure of water treatment effectiveness and can occasionally be found in distribution systems. The origins of total coliform bacteria include untreated surface water and groundwater, vegetation, soils, insects, and animal and human fecal material. Typical coliform bacteria found in drinking water systems include Klebsiella pneumoniae, Enterobacter aerogenes, Enterobacter cloacae, and Citrobacter freundii. Other typical species and genera are shown in Table 3-2. Although most coliforms are not pathogenic, they can indicate the potential presence of fecal pathogens and thus in the absence of more specific data may be used as a surrogate measure of public health risk. Indeed, the presence of coliforms is the distribution system is usually interpreted to indicate an external contamination event, such as injured organism passage through treatment barriers or introduction via water line breaks, cross connections, or uncovered or poorly maintained finished water storage facilities. However, biofilms within distribution systems can support the growth and release of coliforms, even when physical integrity (i.e., breaches in the treatment plant or distribution system) and disinfectant residual have been maintained, such that their presence may not necessarily indicate a recent external contamination event. Coliform regrowth in the distribution system is more likely during the summer months when temperatures are closer to the optimum growth temperatures of these bacteria. Thermotolerant coliforms (capable of growth at 44.5 oC), also termed “fecal coliforms” have a higher association with fecal pollution than total coliforms. And Escherichia coli is considered to be even more directly related to fecal pollution as it is commonly found in the intestinal track of warm-blooded animals.

 

[Also of interest is TABLE 8-1 Characteristics of U.S. Public and Private Transmission Systems but I don’t have the time to add it to this post ]

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General Charles Wald: Dial 1-800-The-U.S.-Military to solve your oil dependency issues

Senate 110-6. January 10, 2007. Geopolitics of Oil. United States Senate Hearing. 90 pages.

General Charles Wald, U.S. Air Force (retired), Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European command, and member of the Energy Security Leadership Council

I recently retired from the Air Force after 35 years of service and during my career had the opportunity to fly combat over Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq and Bosnia and learned much regarding how to use military assets to effectively solve national security problems.

But I also learned that many believed the U.S. military is solely responsible for security. I like to call this the ‘‘Dial 1-800-The-U.S.- Military’’ syndrome, because it reflects how people assume the U.S. military is a “toll-free” resource that can be called on to perform tasks that no one else has either the capability or will to execute.

I recall a recent meeting with several major global oil company executives in Kazakhstan. Before we began our discussion, one of the executives thanked me and the U.S. military for protecting the free flow of oil around the world. The executive’s world view included the expectation that the U.S. military will be there to provide worldwide security and to ensure the free flow of oil without any assistance from others. This struck me, and frankly, does not seem like a good model, particularly for the United States. The U.S. cannot and should not be everywhere to protect all the vulnerable components of the global oil infrastructure. The global economy relies on a massive oil infrastructure that stretches far beyond the Persian Gulf to pipelines in the Caucasus and offshore drilling rigs in the Gulf of Guinea. Surveying this situation, I realized that the U.S. military could not protect this vast infrastructure without partners. And, trust me, there should be partners out there, because the free flow of oil is in the best interest of many people all over the world.

With regard to the oil dependence issue, military response and capabilities are by no means the only effective tools available and in many cases are not appropriate. In fact, the single most effective step the United States can take to improve its energy security is to increase transportation efficiency. The transportation sector is responsible for nearly 70 percent of the oil the United States consumes. Within the transportation sector, oil—nearly 13 million barrels per day of it—accounts for 97% of delivered energy. More than 8 mb/d are used to fuel the over 220 million light-duty vehicles that Americans rely on for mobility.

CAFE standards legislated in 1973 during the Arab oil embargo were instrumental in helping America lower oil usage by the 1980’s, but there has been little progress since the original mileage targets were met. As a consequence, America’s light-duty vehicle fleet now has the worst average fuel efficiency in the developed world.

Some may be surprised to hear from a former General talk about fuel efficiency standards but they shouldn’t be. In the military, we learned that forced protection isn’t only about protecting weak spots, it’s also about reducing vulnerabilities before you go into harm’s way. That’s why lowering the Nation’s demand for oil is so critical.

Nearly all of our U.S. military commands have some oil security tasks and in essence they provide a blanket of security that benefits all nations. Central Command guards access to the oil supplies in the Middle East; Southern Command defends Colombia’s Cano Limon pipeline; Pacific Command patrols the tanker routes in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Western Pacific; and my last assignment, as deputy commander of European Command, which included, by the way, most of Africa. We patrolled the Mediterranean, provided security in the Caspian Sea and off the West Coast of Africa.

During that assignment, I became more appreciative of the size and scope of the oil security challenge. While surveying that challenge, it became apparent that the U.S. military could not protect that vast infrastructure without partners—and trust me, there should be partners in this mission. The free flow is clearly in the best interests of people all over the world. These interested parties certainly cannot replicate all the capabilities of the U.S. military, but their contributions can free up military tasks that only the U.S. military can successfully accomplish.

The armed forces of the United States have thus far been successful in fulfilling our energy security mission and they continue to carry out their duties professionally and with great courage. As a result of this success, many have come to believe—and I believe, falsely—that energy security can be achieved solely by military means. We need to change this paradigm because the U.S. military is not the best instrument for confronting all the strategic dangers emanating from oil dependence. The 1973 oil embargo is the most famous example of the use of energy as a political strategic weapon.

THE MILITARY’S HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT IN ENERGY SECURITY

Since 1980, the U.S. Government, through military application, has put about $50 billion to $60 billion a year into the Persian Gulf. That doesn’t count the current Iraq war or the 1990 Iraq war. And that’s good for our country, for security interests, but the problem is, we’re subsidizing world energy. There is nobody else in the world doing this, and really, if you look at how much we’re paying per gallon, me, as a U.S. citizen today, for gasoline, you could almost say it’s $7 a gallon, based on the fact that we’re subsidizing world security on this issue.

The United States protects the global oil trade for the benefit of all nations. In part, this is because the U.S. has unmatched military capabilities. But another reason is that other nations know the U.S. military is out there doing the job.

The implicit strategic and tactical demands of protecting the global trade have been recognized by national security officials for decades, but it took the Carter Doctrine of 1980, proclaimed in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, to formalize this critical military commitment.

The Carter Doctrine committed the U.S. to defending the Persian Gulf against aggression by any ‘‘outside force.’’ President Reagan built on this foundation by creating a military command in the Gulf and ordering the U.S. Navy to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War. The Gulf War of 1991, which saw the United States lead a coalition of nations in ousting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, was an expression of an implicit corollary of the Carter Doctrine: the U.S. would not allow Persian Gulf oil to be dominated by a radical regime—even an ‘inside force’ that posed a dangerous threat to the international order. More recently, the security agenda in the Gulf has expanded beyond state actor aggression to include concerns about terrorist attacks on facilities and supply lines.

THREATS ABOUND

Since issuing his 1996 ‘‘Declaration of War’’ against the U.S. and its partners, Osama bin Ladin has warned of attacks on oil installations in the Persian Gulf. Last year, the world came close to experiencing an oil supply shock when an Al- Qaeda attack on the Abqaiq facility through which approximately 60% of Saudi Arabian oil exports pass was barely foiled. In addition to attacking physical infrastructure, Al Qaeda operatives have also targeted expatriates in their residential areas, in particular in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (October 2002) and in al-Khobar (May 2004).

Iraq is also the scene of persistent insurgent and terrorist attacks on pipelines and pumping stations, especially in the North of the country. These attacks have severely limited Iraqi oil exports to the Mediterranean through Turkey, and they are a major reason why Iraqi oil production has stubbornly remained below its prewar peak. The lost output has cost Iraq billions of dollars at a time when it needs every dollar and while U.S. taxpayers have spent billions on the reconstruction of the country. But if violence continues, and especially if it spreads to the south, where most of the oil and export facilities are located, then all of Iraq’s oil production could be at risk. The implications of this supply cut would be severe.

The danger of attacks on shipping is proven—in October 2002, the French supertanker Limburg was rammed by a small boat packed with explosives off the coast of Yemen. Most oil shipments have to pass through a handful of maritime chokepoints. Roughly 80% of Middle East oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz (17 mb/d), Bab el Mandeb (3 mb/d), or the Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline (3.8 mb/d). Another 11.7 mb/d pass through the Straight of Malacca and 3.1 mb/d through the Turkish Straits. All of these passageways are vulnerable to accidents, piracy, and terrorism. Since alternative routes are lacking, the effect of a major blockage at one of these points could be devastating. Even unsuccessful attacks on tankers are likely to raise insurance rates and thus oil prices.

MILITARY POWER HAS LIMITS

The armed forces of the United States have been extraordinarily successful in fulfilling their energy security missions, and they continue to carry out their duties with great professionalism and courage. But, ironically, this very success may have weakened the nation’s strategic posture by allowing America’s political leaders and the American public to believe that energy security can be achieved by military means alone. We need to change the paradigm, because the U.S. military is not the best instrument for confronting all of the strategic dangers emanating from oil dependence. This is particularly true when oil is used a political weapon.

The 1973 Arab embargo is still the most famous example of the use of energy as a political strategic weapon. But in recent years, it has been Russia that has shown the most willingness to play this dangerous game, as at the beginning of 2006, when it stopped natural gas exports to the Ukraine, which in turn withheld the natural gas destined for Western Europe. The danger of conflict with a nuclear power like Russia should make it abundantly clear that there are limits on how we can use military power to guarantee energy flows. But we can take political steps to counter Russia’s brandishing oil and natural gas as political weapons. Russia wants to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a full member. Russia’s entry into this organization must be made contingent on its behavior. Russia must make a commitment to fostering energy security; there should be no reward for sowing insecurity.

Of course, energy exporting governments don’t need to resort to full-fledged embargoes to hurt the U.S. and other importers. Exporters can manipulate price through less drastic production cuts. Tellingly, after oil prices dropped from their 2006 peak of $78 to about $60 in the U.S. market, OPEC members began to cut back on production. Governments in oil-producing countries can also constrain future supply through investment decisions that lead to long-term stagnant or glowing growth in production and exports, or even decline. Often enough, future supply destruction is the unintended or accepted consequence of an insistence on government control of natural resources. Currently, an estimated 80-90% of global oil reserves are controlled by national oil companies (NOCs), which are highly susceptible to being constrained by political objectives, even if these undermine long-term supply growth.

State-controlled production is frequently inefficient, relying on outdated technology and reserve management techniques. Russia, whose government has made it abundantly clear that it wants to maintain near absolute control over its energy resources. This power grab has curtailed foreign investment, and ultimately limited production as well. Russia’s oil industry stands as a testament to the dangers of political meddling in oil production. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian production plummeted to only 6 mb/d in the mid-1990s, but then the efforts of private companies helped push production back to over 9 mb/d, achieving 10% annual growth rates in 2003 and 2004.1 However, with the subsequent expropriations of private enterprises such as Yukos, the production growth curve has flattened. Government control over production in Russia will also adversely impact the massive Shtokman natural gas field and Sakhlain-2 oil projects. President Putin has determined that tight government control of resources is more important than the greater revenue that would accrue from increased production achieved through cooperation with Western oil companies.

In an oil-dependent world facing increasingly tight supplies, the growing power of oil exporting countries and the shift in strategic calculations of other important countries have all added up to lessen U.S. diplomatic leverage.

Iran, which exports to the United States’ European and Asian allies, has threatened the use of the oil weapon to retaliate against efforts to constrain their nuclear program. The European Union relies on Middle Eastern oil, and Russian gas continues to complicate U.S. foreign policy efforts, especially when considering our efforts to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. China, with its rapidly growing dependence on foreign oil also blocks U.S. diplomatic initiatives in an effort to strengthen its own ties with oil exporters.

Given all these factors, it is imperative that the United States make energy security a top strategic priority. Toward that end, we should mobilize and leverage all of our national security resources, including our economic power, our investment markets, our technological products and our unsurpassed military strength. Curtailing demand is the most important security step we can take.

We need a comprehensive national security strategy for energy security. We must be prepared for sudden supply shocks triggered by terrorism or politics. We must promote greater diversity of fuel options while improving the efficiency of our Nation’s fleet.

CAN. May 2009. Powering America’s Defense: Energy and the Risks to National Security. 74 pages. PoweringAmericasDefense.org

Retired Air Force General Chuck Wald wants to see major changes in how America produces and uses energy. He wants carbon emissions reduced to help stave off the destabilizing effects of climate change.

“We’ve always had to deal with unpredictable and diverse threats,” Gen. Wald said. “They’ve always been hard to judge, hard to gauge. Things that may seem innocuous become important. Things that seem small become big. Things that are far away can be felt close to home. Take the pirates off the African coast. To me, it’s surprising that pirates, today, would cause so much havoc. It’s a threat that comes out of nowhere, and it becomes a dangerous situation.

“I think climate change will give us more of these threats that come out of nowhere. It will be harder to predict them. A stable global climate is what shaped our civilizations. An unstable climate, which is what we’re creating now with global warming, will make for unstable civilizations. It will involve more surprises. It will involve more people needing to move or make huge changes in their lives. It pushes us into a period of nonlinear change. That is hugely destabilizing.

“Our hands are tied in many cases because we need something that others have. We need their oil.

He gives another reason for major changes in our energy policy: He wants to reduce the pressure on our military.

“My perception is that the world, in a general sense, has assumed the U.S. would ensure the flow of oil around the world,” Gen. Wald said. “It goes back to the Carter Doctrine. I remember seeing the picture of the five presidents in the Oval Office. [He referred to a January photo, taken just before President Obama assumed office. Most people would not guess it was Jimmy Carter who said the U.S. would protect the flow of Persian Gulf oil by any means necessary. But he did. He recognized it as a vital strategic resource.

“And since that time, as global demand has grown, we see oil used more and more often as a tool by foreign leaders. And that shapes where we send our military. You look at the amount of time we spend engaged, in one way or another, with oil producing countries, and it’s staggering. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela gets a lot of our attention because he has a lot of oil. We spend a lot of money and a lot of time focused on him, and on others like him.

Gen. Wald cautions against simplistic responses to the challenge of energy dependency.

“The problem is dependence, and by that I mean our hands are tied in many cases because we need something that others have. We need their oil. But the solution isn’t really independence. We’re not going to become truly independent of anything. None of this is that simple. Reaching for independence can lead us to unilateralism or isolationism, and neither of those would be good for the U.S. The answer involves a sort of interdependence. We need a diversity of supply, for us and for everybody. We need clean fuels that are affordable and readily available, to us and to everybody. That’s not independence. It might even be considered a form of dependency-but we’d be dependent on each other, not on fossil fuels.”

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Carbon Capture and Storage not likely to ever be commercial: too expensive, uses up to 30% of the power

[It’s 2016 and CCS still isn’t working, and can never work because the size of the storage area is too large:  “The prospects for carbon capture (e.g., clean coal) are widely discussed. Unfortunately, what is not usually discussed is that capture and condensation of CO2 requires about 25% of the gross starting energy. In addition, the scale of the problem is usually not appreciated. Chu (2009) reported that the world burns 6 billion tons of coal C each year. The volume triples after conversion to CO2 so the storage volume required would be 39,000 km3 per year, which is equal to 600 Niagara Falls.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

2016. Richard Heinberg and David Fridley on Carbon Capture and Storage in “Our renewable future”. Island Press.

Why would implementing CCS be so expensive? Capturing carbon from coal combustion consumes 25 to 45% of the power produced. Add in the energy costs to transport, inject, and manage storage would lead to higher prices for coal-generated electricity and more power plants to provide it.  There are no commercial technologies at this point to capture carbon, so the costs are unknown.  To capture and bury just 38% of carbon from United States coal combustion would require making and installing pipelines, compressors, and pumps on a scale equivalent to the size of the nation’s oil industry.  Bolting CCS technology onto existing power plants is extremely inefficient, ideally CCS would be added to new coal power plants, but that would require replacing 600 current plants.

Austenmarch, I. March 29, 2016. Technology to Make Clean Energy From Coal Is Stumbling in Practice. New York Times.

Although this technology worked in a small demonstration project, it didn’t scale up: “An electrical plant on the Saskatchewan prairie was the great hope for industries that burn coal. In the first large-scale project of its kind, the plant was equipped with a technology that promised to pluck carbon out of the utility’s exhaust and bury it underground, transforming coal into a cleaner power source.  But the $1.1 billion project is now looking like a green dream…plagued by multiple shutdowns, has fallen way short of its emissions targets, and faces an unresolved problem with its core technology. Costs soared, requiring tens of millions of dollars in new equipment and repairs….the system is working at only 45% of capacity, has 8 major problem areas…and not apparent how to resolve some of the problems.  A chart covering the first year of operation showed that the system often didn’t work at all. When it was turned back on after shutdowns for adjustments and repairs, the amount of carbon captured sometimes even dropped.  ]

House 112-179. September 20, 2012. The American initiative part 29: a focus on H.R. 6172. House of Representatives.

[ Excerpts from the 205 page transcript of the hearing follow ]

Key points about Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) clean coal technology:

  • Large-scale commercialization remains years, if not decades, away
  • It is too expensive: EPA and DOE’s National Energy Technology Lab estimates that applying CCS to new coal-based units would increase the cost of electric power by 80%
  • CCS technology is in an early stage of development, so not a single CCS developer in the world can guarantee its technology will work at commercial scale, and without such a guarantee, power plant operators will not invest in CCS technology.
  • CCS reduces the EROEI substantially: Many of the current pilot projects estimate the parasitic load and cycle efficiency penalties to be at least 25 or 30% of a generating station output. So if CCS technology were retrofitted to an existing 2,000 MW coal-fired station the output from the plant would be reduced by 500 to 600 MW at a minimum.
  • Finding enough storage will be difficult
  • Very serious questions remain regarding the implications injection processes will have on mineral and property rights, monitoring C02 plumes across property lines or state boundaries, and the verification systems necessary to ensure long term monitoring to be sure no CO2 is escaping

ED WHITFIELD, KENTUCKY. Today we will be focusing on H.R. 6172, which would prohibit EPA’s proposed New Source Performance Standard for greenhouse gases from being finalized until it is technologically and economically feasible.

I don’t think that anyone is not aware of the fact that this administration has a strong bias against coal. We all are familiar with the President’s comments in San Francisco when he was running for President that people would be able to build coal plants if he is elected President but they would be bankrupt. Yesterday, many of you read about Alpha Resources closing down eight coalmines, 1,200 jobs. Patriot Coal recently announced they were going into bankruptcy. Murray Coal up in Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky and Illinois has announced they are going to be closing down three mines. And I understand the argument on the other side because they say it has nothing to with us, it has nothing to do with our regulations, this is because natural-gas prices are low, which is true. But even if that were not the case, once this regulation becomes final, no one will be able to build a new coal power plant in America.

BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. Today’s hearing will focus on H.R. 6172, a bill that prohibits the EPA from finalizing standards of performance under section 111 of the Clean Air Act for carbon dioxide emissions from existing or new fossil fuel-fired power plants unless or until carbon capture and storage is found to be technologically and economically feasible.

Ironically this bill comes on the heels of the last markup the subcommittee held where the majority defeated an amendment I offered that would have exempted future clean-coal projects from the arbitrary December 2011 deadline, and my Republican colleagues’ misguided attempts to disrupt the Department of Energy loan program by prohibiting any funding for future proposals regardless of the merits or technological advances of those projects. So as the first attempt to abandon any new Department of Energy funding for future clean-coal projects, the majority party is now bringing forth a bill that would block and delay EPA rules from finalizing the proposed carbon pollution standards for new power plants or any future carbon pollution standards for existing power plants until carbon capture and sequestration is technologically and economically feasible. This bill to most people would seem simply another attempt to try and shield the dirtiest polluters from commonsense air quality standards that would make their facilities cleaner and more efficient while protecting Americans’ health.

FRED UPTON, MICHIGAN. We are extremely concerned about the impacts that this proposed rule would have on the future of affordable coal-fired power generation in America if indeed it is finalized. As currently written, the rule requires any new coal-fired plants to install costly carbon capture and sequestration technology. However, even President Obama’s Department of Energy has acknowledged that CCS technology is not yet commercially available and that large-scale commercialization remains years, if not decades, away.

Leaders in CCS technology and industry stakeholders agree that significant technical, legal and regulatory hurdles still need to be overcome in order to successfully bring CCS to commercial scale. And because CCS technology remains in its early stages of development, not a single CCS developer in the world can currently guarantee that its technology will work at commercial scale, and without such a guarantee, power plant operators will not, and cannot, make investment in CCS technology.

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA. This committee has heard a lot of arguments from victims and people are being convinced that they are victims by the government when that is not the case. Let me cite an example. This committee had a hearing on EPA’s proposed regulation of farm dust. Can anybody think of anything more ridiculous than regulating farm dust that is ubiquitous to farms? So this committee rushed legislation to protect the farmers from EPA regulation of farm dust even though EPA said they had no plans to regulate farm dust, and we passed a bill. Do you know what the bill did? It provided for repeal of regulations from open-pit mining that put out particulate matter and toxic substances in the air. So the farmers were told they were victims and they were being used for a different purpose.

We don’t have the technology to remove the carbon from coal and store it. It is a technology we all should want to have. But the industry has no incentive to develop that technology because they are doing fine selling coal and using coal without that technology. That would just be an extra expense.

The Republicans in this House passed H.R. 910, the Upton- Inhofe bill. That would have barred EPA from reducing dangerous carbon pollution and codified science denial by overturning EPA’s scientific finding that carbon pollution endangers health and welfare. It is a premise that climate change is a hoax, and since that time early last year, this Republican House has proved to be the most anti-environmental in the history of the Congress. Republicans have voted more than 300 times on the House Floor to weaken longstanding public-health and environmental laws, block environmental standards, defund protections of our air, water and public lands, and oppose clean energy. They voted 47 times to block action on climate change. When they passed that Upton-Inhofe bill a year and a half ago, House Republicans argued the science was uncertain, EPA was exceeding its authority. By now, everybody should understand that they were wrong on both counts. The science has been clear and clearer, and just look at all the signs of climate change occurring around us: recent wildfires, droughts, heat waves, exactly the type of extreme weather events that scientists have been predicting for years and that this committee has been ignoring.

The EPA is not overreaching. The courts have affirmed their power to regulate in this area. It is about time we try to help the people in the coal area be viable in a new economy that is coming. Otherwise you can scare them with talk of war against them but it is a dishonest approach. It doesn’t help them. It stirs up the feelings of victimology by the people in these areas, and I suppose it is supposed to help Republicans in the election. But sometimes let us stop playing politics and deal with national urgent matters, and this committee has refused to do it for a year and a half.

Eugene Trisko. I am an attorney in private practice, here today to testify on behalf of the United Mine Workers of America to support the enactment of H.R. 6172. I have had the honor of representing the UMWA in Clean Air Act and domestic international climate change issues for the past 25 years. H.R. 6172 is sound policy and a commonsense solution to the threat to new advanced coal generation posed by EPA’s proposed carbon pollution standard rule. That rule sets a uniform CO2 emissions rate of 1,000 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour applicable to both coal and natural-gas combined cycle units. New coal units would need to employ CCS technology to comply while new natural-gas combined cycle units could comply without CCS.

EPA and DOE’s National Energy Technology Lab estimates that applying CCS to new coal-based units would increase the cost of electric power by 80 percent.

CCS has not been commercially demonstrated in this country as indicated by the findings of the 2010 Interagency Task Force Report on Carbon Capture and Storage. EPA’s proposed rule is simply a means of forcing winners and losers in the future market for electric generation.

Coal is an indispensable part of America’s energy supply and must be a core element of any all-of-the-above energy policy. More than one-third of our Nation’s electricity is generated by coal, mainly in baseload plants. The principal alternatives to coal for future baseload generation are nuclear and natural gas. While natural-gas prices have declined recently, substantial uncertainty surrounds future natural-gas prices, particularly in view of the 40- to 60-year lifetimes of electric generation assets.

John N. Voyles,.fr. On behalf of LG&E and KU Energy LLC. We are aware of no full scale application of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in continuous operation on a fossil-fueled electric generating unit.

The energy penalty to add CCS technology to a coal-fired electric generating unit is prohibitively high. Many of the current pilot projects estimate the parasitic load and cycle efficiency penalties to be at least 25 or 30% of a generating station output. For a company like mine, those penalties would mean if CCS technology were retrofitted to an existing 2,000 MW coal-fired station producing power for our customers today, the output from the plant would be reduced by 500 to 600 MW at a minimum.

An even bigger challenge is the application of C02 storage technology. While some carbon dioxide is successfully being utilized in enhanced oil or methane recovery operations and other pilots have successfully injected small quantities of CO2 into deep saline aquifers, the volume of storage necessary to facilitate such operations on a continuous basis for the life of an electric generating station has yet to be established. Very serious questions remain regarding the implications such injection processes have on mineral and property rights, the monitoring of the C02 plume across property lines or state boundaries and the verification systems necessary to ensure long term monitoring is taken into account. We believe these questions loom much larger than the simple view that CO2 can be captured and injected underground and might be done more cost effectively, with less energy penalties at some undetermined point in the future. Until such time as CCS technology is commercially available to be deployed at full scale in a technical and economical manner, we are concerned that any standard of performance proposed

Robert Hilton, Vice President of Power Technologies for Government Affairs for Alstom. Alstom has completed work on four pilot and validation-scale plants and has 10 pilots, validation, and commercial-scale plants in operation, design, or construction worldwide. These CCS projects include both coal and gas generation.

We are here today to specifically address the status of CCS as a commercial technology. CCS is, within the realm of innovation, no different than any other technology under development. It is required to move through various stages of development at consistently larger scale. Alstom has taken each of its CCS-related technologies from the bench level to validation scale with the aim of finally reaching commercial. However, to date, no CCS technologies have been deployed at commercial scale. Validation scale is the proof of technology in real field conditions. This is important. It is at this point we can say confidently that the basic technology works. CCS technology is technologically feasible now.

The final stage to reach commercial status is to perform a demonstration at full scale. It is critical to define the risk of technology to make offers. This cannot be defined until the technology can be shown to work at full scale. This is the first opportunity we have to work with the exact equipment in the exact operating conditions that will become the subject of contractual conditions including performance and other contractual guarantees. This also becomes the first opportunity to optimize the process and equipment to effect best performance and seek cost reduction. Based on these criteria, Alstom does not currently deem its technologies for CCS commercial and, to my knowledge, there are no other technology suppliers globally that can do so.

In its recent rulemaking, EPA has required CCS for all new coal plants and, conceivably gas plants. While Alstom, in conjunction with AEP, has run the largest plant, we are not ready to do this on 500- or 1,000-megawatt plants. It

The current DOE program for first generation technologies on CCS has encountered serious difficulties in bringing projects of commercial scale to operation. It appears that most of the projects, if they continue, are not likely to become operational until 2017 with the exception of Radcliffe/Kemper. Globally the picture is similar. The EU, and notably the UK, are targeting 2016 for commercial scale demos to start up. The Chinese have a road map aimed at two commercial scale demos to begin operation in 2016. But note: these are startups. A period of operation must follow before the technology is deemed ready for commercial offer.

CCS has been in development for approximately the last 12-14 years- a relatively short time for such a complex and critical technology. In the power industry, development periods of 20-25 years are common.

While Alstom, in conjunction with American Electric Power, have built and operated the largest continuous CCS operation on a coal plant through to sequestration, this plant was approximately 50 MWh. This plant, while proving the technology works very well, was not of such scale as to use the real equipment required for a 500 or 1000 MW Coal plant. Many of the components including the chillers and heat exchangers will change for use on a larger plant.

While this plant was capable of capturing and storing over 100,000 tons per year, it was not ready to be offered commercially on a 3-6 million ton per year power plant. [My comment: that is a HUGE amount of CO2 to store].

Baseload Operation

All power plants have some load variation that will have impacts on a plant’s heat rate and CO2 emissions. A typical PC baseload plant may operate 60% of the time at 100% load and another 35% between 50-75% load. The average capacity factor would be about 85% and it would have an average heat rate typically about 1% higher than at 100% load. This alone would be sufficient to increase the specific CO2 emission from a PC plant firing Wyoming subbituminous coal from 1781 to 1799 Ib CO2/MWh – essentially at the 1800 limit.

Cycling Operation

A typical PC cycling plant may operate 30% of the time at 100% load, another 55% between 50-75% load, with the balance of operation at even lower loads. The average capacity factor would be about 70% and it would have an average heat rate typically about 4·5% higher than at 100% load. A 5% heat rate increase from cycling operation would increase the specific CO2 emission of the Illinois bituminous coal from 1698 to 1783 Ib CO2/MWh – already getting very close to the 1800 limit. Note that this is particularly significant as more plants are expected to cycle in the future as renewables increase their share of power generation.

Degradation Due To Plant Age

Power plants are designed to operate for 30 years and many existing plants have operated much longer than that. Normal wear and tear is to be expected which has an impact on the plant heat rate. Looking at just the steam turbine, the plant heat rate could deteriorate by about 1% after 10 years of operation.

Site Factors

Other factors can impact a modern plant design that can also have a negative impact on plant heat rate and thus the CO2 emissions. For example, areas with limited water resources could require an air-cooled condenser vs. water cooling. Local water temperature can also have an impact on condenser operating pressure and heat rate. Table 2 summarizes the impact of an increase in plant heat rate due to the above factors on the specific CO2 emissions for a state-of-the-art USC PC power plant. A plant that is required to cycle would likely have a heat rate 5% higher than its design 100% load heat rate. In this scenario, a bituminous coal would just barely meet the standard and the lower rank fuels would exceed the 1800 Ib CO2/MWh target. It is likely that the bituminous plant would also exceed this target when site specific factors, impacts of startup, shutdown, and age deterioration are also factored in. The cycling impact could be even more significant in the future as renewables assume a larger portion of the total power generation.

Table 2: Impact of Heat Rate Degradation on Specific CO2 Emissions

The power industry normally has heavy production in the winter and summer and less production in the shoulder months of fall and spring.

Among the many challenges faced in implementing technology to reduce CO2 emissions from the power generation sector, minimizing both the energy penalty and the cost of electricity for fossil fueled power plants equipped with CCS are two of the most significant. Many parameters have to be taken into account to calculate these costs, including those related to technical performance. Evaluations and comparisons often result in endless debates due to the infinite number of possible combinations of these input parameters.

The “IPCC Summary for Policymakers” published in May 2007, gives a target for the maximum concentration of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) in the atmosphere of 450 ppm CO2 equivalent. This is required in order to give a reasonable chance of limiting the earth’s long-term surface temperature increase to a maximum of 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. This figure was agreed by all countries at Copenhagen & Cancun. To achieve this goal, CO2 emissions will need to be reduced massively. The main contributors to CO2 emissions today are Power Generation (40%), Transport (20%) and Industry (20%). Power generation currently emits 12 GtCO2/yr. Power is projected to grow significantly, and the 2°C goal will require full de-carbonization of Power generation. Low carbon technologies are needed both for new power generation plants, and for the existing installed base. The possibilities to reduce CO2 emissions in the Power sector include: i) demand reduction, ii) efficiency increase, iii nuclear, iv) renewables (wind, hydro, solar, biomass ), and v) Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). This last alternative will by necessity play a major role:

The IEA calculates that 54 to 67% of worldwide electricity generation will still be provided by fossil power plants in 2035. CCS is the only option to deal with the resulting emissions during a transition period until around 2050 after which time it may be possible to move toward a power generation system not reliant on fossil fuels.

John Christy, Alabama State Climatologist, Professor of Atmospheric Science, and Director of the Earth Systems Science Center at the University of Alabama at Huntsville. A climate change denier.

Also see:

Murray, J. W.  2016.  Limitations of Oil Production to the IPCC Scenarios: The New Realities of US and Global Oil Production. Biophysical Economics and Resource Quality.

Posted in Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS), Congressional Record U.S. | Tagged , , | 2 Comments

Electromagnetic pulse threat to infrastructure: U.S. House hearings 2012 & 2014

Related articles:

In 2012 and again in 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives held hearings on the threat of electromagnetic pulses — from either the sun or nuclear blaststo critical U.S. infrastructure.  The testimony at these hearings could be mistaken for a grade B science fiction movie.  But it’s not a Hollywood thriller.  Below are excerpts from the transcripts of the 2012 and 2014 hearings.

Chair, Michael McCaul (Texas). Some would say it is a low probability, but the damage that could be caused in the event of an EMP attack both by the sun, a solar event, or a man-made attack would be catastrophic. We talk a lot about a nuclear bomb in Manhattan, and we talk about a cybersecurity threat, the grid, power grid, in the Northeast, and all these things would actually probably pale in comparison to the devastation that an EMP attack could perpetrate on Americans. We have extraordinary capability in this country to do great things. We are a responsible Nation with our power and with our might. But a nation, a rogue nation, with that type of capability in the wrong hands could be devastating.

Side note: House Rep McCaul has just come out with a 2016 book “Failures of Imagination: The Deadliest Threats to Our Homeland–and How to Thwart Them”.   Yet this book doesn’t mention the threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). He doesn’t explain why EMP is no longer a threat, so he’s lost credibility with me, and I won’t be buying his book and reviewing it.

VICE CHAIRMAN SCOTT PERRY (Pennsylvania): In 1962, the United States conducted a test named STARFISH Prime where the military detonated a 1.4-megaton thermonuclear bomb about 25 miles above Johnston Atoll in the in the Pacific. In space, six American, British, and Soviet satellites suffered damage, and 800 miles away in Hawaii, burglar alarms sounded, street lights blinked out, and phones, radios, and televisions went dead. While only 1 percent of the existing street lights were affected, it became clear that electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, could cause significant damage.

EMP is simply a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results from certain types of high-energy explosions or from a suddenly fluctuating magnetic field. A frightening point is that EMP can be generated by nuclear weapons, from naturally-occurring sources such as solar storms, or specialized non-nuclear EMP weapons.

Nuclear weapon EMPs are most catastrophic when a nuclear weapon is detonated at a high altitude at approximately 30 kilometers, or 20 miles, above the intended target. The consequences of such an attack could be catastrophic. All electronics, power systems, and information systems could be shut down. This could then cascade into interdependent infrastructure such as water, gas, and telecommunications. While we understand that this is an extreme case, we must always be prepared in case a rogue state decides to utilize this technology.

Currently the nations of Russia and China have the technology to launch an EMP attack, and we have speculated that Iran and North Korea may be developing EMP weapon technology

Since most critical infrastructure, particularly electrical infrastructure is in the hands of private owners, the Federal Government has limited authority to mandate preparedness. DHS has no statutory authority whatsoever to regulate the electric grid.

Trent Franks (Arizona): With each passing year, our society becomes increasingly dependent on technology and an abundant supply of electricity. Our entire American way of life relies upon electrical power and technology. Our household appliances, food-distribution systems, telephone and computer networks, communication devices, water and sewage plants would grind to a halt without it. Nearly every single facet of modern human life in America is susceptible to being crippled by a major Electromagnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance event. We are so reliant on our electric power grid that we specifically consider it ‘‘critical infrastructure’’.

Chairman and Members of the committee, it strikes at my very core when I think of the men, women, and children in cities and rural towns across America with a possibility of no access to food, water, or transportation. In a matter of weeks or months at most, a worst-case scenario could bring devastation beyond imagination.

The effects of geomagnetic storms and electromagnetic pulses on electric infrastructure are well-documented, with nearly every space, weather, and EMP expert recognizing the dramatic disruptions and cataclysmic collapses these pulses can bring to electric grids. In 2008, the EMP Commission testified before The Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, that the U.S. society and economy are so critically dependent upon the availability of electricity that a significant collapse of the grid, precipitated by a major natural or man-made EMP event, could result in catastrophic civilian casualties. This conclusion is echoed by separate reports recently compiled by the DOD, DHS, DOE, NAS, along with various other Government agencies and independent researchers. All came to very similar conclusions. We now have 11 Government studies on the severe threat and vulnerabilities we face from EMP and GMD.

We have known the potentially devastating effects of sufficiently intense electromagnetic pulse on the electronic systems and its risk to our National security. More troubling, our enemies know.

More than a year ago, an unknown number of shooters with AK–47s knocked out 17 large transformers during a highly-choreographed assault on the PG&E Metcalf Transmission Substation in California. While the power company was able to avoid blackouts, the damage to the facility took nearly 4 weeks to repair.

This is not an isolated incident and world-wide adversaries are taking notice in the vulnerability of our grid.

We as a Nation have spent billions of dollars over the years hardening our nuclear triad, our missile-defense capabilities, and numerous other critical elements of our National security apparatus against the effects of electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type of electromagnetic pulse that might be generated against us by an enemy.

However, our civilian grid, which the Defense Department relies upon for nearly 99% of its electricity needs, is completely vulnerable to the same kind of danger. This constitutes an invitation on the part of certain enemies of the United States to use the asymmetric capability of an EMP weapon against us.

We also face the threat of a natural EMP event. Since the last occurrence of a major geomagnetic storm in 1921, the Nation’s high-voltage and extra-high- voltage systems have increased in size more than ten-fold.

HON. PETE SESSIONS: The possibility that a single nuclear weapon detonated in space high over this country could unleash intense electromagnetic pulses (EMP), disrupting for many months—if not indefinitely—the supply of power to large area. Until recently, information about EMP was Classified and many of us have little knowledge of the serious danger such threats represents to everything we hold dear.

Dr. William Graham, the chairman of the EMP Threat Commission, believes that, if the power goes out and stays out for even 1 year’s time, as many as 9 out of 10 of us would perish.

we need not face such a horrific prospect. We know how to protect electrical and electronic devices from the effects of EMP. In fact, the Department of Defense has been doing it with respect to the military’s nuclear deterrent and command-and-control systems for over 50 years. There are, in short, proven and easily implementable techniques that can now be applied to ensure the resilience ofthe U.S. electric grid and the things that depend upon it in 21st Century America—which is just about everything.

Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is the executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a Congressional advisory board dedicated to achieving protection of the United States from electromagnetic pulse and other threats. Dr. Pry is also the director of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, an advisory body to Congress on policies to counter weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Pry has served on the staffs of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from an EMP Attack, the House Armed Services Committee, as an intelligence officer with the CIA, and as a verification analyst at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Mr. PRY.  Natural EMP from a geomagnetic super-storm like the 1859 Carrington Event or the 1921 Railroad Storm, a nuclear EMP attack from terrorists or rogue states as practiced by North Korea during the nuclear crisis of 2013 are both existential threats that could kill 9 of 10 Americans through starvation, disease, and societal collapse.

A natural EMP catastrophe or nuclear EMP attack could black out the National electric grid for months or years and collapse all the other critical infrastructures, communications, transportation, banking and finance, food and water, necessary to sustain modern society and the lives of 310 million Americans.

EMP is a clear and present danger:

  • A Carrington-class coronal mass ejection narrowly missed the earth in July 2012.
  • Last April, during the nuclear crisis with North Korea over Kim Jong-Un’s threatened nuclear strikes against the United States, Pyongyang apparently practiced an EMP attack with its KSM–3 satellite that passed over the U.S. heartland and over the Washington, D.C.- New York City corridor.
  • Iran, estimated to be within 2 months of nuclear weapons by the administration, has a demonstrated capability to launch an EMP attack from a vessel at sea. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy commenced patrols off the East Coast of the United States in February.

An EMP attack is a high-tech means of killing millions of people the old-fashioned way—through starvation, disease, and societal collapse.

A single nuclear weapon detonated at high altitude will generate an electromagnetic pulse that can cause catastrophic damage across the entire contiguous United States to the critical infrastructures—electric power, telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, food and water—that sustain modern civilization and the lives of 310 million Americans. Nature can also generate an EMP causing similarly catastrophic consequences across the entire contiguous United States— or even across the entire planet—by means of a solar flare from the Sun that causes on Earth a great geomagnetic storm. Non-nuclear weapons, often referred to as radio frequency weapons, can also generate an EMP, much more limited in range than a nuclear weapon, that can damage electronics, and could cause the collapse of critical infrastructures locally, perhaps with cascading effects over an area as large as a major city.

Any nuclear warhead detonated at high altitude, 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) or more above the Earth’s surface, will generate an electromagnetic pulse. The immediate effects of EMP are disruption of, and damage to, electronic systems and electrical infrastructure. EMP is not reported in the scientific literature to have direct harmful effects on people. Because an EMP attack would detonate a nuclear warhead at high-altitude, no other nuclear effects—such as blast, thermal radiation, or radioactive fallout—would be experienced by people on the ground or flying through the atmosphere. However, because modern civilization and life itself now depends upon elec Gamma rays, and the fireball from a high-altitude nuclear detonation, interact with the atmosphere to produce a super-energetic radio wave—the EMP—that covers everything within line-of-sight from the explosion to the Earth’s horizon.

Even a relatively low-altitude EMP attack, where the nuclear warhead is detonated at an altitude of 30 kilometers, will generate a damaging EMP field over a vast area, covering a region equivalent to New England, all of New York, and half of Pennsylvania. A nuclear weapon detonated at an altitude of 400 kilometers (~250 miles) over the center of the United States would place an EMP field over the entire contiguous United States and parts of Canada and Mexico.

It is a myth is that rogue states or terrorists need a sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile to make an EMP attack. In fact, any missile, including short- range missiles that can deliver a nuclear warhead to an altitude of 30 kilometers or more, can make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States, by launching off a ship or freighter. Indeed, Iran has practiced ship-launched EMP attacks using Scud missiles—which are in the possession of scores of nations and even terrorist groups. An EMP attack launched off a ship, since Scuds are common-place and a warhead detonated in outer space would leave no bomb debris for forensic analysis, could enable rogue states or terrorists to destroy U.S. critical infrastructures and kill millions of Americans anonymously.

The EMP generated by a nuclear weapon has three components, designated by the U.S. scientific-technical community E1, E2, and E3.

E1 is caused by gamma rays, emitted by the nuclear warhead, that knocks electrons off of molecules in the upper atmosphere, causing the electrons to rotate rapidly around the lines of the Earth’s magnetic field, a phenomenon termed the Compton Effect. The E1 component of nuclear EMP is a shockwave, transmitting thousands of volts of energy in mere nanoseconds of time, and having a high-frequency (short) wavelength that can couple directly into small objects, like personal computers, automobiles, and transformers. E1 is unique to nuclear weapons and is too fast and too energetic to be arrested by protective devices used for lightning.

The E2 component of a nuclear EMP is comparable to lightning in its energetic content and medium (milliseconds) frequency and wavelength. Protective devices used for lightning are effective against E2.

E3 is caused by the fireball of a nuclear explosion, the expanding and then collapsing fireball causing the Earth’s magnetic field to oscillate, generating electric currents in the very large objects that can couple into the low frequency, long (seconds) wavelength part of the EMP that is E3. The E3 waveform can couple directly only into objects having at least one dimension of great length. Electric power and telecommunications lines that run for kilometers in many directions are ideally suited for receiving E3. Although E3 compared to E1 appears to deliver little energy, just volts per meter, this is multiplied manifold by power and telecommunications lines that are typically many kilometers long, building up E3 currents that can melt Extremely High-Voltage (EHV) transformers, typically designed to handle 750,000 volts. Small electronics can also be destroyed by E3 if they are connected in any way to an E3 receiver—like a personal computer plugged into an electric outlet, which of course is connected to power lines that are ideal E3 receivers, or like the electronic servo-mechanisms that operate the controls of large passenger airliners, that can receive E3 through the metal skin of the aircraft wings and body. Protective devices used for lightning are not effective against E3.

The Soviets executed a series of nuclear detonations in which they exploded 300 kiloton weapons at approximately 300, 150, and 60 kilometers above their test site in South Central Asia. They report that on each shot they observed damage to overhead and underground buried cables at distances of 600 kilometers. They also observed surge arrestor burnout, spark-gap breakdown, blown fuses, and power supply breakdowns.

A high-yield nuclear weapon is not necessary to make an EMP attack. Although a high-yield weapon will generally make a more powerful EMP field than a low- yield nuclear weapon, ALL nuclear weapons produce gamma rays and EMP. The EMP Commission found, by testing modern electronics in simulators, that ANY nuclear weapon can potentially make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. Even a very low-yield nuclear weapon—like a 1-kiloton nuclear artillery shell—will produce enough EMP to pose a catastrophic threat. This is so in part because the U.S. electric grid is so aged and overburdened, and because the high-tech electronics that support the electric grid and other critical infrastructures are over 1 million times more vulnerable to EMP than the electronics of the 1960s.

The EMP Commission also found that, contrary to the claim that high-yield nuclear weapons are necessary for an EMP attack, that very low-yield nuclear weapons of special design can produce significantly more EMP than high-yield nuclear weapons. The EMP Commission found further that Russia, probably China, and possibly North Korea are already in possession of such weapons. Russian military writings call these ‘‘Super-EMP’’ nuclear weapons, and credibly claim that they can generate 200 kilovolts per meter—many times the 30 KVs/meter attributed to a high-yield (20 megaton) nuclear weapon of normal design. Yet a Super-EMP warhead can have a tiny explosive yield, perhaps only 1 kiloton, because it is specially designed to produce primarily gamma rays that generate the E1 electromagnetic shockwave component of the EMP effect. Super-EMP weapons are specialized to generate an overwhelming E1, and produce no E2 or E3 but do not need to, as their E1 is so potent.

In 2004, credible Russian sources warned the EMP Commission that design information and ‘‘brain drain’’ from Russia had transferred to North Korea the capability to build a Super-EMP nuclear weapon ‘‘within a few years.’’ In 2006 and again in 2008, North Korea tested a nuclear device of very low yield, 1–3 kilotons, and declared these tests successful. South Korean military intelligence, in open-source reporting, independently corroborates the Russian warning that North Korea is developing a Super-EMP nuclear warhead. North Korea’s proclivity to sell anything to anyone, including missiles and nuclear technology to fellow rogue nations Iran and Syria, makes Pyongyang’s possession of Super-EMP nuclear weapons especially worrisome.

Geomagnetic storms rarely affect the United States, but regularly damage nations located at high northern latitudes, such as Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Damage from a normal geomagnetic storm can be severe. For example, in 1989 a geomagnetic storm over Canada destroyed the electric power grid in Quebec. The EMP Commission was the first to discover and report in 2004 that every hundred years or so the Sun produces a great geomagnetic storm. Great geomagnetic storms produce effects similar to the E3 EMP from a multi-megaton nuclear weapon, and so large that it would cover the entire United States—possibly even the entire planet.

Geomagnetic storms, even great geomagnetic storms, generate no E1 or E2, only E3, technically called the magnetohydrodynamic EMP. Nonetheless, E3 alone from a great geomagnetic storm is sufficient to end modern civilization. The EMP produced, given the current state of unpreparedness by the United States and every nation on Earth, could collapse power grids everywhere on the planet and destroy EHV transformers and other electronic systems that would require years to repair or replace.

Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without electricity. Within days of a blackout across the United States, a blackout that could encompass the entire planet, emergency generators would run out of fuel, telecommunications would cease as would transportation due to gridlock, and eventually no fuel. Cities would have no running water and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals cannot long operate in a blackout. Government and industry also need electricity in order to operate.

The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given current unpreparedness, would likely result in societal collapse.

Terrorists, criminals, and even lone individuals can build a non-nuclear EMP weapon without great trouble or expense, working from Unclassified designs publicly available on the internet, and using parts available at any electronics store. In 2000, the Terrorism Panel of the House Armed Services Committee sponsored an experiment, recruiting a small team of amateur electronics enthusiasts to attempt constructing a radiofrequency weapon, relying only on unclassified design information and parts purchased from Radio Shack. The team, in 1 year, built two radiofrequency weapons of radically different designs. One was designed to fit inside the shipping crate for a Xerox machine, so it could be delivered to the Pentagon mail room where (in those more unguarded days before 9/11) it could slowly fry the Pentagon’s computers. The other radiofrequency weapon was designed to fit inside a small Volkswagon bus, so it could be driven down Wall Street and disrupt computers— and perhaps the National economy. Both designs were demonstrated and tested successfully during a special Congressional hearing for this purpose at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Radiofrequency weapons are not merely a hypothetical threat. Terrorists, criminals, and disgruntled individuals have used home-made radiofrequency weapons. The U.S. military and foreign militaries have a wide variety of such weaponry. Moreover, non-nuclear EMP devices that could be used as radiofrequency weapons are publicly marketed for sale to anyone, usually advertised as ‘‘EMP simulators.’’ For example, one such simulator is advertised for public sale as an ‘‘EMP Suitcase.’’ This EMP simulator is designed to look like a suitcase, can be carried and operated by one person, and is purpose-built with a high energy radiofrequency output to destroy electronics. However, it has only a short radius of effect. Nonetheless, a terrorist or deranged individual who knows what he is doing, who has studied the electric grid for a major metropolitan area, could—armed with the ‘‘EMP Suitcase’’— black out a major city.

A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. An EMP weapon can be used by state actors who wish to level the battlefield by neutralizing the great technological advantage enjoyed by U.S. military forces. EMP is also the ideal means, the only means, whereby rogue states or terrorists could use a single nuclear weapon to destroy the United States and prevail in the War on Terrorism or some other conflict with a single blow. The EMP Commission also warned that states or terrorists could exploit U.S. vulnerability to EMP attack for coercion or blackmail: ‘‘Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them—or threatening their use—in an EMP attack.’’

The EMP Commission found that states such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have incorporated EMP attack into their military doctrines, and openly describe making EMP attacks against the United States. Indeed, the EMP Commission was established by Congress partly in response to a Russian nuclear EMP threat made to an official Congressional Delegation on May 2, 1999, in the midst of the Balkans crisis. Vladimir Lukin, head of the Russian delegation and a former Ambassador to the United States, warned: ‘‘Hypothetically, if Russia really wanted to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire an SLBM and detonate a single nuclear warhead at high altitude over the United States. The resulting EMP would massively disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems, shutting down everything.’’

China’s military doctrine also openly describes EMP attack as the ultimate asymmetric weapon, as it strikes at the very technology that is the basis of U.S. power. Where EMP is concerned, ‘‘The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world’’: ‘‘Some people might think that things similar to the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet it could be regarded as the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ of the 21st Century if a surprise attack is conducted against the enemy’s crucial information systems of command, control, and communications by such means as… electromagnetic pulse weapons… Even a superpower like the United States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed forces, cannot guarantee its immunity…In their own words, a highly computerized open society like the United States is extremely vulnerable to electronic attacks from all sides. This is because the U.S. economy, from banks to telephone systems and from power plants to iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer networks… When a country grows increasingly powerful economically and technologically…it will become increasingly dependent on modern information systems… The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world.’’

Iran—the world’s leading sponsor of international terrorism—in military writings openly describes EMP as a terrorist weapon, and as the ultimate weapon for prevailing over the West: ‘‘If the world’s industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years… American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot.’’

The threats are not merely words. The EMP Commission assesses that Russia has, as it openly declares in military writings, probably developed what Russia describes as a ‘‘Super-EMP’’ nuclear weapon—specifically designed to generate extraordinarily high EMP fields in order to paralyze even the best protected U.S. strategic and military forces. China probably also has Super-EMP weapons. North Korea too may possess or be developing a Super-EMP nuclear weapon, as alleged by credible Russian sources to the EMP Commission, and by open-source reporting from South Korean military intelligence. But any nuclear weapon, even a low-yield first generation device, could suffice to make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. Iran, although it is assessed as not yet having the bomb, is actively testing missile delivery systems and has practiced launches of its best missile, the Shahab–III, fuzing for high- altitude detonations, in exercises that look suspiciously like training for making EMP attacks. As noted earlier, Iran has also practiced launching from a ship a Scud, the world’s most common missile—possessed by over 60 nations, terrorist groups, and private collectors.

A Scud might be the ideal choice for a ship-launched EMP attack against the United States intended to be executed anonymously, to escape any last-gasp U.S. retaliation. Unlike a nuclear weapon detonated in a city, a high-altitude EMP attack leaves no bomb debris for forensic analysis, no perpetrator ‘‘fingerprints.’’ Under present levels of preparedness, communications would be severely limited, restricted mainly to those few military communications networks that are hardened against EMP.

Today’s microelectronics are the foundation of our modern civilization, but are over 1 million times more vulnerable to EMP than the far more primitive and robust electronics of the 1960s, that proved vulnerable during nuclear EMP tests of that era. Tests conducted by the EMP Commission confirmed empirically the theory that, as modern microelectronics become ever smaller and more efficient, and operate ever faster on lower voltages, they also become ever more vulnerable, and can be destroyed or disrupted by much lower EMP field strengths.

Microelectronics and electronic systems are everywhere, and run virtually everything in the modern world. All of the civilian critical infrastructures that sustain the economy of the United States, and the lives of 310 million Americans, depend, directly or indirectly, upon electricity and electronic systems.

Of special concern is the vulnerability to EMP of the Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) transformers, that are indispensable to the operation of the electric grid. EHV transformers drive electric current over long distances, from the point of generation to consumers (from the Niagara Falls hydroelectric facility to New York City, for example). The electric grid cannot operate without EHV transformers—which could be destroyed by an EMP event. The United States no longer manufactures EHV transformers. They must be manufactured and imported from overseas, from Germany or South Korea, the only two nations in the world that manufacture such transformers for export. Each EHV transformer must be custom-made for its unique role in the grid. A single EHV transformer typically requires 18 months to manufacture. The loss of large numbers of EHV transformers to an EMP event would plunge the United States into a protracted blackout lasting years, with perhaps no hope of eventual recovery, as the society and population probably could not survive for even 1 year without electricity.

Another key vulnerability to EMP are Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition systems (SCADAs). SCADAs essentially are small computers, numbering in the millions and ubiquitous everywhere in the critical infrastructures, that perform jobs previously performed by hundreds of thousands of human technicians during the 1960s and before, in the era prior to the microelectronics revolution. SCADAs do things like regulating the flow of electricity into a transformer, controlling the flow of gas through a pipeline, or running traffic control lights. SCADAs enable a few dozen people to run the critical infrastructures for an entire city, whereas previously hundreds or even thousands of technicians were necessary. Unfortunately, SCADAs are especially vulnerable to EMP.

EHV transformers and SCADAs are the most important vulnerabilities to EMP, but are by no means the only vulnerabilities. Each of the critical infrastructures has their own unique vulnerabilities to EMP:

The National electric grid, with its transformers and generators and electronic controls and thousands of miles of power lines, is a vast electronic machine—more vulnerable to EMP than any other critical infrastructure. Yet the electric grid is the most important of all critical infrastructures, and is in fact the keystone supporting modern civilization, as it powers all the other critical infrastructures. As of now it is our technological Achilles Heel. The EMP Commission found that, if the electric grid collapses, so too will collapse all the other critical infrastructures. But, if the electric grid can be protected and recovered, so too all the other critical infrastructures can also be restored.

Transportation is a critical infrastructure because modern civilization cannot exist without the goods and services moved by road, rail, ship, and air. Cars, trucks, locomotives, ships, and aircraft all have electronic components, motors, and controls that are potentially vulnerable to EMP. Gas stations, fuel pipelines, and refineries that make petroleum products depend upon electronic components and cannot operate without electricity. Given our current state of unpreparedness, in the aftermath of a natural or nuclear EMP event, transportation systems would be paralyzed.

Traffic control systems that avert traffic jams and collisions for road, rail, and air depend upon electronic systems, that the EMP Commission discovered are especially vulnerable to EMP.

Communications is a critical infrastructure because modern economies and the cohesion and operation of modern societies depend to a degree unprecedented in history on the rapid movement of information—accomplished today mostly by electronic means. Telephones, cell phones, personal computers, television, and radio are all directly vulnerable to EMP, and cannot operate without electricity. Satellites that operate at Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) for communications, weather, scientific, and military purposes are vulnerable to EMP and to collateral effects from an EMP attack. Within weeks of an EMP event, the LEO satellites, which comprise most satellites, would probably be inoperable.

Banking and finance are the critical infrastructure that sustain modern economies. Whether it is the stock market, the financial records of a multinational corporation, or the ATM card of an individual—financial transactions and record keeping all depend now at the macro- and micro-level upon computers and electronic automated systems. Many of these are directly vulnerable to EMP, and none can operate without electricity. The EMP Commission found that an EMP event could transform the modern electronic economy into a feudal economy based on barter.

Food has always been vital to every person and every civilization. The critical infrastructure for producing, delivering, and storing food depends upon a complex web of technology, including machines for planting and harvesting and packaging, refrigerated vehicles for long-haul transportation, and temperature-controlled warehouses. Modern technology enables over 98 percent of the U.S. National population to be fed by less than 2 percent of the population. Huge regional warehouses that resupply supermarkets constitute the National food reserves, enough food to feed the Nation for 30–60 days at normal consumption rates, the warehoused food preserved by refrigeration and temperature control systems that typically have enough emergency electrical power (diesel or gas generators) to last only about an average of 3 days. Experience with storm-induced blackouts proves that when these big regional food warehouses lose electrical power, most of the food supply will rapidly spoil. Farmers, less than 2 percent of the population as noted above, cannot feed 310 million Americans if deprived of the means that currently makes possible this technological miracle.

Water too has always been a basic necessity to every person and civilization, even more crucial than food. The critical infrastructure for purifying and delivering potable water, and for disposing of and treating waste water, is a vast networked machine powered by electricity that uses electrical pumps, screens, filters, paddles, and sprayers to purify and deliver drinkable water, and to remove and treat waste water. Much of the machinery in the water infrastructure is directly vulnerable to EMP. The system cannot operate without vast amounts of electricity supplied by the power grid. A natural or nuclear EMP event would immediately deprive most of the U.S. National population of running water. Many natural sources of water—lakes, streams, and rivers—would be dangerously polluted by toxic wastes from sewage, industry, and hospitals that would backflow from or bypass wastewater treatment plants, that could no longer intake and treat pollutants without electric power. Many natural water sources that would normally be safe to drink, after an EMP event, would be polluted with human wastes including feces, industrial wastes including arsenic and heavy metals, and hospital wastes including pathogens.

Emergency services such as police, fire, and hospitals are the critical infrastructure that upholds the most basic functions of government and society—preserving law and order, protecting property and life. Experience from protracted storm-induced blackouts has shown, for example in the aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, that when the lights go out and communications systems fail and there is no gas for squad cars, fire trucks, and ambulances, the worst elements of society and the worst human instincts rapidly takeover. The EMP Commission found that, given our current state of unpreparedness, a natural or nuclear EMP event could create anarchic conditions that would profoundly challenge the existence of social order.

MICHAEL J. FRANKEL, Senior Scientist, Penn State University, Applied Research Laboratory  

Another important analytic insight provided by the Commission was its understanding and raising the alarm for the prospect of simultaneous failures of the system. All engineers design their systems against single-point failure.

Nobody designs against multiple failures. Here and there you may find some engineers who design against two simultaneous failures. But these failures can be affected not just by EMP. They could be affected by cyber. The important thing is that if there are simultaneous failures over large areas, the analysis of the Commission was things are very likely to fail, and restoration will take a very long time.

While not often considered in tandem, it is more correct to consider EMP vulnerabilities as one end of a continuous spectrum of cyber threats to our electronic-based infrastructures. They share both an overlap in the effects produced—the failure of electronic systems to perform their function and possibly incurring actual physical damage—as well as their mode of inflicting damage. They both reach out through the connecting electronic distribution systems, and impress unwanted voltages and currents on the connecting wires. In the usual cyber case, those unwanted currents contain information—usually in the form of malicious code—that instructs the system to perform actions unwanted and unanticipated by its owner. In the EMP case, the impressed signal does not contain coded information. It is merely a dump of random noise which may flip bit states, or damage components, and also ensures the system will not behave in the way the owner expects.

This electronic noise dump may thus be thought of as a ‘‘stupid cyber’’. When addressing the vulnerability of our infrastructures to the cyber threat, it is important that we not neglect the EMP end of the cyber threat spectrum. And there is another important overlap with the cyber threat. With the grid on the cusp of technological change in the evolution to the ‘‘smart grid’’, the proliferation of sensors and controls which will manage the new grid architecture must be protected against cyber at the same time they must be protected against EMP. Cyber and EMP threats have the unique capability to precipitate highly multiple failures of these many new control systems over a widely distributed geographical area, and such simultaneous failures, as previously discussed, are likely to signal a wider and more long-lasting catastrophe.

Another important legacy of the EMP Commission was to first highlight the danger to our electric grid due to solar storms, which may impress large—and effectively DC—currents on the long runs of conducting cable that make up the distribution system. While this phenomenon has long been known, and protected against, by engineering practices in the power industry, the extreme 100-year storm first analyzed by the Commission is now widely recognized to represent a major danger to our National electrical system for which adequate protective measures have not been taken and whose consequences—the likely collapse of much of the National grid, possibly for a greatly extended period, may rightly be termed catastrophic. At this point, the only scientific controversy attending the likelihood of our system being subject to a so-called super solar storm, is related to the time-constant. But these events have already occurred within the last century or so, they will occur again. We should be ready.

The final report of EMP Commission contained 75 recommendations to improve the survivability, operability, resilience, and recovery of all the critical infrastructures, and in particular of the most key of all, the electrical grid. Most of these recommendations were pointed towards the Department of Homeland Security. While there have been some conversations, it has been hard to detect much of an active resonance at all issuing from the Department. They have not, as far as I know, even designated EMP as a one of their 10 of 15 disaster scenarios for advanced planning circumstances. And this at a time when they do include a low-altitude nuclear disaster—certainly disastrous but not one that would produce wide-ranging EMP.

CHRIS BECK, VP, POLICY & STRATEGIC INITIATIVES, the ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY COUNCIL

For severe space weather, the most recent events occurred roughly 90 and 150 years ago, but the timing of the next such occurrence, as with all extreme natural disasters, is unknown.

Mr. PERRY. If we do harden and protect the grid, but this affects potentially all electric and electronic devices, so even though we harden the grid and power stations and can produce power and so on and so forth, will the systems in individual homes and businesses, like refrigerators and heating and cooling systems, will they be affected to the point where they will all need to be replaced, or even while we have power to our homes, none of the lights will come on and so on so forth?

Mr. PRY. It depends on the scenario. If you are talking about a geomagnetic storm, it puts at the wavelength of that, which we call E3, or magnetohydrodynamic EMP is so long that it needs to couple into long lines, like power lines, railroad tracks. It won’t couple into automobiles, refrigerators, personal computers, and things of that sort. So under that scenario, yes, if you basically keep the electric grid on, you will be able to recover the rest of the society pretty promptly. In the nuclear case of a nuclear EMP, it has an electromagnetic shock wave that we call E1. This can couple into personal computers, automobiles, and the like, and so you will have deeper societal damage; but then, again, it depends on the kind of weapon used. If it is a primitive, first-generation nuclear weapon, you know, it is not likely to do that across the whole country. It would be more limited to a several-State-size region. If it is the worst-case kind of a nuclear weapon, like a super EMP weapon, which is what we think Russia, China, and probably North Korea have, you know, then you are talking about a scenario where you are having massive, deep damage to personal computers, and refrigerators, and lights and the rest. But if you don’t have the bulk power system surviving, there is no hope of recovery under those circumstances. Under that worst-case scenario, what you are doing is you are mitigating a catastrophe and turning it into a manageable disaster, a situation where you won’t have massive loss of life, hopefully.

Mr. PERRY. How would you rate the likelihood that the United States will face an EMP event from either a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, a HEMP, or a massive solar storm?

Mr. FRANKEL. I will take that one. You guys can as well. I think that the likelihood that the United States will face at some point a so-called massive solar storm, and thus our entire system will be under the footprint, if you will, of a massive solar storm, is about 100 percent. It will happen. The uncertainty here, I believe, is the time constant. It could happen next year, it could be 100 years, but probably not 1,000 years. The probability that we will be faced with a nuclear HEMP I would say is unknown. I don’t call it high. I don’t call it low. I would say it is an unknown probability.

Ms. CLARKE. I just wanted to clarify for the record from Dr. Pry and Dr. Frankel. I see that both of you served as staff on the EMP Commission in 2004 or thereabouts, but I am trying to get a sense of what organizations you are representing today, and how can we learn more about those organizations?

Mr. FRANKEL. I am representing only my status as a senior scientist at the Penn State University.

Mr. PRY. We both served on the Congressional EMP Commission through its life, from 2001 to 2008. I am currently the executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, which was an effort to continue the EMP Commission, because the Commissioners, including the chairman, believed it was terminated prematurely before its work was completed. So this task force is an attempt to continue the EMP Commission in some way. Dr. Graham, for example, who is the chairman of that Commission, is the chairman of my task force, and I am here today representing the task force.

Mr. PERRY. Dr. Pry. You mentioned in your testimony a satellite passing over the Washington-New York corridor. I would like you to describe the importance or the potential importance of that, and in that context also please describe the National electric grid interconnection, what regions of the country are most vulnerable to grid collapse as a result of EMP attack.

Mr. PRY. Well, the KSM–3 satellite was orbited by North Korea in December 2012, about 3 months before we had our gravest nuclear crisis with North Korea when in February 2012 they ignited— they conducted their third nuclear test, violating international law, and when the United States international community moved to impose additional sanctions to punish North Korea for this, they started threatening to make nuclear strikes against the United States. There was a nuclear crisis so grave during the period from February 12 through the end of April that, you know, the President was sending B–2 bombers over the demilitarized zone to do practice bombing runs and demonstration exercises; strengthened the National missile defense, including moving a THAAD interceptor to Guam just in case Kim Jong-Un tried to deliver on these nuclear threats. In the midst of this crisis, the KSM–3, which was still orbiting, its orbit followed the exact orbit that the Soviets had come up with in the Cold War for a secret nuclear weapon to conduct a surprise nuclear attack called a fractional orbital bombardment system. It is basically a space launch vehicle that uses a nuclear weapon disguised as a satellite, and instead of launching over the North Pole and following a normal ballistic trajectory toward the United States, it launches south and crosses over the south polar region and comes up from—approaches from the south because we don’t have any ballistic missile early warning radars in that location or interceptors, and we are blind to the south and defenseless, and so you would be able to detonate a warhead and do an EMP attack and catch us by surprise. That was the plan during the Cold War, and the trajectory and the altitude of this satellite were precisely the same as the kinds of fobs that the Soviets had used. Between April 8 and the 16th of April, it went from the center of the United States, and on the 16th was passing over the Washington, DC/New York corridor, which is the ideal location for putting down a peak field, because if you look at where our EHV transformers are located, they are most deeply located, the largest numbers of them, the map is just almost a solid block of red because it is so densely concentrated, the EHV transformers in that area. If you wanted to take down the eastern grid, that would be the best place to place a peak EMP field. Taking out the eastern grid is really all you have to do because 75 percent of our power is generated in the eastern grid. The western grid is the next most important, and the Texas grid is the third most important. But that was the KSM–3 threat and its relationship to the grid system.

Mr. PERRY. Speaking of those, the transformers, it has been noted that the Extremely High-Voltage, the EHV transformers which are indispensable to the electric grid, are expensive and hard to replace. If you know, what is the lead time for manufacturing new or replacement transformers, and given that there are limited manufacturers in the United States, where are the suppliers located?

Mr. PRY. There are two places that manufacture these for export, South Korea and Germany, and we are still dependent on them.

There is a DHS briefing going around that says we have limited capabilities to manufacture EHV transformers in the United States. In fact, we currently don’t really have demonstrated capability to manufacture these transformers in the United States yet. They have to be made by hand the way they were made back in Nikola Tesla’s day, the inventor of the EHV transformer. So every one of them is custom made, every one of them has a unique role to play in the grid. They aren’t mass produced. It is not easy. There is a lot of artisanship that goes into the making of these transformers.

Brazil tried to become independent of making its own EHV transformers a decade ago, and it took them 5 years before they were able to start attempting to make their first transformers, and they didn’t perform well. So now Brazil gave up on that, and it has to import them.

So it remains to be seen if the United States can actually manufacture any of its own EHV transformers. We haven’t manufactured one and put them out in the field and seen if they last and stand up to this. It takes 18 months under normal conditions to build one of these transformers.

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to add to the DHS question that I had raised earlier that one of the observations of the Sandy event was the unintended consequence of the grid going—the electricity going out was that people forgot that fuel stations are run through—by electricity, and so we ended up having a fuel crisis at the same time. So there is sort of a collateral damage piece to this that I hope is acknowledged as we go through this discussion about what happens in areas when just in a short period of time electrical shortages occur or the grid goes out, because even if you were trying to move physical assets, if you don’t prepare for things like fuel stations that are run by electricity, you will have a massive issue.

Mr. FRANKS. We realize that if indeed we did lose our grid, in a worst-case scenario, and we are not projecting a worst-case scenario, but if it did happen, really the aftermath where society would begin to tear ourselves apart seems to be the most frightening aspect of it to me. So the cost of doing nothing is significantly high, and I think you have demonstrated that well, but could you give us a sense of how expensive it would be to harden our bulk power system enough to recover from a major event; in other words, where we keep our main components intact, and we can bring our grid back on-line? I have been told that a couple, $3 billion over 5 years might do it, and that might be less than $1 per year per ratepayer. Am I accurately expressing that?

Mr. PRY. Yes. In fact, your estimate is high compared to the Congressional EMP Commission’s estimate, which was that it would cost about $2 billion over 3 to 5 years to harden the bulk power system, and $10–20 billion over that same period, you know, would protect all of the critical infrastructures.

Mr. BECK. The U.S. electric grid is the most complicated in the world both by physical design; by the overlapping regulatory authority, 50 States, a Federal Government, 3,500 electric companies, et cetera. When we did the international study, it was pretty easy, and one of the things where lessons learned was easy was because you could look at Finland, which has one company and one regulator, right? So a much easier thing to deal with. Here it is—that does make it very difficult, and so I have to—in all honesty, and not to try to duck the question, but the answer is somewhat complicated because there are all these agencies, and there isn’t just one agency that is in charge.

Mr. FRANKEL. Yes, certainly the Department of Homeland Security, I think, has the primary responsibility, but we should also not forget the Department of Energy. They have offices of energy assurance, and they should also be playing some role. Right now I don’t discern exactly what it is, but somewhere between those two, with DHS in the primary role, I think that is where you look for leadership. I want to at least mention the Department of Defense not in a leadership role in this instance, but they are doing a lot of relevant work developing hardening techniques. Worried about their own networks and things of that sort, but they have very important technology support to contribute to that sort of thing. But in the end it is not their responsibility, and it is not their mission, and they are not going to do it. You need to look at those two Departments for leadership.

Mr. PRY. I agree with what has been said. The Department of Homeland Security, especially when you are looking at the role from the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act for planning, training, and resource allocation for emergency planners and responders—under the Department of Homeland Security, within the Department of Homeland Security, the logical regulatory authority to work most closely over the electric grid should be the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the U.S. FERC, and this would be addressed by the SHIELD Act that Mr. Franks is sponsoring in front of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. I think this is really like the—almost equally important with the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act in terms of its passage, because the reality and the reason we have this problem is because the electric power industry exists in a 19th Century regulatory environment. I mean, there is no Federal agency that has the kind of regulatory authority relative to the electric power industry that, for example, the Federal Aviation Administration has over the airline industry, you know. I think all Americans and even Tea Party Republicans would agree that, you know, we need an FAA so you have independent inspectors who will go out and see, you know, is there metal fatigue in the wings of this aircraft, and when that airplane can’t fly, and that if an airplane crashes, you have an FAA to inspect the crash and find out what happened so that it never happens again. We do this because hundreds of lives are at stake, and we need to maintain the public safety. That is why we have an FAA. But the U.S. FERC doesn’t have that power. It can ask the NERC, which represents the industry, and previously was a trade association, by the way, and unofficially is a lobby for the electric power industry, and NERC is the one that is in charge. They regulate themselves through the NERC. The FERC can ask them to come up with a plan.

The great 2003 Northeast blackout was caused by a falling tree branch that caused cascading—it took them 10 years for NERC to come up with a plan, vegetation management plan. So not just—you know, cyber 5 years; they were asked for a plan some 5 years before they started moving on that. So U.S. FERC, I say, would be the tip of the spear for dealing with the electric power industry.

Mr. Pry. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a super-energetic radio wave that can destroy, damage, or cause the malfunction of electronic systems by overloading their circuits. EMP is harmless to people biologically, passing through their bodies without injury, like a radio wave. But by damaging electronic systems that make modern society possible, that enable computers to function and airliners to fly for example, EMP can cause mass destruction of property and life.

It would take about 3.5 years to harden the grid.

Thousands of emergency planners and first responders at the Federal, State, and local level want to protect our Nation and their States and communities from the EMP threat, but they are seriously hindered and even prohibited from doing so because the EMP threat is not among the 15 canonical National planning scenarios utilized by the Department of Homeland Security.

House 112-115. September 12, 2012. The EMP threat: Examining the consequences. House of Representatives. 64 pages.

Mr. LUNGREN. An EMP is a burst of electromagnetic radiation typically generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion or a non-nuclear device. Nuclear weapon EMPs are most effective when detonated high in the altitude above the intended target. Depending on the yield of the weapon and the height of the explosion, nuclear EMPs can destroy large portions of the U.S. power and communications infrastructure

Geomagnetic radiation generated by a naturally occurring solar storm can also damage the same infrastructure. An EMP attack would destroy the electronics and digital circuitry in the area of impact, thereby denying electric power to our homes, businesses, and military.

Our country is dependent on electricity to power our health, financial, transportation, and business systems. If our power system was ever lost for an extended period, according to Dr. William Graham, the chairman of the EMP Commission, it would have catastrophic and lethal consequences for our citizens and the economy. It would also potentially degrade our military defenses.

America’s digital dependence grows every year and we rejoice in that. But the fact of the matter is that along with that dependence comes our EMP vulnerability. What I mean by that is America has gotten used to the digital world. It powers and is implicated in so much of our everyday life, that if it were in fact attacked in a serious way, it would result in some cases, unforeseen circumstances. What I mean by that is most people don’t think about them.

Computer simulations carried out in March 2010 by Oak Ridge National Laboratory demonstrated that an electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear device detonated at high altitude or a powerful solar storm could destroy or permanently damage major sections of our National power grid. According to this Oak Ridge study, the collapse of our power system could impact 130 million Americans, could require 4 to 10 years to fully recover, and could impose economic costs between $1 trillion and $2 trillion.

The National electric grid has almost no backup capability in the event of a power collapse from electromagnetic pulses. According to FERC testimony presented this morning, existing bulk power reliability standards don’t even address EMP vulnerabilities. In addition, with most of the Nation’s power system under private ownership, who view an EMP event as unlikely or so we are told, there is been little preparation for a long-term power collapse. Although the impact of an EMP event has been examined, studied, and debated, I am fearful that little progress seems to have been made in mitigating the EMP threat. Although the United States has conducted numerous exercises to test our readiness against natural events such as hurricanes, we have never conducted an exercise to help us prepare for the severe consequences of a National power outage from an EMP event. I am informed that the Defense Department takes this seriously and, therefore, has taken steps to protect many of their critical infrastructure from an EMP event. Either they are wasting a lot of money because it is not a serious event—we should stop them from doing it and save us billions of dollars—or it is a serious threat to our National defense capabilities, and we ought to look in the same way in terms of our domestic capabilities. That is, what sustains our standard of living, but in some ways, a way of life for the American public.

I don’t want to be an alarmist on this. I want to be a realist on this. That is why we have asked a number of people to testify here today. My thought is that the more information, the greater awareness the American people have and that we as leaders have, the better we will be prepared to deal with this, as long as we understand what the true consequences are.

With most of the Nation’s power system under private ownership, who view an EMP event as unlikely, there has been little preparation for a long-term power collapse.

NICKOLAUS E. LEGGETT, N3NL, ANALYST, AMATEUR RADIO OPERATOR, INVENTOR, U.S. CITIZEN

Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a serious threat to the continued existence of the United States as a major military, economic, and social power. Indeed, EMP is a major threat to the continued existence of the United States in any form.

High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is the generation of a very intense pulse of radio waves using a nuclear weapon or device exploded in space near the Earth. The radiation from the nuclear bomb excites and agitates the Earth’s ionosphere which generates a large zone of intense radio waves that can disable electronic equipment and communications equipment throughout the Nation.

A HEMP attack consisting of a single high-yield nuclear weapon exploded a couple of hundred miles above the United States would disable electronics and communications through most of the Nation. Most of our Nation’s electronic infrastructure uses solid-state electronics and microprocessors that are quite vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse. The failure of much of our electronics infrastructure would cause serious problems in supplying food, water, electric power, and communications to our population. In addition, the functions of business, government, and law enforcement would be greatly impaired. Panic, rioting, and the failure of law and order would probably occur.

I have devoted many years of my life to bringing the EMP threat to the attention of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Donald J. Schellhardt and I have submitted two formal petitions to the FCC calling for a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) and a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) on EMP. Refer to Note 4. In addition, we have filed other formal comments with the Commission on this subject. The FCC has declined to take any positive action on EMP. I am rather puzzled that the FCC refuses to act to protect our communications infrastructure from EMP. The subject is certainly interesting and it would be desirable to avoid the great damage that would result from any EMP attack. There is ample evidence that EMP is a real and serious threat to the Nation. Certainly, if an EMP attack did occur, the Nation would not be friendly towards the decision makers who refused to protect against EMP attacks and their consequences.

HOSTILE NATIONS. We can all easily imagine several nations that would be quite happy if the United States were to collapse in response to an EMP attack. In their view, EMP would be a rather convenient method for deleting a major competitor. While launching a missile with a warhead from a ship is not an easy task, it is certainly easier than other methods of eliminating the United States. Also, the structure of the United States may become so shattered by an attack that other nations could actually colonize parts of the former United States.

AMATEUR RADIO can perform local and long-distance communications during and after these chaotic events. Congress should establish legislation that would allow amateur radio operators to establish minimum-sized amateur radio antennas despite opposition of homeowner associations, condominium managements, and rental landlords.

Mr. LUNGREN. We have several panels of distinguished witnesses before us today. The sole witness of our first panel is Congressman Trent Franks. He represents Arizona’s second Congressional district, serves on the Armed Services Committee and the Judiciary Committee, where he currently chairs the Constitutional Law Subcommittee. In addition, Congressman Franks serves as the co-chair of the Congressional EMP Caucus, and has studied this issue for several years.

HON. TRENT FRANKS ( ARIZONA). As a Nation, we have spent billions of dollars over the years hardening our nuclear triad, our missile defense capabilities, and numerous other critical elements of our National security apparatus against the effects of electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type that might be generated by a high-altitude nuclear warhead detonation over our country by one of America’s enemies. However, our civilian grid, which the Defense Department relies upon for nearly 99 percent of its electricity needs, is completely vulnerable to the same kind of danger. This constitutes an invitation on the part of certain enemies of the United States to use the asymmetric capability of EMP against us. There is now evidence that such strategies are being considered by certain of those enemies. We recently witnessed, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the chaos that attends a prolonged power outage when the derecho storm impacted the District of Columbia and the surrounding area. Our sick and elderly suffered without air conditioning. Grocery stores were unable to keep food fresh. Gas lines grew. Thankfully, the derecho had only a regional and limited impact.

In 2004 and 2008, the EMP Commission testified before the Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, that the U.S. society and economy are so critically dependent upon the availability of electricity that a significant collapse of our grid precipitated by a major natural or manmade EMP event could result in catastrophic civilian casualties. This conclusion is echoed by separate reports recently compiled by the DOD, DHS, DOE, NAS, along with various other agencies and independent researchers.

While there are those certainly who believe that the likelihood of terrorists or rogue nations obtaining nuclear weapons and using them in an EMP attack is remote, the recent events of the Arab Spring our intelligence apparatus did not foresee, show us that regimes can change very quickly. Iran’s increasingly obvious efforts to gain nuclear weapons should serve as a grave and urgent warning to all of us.

Catalyzed by a major solar storm, a high-altitude nuclear blast, or a non-nuclear, device-induced Intentional Electromagnetic Interference, this invisible force of ionized particles has the capability to overwhelm and destroy our present electrical power grids and electrical equipment, including electronic communication networks, radio equipment, integrated circuits, and computers. The reality of the potentially devastating effects of sufficiently intense electromagnetic pulse on the electronic systems/sources of many of our critical defense and National security components is well-established, and beyond dispute.

Automated hardware is particularly important when one considers the shortcomings of procedural safety measures alone in response to an EMP event. According to solar weather experts, there is only 20–30 minutes’ warning from the time we predict a solar storm may affect us to the time it actually does. This is simply not enough time to implement procedures that will adequately protect the grid. Furthermore, these predictions are only accurate one out of three times. This places a crushing dilemma on industry, who must decide whether or not to heed the warning with the knowledge that a wrong decision either way could result in the loss of thousands or even millions of lives and massive legal ramifications beyond expression.

Because of new understandings of how EMP interacts with the Earth’s electromagnetic field, and that it is intensified over large land mass, we now believe that if a warhead with a nuclear yield of just 100 kilotons detonated at an altitude of 400 kilometers over America’s heartland, the resulting damage to our electric grid and infrastructure would be catastrophic across most of the continental United States. Such a result would be devastating to our electricity, transportation, water and food supply, medical care, financial networks, telecommunication and broadcasting systems and our infrastructure in general. Under such a scenario, both military and productive capability would be devastated. The immediate and eventual impact, directly and indirectly, on the human population, especially in major cities, is unthinkable. It should be remembered that EMP was first considered as a military weapon during the ‘‘Cold War’’ as a means of paralyzing U.S. retaliatory forces. America’s EMP commission began their 70-page executive summary describing a one- or two-missile EMP attack as one of the few threats which look as if it could defeat the U.S. military.

Dr. William Graham, the chairman of the EMP Commission, testified before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, and stated: ‘‘EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences. ‘‘…A determined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capability without having a high level of sophistication. For example, an adversary would not have to have long-range ballistic missiles to conduct an EMP attack against the United States. Such an attack could be launched from a freighter off the U.S. coast using a short- or medium-range missile to loft a nuclear warhead to high altitude. Terrorists sponsored by a rogue state could potentially execute such an attack without revealing their identity.’’ Dr. Graham has said that a major catastrophic EMP attack on the United States could cause an estimated 70–90 percent of the our Nation’s population to become unsustainable.

It is impossible for me to even wrap my mind around that figure.

But for terrorists, this is their ultimate goal, and I believe EMP is their ultimate asymmetric weapon. In 1988, Osama bin Laden called it a religious duty for al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons. U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated: ‘‘My worst nightmare is terrorists with nuclear weapons. Not only do I know they are trying to get them, but I know they will use them.’’ This is indeed the greatest danger of all. If a rogue state like Iran steps over the nuclear threshold, rogue regimes and terrorists the world over will have access to these monstrous weapons.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad again made it clear where he stands on Israel when he declared, ‘‘[Israel] is about to die and will soon be erased from the geographical scene.’’ Jewish author, Primo Levi, was once asked what he had learned from the Holocaust. He replied, ‘‘When a man with a gun says he’s going to kill you—believe him.’’

At this moment, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a man who, in the same breath, both denies the Holocaust ever occurred, and then threatens to make it happen again, is arrogantly seeking a gun with which he vows to wipe the state of Israel off the map.

He has also said: ‘‘The time for the fall of the satanic power of the United States has come and the countdown to the annihilation of the emperor of power and wealth has started.’’ He has said point-blank, ‘‘The wave of the Islamist revolution will soon reach the entire world.’’ Unfortunately, he talks like a man who knows something the rest of us don’t. It is not enough, to casually dismiss his fanatical rhetoric. When analyzing the nature of any threat, we must always seriously assess two things: A potential enemy’s intent and his corresponding capacity to carry out any such intent.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his regime have stated very clearly their intent to see Israel wiped off the face of the earth and America and the West brought to their knees. Nuclear warheads could give them the capacity to effectively proceed in that endeavor.

Mr. Chairman and Members, these things should not surprise us. We are now 65 years into the nuclear age, and the ominous intersection of jihadist terrorism and nuclear proliferation has been inexorably and relentlessly rolling toward America and the free world for decades. But, when we add the dimension of asymmetric electromagnetic pulse attacks to that equation, we face a menace that may represent the gravest short-term threat to the peace and security of the human family in the world today.

Is a regime change in Pakistan possible? Will there be blowback from our involvement in Libya? What about the current crisis in Syria? Will North Korea ever supply or sell its nuclear technology or warheads to terrorists? Will Iran develop or obtain nuclear weapons? Iran’s increasingly obvious efforts to gain nuclear weapons should serve as a grave and urgent warning to all of us. If terrorists or rogue states do acquire nuclear weapons, hardening our electric grid would become a desperate priority for our Nation. However, that process will take several years, while a regime change takes only weeks and a missile launch only minutes. The fact that we are now 100% vulnerable means we should start securing our electric infrastructure now. Indeed, by reducing our vulnerability we may reduce the likelihood that terrorists or rogue states would attempt such an attack.

We should always remember that 7 decades ago, another murderous ideology arose in the world. The dark shadow of the Nazi swastika fell first upon the Jewish people of Germany. And because the world did not heed the warnings of men like Winston Churchill and respond to that evil in time, it began to spread across Europe until it lit the fires of World War II’s hell on earth which saw atomic bombs fall upon cities and over 50 million people dead worldwide.

History has repeatedly shown humanity to be susceptible to malignant dangers that approach inaudibly and nestle among us with innocuous countenance until a day of sudden calamity finds us empty-handed, broken-hearted, and without excuse.

Mr. LUNGREN. Where is the failure? Is the failure with the Congress? Is the failure with the Executive branch? Is the failure with critical infrastructure owners? If this is as serious as you suggest, as some of these reports suggest, the lack of attention to it is something that bewilders me. You have been involved in a lot of issues on the Armed Services Committee and so forth, and I am trying to figure out what is it that is lacking on this issue that does not garner the attention of the American people? In other words, is there a lack of consensus about the threat? Is there a serious question about whether this is a serious issue?

Mr. FRANKS. I would only suggest to you that when the EMP Commission came to the Armed Services Committee in 2004, I had been aware of EMP. My background is engineering. I had been aware of it, but I thought it was like something that could be catastrophic, but the chances of it happening were so remote.The testimony was that five other nations were developing this as an offensive capability. Certainly, the Soviet Union had a major EMP component in their nuclear strategy. So there is a … clear consensus of the danger this represents. However, when you go over into the civilian areas, it seemed like there is a general, sort of a lackadaisical, kind of a——

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me ask you about that, because I have found most people who are involved in critical infrastructure in the private sector are serious-minded folks. They do recognize the value of their assets. In most cases, when I am dealing with them on issues, I find them to be forward-thinking and to actually try and protect those assets. They articulate that in a way so that they can justify certain capital investments to their shareholders or their ratepayers. Well, let me ask you this: Do you find the attention to the protection of their assets that you believe to be necessary, and if not, why as the owners and protectors of those assets, is this not taken more seriously?

Mr. FRANKS. I think that is a good question. It has been something that has bewildered me to a degree. It seemed just a few years ago, as this became more well-known that there was a more serious—or at least a more recognizable response. It seemed like in the last year, there has been sort of a pushback in parts of industry. My concern is if they have credible, scientific bases for being unconcerned or not addressing it as vigorously as some of us think that it should be, then I would adjure them to bring that testimony and that evidence to the rest of us. Because I can suggest to you that I haven’t seen it. It may be that there is some concern on the part of major manufacturers of these large components, transformers and others, that are somewhat out of professional pride. That they either don’t want to recognize the danger or somehow they feel like that there would be some requirement of reengineering of some of these major components if they did. But I would suggest that the potential liability here is off the charts. The fix here—and this would probably be one of the more important points to point out—the fix here is fairly simple, at least in terms of protecting our electric-producing grid—not all the elements that are connected to it. That is a huge issue. But at least to be able to keep the lights on—electricity coming—that is a fairly easy fix.

The primary thing that the Shield Act addresses is to make sure that our major transformers are 750 KV corridor are not destroyed, which means that we would be in a catastrophic civilizational challenge where we wouldn’t have electricity and wouldn’t be able to perhaps restore it for months or even years. That is the worst-case scenario. The Shield is designed to prevent that. Some of these ancillary damages on cell phones, radios, things like that, it is difficult to mitigate against that in a short-term fix. We have to harden as we go. But my contention is if we take those components as we rebuild them and replace them and harden them against EMP, which we can do that. It adds about 10 percent to the cost of doing that. Then we can eventually get past this vulnerability. But the main big vulnerability that we have right now is the potential damage to our major transformers that could be caused by either a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse or GMD.

Finally, I would just say that the worst-case scenario is so bad that rather than preparing for it, we must prevent it from ever occurring.

Joseph McClelland, Director, Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

Faced with a National security threat to reliability, there may be a need to act decisively in hours or days, rather than weeks, months, or years. That would not be feasible even under the expedited process. In the meantime, the bulk power system would be left vulnerable to a known National security threat. Moreover, existing procedures, including the expedited action procedure, could widely publicize both the vulnerability and the proposed solution, thus increasing the risk of hostile actions before the appropriate solutions are implemented.

In addition, a reliability standard submitted to the Commission by NERC may not be sufficient to address the identified vulnerability or threat. Since FERC may not directly modify a proposed reliability standard under section 215 and must either approve or remand it, FERC would have the choice of approving an inadequate standard and directing changes, which reinitiates a process that can take years, or rejecting the standard altogether. Under either approach, the bulk power system would remain vulnerable for a prolonged period.

Finally, the open and inclusive process required for standards development is not consistent with the need to protect security-sensitive information. For instance, a formal request for a new standard would normally detail the need for the standard as well as the proposed mitigation to address the issue, and the NERC-approved version of the standard would be filed with the Commission for review. This public information could help potential adversaries in planning attacks.

Regarding man-made events, EMP can also be generated by weapons. Equipment and plans are readily available that have the capability to generate high-energy bursts, termed ‘‘E1’’, that can damage or destroy electronics such as those found in control and communication systems on the power grid. These devices can be portable and effective, facilitating simultaneous coordinated attacks, and can be reused, allowing use against multiple targets. The most comprehensive man-made EMP threat is from a high-altitude nuclear explosion. It would affect an area defined by the ‘‘line-of-sight’’ from the point of detonation. The higher the detonation the larger the area affected, and the more powerful the explosion the stronger the EMP emitted. The first component of the resulting pulse E1 occurs within a fraction of a second and can destroy control and communication electronics. The second component is termed ‘‘E2’’ and is similar to lightning, which is well-known and mitigated by industry. Toward the end of an EMP event, the third element, E3, occurs. This causes the same effect as solar magnetic disturbances. It can damage or destroy power transformers connected to long transmission lines and cause voltage problems and instability on the electric grid, which can lead to wide-area blackouts. It is important to note that effective mitigation against solar magnetic disturbances and non-nuclear EMP weaponry provides effective mitigation against a high-altitude nuclear explosion.

In 2001, Congress established a commission to assess the threat from EMP, with particular attention to be paid to the nature and magnitude of high-altitude EMP threats to the United States; vulnerabilities of U.S. military and civilian infrastructure to such attack; capabilities to recover from an attack; and the feasibility and cost of protecting military and civilian infrastructure, including energy infrastructure.

In 2004, the EMP commission issued a report describing the nature of EMP attacks, vulnerabilities to EMP attacks, and strategies to respond to an attack. A second report was produced in 2008 that further investigated vulnerabilities of the Nation’s infrastructure to EMP. The reports concluded that both electrical equipment and control systems can be damaged by EMP. The reports also pointed out how the interdependencies among the various infrastructures could become vulnerabilities after an EMP. In particular, they point to the electrical infrastructure’s need of the communication and natural gas infrastructures.

In 1859, a major solar storm occurred, causing auroral displays and significant shifts of the Earth’s magnetic fields. As a result, telegraphs were rendered useless and several telegraph stations burned down. The impacts of that storm were muted because semiconductor technology did not exist at the time. Were the storm to happen today, according to an article in Scientific American, it could ‘‘severely damage satellites, disable radio communications, and cause continent-wide electrical black-outs that would require weeks or longer to recover from.’’3 Although storms of this magnitude occur rarely, storms and flares of lesser intensity occur more frequently. Storms of about half the intensity of the 1859 storm occur every 50 years or so according to the authors of the Scientific American article, and the last such storm occurred in November 1960, leading to world-wide geomagnetic disturbances and radio outages. The power grid is particularly vulnerable to solar storms, as transformers are electrically grounded to the Earth and susceptible to damage from geo-magnetically-induced currents. The damage or destruction of numerous transformers across the country would result in reduced grid functionality and even prolonged power outages. In March 2010, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge) and its subcontractor Metatech released a study that explored the vulnerability of the electric grid to EMP-related events. This study was a joint effort contracted by FERC staff, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Homeland Security and expanded on the information developed in other initiatives, including the EMP commission reports. The series of reports provided detailed technical background and outlined which sections of the power grid are most vulnerable, what equipment would be affected, and what damage could result. Protection concepts for each threat and additional methods for remediation were also included along with suggestions for mitigation. The results of the study support the general conclusion that EMP events pose substantial risk to equipment and operation of the Nation’s power grid and under extreme conditions could result in major long-term electrical outages. In fact, solar magnetic disturbances are inevitable with only the timing and magnitude subject to variability. The study assessed the 1921 solar storm, which has been termed a 1-in-100-year event, and applied it to today’s power grid. The study concluded that such a storm could damage or destroy up to 300 bulk power system transformers, interrupting service to 130 million people for a period of years.

In February 2012, NERC released its Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power System. In it, NERC concluded that the most likely worst-case system impact from a severe geomagnetic disturbance is voltage instability and voltage collapse with limited equipment damage.

The existing reliability standards do not address EMP vulnerabilities. Protecting the electric generation, transmission, and distribution systems from severe damage due to an EMP-related event would involve vulnerability assessments at every level of electric infrastructure.

BRANDON WALES, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND INFRASTRUCTURE THREAT AND RISK ANALYSIS CONTER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack recommended in its final report that DHS ‘‘play a leading role in spreading knowledge of the nature of prudent mitigation preparations for EMP attack to mitigate its consequences.’’

EMPs can be high-frequency, similar to a flash of lightning or a spark of static electricity, or low- frequency, similar to an aurora-induced phenomenon. An EMP can spike in less than a nanosecond or can continue longer than 24 hours, depending on its source. The consequences of an EMP range from permanent physical damage to temporary system disruptions and can result in fires, electric shocks to people and equipment, and critical service outages. There are four general classes of EMP.

High-altitude EMP (HEMP) results from a nuclear detonation typically occurring 15 or more miles above the Earth’s surface. The extent of HEMP effects depends on several factors, including the altitude of the detonation, the weapon yield and design, and the electromagnetic shielding, or ‘‘hardening,’’ of assets. One high-altitude burst could blanket the entire continental United States and could cause widespread power outages and communications disruptions and possible damage to the electricity grid for weeks or longer.4 HEMP threat vectors can originate from a missile, such as a sea-launched ballistic missile; a satellite asset; or a relatively low- cost balloon-borne vehicle. A concern is the growing number of nation-states that in the past have sponsored terrorism and are now developing capabilities that could be used in a HEMP attack.

Source Region EMP (SREMP) is a burst of energy similar to HEMP but differs in that it is created when a nuclear weapon detonates at lower altitudes within the atmosphere. SREMP can occur when a detonation occurs on or near the ground, as would likely be the case of a terrorist nuclear device attack. A SREMP’s electromagnetic field is much more limited in range than that from HEMP; it would only affect a delimited geographic area. SREMP can induce very high currents on power cables or metallic communications lines near the fireball, and it can send extreme spikes of energy great distances from the blast zone along these metal lines, potentially causing fires where these lines meet other infrastructures. In addition, the SREMP travels through the air and can damage or disrupt equipment connected to Ethernet cables, telephone lines, and power cords out to 70 miles or more. Electronic systems not connected to power cords or communications lines, such as a cell phone, are generally resistant to SREMP but become useless if the infrastructure that supports them is non-functional. While SREMP is not the primary reason a terrorist would detonate a nuclear weapon, it is important to note that all ground-based detonations create SREMP of sufficient magnitude to cause infrastructure disruptions, including an improvised nuclear device, a crude nuclear device that could be built from the components of a stolen weapon or from using nuclear materials. Given the possible impacts of SREMP, such as secondary fires and the disruptions of power, communications, and other critical infrastructures, it is an important consideration in our Department’s planning to mitigate and respond to this type of attack.

Since the 1980s, our power grid control systems and information infrastructures have been growing in their reliance on the Ethernet and computers, which are much more vulnerable to E1 EMP than previous control and communications systems designs. Likewise, the power grid today is much more vulnerable to (E3 EMP) and solar storms than the grid of the 1970s and 80s due to the increasing network size and evolution to higher operating voltages.

Unlike HEMP and SREMP, which primarily disrupt Earth-based infrastructures, System Generated EMP (SGEMP) is a threat to space-based assets, such as satellites or a space station. SGEMPs originate from a nuclear weapon detonation above the atmosphere that sends out damaging X-rays that strike space systems. Both SGEMP and HEMP are similar, in that they both originate from a high-altitude burst. The Department’s chief concern with SGEMP and other related high- altitude nuclear effects is that satellite or other space systems that support critical communications and navigation services, as well as essential intelligence functions, can be immediately disrupted. SGEMP and other related effects could also harm systems supporting any astronaut in space. The fourth type of EMP is Non-Nuclear EMP, or NNEP. This type of EMP can be created by Radio Frequency Weapons (RFWs), devices designed to produce sufficient electromagnetic energy to burn out or disrupt electronic components, systems, and networks. RFWs can either be electrically-driven, where they create narrowband or wideband microwaves, or they can be explosively driven, where an explosive is used to compress a magnetic field to generate the pulse. Multiple nations have used RFWs since the 1960s to disable or jam security, communications, and navigation systems; induce fires; and disrupt financial infrastructures. Devices that can be used as RFWs have unintentionally caused aircraft crashes and near crashes, pipeline explosions, gas spills, computer damage, vehicle malfunctions, weapons explosions, and public water system malfunctions.5 The Department believes that much of the mitigation and planning we are doing for other types of EMP will help reduce our threat to NNEP.

 

SOLAR WEATHER is created as a result of massive explosions on the sun that may shoot radiation towards the Earth. These effects can reach the Earth in as little as 8 minutes with Solar Flare X-rays or over 14 hours later with a Coronal Mass Ejection (CME) plasma hurricane. An extreme CME is the Department’s biggest Solar Weather concern. It could create low-frequency EMP similar to a megaton-class nuclear HEMP detonation over the United States, which could disrupt or damage the power grid, undersea cables, and other critical infrastructures. The United States experiences many solar weather events each year, but major storms that could significantly impact today’s infrastructures are not common but have previously occurred in 1921 and 1859 and possibly in several other years prior to the establishment of the modern power grid. The U.S. Department of Energy and utility owners and

In the last 200 years, only the 1859 and 1921 solar superstorms are believed by experts to have exceeded the 4,000 nanoTesla/minute level over the United States. If one of these storms were to occur today, many experts believe they would likely damage key elements of the power grid and could cause very long-term power outages over much of the United States.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Overall, EMP in its various forms can cause widespread disruption and serious damage to electronic devices and networks, including those upon which many critical infrastructures rely, such as communication systems, information technology equipment, and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) modules. SCADA modules are used in infrastructure such as electric grids, water supplies, and pipelines. The disruptions to SCADA systems that could result from EMP range from SCADA control errors to actual SCADA equipment destruction. Secondary effects of EMP may harm people through induced fires, electric shocks, and disruptions of transportation and critical support systems, such as those at hospitals or sites like nuclear power plants and chemical facilities. EMP places all critical infrastructure sectors at risk. Those sectors that rely heavily on communications technology, information technology, the electric grid, or that use a SCADA system are particularly vulnerable. The complex interconnectivity among critical infrastructure sectors means that EMP incidents that affect a single sector will likely affect other sectors—potentially resulting in cascading failures. The interdependent nature of all 18 critical infrastructure sectors complicates the impact of the event and recovery from it.

MICHAEL A. AIMONE, DIRECTOR, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE INTEGRATION OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT, OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

I would also say that some of the information associated with the likelihood of an EMP being used would have to be done in a closed hearing.

REFERENCES (112-115, 2nd post)

The text of the Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack is available at the web site: www.empcommission.org.

This document confirms the serious impact of an EMP attack on the infrastructure of the United States.

Severe Space Weather Events—Understanding Societal and Economic Impacts— A Workshop Report, National Academy of Sciences, National Academies Press, Publication Year 2008, PAPERBACK, ISBN–10:0–309–12769–6, ISBN–13:978–0–309– 12769–1. This document can be accessed on-line at the URL: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordlid=12507.

Robert Schroeder, ‘‘Electromagnetic Pulse and Its Implications for EmComm’’, QST magazine, November 2009, pages 38 through 41. [The term EmComm refers to emergency communication.]

Petitions to the Federal Communications Commission by Donald J. Schellhardt and Nickolaus E. Leggett: Docket RM–5528, Request to Consider Requirements for Shielding and Bypassing Civilian Communications Systems from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Effects. Docket RM–10330, Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Shield Electronics Equipment Against Acts of War or Terrorism Involving Hostile Use of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP).

Daniel N. Baker and James L. Green, ‘‘The Perfect Solar Superstorm’’, Sky & Telescope, February 2011, Vol. 121 No. 2, Pages 28–34.

Publications Dealing with the Protection of Civil Equipment and Systems from the Effects of HEMP and HPEM—Issued by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) SC 77C.

Mark Clayton, ‘‘Is US Ready for a ‘Solar Tsunami’? ‘‘The Christian Science Monitor, June 27, 2011, Page 20.

H.R. 668, Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage Act (SHIELD Act). This bill was introduced on February 11, 2011. This bill addresses the subjects of solar geomagnetic storms and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) impacting the electric power industry.

‘‘Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructures,’’ April 2008, page 181. This report presents the results of the Commission’s assessment of the effects of a high-altitude EMP attack on our critical National infrastructures and provides recommendations for their mitigation.

Graham, Dr. William R. et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack (2004).

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack (2008).

Odenwald, Sten F. and Green, James L., Bracing the Satellite Infrastructure for a Solar Superstorm, Scientific American Magazine (Jul. 28, 2008).

Robert L. Schweitzer, LTG (ret) USA, ‘‘Radio Frequency Weapons: The Emerging Threat and Policy Implications,’’ Eagan, McAllister Associates, October 1998; see also: Overview of Evolving and Enduring Threats to Information Systems, National Communications System, August 2012.

Related articles

Electric Grid

 

 

 

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Another reason to think oil production probably peaked in 2005

[ In this Kurt Cobb post, Texas oilman Jeffrey brown explains why the story of oil production growth from 2005 to 2014 is probably wrong, because the increase came from lease condensate, not oil.  If this is true then Brown says that worldwide production of condensate “accounts for virtually all of the post-2005 increase in C+C [crude plus condensate] production.” This means almost all of the 4 million-barrel-per-day increase in world “oil” production from 2005 through 2014 may actually be lease condensate. And that means crude oil production proper has been nearly flat during this period.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts:  KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity]

Texas oilman Jeffrey Brown has been pointing out to everyone that the supposed oversupply of crude oil isn’t quite what it seems. Yes, there is a large overhang of excess oil in the market. But how much of that oversupply is honest-to-god oil and how much is so-called lease condensate which gets carelessly lumped in with crude oil? And, why is this important to understanding the true state of world oil supplies?

Lease condensate consists of very light hydrocarbons which condense from gaseous into liquid form when they leave the high pressure of oil reservoirs and exit through the top of an oil well. This condensate is less dense than oil and can interfere with optimal refining if too much is mixed with actual crude oil. The oil industry’s own engineers classify oil as hydrocarbons having an API gravity of less than 45–the higher the number, the lower the density and the “lighter” the substance. Lease condensate is defined as hydrocarbons having an API gravity between 45 and 70.

Refiners are already complaining that so-called “blended crudes” contain too much lease condensate, and they are seeking out better crudes straight from the wellhead. Brown has dubbed all of this the great condensate con.

Brown points out that U.S. net crude oil imports for December 2015 grew from the previous December, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistical arm of the U.S. Department of Energy. U.S. statistics for crude oil imports include condensate, but don’t break out condensate separately. Brown believes that with America already awash in condensate, almost all of those imports must have been crude oil proper.

Brown asks, “Why would refiners continue to import large–and increasing–volumes of actual crude oil, if they didn’t have to–even as we saw a huge build in [U.S.] C+C [crude oil plus condensate] inventories?”

Part of the answer is that U.S. production of crude oil has been declining since mid-2015. But another part of the answer is that what the EIA calls crude oil is actually crude plus lease condensate. With huge new amounts of lease condensate coming from America’s condensate-rich tight oil fields–the ones tapped by hydraulic fracturing or fracking–the United States isn’t producing quite as much actual crude oil as the raw numbers would lead us to believe. This EIA chart breaking down the API gravity of U.S. crude production supports this view. Exactly how much of America’s and the world’s presumed crude oil production is actually condensate remains a mystery. The data just aren’t sufficient to separate condensate production from crude oil in most instances.

Brown explains: “My premise is that U.S. (and probably global) refiners hit in late 2014 the upper limit of the volume of condensate that they could process” and still maintain the product mix they want to produce. That would imply that condensate inventories have been building faster than crude inventories and that the condensate is looking for an outlet.

That outlet has been in blended crudes, that is heavier crude oil that is blended with condensates to make it lighter and therefore something that fits the definition of light crude. Light crude is generally easier to refine and thus more valuable.

Trouble is, the blends lack the characteristics of nonblended crudes of comparable density (that is, the same API gravity), and refiners are discovering to their chagrin that the mix of products they can get out of blended crudes isn’t what they expect.

So, now we can try to answer our questions. Brown believes that worldwide production of condensate “accounts for virtually all of the post-2005 increase in C+C [crude plus condensate] production.” What this implies is that almost all of the 4 million-barrel-per-day increase in world “oil” production from 2005 through 2014 may actually be lease condensate. And that would mean crude oil production proper has been nearly flat during this period–a conjecture supported by record and near record average daily prices for crude oil from 2011 through 2014. Only when demand softened in late 2014 did prices begin to drop.

Here it is worth mentioning that when oil companies talk about the price of oil, they are referring to the price quoted on popular futures exchanges–prices which reflect only the price of crude oil itself. The exchanges do not allow other products such as condensates to be mixed with the oil that is delivered to holders of exchange contracts. But when oil companies (and governments) talk about oil supply, they include all sorts of things that cannot be sold as oil on the world market including biofuels, refinery gains and natural gas plant liquids as well as lease condensate. Which leads to a simple rule coined by Brown: If what you’re selling cannot be sold on the world market as crude oil, then it’s not crude oil.

The glut that developed in 2015 may ultimately be tied to some increases in actual, honest-to-god crude oil production. The accepted story from 2005 through 2014 has been that crude oil production has been growing, albeit at a significantly slower rate than the previous nine-year period–15.7 percent from 1996 through 2005 versus 5.4 percent from 2005 through 2014 according to the EIA. If Brown is right, we have all been victims of the great condensate con which has lulled the world into a sense of complacency with regard to actual oil supplies–supplies he believes have been barely growing or stagnant since 2005.

“Oil traders are acting on fundamentally flawed data,” Brown told me by phone.

Brown points out that it took trillions of dollars of investment from 2005 through today just to maintain what he believes is almost flat production in oil. With oil companies slashing exploration budgets in the face of low oil prices and production declining at an estimated 4.5 and 6.7 percent per year for existing wells worldwide, a recovery in oil demand might push oil prices much higher very quickly.

That possibility is being obscured by the supposed rise in crude oil production in recent years that may just turn out to be an artifact of the great condensate con.

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When Trucks Stop Running, So Does Civilization. Energy and the Future of Transportation.

when_trucks_stop_running_book_coverWhen Trucks Stop Running. Energy and the Future of Transportation.

Available at Springer, Amazon, Google Play, Barnes & Noble, Alibris

When Trucks Stop Running: Table of Contents, Preface, References

Book review: “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation: Review” By Allan Stromfeldt Christensen

Trucks stop running in the news:

2021 Shortage of urea, used to make diesel anti-pollution additive AdBlue, threatens to grind Australia to a halt, transport industry warns. “Diesel trucks and the people who drive them are often described as the lifeblood of Australia — almost everything we buy in this country spends some time on the road.  A lot of the AdBlue, or the chemical Urea that goes into making it, is imported from China, and the supply has dried up.”

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy”, 2021, Springer; “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report

***

Virtually everything in our homes, everything in our stores, got there on a truck. Prior to that, 90 percent of those items were transported on a ship and/or a train. If trucks, trains, and ships stopped running, our global economy and way of life would stop too.

The impact of peak oil on commercial transportation has been of great interest to me after a 22-year career at American President Lines, where I developed computer systems to keep cargo seamlessly moving around the globe and just-in-time between ships, rail, trucks, and customers.

So I was thrilled when Charles Hall invited me to write a book on energy and transportation for his Springer Energy series, a book that has just been published: When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation.

Ships, trucks, and trains are the backbone of civilization, hauling the goods that fulfill our every need and desire. Their powerful, highly-efficient diesel combustion engines are exquisitely fine-tuned to burn petroleum-based diesel fuel. These engines and the fuels that fire them have been among the most transformative yet disruptive technologies on the planet. This is a dependency we take for granted.

Since oil reserves are finite, one day supplies will be diminished to where the cost of moving freight and goods with our present oil-fueled fleet will not pencil out. We have an oil glut in 2016 and a corresponding lack of urgency. Yet, inevitably the day will come when oil supplies decline. What will we do? What are our options? That is the sobering reality my book explores.

Consider just how dependent we are on abundant and affordable oil, which fuels commercial transportation: Grocery stores, service stations, hospitals, pharmacies, restaurants, construction sites, manufacturers, and many other businesses receive several deliveries a day.  Since they keep very little inventory, most would run out of goods within a week.  When trucks stop, over 685,000 tons of garbage piles up every day in the U.S., sewage treatment ends as storage tanks fill up, and in two to four weeks water supplies would be imperiled as purification chemicals were no longer delivered. That is just the tip of the iceberg.

Although ships move roughly 90% of cargo and made globalization possible, it is hard to think of a single thing that isn’t transported on a truck at some point, if only for the last mile. Equally important are other kinds of “trucks” and equipment used in farming, logging, mining, construction, garbage, and countless human endeavors. Certainly it would be better to deliver goods by rail, which are four times more fuel efficient than trucks, or by ship, which can be up to 80 times more efficient than trucks. But there are only 95,000 route miles of railroad track, and 25,000 miles of inland and coastal waterways in the U.S. That’s compared to over 4 million miles of U.S. roads. Just why we are so reliant on trucks and under-utilize more efficient ships and trains is explored in my book.

Renewable electricity – solar and wind — is ramping up, but in our optimism over the renewable revolution, we collectively forget that our trucks, ships, and freight trains don’t run on electricity. Although I’d often thought about Robert Hirsch’s saying that peak oil was best framed as a liquid fuels transportation crisis, I had never fully researched the details of what this meant.  After all, vehicles potentially could run on coal-to-liquid fuel, natural gas, biofuels, hydrogen, or be electrified.

So for the past two years I’ve researched the evolution and future of commercial transportation, the technologies and energy resources available now or in the next decade that ships, locomotives, and trucks could run on. The ideal fuel would be a “drop-in” fuel so that we didn’t have to toss out over $1 trillion of vehicles and their engines and $4.6 trillion of transportation infrastructure that comprises 12% of all the wealth in the U.S.  These billions of diesel engine vehicles and equipment can last 40 years and go a million miles.

The main thesis of Vaclav Smil’s book “Prime movers of globalization: the history and impact of Diesel Engines and Gas Turbines (MIT Press)” is that diesel engines made civilization as we know it possible, far more than computers did.  Gasoline and steam engines are not capable of doing some of the heaviest work diesel engines do, are far less efficient, and have a shorter lifespan.

Since fossil fuels are finite, we can’t run trucks on liquefied coal or natural gas either. Ultimately we will have no choice but to run commercial transportation on renewable energy. Biofuels don’t come even remotely close to scaling up, so trucks would need to be electrified some day via batteries or catenary systems (overhead wires).

This seemingly inevitable future scenario requires understanding the challenges of getting to an electric grid that is 80 to 100% powered by renewables, utility-scale energy storage systems, and understanding how much energy storage is needed to cope with the intermittency and seasonality of wind and solar power.

The co-dependencies of electricity and computers make our transportation system even more fragile and vulnerable to failure. Electricity outages or software/equipment failures prevent ships, rail, and trucks from loading or unloading, since dozens of financial, tariff, manifest, bill of lading, and other documents are required to keep cargo moving.

What I have attempted to do in the book is to investigate every technical and energy option foreseeable for the movement of goods and services.   In the process, there is no avoiding an eyes-wide-open look at the challenges. These include renewable liquid fuels, climate change, the financial system, and corrosion.

Politics may be one of the most insurmountable challenges. To understand the evolution of U.S. energy policy and what, if any, plans are being made for the future of transportation, I read the transcripts of hundreds of congressional hearings in the U.S. House and Senate. If the global freight transportation system so central to our era of abundance has any hope of being sustained as oil declines, then political leadership, long term planning, and massive funding are essential. Some may liken this challenge to a technical “moon shot.” Right now, mobilizing for this change looks more like a long shot.

Related Posts: There are many other barriers to building a battery electric car or truck. They use many finite platinum group elements, precious elements, and rare earth elements.  Plus there are dozens of challenges to improving batteries that must be overcome but can’t because of the laws of physics and thermodynamics. Nor are trucks going to be running on hydrogen: The dumbest & most impossible renewable.

The electric grid will eventually fail without utility scale energy storage of at least a month of electricity to compensate for seasonal deficits (When Trucks Stop Running Chapter 17 The Electric Blues). Natural gas is the main energy storage now (and coal), and essential for balancing the sudden life and death of wind and solar power. But natural gas and coal are finite.  Yes, hydropower can also balance wind and solar, but mostly in the 10 lucky states that have 80% of it for just part of the year, and the few places that can afford multi-million-dollar batteries (though only for an hour or so).  The electric grid could crash from a weapon or solar flare electromagnetic pulse and be down for a year or more. Electric trucks are impossible. Without trucks, civilization fails. And it’s checkmate as well, because manufacturing uses over half of all fossil fuels, and depends on the high heat only fossils can provide to make cement, steel and other metals, glass, brick, ceramics, microchips and so on. Manufacturing can’t be run on electricity, hydrogen, or anything else, as explained in Chapter 9 of Life After Fossil Fuels. No transportation? No Manuracturing? Then no electricity generating contraptions like solar panels or wind turbines. Checkmate.

 

 

 

 

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When Trucks Stop Running: Table of Contents, Preface, References

Alice Friedemann.  2016. When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Civilization. Springer.

Available in print and eBook at Springer, Amazon, and Barnes & Noble.

Table of Contents

1 When Trucks Stop Running, America Stops

2 Shipping Makes the World Go Round

From Sail to Steamships
The Container Ship Revolution
Ninety Percent of Global Trade Is Carried by Ships and Barges

3 Why You Should Love Trains

Trains Consume Less Fuel Yet Carry More Goods Than Trucks
A Brief History of Railroads
So Why Not Build More Railroad Tracks to Conserve Oil?
Who’s Going to Pay for It?

4 Why You Should Love Trucks

5 The Oiliness of Everything: Invisible Oil and Energy Payback Time

How Energy is Used in the U.S. Economy
Energy Return on Investment or EROI
When You Do an EROI Analysis, Clearly a Low EROI Is a Problem

6 Peak Oil and Transportation

Risks and Risk Management
Peak Oil May Be Less Than 20 Years Away
Oil Field Decline Rates
Where Will Additional Oil Come From?
Other Threats to Oil Supplies for the Transportation System

7 Distributing Drop-in Fuels: The Fastest Road to Something Else

Next Stop: Service Stations
Cost to Create Drop-in Fuel
Railroads Can’t Afford to Replace Their Locomotives
Conclusion: Time Is Running Out

8 Post Fossil Fuels, If Biomass Is the “Answer to Everything,” Is There Enough?

9 Hydrogen, the Homeopathic Energy Crisis Remedy.  Updated here: Hydrogen: The dumbest & most impossible renewable.

10 Natural Gas—A Bridge Fuel to Where Exactly?

Economic Peak Natural Gas and Tight Oil?
Import Liquid Natural Gas?
Or Export LNG? America’s Newfound Energy Independence
Is There Enough Natural Gas for Transportation?

11 Liquefied Coal: There Goes the Neighborhood, the Water, and the Air

The Future of CTL: How Much Diesel Could Be Made from Coal?
World and U.S. Peak Coal May Have Happened, or Will Soon

12 Who Killed the All-Electric Car?

So Why Isn’t There a Better Battery?

All-Electric Autos

13 Can Freight Trains Be Electrified?

D’oh! Why Electrify? Diesel-Electric Locomotives Already Are
Electric and More Efficient Than All-Electric Locomotives!
Electrify with Batteries? Been There, Done That. It Didn’t Work Out
Other Issues with Electrification
Europe’s Freight Trains Are Inferior. Why Copy Them?
Electrify Just the Busiest Corridors

14 All-Electric Trucks Using Batteries or Overhead Wires

Battery-Electric (BEV) Trucks
WAAAAY Too Expensive
Additional Costs
Trucks Running on Overhead Wires (Catenary)

15 Overview of the Electric Grid: Herding Lightning

16 The Electric Grid Trembles When Wind and Solar Join the High Wire Act   

Where Will Tomorrow’s Power Come from?
There Is No Free Lunch
Intermittency
The Electric Grid Trembles When Wind & Solar Join the High Wire Act
A National “Super-Grid”?
Wind and Solar Don’t Replace Conventional Power, They just Add to the Blaze
How Much Intermittent Wind and Solar Penetration can the Grid Handle?

17 The Electric Blues: Energy Storage for Calm and Cloudy Days

More Wind Power and the Short-Term Storage to Make that Happen
Longer Term Storage
Storage Goal: One Day of U.S. Electricity Power Generation
Pumped Hydro Storage (PHS)
Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES)
Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) with Thermal Energy
Storage (TES)
Hydrogen
Electrochemical Batteries
Battery Energy Storage at Grid Scale Is Limited by Materials

18 Other Truck Stoppers: Mother Nature  

Crumbling Concrete
Rust and Corrosion
Climate Change
The Water-Energy-Transportation Nexus
Nuclear Power Plants

19 U.S. Energy Policy: Oil Wars and Drill-Baby-Drill to Keep Autos Running?

Cars and Light Trucks Are a Huge Part of the Problem, Using 63 Percent of Transportation Oil
Energy Policy: Cars
Wars Keep the Oil Flowing

20 Where Are We Headed?

Hubbert’s Curve is More Like a Cliff
Setting National Priorities for How Petroleum Is Used
Food Distribution: Putting Food on the Table
Isaac Asimov and Admiral Hyman Rickover on Energy Descent
Isaac Asimov, “the Future of Humanity,” 1974
Admiral Hyman Rickover, “Energy Resources and Our Future,” 1957
More Research on How to Get the Most Bang for the Energy Buck
Shouting into the Wind

Preface: Running on Empty

Even as a child, I was interested in oil. When I was 10 years old, Dad drove us into the hot oven of Death Valley in a dark blue car with black seats and no air-conditioning. We were being cooked alive. The gas gauge crept toward empty for what seemed like hours. I thought, for sure, we were going to run out of gas. Cockroaches may be able to survive this heat, but I am not a bug! I will never forget finally pulling into the gas station, the drinking fountain getting ever closer until, at last, I felt the delicious chill of water in my throat. Dad gassed up the car, and all was well with the world.

A decade later, it looked like civilization itself was running on empty as the energy crisis of 1973 took over our lives. I was in college, and joined an alternate technology group. We watched engineers build electric cars, windmills, and convert a car to run on methanol. I got to help build a solar collector by drinking beer and painting the cans black. Saving the planet was not only going to be fun, it was going to be a party!

It wasn’t long before non-OPEC oil was found and the Mideast turned their oil tap back on, and I stopped worrying about energy. Renewable power was on the way and the “evil” oil companies wouldn’t be able to stop it. My grandfather, Professor Francis J. Pettijohn, was a seminal figure in sedimentary geology. Sedimentary basins—that is where you find oil! Grandfather would try to educate me about the energy density of oil and the high hurdles blocking the path of alternate energy, but it wasn’t until I read his memoir that my world view of running the planet on beer-can solar power changed. That’s when I discovered that Grandpa had been a friend and mentor of M. King Hubbert, who predicted world peak oil production around the year 2000.

Yikes! It was 2000. Had oil peaked yet? An Internet search led to a Pandora’s box of Jay Hanson’s die-off website, Yahoo group energy resources, and years later attending Association for the Study of Peak Oil conferences. I was a science writer and shifted my focus from natural history to energy-related topics, and have since then read hundreds of books and thousands of articles on energy from within the U.C. Berkeley library system.

Earlier in my life, to pay the mortgage I designed and architected software systems, which I learned how to do at Electronic Data Systems after rigorous training in analysis and assembler programming working on the Medicare system, followed by a stint at Bank of America in the check processing division, and finally 22 years at American President Lines (APL). As a systems engineer, you need to have both a “big picture” and detailed understanding of the business framework before designing a new system. Inevitably, everything is connected.

APL was a global shipping line that also routed cargo on trucks and trains as well as helped customers with logistics, especially just-in-time freight and the fastest, most reliable delivery times possible within a continuous intermodal flow of containers across ships, trains, and trucks. APL was a leader in transportation and had the most extensive container ship system in the U.S. by the late 1960s, and partnered with rail to start the StackTrain service, containers stacked double high on railcars, tremendously increasing the efficiency of trains and reducing fuel consumption.

All of the APL computer systems needed to be up 24 × 7, everywhere, or ships, trucks, and trains would stop as Bills of Lading, manifests, and dozens of other legal documents could not be produced. Around the clock, everything from military supplies for the 1991 Gulf War to running shoes was kept on the move with as little waiting time as possible between modes of transportation.

When a new project came along, I needed to understand how long it would take and how many staff were needed to make sure an “improvement” didn’t cost more than the money saved. This is very much like the “energy returned on invested analysis” performed to make sure more fossil energy isn’t invested than returned on a given technology or project.

In business, this kind of analysis is essential to prevent bankruptcy. Yet when scientists find oil, coal, and natural gas production likely to peak within decades, rather than centuries, or that ethanol, solar photovoltaic, tar sands, oil shale, and other alternative energy resources have a low or even negative energy return on the energy invested, they are ignored and called pessimists, no matter how solid their findings. For every one of their peer-reviewed papers, there are thousands of positive press releases with breakthroughs that never pan out, and economists promising perpetual growth and energy independence. Optimism is more important than facts. And, it’s essential for attracting investors.

Civilization as we know it depends on our global transportation system of ships, trains, and trucks, all of which are fueled by oil. Since oil reserves are finite, one day supplies will be diminished to where the cost of moving freight and goods with our present oil-fueled fleet will not pencil out. We have an oil glut in 2015 and a corresponding lack of urgency. Yet, inevitably the day will come when oil supplies decline. What will we do? What are our options? That is the sobering reality this book will explore.

Using my transportation knowledge and the analytical skills I learned during my 27-year career as a systems engineer, my science background (B.S. in Biology with a Chemistry and Physics minor from the University of Illinois), and what I have learned over what is now 15 years of energy research, I will look at the vulnerabilities of our current commercial transportation sector.

Everything in our homes, everything in our stores, got there on a truck at some point. Before that, many of those goods also were transported by ship and/or train.

Come the day that oil is no longer abundant and affordable, will the millions of trucks that make our way of life possible be able to keep on running? I’ll look at the energy scenarios that could disrupt trucking, followed by overviews of the roles and respective energy efficiency of ships, railroads, and trucks—the three modes of heavy-duty transportation essential to keeping industrial civilization running. After that there are three chapters on oil: how invisible yet necessary it is, peak oil risks, and the distribution of liquid fuels. Then the viability of alternative fuels that are already commercially developed to replace oil is considered: biofuels, hydrogen, natural gas, and liquefied coal. Another way transportation might continue without a diesel fuel substitute is electrification with batteries or overhead wires, the subject of the next chapters. If electricity is to be used to power transportation, then it is important to understand the issues that need to be solved as we migrate towards a 100 % renewable electric grid as fossil fuels decline. Finally I look at other issues that will affect transportation such as climate change, at U.S. government energy policy since the first energy crisis in 1973, and then conclude with how I see the road ahead.

This book is very United States-centric, because the U.S. uses the most oil of any nation, is the most dependent on oil for transportation, and will be the most affected by oil decline. America is also the military superpower that keeps oil flowing from the Middle East (or at least thinks it does), where two-thirds of the remaining oil lies, to Europe and Asia. Finally, the U.S. is where I live.

We live in the Oil Age, and as oil declines, our lives will change. Eyes wide open, this book explores the way forward.

The book would need to be many hundreds of pages to cover commercial and noncommercial energy technology as much as I’d like, but more information can be found here on my website, www.energyskeptic.com.

References in the Book

Below are the references cited in the book in alphabetical order, but I did far more research than this, and the book could have easily had a reference section much longer than the book itself.

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Additional material read but not cited in the book:

IN PROGRESS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Cost overruns on roads from subsurface conditions

[ What follows are excerpts from the 91 page NRC document on cost overruns. As energy declines, future new roads aren’t likely to be built, and existing roads unpaved, so I didn’t excerpt much.  Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com ]

NRC. 2016. NCHRP Influence of Geotechnical Investigation and Subsurface Conditions on Claims, Change Orders, and Overruns. National research council, National Academies Press.

Subsurface conditions are frequently considered to represent significant elements of technical and financial risk for highway construction projects. Unfortunately, information quantifying these risks is rare. This Synthesis documents the extent and type of claims, change orders, and cost overruns from subsurface conditions for state departments of transportation (DOTs). The report also identifies practices used by agencies to reduce such claims, change orders, and cost overruns.

Nearly 70% of responding agencies have minimum subsurface investigation requirements that are equal to or generally consistent with AASHTO specifications and guidelines. Fourteen percent of the responding agencies do not have minimum subsurface investigation requirements, 10% have requirements exceeding AASHTO specifications and guidelines, and the other responding agencies have requirements that are either materially different from AASHTO specifications and guidelines (6%) or less stringent than AASHTO specifications and guidelines (2%).

The most common causes of claims, change orders, and cost overruns resulting from subsurface conditions included: • Pile overruns; • Groundwater shallower than expected, affecting many types of construction; • Seepage problems, including those requiring dewatering, which was identified as being notably more costly than other causes; • Misclassified or mischaracterized subgrade, resulting in quantity revisions related to pavements, earthwork, and removal and replacement requirements for foundations; • Unanticipated rock excavation, especially that when encountering rock shallower than expected or encountering rock at foundation locations where it was not expected; and • Mischaracterized rock for drilled shaft construction.

The survey revealed the following quantitative information regarding the frequency and cost of claims, change orders, and cost overruns attributed to subsurface conditions: • The annual cost of change orders resulting from subsurface conditions was commonly in the millions of dollars and as much as $10 million per agency. • The total share of claims, change orders, and cost overruns attributed to subsurface conditions out of all claims, change orders, and cost overruns was 5% by number and 7% by cost. • The cost of subsurface condition change orders approaches 1% of the agencies’ total budgets for new construction. • Survey results indicated that the impact of subsurface conditions claims, change orders, and cost overruns is particularly significant on a project level. For instance, for one agency the cost of the average subsurface condition change orders alone consumed 7% of the associated project budget for one agency. The impact on some individual project budgets was likely much greater than 7% considering the variability of change orders.

Relatively modest changes to subsurface investigation practices can produce considerable reductions in claims, change orders, and cost overruns, particularly when the changes are tailored to a specific, recurring problem. For instance, Florida DOT reduced earthwork claims by requiring that plans show hard material that cannot be excavated using a backhoe with rock patterning rather than patterns associated with soil.

 

Communication and training involving a broad spectrum of agency and contractor personnel (including designers, contractors, inspectors, and field crews) appear to be a critical component to realizing the benefits of improvements to site characterization practices. Examples of such communication include agency guidelines and specifications, contract and bid documents, and regular training opportunities.

 

Improving subsurface investigation practice has clear benefits for design, even if substantial reductions in claims, change orders, and cost overruns are not achieved. • Improving the accuracy of boring location information can be effective in reducing claims, change orders, and cost overruns, especially for construction sites with significant spatial variation. • Implementing minimum standards for subsurface investigation and site characterization was reported to reduce claims, change orders, and cost overruns. After publishing its Geotechnical Design Manual, South Carolina DOT observed fewer claims associated with excavation equipment requirements and improved accuracy of plan earthwork quantities.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Risks associated with geotechnical issues are significant for many construction projects and many if not most of these risks are directly or indirectly affected by the quantity and quality of subsurface investigations. Baynes (2010) found that the likelihood of experiencing geotechnical problems that significantly impact project costs or schedule on major infrastructure projects is between 20% and 50%. Other studies have found similar results for various sectors of the construction industry

 

GEOTECHNICAL CHANGE ORDERS AT INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

 

  • The average cost of geotechnical change orders was 1.3% of the estimated total construction costs. • The cost of geotechnical change orders was just over 10% of the total cost of all change orders. • Approximately one-quarter of the projects (84 of 300) included geotechnical change orders, with many of these projects including more than one geotechnical change order.

 

Prezzi et al. (2011) studied INDOT change orders associated with work done by the agency’s geotechnical office over a 5-year period beginning in 2003. The work was motivated by an agency perception that change orders “attributed to geotechnical conditions” were “excessive” and perhaps increasing; the research was designed to quantify the number and cost of geotechnical change orders and to develop guidance for reducing them. The study included three components:

 

  1. A national survey similar to that conducted for this synthesis. 2. Analysis of change order information from the ten largest contracts per year in each of INDOT’s six districts (300 contracts total). 3. Thirteen interviews with agency project engineers and external consulting engineers familiar with INDOT projects and practices.

 

Four main causes for geotechnical claims based on the interviews were summarized, although some of the causes are associated more with design issues than with investigation problems: • Failure to identify poor subgrade that was frequently attributed to inadequate site investigation, but also resulted from improper plan elevations. • Pile overruns and underruns, which occur when the as-built driven pile depths are different from those shown on plans. • Erosion control material quantity errors often associated with underestimating riprap and geotextile quantities as a result of mischaracterizing the soil drainage conditions. • Mechanically Stabilized Earth wall construction, although the changes were mostly related to no geotechnical aspects such as wall geometry conflicting with surface drainage lines.

 

Mott MacDonald and Soil Mechanics, Ltd. (1994) studied the effect of subsurface investigation on construction cost overruns by examining results from a database of 58 transportation projects in the United Kingdom. Three-quarters of the projects had cost overruns greater than 10% of the contract value. The authors reported “about half” of the overruns resulted from geotechnical causes, the most common being (1) problems from seepage and groundwater, (2) encountering materials different in classification from those anticipated, and (3) removal and replacement of additional unsuitable material. The direct geotechnical cost overruns averaged 3% of contract cost, which the authors compared with an average of 1% of contract cost spent on site investigation. Indirect claims resulting from delay and disruption were more significant, amounting to 5% of contract cost. It was noted that while most of the direct costs would have been required even with an adequate site investigation, the indirect overruns could have been avoided.

 

A similar study was undertaken by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology (USNCTT), which studied the effect of geotechnical site investigation on construction changes and claims. USNCTT described differing site condition change orders and claims as “many” and “costly” (U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology 1984). Indeed, Gould (1995) summarized the data from the USNCTT study as including claims that amounted to 12% of the overall construction costs. The USNCTT study included 87 major tunneling projects constructed over a 20-year period. USNCTT examined the ratio of completed cost to engineer’s estimate versus subsurface exploration quantity and cost data, which were available for 36 of the projects. The resulting plots reveal significant scatter, but USNCTT noted that engineer’s estimates become more reliable as the subsurface exploration quantity and cost increase. USNCTT recommends 1.5 linear feet of borehole per route foot of tunnel; according to the study, the cost of such an investigation is roughly equivalent to 3% of construction cost.

 

Finally, improved subsurface investigation has other benefits for infrastructure projects. Many studies have noted that improved subsurface investigation results in design efficiencies as well

 

The second most common cause of failure, noted in 15 of the 37 cases, was “lack of disclosure of risks, uncertainties, and consequences,” meaning the engineer failed to effectively advise owners or contractors about geotechnical risks that ultimately came to fruition. The most common cause of failure was “recommendation not followed by client or contractor,” which has similar albeit more obvious roots in human error. The authors’ recommendations emphasize the responsibility of management personnel to staff and train technical personnel appropriately and to “deal with the real need for intelligent disclosure of risks, uncertainties, and consequences.

 

The findings of Baynes (2010), Clayton (2001), and Moorehouse and Millet (1994) suggest that human effects are a primary cause of subsurface conditions claims, change orders, and cost overruns, likely equal in importance to the more tangible effects of geotechnical investigation and construction practices.

 

HUMAN EFFECTS ON SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS CLAIMS, CHANGE ORDERS, AND COST OVERRUNS EFFECT OF CONTRACTING PRACTICES ON SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS CLAIMS, CHANGE ORDERS, AND COST OVERRUNS

 

Interestingly, several studies have concluded that geotechnical risks are not exclusively attributable to ground conditions, but also involve human contributions. Based on the collective evaluation of several studies of geotechnical risks, Baynes (2010) concluded that “available information suggests that the ground conditions and the project staff responsible for the geo-engineering process are both significant sources of geotechnical risk and that the project staff may actually be the largest source.” Clayton (2001) described this “human” aspect of geotechnical risk as follows: Even a quick reading of literature related to claims, change orders, and cost overruns attributed to subsurface conditions reveals that contractual issues play a significant role. Construction contracts allocate risks between owner and builder. Typically, subsurface risks are allocated to owners through a differing site condition clause. Contractual issues are not a focus of this synthesis; however, two contract topics—bid documents and design-build arrangements—are summarized here because of their relevance to the synthesis topic. There are numerous ways in which the ground can cause problems for construction, for example due to chemical attack, heave, subsidence, groundwater flow, slope failure, excessive foundation settlement, and so on. Because of the considerable range of risks the ground can pose, it is relatively easy for an inexperienced or non-specialist designer, perhaps using routine

 

During the agency interview, SCDOT discussed the effect of its manual on claims, change orders, and cost overruns.

 

SUMMARY OF COMMON CAUSES OF SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS CLAIMS, CHANGE ORDERS, AND COST OVERRUNS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM ALL CASE EXAMPLES

 

Common Causes of Subsurface Conditions Claims, Change Orders, and Cost Overruns The agency interviews focused primarily on methods of reducing claims, change orders, and cost overruns attributed to subsurface conditions; however, the conversations also revealed common causes. The following list summarizes some of the most frequent situations and applications associated with subsurface conditions claims, change orders, and cost overruns. • Pile overruns and underruns. • Higher than expected groundwater for – Retaining walls, – Earthworks, – Utility and sewer work, and – Drilled shaft installation. • Misclassified or mischaracterized subgrade for – Pavements, – Embankments, and – Retention ponds. • Unanticipated rock during foundation construction; such claims are especially frequent for sound barrier walls and other secondary structures with relatively small loads, relatively large numbers of foundations, and relatively sparse borings compared with more significant structures. • Mischaracterized rock for drilled shaft construction, leading to improper equipment selection and construction delays.

 

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