U.S. taxpayers lose billions from Powder River Basin bad lease deals and undervalued coal

According to the Center for American Progress:

For decades the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has run a fundamentally noncompetitive leasing program, which has been a boon to industry. Since 1990, 96 of the 107 coal-lease sales held by the BLM have had only one bidder, despite a clear mandate under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 that federal coal leases be offered “competitively.” This means that almost 90% of all federal coal-lease sales over the past 25 years have been noncompetitive.

Powder River Basin (PRB) coal is significantly undervalued and sells at a fraction of the cost of coal produced in other regions of the United States. Coal produced in the Appalachian region, for example, sells for $63 per short ton, but PRB coal sells for a shockingly low $13 per short ton—$50 less per short ton.  Even accounting for the higher energy content of Appalachian coal, PRB coal is cheaper, just $0.74 per million British thermal units (BTU), versus $2.46 per million BTUs for Appalachian coal.

In 2013, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and U.S. Department of the Interior issued separate reports in which they each found major deficiencies in the coal-leasing program and concluded that it lacks rigor and oversight. Both noted that the BLM employs a deeply flawed process to assess the fair market value of federal coal.  The artificially low market price of Powder River Basin coal costs U.S. taxpayers in several ways. Although the GAO and the Office of Inspector General refrained from assessing the full loss to taxpayers from the noncompetitive nature of BLM’s coal-leasing program, a third-party review estimated that over the past 30 years, the government’s undervaluation of coal may have cost taxpayers upward of $30 billion in lost revenue.

What’s more, taxpayers are missing out on royalty payments that would accrue if the coal were sold at a higher price on the market. A short ton of coal sold at $60 per short ton provides a 12.5% royalty payment of $7.50 per short ton for taxpayers, a short ton of coal sold at $13 per short ton returns a 12.5% royalty payment of just $1.63 per short ton. With hundreds of millions of tons of federal coal sold annually from the Powder River Basin, these losses to American taxpayers add up quickly (Thakar, N. 2014. Federal Coal Leasing in the Powder River Basin: A Bad Deal for Taxpayers. CAP)

Below is an excerpt of a House of Representatives oversight hearing on BLM leasing practices. A shorter summary is a 2014 Summary of GAO Report on Federal Coal Leasing Prepared for Sen. Edward J. Markey and Rep. Peter DeFazio  and the full GAO report is at December 2013 COAL LEASING. BLM Could Enhance Appraisal Process, More Explicitly Consider Coal Exports, and Provide More Public Information ].

July 9, 2013. Mining in America, Powder River Basin coal mining. The Benefits & Challenges. Oversight hearing, subcommittee on energy & mineral resources. House of Representatives .Serial No. 113–29. 56 pages.

DOUG LAMBORN, COLORADO. About 40% of the coal mined in the United States comes from the Powder River Basin. The region has tremendous potential. According to a recent U.S. Geological Survey assessment, the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana contains about 162 billion short tons of recoverable coal from a total of 1.07 trillion short tons of in-place resources.

JARED HUFFMAN, CALIFORNIA. Forty percent of our Nation’s coal production occurs on public lands; and the vast majority of that, more than 80%, is produced in Wyoming. And yet, coal production from public lands in the Powder River Basin has largely escaped oversight in recent years. It has been nearly 20 years since the GAO has examined the Federal coal program. This is the first hearing that we have had on coal production in this region, in 2.5 years under the Majority. We have a responsibility in this Committee, I believe, to ensure that taxpayers are getting a proper return on this incredibly valuable public resource. Indeed, taxpayers have a history of getting short-changed when it comes to coal production in the Powder River Basin. In the early 1980s, at the request of Ranking Member Markey, the GAO undertook an investigation into the coal leasing program in that region. And the GAO found that the Reagan Administration had been leasing coal in the Basin for $100 million less than fair market value. As a result, Congress created a special commission to look at this issue, and enacted a moratorium on leasing until the problems could be addressed and taxpayers could be guaranteed a proper return.

There are troubling indications that taxpayers may once again be losing millions of dollars that they are rightfully owed from coal leases in the Powder River Basin. Last month the Interior Department Inspector General issued a report which concluded that taxpayers may have lost $2 million in recent lease sales and $60 million in potentially under-valued lease modifications.

Now, according to the inspector general, the vast majority of lease sales in the Powder River Basin are not, in reality, competitive. Over the past 20 years, more than 80% of the coal lease sales in the Basin received bids from a single company. This lack of industry competition means that if the Department is not correctly estimating the fair market value of the federally owned coal, then taxpayers could be losing millions of dollars.

And as coal companies are increasingly looking to export coal produced in the United States abroad, where it can be sold for higher prices, the inspector general report found that the Interior Department does not fully account for the possibility of exports in determining the value of coal below our public lands. In fact, the amount of coal being exported from the United States and the price of exported coal has doubled since 2007. Coal companies have told their investors they want to continue growing the amount of American coal sent overseas.

Leases in the Powder River Basin are issued for 20 years. Despite the claims of the Majority, the Obama Administration is leasing coal in the Powder River Basin. In fact, there were more successful coal lease sales in the region during President Obama’s first term than during President Bush’s first term. We have produced slightly more coal from Federal lands during the last 4 years under the Obama Administration than during the previous 4 years under the Bush administration. And I will say I take no joy in these facts, as somebody who happens to care about climate change, and happens to believe we should be transitioning away from coal. But the facts are the facts, and we should bear that in mind as we move forward with this hearing. We must now ensure that taxpayers are getting their fair share for that public resource.

I was disappointed to see that the Interior Department will not be able to testify at the hearing today. This Committee needs to hear from the Department directly on what it is doing to respond to the recommendations from the inspector general, and to ensure that taxpayers are being protected. I hope that the Majority would work with us on that, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

DAN COOLIDGE, CHAIRMAN, CAMPBELL COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. Wyoming is the largest producer of coal in the United States. The PRB has 13 surface mines and up to 100 foot thick coal seams. Nine of the Nation’s 10 largest coal mines operate in the PRB. Coal is mined at the rate of 12 tons per second in the PRB and over 80 coal trains per day leave the PRB loaded with coal to destinations outside of Wyoming. Since 2006, PRB coal production has averaged approximately 425 million tons per year. Most of the coal mined in the PRB is burned as ‘‘steam’’ coal used in power plants to produce steam for generating electricity.

The majority of PRB coal is exported out of State to power plants in 34 States. In 2011, Texas was the top consumer, followed by Illinois, Mississippi, Iowa, and Oklahoma, respectively. Of the 20 States that consume over 8 million tons, all but one have electrical rates below the national average.

Approximately 28% of the coal used for U.S. electricity generation in 2012 came from the PRB. This is equivalent to approximately 95 nuclear plants, 175 Hoover Dams or 200,000 wind turbines.

As an example, Wyoming’s North Antelope Rochelle and Black Thunder coal mines accounted for 20% of the United States’ coal production by tons in 2012. In 2012, Wyoming mines produced 401 million tons, with a total value of approximately $4 billion. By utilizing the coal resources that currently exist in Wyoming, our country can strive toward energy independence for North America. Coal provides electricity for hundreds of thousands of American homes, hospitals, roadways and schools. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that PRB recoverable coal reserves amount to 127 billion tons in 2010.

MARY J. HUTZLER, DISTINGUISHED SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY RESEARCH

Coal is the world’s most plentiful fossil fuel and is the most abundant fossil fuel produced in the United States. Over 90% of the coal consumed in the United States is used to generate electricity. Coal is also used as a basic industry source for making steel, cement and paper, and is used in other industries as well. As the first concentrated energy source to be used by man, coal fueled the Industrial Revolution and lifted the burden of labor from the backs of men and animals. The Industrial Revolution was begun in England, the first nation to employ its coal resources to increase human productivity, in turn becoming the first economic and political superpower of the energy age. For over a century, coal served as the chief transportation energy source and fed the world’s commerce with railroads and steamships. Its transformation from an abundant but useless rock into a valuable energy source created an explosion of intellectual creativity that changed the course of human events. Currently, coal is used to meet almost 20% of America’s total energy demand and generate about 40% of all its electricity.

In additional to its pivotal role as an affordable source of electricity, coal can also be converted into liquid fuels—gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel—as well as into an alternative to liquid natural gas (LNG) for use in synthetic and industrial gases. South Africa currently produces much of its liquid fuel from coal, using a process pioneered and used by Germany prior to World War II. Many nations are exploring methods by which coal can be utilized in cleaner forms. American coal production is currently the second highest in the world (behind China), delivering 1.01 billion short tons in 2012. China produces over 3.8 billion short tons a year and still needs to import coal. While coal use has slightly decreased over the last few years in the United States due to low cost natural gas and government policies against coal use, its share of world energy consumption has increased to 29.9% in 2012, the highest since 1970.

According to data from BP’s 2013 Statistical Review of World Energy, coal constituted almost 70% of China’s 2012 energy consumption.

In Germany, new coal-fired plants with a capacity of 5.3 gigawatts of electricity will come online this year to replace retiring nuclear plants and to back-up intermittent renewable technologies. In total, 10 new coal and lignite power plants are currently under construction in Germany.

To fuel these overseas plants, countries are importing U.S. coal. U.S. coal exports totaled 125.7 million short tons in 2012, 17% higher than in 2011, and the highest level in the history of the United States. About 75% of U.S. coal exports were shipped to Europe and Asia in 2012. Their desirability is continuing. The EIA reports that U.S. coal exports in March 2013 totaled 13.6 million short tons, almost 0.9 million short tons above the previous monthly export peak in June 2012. EIA is projecting a third straight year of more than 100 million short tons of coal exports in 2013. The top five destinations of exported coal (in descending order) during March were China, Netherlands (a large transshipment point), United Kingdom, South Korea, and Brazil. China imports U.S. metallurgical coal that has a high Btu content that the country uses for steelmaking and steam coal for electric generation.

Wyoming is the largest coal producing State, producing more coal than the next six largest coal producing States combined. Powder River Basin coal seams are thick, facilitating surface mining and making extraction easy and efficient. As a result, the price of Powder River Basin coal at the mine mouth tends to be less than that of coal produced elsewhere in the Nation.

According to a multi-agency Government study required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the Federal Government owns 957 billion short tons of coal in the lower 48 States, of which about 550 billion short tons are available in the Powder River Basin. The Bureau of Land Management has under lease or lease application about another 11.6 billion short tons of coal in the Basin. The report found that approximately 1.5% of the Federal mineral estate assessed in the Powder River Basin—or 82,000 out of 5.4 million acres—is available for coal mining under standard lease terms, which is about 27 billion tons of Federal coal. Nearly 88% of the Federal mineral estate in the basin is available for mining with varying degrees of access restrictions and about 11% is prohibited from being leased by statute or because of land-use planning decisions. Clearly, there is plenty of public land yet to be leased.

We evaluated the entire 957 billion short tons of federally owned lower 48 coal at an average price of $15 per ton for the subbituminous Powder River Basin coal and $35 per ton for the remainder of the Federal lower 48 coal, the worth of federally owned coal in the lower 48 States to the economy would be $22.5 trillion. Most of the coal resources in Alaska are deemed to be federally owned and are estimated to be 60% higher than those in the entire lower 48 States but are not included in these estimates. The United States, with the largest estimated coal resource base in the world, does not count Alaska’s coal in its resources, but Alaska has more coal in place than the entire lower 48 States.

Until recently, coal had been used to produce 50% of the Nation’s electricity, but is losing market share to natural gas and renewable energy as natural gas prices drop, renewable energy is mandated and subsidized, and new environmental regulations take effect. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has produced regulations that essentially ban new coal plants and make its continued use in existing plants extremely costly. As a result, coal produced only 37% of our electricity in 2012.

Some have suggested that these closures are mainly due to the low price of natural gas made possible through shale gas discoveries. Regardless, it would be prudent for policy makers and analysts to consider the consequences of removing one of the major three sources of electrical generation from our fuel mix for electricity. Currently our electrical generation mix is largely coal, natural gas and nuclear power. While natural gas prices are currently low, gas-directed rig activity is also very low, which could have an impact on supplies in the out years. Further, the Wall Street Journal reported on January 29 that pressure is increasing to shutter nuclear power plants. If the United States decides that it can provide the vast majority of its electricity from natural gas, it must assure that those supplies will not be threatened by Government actions, including the federalization of hydraulic fracturing regulation or other attempts to require Federal permission to drill natural gas wells, as many have advocated.

MARY L. KENDALL, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

We conducted our evaluation to determine if the Department’s coal leasing process obtains a fair return on coal, produced from public and Indian lands, and assessed the effectiveness of the Department’s coal lease inspection and enforcement program. We found several areas in which BLM could improve its coal program. I will discuss a few of these. BLM is responsible for obtaining fair market value for coal production on public and Indian lands. Mineral valuation expertise is critical for setting fair market value. But BLM does not use the Department’s authority on valuation for minerals. We believe that BLM’s coal lease sales would be greatly enhanced if the Office of Valuation Services assumed the appraisal function. In addition, BLM does not fully account for export potential in developing fair market value. A reported 125 million tons of coal were exported in 2012, an amount that has almost doubled in 5 years. The price of exported coal has also more than doubled in only 4 years. This trend suggests that export potential should be considered in calculating fair market value. Accurately calculating fair market value is particularly important in coal leasing, because a competitive market does not generally exist for coal leases, making fair market value a substitute for competition.

BLM is required by law to reject bids that fail to meet or exceed fair market value. We found instances, however, in which BLM accepted bids below fair market value, resulting in over $2 million in lost revenue. We believe that any bid below fair market value should be rejected.

Prior to a lease sale, a mining company explores the site for the existence and extent of coal seams and considers the energy content and quality of the coal. The company must then furnish this information to BLM, which uses the information to develop fair market value. BLM does not, however, independently verify this information, and places itself at risk of receiving and relying upon incorrect data from mining companies.

We also found that BLM may not be getting a fair return for lease modifications. BLM typically approved a substantially lower price for modifications, averaging more than 80% lower than the price used in the regular lease sales. We estimated a potential $60 million in lost revenues because of this practice.

BLM does have an active inspection and enforcement program, but runs the risk of inconsistencies among its State offices due to its decentralized organization structure and outdated and never-finalized guidance. BLM also has an inspector certification initiative underway that covers all personnel who inspect solid minerals, including coal. This initiative should improve the quality and consistency of inspections and enforcement.

Coal management is a high-dollar program for the Department. In fiscal year 2012, the Department collected $876 million in coal royalties, and over $1.5 billion in bonuses from six lease sales. The budget for coal management is approximately $9.5 million.

BLM manages a total of 314 leases—306 leases on public lands and 8 on Indian lands. In fiscal year 2011, 473 tons of coal were produced from these mining operations. Seventy-one companies operate about 80 mines on public and Indian lands. Four companies account for over 90% of BLM’s sales volume. The largest coal producing State is Wyoming, primarily from the Powder River Basin. In fiscal year 2011, Wyoming accounted for 83% of the Department’s total coal production and 86% of its coal revenues.

We conducted our evaluation to determine if the Department’s coal leasing process obtains a fair return on coal produced from public and Indian lands. We also assessed the effectiveness of the Department’s coal lease inspection and enforcement program.

We found several areas in which BLM could improve the coal leasing process— in valuation, bid acceptance, internal controls, exploration integrity, modifications, and royalty rate reduction—and strengthen the inspection and enforcement program.

In addition, BLM does not fully account for export potential in developing FMV. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that 125 million tons of coal were exported in 2012, an amount that has more than doubled in 5 years. The price of exported coal has also more than doubled in only 4 years. This trend suggests that export potential should be considered in calculating FMV. Exported coal volumes from the Powder River Basin represent about 1.6% of production (6 million tons), but mining companies are actively exploring methods to transport the coal to western ports to export the coal overseas. Export volumes have stabilized in 2013 but are expected to rise in the long term.

Accurately calculating FMV is particularly important in coal leasing because a competitive market does not generally exist for coal leases, making FMV a substitute for competition. Over 80% of the sales for coal leases in Wyoming’s Powder River Basin had only one bid in the past 20 years. None had more than two bidders on a sale. The lack of competition is attributed to BLM’s decision in 1990 to discontinue large-scale regional lease sales and use smaller scale lease sales to continue or extend the life of existing mines.

We also found that BLM has internal control weaknesses regarding FMV data security and review and approval of FMV determinations. Procedures for safeguarding FMV data are inconsistent among BLM offices, and in one State office, a single individual computes FMV, increasing the possibility of undetected errors, a higher risk of fraud, and an inability to move sales forward if that person is absent.

We found that BLM may not be getting a fair return for lease modifications. In the lease modifications we reviewed, BLM typically approved a substantially lower price—averaging more than 80% lower—than the price used in the regular lease sales during the same period. We estimated a potential $60 million in lost revenues. While the modifications may have been justified, we could not validate BLM’s decision-making process with the documentation available to us.

Mining companies may apply for a royalty rate reduction for a number of reasons. When a royalty rate reduction is based on financial hardship, however, BLM program officials generally do not have the expertise to evaluate a company’s financial statements and other supporting documentation. We recommended that in such cases, BLM seek the assistance of the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR), which has accounting expertise in financial records analysis.

BLM has an active inspection and enforcement program. The Bureau runs the risk of inconsistencies among its State offices, however, due to its decentralized organizational structure and outdated and never-finalized guidance. The practice of BLM coal inspectors is to work informally with mining companies to resolve noncompliance. This is due, in part, to the ineffective tools they have for enforcement. The Notices of Noncompliance that BLM uses to cite companies for infractions do not have a financial penalty associated with them. BLM told us that it is limited by current statutory authority.

BLM has assigned inspectors to the same mines for many years, sometimes decades. This may result in over familiarity with mine operators and complacency in inspections and enforcement.

Mr. HUFFMAN. We have heard a $62 million figure that you offered up as the possible loss to the taxpayers. Whether you actually attempted to quantify the full extent that BLM may have failed to accurately reflect Federal coal before the leasing, and so, how you would characterize the $62 million estimate? Is it is a conservative estimate? What would you say about that?

Ms. KENDALL. It is hard for me to call it, really, anything. It is based on the sample of leases that we looked at. And the way we looked at it, we could not extrapolate out the entire body. It is just one approach to looking at a program. In this case it was a select sample. It was not the kind of sample where we could figure out what the whole universe was.

Mr. HUFFMAN. I realize I am asking you to speculate. But if you were asked to speculate, would you say the actual number is more likely to be higher or lower than that amount?

Ms. KENDALL. I would say higher.

Mr. DAINES.   According to the Government’s own stats, about 40% of Americans’ electricity comes from coal, about 30% from natural gas, about 20% nuclear, 7% hydro, 3% wind, and 0.1% solar.

I am not opposed to electric cars, but we ought to remind the American consumer that, based on these statistics, a sign on the back of that Tesla might read, ‘‘This car likely powered by coal.’’ That is what the statistics would show us.

When I toured Colstrip last week they told me they used to use 1,000 homes per megawatt as their ratio. Now it is 750 homes. Why is that? Americans are using more electricity. They like their flat-screen TVs, they like their mobile devices, they like their computers. We are using more electricity.

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13 fallacies of Steven Pinker’s “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined”

It only took me half an hour to find significant criticism of Pinker’s work and write this up.  If I had more time I could find a lot more. Hopefully this will spare you many days of wasted time reading this 832 page book.

John Gray (2015) describes Pinker’s thesis as:

“For an influential group of advanced thinkers, violence is a type of backwardness. In the most modern parts of the world, these thinkers tell us, war has practically disappeared. The world’s great powers are neither internally divided nor inclined to go to war with one another, and with the spread of democracy, the increase of wealth and the diffusion of enlightened values these states preside over an era of improvement the like of which has never been known. For those who lived through it, the last century may have seemed peculiarly violent, but that, it is argued, is mere subjective experience and not much more than anecdote. Scientifically assessed, the number of those killed in violent conflicts was steadily dropping. The numbers are still falling, and there is reason to think they will fall further. A shift is under way, not strictly inevitable but enormously powerful. After millennia of slaughter, humankind is entering the Long Peace.It is now not uncommon to find it stated, as though it were a matter of fact, that human beings are becoming less violent and more altruistic. Ranging freely from human pre-history to the present day, Pinker presents his case with voluminous erudition. Part of his argument consists in showing that the past was more violent than we tend to imagine. Tribal peoples that have been praised by anthropologists for their peaceful ways, such as the Kalahari !Kung and the Arctic Inuit, in fact have rates of death by violence not unlike those of contemporary Detroit; while the risk of violent death in Europe is a fraction of what it was five centuries ago. Not only have violent deaths declined in number. Barbaric practices such as human sacrifice and execution by torture have been abolished, while cruelty towards women, children and animals is, Pinker claims, in steady decline. This “civilising process” – a term Pinker borrows from the sociologist Norbert Elias – has come about largely as a result of the increasing power of the state, which in the most advanced countries has secured a near-monopoly of force. Other causes of the decline in violence include the invention of printing, the empowerment of women, enhanced powers of reasoning and expanding capacities for empathy in modern populations, and the growing influence of Enlightenment ideals.”

This is not a new thesis. Gray discusses the many writers who preceded Pinker.

Fallacy #1: Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics

Please read Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s The “Long Peace is a Statistical Illusion” at http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/longpeace.pdf if you have a degree in statistics.

John Arquilla writes in Foreign Policy:

There are better ways to parse the problem of war’s prevalence and its patterns over time. One approach would be simply to look at the number of armed conflicts under way at any given time. The Human Security Report actually does this for the period 1946-2008, its compelling graphic showing a steady rise to over 50 wars per year in the early 1990s. The rest of that decade saw a drop of about 40 percent — to a great extent driven by the winding down of the Balkan and post-Soviet wars — and then a rising pattern once again post-9/11. Yes, the number of wars is down by over a third since the peak 20 years ago, but ongoing conflicts today are still more than double the totals seen in the years from the end of World War II until the mid-1950s, and are equal to the numbers of wars ongoing during the Vietnam era. It is hard to describe this as a world in which war is on the wane.

The argument that the world has become more peaceful is even harder to sustain if one focuses on the patterns of the most destructive wars of the past few centuries. In my own work, I chose to search for what I call “big-kill” wars, during which a million or more die — soldiers and civilians. From 1800-1850, only the Napoleonic Wars surpassed the million-death mark. In the latter half of the 19th century, there were two such wars: the Taiping Rebellion, during which 20 million or more Chinese died; and the Lopez War between Paraguay and its neighbors. The latter conflict resulted in “only” a million deaths, but Paraguay lost roughly 80 percent of military-age males during this war, which had a shattering societal effect.

Between 1900 and 1950, the number of big-kill wars doubled, if one is willing to accept the view of some that the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) reached a million deaths. About the two world wars there is no doubt. The same is true of the civil war in China that ultimately brought Mao Zedong to power. And if one wants to consider the forced collectivization of farms that Stalin pursued as a form of internal war — which also saw the deaths of millions — then the total for this period would rise to five.

The troubling rise in big-kill wars in the first half of the 20th century was followed by an even more disturbing pattern in the second half: they doubled once again. There was nothing of the magnitude of World War II in sheer numbers of dead, but the million-mark in war deaths was steadily surmounted, mostly in societies in which such losses had staggering effects.

Six of these wars occurred in Africa. In rough chronological order they took place in Biafra, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Congo. Some debate whether the Rwandan genocide reached a million or fell slightly below, and the Human Security Project asserts that the International Red Cross’s estimate that five million people have died in the Congo war (an estimate echoed by many other reporting agencies) is a bit high — but both wars clearly fit the “big-kill” category in terms of percentages of the populations that have died from these wars and their societal effects. Besides, the more common historical pattern in the statistics of deadly quarrels has been to under-report deaths, so Rwanda and Congo should be kept in the count.

The other four big-kill wars occurred in Asia: Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Afghanistan — the last just counting the Russian war there (1979-1989), not the civil strife of the ‘90s and the American intervention over the past decade. All four easily surpassed the million-mark in war deaths. There is debate about whether the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s reached this level — though there is little doubt about the profound effect of the conflict on both countries.

The rising number of the deadliest conflicts over the past two centuries belies both the conclusions of the Human Security Report and those of Professor Pinker.

there is another alarming trend that has been getting under way alongside the big-kill wars: the rise of smaller conflicts that nevertheless cause the deaths of hundreds of thousands. The Balkan wars of the 1990s fit this pattern. As does the Chechen resistance to Russia, both before and since the millennium. The civil war in Burundi (1993-2005) and Somalia (ongoing) fit this bill as well. The same goes for the strife in Darfur, and Syria is on the edge of entering this category as well. Most of the conflicts that fall into this category will occur in failed or failing states — see this magazine’s Failed States Index as a guide to where the next disaster may occur. The “red zones” of critical concern are massive.

No, war is not on the wane. The second horseman of the Apocalypse remains with us. Indeed, it seems he may even have found a fresh mount. 

Fallacy #2: ignoring how many people a future nuclear war might kill

What keeps many politicians awake at night is the day when a terrorist group gets a small nuclear bomb and detonates it in a large city. Given the massive amount of oil money these groups receive this is bound to happen someday.

John Gray writes:

It’s a mistake to focus too heavily on declining fatalities on the battlefield. If these deaths have been falling, one reason is the balance of terror: nuclear weapons have so far prevented industrial-style warfare between great powers. Pinker dismisses the role of nuclear weapons on the grounds that the use of other weapons of mass destruction such as poison gas has not prevented war in the past; but nuclear bombs are incomparably more destructive. No serious military historian doubts that fear of their use has been a major factor in preventing conflict between great powers. Moreover deaths of non-combatants have been steadily rising. Around a million of the 10 million deaths due to the first world war were of non-combatants, whereas around half of the more than 50 million casualties of the second world war and over 90% of the millions who have perished in the violence that has wracked the Congo for decades belong in that category.”

Discussing the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 in which nuclear war was narrowly averted, Pinker dismisses the view that “the de-escalation was purely a stroke of uncanny good luck”. Instead, he explains the fact that nuclear war was avoided by reference to the superior judgment of Kennedy and Khrushchev, who had “an intuitive grasp of game theory” – an example of increasing rationality in history, Pinker believes. But a disastrous escalation in the crisis may in fact have been prevented only by a Soviet submariner, Vasili Arkhipov, who refused to obey orders from his captain to launch a nuclear torpedo. Had it not been for the accidental presence of a single courageous human being, a nuclear conflagration could have occurred causing fatalities on a vast scale.

Fallacy #3: Ignoring modern violence

John Gray writes in the Guardian:

Then again, the idea that violence is declining in the most highly developed countries is questionable. Judged by accepted standards, the United States is the most advanced society in the world. According to many estimates the US also has the highest rate of incarceration, some way ahead of China and Russia, for example. Around a quarter of all the world’s prisoners are held in American jails, many for exceptionally long periods. Black people are disproportionately represented, many prisoners are mentally ill and growing numbers are aged and infirm. Imprisonment in America involves continuous risk of assault by other prisoners. There is the threat of long periods spent in solitary confinement, sometimes (as in “supermax” facilities, where something like Bentham’s Panopticon has been constructed) for indefinite periods – a type of treatment that has been reasonably classified as torture. Cruel and unusual punishments involving flogging and mutilation may have been abolished in many countries, but, along with unprecedented levels of mass incarceration, the practice of torture seems to be integral to the functioning of the world’s most advanced state

There is something repellently absurd in the notion that war is a vice of “backward” peoples. Destroying some of the most refined civilizations that have ever existed, the wars that ravaged south-east Asia in the second world war and the decades that followed were the work of colonial powers. One of the causes of the genocide in Rwanda was the segregation of the population by German and Belgian imperialism. Unending war in the Congo has been fueled by western demand for the country’s natural resources. If violence has dwindled in advanced societies, one reason may be that they have exported it.

It may not be an accident that torture is often deployed in the special operations that have replaced more traditional types of warfare. The extension of counter-terrorism to include assassination by unaccountable mercenaries and remote-controlled killing by drones is part of this shift. A metamorphosis in the nature is war is under way, which is global in reach. With the state of Iraq in ruins as a result of US-led regime change, a third of the country is controlled by Isis, which is able to inflict genocidal attacks on Yazidis and wage a campaign of terror on Christians with near-impunity. In Nigeria, the Islamist militias of Boko Haram practise a type of warfare featuring mass killing of civilians, razing of towns and villages and sexual enslavement of women and children. In Europe, targeted killing of journalists, artists and Jews in Paris and Copenhagen embodies a type of warfare that refuses to recognise any distinction between combatants and civilians. Whether they accept the fact or not, advanced societies have become terrains of violent conflict. Rather than war declining, the difference between peace and war has been fatally blurred.

Deaths on the battlefield have fallen and may continue to fall. From one angle this can be seen as an advancing condition of peace. From another point of view that looks at the variety and intensity with which violence is being employed, the Long Peace can be described as a condition of perpetual conflict.

Fallacy 4: It has been less violent for a while, therefore it always will be

I am tired of the arguments that just because something hasn’t happened yet or for a while, such as limits to growth, or peak oil, it will never happen. Pinker makes this argument about violence, that nation’s (especially democracies) have had less violence for many decades, human society has evolved to the point that there will be less violence in the future than in the past.

Fallacy 5: ignoring the role fossil fuels and other abundant resources played in reducing violence temporarily

What if the reason there’s been less violence is that fossil fuels allowed humans to be the most wealthy at any point in the history of the planet, both past and future?  Each of us in the U.S. has hundreds of energy slaves working for us.  Even the poorest of the poor in the most remote highlands of Peru have energy slaves — trucks that take them and their goods to the nearest market.

The Haber-Bosch process of making fertilizer from natural gas or coal allowed the human population to grow by at least 4 billion people, and oil another 2.5 billion.  Fossil fuels make all resources available. There is no aquifer too deep for oil to pump up, no school of fish too distant to find, and no problem to make as much concrete, steel, aluminum, plastic, and trucks, ships, and other goods as you desire.

But oil masks the destruction of all our other resources. Industrial farming has eroded so much topsoil that when natural gas and/or oil run scarce, we will no longer be able to grow enough food to feed 7.5 billion people, and all the other thousands of actions made possible by oil, coal, and natural gas that allowed population to rise from 1 to 7 billion people. And then you have centuries to millenia of climate change as the coup de grace.

Fallacy 6: thinking that people will continue to behave well when times get hard after Peak Oil shrinks all resources

Look at America now, at a time when there is enough food for everyone, and health care for most.  Yet Donald Trump is the main Republican candidate, reminiscent of the Nazis in wanting to keep track of every Muslim and in other hate talk (not to mention Rush Limbaugh, Ann Coulter, and so on).

Does Pinker seriously think that on the downslope of oil decline, also known as Hubbert’s curve, when up to 6.5 billion people will die, that there will be no violence?  Does he believe that people will quietly starve to death? And that gangs won’t invade homes for food and other goods, that nation’s won’t attack one another for the remaining oil, agricultural land to feed their people, and other natural resources? What planet does he live on?

Fallacy 7: Cherry-picking data to suit his thesis that modern violence has gone down

John Gray writes:

If great powers have avoided direct armed conflict, they have fought one another in many proxy wars. Neocolonial warfare in south-east Asia, the Korean war and the Chinese invasion of Tibet, British counter-insurgency warfare in Malaya and Kenya, the abortive Franco-British invasion of Suez, the Angolan civil war, the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the Vietnam war, the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf war, covert intervention in the Balkans and the Caucasus, the invasion of Iraq, the use of airpower in Libya, military aid to insurgents in Syria, Russian cyber-attacks in the Baltic states and the proxy war between the US and Russia that is being waged in Ukraine – these are only some of the contexts in which great powers have been involved in continuous warfare against each other while avoiding direct military conflict.

While it is true that war has changed, it has not become less destructive. Rather than a contest between well-organised states that can at some point negotiate peace, it is now more often a many-sided conflict in fractured or collapsed states that no one has the power to end. The protagonists are armed irregulars, some of them killing and being killed for the sake of an idea or faith, others from fear or a desire for revenge and yet others from the world’s swelling armies of mercenaries, who fight for profit. For all of them, attacks on civilian populations have become normal. The ferocious conflict in Syria, in which methodical starvation and the systematic destruction of urban environments are deployed as strategies, is an example of this type of warfare. Advertisement

It may be true that the modern state’s monopoly of force has led, in some contexts, to declining rates of violent death. But it is also true that the power of the modern state has been used for purposes of mass killing, and one should not pass too quickly over victims of state terror. With increasing historical knowledge it has become clear that the “Holocaust-by-bullets” – the mass shootings of Jews, mostly in the Soviet Union, during the second world war – was perpetrated on an even larger scale than previously realised. Soviet agricultural collectivisation incurred millions of foreseeable deaths, mainly as a result of starvation, with deportation to uninhabitable regions, life-threatening conditions in the Gulag and military-style operations against recalcitrant villages also playing an important role. Peacetime deaths due to internal repression under the Mao regime have been estimated to be around 70 million. Along with fatalities caused by state terror were unnumbered millions whose lives were irreparably broken and shortened. How these casualties fit into the scheme of declining violence is unclear. Pinker goes so far as to suggest that the 20th-century Hemoclysm might have been a gigantic statistical fluke, and cautions that any history of the last century that represents it as having been especially violent may be “apt to exaggerate the narrative coherence of this history” (the italics are Pinker’s). However, there is an equal or greater risk in abandoning a coherent and truthful narrative of the violence of the last century for the sake of a spurious quantitative precision.

There are many kinds of lethal force that do not produce immediate death. Are those who die of hunger or disease during war or its aftermath counted among the casualties? Do refugees whose lives are cut short appear in the count? Where torture is used in war, will its victims figure in the calculus if they succumb years later from the physical and mental damage that has been inflicted on them? Do infants who are born to brief and painful lives as a result of exposure to Agent Orange or depleted uranium find a place in the roll call of the dead? If women who have been raped as part of a military strategy of sexual violence die before their time, will their passing feature in the statistical tables?

While the seeming exactitude of statistics may be compelling, much of the human cost of war is incalculable. Deaths by violence are not all equal. It is terrible to die as a conscript in the trenches or a civilian in an aerial bombing campaign, but to perish from overwork, beating or cold in a labour camp can be a greater evil. It is worse still to be killed as part of a systematic campaign of extermination as happened to those who were consigned to death camps such as Treblinka. Disregarding these distinctions, the statistics presented by those who celebrate the arrival of the Long Peace are morally dubious if not meaningless.

Herman & Peterson write:

How does Pinker get around the seemingly large numbers of wars and militarization process that bother so many ordinary people and specialist observers such as Chalmers Johnson, Andrew Bacevich, and Winslow Wheeler? One Pinker method is to confine his focus to post-1945 wars among the great democracies, which have not fought one another in this sixty-seven-year interim, and to ignore or downplay the numerous wars that the great democracies have fought in the Third World. He calls this the “Long Peace,” while the other wars have no name. Pinker contends not only that the “democracies avoid disputes with each other,” but that they “tend to stay out of disputes across the board,” an idea he refers to as the “Democratic Peace.” This will surely come as a surprise to the many victims of US assassinations, sanctions, subversions, bombings, and invasions since 1945. For Pinker, no attack on a lesser power by one or more of the great democracies counts as a real war or confutes the “Democratic Peace,” no matter how many people die.

“Among respectable countries,” Pinker writes, “conquest is no longer a thinkable option. A politician in a democracy today who suggested conquering another country would be met not with counterarguments but with puzzlement, embarrassment, or laughter.” This is an extremely silly assertion. Presumably, when George W. Bush and Tony Blair sent US and British forces to attack Iraq in 2003, ousted its government, and replaced it with a regime operating under laws drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority, this did not count as “conquest,” as these leaders never stated that they launched the war to “conquer” Iraq, but rather “to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger,” in Bush’s words. What conqueror has ever pronounced a goal other than self-defense and the protection of life and limb? It is on the basis of devices such as this that Pinker’s “Long Peace,” “New Peace,” and “Democratic Peace” rest.

It also rests on a patriotic rewriting of history and use of sources that will support this rewriting. A dramatic example is his treatment of the US-backed war in Vietnam. Pinker makes that war a case in which enemy fanaticism and the “life-is-cheap” mentality of the Vietnamese were responsible for the heavy casualties. He tells us that “the three deadliest postwar conflicts were fueled by Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese communist regimes that had a fanatical dedication to outlasting their opponents.” It was thus the Vietnamese resistance and willingness to absorb the large casualties inflicted on them by the US invaders that fueled the war. There is not a word of criticism of the invaders who sent large forces across the Pacific Ocean to ravage a distant land; certainly no suggestion of “fanaticism,” no mention of the UN Charter, no word like “aggression” is applied to this attack. And there is no mention anywhere in the book that the United States had supported the French effort at recolonization, then supported a dictatorship of its own choosing; and that US officials recognized that those fanatical resisters had majority support as they killed vast numbers of Vietnamese to keep in power the minority government the United States had imposed. Claiming eight hundred thousand or more “civilian battle deaths” in the war, Pinker never explains how vast numbers of civilians could be killed in “battle” or whether these deaths might possibly represent a gross violation of the laws of war. Or how this could happen in an era of rising morality and humanistic feelings, carried out so ruthlessly by the dominant “civilized” power.

Nowhere does Pinker mention the massive US use of chemical warfare in Vietnam (1961–70), and the estimated “three million Vietnamese, including 500,000 children, . . . suffering from the effects of toxic chemicals” used during this ugly and very un-angelic form of warfare.2 What makes this suppression especially interesting is that Pinker cites the outlawing and non-use of chemical and biological weapons as evidence of the new evolving higher morality and decline of violence, so his dodging of the facts on the massive use of such weapons in Operation Ranch Hand and other US programs in Vietnam is remarkably dishonest.

Pinker’s Vietnam analysis relies heavily on Rudolf Rummel as a source for what Rummel calls “democide,” or the “intentional government killing of an unarmed person or people.” Rummel, a far-right analyst who believes that Barack Obama is an antiwar activist attempting a coup d’état in the United States, estimates that while the “communist” North deliberately killed 1.6 million of their fellow Vietnamese civilians, the United States deliberately killed only 5,500 Vietnamese civilians—or one-three-hundredth as many as were allegedly murdered by the “communists.” Rummel matches this kind of extreme apologetics for US violence in other areas as well, but for Pinker he is a preferred source.

In dealing with the US treatment of Iraq (1990–2010), Pinker’s bias is equally impressive. He ignores the “sanctions of mass destruction” imposed between 1990 and 2003, which according to John and Karl Mueller resulted in more deaths than “all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history.” Although Pinker cites John Mueller often in Better Angels, he never cites his (and Karl’s) 1999 article on this subject in Foreign Affairs or mentions this “violence” landmark. Pinker minimizes the US role in the Iraq invasion and occupation that began in March 2003 by distinguishing the invasion violence from the follow-up violence, allegedly strictly internal. He says that the initial stage of the war was “quick” and “low in battle deaths,” and the major deaths occurred during the “intercommunal violence in the anarchy that followed.” This ignores how all the violence flowed from the invasion/occupation, and the US involvement in that “intercommunal” violence never stopped.

Pinker’s analysis and use of sources on war-based deaths in Iraq is also compromised. The study of Iraqi casualties by the Johns Hopkins researchers published in the British medical journal the Lancet reported that 655,000 Iraqis had died during the roughly forty-month period from the March 20, 2003, invasion through July 2006, with some 601,000 of these deaths due to violence. This is unacceptable to Pinker, who prefers the much lower estimate of Iraq Body Count, which relies largely on news media reports of deaths, while the Johns Hopkins team used a standard retrospective survey method. Pinker objects to the “Main Street bias” of the Johns Hopkins sample, but he raises no questions about Rummel’s bizarre conclusions or the systematic low-ball estimates of “battle deaths” by an array of government- and foundation-supported organizations devoted to showing that modern wars have become more and more civilian-friendly since 1945. Elsewhere in Better Angels, Pinker reverses course and reports that there were “373,000 deaths from 2003 to 2008” in the Darfur states of the western Sudan, accepting a body count produced via the same retrospective survey method used by the Johns Hopkins teams for Iraq. This is the preferential method of research in action.

Fallacy 7: exaggerating violence in the distant past

This was written by Hugo at amazon.com:

Pinker’s records don’t reflect “man in a state of nature” at all. Instead of being a pacifier force, at first, the encroaching state wreaks havoc in the native population. Tribal groups have been affected by expanding states for at least 5,000 years, not only by Europeans but also by the Mayans, Aztecs, Toltecs, Chimu and Inca peoples in America; Ancient Egypt in North Africa and the Near East, and many more. There is convincing evidence that Ancient Egyptian imperialism affected local patterns of warfare (see “The Prehistory of Warfare in Europe and the Near East” by R. Brian Ferguson, from the book ”War, Peace and Human Nature”) but no assessment has been done about the impact of other civilisations on the patterns of warfare in nearby tribal peoples. Worse, Pinker’s data about deaths in warfare was taken during the 20th century, when almost all indigenous groups were being robbed of their lands and being victims of genocide: “Dispossetion often forced enemy groups into intense competition for greatly reduced resources and the availability of firearms made the resulting conflicts far more destructive than previous conflicts. These increased conflicts combined with other new disturbances in economic and social patterns often placed new stresses on tribal societies and weakened them often to the point that they willingly accepted outside control and welfare” (book “Victims of Progress”). So, instead of ‘pacifying’ the peoples, at first, the colonial powers robbed them of much of their land making them fight for increasingly scarce resources only to impose their iron fist when the damage was done. It is estimated that from 1780 to 1930, the world’s tribal populations were reduced by 30 to 50 million, not only by direct killing but also by disease, suicide, and lack of will to have children. In Australia, the aboriginal population was reduced from 500,000 to an all-time low of 65,000. Indeed, for the Ache and Hiwi peoples, the 1st and 3rd with the highest rates of warfare deaths, all the so-called war deaths involved frontiersmen killing the indigenous peoples. To say that this table represents the level of war deaths that existed prior to the Agricultural Revolution is not just preposterous: it is ridiculous. Jonathan Haas and Matthew Pisticelli summarize this perfectly:
“(…) in turning to the historic ethnographic record to support their claims of the ubiquity of warfare in the prehistoric past, [they] fail to consider how hunters and gatherers of the ‘ethnographic present’ may be profoundly different from hunters and gatherers of the more distant archaeological past. How many of these societies were surrounded and circumscribed by existing states; pushed by the rippling effects of other refugees; armed by traders; provoked, directly or indirectly, by missionaries; cut off from traditional lands? The short answer to this is that all of them, by the very fact of having been described and published by anthropologists, have been irrevocably impacted by historic and modern colonial nation states” (p. 173-174 of the chapter “The Prehistory of Warfare: Misled by Ethnography” part of the book “War, Peace and Human Nature”).

Fallacy #8: Confirmation Bias

Epstein (2011) argues in Scientific American that “There is, however, another psychological process—confirmation bias—that Pinker sometimes succumbs to in his book. People pay more attention to facts that match their beliefs than those that undermine them. Pinker wants peace, and he also believes in his hypothesis; it is no surprise that he focuses more on facts that support his views than on those that do not. The SIPRI arms data are problematic, and a reader can also cherry-pick facts from Pinker’s own book that are inconsistent with his position. He notes, for example, that during the 20th century homicide rates failed to decline in both the U.S. and England. He also describes in graphic and disturbing detail the savage way in which chimpanzees—our closest genetic relatives in the animal world—torture and kill their own kind. Of greater concern is the assumption on which Pinker’s entire case rests: that we look at relative numbers instead of absolute numbers in assessing human violence. But why should we be content with only a relative decrease? By this logic, when we reach a world population of nine billion in 2050, Pinker will conceivably be satisfied if a mere two million people are killed in war that year.”

Fallacy #9: making excuses for modern violence

Pinker wrote: “There is no indication that anyone but Hitler and a few fanatical henchmen thought it was a good idea for the Jews to be exterminated.” Recent research has found 42,500 institutions set up to perpetrate the Holocaust.

According to Goldhagen (1998) and also Geoffrey Megargee, “Many more people knew about it and took part in it … it was central to the entire Nazi system … many other countries had their own camp systems.”

Fallacy #10: Only counting battlefield deaths and ignoring the dramatically increasing numbers of civilians killed:

John Arquilla writes in Foreign Policy:

The problem with the conclusions reached in the studies Pinker cites is their reliance on “battle death” statistics. The pattern of the past century — one recurring in history — is that the deaths of noncombatants due to war has risen, steadily and very dramatically. In World War I, perhaps only 10 percent of the 10 million-plus who died were civilians. The number of noncombatant deaths jumped to as much as 50 percent of the 50 million-plus lives lost in World War II, and the sad toll has kept on rising ever since. Perhaps the worst, but hardly the only, terrible example of this trend can be seen in the Congo war — flaring up again right now — in which over 90 percent of the several million dead were noncombatants. As to Pinker’s battle-death ratios, they are somewhat skewed by the fact that overall populations have exploded since 1940; so even a very deadly war can be masked by a “per 100,000 of population” stat.

Fallacy #11: Exaggeration and misrepresentation of past violence 

Stephen Corry (2013) writes: “As proof of Middle Age depravity, Pinker cites a 1480 manuscript, which he calls “a depiction of daily life.” He reproduces drawings of people behaving grossly, entitled Saturn and Mars, but omits to tell us that they are intended to show the effects engendered by those planets, not “daily life” at all. Plenty of other drawings in the book show people going about their lives perfectly politely (busily undermining his theory).

This, of course, is the time of the extraordinarily original European cathedrals, of Thomas Aquinas, whose work has been called the philosophical foundation from which science originates, the age when Renaissance ideas started to be forged, when Francis of Assisi and Hildegard of Bingen promulgated revolutionary notions about humanity.

Fallacy #11: Ignoring inconvenient truths that don’t square with his “childish simplicity way of thinking”

Gray (2015) writes: “You would never know, from reading Pinker, that Nazi “scientific racism” was based in theories whose intellectual pedigree goes back to Enlightenment thinkers such as the prominent Victorian psychologist and eugenicist Francis Galton. Such links between Enlightenment thinking and 20th-century barbarism are, for Pinker, merely aberrations, distortions of a pristine teaching that is innocent of any crime: the atrocities that have been carried out in its name come from misinterpreting the true gospel, or its corruption by alien influences. The childish simplicity of this way of thinking is reminiscent of Christians who ask how a religion of love could possibly be involved in the Inquisition. In each case it is pointless to argue the point, since what is at stake is an article of faith.”

References

Arquilla, John. December 3, 2012. Rational Security The Big Kill. Sorry, Steven Pinker, the world isn’t getting less violent. Foreign Policy.
Corry, S. June 11, 2013. Why Steven Pinker, Like Jared Diamond, Is Wrong.  Truthout.

Epstein, R. October 7, 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined Rates of violent deaths have declined. But psychologist Robert Epstein argues in this review that it is too early to praise human nature’s “better angels.” Scientific American.

Goldhagen, D. J. 1997. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans & the Holocaust. Vintage.

Gray, J. March 13, 2015. Steven Pinker is wrong about violence and war. The Guardian.

Herman, E.S.; Peterson, D. 2013. Steven Pinker on the alleged decline of violence. ISR #86.

 

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New Alaskan strip coal mine for China, there go the salmon

McGrath, M. 2015-11-25. The Alaska fishing village taking on ‘Godzilla’. BBC News

Cook inletImage copyright Pete Niesen

[See original article for details, what follows is reduced and most pictures removed]

Alaska is a vast wilderness of natural beauty. But it also holds more coal than all the other US states put together. As world leaders prepare to gather for a major climate change summit, plans to build an open coal mine that would cover 78 sq km (30 sq miles) surrounding a valued Alaskan river could be coming to a head.

Al Goozmer is about to take on Godzilla. One more time. We are standing on the sandy edge of the Chuitna River, and Al, the president of the Tyonek Native Village, is holding some small lumps of coal in his hand. This is the coal that the indigenous people in his small settlement have collected and used for generations as a fuel source, the coal that emerges on the beach from under the river, part of a huge mother lode that stretches about a dozen miles inland.

Godzilla is what Al calls the proposed development of an open cast, strip coal mine at that site, that would encompass over 5,000 acres. It would be the largest in Alaska. The ore would then travel along a permanent 18km transporting chute, over the river, out to waiting ships in the Cook Inlet.

Destination? Power stations in China.

Al and many in his community think the development will be a disaster for his village and their way of life. “I call it my cathedral, an open-air cathedral, I come here to meditate and pray,” Al says as we survey the beach littered with tree trunks and other river-borne natural debris.

Tyonek is a gated indigenous community of around 200 people by the edge of the sea, just 64km  across the Cook Inlet from Anchorage. In Tyonek there are no open roadways – you have to fly in or come by boat when the sea is calm. You also have to be invited. Tribal regulations permit visitors if someone vouches for them, and they stay less than 24 hours.

Map

The villagers are called the Tebughna – the Beach People. They speak an Athabascan dialect called Dena’ina and can trace their origins in the area back 1,000 years. Their first recorded encounter with Europeans came when tribe members met Captain James Cook in 1778.

Then as now, many natives of Tyonek subsist by hunting and fishing, with salmon from the rivers being a significant part of their diet.

Sitting in the tribal center building, surrounded by black-and-white pictures of the village down the years, Frank recalls how commercial fishing, oil and timber industries have all come to Tyonek to exploit natural resources.

It has always ended badly, he says. I personally have experience with timber and lumber. They came here in the 1970s and promised us jobs. We ended up being labourers, then they fired us.”

Al Goozmer believes it will be the same if the coal project goes ahead. “Those industries left our shores with their pockets full of money and left behind shattered lives and broken promises. Now we see coal as the Godzilla of development here on the west Cook Inlet.”

The Chuitna River is not the only place in Alaska that has considerable resources of coal. Alaska is said to have more reserves than the lower 48 states put together.

The US Geological Survey estimates there are more than 4 trillion metric tonnes of coal as a total resource in the state, though how much of this is recoverable is open to question.

Certainly the low sulfur, sub-bituminous coal that is in the Chuitna basin is attractive for export. It contains less carbon and mercury than other types of coal.

PacRim Coal didn’t respond to requests for an interview, but according to their website, the company expects to produce around 12 million tonnes of coal per year, making it more productive than the biggest mine in Russia.

Al Goozmer says they will discharge seven million gallons of waste water into the Chuitna River every day. He fears the toxic elements will disorient the salmon returning to spawn. When the salmon go, a vital source of protein and a key part of the village culture could be lost.

“We’ve been teaching our kids how to fish their whole lives,” says Gwen Chickalusion who is a cook at the school and looks after the bountiful community garden.

“If we don’t have the fish, the only option will be to go to Anchorage and go shopping – we can’t just jump in our trucks and go down the road. They say they could reclaim it and make it just like before, but how many years will it take? How many years will I go hungry for moose or fish, if they ever return again?”

Back on Tyonek, another small aircraft trundles to a halt on the shingle runway in the cold, spitting rain. As we watch, Al tells me he worries that if coal exports to China go ahead, they will rebound badly on Alaska.

“Alaska is the most sensitive area in the world for climate change and we see that every day. The river is named after my grandfather. One of my uncles was a historian and lay preacher here. He taught me all the old stories of who we are and what we are. I don’t believe that coal is a vital source of power for the world or anyone,” he says. “It’s good right where it is at. Leave it there.”

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What if cash were made illegal so your money could be used to bail out too-big-to-fail banks after the next crash?

 

Ellen Brown. November 23, 2015. Hang Onto Your Wallets: Negative Interest, the War on Cash and the $10 Trillion Bail-InThe Web of Debt Blog (Excerpts)

By quietly eliminating the possibility of cash withdrawals, banks can make sure the deposits are there to be grabbed when disaster strikes.

Economist Martin Armstrong goes further and suggests that the goal is to gain totalitarian control over our money. In a cashless society, our savings can be taxed away by the banks; the threat of bank runs by worried savers can be eliminated; and the too-big-to-fail banks can be assured that ample deposits will be there when they need to confiscate them through bail-ins to stay afloat.

And that may be the real threat on the horizon: a major derivatives default that hits the largest banks, those that do the vast majority of derivatives trading. On November 10, 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported the results of a study requested by Senator Elizabeth Warren and Rep. Elijah Cummings, involving the cost to taxpayers of the rollback of the Dodd-Frank Act in the “cromnibus” spending bill last December. As Jessica Desvarieux put it on the Real News Network, “the rule reversal allows banks to keep $10 trillion in swaps trades on their books, which taxpayers could be on the hook for if the banks need another bailout.”

The promise of Dodd-Frank, however, was that there would be “no more taxpayer bailouts.” Instead, insolvent systemically-risky banks were supposed to “bail in” (confiscate) the money of their creditors, including their depositors (the largest class of creditor of any bank). That could explain the push to go cashless. By quietly eliminating the possibility of cash withdrawals, the central bank can

It is already happening

Four European central banks – the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, Sweden’s Riksbank, and Denmark’s Nationalbank – have now imposed negative interest rates on the reserves they hold for commercial banks; and discussion has turned to whether it’s time to pass those costs on to consumers. The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve are still at ZIRP (Zero Interest Rate Policy), but several Fed officials have also begun calling for NIRP (negative rates).

The stated justification for this move is to stimulate “demand” by forcing consumers to withdraw their money and go shopping with it. When an economy is struggling, it is standard practice for a central bank to cut interest rates, making saving less attractive. This is supposed to boost spending and kick-start an economic recovery.

The scheme to impose negative interest and eliminate cash seems so unlikely to stimulate the economy that one wonders if that is the real motive. Stopping tax evaders and terrorists (real or presumed) are other proposed justifications for going cashless.

That is the theory, but central banks have already pushed the prime rate to zero, and still their economies are languishing. To the uninitiated observer, that means the theory is wrong and needs to be scrapped. But not to our intrepid central bankers, who are now experimenting with pushing rates below zero.

Locking the Door to Bank Runs: The Cashless Society

The problem with imposing negative interest on savers, as explained in the UK Telegraph, is that “there’s a limit, what economists called the ‘zero lower bound’. Cut rates too deeply, and savers would end up facing negative returns. In that case, this could encourage people to take their savings out of the bank and hoard them in cash. This could slow, rather than boost, the economy.”

Again, to the ordinary observer, this would seem to signal that negative interest rates won’t work and the approach needs to be abandoned. But not to our undaunted central bankers, who have chosen instead to plug this hole in their leaky theory by moving to eliminate cash as an option. If your only choice is to keep your money in a digital account in a bank and spend it with a bank card or credit card or checks, negative interest can be imposed with impunity. This is already happening in Sweden, and other countries are close behind. As reported on Wolfstreet.com:

The War on Cash is advancing on all fronts. One region that has hogged the headlines with its war against physical currency is Scandinavia. Sweden became the first country to enlist its own citizens as largely willing guinea pigs in a dystopian economic experiment: negative interest rates in a cashless society. As Credit Suisse reports, no matter where you go or what you want to purchase, you will find a small ubiquitous sign saying “Vi hanterar ej kontanter” (“We don’t accept cash”) . . . .

Today’s central bankers are proposing to tax existing money, diminishing spending power without first building it up. And the interest will go to private bankers, not to the local government.

Consumers today already have very little discretionary money. Imposing negative interest without first adding new money into the economy means they will have even less money to spend. This would be more likely to prompt them to save their scarce funds than to go on a shopping spree.

People are not keeping their money in the bank today for the interest (which is already nearly non-existent). It is for the convenience of writing checks, issuing bank cards, and storing their money in a “safe” place. They would no doubt be willing to pay a modest negative interest for that convenience; but if the fee got too high, they might pull their money out and save it elsewhere. The fee itself, however, would not drive them to buy things they did not otherwise need.

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Peak Aquifers: Very little Ground water is renewable, perhaps only 1.5%

Gleeson, Tom, et al. November 2015. The global volume and distribution of modern groundwater. Nature Geoscience.

The water in aquifers and wells billions of people depend upon is mostly a non-renewable resource that could run out.

Underground water is renewed very slowly. Only 5.8% is replenished within a human lifespan of 50 years, and is further reduced by climate change when this causes less rainfall.

The actual number may be closer to 1.5%, because 5.8% is likely to be an overestimate due to the types of rock in the areas where most of the measurements were taken.

In California and the Midwest (Ogallala aquifer), people are already using “non-renewable” water thousands of years old, water that produces about a third of America’s food.

Egypt is tapping into water last renewed a million years ago. Such old water isn’t just non-renewable — it’s usually saltier and more contaminated than younger groundwater.

In addition, overusing groundwater, either old or young, can lower subsurface water levels and dry up streams, which could have a huge effect on ecosystems on the surface

This water is near enough to the surface to be contaminated by pollution or evaporated by high temperatures

While many people may think groundwater is replenished by rain and melting snow the way lakes and rivers are, underground water is actually renewed much more slowly.

Over a third of the world’s population depends on groundwater for drinking, agriculture, and commercially.

Also see Emily Chung, Nov 16, 2015, Groundwater is mostly non-renewable, CBC News

Konikow, L.F., 2013, Groundwater depletion in the United States (1900-2008): U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2013-5079

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Geopolitics of Oil. United States Senate Hearing 110-6

Senate 110-6. January 10, 2007. Geopolitics of Oil. United States Senate Hearing. 90 pages.

Excerpts:

Senator Jeff Bingaman (New Mexico). The idea of this hearing is to try to look at the big picture, to begin the year with an overview of the geopolitics of oil. There is a quote that my staff dug out of the files of the committee, from Scoop Jackson, when he chaired this committee back in 1980, and he said, at that time, ‘‘The world will witness a growing struggle for secure access to oil through the end of this century and into the next. This gathering energy crisis deserves the highest priority in the counsels of Government. Few other problems are more complicated, few other problems will be more difficult to resolve. Moreover, many of the policies we are currently pursuing to deal with the energy crisis are only making it worse.’’ Today, we still have the struggle for access to oil. We also, of course, have a competition among consumers that has developed, particularly with the increasing appetite for oil in places like China and India. There are great implications for the United States in all of that, both for our economy and for our national security.

GENERAL CHARLES WALD, U.S. AIR FORCE [RETIRED]

Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command, & member of the Energy Security Leadership Council

I recently retired from the Air Force after 35 years of service and during my career had the opportunity to fly combat over Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq and Bosnia and learned much regarding how to use military assets to effectively solve national security problems.

But I also learned that many believed the U.S. military is solely responsible for security. I like to call this the ‘‘Dial 1-800-The-U.S.- Military’’ syndrome, because it reflects how people assume the U.S. military is a “toll-free” resource that can be called on to perform tasks that no one else has either the capability or will to execute.

I recall a recent meeting with several major global oil company executives in Kazakhstan. Before we began our discussion, one of the executives thanked me and the U.S. military for protecting the free flow of oil around the world. The executive’s world view included the expectation that the U.S. military will be there to provide worldwide security and to ensure the free flow of oil without any assistance from others. This struck me, and frankly, does not seem like a good model, particularly for the United States. The U.S. cannot and should not be everywhere to protect all the vulnerable components of the global oil infrastructure. The global economy relies on a massive oil infrastructure that stretches far beyond the Persian Gulf to pipelines in the Caucasus and offshore drilling rigs in the Gulf of Guinea. Surveying this situation, I realized that the U.S. military could not protect this vast infrastructure without partners. And, trust me, there should be partners out there, because the free flow of oil is in the best interest of many people all over the world.

With regard to the oil dependence issue, military response and capabilities are by no means the only effective tools available and in many cases are not appropriate. In fact, the single most effective step the United States can take to improve its energy security is to increase transportation efficiency. The transportation sector is responsible for nearly 70 percent of the oil the United States consumes. Within the transportation sector, oil—nearly 13 million barrels per day of it—accounts for 97% of delivered energy. More than 8 mb/d are used to fuel the over 220 million light-duty vehicles that Americans rely on for mobility.

CAFE standards legislated in 1973 during the Arab oil embargo were instrumental in helping America lower oil usage by the 1980’s, but there has been little progress since the original mileage targets were met. As a consequence, America’s light-duty vehicle fleet now has the worst average fuel efficiency in the developed world.

Some may be surprised to hear from a former General talk about fuel efficiency standards but they shouldn’t be. In the military, we learned that forced protection isn’t only about protecting weak spots, it’s also about reducing vulnerabilities before you go into harm’s way. That’s why lowering the Nation’s demand for oil is so critical.

Nearly all of our U.S. military commands have some oil security tasks and in essence they provide a blanket of security that benefits all nations. Central Command guards access to the oil supplies in the Middle East; Southern Command defends Colombia’s Cano Limon pipeline; Pacific Command patrols the tanker routes in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Western Pacific; and my last assignment, as deputy commander of European Command, which included, by the way, most of Africa. We patrolled the Mediterranean, provided security in the Caspian Sea and off the West Coast of Africa.

During that assignment, I became more appreciative of the size and scope of the oil security challenge. While surveying that challenge, it became apparent that the U.S. military could not protect that vast infrastructure without partners—and trust me, there should be partners in this mission. The free flow is clearly in the best interests of people all over the world. These interested parties certainly cannot replicate all the capabilities of the U.S. military, but their contributions can free up military tasks that only the U.S. military can successfully accomplish.

The armed forces of the United States have thus far been successful in fulfilling our energy security mission and they continue to carry out their duties professionally and with great courage. As a result of this success, many have come to believe—and I believe, falsely—that energy security can be achieved solely by military means. We need to change this paradigm because the U.S. military is not the best instrument for confronting all the strategic dangers emanating from oil dependence. The 1973 oil embargo is the most famous example of the use of energy as a political strategic weapon.

THE MILITARY’S HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT IN ENERGY SECURITY

Since 1980, the U.S. Government, through military application, has put about $50 billion to $60 billion a year into the Persian Gulf. That doesn’t count the current Iraq war or the 1990 Iraq war. And that’s good for our country, for security interests, but the problem is, we’re subsidizing world energy. There is nobody else in the world doing this, and really, if you look at how much we’re paying per gallon, me, as a U.S. citizen today, for gasoline, you could almost say it’s $7 a gallon, based on the fact that we’re subsidizing world security on this issue.

The United States protects the global oil trade for the benefit of all nations. In part, this is because the U.S. has unmatched military capabilities. But another reason is that other nations know the U.S. military is out there doing the job.

The implicit strategic and tactical demands of protecting the global trade have been recognized by national security officials for decades, but it took the Carter Doctrine of 1980, proclaimed in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, to formalize this critical military commitment.

The Carter Doctrine committed the U.S. to defending the Persian Gulf against aggression by any ‘‘outside force.’’ President Reagan built on this foundation by creating a military command in the Gulf and ordering the U.S. Navy to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War. The Gulf War of 1991, which saw the United States lead a coalition of nations in ousting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, was an expression of an implicit corollary of the Carter Doctrine: the U.S. would not allow Persian Gulf oil to be dominated by a radical regime—even an ‘inside force’ that posed a dangerous threat to the international order. More recently, the security agenda in the Gulf has expanded beyond state actor aggression to include concerns about terrorist attacks on facilities and supply lines.

THREATS ABOUND

Since issuing his 1996 ‘‘Declaration of War’’ against the U.S. and its partners, Osama bin Ladin has warned of attacks on oil installations in the Persian Gulf. Last year, the world came close to experiencing an oil supply shock when an Al- Qaeda attack on the Abqaiq facility through which approximately 60% of Saudi Arabian oil exports pass was barely foiled. In addition to attacking physical infrastructure, Al Qaeda operatives have also targeted expatriates in their residential areas, in particular in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (October 2002) and in al-Khobar (May 2004).

Iraq is also the scene of persistent insurgent and terrorist attacks on pipelines and pumping stations, especially in the North of the country. These attacks have severely limited Iraqi oil exports to the Mediterranean through Turkey, and they are a major reason why Iraqi oil production has stubbornly remained below its prewar peak. The lost output has cost Iraq billions of dollars at a time when it needs every dollar and while U.S. taxpayers have spent billions on the reconstruction of the country. But if violence continues, and especially if it spreads to the south, where most of the oil and export facilities are located, then all of Iraq’s oil production could be at risk. The implications of this supply cut would be severe.

The danger of attacks on shipping is proven—in October 2002, the French supertanker Limburg was rammed by a small boat packed with explosives off the coast of Yemen. Most oil shipments have to pass through a handful of maritime chokepoints. Roughly 80% of Middle East oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz (17 mb/d), Bab el Mandeb (3 mb/d), or the Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline (3.8 mb/d). Another 11.7 mb/d pass through the Straight of Malacca and 3.1 mb/d through the Turkish Straits. All of these passageways are vulnerable to accidents, piracy, and terrorism. Since alternative routes are lacking, the effect of a major blockage at one of these points could be devastating. Even unsuccessful attacks on tankers are likely to raise insurance rates and thus oil prices.

MILITARY POWER HAS LIMITS

The armed forces of the United States have been extraordinarily successful in fulfilling their energy security missions, and they continue to carry out their duties with great professionalism and courage. But, ironically, this very success may have weakened the nation’s strategic posture by allowing America’s political leaders and the American public to believe that energy security can be achieved by military means alone. We need to change the paradigm, because the U.S. military is not the best instrument for confronting all of the strategic dangers emanating from oil dependence. This is particularly true when oil is used a political weapon.

The 1973 Arab embargo is still the most famous example of the use of energy as a political strategic weapon. But in recent years, it has been Russia that has shown the most willingness to play this dangerous game, as at the beginning of 2006, when it stopped natural gas exports to the Ukraine, which in turn withheld the natural gas destined for Western Europe. The danger of conflict with a nuclear power like Russia should make it abundantly clear that there are limits on how we can use military power to guarantee energy flows. But we can take political steps to counter Russia’s brandishing oil and natural gas as political weapons. Russia wants to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a full member. Russia’s entry into this organization must be made contingent on its behavior. Russia must make a commitment to fostering energy security; there should be no reward for sowing insecurity.

Of course, energy exporting governments don’t need to resort to full-fledged embargoes to hurt the U.S. and other importers. Exporters can manipulate price through less drastic production cuts. Tellingly, after oil prices dropped from their 2006 peak of $78 to about $60 in the U.S. market, OPEC members began to cut back on production. Governments in oil-producing countries can also constrain future supply through investment decisions that lead to long-term stagnant or glowing growth in production and exports, or even decline. Often enough, future supply destruction is the unintended or accepted consequence of an insistence on government control of natural resources. Currently, an estimated 80-90% of global oil reserves are controlled by national oil companies (NOCs), which are highly susceptible to being constrained by political objectives, even if these undermine long-term supply growth.

State-controlled production is frequently inefficient, relying on outdated technology and reserve management techniques. Russia, whose government has made it abundantly clear that it wants to maintain near absolute control over its energy resources. This power grab has curtailed foreign investment, and ultimately limited production as well. Russia’s oil industry stands as a testament to the dangers of political meddling in oil production. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian production plummeted to only 6 mb/d in the mid-1990s, but then the efforts of private companies helped push production back to over 9 mb/d, achieving 10% annual growth rates in 2003 and 2004.1 However, with the subsequent expropriations of private enterprises such as Yukos, the production growth curve has flattened. Government control over production in Russia will also adversely impact the massive Shtokman natural gas field and Sakhlain-2 oil projects. President Putin has determined that tight government control of resources is more important than the greater revenue that would accrue from increased production achieved through cooperation with Western oil companies.

In an oil-dependent world facing increasingly tight supplies, the growing power of oil exporting countries and the shift in strategic calculations of other important countries have all added up to lessen U.S. diplomatic leverage.

Iran, which exports to the United States’ European and Asian allies, has threatened the use of the oil weapon to retaliate against efforts to constrain their nuclear program. The European Union relies on Middle Eastern oil, and Russian gas continues to complicate U.S. foreign policy efforts, especially when considering our efforts to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. China, with its rapidly growing dependence on foreign oil also blocks U.S. diplomatic initiatives in an effort to strengthen its own ties with oil exporters.

Given all these factors, it is imperative that the United States make energy security a top strategic priority. Toward that end, we should mobilize and leverage all of our national security resources, including our economic power, our investment markets, our technological products and our unsurpassed military strength. Curtailing demand is the most important security step we can take.

We need a comprehensive national security strategy for energy security. We must be prepared for sudden supply shocks triggered by terrorism or politics. We must promote greater diversity of fuel options while improving the efficiency of our Nation’s fleet.

Senator Pete V. Domenici (New Mexico). I think it is most beneficial that we put into perspective who owns access to the oil in the world today. It is rather frightening when you get just that picture before you …, to know how things have changed dramatically and how little of the oil of the world is owned by the American companies that we are constantly arguing with and how little these oil companies of America have access and/or control over these oils. I have had staff reduce the world’s oil to a chart that shows where we are, and there is no question that private investors are already at a disadvantage. The rise in national oil companies has decreased access to reserves through the use of strategic energy agreements between governments. U.S. companies are being squeezed out. Examples are the Chinese national oil company’s development of an energy production agreement in Sudan and Iran, Russia’s reclaiming of oil producing assets from Yukos to form a state oil company and just yesterday, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez called for the end to foreign ownership of crude oil refineries in the Orinoco region. This activity further limits investment opportunities for investor-owned companies. These trends are doubly concerning, given the many producer nations, political instability, and the lack of a legal system for enforcement of contract rights resulting in only a sufficient capital investment in the infrastructure necessary to sustain existing production, much less new capital on line.

Senator Gordon H. Smith (Oregon): Hurricane Katrina showed how vulnerable the United States is to a domestic supply disruption. It also helped us to understand how geographically concentrated U.S. refining capacity has become. All of these factors should lead us to reexamine our energy security strategy. We cannot reduce our dependence on oil without aggressively addressing the transportation sector. Transportation accounts for 70 percent of our nation’s oil use, and the transportation sector is almost exclusively fueled by oil. CAFE standards for automobiles have been stagnant for more than a decade. In 2002, I joined with Senators Kerry and McCain to sponsor an amendment to the energy bill to increase CAFE standards to 36 miles per gallon by 2015. We were told at the time that this would harm the domestic auto industry and reduce consumer choice.

Senator Bernie Sanders (Vermont). [Note: I’ve included most of his testimony because he is now a candidate for President in 2016]

I am pleased to be a member of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee and look forward to the excellent work that this Committee will be doing to ensure a more sane energy policy for our country. Whether it is requiring an increased commitment to renewable sources of energy in the electricity sector or to ensuring appropriate royalty payments from drilling on our public lands, this Committee has a tremendous responsibility. The geopolitics of oil is a topic that none of us can afford to ignore and while I don’t agree with every idea put forward by today’s witnesses, I thank them for their time to address us this morning. What is most striking to me is that, in the prepared testimony, each of the witnesses discusses the dire need to increase efficiency in our transportation sector. I believe—in no uncertain terms—that our failure to increase mileage standards has let the American people down. As consumers look to make each and every dollar go further, they find that, despite the technology being available, their automobiles get the same, or worse—even lower, gas mileage than they did twenty years ago. Additionally, as we grapple with global warming, I believe we must do everything we can to get the most out of each gallon of fuel because the emissions from our cars are simply off the charts. In fact, in Vermont, vehicle emissions are the single largest source of greenhouse gas emissions. I hope, with the help of the witnesses, that we can begin moving forward by starting with a serious discussion of increasing CAFE standards.

Senator Byron L. Dorgan (North Dakota): Oil is critically important. We will always use fossil fuels, always need oil. We suck about 84 million barrels out of the earth a day. Here, in the United States, with our population, we use 1/4 of all the oil that is sucked out of this earth. We are overly dependent on foreign sources of oil, especially given the national security implications of that dependency, and yet I think we’re baby stepping on these issues.   When we passed the energy bill of 2005, I was proud of it. It moves us down the road, but we need to be much bolder and much, much more aggressive, and I think what we will hear today is about the national security implications of us not doing the right thing and not being bold enough.

Senator Ken Salazar (Colorado): I think that the energy issue, at the end of the day, is one of the very most important issues, perhaps one of the top two issues that face our world today

LINDA G. STUNTZ, on behalf of a Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force

Linda is a partner with Stuntz, Davis and Staffier and has been involved previously with the Department of Energy in a high position and, most recently, was part of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force that worked up a report on the national security consequences of U.S. oil dependency.

It is an honor to be before you today to discuss the report prepared by an independent task force organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, released this past October, entitled, as you described, The National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency. Today, let me highlight four points from this report.

First, you will not find in this report support for the concept of energy independence for this country. As much as I know many of you on both sides of the aisle espouse this, it is, in fact, unrealistic. Barring Draconian measures, the United States will depend on imported oil for a significant fraction of its transportation fuel needs for the next several decades. Moreover, so long as we consume any oil, even if it is produced domestically, we will be affected by what happens in the global oil market, just as corn or other markets of that nature are affected. We cannot wall ourselves off for that market. Our allies are also dependent on this oil.

Second, the constraints on foreign policy caused by energy require greater integration of foreign policy and energy policy. The newspapers this morning and every morning are replete, whether in Asia, Africa, South America or even Europe, with incidents of energy and foreign policy intermingling, yet the task force was unanimous in the view that energy issues have not received sufficient attention in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. Among other things, the task force recommends that an energy directorate be established at the National Security Council, similar to those that exist now, for counter-proliferation defense policy and international economics.

Third, and it was highlighted by Senator Domenici in his opening speech, one of things that I believe has changed since Senator Jackson and I and some of you first began looking at this very difficult challenge of energy security is the increasing role of national oil companies. The reality today is that national oil companies control some 3.4 of the world’s oil reserves, as best we can tell. Exxon ranks #14.

Fourth, in order to address the national security consequences of U.S. oil dependency, we need a comprehensive approach. And this will not be a surprise or news to this committee, but we need it all, we cannot focus on one or the other. We need to increase the efficiency of oil use, primarily in transportation fuels. We need to use alternative fuels. We need to diversify oil supplies, particularly outside the Persian Gulf, which includes in the United States. We need to make oil and gas infrastructure more efficient and secure. And we need to increase the investment in new energy technologies. The task force considered—and had a lively debate on—increasing the gasoline tax, increasing CAFE requirements and a tradable permit program for gasoline allowances. Again, it will probably be no surprise to you that while the task force unanimously believed we needed to do one or several of these things, we did not have an agreement on which one of these should be pursued.

Every 10 days, China is opening a coal plant with the capacity to serve a town the size of Dallas or San Antonio. Most of those coal plants are not controlled even as well as most of the plants in the United States. They don’t even have the base technology that we are putting on right now. A fifth of them are actually characterized as illegal because they haven’t been approved by the Federal Government of China.

ROBERT D. HORMATS, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs (International)

I was economic advisor to Dr. Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council staff in the mid 1970s when this country experienced its first energy crisis after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and participated in his Middle Eastern shuttle diplomacy during the period that followed. At that time, I had high hopes that the Arab oil embargo, the sharp increase in the price of oil, and the longlines at gas stations would produce a bipartisan consensus on energy policy and jolt our nation into a bold and effective effort to reduce oil dependence and future vulnerability.

Let me make just a few points about the situation we face today. First is that we have a history in this country of going through periods of great crisis followed by periods of prolonged complacency and that has caused energy policy to be sort of light switch—on/ off. But when prices fell later in the decade, a sense of complacency set in. Then we were hit by another crisis that caused oil prices to spike at the end of the 1970s; that was triggered by the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Iranian Revolution. Complacency set in once again after that crisis receded and prices fell. Another oil crisis occurred in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, after which the sense of urgency about dramatic alterations in energy policy and use faded again. Decade after decade our dependence on foreign oil has risen. In the mid-1970s, 35% of this nation’s oil consumption was supplied by imports. Now, three decades later, it is 60%.

American dependence on potentially vulnerable oil supplies continues to grow, with little prospect that it will change—despite the fact that we are engaged in a War on Terrorism in which oil imports by the U.S. and other nations provide funds to nations hostile to the U.S. and countries friendly to us. It is often said that ‘‘9/ 11 changed everything!’’ Sadly, in the area of energy policy it hasn’t changed very much. American oil vulnerability continues unabated.

There are several national economic and security consequences of this situation:

  • If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate and other oil producing nations become more involved, the risks increase to oil supplies not only from disruptions in Iraq but also from greater tensions between the Sunni nations on the western side of the Persian Gulf and the Shiites on the eastern side, with oil facilities and shipments becoming increasingly vulnerable. Moreover, added western pressures on Iran over its nuclear program could lead to oil disruptions or threats thereof
  • The American economy remains highly vulnerable to supply disruptions in oil exporting nations; these could result from acts or terrorism, political instability, efforts to use oil as leverage, or natural calamities
  • High oil prices resulting from strong demand from countries such as the U.S. and other major importers give countries such as Iran and Venezuela added resources to take actions inimical to American interests
  • Oil-dependent friends and allies feel more vulnerable to the pressures and potential use of oil leverage from supplying countries and therefore are reluctant to side with the U.S. on key issues affecting those suppliers
  • Oil-related tensions and competition are likely to intensify—as countries such as China seek to lock up scarce supplies or make political deals to solidify long term supply relationships, or suppliers such as Russian and Iran use oil as leverage to extract political concessions from consumers.

My concerns about this untenable and dangerous situation led me—together with a group of other concerned citizens to join the Energy Security Leadership Council in an effort to press for greater and more resolute national action on this matter— and for an end to the divisive, highly polarized debate that has stymied genuine progress on many fundamental issues. The Council, a project of Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE), is a nonpartisan group of business executives and retired military leaders. It recently unveiled a report entitled ‘‘Recommendations to the Nation on Reducing U.S. Oil Dependence.’’ (I will discuss a few of these later in my testimony, along with a number of recommendations that I believe can also contribute to progress in this area.) The members of the Council believe that America’s energy security is in a perilous state. Along with my fellow Council members, I am convinced that America’s leaders must move quickly and steadfastly to confront our high level of oil dependence as a profound national security challenge.

Energy policy really has not changed very much. We’re fighting a war on terrorism. We are spending money, lots of money, for oil. We’re heavily dependent on countries that are very unreliable suppliers. A large portion of money is spent by us and other importers, and goes to countries whose interests are hostile to those of the United States. Some of that money finds its way into terrorist hands. We should accept the fact that that is the case. So what we’re doing now is we’re fighting in a post-9/11 environment with a pre-9/11 energy policy. It is simply not sufficient to deal with the national security crisis that we face today. The crisis is a geopolitical one and the vulnerability of this country to disruptions— look what is happening in Nigeria today, kidnappings of people on these oil rigs. We have Venezuela making very tough statements about further nationalization. We have Russia using oil as a political lever. We have instability in the Middle East. If Iran deteriorates further in the relationship—that will affect oil. It has happened before. If Iraq deteriorates further and the civil war increases and other countries start getting involved, then you have additional tensions. If you have tensions between the Shiites on one side of the Persian Gulf and the Sunni on the other, that’s going to make transportation of oil all the more vulnerable. And therefore, we have to come up with a much bolder set of energy policies for national security reasons.

I think Linda has made a very good point: energy independence, at this point, is not possible, but we can manage our vulnerability a lot better than we are doing today and it’s the vulnerability that is the huge problem. Calls for ‘‘energy independence’’ offer a false promise to the American people. Even if the U.S. could substitute domestic energy for all foreign oil—a goal the Council believes to be impossible—American economic prosperity would still be linked to the health of a global economy dependent on international oil flows.

How do we do that? We have the capability, for instance, by insisting on tougher fuel standards for automobiles, to improve the efficiency with which we use oil. And it’s quite possible to do. It’s within the realm of technological possibility. Now there may be reasons why you can’t go as fast as we would like, but there should be the target of much greater energy fuel—oil fuel efficiency standards. The goal ought to be to reduce the efficiency—to improve the efficiency of the use of oil as a transportation fuel because, by and large, in this country, oil is a transportation fuel and if we can’t address that issue, we’re not going to address the overall vulnerability issue.

One key goal must be to make America’s prosperity less dependent on a commodity the production level of which responds only very slowly to changes in price. Combine this price inelastic supply with 1) the vulnerability of oil supplies to various types of disruption, 2) the fact that some countries see oil as a political as well as an economic commodity, and 3) the fact that much of the world’s production is in the hands of state owned oil companies, many of which use oil revenue for political or social ends rather than reinvest it in new production capacity, and you have the recipe for severe energy-related economic disorder.

By 2020, world energy demand is forecast to jump by 50% over 2000 levels, with most of the increase coming in developing countries. The safe and affordable delivery of all this energy is by no means assured. Even if resources turn out to be sufficient in the aggregate, their distribution will not map closely to the topography of demand. The resultant uncertainty of supply and upward pricing pressure will exacerbate international tensions stemming from non-energy issues. Oil provides only 40% of global energy, but, as the premier transportation fuel, it has emerged as the touchstone of the world’s energy outlook. On both economic and psychological grounds, oil price spikes threaten the prosperity of many nations, including many of the poorest on this planet. They also sow the seeds of tension between exporting and importing nations, among consuming nations, and among different groups within countries. Indeed, since so much oil is used for personal transportation, oil prices have an enormous impact on the pocketbooks of virtually every American family. Correspondingly, policy efforts that impact oil’s cost and availability must take into account the interests of the average American family and quickly become major political issues.

America’s Clear and Present Dangers

For much of the last century, surplus domestic oil production reduced U.S. vulnerability to oil disruptions elsewhere in the world. But America’s oil production is now dwarfed by current consumption. Thus, while the U.S. remains the third largest oil producer in the world, domestic production can satisfy barely 40% of its requirements.

The U.S. generates 28% of the world’s goods and services while consuming roughly a quarter of its oil production. This may seem like a balanced, even favorable energy equation, but closer inspection reveals a different story. Despite considerable progress toward more efficient energy use, America requires substantially more oil to create a dollar of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than is the case in most other developed countries. Some of this differential in ‘‘oil intensity’’ can be attributed to our nation’s vast size, the dispersion of our population, and less reliance on public transportation. Global military obligations, which are inextricably linked to our commitment to secure the flow of oil for the benefit of all nations, further increase American consumption. But even with these extenuating factors, there can be little doubt that the U.S. can and must use energy far more efficiently.

America’s long-term supply and demand balance is no more encouraging. U.S. oil demand is expected to grow 24% over the next two decades, and even if new discoveries raise its current 3% share of global oil reserves, our nation will almost certainly still require substantial amounts of petroleum imports. Import dependence will also define energy security for our key allies and most of the world’s manufacturing nations. Unfortunately, the developed nations that consume most of the world’s oil are not in a good position to produce the fuels they need.

A large portion of the world’s oil reserves are owned by state-owned or controlled oil companies in non-O.E.C.D. countries. It is worth underscoring this point—especially because when oil prices were rising last summer there were many accusations, misguided in my view, that this was a conspiracy among the big oil majors, when in fact the six largest state oil companies have ten times the reserves of the top six privately owned companies. Some of these state companies are highly efficient and well run, but others are highly politicized and are not able to utilize their profits to increase production or modernize capacity. Because of the large state company role in the world’s oil markets, there is not a ‘‘free market’’ for oil. As a result, a substantial portion of production is politically influenced and production decisions and practices are frequently economically suboptimal.

With each passing year, the global oil trends now at work—rising consumption, reduced spare production capacity, politicized spending decisions, and potentially high levels of instability in key exporting countries—all increase the likelihood of an energy crisis. The odds in favor of a crisis are further heightened by the rise of terrorist movements bent on targeting critical elements of the world’s vulnerable oil production, processing, and delivery infrastructure.

Given today’s precarious balance between oil supply and demand, taking even a small amount of oil off the market could cause prices to rise dramatically. In Oil Shockwave, a cabinet-level oil crisis simulation conducted in 2005 by SAFE and the National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP), a 4% global shortfall in daily oil supply—only 3.5 million barrels in a 84 million barrel daily market resulted in a 177% increase in the price of oil, to over $150 per barrel. The simulation was played out by men and women who have served in the highest ranks of the U.S. government; Robert M. Gates, our current Secretary of Defense, for example, filled the role of National Security Advisor. The hypothetical scenarios put before the participants were designed to simulate a decline in world oil production due to regional instability and to terrorism. The incidents were completely plausible, and some, such as unrest in Nigeria, have subsequently come to pass. But there was little these skilled officials could do to stop a gut-wrenching increase in the price of oil. Indeed, one of the major lessons of the simulation was that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the emergency supply of federally owned crude oil, offers only very limited protection against a major supply disruption. Emergency reserves cannot sustain the United States through a prolonged crisis, and it will be extremely difficult to reach political consensus on when it is appropriate to begin using them.

Even under normal conditions, oil dependence has severe economic consequences. In 2005, direct outlays for imported oil accounted for a third of the country’s $800 billion current account deficit. In 2006 prices, these outlays have gone still higher. By diverting funds away from domestic consumption and investment, oil imports put a drag on U.S. economic growth and undercut the nation’s long-term competitive position. Oil dependence also adds billions to our defense expenditures by making overseas protection of oil supplies a high strategic priority.

There Are No Silver-Bullet Solutions

Improving efficiency: In the view of the Council, the most important thing the U.S. can do to lessen its oil dependence in the near and medium-term is to utilize oil considerably more efficiently. With the goal of once again halving oil intensity— as in the 1980s and 1990s—in the space of two decades, Americans can do much to protect the economy against the effects of oil shocks that can be unleashed by forces beyond our control. Improved vehicle fuel efficiency is the single most important avenue for further cutting the nation’s oil intensity.

We must face the hard fact that in the U S. oil is primarily a transportation fuel; unless we can dramatically curb the use of oil in our cars and trucks, we will be unable to reduce our oil dependence. Reliance on a single non-substitutable input creates profound economic dangers. Currently the direction is not positive; through 2030 oil usage by SUVs and light duty trucks is expected to surge by roughly 77%. The transportation sector accounts for nearly 70% of all the oil the country uses; and oil fuels almost 97% of all transportation. With most of the vehicles on the nation’s roads operating at efficiency levels far below what is achievable with currently available technologies, there is a clear opportunity to realize sizable fuel economy gains without overall loss of safety or functional utility. We propose empowering the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to mandate annual fuel efficiency increases of 4%.

In his 1975 State of the Union address, President Ford recognized the energy dangers threatening the country. He expressed a ‘‘very deep belief in America’s capabilities,’’—its innovative capacity and technological skills to overcome its growing dependence on imported oil. He also rallied support for fuel efficiency standards. I share President Ford’s optimism in the capacity of Americans to respond to the challenge of growing energy dependence, and his belief that Americans will rally around tougher energy measures, if they are given strong leadership.

America has a long history of pulling together in the face of national security challenges. I am currently completing a book entitled The Price of Liberty: How America Pays for its Wars.

In all the major national security challenges of the twentieth century, Americans demonstrated a remarkable willingness to make patriotic wartime sacrifices. During World War I and World War II, American’s not only paid dramatically higher taxes but also participated in massive bond drives to mobilize billions of dollars to support out troops.

Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, when asked about the significance of such drives, said that they were launched not only to raise massive amounts of funds, but also to respond to people who asked ‘‘What can I do to help.’’

Today, the answer to this question lies not in buying more bonds but in buying less gasoline. Since 9/11 there have been no major bond drives as in past wars—and only limited steps to reduce our dependence on oil. The time has come to recognize that energy security is central to the national security challenges of twenty-first century, and to present the American people with the unvarnished truth regarding how oil affects the struggle in which we are engaged. We must meet the threats we face in the same spirit as our parents and grandparents during past wars—with farsighted patriotism and willingness to compromise narrow partisan, ideological, philosophical and economic positions in the long-tern national interest.

 

FLYNT LEVERETT, Senior fellow & Director, Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, New America Foundation, Washington, DC;  visiting professor of Political Science at MIT

I will start with a very stark assessment and that is, in my view, during the next quarter century, the most profound challenges to America’s continued global leadership will flow from the strategic and political consequences of the structural shifts in global energy markets that previous witnesses have been laying out for you.

On both the supply and demand side of the global oil market, we have seen strategic and political responses to the kinds of structural shifts that Dr. Birol and others have described for you. On the supply side, we’ve seen the rise of what a lot of folks call ‘‘resource nationalism’’. Resource nationalism is often defined as national government with oil and gas resources asserting their ownership rights over those resources in ways that work against the interests of international energy companies, something like Mr. Chavez’s recent declaration about nationalizing projects to develop extra heavy crude in the Orinoco region. But there is another dimension to resource nationalism that I think is very important here and that is the use by energy suppliers of their status as suppliers in a tight market as a source of political leverage. Venezuela is a good example in this hemisphere, obviously Russia is an important example, but there are many others that you could lay out that are very important for American interests. Saudi Arabia, for example, using its unique status as the swing producer in the world oil market to cultivate a kind of alternative strategic partnership with China, as a hedge against a further deterioration in its traditional strategic partnership with the United States. This phenomenon, this aspect of resource nationalism will, I think, pose an increasingly serious set of challenges to American interests in coming years.

Resource nationalism and resource mercantilism pose significant challenges to American interests, each in its own way, but I would also point out that these two phenomena can intersect in some particularly challenging ways for the United States. One of the ways in which they intersect is in what I have described as a ‘‘new axis of oil’’, namely a loose coalition of states— energy-producing states and energy-importing states, loosely organized around a Sino-Russian axis. This axis of oil is bolstering Sino-Russian cooperation on a whole host of strategic issues and I believe this axis of oil is emerging as the principle counterweight to American hegemony in global affairs.

The axis of oil, this Sino-Russian axis of oil, has been quite successful over the last 2 to 3 years in essentially rolling back the projection of U.S. influence into central Asia following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Russia and China have cooperated in standing up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the world’s largest regional security organization and the only such organization in the world in which the United States is not a participant. Working together in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia and China have basically been able to lock us out of central Asia.

Iran’s resource base is truly impressive. If you take its gas reserves— the second largest in the world—convert them into barrels of oil equivalent, and add them to their oil reserves—also the world’s second largest—you basically have a situation in which the aggregate hydrocarbon reserves of Iran and the aggregate hydrocarbon reserves of Saudi Arabia are effectively the same. And each of those countries is significantly larger in terms of aggregate hydrocarbon reserves than Russia. What this means, given Iran’s low rate of production, is that Iran is basically the only major energy producing country in the world that has the resource potential to increase its production of both oil and natural gas by orders of magnitude in coming decades. But to do that, Iran is going to have to get a lot of investment and a lot of technology transfer.

I think that the question of the possibilities for Russian and Iranian cooperation on energy matters is an issue that has potentially very, very profound geopolitical and geostrategic implications for the United States. Russia and Iran together control almost half of the world’s proven reserves of natural gas. If those two countries are cooperating, coordinating in terms of the way they develop and market their gas exports, they could be potentially twice as influential in the global gas trade as Saudi Arabia is in the global oil trade. And I think that within the last 18 months, Russia and Iran have announced their intention to begin cooperating in this area. There is a highlevel Russian/Iranian working group set up to do this. A senior official of Gazprom chairs it on the Russian side, the deputy oil minister of Iran chairs it on the Iranian side, and Russia and Iran are discussing an increasingly wide array of potential energy initiatives, marketing projects and pipeline projects that would increase both Iranian and Russian influence in regional energy markets.

The potential for Russian and Chinese cooperation to develop Iran’s hydrocarbon resources, I think, the potential for that cooperation and its impact on American interests goes beyond Iran. Such cooperation has the potential, basically, to remake the geopolitics of all Eurasia; to establish Moscow as a leading energy supplier, not just to Europe, but also to Asia; to have Moscow as the major influence on energy trade in this part of the world and to consolidate the Sino-Russian axis of oil as the leading counterweight to American hegemony in regional and international affairs.

I think there needs to be a grand bargain between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. My criticism of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group recommendations on engaging Iran is not that they go too far, but that they don’t go far enough. Unless there is a comprehensive deal between the United States and Iran in which all of the major bilateral differences between the U.S. and Iran are resolved in a package, not only will there be no diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue, but basically, the United States will lose the race for Iran that I described to you a few minutes ago. I think it is very important that the United States embrace a comprehensive wrap approach with Iran as an important foreign policy objective.

In my view, the most profound challenges to America’s global leadership during the next quarter century are not posed by the risk of strategic failure in Iraq, further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or the growth and consolidation of extremist forces in the Islamic world. Rather, the most profound challenges to U.S. preeminence during the next 25 years flow from the strategic and political consequences of ongoing structural shifts in global energy markets, especially the global oil market. Most notably, cooperation between China and Russia on energy matters is bolstering Sino-Russian cooperation on strategic issues, effectively creating a Sino-Russian ‘‘axis of oil’’ as the principal counterweight to America’s global hegemony.

FATIH BIROL, CHIEF ECONOMIST, HEAD OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, PARIS, FRANCE. Looking at the next few decades, we think the world is facing twin energy-related threats. One is the increasing risk for energy security and the second one is the energy-related environmental concerns.

  1. The world is facing twin energy-related threats: that of not having adequate and secure supplies of energy at affordable prices and that of environmental harm caused by its use. The World Energy Outlook 2006 confirms that fossil-fuel demand and trade flows, and greenhouse-gas emissions would follow their current unsustainable paths through to 2030 in the absence of new government action—the underlying premise of the Reference Scenario. It also demonstrates, in an Alternative Policy Scenario, that a package of policies and measures that countries around the world are considering would, if implemented, significantly reduce the rate of increase in demand and emissions. Importantly, the economic cost of these policies would be more than outweighed by the economic benefits that would come from using and producing energy more efficiently.
  2. Oil demand grows by 1.3% per year through 2030 in the Reference Scenario, reaching 116 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2030—up from 84 mb/ d in 2005. The pace of demand growth slackens progressively over the period. More than 70% of the increase in oil demand comes from developing countries (notably China and India), which see average annual demand growth of 2.5%.
  3. The transport sector absorbs most of the increase in global oil demand. In the OECD, oil use in other sectors barely increases at all. In developing countries too, transport contributes the bulk of the increase in oil demand. The lack of cost-effective substitutes for oil-based automotive fuels will make oil demand more rigid.
  4. Oil supply is increasingly dominated by a small number of major producers, most of them in the Middle East, where oil resources are concentrated. Non-OPEC production of conventional crude oil is set to peak within a decade. OPEC’s share of global supply grows significantly, from 40% now to 48% by 2030. Iran and Iraq have significant potential to expand their production, but Saudi Arabia remains by far the largest producer. The need for more transparent and comprehensive data on oil (and gas) reserves in all regions is a pressing concern.
  5. The oil industry needs to invest a total of $4.3 trillion (in year-2005 dollars) over the period 2005-2030, or $164 billion per year. The upstream sector accounts for the bulk of this. Almost three-quarters of upstream investments will be required to maintain existing capacity.
  6. A critical uncertainty is whether the substantial investments needed in the oil production sector in key Middle East countries will, in fact, be forthcoming. These governments could choose deliberately to develop production capacity more slowly than we project in our Reference Scenario. Or external factors such as capital shortages could prevent producers from investing as much in expanding capacity as they would like. As demonstrated by a Deferred Investment Case, slower growth in OPEC oil production drives up the international oil price and, with it, the price of gas.
  7. The new policies analyzed in the Alternative Policy Scenario halt the rise in OECD oil imports by 2015. OECD countries and developing Asia become more dependent on oil imports in 2030 compared to today, but markedly less so than in the Reference Scenario. Global oil demand reaches 103 mb/d in 2030 in the Alternative Policy Scenario—13 mb/d lower than in the Reference Scenario. Additional policy measures to promote improved fuel efficiency of cars and trucks, as well as a greater market share for biofuels, therefore have the effect of improving energy security.
  8. Our analysis demonstrates the urgency with which policy action is required. Each year of delay in implementing the policies analyzed would have a disproportionately larger effect on energy security. Yet there are formidable hurdles to be overcome. It will take considerable political will to push through the policies and measures in the Alternative Policy Scenario, many of which are likely to encounter resistance from some industry and consumer groups. Politicians need to spell out clearly the benefits to the economy and to society as a whole of the proposed measures. In most countries, the public is becoming familiar with the energy-security and environmental advantages of action to encourage more efficient energy use and to boost the share of renewables.

SUPPLY: Resources and Reserves

According to the Oil and Gas Journal, the world’s proven reserves2 of oil (crude oil, natural gas liquids, condensates and non-conventional oil) amounted to 1293 billion barrels3 at the end of 2005—an increase of 14.8 billion barrels, or 1.2%, over the previous year. Reserves are concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), together accounting for 62% of the world total. Saudi Arabia, with the largest reserves of any country, holds a fifth. Of the twenty countries with the largest reserves, seven are in the MENA region (Figure 2). Canada has the least developed reserves, sufficient to sustain current production for more than 200 years. The world’s proven reserves, including non-conventional oil, could sustain current production levels for 42 years.

The amount of oil discovered in new oilfields has fallen sharply over the past four decades, because of reduced exploration activity in regions with the largest reserves and, until recently, a fall in the average size of fields discovered. These factors outweighed an increase in exploration success rates.

A lack of reliable information on production decline rates makes it difficult to project new gross capacity needs. A high natural decline rate—the speed at which output would decline in the absence of any additional investment to sustain production— increases the need to deploy technology at existing fields to raise recovery rates, to develop new reserves and to make new discoveries. Our analysis of capacity needs is based on estimates of year-on-year natural decline rates averaged over all currently producing fields in a given country or region. The rates assumed in our analysis vary over time and by location. They range from 2% per year to 11% per year, averaging 8% for the world over the projection period.5 Rates are generally lowest in regions with the best production prospects and the highest RIP ratios. For OPEC, they range from 2% to 7%. They are highest in mature OECD producing areas, where they average 11%.

The average quality of crude oil produced around the. world is expected to become heavier (lower API gravity) and more sour (higher sulfur content) over the Outlook period.6 This is driven by several factors, including the continuing decline in production from existing sweet (low-sulfur) crude oilfields, increased output of heavier crude oils in Russia, the Middle East and North Africa (Figure 7), and the projected growth of heavy non-conventional oil output. This trend, together with increasing demand for lighter oil products and increasing fuel-quality standards, is expected to increase the need for investment in upgrading facilities in refineries.

The availability of capital is unlikely to be a barrier to upstream investment in most cases. But opportunities and incentives to invest may be. Most privately-owned international oil and gas companies have large cash reserves and are able to borrow at good rates from capital markets when necessary for new projects. But those companies may not be able to invest as much as they would like because of restrictions on their access to oil and gas reserves in many resource-rich countries. Policies on foreign direct investment will be an important factor in determining how much upstream investment occurs and where. A large proportion of the world’s reserves of oil are found in countries where there are restrictions on foreign investment (Figure 10). Three countries—Kuwait, Mexico and Saudi Arabia—remain totally closed to upstream oil investment by foreign companies. Other countries are reasserting state control over the oil industry. Bolivia recently renationalized all its upstream assets. Venezuela effectively renationalized 565 kb/d of upstream assets in April 2006, when the state-owned oil company, PdVSA took over 115 kb/d of private production and took a majority stake in 25 marginal fields producing 450 kb/d after the government unilaterally switched service agreements from private to mixed public-private companies. The Russian government has tightened its strategic grip on oil and gas production and exports, effectively ruling out foreign ownership of large fields and keeping some companies, including Transneft, Gazprom and Rosneft, in majority state ownership. Several other countries, including Iran, Algeria and Qatar, limit investment to buy-back or production- sharing deals, whereby control over the reserves remains with the national oil company.

Even where it is in principle possible for international companies to invest, the licensing and fiscal terms or the general business climate may discourage investment. Most resource-rich countries have increased their tax take in the last few years as prices have risen. The stability of the upstream regime is an important factor in oil companies’ evaluation of investment opportunities. War or civil conflict may also deter companies from investing. No major oil company has yet decided to invest in Iraq. Geopolitical tensions in other parts of the Middle East and in other regions may discourage or prevent inward investment in upstream developments and related LNG and export-pipeline projects.

National oil companies, especially in OPEC countries, have generally increased their capital spending rapidly in recent years in response to dwindling spare capacity and the increased financial incentive from higher international oil prices. But there is no guarantee that future investment in those countries will be large enough to boost capacity sufficiently to meet the projected call on their oil in the longer term. OPEC producers generally are concerned that overinvestment could lead to a sharp increase in spare capacity and excessive downward pressure on prices. Sharp increases in development costs are adding to the arguments for delaying new upstream projects. For example, two planned GTL plants in Qatar were put on hold by the government in 2005 in response to soaring costs and concerns about the long-term sustainability of production from the North field. An over-cautious approach to investment would result in shortfalls in capacity expansion.

Environmental policies and regulations will increasingly affect opportunities for investment in, and the cost of, new oil projects. Many countries have placed restrictions on where drilling can take place because of concerns about the harmful effects on the environment. In the United States, for example, drilling has not been allowed on large swathes of US federal onshore lands—such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)—and offshore coastal zones for many years.7 Even where drilling is allowed, environmental regulations and policies impose restrictions, driving up capital costs and causing delays. The likelihood of further changes in environmental regulations is a major source of uncertainty for investment.

Local public resistance to the siting of large-scale, obtrusive facilities, such as oil refineries and GTL plants, is a major barrier to investment in many countries, especially in the OECD. The not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) syndrome makes future investments uncertain. It is all but impossible to obtain planning approval for a new refinery in many OECD countries, though capacity expansions at existing sites are still possible. The risk of future liabilities related to site remediation and plant emissions can also discourage investment in oil facilities. The prospect of public opposition may deter oil companies from embarking on controversial projects. Up to now, NIMBY issues have been less of a barrier in the developing world.

Technological advances offer the prospect of lower finding and production costs for oil and gas, and opening up new opportunities for drilling. But operators often prefer to use proven, older technology on expensive projects to limit the risk of technical problems. This can slow the deployment of new technology, so that it can take decades for innovative technology to be widely deployed, unless the direct cost savings are clearly worth the risk. This was the case with the rotary steerable motor system, which has finally become the norm for drilling oil and gas wells. These systems were initially thought to be less reliable and more expensive, even though they could drill at double or even triple the rate of penetration of previous drilling systems. The slow take-up of technology means that there are still many regions where application of the most advanced technologies available could make a big impact by lowering costs, increasing production and improving recovery factors. For example, horizontal drilling, which increases access to and maximizes the recovery of hydrocarbons, is rarely used in Russia.

Unless major new discoveries are made in new locations, the average size of large-scale projects and their share in total upstream investment could fall after the end of the current decade. That could drive up unit costs and, depending on prices and upstream-taxation policies, constrain capital spending. Capital spending may shift towards more technically challenging projects, including those in arctic regions and in ultra-deep water. The uncertainties over unit costs and lead times of such projects add to the uncertainty about upstream investment in the medium to long term.

The Reference Scenario presents a sobering vision of the next two-and-a-half decades, as the major oil-consuming regions—including the United States—become even more reliant on imports, often from distant, unstable parts of the world along routes that are vulnerable to disruption. In July 2005, G8 leaders, meeting at Gleneagles with the leaders of several major developing countries and heads of international organizations, including the IEA, recognized that current energy trends are unsustainable.

In the Alternative Policy Scenario, the implementation of more aggressive policies and measures significantly curbs the growth in total primary and final energy demand— a reduction of about 10% relative to the Reference Scenario. That saving is roughly equal to the current energy demand of China. Demand still grows, by 37% between 2004 and 2030, but more slowly: 1.2% annually against 1.6% in the Reference Scenario. The reduction in the use of fossil fuels such as oil is even more marked than the reduction in primary energy demand (Figure 13). It results from the introduction of more efficient technologies and switching to carbon-free energy sources. Nonetheless, fossil fuels still account for 77% of primary energy demand by 2030 (compared with 81% in the Reference Scenario).

By 2015, demand reaches 95 mb/d, a reduction of almost 5 mb/ d on the Reference Scenario.

We would like to know the amount of oil left in [the Middle East] as all the numbers show that the bulk of the oil in the future will need to come from those countries.

Saudi Arabia is a key player and will remain so for several years to come and the Saudis have the highest reserves in the world. We do believe that Saudi Arabia has enough oil to meet the growth in global oil demand. However, we would like to be sure how much oil is there to make everybody feel better and give more confidence to the investor. Another issue which is as crucial is that the growth which will come from Saudi Arabia will not be mainly as a function of their reserves but as a function of their willingness to increase the production capacity. Saudi Arabia has the reserves, Saudi Arabia has the money to transform these reserves to production, but whether or not in the future Saudi Arabia will increase the production as they did in the past, as much as the world demands from them, or they will leave their oil for the next generations. And Saudi Arabia is differently— they will decide what they are going to do. But it is also the consumers’ right to recognize that one day, production from those countries in which we do not have excess, free, extra capital, to go directly into production, may change their policies and this may have serious implications for the consumers. The structure of the oil market is changing, Mr. Chairman. In the past, the money could have access to many oil deposits in the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, but in the future, it will not be the case. Therefore, how much oil will come will be decided by a very few number of national oil companies. And again, market conditions may not be the primary determinant when they are making those decisions. So, from that point of view, there are two major uncertainties: one, whether or not we will have the reserves and the money we’ll need in the future, and two, it would be very good to have a more transparency on the reserves in all Middle East countries and the rest of the world.

SENATOR DOMENICI. I don’t know what we have to do to convince both ourselves and the American people that we must change and do things differently.

SENATOR SMITH (ALABAMA). I think our focus needs to be domestically and then just have a really good military capacity to deal with this. When it comes to Iran, sitting down with them, they made it very clear what they would want from us and that is essentially a military domination of the Middle East. That is a horrifying prospect. If I was an Israeli, I know what that means: I’m gone, I’m exterminated. And I don’t think we can accede to that in the name of energy cooperation. So I just wanted to say that.

Senator SESSIONS. It gives them [oil producing nations like Russia and Iran] the ability to increase benefits for th[eir] citizens by a small amount and use the extra to invest in military ventures and bad behavior, and it seems to be absolutely happening And I’m part a caucus with Senators Joe Lieberman and Lindsay Graham and a number of others that says we should treat the energy question as a matter of national security, and I think some of the comments made here today are real chilling.

[The last 20 pages are questions from senators for the witnesses, but their replies are not included]

 

Posted in Transportation, U.S. Congress Energy Policy | Tagged , , , , | Comments Off on Geopolitics of Oil. United States Senate Hearing 110-6

Congressional hearings on why the Inland water way system is falling apart

[There are extracts from 2 hearings below.  Alice Friedemann. www.energyskeptic.com]

U.S. SENATE. Jan 31, 2013. Harbor maintenance trust fund & the need to invest in the nation’s ports. S. HRG. 113-578. Hearing before the Committee on Environment & public works. U.S. Senate 113th congress. 93 pages.

SENATOR BARBARA BOXER (CALIFORNIA)

Today’s hearing will examine the role of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund in supporting commerce at our Nation’s ports. The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund is the primary source of Federal investment to maintain America’s ports. The Trust Fund is financed through a fee on the value of cargo imported through coastal and Great Lakes ports. According to the American Society of Civil Engineers, if funding continues at current levels, by 2040 the United States will face a shortfall of nearly $28 billion to meet the dredging needs of the Nation’s ports. As we will hear from our witnesses today, this funding gap can have significant economic consequences. Increasing investment in ports and reforming the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund will be critical components of the next Water Resources Development Act, known as WRDA. Senator Vitter and I have already begun working together on this vital legislation, which supports water resources infrastructure nationwide. WRDA authorizes the projects and programs of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and provides many benefits to the American people, including expanding and maintaining navigation routes for commerce.

Continued maintenance of port facilities is critical for the commerce and jobs that rely on these hubs, and that is why we must increase investment from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. Currently, the Trust Fund collects more revenues than are annually spent for maintaining our ports. In fact, the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, the Obama administration estimated that the Trust Fund would receive $1.8 billion, but the Corps budget request was only $848 million. This leaves a growing surplus at a time when many of the Nation’s ports are not maintained to their authorized depths and widths.

This is something that has gone on with every administration. They do not spend the funds in the Trust Fund the way they are meant to be spent. Significant challenges remain in working to ensure the revenues collected in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund are fully expended.

SENATOR DAVID VITTER (LOUISIANA)

I certainly want to underscore your comments about how our Nation’s ports and waterways are grossly underfunded for routine operation and maintenance, and one big reason is the misallocation of Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund revenues. It is a pretty simple story. Revenue into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund has increased steadily over the past decade, minus a one-time decrease in Fiscal Year 2009. The Fund currently collects about $1.8 billion a year in revenue. However, even though all of that money clearly, under law, is supposed to be used only for designated purposes with regard to harbor maintenance, even though that is clearly true, the Administration only spends roughly half that amount for harbor maintenance. What does that mean? Well, some people say that means we have an unspent balance of $8 billion. It really doesn’t mean that; it is really worse than that, because that money isn’t sitting anywhere. There is no pile of cash; that money is gone. What it really means is that the other money is stolen and spent on other completely unrelated purposes, directly contrary to the statute setting up the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund and the revenue to go into it. Meanwhile, what is going on with our infrastructure? You know, if all of our needs were being met, if we were fully dredging our crucial waterways and harbors, that might be understandable. But, of course, that is not the case. According to a recent analysis from the Corps itself, fully authorized channel dimensions are available less than an average of 35 percent of the time at the 59 highest use, harbors and waterways, and those are the harbors and waterways that basically get the best treatment. So there that fully authorized dimension and depth is available only 35 percent of the time. Every time a vessel’s draft is decreased by one foot on the lower Mississippi because of under-maintained waterways, this costs shippers about $1 million against the value of their cargo. So that is a tax on shippers; that is a tax on commerce, and it slows down the economy and holds us back from job creation and economic growth.

Senator Inhofe (OKLAHOMA)

Harbors and inland waterways are vital to the economic health of our country. In my home State of Oklahoma, over 90 percent of the grain that is shipped on barges eventually finds its way to New Orleans to be exported. If the harbor in New Orleans is not properly maintained, shipping from Oklahoma will suffer. And vice versa—for harbors to gain the economic benefit of shipping from places like Oklahoma, our inland waterways must also be properly maintained. As everyone here knows, only about half of the annual revenue in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund is spent as intended—on critical maintenance dredging. But because of the current structure of budgetary allocations, we simply cannot afford to allow funding for our inland waterways and ports to be redirected—it, too, needs a source of stable revenue. The only reasonable solution is increased funding for the system as a whole. The Inland Waterways Trust Fund helps fund the 18 locks and dams on the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System, but it is woefully underfunded. In 2012, over 2.7 million tons of cargo shipped from the Port of Catoosa, with over 12 million tons being shipped on MKARNS, but the system could function much more efficiently and productively if it was deepened from its current 9-foot depth to the authorized 12 feet, and if hours of service on the locks are not further reduced.

SENATOR MIKE CRAPO (IDAHO)

The Port of Lewiston, is located at the confluence of the Snake and Clearwater Rivers in the city of Lewiston. For farmers and other businesses in the west, the Port of Lewiston provides a critical link through the Snake and Columbia Rivers to the Port of Portland and ultimately to the Pacific Ocean. However, the Port of Lewiston, like other ports, faces considerable challenges with meeting shipping needs. Despite a large surplus in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, which has already been discussed, harbors across the United States are presently under-maintained. Again, the statistics that have already been presented show that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates that the full channel dimensions of the Nation’s busiest 59 ports are available less than 35 percent of the time. We too, in Idaho, are very interested and concerned with the management of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. We have seen, just as an example from Idaho, that the draft restrictions in 2011 and 2012, due to the Corps’ inability to maintain the deep draft portion of the Columbia River, have been significant impacts on our economy. For every inch of draft that is lost due to the silted-in channel, vessels are unable to load 358,000 pounds of wheat. This is just one example of how important it is that we properly utilize the funds in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. Second, Idaho is also very interested in the Inland Waterways Trust Fund concerns. There are eight locks between the Pacific Ocean and the Port of Lewiston, and we need to have the adequate support for the maintenance of these locks and the facilities to allow for the traffic to reach the port and to return back to the Pacific Ocean.

Each day the condition of our water infrastructure results in significant losses and damages from broken water and sewer mains, sewage overflows and other symptoms of water infrastructure that is reaching the end of its useful life; and with these challenges and the others I have already mentioned in mind, as this Committee is well aware, a national investment in water infrastructure projects would create jobs, repair crumbling infrastructure, and provide significant protection for public health and the environment. A strong focus on improving the financing structure of our Nation’s water infrastructure is greatly needed.

SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY (OREGON)

I think you are hearing the general story of the significant challenges in maintaining levees and jetties and harbor dredging and locks, and how frustrating it is that we have funds that are raised specifically for maintenance, and in this case harbor maintenance, and they are not being spent in that fashion. Now, Oregon is a coastal State, so I go to town after town after town where industry depends upon the success of those harbors and the maintenance of the jetties; and not only is it important to commerce moving back and forth, it is important to our fishing vessels, it is important to our recreational coastal industry, and it imposes not just an issue of commerce, but an issue of safety, because when the dredging is not maintained and the jetties are not maintained, you can have very dangerous entries from the ocean. So how can I possibly justify that we have funds that have been raised for a specific purpose, commerce is at stake, safety is at stake, and we are not spending it in this fashion? I can’t justify it. I want to see this policy changed. I so much applaud the Chair and Ranking Member for bringing this bill forward and I, like my colleague from New Mexico, apologize because I have a conflict to attend to, but I certainly look forward to your comments. I will be following up and hope that we can get to the point that we are spending these funds in the appropriate place.

SENATOR JOHN BOOZMAN (ARIZONA)

the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund should be fully used, but I also agree with our witnesses who emphasize that the Trust Fund should be used to boost funding for the Corps of Engineers.

Appropriations should not be taken from other Corps of Engineers programs due to the potential increased funding from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund.

Another concern I have is how we move forward on equitable return of HMT dollars. Arkansas is an inland State, but we have significant water infrastructure. Our State, as many other States like it, receives just a tiny portion of the Trust Fund dollars, but these funds are critical. While I understand the importance of equitable return, we need to ensure that Arkansas’s infrastructure and similar States, that that infrastructure is maintained. Expanding the potential uses of Trust Fund dollars may be a balanced approach, but we must avoid an inflexible framework, such as a rigid formula, which would abandon infrastructure States like Arkansas.

JO-ELLEN DARCY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY of the ARMY, CIVIL WORKS

The Army Corps of Engineers provides support for safe, reliable, highly cost-effective and environmentally sustainable waterborne transportation systems, investing over $1.7 billion annually, more than one-third of the total budget of the Civil Works program, to study, construct, replace, rehabilitate, operate, and maintain commercial navigation infrastructure across this Country. The Nation’s ports handle over 2 billion tons of commerce annually, including over 70% of the imported oil and more than 48 percent of goods purchased by American consumers. The Administration understands that our ports are an important part of the Nation’s infrastructure and has formed an Interagency Task Force on Ports to develop a strategy for investment in our ports and related infrastructure. Maintaining these ports and making targeted investments in their improvement can lower shipping costs for U.S. exports and imports. The work of the task force will reflect a strategic, multi-modal view of the Nation’s investment priorities for the infrastructure that supports the movement of freight through our ports, including the protections for life, safety, and property during transport, as well as protections for affected communities and for sustaining our ecosystem. The Harbor Maintenance Tax and the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund were established by the Water Resources Development Act of 1986. The harbor maintenance tax is an ad valorem fee on the value of commercial cargo loaded or unloaded on vessels using federally maintained harbors. An amount equivalent to the revenue collected is deposited in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund and is then available to finance certain costs, subject to the congressional appropriations process. For the Civil Works Program, the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund is authorized to be used to finance up to 100 percent of the Corps’ eligible operation and maintenance expenditures for commercial navigation at all Federal coastal and inland harbors within the United States. Expenditures from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund are also authorized to be used to recover the Federal share of construction costs for dredged material placement facilities, including beneficial uses associated with the operation and maintenance of Federal commercial navigation projects. The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund is also authorized to be used to finance operation and maintenance costs of the U.S. portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway.

Harbor Maintenance Tax receipts in Fiscal Year 2012 were $1.54 billion, and the interest earned was $47.3 million. The balance in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund at the end of Fiscal Year 2012 was $6.95 billion. An increasing portion of Civil Works funding in recent years has been devoted to harbor maintenance. The President’s 2013 budget request for the Corps included $848 million for the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund to support the maintenance of coastal harbors and their channels and related works, the most ever requested by any president. This is a significant increase over the level in the Fiscal Year 2012 budget, which was $758 million; this all at a time when many programs government-wide are being reduced in order to put the Nation on a sustainable fiscal path. Our investments in coastal port maintenance are directed primarily at providing operational capabilities and efficiencies. To make the best use of these funds, the Corps evaluates and establishes priorities using objective criteria. These criteria include transportation cost savings, risk reduction, and improved reliability, all relative to the cost. Consequently, maintenance work generally is focused more on the most heavily used commercial channels, those with 10 million tons of cargo a year or more, which together carry about 90 percent of the total commercial cargo by tonnage traveling through our coastal ports. The amount proposed in the Fiscal Year 2013 budget is an appropriate level, considering the other responsibilities of the Corps for inland navigation, flood risk management, aquatic ecosystem restoration, hydropower, and other Civil Works Program areas. The Corps is working to develop better analytical tools to help determine whether additional spending in this area is warranted based on the economic and safety return. Dredging costs continue to rise due to increases in the cost of fuel, steel, labor, and changes in methods of disposal of dredge material. We recognize that this presents challenges in maintaining commercial navigation projects. The pending improvements to the Panama Canal will increase the draft of vessels transiting the Canal to 50 feet. On our Atlantic Coast we now have two 50-foot deep ports capable of receiving these ships, Norfolk and Baltimore. The Corps expects to complete the dredging work for deepening the Port of New York-New Jersey to 50 feet in fiscal year 2015. The Corps is also working with the Port of Miami, which is financing a project, to deepen the Federal channel to 50 feet. On the West Coast, the Ports of L.A., Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle, and Tacoma all have channel depths of 50 feet or greater. In addition to the ongoing work, the Corps is also working with seven ports on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts to evaluate proposals to deepen or widen those channels.

Senator BOXER. You know, you stay away from the bigger notion, bigger issue here, which is is it right to collect fees and then not spend them on this purpose that they are supposed to be used for, and I don’t blame you for staying away from that because, in essence, you don’t really have control over that; the Administration does and prior administrations did, and we do, and we intend to fix it to the greatest extent that we can. Now, the Corps has estimated that the Nation’s 59 busiest ports have access to their full channel dimensions only 35 percent of the time. These ports are critical for commerce and international trade. Restrictions on commerce as a result of inadequate port maintenance can have significant consequences. In fact, a recent report by the American Society of Civil Engineers, which we will hear about on our second panel, indicates that failure to adequately maintain our ports could result in a variety of economic impacts.

Do you agree that failure to invest in port maintenance could have economic consequences that we must seek to avoid?

Ms. DARCY. the receipts go directly into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund through the Treasury and then the Bureau of Public Debt, which manages 18 different trust funds across the Government, then is the dispenser of those funds when our agency says we have been appropriated this much money and that is what comes out of the Fund.  The balance of the funds are invested and accumulate interest, and it is up to the Bureau of Public Debt as to how those funds then are used.

Senator VITTER. If there is this balance of $6.95 billion, what vault can I go to and look at it? That is what I am asking. Because it doesn’t exist. So where can I look at that balance of almost $7 billion?

Ms. DARCY. Again, those are the Federal investments in securities, for the most part, I understand, and then the interest that accrues on that is what gets you to that balance. Senator VITTER. Well, again, this is a big fiction, and I think the first important part of this conversation is to get beyond the fiction. It is the same fiction as the Social Security Trust Fund, because when you go and look at that balance, basically this is what you find, IOU $6.95 billion. It is gone, it is spent for unrelated purposes, and that is wrong when it is authorized for specific uses under the law. In looking at the overall budget for the Corps of Engineers, we have to manage for all of the missions within the Corps, we operate under a cap, and we know that if you increase one mission, there must be a decrease somewhere else within the program. As I said in my statement, over one-third of our budget, $1.7 billion, is spent on navigation, and that additional money that does not come out of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund is spent on other studies or construction, because the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund does not fund construction.

Senator BOOZMAN. So you mention the cap, which is a concern, and you also mention that we are going to be increasing the money spent from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. So where is that coming from, is that new money or is that money that you are essentially shuffling around, so that something else under the cap is going to suffer?

Ms. DARCY. The 2013 budget request which includes $848 million is $90 million more than Fiscal Year 2012. Within our program we had to make a decision as to how to balance programs, because we are still under the $4.7 billion program. We did put more money on activities reimbursed from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, so some of the other programs like some of our other operation and maintenance activities were reduced. Although operation and maintenance has also increased in our overall budget over the last couple of years. We would have to take decreases in some other programs, including some of our CAP programs, which are our small project programs. Again, the overall program has to be balanced across all the business lines within our budget.

Senator BOOZMAN. So I guess that is really the real problem. It doesn’t matter how much we put into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund; the reality is it really wouldn’t be any additional new money.

Ms. DARCY. No. But also within the budget process, when the appropriations committees get their 302(b) allocations, there is a cap in there, and there is Army Corps of Engineers within that 302(b), there is the Nuclear Program, there is the Energy Program. So the balance within that allocation would have to either be increased in order to accommodate increases across all the programs.

MICHAEL R. CHRISTENSEN, Deputy Executive Director of Development, Port of Los Angeles; Chair, California Marine Affairs & Navigation Conference

The Port of Los Angeles, in conjunction with our neighbor, the Port of Long Beach, handles over 40 percent of all the containerized goods that come into the United States, worth approximately $311 billion. This cargo supports about 900,000 regional jobs, nearly $40 billion in annual wages and tax revenues, and nationally the goods that come through the port complex of Southern California support also about 3.5 million jobs throughout the United States. We are not tax supported; instead, our revenues are all derived from fees and from other shipping service revenue.

The maintenance that is funded by HMT supports a well-functioning navigation system that includes the ports and harbors that accommodate a wide variety of commodities: containers, bulk goods, agriculture products, automobiles, fisheries, and also serve these facilities of service critical harbors of refuge. The system not only supports jobs in operation and maintenance, but facilitates trade that supports jobs throughout the supply chain throughout the United States, reduces the transportation costs for American businesses, and ultimately keeps the prices lower for American consumers. For this reason, the California ports support the following: No. 1, full utilization of HMT revenues for operations and maintenance purposes; No. 2, the prioritization of HMT funds for use on traditional O&M purposes, including maintenance of Federal navigation channels, disposal sites, selected in-water projects such as breakwaters and jetties, and studies; No. 3, more equitable return of HMT funds to the systems of ports of California; and, No. 4, a cost- share formula for maintenance that reflects the current cargo fleet. First, we believe HMT should be fully used for O&M purposes. Appropriations from the HMTF have lagged behind receipts for several years, leaving a surplus and deferring maintenance on our Nation’s system of ports and harbors. Achievement of full use of the HMT should be additive in nature. That is, in a given fiscal year, the guarantee of full utilization should not be achieved by taking funds from other U.S. Army Corps priorities.

We support a more equitable allocation framework within WRDA. Even if HMT funds are fully utilized for O&M, we believe efforts should be made to increase the funding return to systems that contribute large amounts to the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. One of the reasons we believe in this approach is because the users, not the ports, pay into the harbor maintenance tax. The users of the California port systems, for example, have reasonable expectation that the money they pay would be returned to the systems that they use.

JAMES K. LYONS, Director & CEO, Alabama State Port Authority

Mobile is amongst the 90% of the Nation’s top 50 ports in foreign trade commerce that require regular maintenance dredging. In total, dredged ports move nearly 93 percent of all waterborne commerce by weight annually. The 35% availability is a very real figure, something that we can attest to from Mobile, and in talking to my fellow port directors in other ports, I believe this is a very real number. As an example, between 2006, after we finished the dredging cycle that included supplemental funding that came as a result of Hurricane Katrina, and 2011, Mobile had only half of our authorized width in much of our 30-mile-long channel. These conditions caused numerous groundings, forced restrictions in vessel traffic, and, in short, cost the shippers using our port a great deal of time and money. The budget versus the appropriation in Mobile is, again, very real, just as it is. We saw the figures in the chart that Senator Sessions put up. Mobile’s 2012 budget was $22.6 million, but we really need $28 million to fully maintain our authorized width and depth. So enough money is not being appropriated in the Mobile harbor project, and the same applies to many of our other projects that require dredging. These poorly maintained harbors increase the cost for all port users, reduce U.S. global competitiveness, and exacerbate the maintenance dredging backlog, all of which adversely impact the U.S. tax base and the job market. Aside from dredging backlogs and funding shortfalls, we are deeply concerned with how the Nation’s ports will be expanded, funded, and maintained in the current fiscal climate. As Congress considers requests for use of the Trust Fund to resolve the dredging conundrum, we ask Congress to consider the long-term relevance and economic impact of ports within the context of re-examining the base of all major Federal spending and tax programs. There is legitimate need for port investment to serve larger vessels transiting most trade lanes. Any Federal project investments will ultimately draw on the trust as deepened and widened channels are brought online. We recognize the link between fee collections and expenditures is complicated. Increased maintenance spending on harbors will impact the Federal deficit unless spending in other areas is decreased or other collections are increased. We also understand guaranteed funding for dredging, and the budget protects dredging obligations from competing interests with revenue sources of type.

MIKE LORINO, President, Associated Branch Pilots

The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund is not a Louisiana issue, it is a Nation issue. It is an ad valorem tax for dredging jetties, breakwaters, and it is being abused. Seven million dollars is just being moved somewhere else.

The Mississippi River touches 31 States and two Canadian provinces. We have five deepwater ports, the largest complex in the world. Not in the United States; in the world. Last year, my association that I represent, we did 12,000 ships in the Mississippi River. There was 40,000 movements of vessels from the mouth of the river to Baton Rouge, 40,000 in 1 year. It is unbelievable. Thirty percent of the Nation’s oil, 60 percent of the Nation’s grain is shipped out of the Mississippi River system. If we would shut down the Mississippi River, and that has happened a few times, it is $295 million a day for the Country, and grows exponentially after the fourth day. A hundred percent of the channel helps us maintain cost effectiveness in the world market, $0.13 per bushel saving over highways or rail when dimensions are 100 percent. Narrow channels hinder our ability to compete globally. What happens there, a ship will come in to load cargo and he can’t get it all on that ship. So one would think, well, we will send it to the West Coast. That works for 1 year. After that we cannot compete with Brazil and Argentina. Now our prices are gone. Our farmers in the heartland lose that business. It is not acceptable when we have this money coming in. A closed Mississippi River system would dramatically affect gas prices, grain prices, all exports and imports. After our Hurricane Katrina, gas prices went up overnight because we had the refineries on the river. We couldn’t get fuel oil out; we couldn’t get aviation oil out. It is unbelievable. We need this. Someone mentioned about environmental. That is gigantic. We had an oil spill down there with BP. We have tankers coming in the Mississippi River system with 600,000 barrels of oil on one ship. If that ship runs ground and puts a hole, we have another BP in the Mississippi River system. But the travesty for that is very simple: that ship is paying. It is importing here, paying that tax, and here he could run aground and have another problem after he is paying money to come into the United States. That is unacceptable, ladies and gentlemen. Current draft at the present time is 45 by 700 feet. Channel width is crucial. Last year we were down to 100 feet from 750. We had to have one-way traffic.

The cost for the Mississippi River for the last 5 years, we have been underfunded by approximately $50 million a year. Fifty million a year. You know what I have to look for, and it is a shame in our great Country? I have to look for a catastrophe to put a supplemental on there to get funding.

Safety is a huge, huge factor. Chairman, you had an incident out there in California a few years ago. You know what happens when oil is dropped in the water: everybody is concerned; especially a pilot, especially the owners. We can’t have that. It happens sometimes with human error. It happens sometimes with mechanical. But it is not acceptable to have it happen when we have money coming in to keep our channels and ports open to project dimensions. The Administration said they would like to double exports. How can we double exports when I can’t load what we have today? It is impossible. I am just a pilot.

This is a problem that can be fixed with no new taxes. The money is being collected.

ANDREW H. CAIRNS, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS’ COASTS, OCEANS, PORTS AND RIVERS INSTITUTE; PORTS & MARINE—NORTHEAST LEAD, AECOM

The United States has approximately 300 commercial ports, 12,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways, and 240 lock chambers which carry more than 70 percent of the U.S. imports.

For this system to remain competitive, U.S. marine ports and inland waterways will require investment in the coming decades beyond the $14 billion currently expected to be spent. According to the ASCE’s Failure to Act Economic Study, aging infrastructure for marine ports and inland waterways threatens more than 1 million U.S. jobs. Additionally, between now and 2020, investment needs in the marine ports and inland waterways sector will total $30 billion nationwide. With planned expenditures only expected to be about $14 billion, a total Federal investment gap of nearly $16 billion remains. Meanwhile, the costs attributed to delays in the Nation’s inland waterways system were $33 billion in 2010, the cost is expected to increase to nearly $49 billion by 2020.

Fiscal Year 2013, the Obama administration requested $839 million to be appropriated from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. This amount equals only 50 percent of the total estimated revenues in the Trust Fund, and nowhere near the estimated needs, which, according to the Army Corps of Engineers, is between $1.3 billion and $1.6 billion annually.

This troubling trend toward reduced investments has led to ever- greater balances in the Trust Fund, with the unexpended balance growing to more than $6 billion by September 2013, according to the Office of Management and Budget. Therefore, the Committee should include a provision in the Water Resources Development Act requiring the total of all appropriations from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund be equal to all revenues received by the Trust Fund that same year.

SENATOR SHELDON WHITEHOUSE (RHODE ISLAND)

I come at this issue with a particular history and a particular context, and particularly when I hear Mr. Lorino and his wonderful voice and the message that he brings from the Mississippi and the Gulf Coast about the urgency of their problems, and that is that not too long ago in Congress we passed a piece of legislation that conferred an enormous multibillion dollar benefit along the Gulf Coast, and we did so as the result of an agreement that was reached that the bulk of the benefit was going to flow to the Gulf Coast, but that there would be a small portion that would accrue to the benefit of all coastal and Great Lakes States. After the agreement that allowed that to go forward was reached, the part that went to the benefit of all coastal and Great Lakes States was stripped out. An agreement was made and an agreement was broken. I am inclined to, and I want to, support enhanced traffic on the Mississippi River. I want to support the protection and growth of the port in Louisiana and, frankly, in Los Angeles and Alaska, and everywhere else. But the past bargain has to be honored for me to be very enthusiastic about going forward with further benefit that goes to the Gulf and to the Mississippi, and I just want to make that point.

Senator BOXER. Well, we are going to make another effort. There may be a way we can do something for the smaller ports here that really gives them an opportunity, because when you listen to Senator Whitehouse talk about his State, his State is in jeopardy right now, we know that, because of what is happening with the rising sea levels. He just needs to have some attention paid. In the last WRDA bill he was knew, I remember it. We really didn’t do what we should do. By the way, just saying to colleagues who are here, we had a really hard time drafting this bill because there are no more earmarks, and we have to take care of our States. So the way we did it here is to make sure that any project that had a complete Corps report which was sent down from the Corps would get funded without naming any projects or getting into all that. This could be very well the last WRDA bill that we can figure out how to do without naming projects after this one it is going to get increasingly more difficult.

Senator BOOZMAN. We need to establish some integrity before we protect it and go forward, much like the Highway Trust Fund and the Aviation Trust Fund. It is difficult to get done, but we can at least reach agreement. The more difficult thing is, once you have the trust fund, how do you divvy it up, realizing that it is system-wide? Los Angeles is remarkable in the sense that you have all this high- value stuff coming in there. You are creating about, I think, over 13% of the revenue that comes in, and because of the nature of your port you need more than what you are getting, but you are not getting very much of that 13% out. Some of our other ports through no fault of their own, are in situations where there is a lot more silting; there is just a lot more need for dredging and things, and that is the difference in the East Coast and the South. It is just the way it is. Then the other thing my ports that lead into the Mississippi River that ultimately come out and create some of this traffic, how do you do all that?

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. Even the Port of Stockton is suffering because of lack of maintenance funding. They have shoaling that means that iron ore ships loaded in Stockton cannot leave full, they have to leave light-loaded; they go to Oakland and then they get topped off. That is extremely inefficient.

Senator BOXER. I wanted to ask you about beneficial uses of dredge material. In your testimony you raised the possibility that increased spending from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund could create additional opportunities for beneficial use of dredge materials, such as wetlands restoration, and it was mentioned by Senator Cardin. Could you elaborate on some of the beneficial uses of dredge material that might be realized if we increased investment in dredging navigation channels?

Mr. LORINO. Beneficial use in the State of Louisiana is a very tough issue because of money. As I discussed a few minutes ago, we have $83 million to spend, and that is picking up sediment that comes down every year. The State would love us to use that for beneficial use. We would love to use that for beneficial use. But we are barely keeping our channel open. To use it for beneficial use, we have to transport it further. That would take time. There is not enough dredges to do that at the present time. So we have this conflict that is going back and forth. What I would like to see, if we could, and we are looking at a 50-foot channel also on the Mississippi River. Someone mentioned on the East Coast about the port study to get the 50 feet. They left out the bulk port, and that is very important. The Mississippi River is a bulk port. But if we could dredge, we could use a cutter head dredge and build the coast down in Plaquemines Parish that was devastated by Katrina.

 

June 10, 2008. S. HRG. 110–1165 Keeping America Moving: A review of national strategies for efficient freight movement. 74 pages.

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION & MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE 110th CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG (NEW JERSEY)

Today we’re going to take a closer look at how our Nation moves its freight by ship, truck, train, and barge, and the challenges that we must overcome to keep that freight and our economy moving in the future. Our country has one of the best freight transportation systems in the world. It’s the backbone of our economy. It carries the products that Americans rely on, such as food, clothing, toys, things that go on store shelves. Raw materials like coal, lumber, fuel and iron required to manufacture all kinds of goods are also moved as freight. Just-in-time delivery and real-time tracking of shipments have greatly reduced the need for companies to hold huge inventories because we can count on goods being there when needed.

But our economy is threatened by the current state of the transportation infrastructure and its inability to meet future demands. 25% of our Nation’s bridges are functionally deficient. Even when these bridges are repaired, our highways along with our ports and railroads will be overwhelmed. Congestion on our roads already costs our country nearly $80 billion a year. On the rails, some trains take a day to just cross the City of Chicago.

To keep getting the goods we need in the future, we’ve got to invest in our transportation infrastructure right now. Building roads will not solve all of our problems and in some places it’s not even possible.

Trains and barges can reduce highway congestion and wear and tear on our roads and bridges. They’re also more energy efficient than trucks, which will aid our fight against global warming, and help us become more energy independent. We need to encourage these efficiencies to the maximum extent possible. The Federal Government has to step up and play a leadership role in planning our future transportation network, one which takes these benefits into account.

One gallon of diesel can carry a ton of freight if it goes by truck 155 miles, by rail 413 miles, and by barge 576 miles. This tells you about the significant part of what we’ve got to do and the problem that we have if we don’t take advantage of these time-saving and value-saving changes.

 

SENATOR AMY KLOBUCHAR (MINNESOTA)

I’ve seen the tremendous potential for biofuels in our state, but then see that we have a transportation system that’s actually worn down from the increase in biofuels and from the weight of these new products, and yet we aren’t keeping up.

 

GLENN VANSELOW, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PACIFIC NORTHWEST WATERWAYS ASSOCIATION

The Northwest ports ship 90 million tons of cargo worth $60 billion. The Columbia River is the Nation’s number one gateway for the export of wheat and barley. Seattle and Tacoma form the country’s third largest gateway for containerized cargo. A typical barge can carry 1,500 tons on the Mississippi and 3,500 tons on the Columbia and Snake Rivers. That compares with 100 tons by rail car or 29 tons per truck. For the Columbia River, loading a typical grain ship with 55,000 tons of wheat for export requires four barge tows or 550 rail cars or 1,900 trucks.

Since 1789, the Federal Government has exerted control over navigation channels and channel improvements. In 1824, Congress delegated authority over the Nation’s navigation system to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Operations and maintenance and new construction of navigation projects are funded annually in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill. Since 1978 there has been a user fee on the Nation’s inland waterways, the Inland Waterways User Fee. In 1986, Congress established a user fee for deep draft coastal ports and harbors, the Harbor Maintenance Tax.

Money collected every year

  • $1.5 billion inland and deep draft user fees put into the Harbor Maintenance Trust fund. But only $900 million is expended. The surplus of collections over expenditures is over $4 billion. The GAO reports that the surplus is expected to grow to $8 billion by 2011. Rather than being used for their intended purpose, at least $500 million of these user fees is instead used to balance the Federal budget. The Harbor Maintenance Tax was established to collect fees to provide 100% of the cost of operations and maintenance, primarily dredging, of the Nation’s deep draft and coastal ports and harbors.
  • $21 billion Customs duties
  • $80 million Inland Waterways Fuel Tax to provide for 50% of the cost of new construction and rehabilitation of locks on the Nation’s inland waterways. It collects 20 cents per gallon of fuel used by towboats on the inland waterways.

Despite the collection of these fees, navigation needs are not being met. There is a significant backlog of maintenance and new construction.

The Inland Waterways Trust Fund had a surplus for many years, but now, expenditures are projected to surpass collections in 2009. The Administration has proposed instituting a new inland waterway tax which would replace the fuel tax with a lockage fee for each barge. The proposal would increase the user tax approximately 4-fold for barging on the Columbia and Snake Rivers. PNWA opposes this new tax.

Despite collections far exceeding expenditures, the Administration does not propose sufficient funding to maintain the existing navigation system or to meet future needs. For decades, during both Republican and Democratic administrations, we have had to look to Congress for increases over and above the inadequate Administration budget proposals.

Unfortunately, having money in a Federal trust fund does not mean that the money is actually available to be spent for its designated purpose. That is wrong. User fees were instituted to meet a specific funding need. The funds collected from navigation user fees must be spent to meet navigation needs. Congress has the authority to make this happen. We urge Congress to exercise that authority.

We encourage Congress to reinvigorate our Nation’s navigation infrastructure by funding navigation at levels that match the overall collection of user taxes. That is what is necessary to meet our Nation’s vital economic needs. That would equate to an annual increase of $500 million nationally.

Pacific Northwest examples

As an example of how this affects the Pacific Northwest, I have attached a copy of PNWA’s appropriations request for FY 2009. We track 32 navigation projects from Humboldt Bay in California, up the Oregon Coast, along the entire length of the Columbia Snake River System in Oregon, Washington and Idaho, to the Ports of Seattle and Tacoma and the northern reaches of the Puget Sound in Washington. Of those 32 navigation projects, 29 are in need of additional funding. In other words, the Administration’s budget proposal provides adequate funding for only three of our region’s 32 navigation projects. Additional funding is needed in all categories . . . general investigations, new construction and routine operations and maintenance. Here are a few examples.

On the Columbia Snake River System, Congressional adds are needed to maintain authorized channel depth throughout the Columbia and Lower Willamette project. Two of our eight locks need Congressional adds for routine operations and maintenance. Five need adds for major maintenance and repairs. One needs additional funding for dredging to maintain authorized channel depth. Oregon’s coastal ports need funds added for routine dredging to maintain their navigation channels and for jetty repairs. In Puget Sound, the Lake Washington Ship Canal needs a Congressional add to meet Endangered Species Act requirements. More funding is needed for the Elliott Bay Seawall study in Seattle. In California, Humboldt Bay needs funding to complete a long term sediment management feasibility study. Congress has responded in past years. Those hard fought increases have been important, and very much appreciated, but they have not been sufficient to prevent navigation infrastructure from further deteriorating.

PNWA supports full funding for these critical projects. These ports, home to fishing fleets, marinas and significant commercial and recreational facilities, are critical to the economic survival of their communities. Many have small populations, and the ports provide employment for a significant proportion of community.

Mr. VANSELOW. For both Republican and Democratic administrations we’ve had the problem that the Administration in the President’s budget underfunds those collections dramatically. Again, we’re at $4 billion-plus today. It will be growing by approximately a billion dollars a year over the next few years.

Senator SMITH. Well, my friend the Chairman—it’s easy to pick on the Bush Administration. We had the same problem with the Clinton Administration. This isn’t a Republican or Democratic problem.

Senator LAUTENBERG. He said that and I heard it. I was disappointed to hear it.

Senator SMITH. This is money that we are taking. We’re already collecting enough taxes and we’re just simply spending it on other general fund issues. But the point is the inefficiencies that flow from this, the energy waste that comes from this, is a bipartisan shame and I think we ought to fix it. my take-home to this is that we have not a Republican problem, not a Democratic problem, not a tax collection problem. We have a tax allocation problem.

Senator LAUTENBERG. I wanted to ask this question generally. Some have suggested that we could reduce truck traffic on our highways by using barges and ships to move freight between two U.S. ports on marine highways. But a shipment from overseas that then travels between these two U.S. ports faces double taxation because it pays the Federal Harbor Maintenance Tax twice. Now, might removing this tax for the domestic portion of this shipment provide incentive for these so-called short-sea shipping moves to get more trucks off the road?

Mr. VANSELOW. If you don’t mind, Mr. Chairman, I’m going to use your question to speak a little more broadly about the Harbor Maintenance Tax. First, industry does not object to a tax. We do believe that it is necessary to fund navigation. These are all Federal channels. They are all maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. They are all appropriated by Congress, and it is the user fee that should be paying for that. The user fee does have some issues. One we’ve talked about, the surplus. Others, we have had an issue at our north and south borders, where Seattle and Tacoma, for example, are competing with Vancouver, B.C., and they are advertising no Harbor Maintenance Tax here, trying to woo cargo away from U.S. ports. This is cargo destined to U.S. importers, but moving through a foreign country to get there. So there are other issues. We do believe that we do need to take care of those kinds of movements. If a cargo is taxed once coming into the United States, that ought to be all that it is taxed.

One of the issues that we have is it is the largest ports in the country that need the ability to exercise short-sea shipping because of their capacity constraints. We have a problem through OMB and administration priorities, it is the largest ports in the country that are the top priority for getting funding for expenditure out of that Harbor Maintenance Tax. The smaller ports, which could be the feeder ports, are the ones that Senator Smith just remarked are zero in the Administration’s budget proposal. We have to come to Congress to ask for more. So if we could more broadly spend that—it’s not just L.A. and Long Beach that needs money. Their overflow opportunities go to Oxnard and Port Hueneme and elsewhere on the California coast. We have the same issues in the Pacific Northwest.

 

 

 

Posted in Congressional Record U.S., Ships and Barges | Comments Off on Congressional hearings on why the Inland water way system is falling apart

Why U.S. Is Running Out of Gas (Time magazine 2003)

Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele. July 21, 2003.  Why U.S. Is Running Out of Gas. Time Magazine.

Inflated oil prices and natural gas shortages are wiping out jobs and savings, thanks to three decades of bungled energy policy. Get ready for more bungling.

If all goes according to plan, the U.S. Senate in the next few weeks will follow the House and approve the latest in a long line of national energy policies. This one incorporates a favorite initiative of President George W. Bush’s—the hydrogen-powered car. In his State of the Union address in January, the President proposed “$1.2 billion in research funding so that America can lead the world in developing clean, hydrogen-powered automobiles.” As the President explained, his goal was “to promote energy independence … in ways that generations before us could not have imagined.”

Democrats joined euphoric Republicans in signing on to the proposal. “The supply of hydrogen is inexhaustible,” Senator Byron Dorgan, North Dakota Democrat, told his colleagues. “Hydrogen is in water. You can take the energy from the wind and use the electricity in the process of electrolysis, separate the hydrogen from the oxygen and store the hydrogen and use it in vehicles. The fact is, hydrogen is ubiquitous. It is everywhere.”

Was this a rare instance of the two parties working together in Washington for the good of the country? Far from it. They’ve been doing this energy dance off and on for 30 years.

At the time of the first energy crisis, in 1974, President Richard M. Nixon put forth Project Independence to end American reliance on foreign oil through a series of energy programs, among them “hydrogen-fueled vehicles” that could be developed “to enable a shift away from oil.” Takeoff date for the new technology: 1990. Members of Congress were enthusiastic about the hydrogen car then too. “Hydrogen offers us great potential as a fuel for the future,” said Representative Charles Vanik, Ohio Democrat. Representative Robert Wilson, a California Republican, was equally excited: “We can now look forward to running our automobiles on water.”

But hydrogen power went nowhere then, just as it went nowhere when it was trumpeted nearly a century ago. It will probably go nowhere today, for many reasons, most notably a chronic case of short attention span among American politicians when it comes to energy policy. With great fanfare, lawmakers and Presidents—both Democrats and Republicans—announce sweeping plans to end or ease American dependence on foreign oil and find other stable sources of energy. When the headlines and television sound bites fade away, however, they scrap the programs, which then are often reintroduced to an unsuspecting public as new in later years by another generation of lawmakers and Presidents. But changing anything as deep-seated as America’s habits of energy use calls for consistency and follow through, so the failure of Washington to stick with hardly any of its plans has wound up making the U.S. more dependent than ever on foreign sources.

Now Congress is about to enact yet another doomed energy policy that promises more of the same. Take hydrogen. Ideally, the gas would be extracted from water using fusion technology. But that won’t be available for decades. In the interim, a substitute energy source would be used—natural gas. Yes, the same natural gas already in short supply.

Then there’s coal. The Senate bill would authorize spending $200 million a year to study and develop “clean coal” technologies. But that’s a substantial comedown from the billions spent in the 1970s and 1980s to encourage development of an industry that would turn coal into oil and synthetic gas, enabling the U.S. to dramatically curb imports. It never came about.

The Senate bill also contains an assortment of goodies. It would hand out $3.5 billion to revive America’s moribund nuclear power industry—even though the last order for a plant that actually went online was placed in 1973. It would parcel out nearly $10 billion in tax breaks and subsidies to oil and gas companies that will not erase falling production but instead enrich oilmen and investors. At the same time, the President’s proposed budget slashes spending on wind research by 5.5%, zero-energy buildings by 50% and biomass by 19%. To add to the insult, the Administration took the money to print its 170-page 2001 National Energy Policy out of the budget for renewable fuels.

This comes at a time when Americans are heading into their first big energy squeeze since the 1970s: a shortage of natural gas, the invisible resource used to heat homes, fuel kitchen appliances, generate electricity and manufacture many of the chemicals we use. The shortage has triggered a sharp rise in prices that is likely to exact a heavy toll on low- and middle-income Americans, especially those living on fixed incomes. Home heating bills last winter more than doubled in some areas, and they are expected to go up at least another 20% this winter. Electric bills also will spike because generating plants are increasingly gas-fueled. And in places like Louisiana, where the petrochemical industry makes up a big part of the local economy, the shortage is causing a loss of jobs, with at least 2,000 layoffs so far. The entire industry may be forced to move offshore over the next few years if there is no relief.

Beth Wilson, a stay-at-home mom in Hobart, Ind., 35 miles southeast of Chicago, is still seething over last winter’s bills from Northern Indiana Public Service Co., known as NIPSCO. In March 2002, Wilson paid the utility 33(cent) a heating unit for the family’s two-bedroom home. By March of this year, the price had shot up to 86(cent), an increase of 161%. If the price of new cars had risen at the same pace, a midrange Ford Taurus would sell for $54,000 today. Says Wilson: “I never turn my heat up past 68. I didn’t want to turn my ceiling fan on.” (NIPSCO also furnishes her electricity.) “How can other people on fixed incomes pay if I can’t?”

For consumers, the second part of this one-two punch is exaggerated oil prices. While the world is swimming in crude oil, it already trades at an inflated price of $30 a bbl., a level essentially dictated by Saudi Arabia with the approval of the U.S. government. This translates into swollen prices for gasoline, home heating oil and other petroleum products. What’s worse is that because of Congress’s three decades of fumbled energy legislation, Americans have become more vulnerable than ever to an interruption in foreign supply that would truly send prices into orbit and cripple the U.S. economy. More than 53% of America’s daily consumption of oil and petroleum products comes from foreign sources, compared with 35% in 1973.

Why are Congress and the White House responsible? As part of a long-standing ritual involving Democrats and Republicans, lawmakers and Presidents have devised energy plans that add up to no plan at all—not deliberately but by default. In pursuit of different agendas, competing interests tend to cancel one another out over time, leaving the nation with no coherent direction on energy. Lawmakers launch programs to develop alternative- energy supplies but later quietly cut or eliminate the funding so there are no realistic alternative sources.

They enact legislation offering incentives to stimulate crude-oil production in the U.S., when the politicians know—or should know—that the programs will not do so in any significant way. They encourage utilities, businesses and industries to shift to natural gas, then fail to ensure sufficient supplies of the fuel. The lawmakers refuse to make the tough choices on energy supplies and consumption, while they cater to the demands of campaign contributors and special interests. Worst of all, when politicians craft a conservation program that actually works, they abandon it. As a result, after three decades and dozens of energy bills, Congress has helped position Americans so they may be closer to an energy crisis than at any time since the oil shocks of the 1970s. And this time, the U.S. is finally beginning to run out of domestic oil and easily recoverable natural gas. Here is how it happened:

NATURAL GAS: THE CONGRESSIONAL FLIP-FLOP. A quarter-century ago, Congress enacted the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, which banned after 1990 the burning of natural gas by power plants to generate electricity. The reasoning: because that fuel was in short supply and was most widely used to heat homes—it goes to half of all residences—it should be preserved for that purpose. Pete Domenici, the Republican Senator from New Mexico, told his colleagues that year, “Almost since we found natural gas we have been busy finding ways to abuse it, waste it, literally throw it away on uses that we are now finding are absolutely the wrong thing to do, and basic among those that are wasteful are … the use of natural gas to generate electricity.”

As the years slipped by, Congress reversed course. Prodded by the Reagan Administration, lawmakers repealed the ban in 1987 and opened the door to construction of natural gas-guzzling power plants. Three years later, they amended the environmental rules to discourage the burning of coal—America’s most plentiful fuel—to produce electricity. Predictably, the generation of electricity with natural gas, which had fallen 17% from 1979 to 1987, has shot up 151% since then, reaching a record 686 billion kWh last year. Nearly a fifth of all U.S. electricity is now generated with natural gas, and 88% of all new generating plants built in the past decade use the fuel. Meanwhile, U.S. production of natural gas has remained stagnant at 19 trillion cu. ft. a year, about the same as a decade ago. But the U.S. consumed 22 trillion cu. ft., up 8% during that time. Because natural gas moves more efficiently by pipeline than tanker (for which it needs to be liquefied), the difference comes mostly from Canada. Now the Canadians are running low, and exports to the U.S. are expected to be flat, or possibly even decline.

During these same years, Congress prohibited drilling for natural gas offshore for environmental reasons.

Earlier, in the 1970s, it had studied and then rejected building a natural-gas pipeline from the Arctic, where there are substantial gas reserves, south through Canada to serve the U.S. The worry was that Canada would hold the U.S. economic hostage.

This time around, the energy bill calls for taxpayer subsidies to build a needlessly longer and far more costly pipeline that follows a roundabout path. Called the Southern Route, it starts at the North Slope and heads south along the Alaskan highway before turning east into Canada. A far more direct path, called the Northern Route, would have cut across the north coast of Alaska and hooked up in Canada with the recently announced Mackenzie Valley pipeline. Both lines ultimately would feed into trunk lines in Alberta and serve the U.S. market.

Why the meandering route? In 2001 the Alaska state legislature enacted a law blocking the cheaper northern pipeline. Lawmakers wanted a pork-barrel project to keep construction and supplier jobs in the state. State representative Jim Whitaker, a Fairbanks Republican who sponsored the measure, summed up the state’s attitude: “The legislature has a responsibility to ensure that Alaska gas goes to market in a manner that is in the maximum best interest of the people of the state of Alaska.” Congress has agreed. In the years that it will take North Slope gas to reach the lower 48 states, natural-gas prices will keep moving up. In the short run, high temperatures this summer could produce spikes in prices and regional brownouts. In June natural gas sold for an average of $5.83 per 1 million btus, up 169% from the same week in 1998. Higher prices already are taking their toll on energy-dependent industries, like those that produce ammonia, the key ingredient in fertilizer. In June 1998 the Louisiana Ammonia Producers trade association had nine corporate members with 3,500 employees. Today it has one, CF Industries. “We’ve lost 2,000 employees,” says Jim Harris, a spokesman for the producers, who accounted for 40% of America’s ammonia output. “It’s been devastating. The high natural-gas costs have been the overwhelming reason plants have closed. It’s completely depressed the whole area.”

Other businesses have sounded the alarm, among them a consortium of nearly two dozen companies, including pharmaceutical makers (Abbott Laboratories), brewers (Coors), chemical companies (Dow) and makers of building materials (Owens Corning). They have urged President Bush “to declare war on high natural-gas prices.” Heading a list of recommendations: “Maximize use of other energy sources for power generation.”

At the same time that Louisiana factories are laying off workers because of gas prices, the U.S. is shipping gas to Mexico to generate electricity there. While the volume is still comparatively small, exports nonetheless have swelled 674% over the past seven years, to 263 billion cu. ft. last year. El Paso Energy, for one, pipes gas directly to the new Samalayuca II power plant, about 25 miles south of Ciudad Juarez. It serves 1 million people and some 300 factories south of the border. The potentially chronic natural-gas shortage and its impact on the economy and employment have even Alan Greenspan worried. Talking about the many industries dependent on natural gas, the Federal Reserve chairman told the Senate Energy Committee last week that “we do see the obvious loss of jobs … because it has made us largely uncompetitive in a number of industries in which gas is a critical input.” He also saw little hope that prices would fall. “We are not apt to return to earlier periods of relative abundance and low prices anytime soon,” he said.

LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS: BACK TO THE FUTURE. To meet the surging demand for natural gas in the short term, Greenspan does see a solution: liquefied natural gas (lng). He has told Congress that “given notable cost reductions for both liquefaction and transportation of lng, significant global trade is developing. And high gas prices projected in the American distant futures market have made us a potential very large importer.”

Translation: Because natural-gas prices are going up—and are going to stay up—it’s now time to bring in more expensive lng from the Caribbean, the Middle East, Africa and possibly Russia. To import natural gas, it must be chilled to minus 260(degree)F, which converts it to a liquid and reduces its volume. An amount that would normally fill a beach ball can fit inside a Ping-Pong ball. When the liquid arrives at terminals in the U.S., it is slowly warmed up, returned to a vapor form and sent through pipelines.

The U.S. tried to build an lng supply line once before but, in typical fashion, abandoned it. During the last natural-gas shortage in the 1970s, when lawmakers voted to ban its burning to generate electricity, they also encouraged the establishment of the lng industry with taxpayer- guaranteed loans and grants. Special tankers, the most expensive ships in the world at the time, were built along with four terminals and re-gasification facilities at Cove Point, Md., near Baltimore, as well as in Georgia, Louisiana and Massachusetts. The first lng shipments arrived in 1978. In April 1980, Morris Udall, the Democratic Representative from Arizona, told the House that a Congressional Office of Technology Assessment report concluded that lng imports, “if encouraged, could double by 1990 and meet as much as 7% to 13% of U.S. natural-gas needs.” It was not to be. A series of events conspired to derail the policy. The Algerians, who shipped the lng, jacked up the price. The Carter Administration and the natural-gas and pipeline companies balked at paying more. After months of fruitless negotiations, the deal unraveled. The ships went elsewhere. Cove Point and two other plants closed. It was the end of the lng experiment. But the shortage has triggered a scramble to reverse course. Today Cove Point is being expanded and will reopen soon. The plants in the three other states are already open, and plans are on the drawing board for two dozen more.

OIL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS: PROMISES, PROMISES. In 1973, with the country importing 6 million bbl. of crude oil and petroleum products daily, President Nixon pledged that by virtue of his Project Independence “in the year 1980, the United States will not be dependent on any other country for the energy we need to provide our jobs, to heat our homes, and to keep our transportation moving.”

He advanced a catalog of energy proposals that covered everything from drilling on the outer continental shelf to building more nuclear power plants, from expanding the use of coal to conducting research on potential new sources. In the end it didn’t work, and the U. S. failed to come close to his goal of energy independence. While the yearly numbers rose and fell, by 1980 net oil imports had increased 400,000 bbl. a day over 1973.

After the second oil shock hit America in 1979, Washington’s wandering attention was focused again on energy. Following Nixon’s lead, President Carter pushed development of synthetic fuels as part of his strategy to slash imports. When he signed the Energy Security Act into law in June 1980, Carter said it would “encourage production of 2 million bbl. a day of synthetic fuels by the year 1992.” That didn’t work either: synthetic-fuel production ended up slightly in excess of zero, and oil imports totaled 6.9 million bbl. a day that year.

Throughout the years, in one energy debate after another, lawmakers and Presidents insisted that if they handed out enough incentives, U.S. oil production would rise, and there would be less need for imports. In each instance, legislation was accompanied by extravagant forecasts not only by lawmakers but by energy-company officials as well. In 1974 policymakers predicted that U.S. oil production “could increase to more than 17 million barrels a day, which is more than sufficient to be at zero imports by 1985.” The Reagan White House shared the optimism. A spokesman said that “the ranges that any reasonable person is considering include zero (imports) by 2000.” By that year, however, imports were at their highest level ever, and domestic production had declined to levels not seen since 1950. Now President Bush has his own plan to jump-start oil production.

He wants to begin drilling in a portion of the 1.5 million-acre arctic coastal-plain area of the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge (anwr), which covers a total of 19 million acres. According to the White House, the President “believes that opening this small area to environmentally responsible exploration would provide the resources necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of oil and provide for greater energy security.”

The reduction would be modest. Even if the ANWR would yield 1 million bbl. daily of crude oil, as suggested by the President, by the time pipelines are built and production gets under way, the oil would displace less than 10% of U.S. imports. And there are no guarantees for the 1 million bbl. In the early days of the North Slope project, politicians predicted that consumers would get 3.8 million bbl. of crude oil daily out of Alaska “by the end of the century.” Instead production hit a high of 2 million bbl. in 1988—the only year at that level— and then began to trail off, dropping to 984,000 bbl. last year.

To make matters worse, the U.S. is confronted with a refinery gap—just as it was in the 1973-74 oil crisis. The U. S. consumed 19.8 million bbl. a day of petroleum products last year, but its refineries could process only 16. 6 million bbl. of crude oil. The 3.2 million barrel difference was made up through imports of finished products like gasoline and jet fuel, which are even more susceptible to supply disruptions than crude oil.

Following the energy debacles of the 1970s, the industry began adding refinery capacity. By 1980, it could process all the crude oil required to meet demand, but that lasted only until 1985. The gap has been widening ever since.

CONSERVATION—BUT NOT FOR REAL MEN. After the 1973-74 energy crisis, when gas stations closed on Sundays and motorists waited in lines for hours to fill up, Congress enacted a series of tough conservation measures. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 imposed stringent mileage requirements on automakers—an average of 27. 5 m.p.g. on passenger cars by model year 1985—to curb gasoline consumption. It worked.

In the decade before the act’s passage, gasoline consumption had risen 48%, to 6.5 million bbl. a day in 1974. In years to follow, even with millions more cars on the highways, consumption remained largely unchanged.

Beginning at 7 million bbl. a day in 1976, demand went up and down in a narrow range and by 1991 was at just 7. 2 million.

During the 1980s, as it became clear gasoline conservation was working, aided by a nasty recession, one energy forecast after another anticipated ever better mileage. The American Petroleum Institute, swept up by auto-industry fervor, announced in September 1981 that “forecasts of fuel efficiency for new cars now exceed those mandates (27.5 m.p.g.), suggesting an industry-fleet average of 30 m.p.g. by 1985.”

Not exactly: this year the average is still 27.5 m.p.g. for vehicles officially labeled as passenger cars, but for the entire fleet of vehicles, including suvs and trucks, it is much worse. The best overall fuel economy of 22.1 m.p.g. (for U.S.- made vehicles) was achieved in 1987-88. Aside from an occasional upward tick, that figure has inched steadily downward, to 20.4 m.p.g. last year.

That’s because Congress lost interest in conservation and failed to keep the pressure on the car companies. Lawmakers refused to set new mileage goals. Worse, they excluded from the existing requirements light trucks and suvs, the fastest-selling vehicles and the ones that use the most gasoline. Contributing even more to the trend, they extended an extraordinary tax benefit to the gas guzzlers, so drivers who used a vehicle for work could write off the cost on their tax returns—even as much as $38,200 toward a new Hummer H2 that gets only 10 m. p.g. As might be expected, consumption rose 1.5 million bbl. a day over the past decade, to 8.8 million last year. But for owners of pricey vehicles like the Hummer, it keeps getting better. The tax-cutting bill signed into law in May expanded the write-off to $100,000.

For its part, the Bush Administration is dismissive of serious conservation. Vice President Cheney, who headed an Administration task force to devise an energy strategy—a group whose work was carried out in secret and whose papers remain secret—expressed the attitude two years ago in a now infamous way: “Conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient basis for a sound, comprehensive energy policy.”

Representative Raymond Green, a Texas Democrat, was more blunt when the House earlier this year beat back an attempt to raise mileage standards. While allowing that he was for “better gas mileage,” said Green: “We come from a big state that wants big trucks and big cars.”

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY: HERE COMES THE SUN, AND THERE IT GOES AGAIN. No alternative-energy source has captured the imagination of lawmakers and Presidents like the sun. For three decades, solar energy’s champions on Capitol Hill have insisted that the harnessing of this free and unlimited supply of energy was just around the corner. Representative Charles Mosher, Ohio Republican, was among the ardent supporters in 1974. “Much of the technology needed to utilize this nonpolluting source of power is nearly at hand,” Mosher said in a speech on the House floor. “In fact, the consensus is that there are no major technical barriers to the widespread application of solar energy to meet U.S. energy needs.”

With that notion in mind, President Carter in 1980 pushed legislation that he said would help “us to reach our goal of deriving 20% of all the energy we use by the end of this century directly from the sun.” The forecast proved breathtakingly overreaching. Last year solar energy accounted for about seven one-hundredths of 1% of all U.S. energy consumption. The Bush energy package includes a $2,000 tax credit for individuals who buy and install photovoltaic or solar water-heating equipment in their residences.

Nothing new here: the government has been selling solar for years with generous tax incentives. Most of the public, though, isn’t buying. And people who do often have memorable experiences. A quarter-century ago, the owners of a 13-story, 64-unit co-op at 924 West End Avenue on New York City’s Upper West Side erected a steel framework on the rooftop, welded it to the building’s steel beams and attached 117 solar-collector panels.

Water heated by the sun flowed through pipes into a 5,000-gallon storage tank in the building’s old coal bin and from there into the building’s hot-water system. The project was funded in part with a $112,000 federal grant. Today the solar experiment is long gone. A building workman told Time that the collectors behaved like sails, swaying back and forth so much that water leaked into apartments below. It cost several million dollars to repair the roof, he said.

But solar is hardly the only alternative energy source that has failed to live up to the promises of its congressional supporters. Just as both parties have embraced President Bush’s hydrogen initiative, they have also signed on to another of his long-shot proposals, one he says will provide “clean, safe, renewable and commercially available fusion energy by the middle of this century.”

Unlike nuclear fission, the splitting of uranium atoms that powers nuclear reactors, fusion joins hydrogen atoms to unleash far more energy. The trick is to control the fusion reaction to generate electricity. It has been an elusive goal for half a century and probably will be for many decades to come. Even so, according to the President, “commercialization of fusion has the potential to dramatically improve America’s energy security while significantly reducing air pollution and emissions of greenhouse gases.”

That’s about what President Carter envisioned more than 20 years ago—albeit with a different timetable—when he signed into law the Magnetic Fusion Engineering Act in 1980. Said Carter: “Fusion power offers the potential for a limitless energy source with manageable environmental effects.” The law established as a national goal the successful operation of a magnetic fusion-demonstration plant in the U.S. by 2000.

The cost was put at $20 billion. As Congress is given to do after announcing grand projects, it slimmed down appropriations to less than $10 billion. U.S. researchers eventually teamed up with colleagues in several countries, but in 1998 Congress pulled the plug on the consortium, contending that it was too expensive.

President Bush, however, reversed that decision. The White House announced last January that the U.S. “will join … an ambitious international research project to harness the promise of fusion energy, the same form of energy that powers the sun. America will join negotiations with Canada, Europe, Japan, Russia and China to create the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (iter). This will be the largest and most technologically sophisticated fusion experiment in the world.” Actually, it’s the same consortium to which the

U. S. had been party in the 1990s and from which it then bailed out.

So it is that the U.S. is likely to be faced with recurring oil and natural-gas crises for some years to come. Their duration and severity remain to be seen. But volatile prices—as with gasoline during the Iraqi war, natural gas last winter and electricity in 2000—are all but guaranteed. The result is a hidden tax of tens of billions of dollars on American consumers. Just how many billions depends on a catalog of variables ranging from the harshness of the weather to unfolding events in the Middle East. More important, it depends on whether Congress and the White House, Democrats and Republicans, come up with a thoughtful energy policy that imposes tough conservation and efficiency measures, promotes research to develop one or two realistic alternative energy forms in commercial quantities and encourages production from a mix of existing energy sources. But none of this will be worth the effort unless the U.S. sticks with a plan long enough for it to pay off.

—With reporting by Laura Karmatz/New York and Eric Roston/Washington, with research by Joan Levinstein/New York

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House Representative Stewart Udall (Arizona) 2005 Time to discard 50 years of energy myths

Stewart Udall and Matthew R. Simmons. Nov 20, 2005. Time to discard fifty years of energy myths. Arizona Daily Star.

Stewart Udall was elected to Congress more than 50 years ago, and served as secretary of the Interior during a vast expansion of the nation’s wilderness areas. For the last 35 years, Matt Simmons has been one of the world’s leading energy investment bankers, while writing widely on energy trends. One of us is a Democrat, one a Republican, but both of us believe that the nation can no longer afford fanciful, indulgent, “Alice in Wonderland” energy policies that place our economic prosperity and national security at risk. Stewart Udall, a former Arizona congressman, served as secretary of Interior in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Matthew R. Simmons is chairman of Simmons & Co. International, an energy investment banking firm. His recent book, “Twilight in the Desert,” is an investigation of Saudi Arabia’s oil industry.

This summer’s hurricanes have triggered the most serious energy emergency in the nation’s history. With gasoline, natural gas and heating oil at near-record highs, many families face the chilly prospect of much higher energy bills in the future. The entire economy is at risk, but airlines, tourism, farmers, small business, seniors and the poor are particularly threatened.

Katrina and Rita ravaged the Gulf of Mexico’s petroleum infrastructure, but a larger, more daunting crisis was already on the horizon.

To craft an intelligent response, we must begin by discarding 50 years of energy myths.

Because our continent had huge reserves of oil, coal and natural gas, Americans have nurtured a set of energy illusions that have now come home, in biblical fashion, to haunt us.

The most dangerous myth is that cheap energy is our birthright, that the well will never run dry.

This illusion was born in the early 1950s, when U.S. oil fields provided two-thirds of the planet’s petroleum. Oil was so abundant that domestic producers were required to curtail production to prevent a price collapse. For lack of a market, large plumes of natural gas, now our most precious heating fuel, were flared into the sky.

And atomic energy, the new kid on the block, promised an infinite supply of almost-free electricity. In this euphoric moment, our nation began to fashion a new way of living unlike anything ever seen on the planet.

For a half century, we designed skyscrapers, autos, cities and houses on the assumption that energy would remain inexpensive. In the ’50s, we invented the suburb, the shopping center and the Interstate Highway System. In the ’60s we bought Mustangs. In the ’70s we visited the moon, and in the ’80s we built the world’s most powerful military. Between 1950 and 2005, the country’s population doubled and the economy grew sixfold.

Although advanced technology, superb engineering and Yankee ingenuity played vital roles, it was cheap energy that invented U.S. prosperity. Even at today’s prices, a dime buys enough electricity to lift a pickup truck 500 feet in the air. A gallon of gasoline contains as much energy as that expended riding a bicycle across the United States or hiking 300 miles across Arizona.

Because energy was affordable and abundant, we learned to consume enormous quantities. In recent decades our “burn rate” has been the equivalent of 100 pounds of coal per person-day. Americans now consume their body weight in petroleum products each week.

Energy may be a sliver of gross domestic product – but try running the rest of the economy without it. Energy, not money, is the original currency, the source of all wealth. We share this view even though we come from vastly different backgrounds.

The coming months will pose an enormous challenge, with the highest heating bills in U.S. history and the prospect of natural gas rationing. It is a time for bold, courageous leadership, but to date the political response can be summarized as “pray for a mild winter.” Although the near-term challenges are dwarfed by those of the coming decade, our leaders continue sleepwalking.

Katrina showed us what happens when you unplug modern energy: Civilization unravels. Because energy is the prerequisite for economic prosperity, social stability and environmental well-being, we must discard the dangerous myths of the past and embrace the momentous challenges of the future.

U.S. oil production peaked 35 years ago and no amount of drilling can turn back the clock.

  • Depletion rates in natural gas wells have reached alarming levels.
  • The nation’s energy workforce and infrastructure are aging.
  • No new refineries have been built in 30 years.
  • Our population is increasing by 30 million each decade.
  • Chinese oil demand is surging.
  • Finally, the cornucopian assumption that the Middle East holds unlimited amounts of oil is false.
  • Approximately three dozen aging fields produce most of that region’s supply. The thesis that the Saudis could open the tap as wide as necessary is appealing but fictitious. As a result, world oil production is likely to peak within the next decade, if not sooner.

In short, the era of cheap energy is over. Where to from here?

More drilling? Of course we will need to do more drilling, if only to stay where we are. But research shows that more than half the energy used in this country is lost in inefficient power plants, buildings and cars.

Efficiency must be the rallying call. Conservation is, well, conservative, the single most patriotic thing we can do. Longer term, we’ve got to acquire more accurate information about the true state of the world’s aging oil fields, reorganize our work patterns, modernize our shipping and transportation systems, refurbish our aging energy infrastructure, weatherize tens of millions of buildings, and exponentially expand the production of domestic biofuels, wind and solar power, while replacing 225 million automobiles and light trucks with far more efficient vehicles. This scope of work is not optional: It is an urgent matter of national preservation.

If we ignore the current crisis or misread its message, the world as we know it is likely to become a far darker place for our children.

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House of Representatives Roscoe Bartlett 2005

[ Former Congressman Roscoe Bartlett has discussed peak oil many times in the congressional record. Here are some of his earliest remarks for those of you interested in peak oil history.  He educated the other house members and formed a peak oil caucus consisting of the following House representatives: Mr. Udall of New Mexico, Mr. Goode, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Jones of North Carolina, Mr. Tancredo, Mr. Gingrey, Mr. Kuhl of New York, Mr. Israel, Mr. Butterfield, Mr. UDALL of Colorado, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Gilchrest, and Mr. Wynn). Peak oil activists have and are doing everything they can to alert leaders of the coming crisis so that proper preparations are made, but for reasons listed in “Why do political, economic, and scientific leaders deny Peak Oil and Climate Change?” it is unlikely that government will do anything about energy descent (except perhaps at local levels) Alice Friedemann, www.energyskeptic.com]

March 14, 2005    US Congressional Record [H1409]

http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2005_record&docid=cr14mr05-103.pdf

Peak Oil Presentation in the US Congress By Roscoe Bartlett  http://www.bartlett.house.gov/

http://www.energybulletin.net/4733.html

OIL DEMANDS —  House of Representatives

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren of California). Under the Speaker’s announced policy of January 4, 2005, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) is recognized for 60 minutes as  the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, in this first chart we have some headlines from The Washington Post just a month or so ago. These are headlines from just one day in The Washington Post. The Dow drops 174 points driven, the article says, by economic damage from rising oil prices, the plunging dollar, and growing worries about consumer spending. It goes on to say that a recent oil price rise of 20 percent is continuing to crunch the profits of struggling airlines and is believed to be a factor in disappointing retail sales. Another headline: “Dollar Slides Against the Euro and the Yen.” And another headline: “Consumer Confidence Slips in February.”

Now, should we have had any indication that these were going to be the kinds of headlines that we have been reading in our paper recently? We need to go back a few years, as indicated on this next chart. Let us go back to the 1940s and the 1950s when a scientist by the name of M. King Hubbert, a geologist, was working for the Shell Oil Company. He was watching the discovery and the exploitation and final exhaustion of individual oil fields. He noticed that every oil field followed a very typical pattern. It was a little slow getting the oil out at first, and then it came very quickly and reached a maximum, and then it tailed off as it became more difficult to get the oil out of the ground.

This followed a bell curve. Here is one of those bell curves. Now, bell curves are very familiar in science, and in life, for that matter. If we look at people and how tall they are, we will have a few people down around 4 1/2 or 5 feet and some up to 7 1/2 feet; but the big mass fall in the middle, clustered around 5 1/2 to 6 feet.

Looking at a yield of corn, a few farmers may get 50 bushels per acre, some may get 300, but the big mass today it is somewhere around 200 bushels per acre for corn.

Hubbert noticed when the bell curve reached its peak, about half of the oil had been exhausted from the field. Being a scientist, he theorized if you added up a lot of little bell curves, you would get one big bell curve, and if he could know the amount of reserves of oil in the United States, and he was doing this in the 1940s and early 1950s, and could project how much more might be found, he could then predict when the United States would peak in its oil production.

Doing this analysis, he concluded that we would peak in our oil production in 1970. This curve is what is known as Hubbert’s Curve. The peak of the curve is what is known as Hubbert’s Peak. Sometimes this is called the “great rollover” because when you get to the top, you roll over and start down the other side. It is frequently called “peak oil.” So peak oil for the United States occurred in 1970, and it is true that every year since then we have pumped less oil and found less oil. The big blue squares here are the actual and Members see they deviated a little from the theoretical as M. King Hubbert predicted, but not all that much.

At the bottom, see the difference the big field in Alaska made, and see what that made in the down slope, that never increased production in our country. It just meant that we were not going down quite as fast. You can see that here on the curve. Notice that the Alaska oil production was not the typical bell curve. It should have been, but a couple of things meant it could not be. One was it could not flow at all until we had a 4-foot pipeline. So the fields were developed and they were waiting; then we got the pipeline on board, and it was filled with oil and oil started to flow, and Members see the rapid increase here. It could not flow any faster than through that 4-foot pipe, and so it levels off at the top. We have pumped probably three-fourths of the oil in Prudhoe Bay.

Many people would like to open up ANWR. ANWR has considerably less oil than Prudhoe Bay, so the contribution will be significantly less. I want to note on this chart we also have the red curve, which is the theoretical curve for the former Soviet Union. It is a nice bell curve, peaking a little higher, they have more reserves than we do, and later because we entered the industrial age with vigor before the Soviet Union was quite there. Notice what happened when they came apart; notice how precipitously it fell here. After they got things organized, the fall stopped and now they are producing more oil. As a matter of fact, we might see a little upsurge in this; but the general trend is still going to be down.

On the next chart, and we have here the same Hubbert Curve, but the abscissa is a little too long and the ordinate a little too compressed, so it is not the sharp peak that we saw before. That is the curve we saw before. It shows the Texas component, and it shows the rest of the United States; and it also shows some natural gas liquids. We learned how to extract those a little later. So if you were plotting that as a bell curve, it would peak about here. It is little and then it is much, and then it tails off.

This is the contribution of Alaska, and you can see this not going to be our salvation to pump ANWR because ANWR contains probably not even half as much as Prudhoe Bay. And notice the small contribution that Alaska made. And that is not a bell curve for the reason I mentioned before because we had to develop the fields and they waited for the pipeline, and then it would surge through the pipeline when it was developed. So you do not see the tail getting greater and tailing off.

This is gulf oil. Remember the hullabaloo about the big finds of gulf oil that were going to solve our problem? That is what it did. There never was a moment in time between the big Alaska oil find and all of the pumping discovery and pumping in the gulf, there never was a moment in time when it decreased the fall in our country. The peak occurred, as you see here, about 1970.

Now, the next chart shows what is happening worldwide.

The red curve here shows the actual discovery of oil. Notice that that peaked. There was a big find here that distorted the curve a little but if you rounded that off, you would have the typical bell curve. It started somewhere back here off the chart, then it peaks, and then it is downhill and it tails off. These are the discoveries. The last find there is simply an extrapolation. We have no idea where it is going. We are, by the way, very good at finding oil now. We use 3D seismic detection techniques. The world has drilled, I think, about 5 million oil wells and I think we have drilled about 3 million of them in this country, so we have a pretty good idea of where oil is.

A couple of Congresses ago, I was privileged to chair the Energy Subcommittee on Science. One of the first things I wanted to do was to determine the dimensions of the problem. We held a couple of hearings and had the world experts in. Surprisingly from the most pessimistic to the most optimistic, there was not much deviation in what the estimate is as to what the known reserves are out there. It is about 1,000 gigabarrels. That sounds like an awful lot of oil. But when you divide into that the amount of oil which we use, about 20 million barrels a day, and the amount of oil the rest of the world uses, about 60 million barrels a day, as a matter of fact, the total now is a bit over the 80 million that those two add up to. About 83 1/2 , I think. If you divide that into the 1,000 gigabarrels, you come out at about 40 years of oil remaining in the world. That is pretty good. Because up until the Carter years, during the Carter years, in every decade we used as much oil as had been used in all of previous history. Let me repeat that, because that is startling. In every decade, we used as much oil as had been used in all of previous history. The reason for that, of course, was that we were on the upward side of this bell curve. The bell curve for usage, only part of it is shown on this chart. That is the green one down here, the bell curve for usage. Notice that we are out here now about 2005. Where is it going? The Energy Information Agency says that we are going to keep on using more oil. This green line just going up and up and up is a projection of the Energy Information Agency. But that cannot be true. That cannot be true for a couple of reasons. We peaked in our discovery of oil way back here in the late sixties, about 1970. In our country it peaked much earlier than that, by the way. But the world is following several years behind us. And the area under this red curve must be the same as the area under the green curve. You cannot pump any more oil than you have found, quite obviously. If you have not found it, you cannot pump it. If you were to extend this on out where they have extended their green line, even if it turned down right there at the end of that green line, the area under the green curve is going to be very much larger than the area under the red curve. That just cannot be. We will see in some subsequent charts that we probably have reached peak oil.

Let me mention that M. King Hubbert looked at the world situation. He was joined by another scientist, Colin Campbell, who is still alive, an American citizen who lives in Scotland. Using M. King Hubbert’s predictive techniques, oil was predicted to reach a maximum in about 1995, without perturbations. But there were some perturbations. One of the perturbations was 1973, the Arab oil embargo. Other perturbations were the oil price shocks and a worldwide recession that reduced the demand for oil. And so the peak that might have occurred in 1995 will occur later. How much later? That is what we are looking at this evening. There is a lot of evidence that suggests that if not now, then very quickly we should see world production of oil peak.

What are the consequences? What are the consequences of this depletion? The remaining oil is harder to get. It requires greater energy investment, resulting in a lower return on energy invested. That is the energy- profit ratio, which is decreasing. When we started out, you put in one unit of energy and you could get 30 out. Then that fell off, and then we found a few more fields and we got really good at extracting oil with better techniques. It looked for a little while like it was going up, but look what happened. It falls off to where it would have come anyhow if this curve had simply gone down. This is an inevitable consequence of pumping a field.

Lower profits are not the only concern. When more energy is required to extract it than is contained in the recovered oil, that is, when this ratio is less than 1, notice, we are over there at about 1984, we have got to get now another 20 years, I am not quite sure where we are now when you plot that day. We are getting very close to the unit it takes as much energy to get the oil out as you get out of the oil. It may still seem profitable from a monetary perspective, but when you are using more energy to get oil out of the ground than you are getting out of the oil, then clearly you need to leave it there when we reach that point. I mentioned the bump there was caused by a few more discoveries and particularly by increased efficiency in pumping the oil.

What is the current U.S. status? We have only 2 percent, between 2 and 3 percent, not really known for certain, but approximately 2 percent of the known reserves of oil. We use 25 percent of the world’s oil. By the way, we have about 8 percent of the world production. What that means is if we have only 2 percent of the reserves and 8 percent of the production, that means we are real good at pumping oil, does it not? That means we are pumping our reserves at roughly four times faster than the rest of the world. That means that this 2 percent will not stay 2 percent by and by because we are so good at pumping oil, we are going to be down to 1 percent of the known reserves in the world and we will still be using about 25 percent of the world’s oil. We are now importing about two-thirds of that. At the Arab oil embargo we imported about one-third of that. So we are now importing, relatively, two times more oil, actual quantity much more than that, but relatively about two times more oil.

Chart 6 shows us that more drilling just will not solve the problem. This is a very interesting chart. This shows the difference between the amount of oil that you are finding and the amount of oil that you are pumping. Notice from 1960 on until about 1980, declining for sure, but every year except for one we found more oil than we pumped. The yellow line up here is drilling. You remember the Reagan administration and all the emphasis on drilling because we knew that we were approaching this flipover point where we were going to be pumping more oil than we found and so there was a rationale that if you just give them a profit motive and you have the right incentives, tax and regulatory incentives and so forth, they will go out and they will dig more wells and they will find more oil. Sure as heck they went out and dug more wells. But did they find any more oil? As a matter of fact, in 1982, more oil was used in looking for oil than the oil they found in 1982. Pretty consistently for every year after 1982, we have used more oil than we found.

Today worldwide we are pumping at least six barrels of oil for every barrel that we find.

Chart 7 shows that worldwide discoveries are repeating the U.S. pattern. This is a rough bell curve. You find a big find of oil and it is going to make a spike. This is average for 5 years. If you look at it on a year for year, it is really up and down as you find big reservoirs of oil. But generally it starts low and it goes up and it comes down. It follows roughly a bell curve. I would not pay too much attention to the figures on the ordinate here, because the area under this curve must equal just a little bit over 2,000 gigabarrels of oil. If I visually sum the area under this curve, it is going to equal something more, not frightfully more but something more than 2,000 gigabarrels of oil which from other sources we know ought to be the total amount of oil under the sun. Notice that we are tailing off to something very low. It is unlikely that we are going to find big additional finds in the future. Again, we are very good at that. We have dug about 5 million wells worldwide. We have done a whole lot more than that explorations with detonations and seismic and 3D and computers and we are very good at looking at the kind of geology where you might find oil. There is just no real expectation that there are going to be big additional fields of oil found out there. This dropoff in discovery is really in spite of very improved technology for finding oil.

Chart 8. This is a very interesting chart. It has nothing to do with time, because on the abscissa here, we have the number of wells that are drilled, the cumulative oil caps, and on the ordinate, we have the amount of oil that was found. For any relatively big field, here we are talking about 50 gigabarrels. Remember, there are about 2,000 gigabarrels worldwide, so this is a meaningful part of the world reserves of oil. We see that that goes up and up and then it tails off. You cannot find what is not there. No matter how many more wells you drill, you are not going to find oil that is not there. The same pattern should be apparent on a world scale. Chart 9. This is a very interesting chart. It is a little too busy, but let me try to explain what is there. The oil companies for reasons of pricing and regulations and so forth have had the habit through the years of underreporting initially how much oil they found. Then later when it was appropriate to their license to produce more oil, they would report additional oil. They never found any additional oil, they simply reported oil they had found previously. By the way, you may have noted that three times in the last roughly 3 weeks, oil companies have admitted that their estimates of the reserves were exaggerated and have downscaled the reserves that they said were there. If you took the original reporting of the reserves, you might be able to construct a curve, a straight line curve which said we are just getting more and more. But if you backdated that to the actual discoveries, then you get this curve. This curve is asymtoting at a bit over 2,000 gigabarrels, which is about what the world’s experts say had been there. We have now pumped about half of that. We have about 1,000 gigabarrels remaining.

What now? Where do we go now? One observer, Matt Savinar, who has thoroughly researched the options, and this is not the most optimistic assessment, by the way, but may be somewhat realistic, he starts out by saying, Dear Readers, civilization as we know it is coming to an end soon. I hope not. This is not the wacky poclamation of a doomsday cult, apocalypse Bible sect or conspiracy theory society. Rather, it is a scientific conclusion of the best-paid, most widely respected geologists, physicists and investment bankers in the world.

These are rational, professional, conservative individuals who are absolutely terrified by the phenomenon known as global peak oil.

Why should they be terrified? Why should they be terrified just because we have reached the peak of oil production? Last year, China used about 30 percent more oil. India now is demanding more oil. As a matter of fact, China now is the second largest importer of oil in the world. They have passed Japan. When you look at how important oil is to our economy, you can understand the big concern if, in fact, we cannot produce oil any faster than we are producing it now and there are increasing demands, as there will be, for oil. In our country, for instance, we have a debt that we must service. It will be essentially impossible to service that debt if our economy does not continue to grow. So there are enormous potential consequences, which is why he says that these people are absolutely terrified by the phenomenon known as peak oil.

What can we do to avert the kind of a catastrophe that he hints at with those words? We must not squander an opportunity. One is always reminded of Malthus. I am sure you have heard of him. He was looking at the increase in world population and he looked at our ability to produce food and he says, gosh, those two curves are going to cross because the world population was increasing faster than our ability to produce food and we are going to have mass starvation. That did not happen. The reason that did not happen was because Malthus could not have anticipated the green revolution, which, by the way, was made possible almost entirely, well, the plant science had a lot to do with it but better plants and better genes without the fertilizer to make them grow is not going to do you much good, so the green revolution was very largely the result of our intensive use of oil. Most people do not know it, but all of our nitrogen fertilizer is made from natural gas. You may have observed that when you have a thunderstorm in the summertime, your lawn is greener than when you have watered it.

That is because of what is known as poor man’s fertilizer. The lightning combines some of the nitrogen so they can be carried down by the water and one’s lawn is, in fact, greener after a thunderstorm than it is when they water it. We have kind of learned how to mimic lightning, and we now know how to make nitrogen fertilizer from gas. By the way, before we knew how to do that, the only sources of nitrogen fertilizer were barnyard manurers. If one is on the Eastern Shore with a lot of chickens, one could go a long way with that now in agriculture, could one not? But barnyard manurers would fertilize only a tiny percentage of the nitrogen needs of our plants.

And other than that it was guano. My colleagues know what guano is. Guano is the droppings of bats or of birds on a tropical island, their droppings accumulating for thousands of years, and there was a major industry insending ships around the world to tropical islands and getting the guano.

We must not squander the opportunity that we have. Jevons Paradox becomes applicable here. Just a word about what Jevons Paradox is because I am going to mention it a time or two again. But Jevons Paradox says that frequently when one works to solve a problem, they really make the situation worse.

Let me give one little example. Suppose there is a small businessman who owns a store. He is really concerned about peak oil, and he is concerned about energy, and he wants to do something. His little store is using $1,000 worth of electricity a month, and he decides that he can really cut that use. So he does several things. He gets a storm door. He puts on storm windows. He insulates more. He turns down the thermostat, and he asks his workers to wear sweaters. And he is successful because he reduces his electric bill from $1,000 to $500. Almost no matter what he does with that $500, he has just made the situation worse by doing that.

Let me explain. One of the things that he may do, and it is a natural thing for a small businessperson to do, he may decide, I could hire more people and have a bigger business if I expanded. And so now he will expand, and he will still be using as much energy. Or if he decides to invest his money, if he invests his money in the bank, the bank will lend his money out five or six times, and at least some of those loans will be to small business people. And what the small business people will do is to create jobs and use energy. So the store owner is concerned about energy and the environment and being a responsible citizen, cutting his use of electricity, because everybody did not do it, because only he did it and nobody took advantage of the opportunity that was presented because he used less energy, he really contributed to the problem.

Because after he expanded his business, he would be using still more energy. Or if the money was lent out by the bank and small businesses created more jobs and they used more energy, the situation would have just gotten worse.

All that the “green revolution” did was temporarily extend the carryng capacity of the world. If we think about that, ultimately if we cannot do something about it to stabilize it, the green revolution just made matters worse. In the meantime we have all eaten very well in spite of the fact that about a fifth of the world will go to bed hungry tonight; but on the average, we are eating very well, and because of the average American, we are eating maybe too well.

But what we have done with the green revolution is to permit the population of the world to double and double again. So if we cannot now make sure that we stabilize population and bring it to the point where it can be supported by a technology where there is not what was ordinarily perceived as an inexhaustible supply of oil, there will simply be more people out there to be hungry and starved if we cannot meet their needs. So we have got to make sure that whatever we do to solve this problem that Jevons Paradox does not contribute.

Chart 10, this shows that this growth cannot be sustained forever. The greatest power in the universe, Albert Einstein was asked this question: Dr. Einstein, you have now discovered the ability to release energy from the atom. We get just incredible amounts of energy from the atom. A relatively small amount of fuel in one of our big submarines will fuel it for 33 years now. Enormous energy density. And they asked him, Dr. Einstein, wat is the most energy-intensive thing in the world? He said, “It is compound interest.”

That is what we have here in this exponential curve. And by the way, we, and when I say “we,” I mean the world, have been using oil as if our economy could just continue to grow on this unlimited exponential curve.

Whether it is 2 percent a year or 5 percent a year or near 10 percent, which is what China has been growing in the last few years, we are still on an exponential curve.

Not quite so steep if we are on a lower growth rate. It goes up and up forever and ever.

Obviously, there is not an inexhaustible amount of oil in the world; so we have the exhaustible resource, which is this lower curve. It reaches a peak,which, if not now, shortly. Oil, as the Members may have noticed, is $54 or $55 a barrel. I saw the other day one future had sold for $100 a barrel, and the experts are saying we are probably going to see $60 before we see $50. We will wait and see.

The third curve here is the renewable resource curve. Do not be confused by the size of these curves. They are simply placed here so that lines would not cross other lines. But in actual practice, the renewable resource curve is likely to be nowhere near the peak of the exhaustible resource curve, energy.

Let me give a little example of what the problem is and why this is almost certainly true. One barrel of oil, 42 gallons of oil, equals the productivity of 25,000 manhours. That is the equivalent of having 60 dedicated servants that do nothing but work for someone. We can get a little better real-life example of this. A gallon of gas will drive a 3-ton SUV, and some of those are better than others, and let us say it takes it 20 minutes, which some will but most will not. Most are around 10. But let us say one gallon of gas will take a 3 -ton SUV 20 miles at 60 miles an hour down the road. That is just one little gallon of gas, which, by the way, is still cheaper than water. We pay more for water in the grocery store than we pay for gas at $2 a gallon at the pump, added up.

How long would it take one to push their 3-ton SUV the equivalent of 60 miles an hour, 20 miles down the road? To get some idea of the energy density in these fossil fuels, there is just nothing out there in the alternatives that have anything like this energy density. There are some potentials, nuclear, and we will talk about those in a little bit. But of the general renewables, there is nothing out there with that kind of density. So this curve is likely to be much lower than this curve; and notice that if it is, in fact, going to be renewable, it cannot go to an unrealistic height. There is only so much wood to cut. Easter Island had that experience. When they cut the last tree, they totally changed the ecology.

The Bible talks about the large clusters of grapes and the honey and so forth that they found when the spies went out. That now is a desert. The Cedars of Lebanon, the grand Cedars of Lebanon that built the temple, that is now largely a desert. Why is it a desert? Because they cut the trees, they changed the environment, they changed the climate. So obviously this line has to be a reasonable sustainable level. It just cannot go on forever.

The challenge, then, is to reduce consumption ultimately to a level that cannot be sustained indefinitely without succumbing to Jevons Paradox.

How do we buy time, the time that we will need to make the transition to sustainability? Obviously, there are only two things that we can do to buy time. One is to conserve, and the other is to be more efficient. And the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Gilchrest) mentioned our increasing efficiency. We have done a great job. Our refrigerators today are probably twice as efficient as they were 20 or 30 years ago. But instead of a little refrigerator, we have a big one. Instead of one, we may have two. So I will bet we are using as much electricity in our refrigeration as we ever used.

Conservation, we can do that. Remember several years ago when there were brownouts, blackouts in California and we were predicting, boy, the next year is really going to be rough? Do the Members know why it was not and we did not see any headlines about blackouts in California? Because knowing that there was a problem, the Californians, without anybody telling them they had to, voluntarily reduced their electricity consumption by 11 percent. That is pretty significant. And that avoided the rolling blackouts or brownouts.

And, finally, we must commit to major investments in alternatives, especially as efficiencies improve. This must ultimately lead to the ability to do everything within the capability of renewable resources. If we have got a solar breeder, and this shows a picture of a solar breeder. That, by the way, is about 5 miles from my home. It was built by Solarex, and it is a sign of the times. Mr. Speaker, this is now owned by BP. They know that oil is not forever. They are now the world’s second largest producer of solar panels.

A few years ago, the largest buyer of solar panels in the world, and I do not know if that is true today, but a few years ago it was Saudi Arabia. Why would Saudi Arabia, with the most oil in the world, be the biggest purchaser of solar panels in the world? The reasons are very simple. These are not dumb people, and they figured out that solar panels were better for them in producing electricity than oil because they had widely distributed communities that were very small. Electrons in a wire are very different than oil in a pipeline.

Put a gallon of oil in a pipeline up at Prudhoe Bay, and a gallon will come out where it goes on the ship. If we put electrons in a line which is long enough, nothing will come out in the other end. It is called line loss.

And they knew that in their small communities, widely distributed, with the enormous line losses they had from big plants, that they would be better off with distributed production.

By the way, just a hint to our people who are concerned with homeland security, the more distributed production we have, the less vulnerable we are going to be to terrorist attacks on our power infrastructure.

Transition to sustainability will not happen if left applying market forces alone. Everyone must be part of the effort or Jevons Paradox will prevail. If only our country tries to do it and nobody else helps, we will just put off the day when we must make the transition, and it will be even more difficult. The market will, indeed, signal the arrival of peak oil. To wait until it does, however, is like waiting until we see a tsunami:
by then it may be too late to do anything.

We now are doing a lot of talking here in the Congress and fortunately across the country about Social Security, and it is a big problem. But I tell the Members if the problem of Social Security is equivalent to the tidal wave produced by the hurricane, then this peak oil problem is equivalent to the tsunami. The impact and the consequences are going to be enormously greater than the impact and the consequences of Social Security or Medicare or those two put together.

It will take a sustained, conscious, coordinated national and even international, effort. If everybody is not working together and buying time by conserving and being efficient and using wisely that time we bought, then all we do is put off the inevitable.

The hydroelectric and nuclear power industries did not arise spontaneously from market forces alone. They were the product of a purposeful partnership of public and private entities focused on the public good. This is what we have to do relative to alternatives.

As I mentioned, California solved their energy crisis by voluntarily reducing their demand for electricity. Time, capital and energy resources are all finite. We have only so much time until it would be too late to avoid a real problem. Capital is limited and energy resources are certainly limited.

This time it will not be like the seventies. The big difference between now and the seventies is that in the seventies, we were just going up this curve, we were nowhere near the top of the curve, so there was always the ability to expand, to surge. If, in fact, we are now at peak oil, there is no such ability remaining.

Is there any reason to remain optimistic or hopeful? Let me go back to Matt Savinar, that not-too-optimistic journalist. “If what you mean is there any way technology or the market or brilliant scientists or comprehensive government programs are going to hold things together or solve this for me or allow for business to continue as usual, the answer is no. On the other hand, if what you really mean is is there any way that I still can have a happy, fulfilling life, in spite of some clearly grim facts, the answer is yes. But it is going to require a lot of work, a lot of adjustments, and probably a bit of good fortune on your part.”

What now? Well, what we need to do now clearly is to buy time, and we buy that, as I mentioned, with efficiency and conservation. This will keep energy prices affordable. If demand continues to increase and output cannot increase, energy prices are going through the ceiling.

So we have got to reduce demand so that prices do not get so high that it is impossible to invest the capital necessary to develop the alternatives, using existing conventional technologies to make the transition as new technologies are developed.

We must use it wisely. If we do not use it wisely, and I have talked about Jevons Paradox several times, we have got to make investments in efficient, sustainable technologies, further reduce requirements for energy in any form, making smaller systems feasible which reduce both initial and operating costs.

The benefits are enormous. Additional benefits include business opportunities, lots of business opportunities we do not even dream of. Look at the business opportunities created by putting a man on the moon.

I have 200-some companies in Maryland alone which are there only because of technology breakthroughs in putting aman on the moon.

That same thing could happen if we had a Manhattan type project focusing on renewables, potential worldwide markets, if we are the leader, and we have every reason to be the leader because we have the biggest problem.

We can develop worldwide markets, domestic job creation and environmentally benign technologies with potential to reduce and or eliminate pollution. We could be a real role model.

We are, as I mentioned, less than 5 percent of the world’s population, and we use 25 percent of the world’s energy. I was in Europe a month or so ago, and their comment was somewhere between anger and disdain. “You are still only paying $2 a gallon for gasoline in your country.” It is $5.50 or $6.00 a gallon there. And they are not unmindful that this one person in 22 in the world is using 25 percent of the world’s energy. We have a real opportunity to be a role model.

Let me put up the last chart. This is potential alternative solutions. For what time we have remaining, let me ask my colleague, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Gilchrest) to join us as we talk about this.

I have only have some of the potential solutions here. I just want to go down this list and look at these. There may be some others. The gentleman mentioned hydrogen from the ocean. That is certainly one.

There are some finite resources here, ones we have not maximally exploited here, and some renewable resources here, and we want to spend another whole hour talking about this, because there are a lot of things to talk about in these resources. But almost none of these have the density of energy that we find in fossil fuels.

There are tar sands in Canada, there is oil shale in this country, but it takes an awful lot of energy to get energy out of those. You may not have much more than a one-and-a-half to one. I have heard it takes six barrels of oil to get one net barrel of oil out of these tar sands and oil shale. There is an awful lot there, but there are considerable environmental costs and enormous economic costs to develop it.

Mr. GILCHREST. If the gentleman will yield, another analogy I heard recently about the efforts to bring out ever-increasing and diminishing oil reserves and how that simply is not going to work for sustaining our energy needs, this particular physicist gave an analogy that compared the oil to a lion in Africa taking the energy of catching two gazelles to catch one gazelle. How long would that lion last? It takes the energy of catching two gazelles to only catch one, but he needs it to sustain himself, and that simply is not going to work.

I want to compliment the gentleman from Maryland, and I would like to be a part of the extra hour that we will do maybe this week to show what the alternatives are, simply because our energy requirements are increasing, they are not decreasing, and they will continue to increase.

Political parties are not going to let the grid go cold, but what do we do when we rely on oil and natural gas as the predominant energy source for this country? We have to simply find alternatives.

If I could just say briefly, there are two problems with our dependence on oil, and the gentleman has laid those out exceptionally well tonight. Part of the first problem is trade deficits and national security because of our oil dependence. When the price goes up, because we do not have most of the reserves, when oil peaks, we have no control over that. There will never be a decrease in demand. There will always be an increase in demand, no matter what happens, and our energy hunger is gargantuan.

The other problem with our oil dependence is that we are burning fossil fuel. We are returning to the atmosphere carbon that has not been there in this amount for millions of years, and what we are burning in decades it took the natural processes millions of years to lock away.

One other comment about letting the market forces deal with this fairly eminent problem. The global marketplace deals with the CEOs that are rightly so in the business to make a quick profit. The international marketplace is when nations get together, discuss an issue and they find mutual benefit to these vast problems.

Vast solutions are available through what the gentleman has described so well tonight.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, of course the real challenge is to have everybody agree on what the facts are. I suspect a big percentage of the people that might read or listen to what we say this evening had not even heard of peak oil.

We really had about 30 years warning that this was going to happen. When M. King Hubbert predicted oil would peak in this country in 1970 and it did, and 5 years later, certainly by 10 years later we knew absolutely he was right, because we were well down on the curve 10 years later, we should have had some hint that he probably was right, he and Colin Campbell were probably right about world production? We paid no attention to that.

As a matter of fact, the people that were talking about this until very recently have been quickly relegated to the lunatic fringe. If I had been up here 3 or 4 years ago talking about this, someone may want to relegate the two of us this evening to the lunatic fringe.

But I think the evidence is out there. I think the evidence is out there, and the marketplace is saying that it is out there, because oil is now at $54 or $55 a barrel, they are saying we are going to see $60 before we see $50. I saw one future that was $100 a barrel.

By the way, at $100 or $200 a barrel, tar sands and oil shale become somewhat competitive, but with enormous costs. They will be positive, we will get a little more out than we put in, but not the kind of energy we are now using.

Coal, we have a lot of coal. China has a lot of coal. We now use coal primarily in this country for producing electricity. It is very dirty. Our environmental requirements now, there has not been a new coal plant in a long while, it is all natural gas. It is a real pity. Oil and natural gas are, in a very real sense, too good to burn. They are the feedstock for an enormous petrochemical industry. I mentioned only the fertilizer that grows our crops and the pesticides we make from oil. We live in a plastic world, and all of that plastic is made from oil.

Now, it is true that you can also use biomass and so forth to do some of that, but let us remember that we are just on the verge of not being able to feed the world. Tonight about one-fifth of the world will go to bed hungry. We we are not going to bed hungry in this country, not by a long shot, and we are living very high on the food chain. The time will come when you will not be able to eat the pig that ate the corn, because there is at least 10 times as much energy in the corn that the pig ate as you are going to get out of the pig by eating him. So we can certainly do a lot of by living lower on the food chain.

Mr. GILCHREST. If the gentleman would yield for a second, first of all, I want to compliment the gentleman on this fascinating factual presentation which leads me to what I want to say.

The gentleman said something earlier about finding solutions to the problem is going to be similar to the Manhattan Project or similar to placing a man on the moon within a decade when President Kennedy made that statement, and it is that kind of leadership from this Congress, from the administration, to incentivize, to create the kind of inspiration from the general public, to put these forces together to make it all work.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, but now we must do it on a global basis, because of Jevons Paradox, if all the world does not cooperate, we will not get there. Had we paid attention to M. King Hubbert and not relegated him to the lunatic fringe, and he was right as evidence indicates on his prediction from 1970, had we paid attention to him we would have had at least 20 years headstart, and then we could have done it alone in this country because we are so big and use so much of the world’s energy.

Before we leave coal, we are going to come back to this and spend another hour with a lot of detail on this, but someone said there are 500 years of coal, that is not true there is maybe 250, at present use rates. But as oil becomes harder and harder to find, we are going to turn more and more to coal, and that 70 years with enormous environmental penalty will shortly become a relatively few years. That is not forever. But we will be leaning on coal more than in the past nuclear.

Three ways we can get nuclear energy. For one of them we are home free, and that is fusion. We send a little less than $300 million a year on that. I would like to spend more if there was the infrastructure out there to support it, because if we get there, we are home free.

But I kind of think that hoping to solve our energy problems with fusion is a bit like you or me hoping to solve our personal financial problems by winning the lottery. That would be real nice. I think the odds are somewhere near the same. I am about as likely to win the lottery as we are to come to economically feasible fusion.

I hope I am wrong. Frequently my hopes and my anticipations are different. My anticipation is we are not going to get there because of the enormous engineering challenges. My hope is I am wrong and we are going to get there.

Two other ways to get energy from nuclear. One is the light water reactor, which is all we have in this country. By the way, tonight when you go home, every fifth home and every fifth business would be dark if we did not have nuclear. It produces 20 percent of all of our electricity. But there is not all that much fissionable uranium in the world, so we are not going to get there with light water reactors. France produces about 80 percent of its electricity from nuclear. They have a lot of breeder reactors. They do what the name implies, they make more fuel than they use, with big problems, in enrichment, shipping it around, squirreling away the products for a quarter of a million years. That presents enormous challenges to us.

So there is the potential here in nuclear, but a lot of problems involved with it. It is not just that simple. By the way, it takes a lot of oil to build a nuclear power plant.

At some point, you pass the point of no return where there is not enough readily available high-quality fossil fuels to support our present economy while we make the investment we have got to make to transition to these renewables. And then we come to true renewables: solar, wind, geothermal, ocean energy. All of these suffer.

By the way, I am a big supporter of these. I had the first hybrid electric car in Maryland. I had the first one in the Congress. I have a vacation home that is off the grid and totally powered by solar. And I am going to put in a wind machine. I am a big supporter of this.

But the energy density here is very low. And it is intermittent. It takes a lot of solar panels to produce the electricity that you use in your home. It takes 12 of them to power your ordinary refrigerator just as an example. So those are real potential, and they are growing. Wind machines now produce electricity at 3 1/2 cents a kilowatt hour. That is getting competitive. A whole lot of them in California. They are in West Virginia. We are putting some up on Backbone Mountain in western Maryland.

Boy, if we could get down there to geothermal we would have it, would we not?

There is not a single chimney in Iceland because they do not need them. They have got geothermal. They have a little bit of it in the West. But for most of the world that molten core is far too deep for us to tap.

Mr. GILCHREST. If the gentleman would yield just for a second, I am sure he knows, but the general public, I do not think realizes it is not necessary to be sitting right on top of a volcanic area, an earthquake zone to get geothermal energy. We on the Eastern Shore of Maryland have a number of schools that are actually providing heat for those schools from geothermal energy. Some of these things are sort of a hidden secret. But it is the classical conventional wisdom that keeps us from exploring some of these things a little bit further. And I think the gentleman is bringing those out tonight.

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Is this tying the school to the molten core, or is it simply using a heat pump and exchanging, not with the air? What you are trying to do in the winter-time is cool the air and what you are trying to do in the summer time is heat the air.

Mr. GILCHREST. It is actually bringing water up from the surface, from the subsurface. The water is much warmer further down.

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. It is indeed. But you still have to have energy to use that. You are much more efficient using a heat pump that is tied to the ground, to groundwater than it is to the cold air in the winter and the hot air in the summer. If you are thinking about what you are trying to do is to cool the cold air in the winter time and to heat the hot air in the summertime. And obviously ground water is very much better in both seasons than either the air in the winter or the cold, the hot air in the summer or the cold air in the winter.

Ocean energy. You know, it takes an enormous amount of energy to lift the ocean 2 feet. That is roughly what the Moon does in the tides, is it not? But the problem with that is energy density.

There is an old adage that says what is everybody’s business is nobody’s business. And the corollary to that in energy is if it is too widely distributed, you probably cannot make much of it. And we have really tried to harness the tides. In some fjords in Norway where they have 60-foot tides you put a bar there, when it runs in you trap it and then you run it out through a turbine. When it is running out, you can get some energy from it. And there is potential there, a lot of potential energy. But you know it is very dispersed. We have a hard time capturing that energy.

I suspect that our hour is about up, and this is maybe a good place to end. We are going to come back and spend another hour looking at agriculture, enormous opportunities from agriculture. But let me remind the gentleman that we are just barely able to feed the world now. And if we start taking all of this biomass off the field, what is going to happen to the tilth of our soil, to the organic matter in our soil, which is essential to the availability of nutrients in the soil by the plant. So there are lots of challenges here. There are lots of opportunities here. And we will spend another hour talking about them. Thank you very much. And I yield back, Mr. Speaker.

 

In the 109th Congress, Bartlett serves as Chairman of the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee.  One of three scientists in the Congress, Dr. Bartlett is also a senior member of the Science Committee.  Due to his ten years of experience as a small business owner, he also serves on the Small Business Committee and is its Vice Chairman. More info at www.bartlett.house.gov

 

20 Apr 2005 by US Congressional Record. Our Dependence on Oil by Roscoe Bartlett

http://www.energybulletin.net/5519.html

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Madam Speaker, on March 24 of this year, 30 of the prominent leading individuals in our country wrote a letter to the President about what they considered a very critical national security issue. The letter was signed by Robert McFarlane, James Woolsey, Frank Gaffney, Boyden Gray, Timothy Wirth, and 30 other people, including 12 retired generals and admirals, five Secretaries of Defense Departments, and several retired Senators and Representatives.

To understand their concern, we need to go back about 6 decades to a sequence of events that brought us to a situation that very much concerned them. We have only 2 percent of the world’s oil reserves, we use 25 percent of all of the oil used in the world, and we import two-thirds of that. We have less than 5 percent of the world’s population.

How did we get here? The next chart shows us that, and this goes back the 6 decades that I mentioned to a Shell oil scientist by the name of M. King Hubbert who, in the 1940s and 1950s watched the exploration, the pumping, and the exhaustion of oil fields, and he noted that each of the fields followed a bell curve. It rose to a maximum, and then it fell off as they pumped out the remaining oil. He noticed that at the peak of that curve, that about half of the oil had been consumed from the average field. It is logical that the second half of the oil would be harder to get and take more time, and it would not flow as quickly. He theorized that if you added up all of the individual fields in the country, you could predict when that country would peak in its oil production. And in 1956, he made a projection for the United States. Fourteen years later, which was when he said it would occur, the United States peaked in its oil production.

This curve here in green, the smooth, green curve was his prediction. The little more ragged curve, the points that do not fall quite on the curve were the actual data points which we see fell remarkably close to his prediction. We are now well down that curve. We are now producing less than half of the oil that we produced in 1970.

The red curve there, by the way, is the curve for Russia. There is going to be a second peak there, because after the Soviet Union fell, they kind of got their act together and they are going to have a second peak, but not so high, and so their real peak was when it is shown there.

The next chart shows us the elements of the oil in this country, where we got it from. We see a whole bunch of it came from Texas, and then the rest of the United States, and then nos gas liquids, the red above, and we see what is called Alaska there. That is all the oil that we got from Prudhoe Bay, the north slope, a lot of oil.

But it really did not make a very big difference. You see, we are still sliding down that slope and there is just a little blip produced by Prudhoe Bay, and then we slide down the slope.

Mr. Speaker, we remember a couple of years ago, the Gulf of Mexico oil, and that oil was going to solve our oil problem. That oil is represented by that yellow there. Not a whole lot, and it did not stop our slide down Hubbert’s peak. The amount of oil that may be present in ANWR is predicted to be, who knows; it may be very little, it may be a whole lot, but the prediction is about half of what was in Prudhoe Bay. So you may agree or disagree that we should drill in ANWR, but it really does not matter because there is not enough oil in ANWR to really make a difference.

The next curve we have shows a very simple curve, the problem that we face. If, in fact, we have reached peak oil, and I spoke here on the Floor a bit more than 5 weeks ago for an hour on this subject and we have had a lot of people come through our offices and a lot of phone calls and e-mails from all around the world, and I will tell my colleagues that there is nobody who does not believe that we are either at peak oil or will shortly be at peak oil. As this chart shows, you do not have to be at peak oil to have a problem. If peak oil occurs here, and we are here, you see that there is a bit of yellow between our use curve and by the way, this use curve is only a 2 percent growth. Now, we think that if our economy is not growing 2 percent, that the sky may fall, the stock market reacts very badly, and this is only a 2 percent growth curve. Look what happens with this 2 percent curve, with that yellow there, that is what we would like to use at only 2 percent growth, and the blue line there shows us the oil that will be available. Now, we cannot use oil that is not there. So that is going to be all the oil that we have available to use if, in fact, this is correct.

Now, I would point out 2 things. One is that M. King Hubbert was right about the United States. Using exactly the same prediction techniques, he predicted that the world would peak in about 2000. It did not quite, because he could not have known about the Arab oil embargo or the big price spike hikes or the world recession that resulted from that net delay that is probably occurring about now. But we have a problem of a shortfall before we actually get to peak, and that is probably where we are now.

Let me just spend a moment on this chart, because I want to point out some realities here. This is the amount of oil that we would like to use, following up this just 2 percent slope. And the amount of oil we will have to use is represented by the blue curve here. But we cannot use all of that oil for the present purposes for which we use oil, because if we do, there will be no oil left over to make the investments we have to make in the alternatives and the renewables that ultimately must take the place of oil, because you see, we are shortly going to be sliding down Hubbert’s peak.

The next chart shows us the slopes of these peaks when you have more than a 2 percent growth. This is the 2 percent growth line, if you chart out with 2 percent growth and then extrapolate that as a straight line, but that is not what growth is. Growth is always exponential. It is like compounding interest, and people understand compound interest, and I am not sure why they do not understand exponential growth, but 2 percent growth follows this curve, it does not follow this straight line curve. The next curve above it is only 4 percent growth. I would note that last year, the world economies grew by 5 percent on average. Now, we did not do quite that well, but China did a whole lot better. China grew at 10 percent. I was kind of playing around with this chart and I think the 10 percent curve goes about here.

Mr. Speaker, with a 10 percent growth curve, every 7 years, it doubles. That means in 14 years, it is 4 times bigger, and in 21 years, it is 8 times bigger. As a matter of fact, one of the biggest forces in this world is the force of exponential growth, and it is very difficult for a lot of people to understand. Albert Einstein was asked, Dr. Einstein, you have been instrumental in developing nuclear energy. It is really very powerful; from a little tiny bit of this, you get a great big explosion. What will be the next big energy source? And his response was the most powerful force in the universe is the power of compound interest, which is an exponential growth curve.

The next chart shows a reality here that we really need to pay attention to, and this was the reason, this was the reason for the letter that these gentlemen wrote. It was in the letter that they said, the United States’ dependence on imported petroleum poses a risk to our homeland security and economic well-being. If we have only 2 percent of the known reserves, and we use 25 percent of the world’s oil, and we import more than two-thirds of it, and as the President said himself, much of that oil, he said, we rely upon energy sources from countries that do not particularly like us. Yes, Mr. President, that is true. Most of the reserves of oil are in the Middle East, and many of those countries go a bit further than just do not particularly like us.

What we have here on the easel is a view of the world which shows what China has been doing. China has been scouring the world, looking for oil. And all of the blue, here is where China has been: In the Orient, in the Middle East, several places in the Middle East, in our backyard. They have contracts in Canada, they have contracts in Colombia, they have contracts in Venezuela, they have contracts in Brazil, they have contracts in Argentina, and they almost bought an oil company in our country; they were just outbid a little. They will be back again trying to secure an oil company in our country.

China now is the second largest importer in the world. Last year, they increased their demand for oil by 25 percent. Now, that will not go on year after year, because last year, they shut down a lot of coal-fired power plants because the pollution was killing them, so they bought a whole bunch of diesel generators; I suspect that the pollution might be almost as much from them, but they are more widely distributed, which is one of the reasons they used so much oil last year.

The next chart shows us something very interesting about energy and the effect that it has had on civilization and on growth of economies. On this chart, and I am sorry that most of it is blank, but that is just the reality of what has happened through history. We started out the industrial revolution relying on wood, and here it is, the brown curve here. We were burning wood. As a matter of fact, the industrial revolution almost floundered before we discovered that we could get energy from coal, because we had largely denuded New England in sending the trees to England to produce charcoal to produce coal. There is a little relic of bygone years up by Thurmont, Maryland, and they denuded the hills of Thurmont, Maryland for a tiny foundry there in Catoctin, up near Thurmont, and then we discovered coal. And notice, there is a big jump. This is quadrillion Btus.

We were going along with the coal economy, they are about leveled out, and we discovered that we could get even more energy from oil. And look what happened in the age of oil: way up. This chart points out something very interesting and very important about these fuels.

Every time we went to a new fuel, we went to a higher density fuel, higher energy density fuel. The energy density in oil is just incredible. One 42-gallon barrel of oil, which if you bought it for $50-some and refined it, maybe another $40-some, it would cost you $100 for the refined products of that barrel of oil.

But the energy you get from that is the equivalent of 25,000 man-hours of labor. That would be 12 people who did nothing but work for you all year long. Everything they did was for you, and the energy they would expend in that full year is the energy equivalent of one barrel of oil.

Now, you may have a little trouble understanding that, but let me give you a little anecdote that may be simpler to understand. A couple of weeks ago we took my brother-in-law and his wife down to West Virginia. And we have a little Prius car, we get 45 miles per gallon, not that time because it was very heavily loaded and we were going up mountains. And the worst mileage we got was 20 miles per gallon in this Prius hybrid electric, hybrid car, carrying this big load up this steep mountain in West Virginia.

That was 1 gallon of gasoline. Still cheaper, by the way, than water in the grocery store. But look at the energy in that 1 gallon of gasoline. It took this car, heavily laden, 20 miles up a steep mountain in West Virginia. Now, how long do you think, Madam Speaker, that it would take you or me to pull that car up the mountain?

Obviously, we cannot pull it, but we can use a little mechanical advantage and get it up there. It is a winch called a come-along and there is a guardrail and there are trees and you can use a chain, and you could get the car 20 miles up the mountain. Do you think you can do it in 90 days? If you did it in 90 days that would be just about the equivalent. By the way, that would be a tough pull. That is a long distance per day to go 20 miles in 90 days pulling your car up the mountain.

That is the kind of energy density that is there. So the big challenge we have is finding alternatives that have something near the energy density of oil, because there is an enormous amount of energy density there.

The next chart I want to show you is a very interesting one, because one of things that we have got to do very quickly is to conserve the use of oil. We have got to buy time through efficiency and conservation. This is a very interesting chart. This shows the energy use for people in California and the energy used per person in the United States.

And notice that the people in California are only using about 60 percent of the energy that is used by the average person in the rest of the United States. Now, nobody told them that they had to do that. I know that they have some regulations that are a little more stringent than some in other States because they have some bigger problems with pollution.

But you remember several years ago they had some blackouts there and it was predicted that they were going to have rolling blackouts year after year there. They did not have any. That is because voluntarily the Californians, without anybody telling them they had to do it, reduced their consumption of electricity by 11 percent. It was enough that they did not have any rolling blackouts.

I will tell you, it is going to be awfully hard to argue that people in California do not live as well as the people in the rest of the United States. And they are doing it on just a bit more than half of the energy that the average person in the rest of the United States uses. So this is really doable, friends. We can conserve. We can reduce our use of oil. And we must do that, because as the next chart shows, we have got to ultimately move to some other sources of energy.

Oil is not going to run out. But the age of cheap oil is probably over, and we are going to be sliding down Hubbert’s Peak; there is going to be less and less oil. No matter how hard you suck on that, you cannot get more out if it is not there.

This shows the alternatives that are available to us. Some of those are finite resources. Some of them are pretty big, by the way. It may be difficult to get it, but the tar sands of Canada, I am going up there in a month or so to look at that, Canadians called after they heard our speech 5 weeks ago, please come up and visit us and look at our tar sands. We have a lot of oil shale in our country. At $50, $60, $70 a barrel, that is probably going to be competitive, and we can get some oil from the tar sands and the oil shale.

Now we have coal, and I should have brought a chart, next time we will bring a chart on coal. Because what it shows is that when we really start using coal to make up for the oil we are not going to have, there is only about 50 years of it there, at just a 2 percent growth rate, now the world grew 5 percent last year. China is growing 10 percent. We sure as heck would like to grow more than 2 percent, but at just a 2 percent growth, that coal lasts only about 50 years.

They will tell you there is a 250-year supply now. That is at current-use rates. But if we have to start using it faster; it is not going to last anywhere near as long. Then we come to nuclear. There are three kinds of nuclear. We need to explore all of them. I had in my office today a gentleman who really believes that we are going to get to fusion. Now, it is not tomorrow, it is not the day after tomorrow, as a matter of fact it is maybe 30 years from now; but he believes we will get there.

Fusion is the kind of energy you have from the sun. It is the kind of energy that you have in a nuclear weapon. If we can really get there, we are kind of home free. But I will tell you, I think the odds of our solving our energy problems, at least for the immediate future through fusion, is about the same as you and me, Madam Speaker, solving our personal economic problems by winning the lottery. It would be nice if it happened, but the odds are not very good that we are going to solve our personal economic problems that way.

There are two other kinds of nuclear power. One is the light water reactor. That is what we use in our country. And we need to have more of them. We produce now about 20 percent of our electricity through nuclear. Some of those who have been violently opposed to nuclear, looking at the peak oil problem, are now reevaluating whether we should go to nuclear or not.

But there is not fissionable uranium in the world. So then you have got to go to breeder reactors, and they have lots of byproducts that you have to squirrel away somewhere for a quarter of a million years. So we face some real challenges that we have to think through what we are going to do with nuclear.

Than we look at all of the renewables, solar and wind and geothermal, if you are close enough to the molten core of the Earth. Ocean energy. Boy, the moon raises the ocean about 2 feet on average. But it is awfully dispersed. It takes a lot of energy to raise the oceans 2 feet. It is going to be hard to harness that. But we are trying and we need to try further.

And then enormous opportunity in agriculture. And several previous speakers spoke to that, about agriculture:
soy diesel, biodiesel, ethanol, methanol, bio mass. And our agriculture really has an opportunity to contribute here.

And then waste to energy. We have a lot of waste that ends up in the landfill. Some places are burning it. More people ought to be burning it. Then hydrogen from renewables. By the way, hydrogen is not an energy source.

Hydrogen is simply a convenient way of moving energy around. You burn it very cleanly. It produces only water.

You can use it in a fuel cell and get twice the efficiency in a reciprocating engine. I would just like to close by going back to one of the charts I had before and to mention that the real challenge now is to use conservation and efficiency to reduce our demands for oil so that we have enough oil left to make the investments in these alternatives and renewables so that we can take the place of the oil that we are not going to have because we are sliding down Hubbard’s Peak.

Now, we have very clever people in our country. We are really innovative, we are really creative, and what we need is leadership, Madam Speaker, to make this happen.

Apr 19, 2005  PFC Energy’s Diwan, GOP Rep. Bartlett of Maryland look at supply, price, economies

Congressman Roscoe Bartlett has discussed global peak oil in a one-half hour taped program, E&E TV.s .On Point. Host Colin Sullivan, Editor of Environment and Energy Daily, moderated the discussion with Congressman Bartlett and Mr. Roger Diwan, Managing Director, Markets and Countries Group, PFC Energy. It can be downloaded from E&E TV.s website www.eande.tv/main/.
Congressman Bartlett previously discussed the challenges of global peak oil in a one-hour Special Order speech on March 14, 2005. It can be downloaded from Congressman Bartlett.s website, http://www.bartlett.house.gov.

Congressman Bartlett is one of three scientists in the Congress and had successful careers as a scientist, professor, engineer, farmer, and small business owner prior to his election to Congress. He designed and built his own solar-powered home and was the first member in Congress to take delivery of a gas-electric hybrid Prius. Congressman Bartlett earned both a Master’s degree and a Doctorate in Human Physiology from the University of Maryland at College Park.

Congressman Bartlett is currently the Chairman of the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and Vice Chairman of the Small Business Committee. He served as Chairman of the Energy Subcommittee of the House Committee on Science in the 107th Congress and was a key author of the alternative and renewable provisions in the pending Energy bill.

Transcript of interview:

Colin Sullivan: Welcome to OnPoint. I’m Colin Sullivan. With us today is Roger Diwan, and oil markets expert at PFC Energy, and Congressman Roscoe Bartlett, Republican from Maryland. Our subject today is peak oil and whether or not the world is running out of cheap oil and what effect that might have on the global economy. Thank you both for being here. Congressman, I’d like to first start with you. You made some very strong statements in the past about how world production capacity is headed towards peak, or is at its peak, or in decline. What are the consequences of that, and what makes you so convinced that oil production is in decline and reached its peak?

Roscoe Bartlett: Well, two things, one is the science that led to the prediction that the United States would peak in oil production in 1970. It did, and we have fallen in our production the curve that was predicted. Was predicted, by the way, in 1956 by a scientist and geologist named M. King Hubbert, who worked for worked for Shell Oil Co. He made a prediction that the world would peak in oil production about 2000. Now, we didn’t. We had a few years of grace, because he couldn’t have known about the Arab oil embargo or the oil price spikes or the worldwide recession that occurred, which reduced the demand for oil. The second thing is that oil is now over $50 a barrel. For the fourth week in a row, gas prices have increased in our country. If countries had the ability to increase oil production, $50 a barrel ought to be a big incentive to increase oil production. If we are not at peak oil, we’re very close to peak oil, and so we really ought to be talking about what now and what should we have been doing that we didn’t do, and what do we absolutely have to do now.

Colin Sullivan: Mr. Diwan, what’s your response to that? Does $50 oil sustained mean we’re at peak oil?

Roger Diwan: Well, what we have here, in many ways, is a number of cyclical and structural issues which have brought us $50 oil. It’s true that we’re running at very high capacity. Right now we’re producing at 98 percent. It means that we have very little spare capacity. We’ve rarely had that phenomenon. And in term of this issue of peak oil, if you look at the current conditions, and if you trend them up for the next 10, 15 years, you see that, you know, with the present technology and the present access to resources, it’s difficult to imagine that we’re going to be able to produce a lot more than 100, 105 million barrel per day, which probably could be around 2015. So we’re entering that era, if we don’t have two dramatic changes. One is technology, both on supply and demand, and second one is access to the reserve which do exist in the Middle East.

Colin Sullivan: Well, is there any reserve capacity in the world besides in Saudi Arabia going forward the next 20 years? Or do you have rely exclusively on the Saudis and the Middle East?

Roger Diwan: No, no, I mean you have a lot of oil in the ground, in Saudi Arabia, in Iran, in Iraq, in Kuwait, in the UAE, in Russia. The question is how do we have access to those reserves, and are these countries willing to develop these reserve at the pace we want them to develop them.

Colin Sullivan: And will it be just as inexpensive as it’s been for the past 50 years, or are we talking about more expensive oil production?

Roger Diwan: It could be a little bit more expensive; but, you know, if you’re producing oil at $7 or $8 or $9 in the Middle East, and prices are $50, there’s, you know, it’s not a big issue.

Colin Sullivan: Congressman, what do you see as the consequences of this — if we have reached peak oil, as you say? What are the consequences on our long-term economic growth and the global economy and U.S. economy?

Roscoe Bartlett: Although there’s a lot of oil left in the world, and we agree that there’s roughly 900 to 1,000 gigabarrels of oil left in the world, you need to put that in context. Up until the Carter years, every decade, we used as much oil as had been used in all of previous history. Now, with exponential growth, if you’re at about a 7 percent growth rate, and we were using oil at about 7 percent more per year, the world was, that explains how we got on that curve. Now, the fact that we have about half of all the oil that was ever in the world still there, doesn’t mean that the next 50 years, 100 years are going to be like the last 50 years, 100 years, because the world is now demanding a whole lot more oil. Last year, China increased their use probably 25 percent. In less than three years, that doubles their use of oil. They probably won’t continue on that growth path, but India’s increasing. China’s now the No. 2 importer in the world. What are the consequences of this? Boy, economic and geopolitical. When the world recognizes that there’s only so much oil that can be produced, and we need more oil — by the way, if our economy doesn’t grow at least 2 percent a year, we can’t service our debt. And if we don’t think the economy’s growing at 2 percent a year, the stock market starts tanking. You know, we have to get used to the fact that there is not going to be oil in the quantities there have been in the past available in the future, and we should have started a long time ago, ’cause we knew — the world knew — by at least 1980, that M. King Hubbert was right about our country. If he’s right about the United States, why shouldn’t he be right about the world? And we should have been doing some things that we’ve now blown 25 years, that we could have been doing some very meaningful things to prepare for this time when the world reaches its peak ability to produce oil. We didn’t do those things then. We really need to start doing them now.

Colin Sullivan: Mr. Diwan, what’s your take on what the long-term economic consequences may be?

Roger Diwan: Well, if we don’t believe that the world can produce more than 100 or 105 million barrel per day, and we’re at 80, 84, 85 right now, it’s certainly time to start preparing for what to do next. I mean the technology exists to consume less. You have car technologies. You have other sources of energy: gas, coal. So there’s a lot to be done. The question is how proactive the consuming country are about it, and so far we haven’t, because energy was very cheap. Hopefully, $50 oil will open the eyes and start thinking about that and plan for tomorrow.

Colin Sullivan: So what are the alternatives, especially in the transportation sector? I mean hydrogen seems pretty far out. Fuel cells seem pretty far out.

Roger Diwan: Yeah.

Colin Sullivan: Hybrids are starting to become more — the public seems to be more interested in buying hybrids now. But, still, there’s a consumption of gasoline with hybrids. What’s the alternative? Development of a energy source we haven’t conceived yet?

Roger Diwan: Well, if we can consume less, we have more oil in many ways. So the question is what technology can be put on the market very quickly. And you’re right, fuel cells and hydrogen are not for the next 10, 15 years. So it’s hybrid and it’s more — it’s cars that are a lot more efficient. After all, we’re still using 100-year-old technology. We can do better than that. We can have small cars. We can have lighter cars, and we can certainly have cars which are a lot more efficient.

Colin Sullivan: Congressman, what’s your take on what the alternatives should be going forward?

Roscoe Bartlett: Well, certainly, we need to conserve, and we certainly need to be more efficient. But that alone won’t solve the problem. With the industrial growth in China and India and Third World would like to do for their people what we’ve done for our people and have an Industrial Revolution that will improve the quality of life for their people. We’re going to have to start moving to alternatives. That’s just the reality. This is a very daunting challenge because of the energy density in fossil fuels. One barrel of oil is the equivalent of 25,000 man hours of labor. That’s like you having 12 people that work exclusively for you for one year, and all it costs you is a little over a hundred dollars. That’s the $50 for the barrel of oil and maybe $50 for refining it. And you get that kind of labor intensity. The energy intensity is just phenomenal. I have a little personal experience. I was in West Virginia with a heavily loaded Prius, a hybrid car which we drive, and the worst mileage I got was 20 miles per gallon — 20 miles per gallon going up a steep West Virginia mountain. The car was heavily loaded. How long would it take me to push that car 20 miles up the mountain? Obviously, I can’t do it. I could do it with a come-along and chains and so forth, and if I did it in 90 days, I’d be very lucky, which is really about what the 25,000 man hours of labor per barrel of oil is. None of the alternatives have anything like the energy density of the fossil fuels except nuclear, but you can’t put a nuclear power plant in the back of your car. And, by the way, hydrogen is not an energy source. It’s not a solution to the problem. It’s a good idea, because it’s a handy way to move energy around. And when you finally use it, it’s non-polluting. You get just water from it. but I think that probably more than half of our people believe that it’s an energy source and we can solve our energy problem with hydrogen. You’ve got to produce more energy — you’ve got to use more energy to produce the hydrogen than you will get out of the hydrogen. Nevertheless, it’s a good idea, because it burns so cleanly when you finally use it.

Colin Sullivan: Do you agree with what the congressman has to say on hydrogen, specifically?

Roger Diwan: Yes, I do. I also think that we have a lot of oil still left in the ground, and if oil use is only geared toward transportation, we can actually extend the life of our barrels here. It means also that we need to destroy demand in other use — in industrial and non-transportation. And that’s also feasible, because, as oil prices increase, we’re going to find alternatives, and we’re going to certainly be more efficient. The efficiency gains in burning energy are still improving, and we need to make sure that that continues. Often, the technology exists. It has not been deployed.

Colin Sullivan: Congressman, it seems like you’re saying that the Republicans Party’s — or factions of the Republican Party’s preoccupation with drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge is a little bit misled. I mean do you — what’s your comment on that? Do you think that drilling in ANWR is just a drop in the bucket and that’s not what an energy policy should be all about?

Roscoe Bartlett: Oh, it is indeed a drop in the bucket. ANWR is going to be probably half or maybe less than half, but about half of Prudhoe Bay, and Prudhoe Bay — we have a chart that we’ll show — Prudhoe Bay had a pretty insignificant impact on oil production in our country. We were on the down slope of Hubbert’s curve when we discovered oil in Alaska; and we had a little bump, but we still went down, and we’re still going down. I’m opposed to drilling in ANWR for a couple of reasons. We use 25 percent of the world’s oil, and we have only 2 percent of the known reserves. Now if you have only 2 percent of the known reserves, I’m having a lot of trouble understanding why it’s in our advantage to use up that 2 percent as quickly as possible. If we could pump ANWR tomorrow, what would we do the day after tomorrow? And I think pumping ANWR will give a false sense of security that is totally irrelevant. ANWR will not solve our problems. We can’t drill our way out of this problem. It just isn’t going to happen. We’re going to have to — as Mr. Diwan says — we’re going to have to use conservation and efficiency, and then we’ve got to use the time we buy with that to move to alternatives. I mentioned that up until the Carter years, every decade we used as much oil as in all of previous history. If that curve had continued, when we’ve used half of the world’s oil, we’d have 10 years of oil left. Now we’re better off than that. At current use rates, we have 40 years, because it won’t be current-use rates. We’d like to use more, but it’s going to be decreasingly available. It’s going to fall off. By the way, nobody yet has mentioned an enormously important use of gas and oil, and that’s the big petrochemical industry. We live in a plastic world. We fertilize our crops with natural gas. All of the nitrogen fertilizer comes from natural gas. And, by the way, when we talk about the depletion of oil, natural gas will follow just about along with it, won’t it?

Roger Diwan: Oh, we have a lot more gas reserves than oil, and we have mined them much less. So in a way, if you look at the ratio of production and reserve, gas is actually the next source of energy. We do have a lot more gas —

Roscoe Bartlett: But we’re now using gas at an increasing —

Roger Diwan: At an increasing rate, but, in a way, we’re 20 — or I would — more like 30 years behind oil. So we have gas, and gas in many ways is our transition fuel here. Question is what happened after oil and gas. But gas is used, as you said, for petrochemicals and for industrial and for electricity, not for transportation.

Roscoe Bartlett: And there’s another problem with gas, and that is that it’s very difficult to move across the ocean.

Roger Diwan: Correct.

Roscoe Bartlett: It’s now used pretty much where it’s produced through a very complex system of pipelines moving it around. To move it across the ocean, you’ve got to what? Liquefy it and store it at very cold temperatures.

Roger Diwan: Yeah.

Roscoe Bartlett: In a pressurized ship.

Roger Diwan: But that’s the next 10, 15 years, we’ll see a dramatic increase in the LNG, in the liquefied natural gas.

Roscoe Bartlett: So we will be dealing — we will be in — using oil — gas more than we are now. But even that will run out. If all we’re doing is finding clever ways to use the little bit that’s there more quickly, we’ve missed the point. Gas and oil are not forever, and we need to be moving to technologies that free us. From a national security basis, by having only 2 percent and using 25 percent is an enormous national security risk. That alone should drive us to do something else, should it not?

Colin Sullivan: Mr. Diwan, changing the subject a little bit, your consulting firm recently released a study that said, “Depletion of oil resources will cause a shift in geographic dominance of production sources.” What kind of shift are we talking about? Are we talking about people — countries in the Middle East being able to dominate more easily now the world energy markets than they are now?

Roger Diwan: Oh, what you have is the declines in oil fields are very steep, in the United States, in the North Sea. So, in general, in the OECD countries and in some of the countries like Mexico, which are close to the United States, and probably even Venezuela, and the reserves that we know of are based in the Middle East and a little bit in Russia. So as we demand more energy, and energy production plateaus or declines in the OECD countries, the gap has to be filled by the producers in the Middle East. So you see that shift happening already over the last two years, over, actually, the last five years. Most of the increase of production came from the Middle East or from Russia.

Colin Sullivan: Now, the Saudis say that they can meet demand growth over the next 20, 30, 40 years. But there’s never really been an audit done on Saudi capacity. How do you do that? Should we believe what the Saudis say about their capacity, about their reserves?

Roger Diwan: They don’t say that. They say they can increase their production to 12 and 14 million barrels per day, which I think is feasible with a lot of investment. But is that enough to meet the increase in demand, and that’s what the Saudis do not answer. I do not believe that they — that if we start to see the big decline setting in later this decade or the next decade in the United States in a number of major fields coming on-stream right now in West Africa, that Saudi Arabia will be able to produce 20 and 25 million barrels per day. I don’t think Saudi Arabia wants to produce 25 million barrels per day. There is a limit of how much production can come from a lease, even if the reserves do exist. To get those reserves into production, you need to spend tens, if not hundreds of billions of dollars. And I’m not sure these countries want to do that — to spend that amount of money that fast to meet the energy needs of the West.

Colin Sullivan: Now, if we are on a decline, if we are past the peak, isn’t it just more expensive to get this oil out of the ground? Isn’t that part of the problem? And we’re going to continue to see sustained oil prices beyond $50 a barrel.

Roscoe Bartlett: Yeah, Goldman Sachs says they’re going to 105, and Americans may change their driving habits when gas is $4 a gallon. But the reality is that we will reach a peak. We may have reached a peak now. A lot of authorities believe that we’ve reached a peak now, but we will reach a peak, and then there will be a decline after that. It’s not a matter of spending more money. Certainly, oil is going to cost more. But not only will it cost more, there’s going to be less of it. And those who believe that the marketplace will take care of this problem, you know, and I have a lot of colleagues in the Congress who aren’t worried about this at all. Not to worry, they say, the marketplace will take care of this. But I’ll tell you, you can’t get blood out of a turnip, and the marketplace can’t do what can’t be done, and the ability to produce oil just isn’t there. And the present surge capacity in the world is what? A million, million-and-a-half barrels a day?

Roger Diwan: Probably. Around a million-and-a-half.

Roscoe Bartlett: That’s about what it is. You know, China will slurp that up almost overnight with their increased demand for oil. If we’re not at peak oil, we very shortly will be at peak oil. We ought to be behaving like the reality says we ought to behave, and that is that oil is going to become increasingly more expensive and decreasingly available. And what will the world do? What will the major countries in the world do when they recognize that there’s not going to be as much oil there as needed to support our economy? What do you think the world will do?

Colin Sullivan: Well, what kind of response do you get when you take this message to the Republican Caucus in the House, especially?

Roscoe Bartlett: Well, right now we’re kind of in an education mode. We did one special order for an hour. We got a great response on that. Next week, we hope to do another special order. And most of the people in the country, including my colleagues, we have representative government, and the representatives generally reflect the general knowledge in the population, and most people in our country don’t know that we’re facing a crisis. One of the writers on this, by the way, starts his article by saying, “Dear Reader, Civilization as we know it will end soon.” Now your first impulse is to put down the article. This guy’s a nut. But if you don’t put it down and read through the article, you’re hard-pressed to argue with his conclusions. That if we don’t do some rational things now — what we need is a war, the equivalent of a war on this. We need the equivalent of a Manhattan Project squared if we are going to produce energy from alternatives in adequate quantities to satisfy the enormous needs of our society.

Colin Sullivan: Mr. Diwan, what do you think about this projection of $105 oil? Is that outlandish, unrealistic?

Roger Diwan: Yeah, I mean I read the report. What the report says, oil prices will be around $50. If we have a big supply disruption in the world, prices will spike. And they put the $105 number. I don’t know why they put $105. Why not $85 or $150? So there’s no reason for that. It’s clear that we don’t have a lot of excess capacity. And, in a world without excess capacity, there is a risk premium, and we can have a spike in oil prices. We need to have a disruption to go there. But what we need to think, also, that we had an economic cycle which was very strong, so demand was very strong in 2003-2004. Still strong in 2005, but also the global economy’s slowing down, so the demand actually will slow down at the same time when a lot of investment made earlier in this decade, both in the former Soviet Union and in West Africa, will be coming onboard. So I imagine that in the next five years, if we had a slower economy, actually oil prices will subside. It doesn’t solve the problem. What it might do is dull the problem. You can say, “Well, oil is now at $30. We don’t need to think about it anymore.”

Colin Sullivan: So we might see prices level off over the next couple years, but then long-term we’re gonna see spikes up to —

Roger Diwan: Yes, because —

Colin Sullivan: $50, $60, $70 a barrel.

Roger Diwan: Correct, I mean the question is where we’re going to find our next [supply] of oil if we don’t have a dramatic breakthrough in technology to be able to pump more of the oil in the ground. Because, right now, we have recovery rates between 30 and 50 percent. In any oilfield, this is how much oil you recover. So you can increase your reserve by lifting more oil from the ground. So we need that to change. Well, that, you know, could be 10, 15, 20 years down the road.

Colin Sullivan: So the days of $20 a barrel oil, $1 a gallon gasoline, is over, a thing of the past?

Roger Diwan: Probably, unless we have a very major recession.

Colin Sullivan: Congressman?

Roscoe Bartlett: Oh, I would agree. Unless there’s a worldwide depression, you’ll never see dollar gas again. By the way, this was a resource which was depletable. Oil never should have been a dollar a barrel. Saudi Arabia, early on, what, they got $5, it was a dollar and a half a barrel or something. They got 5 cents of that. You know, recognizing that this is a resource which is not infinite. Oil has never been priced at its real replacement cost. We’re still not pricing it at its true replacement cost. If we have to replace the energy we get from fossil fuels with alternatives, it’s going to cost a whole lot more than the equivalent of $50 a barrel.

Colin Sullivan: OK, we’re just about out of time. Congressman, Roger Diwan, thanks for being here. Join us tomorrow for another edition on OnPoint. Until then, I’m Colin Sullivan for E&ETV.

21 November 2005  Peak Oil resolution in U.S. House of Representatives

http://www.globalpublicmedia.com/articles/572

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, Mr. UDALL of New Mexico, Mr. GOODE, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. TANCREDO, Mr. GINGREY, Mr. KUHL of New York, Mr. ISRAEL, Mr. BUTTERFIELD, Mr. UDALL of Colorado, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. GILCHREST, and Mr. WYNN) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

PEAK OIL CAUCUS FORMED IN U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES A NEW BEGINNING AS THE CLOCK RUNS DOWN

The Caucus was founded by Roscoe Bartlett. He knows that “There is no such thing, ultimately, as sustainable growth.” Hear his presentation at the Denver ASPO-USA Conference:
<http://www.globalpublicmedia.com/events/564> (for the frank admission about “sustainable growth,” go to 18:56). He knows that “our whole monetary system is based on the premise that we will always have growth.” And he knows that those two insights add up to a new world of sacrifice and transformation.

October 24, 2005  PEAK OIL HOUSE RESOLUTION 507 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Co-sponsors

Tom Udall
Virgil Goode
Raul Grijalva
Walter Jones
Tom Tancredo
Phil Gingrey
Randy Kuhl
Steve Israel
G.K. Butterfield
Mark Udall
Chris Van Hollen
Wayne Gilchrest
Al Wynn
John McHugh
Jim Moran
Dennis Moore

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States, in collaboration with other international allies, should establish an energy project with the magnitude, creativity, and sense of urgency that was incorporated in the `Man on the Moon¹ project to address the inevitable challenges of `Peak Oil¹.

Whereas the United States has only 2 percent of the world¹s oil reserves;

Whereas the United States produces 8% of the world’s oil and consumes 25% of the world’s oil, of which nearly 60% is imported from foreign countries;

Whereas developing countries around the world are increasing their demand for oil consumption at rapid rates; for example, the average consumption increase, by percentage, from 2003 to 2004 for the countries of Belarus, Kuwait, China, and Singapore was 15.9%;

Whereas the United States consumed more than 937,000,000 tonnes of oil in 2004, and that figure could rise in 2005 given previous projection trends;

Whereas, as fossil energy resources become depleted, new, highly efficient technologies will be required in order to sustainably tap replenishable resources;

Whereas the Shell Oil scientist M. King Hubbert accurately predicted that United States domestic production would peak in 1970, and a growing number of petroleum experts believe that the peak in the world¹s oil production (Peak Oil) is likely to occur in the next decade while demand continues to rise;

Whereas North American natural gas production has also peaked;

Whereas the United States is now the world¹s largest importer of both petroleum and natural gas;

Whereas the population of the United States is increasing by nearly 30,000,000 persons every decade;

Whereas the energy density in one barrel of oil is the equivalent of eight people working full time for one year;

Whereas affordable supplies of petroleum and natural gas are critical to national security and energy prosperity; and

Whereas the United States has approximately 250 years of coal at current consumption rates, but if that consumption rate is increased by 2 percent per year, coal reserves are reduced to 75 years: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that– (1) in order to keep energy costs affordable, curb our environmental impact, and safeguard economic prosperity, including our trade deficit, the United States must move rapidly to increase the productivity with which it uses fossil fuel, and to accelerate the transition to renewable fuels and a sustainable, clean energy economy; and

(2) the United States, in collaboration with other international allies, should establish an energy project with the magnitude, creativity, and sense of urgency of the `Man on the Moon¹ project to develop a comprehensive plan to address the challenges presented by Peak Oil.

ALSO SEE:

July 23, 2007. Peak Oil Caucus chairs Bartlett, Udall comment on National Petroleum Council report. eenews.net

Posted in Congressional Record U.S., Other Experts | Comments Off on House of Representatives Roscoe Bartlett 2005