When will the Alaska pipeline turn into an 800-mile-long Popsicle?

[Below are excerpts on the Alaskan pipeline from Rust: The Longest War by Jonathan Waldman.  This is a great book, yet leaves so many possible rust stories uncovered, that I hope Waldman writes Rust II (or any other topic — will certainly read his next book whatever it is). Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com ]

Officially, Neogi is the pipeline’s integrity manager. He is responsible for keeping the pipeline intact, whole. Most pipeline operators employ integrity managers, but most pipelines are not like the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. From Prudhoe Bay to Prince William Sound, TAPS stretches eight hundred miles, which leaves Neogi accountable for one of the heaviest metal things in the Western Hemisphere, through which the vast majority of Alaska’s economy flows. Daily, the four-foot steel tube spits out $50 million of oil.

Four technicians from Baker Hughes, the pig’s manufacturer, wrapped up a third day of checking and double checking and triple checking its componentry. Among other things, in the front segment of the pig, between two yellow urethane cups, they checked 112 magnetic sensors mounted in between 112 pairs of magnetized brushes. These sensors would detect the magnetic field induced in the pipe as the pig, propelled by the flow of oil, traveled through it. Given any kind of anomaly in the half-inch steel—a pit, a ding, a thin spot—the field would change, and the sensors would capture this and record it on a hard drive. Inch by inch, the sensors would capture this information; Neogi hoped they would capture all seven billion square inches of the pipe. That’s 1,200 acres. Using all that data, Neogi would determine the most vulnerable spots on the pipeline, dig them up, and repair them before they became leaks.

No matter how extensively the technicians double checked, even the most advanced pig can’t perform its inspection if the wall of the pipe is covered in wax. Wax, a natural component of crude oil, keeps the magnetic brushes and sensors off the steel wall. The consistency of lip balm or mousse, it plugs up caliper arms that measure the shape of the pipe, and snags odometer wheels. Wax renders smart pigs senseless, leaving them blind, dumb, and amnesiac. Nor can a pig survive a violent voyage. Too fast, and sensor heads melt or crack. Too rough, and the magnetizing brushes wear down. Too jarring, and the universal joint between the pig’s two segments comes apart, wires snap, and power to the magnetic flux sensors is cut off. Poof goes the data, months of work, and millions of dollars—leaving engineers with a pipeline in indeterminate condition, regulators unhappy, and the public at risk. Wax accumulates when the oil cools below 75 degrees, and long, slack sections, where the pig can barrel down mountain passes at high speed, manifest themselves when there’s not much oil flowing through the pipe. Neogi was well aware that it was winter, and that the flow of oil through TAPS was as low as it had been. It was not the best of times to pig.

On account of wax and low flow rates, in the last dozen years, half the smart pig runs have failed.

More recently, a pig was sucked into a relief line at a pump station midway down the line. That the relief line was only sixteen inches in diameter, and guarded with pig bars, was not a sufficient deterrent to the forty-eight-inch pig. This has happened at least a half dozen times. When it happened in 1986, and the pipeline was shut down while the pig was extracted, that meant more than a quarter of the nation’s oil wasn’t moving toward California. Pigs have made it all the way to Valdez, Alaska, only to be ingested in relief lines there. Other pigs have damaged the pipeline, or gotten stuck in it and been destroyed during their extraction.

They planned to launch the tool at seven in the morning, exactly twelve hours behind a red urethane pig of lesser intelligence. That pig, like a giant squeegee, was scraping the line clean. It was the last of nine such scraper pigs that, by Neogi’s design, had been shoved down the pipeline in the previous six weeks. Neogi had kept track of how much wax these pigs had pushed out in Valdez, and graphed it. From 1,200 pounds, the mass had dropped to 400. The line was as clean as it was going to get, primed for inspection. It was ready for the smart

For two decades, the Prudhoe Bay oil fields—Sadlerochit, Northstar, Kuparuk, Endicott, Lisburne—have been declining steadily. Yearly, immutably, they produce 5 percent less oil. The result is that TAPS now carries one quarter of the oil it was designed to carry. It comes out of the ground colder than ever and flows more slowly toward Valdez. Crude used to make it to Valdez in four days, as if running seven-minute miles. Now it walks. Enroute, it cools off even more and, as it does so, deposits more wax on the pipeline. A doctor would call the pipeline arteriosclerotic. While a pipeline waxes, its diameter wanes. Declining throughput makes things difficult for Neogi, but it makes them even more difficult for agencies estimating the pipeline’s lifespan.

The pipeline was designed to survive as long as the oil fields. Lest it clog, it must stay warm, which means that it must remain full of flowing oil. In a perverse symbiosis, the pipeline needs the oil as much as the oil needs the pipeline. As a result, while the consortium of agencies that oversees the pipeline has written that it “can be sustained for an unlimited duration,” Alyeska figures that it’ll survive until 2043, and the state of Alaska figures that it’ll expire a bit sooner. Private consultants, hired to estimate the life of TAPS, mention only “the future” and write of “diligent upkeep” in passive sentences. The estimates all couch what nobody wants to say: the pipeline, once the largest privately funded project in America, and one of its greatest engineering achievements, is now an elderly patient in intensive care.

The companies that built the pipeline foresaw such a future and tried to avoid it. In the immediate aftermath of their 1968 oil discovery, they considered every alternative to a pipeline. They considered extending the Alaska Railroad to the North Slope, until they realized that it’d take sixty-three trains, each one hundred cars long, every day, to ship their oil. They considered trucks, calculating that they’d need nearly the entire American fleet in addition to an eight-lane highway. They looked into jumbo jets supplied by Boeing and Lockheed, turning away when it became apparent that their air traffic would exceed the combined air traffic of all the freight in the rest of the country by more than an order of magnitude. They looked into blimps. They commissioned the world’s largest icebreaking cargo ship, and after it got stuck in the Northwest Passage, they seriously considered using a fleet of nuclear submarines to ship the oil, under Arctic ice, to a port in Greenland. Reluctantly, out of alternatives, they settled on a pipeline.

On most other pipelines, “events” or “incidents” or “product releases”—what the rest of us call leaks or spills—are most often caused by third-party damage. By this, the industry means accidents. Heavy equipment is usually to blame; pipeline ruptures are most often caused by collisions with bulldozers and backhoes. On TAPS, since there’s so little construction across the vastness of Alaska, the risk of accidental third-party damage is low. Natural hazards, on the other hand, present threats in abundance. Earthquakes, avalanches, floods, and ice floes all threaten TAPS. But what really keeps Alyeskans up is corrosion. It’s the number one threat to the integrity of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.  On account of that threat, the pipeline was outfitted with the greatest corrosion-protection features of the era. Its principal protection was its coating: paint. As a backup, a zinc strap the size of a wrist (a giant anode) was buried under the pipe. Though TAPS was, boldly, called rustproof, the defense proved insufficient. Like all coatings, the one on TAPS proved vulnerable—but Alyeska didn’t learn quite how vulnerable for a dozen years. When it did, the company beefed up the pipeline’s corrosion protection with 10,000 twenty-five-pound bags of buried magnesium anodes and a cathodic protection system consisting of a hundred-odd rectifiers spitting a low voltage into the pipe.

Because rocks resist current, the cathodic protection system doesn’t work well in rocky areas, leaving corrosion engineers to their final tool: coupons. On the pipeline, a coupon is a one-inch square of steel, connected to it and buried along it, serving as a surrogate. Alyeska has about eight hundred of them. But coupons don’t prevent corrosion; they just help engineers monitor it.

In a way, monitoring is Alyeska’s second line of defense, and Alyeska does a lot of it. Like all major pipelines, TAPS is monitored by leak-detection software, which compares the flow of oil going into the pipeline with the flow coming out the other end, and also scans for sudden pressure drops. But unlike other pipelines, it is also monitored regularly by pilots using infrared cameras to hunt for signals that the hot oil has escaped into the cold Alaskan earth, as well as by “line walkers” who hunt for dark puddles and squishy tundra along the pipeline, and by controllers watching an array of hydrocarbon-detecting and liquid-detecting and noise-detecting sensors shoved into the ground alongside it. And then there are the dozen state and federal agencies looking over the shoulders of the thousand people operating the pipeline, making it the most regulated pipeline in the world.

But because a smart pig is the only way for Alyeska to determine if its pipeline is about to spring a leak before it has actually done so, and because Alyeska operates under more regulatory scrutiny than any other operator, it sends smart pigs down the line nearly twice as often as any other pipeline operator. It employs a smart pig once every three years, and has been doing so since long before federal pipeline laws stipulated it. Thanks largely to smart pigs, TAPS hasn’t suffered a corrosion-induced leak since it began operating in 1977.2 Over its first thirty years, Alyeska reviewed nearly 350 potential threats to the pipeline, including dents, wrinkle bends, weld misalignments, ovalities, gouges, and corrosion pits. The majority of these problems were found with smart pigs.

Keeping the pipe clean has become a priority nearly as great as keeping it whole, because the latter depends on the former. To keep it clean, Alyeska sends cleaning pigs south weekly. The company keeps a fleet of a dozen such pigs at a maintenance yard in Valdez, and in a perpetual relay, these pigs go back and forth: up the haul road, down the line. The managerial pigs—the smart ones—wait patiently while these janitorial pigs stay busy.

Before the last smart pig run, Alyeska sent a janitorial pig south every four days for a month. When these pigs pop out in Valdez, they usually push out ten or twenty barrels of wax. In the pig mobile, they go straight to the pig wash. The wax, a hazardous material, is collected in barrels and shipped out of state. Once, not many years ago, after the pipeline wasn’t pigged for six weeks, a pig pushed out forty-seven barrels of wax. Beneath all that wax, on account of corrosion, the one-billion-pound pipeline loses in the vicinity of ten pounds of steel a year: the same as an old Ford. Most of that metal loss is on the outside of the pipe, where it’s buried. The inside is, well, nicely oiled. The exception is inside pump stations, where the pipe branches through valves and turbines. In deadlegs—hydraulic culs-de-sac, where oil sits stagnant—microbial-influenced corrosion is a threat. If corrosion struck uniformly, such that the pipeline lost metal evenly and consistently, maintaining it would be vastly easier. After a thousand years, 99.999 percent of the pipe would still be there, sans weak spots. But rust doesn’t work like that. It concentrates in relatively few places, begetting more rust. Alyeska responds only to those places that present severe integrity threats. It looks at spots where 35 percent or more of the pipe’s wall thickness is gone, and where metal loss leaves the pipe at risk of bursting, which it determines from a formula developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

To the pipeline, though, ravens pose a greater threat. Ravens pick at the pipe’s insulation, and then water gets in. Alyeska spent millions installing bands around the seams of the insulation, and the ravens persisted, outsmarting engineers.

the flow of oil through TAPS decreases, pigging will become drastically more difficult. Below 400,000 barrels per day, it will become impossible to tightline Atigun Pass, because there’s only so much oil a controller can store in the tanks at Pump 1 before he runs out of emergency wiggle room. By then, the slack section on Atigun Pass will be over three miles long. Below 350,000 barrels per day, the “slippage factor” of a cleaning pig will prevent it from scraping the line effectively. With the bypass necessary to keep the wax ahead of it in a slurry, there won’t be enough force to push the pig forward. Alyeska will also need to run them more frequently—as frequently as during this run’s cleaning regimen—and this makes controllers nervous. Meanwhile, by 2015, the small percentage of water entrained in the oil will drop out and begin flowing in a separate layer on the bottom of the line. Collecting at a dozen low spots, it could freeze. In so doing, it could disable check valves or halt pigs. At a flow rate of 400,000 barrels per day (expected by 2020), a pig arriving in Valdez could be pushing a slug of water one third of a mile long. Alyeska may need a new type of pig to push out the water, because water will also corrode the pipeline. Compounding matters, lower throughput will make it harder for controllers to detect leaks.

It was the closest that TAPS had ever been to becoming an eight-hundred-mile-long Popsicle. This is Alyeska’s great fear, its “worst-case event.” Declining throughput may necessitate frequent cleaning pigs, complex operating procedures, smarter and tougher pigs, and increased maintenance—but these are nothing compared with the seizure of the pipeline. North Slope crude gels at 15 degrees. It gets so thick that pumps can’t push it. It becomes thixotropic, like quicksand. For whatever reason—a power outage, say—if the oil sits in the line too long, at the wrong time of year, the threat of the big Popsicle looms. In January 2011, the oil cooled to 25 degrees. The threat is critical.

Alyeska’s former president told Congress that at the flow rate expected in 2015, nine winter days of shutdown could spell the ultimate end of the pipeline. If the oil gels, there will be no recovering from it. The threat makes explosions and even leaks seem trivial. It’s a game ender. It’s because of this conundrum that drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas is of such importance to Alaska, Alyeska, and Alaskans. Those rigs will tie into the Alaska pipeline, feed it their oil. Sure, residents will get annual dividends, and Alaska will receive billions in royalties and taxes that fund pretty much everything in the state. But it’s the long-term future of the state on the table.

The sooner that someone turns around the two-decade saga of declining throughput, keeping the pipeline from turning into a giant Popsicle, the easier those concerned with the integrity of the pipe will sleep. In the meantime, if TAPS leaks for some reason, and the public withholds forgiveness, the resultant delay in offshore drilling could portend the end of the line. That’s what Neogi was implying when he mentioned the impact on future drilling. A big spill could delay offshore drilling in the Beaufort or Chukchi Seas for two decades, and this could spell the end of the line. End of the line would be the end of the state of Alaska, and not exactly beneficial to the economy of the other forty-nine states in the union. Precarious is the future of the pipeline, and high are the stakes in which Neogi and the integrity management crew operate.

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Utility, large-scale battery energy storage

Hodson, H. July 25, 2015. Power to the people. NewScientist.

Demand for electricity varies every second, minute, hour, day, and season.  Production is easy to provide from always-ready natural gas and coal. But as we move towards a 100% renewable electric grid as oil, natural gas, coal, and uranium decline, wind and solar will have to provide most of the power, and they are extremely unpredictable, unreliable, and seasonal.  When demand and supply of electricity don’t exactly match, a blackout can occur.

The only way to get around this in the future will be energy storage, mainly from batteries since pumped hydro and compressed air energy storage are limited geologically.

In March 2015 Germany experienced this problem when 66% of solar generation failed during a solar eclipse.  Since this was predictable, utilities had already ramped up goal, natural gas and hydroelectric power to compensate.  If really large utility-scale batteries had existed, that could have also compensated.

Storing energy for the entire grid is a much bigger challenge. “The scale is unimaginable,” says Dahn, whose lab signed a five-year research contract with Tesla in June. He calculates that storing the output of just his local utility company, Nova Scotia Power, for 24 hours would take the energy storage capacity of every battery made worldwide this year – and then half as much again.

 

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Robert McNally on energy at U.S. Congressional Hearings

Preface. I think it is interesting to know what Congress hears about energy from experts, and what the official U.S. energy policies are.  It is frustrating that Energy Return on Invested (EROI) is never discussed, even by intelligent analysts like McNally.  Nor is the enormous ecological harm of biofuels – their stripping of topsoil, depletion of aquifers, their dependence on natural gas based fertilizer and oil, destruction of rainforests to grow palm oil, negative EROI, and the myriad reasons why cellulosic biofuels are unlikely to be developed discussed at hearings (i.e. “Peak Soil“).  Well, what else can be expected of a scientifically illiterate congress and public?  With so many leaders crowing energy independence, the train is picking up speed as it heads for the ecological brick wall, not slowing down.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Financial Sense, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

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House 113-2. February 13, 2013. American Energy Outlook: Technology, Market and Policy Drivers. U.S. House of Representatives. 119 pages.

Testimony of Robert McNally

We must recognize that our standard of living is closely and inextricably linked to fossil fuels.

It is hard to overstate but often overlooked how much modern civilization depends on continuous access to the substantial flow of fossil fuels from producers to consumers. The displacement of bioenergy [i.e. wood] with coal made the industrial era possible. Subsequent use of oil and natural gas augmented coal and enabled our modern transportation and electricity sectors to develop. Concentrated and abundant energy stores of coal, gas and oil power virtually all we do at the current state of technological development.

Transportation, which is critical to food supply chains and other core systems society needs to function, today runs almost entirely on oil.

Electrical generation taps a more diverse suite of fuels but much of it, too, is fossil fuel powered.

“Energy,” as Nobel chemist Richard Smalley noted in 2003, “is the single most important factor that impacts the prosperity of any society.” Fossil-based energy or hydrocarbons–oil, gas, and coal–are far superior to other primary energy sources because they are dense, highly concentrated, abundant, and comparatively easy to transport and store. That is the case now, and it is expected to be the case in the coming decades. The latest EIA International Energy Outlook forecasts that world energy consumption will rise by 53 percent by 2035 and fossil fuels ’ share of total energy consumption will rise from 74 to 79%.

Patience about the time it takes to transform energy systems

The pace of energy transformations depends on both the availability of economical stores of energy and the development of devices that can turn those energy stores into “work” such as light, heat, and mobility. Major energy transitions take a very long time, measured in decades if not generations.

The respected energy expert Vaclav Smil in 2008 “ Moore’s Curse and the Great Energy Delusion, The American Magazine:

“Energy transitions” encompass the time that elapses between an introduction of a new primary energy source oil, nuclear electricity, wind captured by large turbines) and its rise to claiming a substantial share 20 percent to 30 percent) of the overall market, or even to becoming the single largest contributor or an absolute leader (with more than 50%) in national or global energy supply. The term also refers to gradual diffusion of new prime movers, devices that replaced animal and human muscles by converting primary energies into mechanical power that is used to rotate massive turbogenerators producing electricity or to propel fleets of vehicles, ships, and airplanes. There is one thing all energy transitions have in common: they are prolonged affairs that take decades to accomplish and the greater the scale of prevailing uses and conversions the longer the substitutions will take. The second part of this statement seems to be a truism but it is ignored as often as the first part: otherwise, we would not have all those unrealized predicted milestones for new energy sources.

The main reason why it would take many decades to transform our energy system is that our energy system is colossal. Developed countries have made, and continue to make, enormous investments in recent years in fossil energy production, transportation, refining, distribution, and consumption systems and devices that could not quickly be replaced in any reasonable scenario, even if an alternative energy source was available. Whether one regards our society’s massive investment in and dependence on hydrocarbons as an addiction or a blessing, it is here to stay for many more decades.

Humility and restraint about predicting, much less attaining, arbitrary and aggressive energy targets

The historical record is littered with overly optimistic or scary predictions and policy targets , by experts and non-experts alike. While energy surprises can be humbling for analysts, too often leaders and observers ignore technology, geology, and economics and either predict or prescribe unachievable targets.

They range from period cries of imminent peak oil, through confident predictions in the 1950s that nuclear energy would be “too cheap to meter”, to President Nixon ’s declaration that the US would be energy independent by 1980. Widespread adoption of electric cars or deployment of renewable energy technologies has a long and sad history of failure going back over a century. Just six years ago, Congress passed a law mandating 36 billion gallons of biofuels consumption by 2022 that EIA analysts say cannot be met given economic and scientific realities. In July 2008 former Vice President Al Gore called for the US to commit to producing our entire electricity supply from renewable sources within 10 years. Though he described the goal as “achievable” and “affordable” not one energy expert I am aware of would agree this is even remotely possible. At best, arbitrary and aggressive targets can mislead the public about the complexities and uncertainties involved in energy market transformations and at worst when such targets are married to costly mandates or subsidies, they can become expensive policy errors. I would respectfully recommend policy makers abjure from basing policy on arbitrary, unrealistic targets, much less basing mandates or subsidies on them. Energy transformations are more akin to a multi-decade exodus than a multi-year moonshot, as pretending otherwise misleads citizens and distracts from serious debate about real circumstances and solutions.

Senate Hearing. June 23, 2015. American Energy Exports: Opportunities for U.S. Allies and U.S. National Security. Subcommittee on Multilateral International Development, Multilateral Institutions, And International Economic Energy, And Environmental Policy

Oil and natural gas are the lifeblood of modern civilization. Their abundance and affordability are prerequisites for thriving economic growth, high living standards, and ample employment. They are also an essential requirement for our national security. U S foreign policy has historically benefited from our strong position as a producer and exporter of energy. While we were known as the “Arsenal of Democracy” during World War II, we were equally an “Arsenal of Energy” , supplying nearly six out of seven barrels consumed by the Allies. 1 Even after net crude imports began rising steadily after the war, our control of spare production capacity enabled us to supply our allies and prevent economically damaging price spikes that would have resulted due to oil supply disruptions associated with Middle East conflicts in 1956 and 1967.

But after the energy, geopolitical, and economic convulsions of the 1970s , our confidence in our domestic abundance and control shifted to apprehension about dependence and vulnerability. For the past forty years our foreign and national security policy planning has prioritized preparing against supply interruptions and price spikes, protecting Middle East oil fields from hostile control , an d protecting the supply lines between the region and global markets. In this respect, the tremendous and unexpected boom in domestic oil and gas production in recent years is an enormous blessing for our country. In the last ten years, our net oil imports fell from 12.5 mb/d to 5 mb/d (in the first quarter of 2015) or from 60% to 24% of supply. 2 For the first time since the 1950s, most official projections see U.S. net energy imports, which includes all fuels, declining and eventually ending. 3 Our newfound abundance does not mean we can ignore the Middle East, which holds nearly half of the world’s prove n oil reserves and supplies one-third of global production. That region will remain a source of potential price and supply shocks, and its stability will therefore remain a vital national interest. But our domestic boom does confer enormous benefits and require s that we change our thinking about energy.

It is important to realize that we need not export large quantities of gas to benefit from a foreign policy standpoint. Just having the option to buy from the US strengthens the bargaining power of our allies when they negotiate long term contract prices with suppliers like Russia. Last December, Lithuania opened a costly LNG import terminal, an example of an ally willing to pay a security premium for diversified source of supply. Lithuania’s new terminal forced Gazprom to drop its prices to Lithuania, reportedly by 20%.

Natural gas

While much attention is paid to the spectacular turnaround in our oil supply and imports, it is worth remembering our need for imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) underwent a similar and surprising transition. Between 2002 and 2007 our LNG imports had more than tripled, and officials were expecting another doubling. We were building terminals to import from suppliers like Qatar and Russia . But after the shale gas revolution increased proven reserves by 77% from 200 billion cubic feet (bcf) in 2004 to 354 bcf last year, we are now on track to become a net natural gas exporter by 2017, according to EIA.

1 A History of the Petroleum Administration for War , 1946, p. 1.

2 June 2015 Short Term Energy Outlook, Table 4a. http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf

For historical data, see EIA. In 2005, total product supplied was 20.8 mb/d and net imports were 12.5 mb/d.

3 http://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/gruenspecht_06092015.pdf, slide 2

McNally, B. July 19, 2011. Outlook for US Biofuels. 2011 Agricultural symposium, Federal Reserve Bank, Kansas City, Missouri

My outlook for biofuels is, in a word, stark.

First, corn ethanol’s political power in Washington has peaked and is now in surprisingly rapid decline. Future policy support is blocked, and past policy supports are being scaled back. No one expected such a dramatic turnabout, the speed and extent of which is startling. Corn ethanol will be lucky to hold on to a 15 billion gallon per year (bgy) blending mandate, and other, “advanced” biofuel mandates are likely to be reduced by future Congresses or EPA. This shift in policy support for corn ethanol is not yet fully factored into commodity market analysts’ and energy investors’ expectations.

Second, Washington is unlikely to help ethanol surmount the main public policy impediment to greater biofuels blending–i.e. the 10% of gasoline “blend wall.” Washington’s new power constellation and fiscal austerity imperative will limit the future regulatory or fiscal support needed to push ethanol into intermediate blends (e.g. E15) or E85. In the absence of high public support, future growth in ethanol will require technical breakthroughs that dramatically lower costs and allow for production at the commercial scale.

Finally, when ethanol is blended at levels below the blend wall, prices will depend on ethanol’s suitability as a substitute for gasoline, which in turn depends on oil prices. Oil prices are likely to see greater cyclical swings as OPEC is not investing in enough capacity to retain an adequate supply buffer with which to dampen volatility. Greater oil price swings will reduce certainty and bedevil investment in conventional and bio-based energy.

When OPEC supplanted the United States 40 years ago as the dominant force in global oil markets, oil prices rose and imports soared, and energy security became a top policy priority. To promote the growth of a domestic transportation fuel supply, Washington exempted ethanol from part of the federal motor-fuel taxes, placed a tariff protection on imports, mandated government fleet purchases, and extended loans and loan guarantees for ethanol plant investment and federal R&D. Later, policymakers added pro-ethanol incentives in federal fuel economy rules and provided a volatility waiver to the formula in the oxygenated and reformulated fuels programs.

Although President Reagan pared back some support for ethanol, Republican ethanol champions such as Senators Dole, Lugar, and Grassley, as well as longtime Senate Energy Committee Chairman Pete Domenici, protected the blending credit, and the tariff protection survived and was increased. Ethanol has historically enjoyed strong voting blocks in the House and Senate, and the importance of Iowa’s role in the presidential nomination process is not lost on aspiring presidential candidates.

In the 1990s another rationale for ethanol blending emerged: environmental protection. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) mandated oxygenates in gasoline to reduce carbon monoxide emissions resulting from gasoline combustion.   And as ethanol’s chief competitor in the oxygenate market–MTBE–was phased out due to concerns over water contamination, ethanol benefited further. In the last decade, both energy security and environmental rationales for ethanol blending combined to create a third, and by far the biggest, political wave of support for ethanol. Terrorist attacks and oil price gyrations renewed national alarm about energy security, and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions became the holy grail of the environmental movement.

By offering benefits and political support to both causes, ethanol supporters succeeded–via the 2005 and 2007 energy policy acts–in achieving a new and powerful policy support for ethanol–a large and direct blending mandate. Specifically, in 2007 Congress ordered that the US blend 15 bgy of ethanol into gasoline by 2015, which translates into a conversion of some 40% of the US corn crop into 10% of the gasoline pool. And the nation must consume another 21 bgy of advanced cellulosic, not corn starch-based) ethanol by 2022. From a n energy policy and political perspective, the ethanol mandate is probably the single most impactful energy policy Washington has implemented in the last 11 years.

From a financial market perspective, it is no secret that neither Wall Street nor the oil industry is terribly fond of ethanol on its merits. But market participants have come to believe ethanol is a winner in Washington. As Senator Feinstein observed: “Ethanol is the only industry that benefits from a triple crown of government intervention: its use is mandated by law, it is protected by tariffs, and companies are paid by the federal government to use it. Investment in ethanol production and actual blending soared. Commodity analysts and traders began to assume a greater part of future liquid fuel demand would be met by biofuels. And oil companies began to acquire ethanol facilities and started to view corn fields as upstream energy assets.

Looking around

As we turn to the near past and present, it is striking to watch how ethanol’s fortunes have fallen so hard and so fast in Washington. The change was completely unexpected and is still underway, and market participants have been slow to realize it. I must admit, as one who has been noting the turnaround in ethanol’s fortunes over the recent years, the collapse in recent weeks has been breathtaking.

With the benefit of hindsight, signs of the trend shift emerged in 2008, when agricultural commodity prices soared as ethanol was ramping up in response to the 2007 RFS. Of course, other factors were also at work in the commodity price boom. But there had been no prior official analysis by EIA or anyone else of the impact of the RFS on grain prices. Unusually for such a major energy policy initiative, Washington mandated first but analyzed and debated later. Now well underway, the food versus fuel debate will rage for years. But in Washington perception matters as much as reality, and the perception was and is that biofuels mandates contributed to rising food prices. The second shift came in 2009, when the always-tenuous alliance between the environmental community and the ethanol community began to sour. While g reen groups appreciate d corn ethanol’s utility in reducing carbon monoxide, they were irked by exemptions from tough rules limit ing vapor pressure. Nor did they like the fossil fuel consumption, land-use impacts, and life-cycle carbon emissions associated with higher ethanol blending. But as long as cap-and-trade was on the table in the late-Bush and early-Obama administrations, Greens held their noses and allied with ethanol. Greens did lay some traps in the path of potential corn ethanol growth by insisting in the 2007 RFS that biofuels blending above 15 bgy come from more efficient, less carbon emitting sources than corn, such as cellulosic ethanol.

But in the last two years, the Great Recession and Republican gains in the 2010 election have taken cap and trade off the table, and as a result the falling out has gathered steam. Now that the chief rationale for the ethanol-green alliance has fallen away, tensions are laid bare and the gloves are coming off. Green groups are stepping up opposition to ethanol on grounds that it emits high amounts of carbon on a life cycle basis and that blending credits are an expensive way to cut carbon emissions. The Congressional Budget Office estimated blending credits cost about $750/ton of CO2 equivalent reduction. 2

The third, and I would argue most important, challenge corn ethanol faced was the emergence of fiscal austerity and the need to tighten fiscal policy, which is now the primary focus of the Republican-controlled House and also the top priority of the Senate and White House. And given the size of our fiscal imbalances and the election outlooks of most observers, it is fair to assume Washington’s budget cutting imperative won’t be going away soon. Even those without a strong anti-ethanol bias found it hard to justify continuing a blending credit for a product whose demand is mandated. Environmental groups joined with their usual foes on letters to Congress opposing E15.

Long envied, courted, and respected, ethanol now finds itself vulnerable, low-hanging fruit and facing an “unholy coalition” environmentalists, fiscal conservatives, the oil and food industries, and small engine manufacturers able and willing to block its growth and take back its prior gains.

The first tangible signs that corn ethanol was in trouble in Washington came during the E15 debate in 2010, when Congress and the White House failed to direct EPA to grant ethanol the sweeping waiver for E 15 it desired. Then the Tea Party and Republican House came to town. Turning first to E15, the House voted twice to deny federal funding for E15 blending pumps and storage tanks, by 262-158 and 283-128, and by 285-136 to block E15 waiver implementation.

Then the $6bn per year blending credit moved to the center of the bulls-eye. In June, the Senate voted 73-27 for a Coburn/Feinstein proposal to end the blending credit immediately rather than wait for end-year expiration. A strong reversal from the 1990s, when it was the anti-ethanol forces that typically lost Senate votes with counts in the 20s.

The most recent indication of how far corn ethanol’s star has fallen came during President Obama’s recent news conference–actually the first Twitter town hall. He raised eyebrows calling corn ethanol producers “probably the least efficient producers [compared with cellulosic]” and saying “ it’s important for even those folks in farm states who traditionally have been strong supporters of ethanol to examine are we, in fact, going after the cutting-edge biodiesel and ethanol approaches that allow, for example, Brazil to run about a third of its transportation system on biofuels. Now, they get it from sugar cane and it’s a more efficient conversion process than corn-based ethanol. And so us doing more basic research in finding better ways to do the same concept I think is the right way to go.” The President reportedly has put the blending credit on the table to help offset a continuation of the payroll tax cut.

Adding further support to the negative outlook for ethanol, official energy analysts making long term projections of fuel mix are becoming more cautious about biofuels growth . Whereas International Energy Agency IEA projections had ethanol accounting for almost half of gasoline demand growth in the last five years, IEA now projects the fuel will account for less than a quarter of demand growth in the next five, despite higher projected oil prices, 3 due to higher corn prices and greater uncertainty aro und mandates. 4 IEA sees global biofuels rising from 1.8 mb/d to 2.3 mb/d by 2016, displacing some 5.3% of gasoline and 1.5% of diesel by 2016 on an energy content basis. 5 IEA does not expect cellulosic biofuels to achieve widespread cost competitiveness with conventional gasoline until 2030, despite aggressive mandates. EIA, March 24, 2011. http://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations.cfm , slide 4.

IEA projects advanced biofuels will rise from 20 kb/d now to 100-130 kb/d in 2016. Even DOE’s forecasting arm, the Energy Information Administration, projects the US will fail to meet advanced biofuels targets by 2022.

Looking Ahead

Discussion about weakening the RFS has already started in Washington. Senator Inhofe (R-OK) and Representative Issa (R-CA) have introduced the Fuel Feedstock Freedom Act, which would allow states to withdraw from the RFS. However, state opt-outs are likely to be logistically difficult if not unworkable. Eventually either Congress or EPA will probably reduce the mandate to prevent it from colliding with the blend wall and raising gasoline prices. The ethanol lobby saw the blend wall danger and first tried to surmount it by getting EPA approval for “intermediate” blends above 10%, such as 15% ethanol or E15. Ethanol forces are trying to secure federal funding and indemnification for intermediate blend infrastructure and consumer acceptance. While EPA (grudgingly, I suspect) granted partial approval for E15 blends, they did so in the full knowledge that very little is likely to be sold due to large remaining infrastructure compatibility, cost and liability concerns, as spelled out in a recent GAO report. 9 Even ethanol-laden companies like Marathon and Valero said they would not offer E15. While ethanol forces took heart when Senator McCain’s bill against ethanol pump funding failed 40-59, it is far from certain that Congress will be in the mood to grant ethanol additional funds or legal protection to enable E15 growth.

Grains and oil converge

From a commodity market perspective, it is noteworthy that grain and fuel prices are becoming more correlated and volatility is going up. Wallace Tyner noted the rapid explosion in ethanol’s market share has established a high and positive correlation between crude oil and corn that has not previously existed. Below the blend wall, the price of crude will drive ethanol prices. Above the blend wall, the price of corn will drive ethanol prices. There are also important linkages between the RFS and higher grain price volatility. As the RFS mandate rises, it will introduce a price-insensitive source of demand for corn. That in turn will impart greater price volatility back onto agricultural markets.   Two academics recently estimate d that at times when the RFS is driving ethanol demand instead of high oil prices relative to corn, inherent volatility in US grain markets will rise by about 25%.   And volatility of US coarse grain prices in response to supply side shocks in energy markets will rise by almost one-half.

A word about biodiesel and wind energy

Biodiesel history has mirrored that of corn ethanol. The inventor of the diesel engine, Rudolph Diesel, actively considered agricultural feedstocks as a fuel. But petroleum distillate established a dominant position, though oil price hikes of the 1970s renewed interest in homegrown alternatives.

Commercial production of biodiesel began in the 1990s, but only increased sharply since 2004 when a $1 blending/production credit was implemented.   In 2005, supplemental credits for the “renewable diesel tax credit” (“renewable” diesel does not use alcohol in conversion) and “small agri-biodiesel production credit” also went into effect. Biodiesel production was around 30 million gallons before 2005, but by 2008 was over 700 million gallons per year, with a large portion exported (though the EU has since imposed an import tariff that has hurt US exports). Biodiesel remains expensive compared with petroleum distillate. Biodiesel economics feature a high correlation between soybean oil and conventional diesel prices, since it takes a gallon of soybean oil to produce a gallon of soy-based biodiesel. In addition, soy-based biodiesel has a slightly lower energy content than conventional diesel. Bruce Babock, of Iowa State University, has noted biodiesel marginal costs are $2 per gallon higher than diesel, requiring a $1.00 credit and $1.00 RIN price. 12 This makes most analysts cautious about the outlook for biodiesel growth. IEA projects biofuel-based distillate will account for only 4% of diesel demand growth in the next five years, compared with having taken 9% over the last five. 13 EIA expects US biodiesel use to rise from 0.1% of total liquids supply or 0.6% of diesel fuel consumption in 2010 to 0.6% of total supply and 3.0% of diesel demand by 2035. 14 The $1 per gallon biodiesel blending credit does not attract as much support or opposition as the ethanol blending credit. Because biodiesel blending, and therefore subsidy costs, have been lower, it has avoided the attention of the budget cutters, so far. But being small has its downsides too–Washington has frequently let the biodiesel credit expire with barely a whimper. When the credit last expired in 2010, the industry estimated production fell 42 percent and nearly 9,000 jobs were lost. Production fell despite a retroactive and rising RFS mandate, and exports were hurt by an EU import tariff.

As for wind, challenges to large-scale commercialization are fairly well understood. They include intermittency, austerity, distance from load centers, political opposition, and low natural gas prices. However, I am skeptical that $4 per Mmbtu natural gas will endure for too long, given questions about the economics and politics of shale gas production as well as strong political opposition to new nuclear and coal build-out. But ultimately wind cannot scale unless large cost and technological barriers are broken, not the least of which are storage and transmission and public opposition on footprint grounds is overcome.

  • Babcock, Bruce, The State of Biofuels Today, Iowa State University, April 2011
  • Babcock, Bruce A., Mandates, Tax Credits, and Tariffs: Does the U.S. Biofuels Industry Need Them All? CARD Policy Brief, Iowa State University, March, 2010
  • Babcock, Bruce and Carriquiry, Miguel, A Billion Gallons of Biodiesel: Who Benefits?,
  • Iowa Ag Review Online, Winter/2008, http://www.card.iastate.edu/iowa_ag_review/winter_08/article3.aspx
  • Congressional Budget Office, Using Biofuel Tax Credits to Achieve Energy and Environmental Policy Goals, July 2010
  • Congressional Research Service, Intermediate-level Blends of Ethanol in Gasoline, and the Ethanol “Blend Wall,” January 28, 2010
  • General Accounting Office, Biofuels: Challenges to the Transportation, Sale, and Use of Intermediate Ethanol Blends , June 2011
  • Glozer, Ken G., Corn Ethanol: Who Pays? Who Benefits? Hoover Institution Press, 2011
  • Hertel, Thomas W., and Beckman, Jayson, Commodity Price Volatility in the Biofuel Era: An Examination of the Linkage Between Energy and Agricultural Markets , July, 2010
  • International Energy Agency , Medium Term Oil and Gas Market Report , June 2011
  • Tyner, Wallace E., The Integration of Energy and Agricultural Markets, presented at the 27th International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Beijing, China, August 16-22, 2000
  • Tyner, W., Dooley, F., Hurt, C., and Quear, J. Ethanol Pricing Issues for 2008. Industrial Fuels and Power, 2008

 

Serial No. 112-89. December 16, 2011. Changing energy markets and U.S. National Security. House of Representatives. 69 pages

Robert McNally, President of the Rapidan Group, on Changing Energy Markets and US National Security.

Oil is the only major energy commodity we import and lies at the center of our national security concerns.  Our energy security is and will remain strongly linked to trends and developments in the global oil market, not just our import share. We are and will remain vulnerable to price shocks caused by tightening global supply-demand fundamentals and geopolitical disruptions anywhere in the global oil market. And the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf region and its enormous, low-cost hydrocarbon reserves is likely to grow in the coming decades as Asia taps them to fuel growth. Our geopolitical and homeland security interests will remain closely bound to the security of the Persian Gulf region, the sea-lanes to and from it, and the ability to prevent Gulf countries from spending their windfalls on threats to US and global security.

It must not be overlooked that the world urgently needs new productions just to offset declining production in mature fields. The global oil industry needs to find an amount equal to two-thirds of existing conventional production, or 47 mb/d, in coming decades just to offset declines in mature fields. This is in addition to the new oil needed to meet demand growth in Asia and the Middle East.

Ethanol accounts for about 10% of gasoline, and EIA projects all biofuels will rise from 4% of liquids supply in 2009 to 11% by 2035.

While higher US and hemispheric production can and should help fill the gap, OPEC and the Persian Gulf producers hold the bulk of the world’s low-cost, proved reserves (70% and 55%, respectively).

Foreign policy makers should take into account three global energy market changes that will pose large challenges to our energy and economic security. The first is voracious growth in demand for energy, as well as for other natural resources, particularly from densely populated, fast-growing Asia, especially China and India. Achieving modern living standards in developing countries is impossible without consuming large amounts of dense, storable, reliable, and affordable energy. By these measures, fossil fuels are and will remain far superior to alternatives, especially in transportation. Unfortunately, no large scale, commercially viable alternatives to oil exist or are visible on the horizon. The US and other developed countries have made massive investments in oil fields, pipelines, terminals, refineries, tanks and dispensing stations in past decades. And rising Chinese, Indian and other Asian and Middle Eastern economies are starting to do the same.

Second, China and India are going to become tremendously dependent on flows of oil from the Middle East. The International Energy Agency projects China’s oil import dependence will rise from 54% in 2010 to 84% in 2035, and India’s will rise from 73% to 92% over the same period.3 The lion’s share of these imports will come from the Middle East. This is going to make China and India extremely concerned about protecting their access to Gulf supplies and sea-lanes, which is already a strategic concern for the United States.

Third, oil prices are going to gyrate more wildly than in the past as Saudi Arabia and OPEC’s ability to prevent price spikes erodes due to reduced spare capacity. This transition is overlooked but just as important as the first two noted above. The world oil market is leaving the relatively stable OPEC era and entering a new “Swing Era” in which large price swings rather than cartel production changes will balance global oil supply and demand. The Swing Era portends much higher oil price volatility, investment uncertainty in conventional and alternative energy and transportation technologies, and lower consensus estimates of global GDP growth. Ironically, Western governments and investors will miss OPEC, or at least the relative price stability OPEC tried to provide.

In summary, soaring Asian energy demand, sharply increasing Asian dependence on the Persian Gulf, and wild oil price gyrations pose major challenges to US energy security and foreign policy.

What is the future role of OPEC? What happens to price stability?

The changing role of OPEC, with its implications for oil price stability, is the most important, and so far overlooked, feature of global energy markets. It will have enormous consequences for US economic and foreign policy, especially in our bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, as noted further below. In short, soaring global demand and constrained supply growth is causing OPEC to lose its spare capacity cushion and therefore its ability to stabilize oil prices. While intuitively OPEC losing control may seem like a good thing, it actually means global oil prices, and therefore our pump prices, are going to swing much more wildly in the future, at times high enough to contribute to recessions as they did in 2008.

As a commodity, oil exhibits what economists call a very low price elasticity of demand. In plain English, this means supply and demand are very slow to respond to price shifts. Oil is a must-have commodity with no exact substitutes; when pump prices rise, most consumers have little choice in the near term but to pay more rather than buy less. And on the supply side, it takes years to develop new resources, even when the price incentive to do so rises sharply.

Since the beginning of the modern oil market, producers have tried to mitigate the tendency of oil prices to swing wildly. Standard Oil, the Texas Railroad Commission and the “Seven Sisters” (major western oil companies) succeeded at stabilizing prices by controlling supply, most importantly by holding spare production capacity back from the market and using it to balance swings in supply and demand. The 1967 Arab oil embargo did not lead to a major oil disruption or price spike, partly because the United States had spare capacity in reserve and increased production to make up for lost Arab producer exports. The 1973 Arab oil embargo did lead to an oil price spike, mainly because the year before – in March 1972 to be exact – the United States ran out of spare capacity.

OPEC took over control of the global oil market from the US and the Seven Sisters in the early 1970s. Since the mid-1980s, OPEC’s main tool to stabilize prices has been holding and using spare production capacity. If demand jumped unexpectedly or if supplies were suddenly disrupted, OPEC producers with spare capacity, especially Saudi Arabia, would release more oil, reducing the need for prices to swing in order to balance supply and demand.

But the years 2005-2008 marked the first time spare capacity ran out in peacetime since 1972. As in 1972, the reason was demand was racing faster than production. But today, no new cartel waited in the wings to satisfy global crude appetites. In 2008, market balance was achieved by sharply rising oil prices along with the financial crisis. While many in Washington, Paris, Riyadh, and Beijing publicly blamed speculators, energy experts and economists pointed instead to strong demand for a price inelastic commodity running up against a finite supply.

Going forward, OPEC will still be able to influence how and when oil prices bottom. It can and will likely still take oil off the market to keep prices from falling or to raise them, as it did in late 2008 and 2009.

But OPEC’s ability – really, Saudi Arabia’s ability – to prevent damaging price spikes has eroded. Therefore a replay of 2005-2008 is more a question of when than if. Global GDP growth remains oil intensive. When it picks up (and there are many macroeconomic risks currently, so the timing is uncertain), net non-OPEC supply growth is not expected to rise fast enough to meet incremental demand, requiring OPEC producers to increase production. OPEC is not investing enough in total production capacity to meet demand growth and still maintain the 4-5 mb/d spare capacity buffer needed to assure market participants it can respond to disruptions or tighter than expected fundamentals by adding supply. Saudi Arabia, the main spare capacity holder, says it will hold only 1.5 to 2.0 mb/d of spare capacity, and most other OPEC countries hold little if any back in spare.

As OPEC falters, the price mechanism will return to balance the market through demand destruction, enforcing the iron law that consumption cannot exceed production. Even if our import dependence declines, we will still be vulnerable to price gyrations that are very harmful for consumers and producers and will bedevil economic and foreign policymaking.4

What role do/should energy markets play in U.S. national security policy? In U.S. defense posturing?

Even if our import dependence falls, the US will still have a vital national security interest in the Persian Gulf region. Instability or disruptions in the Gulf will be felt quickly and directly at the pump in the US. Gulf producers will earn billions of dollars in revenue, and the US has an interest in seeing that those dollars do not finance terrorism or other threats to our security. And the US will need to ensure no country can use oil as a weapon or threaten vital trade routes and chokepoints.

While the US must find ways to share the costs, burdens, and responsibilities for protecting the global energy commons, our interest in preventing a regional or external hegemon from dominating the Persian Gulf will remain as vital in the next thirty years as it was in the past. The Carter Doctrine and its Reagan corollary must remain cornerstones of our energy security doctrines. The Carter Doctrine states: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” And its Reagan corollary extends the policy to include hegemonic threats to our Gulf allies by hostile regional powers, like Iran.

It will be especially important to repair and strengthen the fraying US relationship with Saudi Arabia. The relationship will likely loosen somewhat as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers see future sales growth and profits in Asia instead of the western hemisphere. But something bigger is at stake: The grand bargain whereby the US provides Saudi Arabia protection from regional and global adversaries in return for Riyadh ensuring stable oil supplies and prices. This grand bargain has served our national and economic interests, and mitigated occasional wars and disruptions in the region.

At present, each side is less certain the other can uphold his end of the bargain. If, as noted above, Saudi Arabia can no longer prevent oil price spikes from damaging the economy, it becomes less important in global affairs and US foreign policy. And if the US can no longer protect Saudi Arabia from a nuclear, belligerent Iran, then Riyadh’s interest in cooperating with us in many areas, including counter-terrorism and regional security, could decline.

Vulnerability of current and future energy markets to terrorism

Terrorists understand the vulnerability of energy infrastructure.  One consequence of low spare capacity is that any disruption, even of a relatively small size, can lead to an oil price spike. We saw this earlier this year in Libya, when the world lost about 1.7 mb/d of supply, equal to about half of total OPEC spare capacity. Prices jumped about $15 per barrel, helping to push gasoline prices here up to $4.00 per gallon and thereby hurting family budgets and economic growth.

What role does energy play in China’s foreign policy? What can be done to check China’s energy development in the western hemisphere?

China’s leaders are preoccupied with finding resources to supply its voracious growth, including energy resources. As its oil imports increase rapidly, China has followed an energy strategy similar to our policies over recent decades. As the US did forty years ago, China is reacting to the prospect of high and rising dependence on imports by building strategic stocks and implementing fuel economy and other efficiency standards. China is also fostering the growth of globally competitive energy companies and diversifying its sources of energy. And it is developing political relationships and strategic capabilities to protect its investment and supply lines.

China’s energy security policies could pose major indirect threats to our national security if Beijing concludes it can and should ignore our national security interests when engaging with foreign producers. This is of concern with Sudan, Venezuela, and especially Iran.

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates US shale gas production has increased twelve-fold over the last decade, now amounting to 25% of total production. EIA projects shale gas will rise to 47% of total production by 2035. Whereas a few years ago we faced the prospect of importing increasing amounts of liquefied natural gas (LNG), we are now permitting export facilities. This new supply holds the potential to revitalize our chemical industry and economically depressed regions of our country, use more natural gas in electricity generation, and possibly fuel natural gas vehicles (though the cost of converting car and truck fleets and fueling infrastructure to natural gas would be very high and the transition would be long, making it impractical except in some centrally-fueled commercial fleets).

Even if we didn’t import a drop from the Middle East, our vital national interest there would remain. The Middle East and the Persian Gulf is and will remain the world’s most important energy region. As of 2009 it held 56 percent of global proven oil reserves, nearly all of those in the Persian Gulf.

With a higher market share and higher prices, Middle Eastern oil producers are going to earn trillions and trillions of dollars in revenues. We must remain engaged in that region partly to ensure that windfall is not spent to threaten us or our allies.

Another interest is to make sure that China and India’s soaring dependence on Middle East oil flow, mentioned earlier, does not lead to strategic competition or conflict. The International Energy Agency sees China’s import dependence headed over 84 percent and India’s over 92 percent by 2035.

U.S. foreign policy can and should aim to share the costs, burdens and responsibilities of protecting the Gulf and sea lanes with other friendly and capable importers. Such cooperation exists to some extent already, such as with multi national anti-piracy patrols. But for the foreseeable future only the United States can play the role of guaranteeing the stability of the Persian Gulf.

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Kunstler: Potemkin Party

James Howard Kunstler. July 27, 2015. Potemkin Party. www.kunstler.com

How many of you brooding on the dreadful prospect of Hillary have chanced to survey what remains of Democratic Party (cough cough) leadership in the background of Her Royal Inevitableness? Nothing is the answer. Zip. Nobody. A vacuum. There is no Democratic Party anymore. There are no figures of gravitas anywhere to be found, no ideas really suited to the American prospect, nothing with the will to oppose the lumbering parasitic corporatocracy that is doing little more than cluttering up this moment in history while it sucks the last dregs of value from our society.

I say this as a lifelong registered Democrat but a completely disaffected one — who regards the Republican opposition as the mere errand boy of the above-named lumbering parasitic corporatocracy. Readers are surely chafing to insert that the Democrats have been no less errand boys (and girls) for the same disgusting zeitgeist, and they are surely correct in the case of Hillary, and indeed of the current President.

Readers are surely also chafing to insert that there is Bernie Sanders, climbing in the opinion polls, disdaining Wall Street money, denouncing the current disposition of things with the old union hall surliness we’ve grown to know and love. I’m grateful that Bernie is in the race, that he’s framing an argument against Ms. It’s My Turn. I just don’t happen to think that Bernie gets what the country — indeed what all of techno-industrial society — is really up against, namely a long emergency of economic contraction and collapse.

These circumstances require a very different agenda than just an I Dreamed I Saw Joe Hill redistributionist scheme. Lively as Bernie is, I don’t think he offers much beyond that, as if cadging a little more tax money out of WalMart, General Mills, and Exxon-Mobil will fix what is ailing this sad-ass polity. The heart of the matter is that our way of life has shot its wad and now we have to live very differently. Almost nobody wants to even try to think about this.

I hugely resent the fact that the Democratic Party puts its time and energy into the stupid sexual politics of the day when it should be working on issues such as re-localizing commercial economies (rebuilding Main Streets), reforming agriculture to avoid the total collapse of corporate-industrial farming, and fixing the passenger rail system so people will have some way to get around the country when happy Motoring dies (along with commercial aviation).

The “to do” list for rearranging the basic systems of daily life in America is long and loaded with opportunity. Every system that is retooled contains jobs and social roles for people who have been shut out of the economy for two generations. If we do everything we can to promote smaller-scaled local farming, there will be plenty of work for lesser-skilled people to do and get paid for. Saying goodbye to the tyranny of Big Box commerce would open up vast vocational opportunities in reconstructed local and regional networks of commerce, especially for young people interested in running their own business.

We need to prepare for localized clinic-style medicine (in opposition to the continuing amalgamation and gigantization of hospitals, with its handmaidens of Big Pharma and the insurance rackets). The train system has got to be reborn as a true public utility. Just about every other civilized country is already demonstrating how that is done — it’s not that difficult and it would employ a lot of people at every level. That is what the agenda of a truly progressive political party should be at this moment in history.

That Democrats even tolerate the existence of evil entities like WalMart is an argument for ideological bankruptcy of the party. Democratic Presidents from Carter to Clinton to Obama could have used the Department of Justice and the existing anti-trust statutes to at least discourage the pernicious monopolization of commerce that Big Boxes represented. By the same token, President Obama could have used existing federal law to break up the banking oligarchy starting in 2009, not to mention backing legislation to more crisply define alleged corporate “personhood” in the wake of the ruinous “Citizens United” Supreme Court decision of 2010. They don’t even talk about it because Wall Street owns them.

So, you fellow disaffected Democrats — those of you who can’t go over to the other side, but feel you have no place in your country’s politics — look around and tell me who you see casting a shadow on the Democratic landscape. Nobody. Just tired, corrupt, devious old Hillary and her nemesis Bernie the Union Hall Champion out of a Pete Seeger marching song.

I’ve been saying for a while that this period of history resembles the 1850s in America in two big ways: 1) our society faces a crisis, and 2) the existing political parties are not up to the task of comprehending what society faces. In the 1850s it was the Whigs that dried up and blew away (virtually overnight), while the old Democratic party just entered a 75-year wilderness of irrelevancy. God help us if Trump-o-mania turns out to be the only alternative.

Oh, by the way, notice that the lead editorial in Monday’s New York Times is a plea for transgender bathrooms in schools. What could be more important?

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A review of life cycle assessments on wind energy systems by Simon Davidsson 2012

[below is a very short excerpt of this 22 page paper, I was interested in how much recycling can contribute to a high EROI but there are many other important points made in this paper]

Davidsson, S., Höök, M., Wall, G. 2012. A review of life cycle assessments on wind energy systems. The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment.

http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:435510/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Energy systems based on wind, as well as other renewable energy sources, are often automatically assumed to be sustainable and environmental-friendly sources of energy in much of the mainstream debate.

However, all systems for converting energy into usable forms have various environmental impacts, not to mention a requirement of natural resources. It is essential to have consistent evaluation methods for analyzing all aspects of a given energy source.

Without such methods, it is difficult to compare them and make the right decisions when planning and investing in energy systems for the future.

Future growth of any new energy systems, in this case wind power, will require energy, as well as other resources during the expansion phase, and these implications need to be considered when planning future developments. A need for meticulous environmental impact assessments and energy performance evaluations can be seen here.

It could be questioned how certain it is that the materials will in fact be recycled in 20 years, or more. For some materials making up large parts of a wind turbine, i.e. steel, copper, aluminum and other metals, it is highly likely that the materials will be recycled in the future, but it is not certain. The economics of recycling scrapped wind plants are also uncertain and it is entirely possible that the cost of dismantling and extracting the recyclable parts will be prohibitively high in the future, especially for wind farms located in remote or off-shore areas. For example, the Tehachapi Pass in California contains “bone yards” of abandoned wind turbine hardware that has been lying around without being recycled (Pasqualetti et al., 2002).

Even if decommission is usually mandatory in operating permits, the total costs of decommissioning may not be covered due to price inflation, low capacity, unexpected circumstances (e.g., hurricane destruction), or a combination of such events (Kaiser and Snyder, 2012). It is possible that recycling can become uneconomic compared to abandonment under certain conditions, which is important to remember as decommissioning is dependent on a number of highly uncertain parameters that can have significant direct or indirect impacts on cost.

Material recovery at the end of the life cycle cannot be guaranteed as expressed by Crawford (2009), who also stresses that the environmental credit should rather be given to products using the recycled material.

Jacobson and Delucci (2011) states that Earth has somewhat limited reserves of economically recoverable iron ore, over a 100–200 year perspective at current recovery rates, but also mention that most of the steel will be recycled. What is not mentioned is that the steel consumption is already rising fast. ESTP (2009) projects the global steel consumption to be over 2000 Mt by 2050, compared to just below 1400 Mt in 2010. This growth, coupled with the fact that recyclable steel has often been held up for many decades before finally being recycled, makes the total part of steel production coming from recycled steel is fairly low, only around 45% in Europe (ESTP, 2009).

Such real world recycling shares appears to be in significant disagreement with some of the very high recycling percentages used in the reviewed studies.

Kubiszewski et al. (2010) compiled 50 EROI studies and found values ranging from 1.0 to 125.8 with an average of approximately 18.

It is difficult to see how the higher figures could be using the same concepts and parameters as the lower ones. It should be added that many of the results in these studies are old, and that LCA methodology has evolved since they were done. However, a large spread in results is still seen in the fairly new studies reviewed in this paper (Table 3).

Improving the treatment of energy

There is significant problem that EROI or EPBT is sometimes presented as primary energy using thermal equivalents, and sometimes using direct equivalents, making comparisons very difficult, especially since is sometimes difficult to even interpret if the conversion were done. As an example, Lee et al. (2006) and Lee and Tzeng (2008) presents an EPBT of 1.3 months – equivalent an EROI of 185 – far superior to all other reviewed studies. It seems like they use direct energy payback time without any conversion to thermal equivalents, but still compare their result to Schleisner (2000), who converts produced electricity to primary energy. It is quite odd that an energy performance many times better than Schleisner (2000) – and literally all other previous LCAs on wind energy –is not reflected upon. Instead, it is claimed that performance of wind power systems implemented in Taiwan is among the best in the world (Lee et al. 2006). Drawing these conclusions without analyzing other reasons for the variations, such as methodological differences, should be considered highly questionable.

This is just one of example how a LCA study can make flawed and even misleading comparisons and conclusions.

Regarding energy use during the life cycle, we find no consensus on how different energy carriers should be treated. How this is done is generally not clearly described in published studies either. The total amount of primary energy used is often presented, and in some cases this is also divided into different energy carriers. However, energy carriers used varies between studies making comparisons difficult. For electricity, national generation mixes are typically used, if anything is mentioned at all. How much of the total energy used was originally electrical energy is not plainly presented in any of the reviewed studies, making it difficult to investigate the impact of using of different electricity mixes. Guezuraga et al. (2012) showed that switching generation mix could alter the results by around 50%, indicating the importance of this factor.

Improved handling of non-energy resources

The need for non-energy resources does not seem to be seen as an important factor in most studies, and is usually not considered or discussed in any detail. When they are, intricate impact methods expressing resource depletion in antimony equivalents per kg is sometimes used even though this likely will be challenging to grasp for laymen and planners. Material resource use is a trivial issue for LCA according to Weidema (2000). In contrast, Finnveden (2005) suggests that resource use, although it should not be included as an impact factor in the LCIA, could be included in the LCA and states that LCA potentially can be a useful tool for discussing both environmental and resource aspects of products. Another significant problem is the use of end-of-life recycling crediting. It can be argued, for many reasons, that environmental effects of recycling that may occur in 20 years should not be credited the environmental impacts apparent today. However, most of the reviewed studies credit future recycling in some way. The implications of the recycling crediting on the results are often difficult to interpret, but for some of the results, the effect appears to be significant. For instance, energy use in Guezuraga et al. (2012) is increased by 43.3% when no recycling of materials is considered.

Final recommendations

The most troublesome part we found is the lack of transparency regarding fundamental and underlying assumptions, calculations and conversions done in the reviewed LCAs. Mitigating this issue will not only improve clarity, but is also likely to strengthen the credibility of LCA methodology. The LCA society should clearly strive for better agreement on which methods are to be used for evaluating renewable energy resources. This is not just desirable, but crucial, to be able to accurately evaluate and present the environmental performance of wind energy. Also, the use of natural resources, like REEs, should be clearly mentioned in the assessments to enable evaluating of possible bottlenecks in future production.

Kubiszewski I, et al (2010) Meta-analysis of net energy return for wind power systems. Renewable Energy. 35(1): 218-225, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2009.01.012

 

 

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The crude oil export ban: Helpful or hurtful 2015 House hearing

House 114-22. April 14, 2015. The Crude oil export ban: Helpful or hurtful? House of Representatives.

[ Excerpts from the 73-page transcript of the hearing follow ]

Ted Poe, Texas. The United States is now the largest crude oil producer in the world. We have more oil than we can refine or store. The majority of U.S. refineries were built to handle heavy, sour crude, but oil production is light, sweet crude. The United States’ refineries cannot keep up with the new production. Normally producers would simply pump oil into storage containers, but experts say those storage tanks could fill up by the end of this month. Instead of exporting excess oil like producers get to do in other nations, the ban is already forcing U.S. oil producers to leave oil in the ground and lay off workers. About 50% of the working rigs in my home state of Texas have had to shut down in just the last 6 months, and 70,000 oil workers have been laid off since Thanksgiving. The solution is clear: Export crude oil; have the ban lifted so that it can be exported. Critics of lifting the ban are afraid the United States’ oil exports will lead to higher domestic gas prices, but many studies have debunked this myth. Gas prices are more closely linked to the international market, or Brent Price, than the domestic price of crude because refined products like gasoline are traded freely on the international market. So the more crude oil we have, the more we can put on the international market, and the lower the international price of crude. The lower the international price of crude the lower the price of gas for America.

Lifting the ban will also lead to more jobs and higher GDP. An IHS study predicts crude oil exports would support nearly 300,000 jobs by 2018. Removing the export ban would add 26 billion to the GDP per year and improve labor income about $158 per year on average.

Europe gets 40% of its oil from Russia. Exporting crude oil would give the Europeans an alternative to having to depend on Russia. It would also increase our influence in Asia. Japan and South Korea partly rely on crude oil from Iran to satisfy the growing energy consumption. U.S. exports can help diminish that reliance. It is ironic to me, with the so-called deal with the Iranians, that it is now the U.S. Government’s long-term policy to allow Iran to export crude oil and inject billions of dollars in their own economy. At the same time, it is still the U.S. Government’s policy to prohibit American producers from doing the same. It seems to me what is good for the Iranian oil exports, should be the same deal that the United States’ oil producers get. U.S. exports offer a stable energy to our allies and decrease their reliance on dictators and state sponsors of terror. Lifting the ban shows the U.S. is serious about supporting free markets around the world. We criticize China for not exporting rare earth materials and yet we are not exporting crude oil. Removing the ban will give us more credibility when we criticize export bans in other nations. All in all, it is time we remove the crude oil export ban. Exporting crude oil will lower gas prices, increase American jobs and strengthen our national security. And that is just the way it is, to coin a phrase.

Jason Grumet, founder & President, Bipartisan policy center. In the broadest sense, this ban is a 40-year-old anachronism. It was passed at a moment of significant national weakness. The irony is that this policy is now inhibiting one of our nation’s greatest strengths. Our energy abundance has profound potential to continue to accelerate our economic recovery, to strengthen our interests internationally, and we do believe it is time for it to be reconsidered and lifted. Left unaddressed, the policy will undermine domestic production and it will weaken our recovery.

Elizabeth Rosenberg, Director, Energy, Economics & Security program, Center for a New American Security. Recent dramatic increases in U.S. energy production have reshaped our oil industry, our industrial output and many of our global trading relationships. The oil boom has improved our GDP and balance of trade and meaningfully advanced our energy and national security. These benefits however will be clipped if policymakers do not change 1970s era crude export policies that prevent U.S. oil from moving to markets overseas.

Another important benefit of lifting the oil export ban is the contribution it will make to energy security. When more of the oil supply pool comes from stable producers such as producers in the United States, the overall market is more stable. U.S. crude will be shipped by fewer maritime hot spots and choke points such as the Straits of Hormuz and the South and East China Seas.

Jason Bordoff, Founding Director, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University.

The oil export ban was originally adopted in the 1970s in response to concerns not only about oil scarcity after the Arab oil embargo, but also to prevent producers from getting around domestic price controls by exporting their oil into the global market where they could fetch a higher price. Price controls were eliminated 30 years ago, but the export restrictions remain. U.S. oil production, as we all know, has boomed and imports have plummeted as a result. We are still going to be an importer of oil for as far as the eye can see, so why are we even talking about exports? The concern is the ability of domestic refiners to absorb the kind of oil that we are producing in the U.S.

U.S. shale oil is very light oil, while many of our refineries have invested billions to handle heavy sour oil. You can run light oil through those refineries but it becomes increasingly economically challenging. So the price of U.S. oil may become discounted relative to the world price to incentivize domestic refiners to take it.

To date, U.S. refiners have made low cost adjustments where they can. We have backed out mostly the import of light oil, and we have also exported what is allowed. Exports after all are not completely banned. They are restricted. Exports are allowed, for example, to Canada, and our exports there have surged, to almost 1/2 million barrels a day. And we have also had a surge in the export, as you heard, of refined petroleum, which is also allowed.

As U.S. production grows, however, at some point you run out of these low cost options. The oil price crash means that the pace of U.S. supply growth is slowing down. The Energy Information Administration said yesterday production will probably decline next month, the first decline in U.S. shale oil output in 4 years. Storage is at an 85-year high.

We also want U.S. supply to respond to global circumstances. Consider how OPEC decided in November to let oil prices fall, forcing higher cost producers like the U.S. to cut production instead. We know shale oil can go off line very quickly compared to conventional oil, but it can also bounce back quickly too. And if the world price were to rise again to the $70s or $80s or $90s, U.S. oil supply could rebound quickly to slow that price rise to temper the impact on consumers at the pump. But that U.S. supply response may be impeded if we have to sell our crude at a discounted price.

Stephen Kretzmann, Founder & Executive director, Oil Change International . Oil Change International believes the crude oil export ban should not be lifted and that maintaining the ban would be helpful from the perspectives of community safety and climate protection.

The crude oil export ban was certainly not designed to play a role in climate change mitigation or to reduce the likelihood of a mile-long freight train full of crude oil destroying a community in America’s heartland, however, it plays an important role in regulating an industry that currently has few limits placed upon it. More broadly, this issue points to the urgent need to harmonize energy policy with climate policy. We cannot drill our way out of the climate crisis, and arguments to that effect are nothing short of climate denial.

Oil Change International conducted an analysis of the impact of lifting the crude oil export ban on U.S. oil production. We estimated a projected production increase of more than 476,000 barrels per day by 2020, which incidentally is very similar to the estimate that was arrived at by the American Petroleum Institute of 500,000 barrels per day. The critical question to consider is what will oil producers do when confronted by this additional U.S. supply? The conventional wisdom had been that OPEC would counter new supply by reducing production to support higher oil prices.

This conventional wisdom has been proven completely wrong over the last year. In the past 9 months it has become increasingly clear that Saudi Arabia is determined to maintain market share rather than cut production to support higher prices.

Lifting the crude oil export ban will likely increase crude by rail traffic putting 25 million Americans at greater risk of disaster. Since 2005, the amount of tank cars on U.S. railways has increased over 4,000 percent. At any given time there are about 135 100-car trains carrying a total of 9 million barrels of crude oil through American communities. If all of the projected increase in U.S. production were to go by rail, crude by rail traffic would see a 50% increase. If increased production were to reach the top end of the CGEP analysis, some 1.2 barrels of oil per day, this could more than double crude by rail traffic from today’s levels.

Of the terminals on the Gulf Coast, at least 4 on the East Coast and at least 6 planned terminals on the West Coast, have facilities or will be designed with facilities for unloading crude oil from trains and loading it onto tankers for export. Lifting the crude oil export ban would put hundreds of communities and the lives of 25 million Americans at increased risk of an oil train disaster such as the one in Lac-Megantic, Canada, last year where 47 people perished because an oil train derailed and exploded. It seems only a matter of luck that the incidents to date have not caused further loss of life. Crude oil trains pass through more than 400 counties including major metropolitan areas such as Philadelphia, Seattle, Chicago, Newark, Richmond and dozens of other cities.

As President Obama noted in June 2013 in regards to the Keystone XL pipeline, our national interest will be served only if this project does not significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution. This climate test should be applied to all policy decisions as well as the permitting of infrastructure to extract, transport and process fossil fuels. The lifting of the crude oil export ban almost certainly fails this test. Our communities and climate in short are worth more than so-called free trade and the profits of the oil industry.

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Ohio run-of-the-river hydroelectric power 4 projects totaling 300 MW for $1.7 billion

[There are limited places on rivers to put these so this a really tiny silver bullet, and there is often opposition from environmentalists, but if you’re lucky enough to have a river nearby that flows constantly it’s more reliable than wind or solar power. Alice Friedemann www.energyskeptic.com]

American Municipal Power plans to spend $1.7 billion dollars on 300 MW of power along the Ohio river.

A run-of-river project does not require a large reservoir and projects tend to be on a smaller scale. Run-of-river projects also need to be built on a river with a consistent and steady flow (mostly natural). By definition, a run-of-river plant can only have storage for no more than 48 hours of water supply. The main structure of a run-of-river plant is simply to redirect water flow from a weir (a small headpond) towards the penstock (delivery pipe), which feeds the water downhill to the power station. The natural force of gravity generates the energy used to spin the turbines located in the power station which converts the energy from the water to generate electricity. After this process, the water is redirected back to the natural flow of the river.

AMP is in the later stages of construction on four run-of- the-river hydro projects at existing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers locks and dams along the Ohio River. With run- of-the-river facilities, a portion of the water that normally would flow through the dam is diverted to the generation facility and river ecology remains un-impacted. This significantly minimizes any environmental impacts. The AMP projects are being built at existing locks and dams, which were constructed decades ago for navigation, to control river levels and to allow for hydro development. The four projects under various stages of construction and commissioning – Cannelton, Meldahl and Smithland in Kentucky and Willow Island in West Virginia – will add more than 300 megawatts (MW) of new hydropower. This represents the largest deployment of new run-of-the-river hydro in the nation.

Even with the practical limitations of run-of-the-river hydroelectric generation, the technology proves to be more reliable and efficient than both wind and solar, especially in the Midwest. Run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects — projects using the energy of water flowing over existing dams — achieve capacity factors of 55-60 percent. This means that of the 8,760 hours of the year, the facilities are able to capture 55-60 percent of that potential energy. Compare that to wind, which in the Midwest has a capacity factor in the 20-30 percent range, and solar in the 15-18 percent range. That’s a significant difference and one that impacts the overall efficiency of the projects.

Hydroelectric projects are less intrusive, have better base load capabilities, have lower operation and maintenance costs, no fuel risks, limited regulatory risk and a longer lifespan.

AMP signed a more than $423-million contract with York, Pennsylvania-based Voith Hydro for turbines and generators for the hydroelectric projects currently under construction.

The Cannelton Project will divert water from the existing Army Corps of Engineers Cannelton Dam through bulb turbines to generate an average gross annual output of about 458 million kilowatt-hours (kWh). The site will include an intake approach channel, a reinforced concrete powerhouse and a tailrace channel. The powerhouse will house three horizontal 28-MW bulb-type turbine and generating units with an estimated total rated capacity of 84 MW at a gross head of 25 feet.

The $500 million dollar Meldahl Hydroelectric facility, currently under construction, will become the largest hydroelectric power plant on the Ohio River with an estimated capacity of 105 MW. Meldahl is a run-of-the-river project on the Captain Anthony Meldahl Locks and Dam located near Maysville, Kentucky, approximately an hour southeast of Cincinnati. The project will divert water from the existing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Dam through bulb turbines to generate an average gross annual output of approximately 558 million kilowatt-hours (kWh). The site will include an intake approach channel, a reinforced concrete powerhouse, and a tailrace channel. The powerhouse will house three horizontal 35-MW bulb-type turbine and generating units with a FERC licensed estimated total rated capacity of 105 MW.

The Smithland hydroelectric facility, currently under development, will add 72 MW of new, renewable generation to the region. The plant is located near Smithland, Kentucky. The Smithland project will divert water from the existing Corps Smithland Locks and Dam through bulb turbines to generate an average gross annual output of approximately 379 million kilowatt-hours (kWh). The site will include an intake approach channel, a reinforced concrete powerhouse and a tailrace channel. The powerhouse will house three horizontal FERC rated 24-MW bulb-type turbine and generating units with an estimated total rated capacity of 72 MW at a gross head of 22 feet. A 2.5-mile-long 161 kV transmission line interconnection is planned to connect to MISO. Smithland is located approximately 62 river miles upstream of the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, in Livingston County, Ky.

The Willow Island hydroelectric facility, currently under development, will add 35 MW of new, renewable generation to the region. The plant is located near St. Marys, West Virginia. The Willow Island project will divert water from the existing Corps Willow Island Locks and Dam through bulb turbines to generate an average annual output of approximately 239 million kilowatt-hours (kWh). The site will include an intake approach channel, a reinforced concrete powerhouse and a tailrace channel. The powerhouse will house two horizontal FERC rated 17.5-MW bulb-type turbine and generating units with an estimated total FERC rated capacity of 35 MW at a gross head of 20 feet. A 1.6-mile-long 138 kV transmission line interconnection is planned to connect to PJM. The Willow Island Locks and Dam are located in Pleasant County, West Virginia, approximately 162 river miles downstream of Point Bridge, Pittsburgh. The Willow Island project is under construction on the West Virginia side of the Ohio River, on the opposite shore of the locks.

Also see:

http://www.amppartners.org/docs/default-source/regulatory-legislative-comments/legislative/2013/gerken_written_testimony_2013.pdf?sfvrsn=2

 

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Rising oil prices and dependence on hostile regimes — the urgent case for Canadian oil

Preface. Sullivan has an interesting overview of the instability in the Middle East, which could lead to an oil shock quickly along with the economic and sky-high prices that entails. He also mentions “peak oil” and its implications, a term rarely used in house and senate meetings, where the phrase “energy security” is preferred.

A key reason for the Keystone pipeline surfaces – the Midwest refineries can’t process any more tar sands than they are now. This makes expanding the tar sands production to 5 million barrels a day by 2035 goal difficult, especially since  a pipeline to the west coast is receiving even stronger opposition from Canadian citizens.  Many opponents to Keystone have no environmental beef –they don’t want Keystone because oil refined in the Gulf would be exported to China. Much of the testimony is a plea for Keystone and is left out of what follows.  

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Financial Sense, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Notes from: HR Serial No. 112–24. March 31, 2011. Rising oil prices and dependence on hostile regimes: the urgent case for Canadian oil. U.S. House of Representatives. 102 pages

Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 112th CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

Paul Sullivan, Ph.D., Professor of economics, National Defense University, adjunct professor of security studies and of science, technology, and international affairs, Georgetown University

http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/sul033111.pdf

Peak conventional oil and the promise of unconventional oil

Conventional oil already peaked worldwide according to the IEA. It peaked in the US in 1973. It has been peaking and will peak in many non-OPEC countries over the years. Clearly, the world will be pushed to rely more and more on unconventional oil as time progresses and the conventional oil gets harder and more expensive to find.

Oil represents 37% of all of our energy use. Two-thirds of the oil is used for transportation. Over 91 percent of our transport fuels are oil based. Some of the rest of the fuels used for transport, like biofuels and “other”, rely on oil for their production and other aspects of their logistical networks. Our sea, rail, and air transport systems are also very much dependent on oil. Our agricultural systems are based on oil. Some of our industries are oil-intensive. About 8% of our households still heat with oil.

Most importantly, when it comes to transportation our military is almost entirely vulnerable to oil markets. We are facing increasing instability in the Middle East and North Africa, an area where over 70% of proved reserves of conventional oil are known to be.

Well over one-fourth of all the oil exported in a single day comes out of the Middle East and North Africa and this is an area of increasing turmoil. Importantly, almost all of the excess capacity in the entire world is found in the Arabian Gulf region and 80 percent of that is in Saudi Arabia. Under certain scenarios, we could be looking at $200 to $300 a barrel of oil if all goes south.

The present and future instabilities in the Middle East and North Africa are not just a problem for oil production, but also of oil transport, such as around the Bab Al Mandab near Yemen, which carries about 3 million barrels of oil a day, the Suez Canal and Sumed pipeline, which carry 3-3.5 million barrels a day, The Straits of Hormuz, which carries between 12 and 15 million barrels a day, and more. There are various pipelines and oil ports and offloading zones, such as the Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) and Khor Al-Amaya Oil Terminal (KABOT) in Iraq, which send out 1.5 million barrels a day.

Syria, Yemen, and Iraq all have SunniShia tensions.

Country Exports from http://www.eia.doe.gov/countries/

  • 1 Saudi Arabia 7,322
  • 2 Russia 7,194
  • 3 Iran 2,486
  • 4 United Arab Emirates 2, 303
  • 5 Norway 2,132
  • 6 Kuwait 2,124
  • 7 Nigeria 1,939
  • 8 Angola 1,878
  • 9 Algeria 1 807
  • 10 Iraq 1,764
  • 11 Venezuela 1,748
  • 12 Libya 1, 525
  • 13 Kazakhstan 1,299
  • 14 Canada 1,144
  • 15 Qatar 1,066

SAUDI ARABIA. Most of the populations above the major Saudi oil fields including the Ghawar field, which is the size of Pennsylvania, 300 meters deep, are Shia. Iran is likely stirring up trouble in that part of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the world’s biggest exporter of oil and has the largest conventional reserves of oil accounting for 25 percent. Then we have the Ab Qaiq facility in Saudi Arabia where six to seven million barrels a day (out of the 82 million barrels a day used worldwide) goes through for sweetening and processing. Al-Qaeda got in the first fence in 2006. Chinese demands for Saudi oil have increased considerably over the last few years . The Chinese take more Saudi oil than we do.

IRAN could be facing increasing instability. It exports 2.5 million barrels a day. There are indications that Iran is trying to stir up trouble in the Shia communities in the region, including, possibly, the large Shia population the lives atop many of the major oil fields of Saudi Arabia. The problem is not just from Shia and Sunni political differences . The problem is also from Iran stirring up trouble and from political, economic and other tensions that have been translate d into confessional stresses and resentments. Iran is trying to use the grievances of some of the Shia in the region for its own benefit.

NIGERIA is having severe internal problems with the MEND The Movement to Emancipate the Niger Delta and other groups. It also has had a very difficult past with regard to interethnic strife and other issues that could become even bigger in the future. Internal strife has led to declines in the production of oil in the country on many occasions.

VENEZUELA may also prove to be unstable in the near future. There seems to be a building resentment given unemployment, underemployment, corruption, oppression and more of the same factors that have led to uprisings and revolutions in the Middle East. China is also planning to take more oil from Venezuela in the future. The widening and deepening of the Panama Canal could also have great effects on oil trade from Latin America to Asia.

SUDAN. We saw the splitting of Sudan into two countries. Sudan is an oil producer.

TUNISIA. We saw the revolution in Tunisia which rocked the region and spurred on other uprisings and revolutions. Tunisia is not a large energy producer but its revolution has made a huge difference to the stability in the region.

EGYPT. We have seen a revolution in Egypt where the important energy transport nodes of the Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline are found. Again, Egypt is a net oil importer but it is the most important country in the region with regard to cultural change and political impetus.

LIBYA. We are now seeing a bloody revolution and civil war in Libya, a country that used to export 1.5 million barrels a day. Its exports have been cut drastically. The situation in Libya is just one indication of the possibly bigger threats that are looming as the contagion of rebellion possibly spreads in the region and maybe even beyond.

ALGERIA could be next in line. They export 1.8 million barrels a day.

BAHRAIN is not a large oil exporter or producer, but has become a focal point for rebellion via the Sunni-Shia split, the most important region for oil production and export in the world. The situation in Bahrain as its spread into Qatif, Saudi Arabia recently is also far from comforting. IRAN is clearly behind many of the troubles in Bahrain.

SYRIA is becoming more violent by the day and it is connected in with the issues in Lebanon, the peace process, and Iran. There have been increasing violent reactions to demonstrations, especially in Dara’a in the south. These demonstrations have recently spread to many areas in the country and have turned quite violent. Syria is not a major oil producer, but its importance in the peace process, its relations with Iran, Lebanon, and other states in the region could make instability and change in this country more important to the overall situation in the region well beyond things weighted by oil production and population.

YEMEN is heading toward a possible failed state status, or even broken into many failed states, and could be one of the most complicated places right across from Somalia. On the coast, to the southwest and the west of Yemen there is the Bab-Al Mandab where 4 million barrels a day goes through a day, and 10% of the world container traffic transits. Yemen could split into multiple failed states and this could happen sooner than we can think.

IRAQ exports about 1.7 million barrels a day but 95% of its exports go through 2 geographically tiny, but strategically gigantic, facilities, the Al Basra Oil Terminal, and the Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal right near it. We have considerable imports from Iraq, not the sort of country that gives one a sense of long term stability, especially given the recent demonstrations and other actions on the ground. Also, almost all of its oil goes through one fairly small geographic speck, the Al Basra Oil Terminal, or ABOT and its sister oil port facility, Khor Al–Amaya Oil Terminal, or KABOT. 95 percent of all Iraq’s export revenues is from the oil exporting out of ABOT and KABOT. The entire economy of Iraq relies on these set of wharves and pipelines at sea not far from Iran. We have our Operation Sea Dragon protecting these facilities, but it may be only a matter of time before something happens there.

JORDAN has had demonstrations, but I don’t see them heading south as some other places have.

We are facing down the peaking of conventional oil resources. We are also facing peak oil at the same time and need to go to unconventional oil. We are potentially facing increasing economic turmoil and energy market turmoil globally.

Tar sands oil is more expensive to make than conventional oil s and there are more steps to ma king it useable in refineries. However, as we explore in deeper water and in harsher climates an d more difficult places to find conventional oil then the costs for extracting the conventional oil will most likely continue to rise. They have been rising for many years. The era of cheap to find and produce conventional oil is over.

One thing to understand right off is that oil markets are global markets and events that occur in even what seem to be remote corners of the world can affect oil prices and even oil supply and transport. Also, non-oil energy, minerals and other markets outside of oil are intertwined with oil markets in many ways as both substitutes and complements to oil use. Furthermore, energy systems are really systems within systems, not just one energy source after another. Oil systems are connected with electricity systems that can be connected with gas, nuclear, renewable energy and other systems. And these energy systems are in turn connected with transportation, water, industrial, residential, commercial, and other systems. We really cannot look at one energy source independently of the others. We can not fully understand the effects of energy market and energy policy changes without looking at the totality of the systems within systems connected to energy systems.

It would be best to have a full, comprehensive energy security policy, but this is unlikely to happen any time soon , so it seems we will need to settle for ad hoc improvements in the diversification of supplies and other ad hoc policy measures until the real shocks hit us in waves upon waves upon waves of economic and energy security woe–and we finally wake up to the severity of the situations we might be facing. We need to be far more diversified in our energy sources and our means and ways of using those energy sources, but all of that will take considerable time to accomplish. Anyone who thinks that we can move away from oil any time soon does not understand the complexity of the intertwined nature of energy systems within systems, and also the energy compactness that will be needed to replace oil. We would also have to change our transportation and industrial systems simultaneously with the change in the energy systems.

It would be great if we could lightweight our cars, make them more efficient in their drive trains and more, and convert most if not all of our cars to electric plug-ins, hybrid plug ins, CNG, hydrogen, methanol, and the like but that could take many years, if not decades. Another good idea is to have more of our transportation vehicles, aircraft, ships, etc. converted to flexible fuel engines in order to allow transport, other companies , the government, military, and consumers, to adjust their costs as different energy resources become more or less expensive or reliable than others. The simple mathematics of automobile vint ages could indicate how long th ese changes could take. If we wanted to get around that then would also need to refit our transport vehicles as well as our transport infrastructure to these alternative fuels. Such things do not happen overnight and could take a very long time.

If these changes are pushed too fast and too hard then we could have significant econ omic and other disruptions in the US. There could also be vastly increased risk of severe instability in the oil producing nations that might dwarf even what is going on now. So we need to phase into the new energy futures over proper time period s and in proper, thoughtful and strategic manners. However, we also need answers to our present and near term oil security issues now. In the longer run we need to change the way we do things, but these changes need to be done in a reasonable and reasoned fashion.

We need energy security now and for the medium term to help us as a nation move beyond oil within the next 50 years or so and go toward these alternatives that we have all been discussing.

Our number one source of imported oil is quiet, stable, safe, and friendly Canada. It is our closest military cooperation. Our largest and closest trade relations are with the Canadians. Our most important energy trading relations are also with the Canadians.

David L. Goldwyn, president, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (former U.S. Department of State coordinator and special envoy for International Energy Affairs)

Oil remains a strategic commodity for the United States and the rest of the world. This will be true for decades to come, even if optimistic scenarios for growth in electric vehicles and advanced biofuels come to pass. As we see today from political developments in the Middle East, a natural and nuclear disaster in Japan, and as we saw with Hurricanes Rita and Katrina not so long ago, disruptions of oil supply can negatively and sometimes severely, impact the U.S. and the global economy.

Our primary source of energy insecurity has been oil dependence. We have been vulnerable to the price impacts of oil suppy disruptions, and we have faced and continue to face foreign policy and security challenges from nations that suffer instability as a result of their misuse of their resource rents, or use oil as a weapon.

Transformation of the U.S. vehicle fleet, much less the world’s will take decades.

I heard the President say yesterday we live in tumultuous times and energy security is important. We heard from him and from each of you today that oil is and will remain a strategic commodity for our economy for decades to come. We have taken some visionary steps led by the President on the demand side on fuel efficiency, on advanced fuels, on critical research and development which in time will take us to a world where we are less dependent on oil. But we are not in that world today and we won’t be for the next couple of decades. Even with increased production from the Bakken and from other areas and revived production in the Gulf of Mexico, we will be importing 8 million barrels a day.

In terms of supply security, we have reason to be concerned. The world is going to consume a lot more energy. Mexican production has declined and while they are trying to revive it, it will be awhile. Venezuelan production has declined because of their own policies. There is uncertainty in the Middle East. Even optimistic projections for the call on OPEC in 2035 for 52% of our oil supply assume that there will be increased production in Venezuela, in Libya, in Iran. These are precarious assumptions at best. We do need to worry about whether there will be adequate investment in the world for oil supply.

Canada supplies the U.S. Midwest region with crude oil through the Enbridge, TCPL Keystone and Kinder Morgan Express/Platte pipelines. The U.S. Midwest refineries have access to more supply than they can economically refine. Gulf Coast refineries cannot access this oil and are operating well below capacity. We do not have the infrastructure to move oil from the Mid West to under-supplied Gulf Coast refineries.

Connie Mack (chairman of the subcommittee) from South Carolina. We need to immediately concentrate on replacing foreign oil from thugocrats like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela with reliable, stable allies like Canada. Doing so will ease U.S. energy concerns and provide economic stability while U.S. oil companies make greater use of their Federal leases both onshore and offshore to help increase domestic oil production. What President Obama and his administration have failed to do is increase American security. By approving the Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline this administration could create tens of thousands of jobs to help boost the ailing economy, and secure an additional 500,000 barrels of oil per day into U.S. refineries in Oklahoma and Texas.

Instead of shoring-up important national security and energy resources from a close ally, our nation continues to rely on the likes of Hugo Chavez for approximately 10 percent of our oil and the price we pay is reliant on the actions of unreliable and corrupt dictators such as Libya’s Qaddafi.

The result of the pipeline would increase productivity, but most importantly for me, it would force Hugo Chavez to realize that the United States is not beholden to fully funding his regime indefinitely. It must be made clear to leaders such as Hugo Chavez, who utilize state-owned oil companies to violate U.S. sanctions on Iran, that there are consequences for their actions.

Mr. Albio SIRES of South Carolina. We are in the midst of an energy crisis. We have a situation in the Middle East that really quite frightens me as we head into our venture in Libya. We have a situation where the price of oil, the price of gas is increasing in the United States. We have a situation where we can remedy some of this with this Keystone XL pipeline. I think that we can stop our dependency on foreign oil. Canada has been a friend. Canada will continue to be a friend and we will continue to work with Canada

Ms. Jean SCHMIDT of Florida. I could not agree more. As we look to the Middle East and the instability that continues to grow in the region and the fact that so much of our reliance on foreign oil comes from that part of the world, we really have to look to another part of the world for that oil.  Over 50% of what we use in this country today comes from a foreign source. Of that, when you look at the total pie of the foreign source, right now we are receiving about 23% from Canada. We need to grow that portion of the pie. It makes absolutely no sense to delay this Keystone pipeline, for a national security reason as well as an economic reason. From a national security reason, it is because our friends are Canadians. It is always good to do business with friends. The second is, as we see a spike in gasoline prices at the pump, my fear is with more consumption in the summer that is only going to continue to grow, it is only going to weaken our economy, so getting the opportunity out there for another good supply of oil for our citizens in the United States makes sense.

Mr. Eliot L. ENGEL of New York. We are speaking here about energy dependence, international commerce, jobs, and more. We are talking about oil, hostile regimes, foreign relations, and geopolitics. We are discussing greenhouse gases, groundwater pollution, and pipeline safety. We must consider all of these factors, not just some.

JEREMY SYMONS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CONSERVATION AND EDUCATION, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION

Events in North America and the Middle East, as you have already heard, and rising gas prices once again underscore our dangerous addiction to oil and the high price we pay due to the instability of global oil markets. America needs energy security, so the question is what is the best way of getting there. As much as we may wish otherwise, there are no quick fixes by switching suppliers of our oil imports from one country to another and turning to extreme oil such as Canadian tar sands. There is only one way out. We need to get serious about the innovation and our transportation and fuel sectors that will create jobs here at home and provide Americans a healthier, cleaner, and more secure energy future.

One myth that I often hear is that Canada will find a responsible way to mind tar sands. Years of experience have proven otherwise. I have been there. I have seen the damage. I have listened to courageous people who have suffered as they have stood up to big oil and the oil companies up in Alberta. Alberta tar sands operations are the most destructive source of oil on the planet. It can take five barrels of clean water and four tons of sand to squeeze out just one barrel of tar sludge. This tar sludge is so thick and heavy it must be diluted and pressurized to transport it through pipelines to refineries.

Last year I flew over the tar sands — what was what forest wilderness has been turned into barren strip mine waste land and lakes full of toxic waste that stretch as far as the eye can see, mine after mine after mine. The scale was shocking and difficult to imagine.

Air pollution from tar sands production also causes 3 times more carbon emissions than conventional oil, escalating greenhouse gas emissions when we should be moving in the other direction. In Alberta I met with First Nation communities and listened as they told the heartbreaking story of how cancer rates have increased as the tar sands operations have expanded. One elder told me that they pull their kids indoors whenever the air gets too noxious. Large volumes of toxic waste leaks into the Athabasca River every year contaminating the water supply and fish. So this is what you expected me to say. You might not have known the extent of the damage but you knew there was an environmental price. The question really comes down to is it worth it. Is it a price that we have to pay?

I have to say, though, we are really seeing Canadian oil as some sort of mirage for our energy security. The idea that expanding Canadian tar sands production provides energy security is really just an illusion. Let us look at what has happened in the past month since outbreak of violence in Libya. The price of Canadian oil has increased by $20 a barrel. That is actually twice as much as the jump in the increase in global oil prices. Twice as much as what we have seen in Saudi Arabia. Nobody likes getting oil from the Middle East, but why is getting oil from Canada better when the oil companies who control it will take advantage of a crisis anytime there is one anywhere in the world to increase oil prices, and speculators will make us pay at the pump. This isn’t about Canada. This is about being loyal. Every hour Americans are now spending $2 million more for Canadian oil than we did 1 month ago. Where is the economic security in that? Oil produced from Canadian tar sands is some of the most expensive oil to produce in the world. As we drive up global oil prices, countries that don’t like us will profit whether we buy their oil directly or not. Where is the energy security in that?

We currently have surplus pipeline capacity to carry all the oil Canada can provide to America’s Midwest. So why do oil companies want to rush to build the Keystone pipeline? Because they want to access the deep water ports down in Texas so they can export the oil that we are bringing in.

We are actually exporting twice as much for fine oil products than we were just 5 years ago. Chairman Valero just said that the future of Iraq refining in the U.S. is in exports. Why do we want to move oil that is coming in from the Midwest down to Texas so it can be exported to China or other places and want to call that energy security? Those refineries in Texas, by the way, are owned by Venezuela and by Saudi Arabia.

The only certain impacts to the Keystone XL pipeline are that it will help oil companies manipulate gas prices in the Midwest and that it puts to risk the Ogallala Aquifer in Nebraska which provides irrigation for much of America’s bread basket and drinking water for over 2 million people. In seeking the Canadian permit, TransCanada actually said to the Canadians, they said that they will increase gas prices by $4 billion a year on the U.S. That was the purpose, $4 billion for oil we are already getting and not another drop. I know that I am running out of time, Mr. Chairman, so let me just say that there has also been a huge spill last year in the Kalazmazoo River in Michigan where we saw 800,000 gallons from a tar sands pipeline because tar sands are corrosive and we have not updated our pipeline regulations for tar sands as need to be before we build a new pipeline so we really appreciate that the State Department is taking a proper look at the safety of these pipelines and the environmental impacts before they rush forward. Thank you very much.

Mr. ENGEL. I often hear calls for energy independence to reduce our reliance on our adversaries in the Middle East and elsewhere. I hear pronouncements about the need for more solar, wind, clean coal, and nuclear power. It seems to me that no amount of new electrical power will make us anymore independent. The U.S. already gets nearly 100% of our electricity from our domestically produced coal, natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectric, wind, and solar. Do you agree that the problem is not energy independence, it is oil dependence? Before you answer that, I want to tell you why. It seems to me that the reason we are not all independent is because of our transportation sector. Virtually every car, truck, bus, train, ship, and plane manufactured and sold in the U.S. runs on oil. The transportation sector is by far the biggest reason why we send $600 billion per year to hostile nations in the Middle East and to Venezuela.

Mr. SULLIVAN. We can’t change it that quickly without serious disruptions in the economy and the overall energy situation. Yes, it is oil security. That is the key here. We have enough coal. We certainly have enough natural gas considering the unconventional gas that is now being discovered day by day. Uranium is another issue. Actually about 10 percent of the lights coming into this room right now probably come from ex-Soviet missiles. We import a lot of uranium so maybe there is an issue there but we certainly have the capacity here to produce that. Also, rare earths, an issue I am sure you are all interested in, is also a major part of our energy security situation. We need rare earths for refining oil but also for the new technologies that you are talking about. Clearly these things can be part of our energy future and our energy security future but they are going to take time. They are going to take a lot of time.

Mr. SIRES. My concern is that if we don’t move in, China is going to move into the Western Hemisphere, China moves in. I keep saying to people when I was in Columbia and the president of one of the most prestigious universities said to me that the second most studied language in Columbia today is Mandarin. So, you know, sometimes we have to make a difficult decision.

Mr. SYMONS. Sure. I understand that. This idea that Canada is sort of holding a gun to our head and saying, ‘‘If you don’t take our pipeline, we’ll take it somewhere else’’ is another one of the myths that the oil industry is perpetuating here. We already have more than enough pipeline to take all the oil Canada can produce into the U.S., according to Canadian petroleum industry, and according to the Department of Energy all the way through 2025. We have the pipeline to bring it here. It’s coming to the Midwest and keeping gas prices down in the Midwest. They want to get it to a port where they can export it.

Mr. SYMONS. The purpose of Canadian oil is to fill the capacity that has already been vacated by Venezuela and other producers and to fill new capacity that is being built by Saudi Arabia and others. Valero is the company that has bought into this pipeline. It was their CEO that said that week that they are moving to exports from those Texas refineries. That is the future. It is a massive growth that is happening there. It is hard to believe because we import so much crude but oil companies are global companies and they are just focused on profits. It doesn’t matter where the oil is. It is their oil, not our oil.

Mr. PAYNE. The whole question of consumption of fuel is something that has been on the table for a long time. Let me just ask, Mr. Symons, 25 mayors addressed a letter to Secretary Clinton last week expressing their grave concern about the prospects of expanded imports of tar sand oil from Canada. The mayors indicate fears over increasing dependence on high carbon fuel for decades to come at a time when local governments are working hard to decrease dependence on oil. The mayors believe that expansion of high-carbon projects such as the proposed Keystone tar sands pipeline will undermine the work being done in the local communities across the country to fight climate change and reduce our dependence on oil. Would you comment on how this pipeline would affect such efforts in your opinion and will the small communities be hampered in their efforts to build clean energy economies?

Mr. SYMONS. First of all, everybody has to do everything they can to reduce emissions and deal with the important threat of climate change. Mayors have been leading the way and should, regardless of what happens, continue to lead the way. But buying into a 50-year pipeline for oil that is 3 times the greenhouse gas emissions of conventional oil makes a mockery of the efforts that we all are pursuing to reduce our own emissions, pursue clean energy here at home. Canada agreed internationally and signed an agreement to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and they have completely ignored. Not only will their emissions go up but Canada is undermining the value of global cooperation through technology and other pieces on addressing the important threat of climate threat, protecting our environment for our kids’ future.

Mr. PAYNE. We do hear this question of energy. We use nuclear and we say that it is safe today and, of course, Japan goes up. I asked the question a couple of weeks ago at a conference out of the country, ‘‘What are you going to do about spent fuel?’’ ‘‘Don’t worry about it. Not a problem. Got it contained.’’ Look at Japan. We look at our good friends in Canada, and they are our greatest allies. However, I guess making a buck is making a buck. If the price of oil goes up coming from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is up in flames and Libya, they say, ‘‘Hey, might as well jack up the price and stick it to our American friends because, hey, that’s business.’’ You know, you have a fiduciary responsibility to your stockholders. You know, with friends like that, who needs enemies? I just think that this whole picture has to be looked at a little bit more carefully. Water is being destroyed. I don’t have the answer. That is for sure. One thing we have to talk about is conservation. We don’t talk about the sacrifice. Everybody has—my time has expired, but especially down in Florida, the air conditioners are up very high in the summer. I mean,

Mr. SYMONS. The real question there is where is the oil coming from. You are actually hearing, if you listen closely, people are kind of having it both ways, ‘‘Oh, we are going to get more oil from Canada,’’ as in Canada is going to produce more oil. The fact is they are not. This oil is going to come from the pipelines where it is already going into the Midwest, much closer, of course, to the northeast. It is going to go all the way down to Texas. Then it has to work its way back up. Why would oil companies spend $12 billion to build a pipeline to take it further away to take it back up? Well, they are going to be able to charge more because once they get it out of the Midwest to a deep water port, they can send it anywhere and charge higher prices. Those higher prices are what are going to fill the coffers of Chavez at the end of the day because Canadian oil is one of the most expensive oils in the world to produce. If we bet on it for 50 years, we are betting on high oil prices and that is going to make Chavez rich.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. That would go back to Mr. Sires’ question about China. China is actually building refineries to use Venezuelan oil and China is building 17 large super tankers to bring that oil through the Panama Canal which China is, part of, widening and deepening. So things are changing in the east as we are talking about the west. China is also looking at a pipeline going from Alberta tar sands to the west coast of Canada to export the tar sands oil to China. There is a direct competition going on here.

If we could take a look at the transport charges, which brings the Chinese are building capacity to use this sort of oil. They need this kind of oil. They need oil from all over the world. They are growing at 7 to 9 percent. Hu Jintao, when asked by our previous President George Bush what kept him up at night, his answer was 25 million jobs. They have to create 25 million jobs every single year. Now the question goes to, and this is rather complicated, do we want them to have the 25 million jobs? I think the answer is probably in the main part yes because we don’t want instability in China and what that could bring to us.

Mr. SYMONS. Let me just say the idea of the Canadian western route to get to China, the Canadian people are rejecting it because of the results. They know what is in the results of this report by Pipeline Safety Trust and others that Alberta pipeline spills are 16 times as common as spills down here because harsh sands oil is not like conventional crude and it is much more dangerous to transport by pipeline. Think about the question you are asking before we all stand up and sing the Canadian national anthem. Canada is threatening and blackmailing us with that. Canadian oil companies are holding a gun to our head. Think about that before we make a 50-year bet that Canada is going to be our friend with oil.

Posted in Congressional Record U.S., Peak Oil | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on Rising oil prices and dependence on hostile regimes — the urgent case for Canadian oil

Former President Carter on U.S. energy security & policy now and in the past

In 2013, world total primary energy consumption was about 543 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu), and U.S. primary consumption was about 97 quadrillion Btu, equal to 18% of world total primary energy consumption. Source: Energy Information Administration. May 16, 2016. What is the United States’ share of world energy consumption?

In 2013, world total primary energy consumption was about 543 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu), and U.S. primary consumption was about 97 quadrillion Btu, equal to 18% of world total primary energy consumption. Source: Energy Information Administration. May 16, 2016. What is the United States’ share of world energy consumption?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Former President Carter and General Wald both say the American public need to be better informed about the energy crisis to motivate them to stop buying gas-guzzling vehicles, since that’s why we go to war in the Middle East, at the cost of thousands of soldiers lives.   Carter explains how hard it was to get bills past special interests, and our lack of an energy policy, except for the Carter doctrine, which Senator Lugar describes as the “United States will use its military to protect our access to Middle Eastern oil”. General Wald concludes “I don’t think we should overly frighten people, but they need to be aware of the fact that we are severely threatened today and vulnerable.”

Carter also explains how it was in the interest of both oil and car companies to keep vehicles inefficient:

We have gone back to the gas guzzlers which I think has been one of the main reasons that Ford and Chrysler and General Motors are in so much trouble now. Instead of being constrained to make efficient automobiles, they made the ones upon which they made more profit. Of course, you have to remember, too, that the oil companies and the automobile companies have always been in partnership, because the oil companies want to sell as much oil as possible, even the imported oil-the profit goes to Chevron and others. I’m not knocking profit, but that’s a fact. And the automobile companies knew they made more profit on gas guzzlers. So, there was kind of a subterranean agreement there”.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation, 2015, Springer]

Excerpts from: Senate 111–78. May 12, 2009. Energy Security: Historical perspectives and Modern challenges. U.S. Senate committee on foreign relations. 45 pages.

John Kerry, Senator from Massachusetts

“Why have we not been able to get together as a nation and resolve our serious energy problem?’’ These were the words of President Jimmy Carter in 1979. And regrettably, despite the strong efforts of President Carter and others, here we are, in 2009, still struggling to meet the same challenge today.

The downside of our continued dependence on oil is compelling, it is well known; and the downside is only growing.

Economically, it results in a massive continuous transfer of American wealth to oil-exporting nations, and it leaves us vulnerable to price and supply shocks.

But, the true cost of our addiction extends far beyond what we pay at the pump; its revenues and power sustain despots and dictators, and it obliges our military to defend our energy supply in volatile regions of the world at very great expense.

These were some of the problems that then-President Carter saw, understood, and defined, back in the latter part of the 1970s. They remain problems today. And to this long list of problems, we now add two very urgent, and relatively new, threats: Global terror, funded indirectly by our expenditures on oil, and global climate change driven by the burning of fossil fuels.

To make matters worse, we are adding billions of new drivers on the roads and consumers across the developing world, as India and China’s population and other populations move to automobiles, as lots of other folks did, all of that will ensure that the supplies of existing energy sources will grow even tighter.

All the trends are pointing in that wrong direction. According to the International Energy Agency, global energy demand is expected to increase approximately 45% between 2006 and 2030, fueled largely by growth in the developing world. So, we’re here today to discuss both the geostrategic challenges posed by our current energy supply and the need to find new and more secure sources of energy in the future.

From development to diplomacy to security, no part of our foreign policy is untouched by this issue. Region by region, our energy security challenge is varied and enormous.

Too often, the presence of oil multiples threats, exacerbates conflicts, stifles democracy and development, and blocks accountability.

  • In Europe the potential for monopolistic Russian control over energy supplies is a source of profound concern for our allies, with serious implications for the daily lives of their citizens.
  • In Nigeria, massive oil revenues have fueled corruption and conflict.
  • In Venezuela, President Chavez has used oil subsidies to great effect to buy influence with neighbors.
  • Sudan uses its energy supply to buy impunity from the global community for abuses.
  • Iran uses petro dollars to fund Hamas and Hezbollah, and to insulate its nuclear activities from international pressure
  • We know that, at least in the past, oil money sent to Saudi Arabia has eventually found its way into the hands of jihadists.
  • And oil remains a major bone of contention and a driver of violence in Kirkuk and elsewhere among Iraq’s religious and ethnic groups.

And alongside these security concerns, we must also recognize that access to energy is fundamental to economic development. Billions of people who lack access to fuel and electricity will not only be denied the benefits of economic development, their energy poverty leaves them vulnerable to greater political instability and more likely to take advantage of dirty or local fuel sources that then damage the local environment and threaten the global climate.

Taken together, these challenges dramatically underscore a simple truth: Scarce energy supplies represent a major force for instability in the 21st century. That is why, even though the price of a barrel of oil is, today, $90 below its record high from last summer, we cannot afford to repeat the failures of the past.

Ever since President Nixon set a goal of energy independence by 1980, price spikes and moments of crisis have inspired grand plans and Manhattan projects for energy independence, but the political will to take decisive action has dissipated as each crisis has passed. That is how steps forward have been reversed and efforts have stood still even as the problem has gotten worse.

In 1981, our car and light-truck fleet had a fuel efficiency rate of 20.5 miles per gallon. Today, that number is essentially the same. The only difference? Back then we imported about a third of our oil; today we import 70 percent.

In recent years, Congress and the administration have made some progress. In 2007, fleet-wide fuel efficiency standards were raised for the first time since the Carter administration. In February we passed an economic recovery package which was America’s largest single investment in clean energy that we have ever made. [But] the lion’s share of the hard work still lies in front of us.

It’s a particular pleasure to have President Carter here, because President Carter had the courage, as President of the United States, to tell the truth to Americans about energy and about these choices, and he actually set America on the right path in the 1970s.

He created what then was the first major effort for research and development into the energy future, with the creation of the Energy Laboratory, out in Colorado, and tenured professors left their positions to go out there and go to work for America’s future.

Regrettably, the ensuing years saw those efforts unfunded, stripped away, and we saw America’s lead in alternative and renewable energy technologies, that we had developed in our universities and laboratories, transferred to Japan and Germany and other places, where they developed them. In the loss of that technology, we lost hundreds of thousands of jobs and part of America’s energy future. President Carter saw that, knew and understood that future. He dealt with these choices every day in the Oval Office, and he exerted genuine leadership. He’s been a student of these issues and a powerful advocate for change in the decades since, and we’re very grateful that he’s taken time today to share insights with us about this important challenge that the country faces.

 

JIMMY CARTER, Former PRESIDENT of the United States, Plains, Georgia

It is a pleasure to accept Senator Kerry’s request to relate my personal experiences in meeting the multiple challenges of a comprehensive energy policy and the interrelated strategic issues. They have changed very little during the past three decades.

Long before my inauguration, I was vividly aware of the interrelationship between energy and foreign policy. U.S. oil prices had quadrupled in 1973 while I was Governor, with our citizens subjected to severe oil shortages and long gas lines brought about by a boycott of Arab OPEC countries. Even more embarrassing to a proud and sovereign nation was the secondary boycott that I inherited in 1977 against American corporations doing business with Israel.

We overcame both challenges, but these were vivid demonstrations of the vulnerability that comes with excessive dependence on foreign oil. At the time, we were importing 50% of consumed oil, almost 9 million barrels per day, and were the only industrialized nation that did not have a comprehensive energy policy.

It was clear that we were subject to deliberately imposed economic distress and even political blackmail and, a few weeks after becoming President, I elevated this issue to my top domestic priority.

In an address to the Nation, I said: ‘‘Our decision about energy will test the character of the American people and the ability of the President and Congress to govern this Nation. This difficult effort will be the ‘moral equivalent of war,’ except that we will be uniting our efforts to build and not to destroy.’’

First, let me review our work with the U.S. Congress, which will demonstrate obvious parallels with the challenges that lie ahead. Our effort to conserve energy and to develop our own supplies of oil, natural gas, coal, and renewable sources were intertwined domestically with protecting the environment, equalizing supplies to different regions of the country, and balancing the growing struggle and animosity between consumers and producers.

Oil prices were controlled at artificially low levels, through an almost incomprehensible formula based on the place and time of discovery, etc., and the price of natural gas was tightly controlled—but only if it crossed a State line. Scarce supplies naturally went where prices were highest, depriving some regions of needed fuel. Energy policy was set by more than 50 Federal agencies, and I was determined to consolidate them into a new department. In April 1977, after just 90 days, we introduced a cohesive and comprehensive energy proposal, with 113 individual components. We were shocked to learn that it was to be considered by 17 committees and subcommittees in the House and would have to be divided into 5 separate bills in the Senate. Speaker Tip O’Neill was able to create a dominant ad hoc House committee under Chairman Lud Ashley, but the Senate remained divided under two strong willed, powerful, and competitive men, ‘‘Scoop’’ Jackson and Russell Long. In July, we pumped the first light crude oil into our strategic petroleum reserve in Louisiana, the initial stage in building up to my target of 115 days of imports. Less than a month later, I signed the new Energy Department into law, with James Schlesinger as Secretary, and the House approved my omnibus proposal.

In the Senate, the oil and automobile industries prevailed in Senator Long’s committee, which produced unacceptable bills dealing with price controls and the use of coal. There was strong bipartisan support throughout, but many liberals, preferred no legislation to higher prices. Three other Senate bills encompassed my basic proposals on conservation, coal conversion, and electricity rates.

I insisted on the maintenance of a comprehensive or omnibus bill, crucial—then and now—to prevent fragmentation and control by oil company lobbyists, and the year ended in an impasse. As is now the case, enormous sums of money were involved, and the life of every American was being touched. The House-Senate conference committee was exactly divided and stalemated. I could only go directly to the people, and I made three primetime TV speeches in addition to addressing a joint session of Congress.

Also, we brought a stream of interest groups into the White House—several times a week—for direct briefings. The conferees finally reached agreement, but under pressure many of them refused to sign their own report, and both Long and Jackson threatened filibusters on natural gas and an oil windfall profits tax. In the meantime, I was negotiating to normalize diplomatic relations with China, bringing Israel and Egypt together in a peace agreement, sparring with the Soviets on a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, allocating vast areas of land in Alaska, and trying to induce 67 Members of a reluctant Senate to ratify the Panama Canal treaties.

Our closest allies were critical of our profligate waste of energy, and OPEC members were exacerbating our problems. Finally clearing the conference committee and a last-minute filibuster in the Senate, the omnibus bill returned to the House for a vote just before the 1978 elections, and following an enormous White House campaign it passed, 207–206.

The legislation put heavy penalties on gas-guzzling automobiles; forced electric utility companies to encourage reduced consumption; mandated insulated buildings and efficient electric motors and heavy appliances; promoted gasohol production and car pooling; decontrolled natural gas prices at a rate of 10 percent per year; promoted solar, wind, geothermal, and water power; permitted the feeding of locally generated electricity into utility grids; and regulated strip mining and leasing of offshore drilling sites. We were also able to improve efficiency by deregulating our air, rail, and trucking transportation systems. What remained was decontrolling oil prices and the imposition of a windfall profits tax.

This was a complex and extremely important issue, with hundreds of billions of dollars involved. The big question was how much of the profits would be used for public benefit. By this time, the Iranian revolution and the impending Iran-Iraq war caused oil prices to skyrocket from $15 to $40 a barrel ($107 in today’s prices), as did the prospective deregulated price. We reached a compromise in the spring of 1980, with a variable tax rate of 30 percent to 70 percent, the proceeds to go into the general treasury and be allocated by the Congress in each year’s budget. The tax would expire after 13 years or when $227 billion had been collected. Our strong actions regarding conservation and alternate energy sources resulted in a reduction of net oil imports by 50 percent, from 8.6 to 4.3 million barrels per day by 1982—just 28 percent of consumption. Increased efficiency meant that during the next 20 years our Gross National Product increased four times as much as energy consumption. This shows what can be done, but unfortunately there has been a long period of energy complacency and our daily imports are now almost 13 million barrels.

The United States now uses 2.5 times more oil than China and 7.5 times more than India or, on a per capita consumption basis, 12 times China’s and 28 times India’s. Although our rich Nation can afford these daily purchases, there is little doubt that, in general terms, we are constrained not to alienate our major oil suppliers, and some of these countries are publicly antagonistic, known to harbor terrorist organizations, or obstruct America’s strategic interests.

When we are inclined to use restrictive incentives, as on Iran, we find other oil consumers reluctant to endanger their supplies. On the other hand, the blatant interruption of Russia’s natural gas supplies to Ukraine has sent a warning signal to its European customers. Excessive oil purchases are the solid foundation of our net trade deficit, which creates a disturbing dependence on foreign nations that finance our debt.

We still face criticism from some of our allies who are far ahead of us in energy efficiency.

A major new problem was first detected while I was President, when science adviser Frank Press informed me of evidence by scientists at Woods Hole that the earth was slowly warming and that human activity was at least partially responsible.

It is difficult for us to defend ourselves against accusations that our waste of energy contributes to [climate change]. Everywhere, we see the intense competition by China for present and future oil supplies (and other commodities), and their financial aid going to other key governments. Recently I found the Chinese to be very proud of their more efficient, less polluting coal power plants. They are building about one a month, while we delay our first full-scale model. We also lag far behind many other nations in … the efficiency of energy consumption

Let me emphasize that our inseparable energy and environmental decisions will determine how well we can maintain a vibrant society, protect our strategic interests, regain worldwide political and economic leadership, meet relatively new competitive challenges, and deal with less fortunate nations. Collectively, nothing could be more important.

An omnibus proposal could be addressed collectively by the Congress by committees brought together in a common approach to this complex problem, because no single element of it can be separated from the others. I think it would also minimize the adverse influence of special interest groups who don’t want to see the present circumstances changed or a new policy put into effect to deal with either energy or with the environment. Another advantage of an omnibus bill is it gives the President and other spokespersons for our Government, including all of you, an opportunity to address this so the American people can understand it.

I think that it is almost necessary to see a single proposal come forward combining energy and environment, as was the case in 1977 to 1980, so that it can be addressed comprehensively. This is not an easy thing, because now, with inflation, I guess several trillion dollars are involved; back in those days, hundreds of billions of dollars. And the interest groups are extremely powerful. I had the biggest problem, at the time, with consumer groups who didn’t want to see the price of oil and natural gas deregulated. It was only by passing the windfall profits tax that we could induce some of them to support the legislation, because they saw that the money would be used for helping poor families pay high prices on natural gas for heating their homes and for alternative energy sources.

Global warming is a new issue that didn’t exist when I was in office, although it was first detected then. I would hope that we would take the leadership role in accurately describing the problem, not exaggerating it, and tying it in with the conservation of energy. And the clean burning of coal, I think, is a very important issue, as well.

I mentioned very briefly the constraints that are already on us. We are very careful not to aggravate our main oil suppliers. We don’t admit it. But, we have to be cautious. And I’m not criticizing that decision. But, some of these people from whom we buy oil and enrich are harboring terrorists; we know it. Some of them are probably condemning America as a nation. They have become our most vocal public critics. We still buy their oil, and we don’t want to alienate them so badly that we can’t buy it.

We also see our allies refraining from putting, I’d say, appropriate influence—I won’t say ‘‘pressure’’—on Iran to change their policy concerning nuclear weapons because they don’t want to interrupt the flow from one of their most important suppliers of oil. So, I think, to the extent that the Western world and the oil-consuming world can reduce our demands, the less we will be constrained in our foreign policy to promote democracy and freedom and international progress.

One of the things that surprised me, back in the 1970s, was that we even lost a good bit of our supplies from Canada. Because when we had the OPEC oil embargo, Canada sent their supplies to other countries, as well. So, we can’t expect to depend just on oil supplies from Mexico and Canada. I would guess that our entire status as a leading nation in the world will depend on the role that we play in energy and environment in the future, not only removing our vulnerability to possible pressures and blackmail.

Senator Lugar (Indiana)

President Carter, in your State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980, you articulated what became known to many as the Carter Doctrine, that the United States would use its military to protec our access to Middle Eastern oil.

At the same time, in the same speech, you went on to say, ‘‘We must take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign oil.’’ You have illustrated in your testimony today all the actions you took.

It seems to me to be a part of our predicament, historically, at least often in testimony before this committee, the thought is that our relationship with Saudi Arabia has, implicitly or explicitly for 60 years, said, ‘‘We want to be friends; furthermore, we want to make certain that you remain in charge of all of your oil fields, because we may need to take use of them. We would like to have those supplies, and in a fairly regular way.’’

Now, on the other hand, we have been saying, as you stated, and other Presidents, that we have an abnormal dependence on foreign oil. I suppose one could rationalize this relationship by saying that Saudi Arabia is reasonably friendly in comparison, to, say, Venezuela or Iran or Russia. And so, we might be able to pick and choose among them. Perhaps regardless of Presidential leadership, throughout all this period of time, the American public has decided that it wants to buy oil or it wants to buy products, whether it be cars, trucks, and so forth that use a lot of oil.

As our domestic supplies have declined, that has meant, almost necessarily, that the amount imported from other places has gone up. And so, despite the Carter Doctrine, say, back in 1980s, we have a huge import bill. Increasingly, our balance-of-payment structure has been influenced very adversely by these payments.

And so, many of us try to think through this predicament, and each administration has its own iteration. President Bush, most recently, in one of his State of the Union messages, said we are ‘‘addicted to oil.’’ At the same time, I remember a meeting at the White House in which he said, ‘‘A lot of my oil friends are very angry with me for making such a statement, said, ‘What’s happened to you, George?’ ’’

You know, there’s this ambivalence in the American public about the whole situation. Now, what I want to ask, from your experience, how could we have handled the foreign policy aspect and/or the rhetoric or the developments, say, from 1980 onward, in different ways, as instructive of how we ought to be trying to handle it now? I’m conscious of the fact that many of us are talking about dependence upon foreign oil. We can even say, as we have in this committee, that you can see a string of expenditures, averaging about $500 million a year, even when we were at peace, on our military to really keep the flow going, or to offer assurance.

Secretary Jim Baker once, when pushed on why we were worried about Iraq invading Kuwait, said of course it was the upset of aggression, but it’s oil. And many people believe that was the real answer, that essentially we were prepared to go to war to risk American lives, and were doing so, all over oil so we could continue to run whatever SUVs or whatever else we had here with all the pleasures to which we’ve become accustomed.

Why hasn’t this dependence, the foreign policy dilemmas or the economic situation ever gripped the American public so there was a clear constituency that said, ‘‘We’ve had enough, and our dependence upon foreign oil has really got to stop, and we are not inclined to use our military trying to protect people who are trying to hurt us’’? Can you give us any instruction, from your experience?

 

President CARTER

In the first place, no one can do this except the President—to bring this issue to the American public, to explain to them their own personal and national interest in controlling the excessive influx of oil and our dependence on uncertain sources. And it requires some sacrifice on the part of Americans— lower your thermostat. We actually had a pretty good compliance with the 55-miles-per-hour speed limit for a while, and people were very proud of the fact that they were saving energy by insulating their homes and doing things of that kind.

I made three major televised prime-time addresses, and also spoke to a special session of Congress, just on energy; nothing else. That was just the first year. I had to keep it up. The public joined in and gave us support. The oil companies still were trying to get as much as possible from the rapidly increasing prices. They were not able to do so because of the legislation passed.

In 1979, at Christmastime when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and I looked upon that as a direct threat to the security of my country. I pointed out to the Soviet Union, in a speech, that we would use every resource at our command, not excluding nuclear weapons, to protect America’s security, and if they moved out of Afghanistan to try to take over the oil fields in the Middle East, this would be a direct threat to our existence, economically, and we would not abide by it. And, secretly, we were helping the freedom fighters—some of whom are no longer our friends—in Afghanistan overcome the Soviet invasion. And it never went further down into Iran and Iraq. Unfortunately that same area was then taken over by the war between Iran and Iraq, and all the oil out of those two countries stopped coming forward in those few months. That’s when prices escalated greatly.

When I became President, the average gas mileage on a car was 12 miles per gallon, and we mandated, by the time I went out of office, 27.5 miles per gallon within 8 years. But, President Reagan and others didn’t think that was important, and so, it was frittered away. We have gone back to the gas guzzlers which I think has been one of the main reasons that Ford and Chrysler and General Motors are in so much trouble now. Instead of being constrained to make efficient automobiles, they made the ones upon which they made more profit. Of course, you have to remember, too, that the oil companies and the automobile companies have always been in partnership, because the oil companies want to sell as much oil as possible, even the imported oil—the profit goes to Chevron and others. I’m not knocking profit, but that’s a fact. And the automobile companies knew they made more profit on gas guzzlers. So, there was kind of a subterranean agreement there.

I would say that, in the future, we have to look forward to increasing pressures from all these factors. There’s no doubt that, as China and India, just for instance, approach anywhere near the per capita consumption of oil that America is using now, the pressure on the international oil market is going to be tremendous, and we’re going to, soon in the future, pass the $110-per-barrel figure again. And when that comes, we’re going to be in intense competition with other countries that are emerging. I’ve just mentioned two of the so-called BRIC countries. I’ve mentioned Brazil and China. But, we know that India is also in there, and Russia is, too. I used the example of the increasing influence of Brazil in a benevolent way. That’s going to continue. We’re going to be competitive with Brazil, and we’re also going to be competitive, increasingly, with China.

Everywhere we go in Africa, you see the Chinese presence, a very benevolent presence and perfectly legitimate. But, anywhere that has coal or oil or copper or iron or so forth, the Chinese are there, very quietly buying the companies themselves if they’re under stress, as they are in Australia right now, or they’re buying the ability to get those raw materials in a very inexpensive way in the future. We’re going to be competing with them. They have an enormous buildup now of capital because of our adverse trade balance and buying our bonds, and they’re able to give benevolent assistance now, wisely invested in some of the countries that I mentioned earlier. So, I think the whole strategic element of our dealing with the poorest countries in the world, of our dealing with friendly competitors, like Brazil, of our dealing with potential competitors in the future, like China, our dependence on unsavory suppliers of oil, all of those things depend on whether or not we have a comprehensive energy policy that saves energy and cuts down on the consumption and also whether we deal with environment.

 

Senator CARDIN of Maryland

You made an interesting observation that the interest groups will make it difficult for us to get the type of legislation passed that we need to get passed. I find it disappointing is our failure to get the interest groups that benefit from significant legislation active—as active as the opponents. So, is there any experience that you can share with us as to how we could do a better job in mobilizing these interest groups? I know there’s a patriotism, everybody wants to do the right thing, but, when it gets down to it, they’re also interested in what they think is in their best immediate interest. I agree that the legislation needs to be a bill that deals with energy and the environment, that if we separate it, we’re likely to get lost on both.

 

President CARTER

I deliberately mentioned three different interest groups—one was oil, one was automobiles, and one was consumers—just to show that there’s a disparity among them in their opposition to some elements of the comprehensive energy policy that I put forward. The oil companies didn’t want to have any of their profits go to the general treasury, renewable energy and that sort of thing. The consumers didn’t want to see the price of natural gas and oil deregulated, because they wanted the cheapest possible prices. The energy companies wanted to sell their natural gas, for instance, just in their own States where they were discovered, because the only price control on natural gas was if it crossed a State line. There was no restriction if they sold it in Texas or if they sold it in Oklahoma, where the gas was discovered. Those interest groups were varied, and they still are.

You will find some interest groups that will oppose any single aspect of the multiple issues that comprise an omnibus package, and they’ll single-shot it enough to kill it, and just the lowest common denominator is likely to pass if it’s treated in that way. The only way you can get it passed is to have it all together in one bill so that the consumers will say, ‘‘Well, I don’t like to see the increase in price, but the overall bill is better for me’’ and for the oil companies to say, ‘‘Well, we don’t like to see the government take some of our profits, but the overall bill is good for me.’’ That’s the only way you can hope to get it. It was what I had to deal with for 4 solid years under very difficult circumstances in the Congress and so forth. And I think that’s a very important issue to make.

And, to be repetitive, the only person that can do this is the President. The President has got to say, ‘‘This is important to our Nation, for our own self-respect, for our own pride in being a patriot, for saving our own domestic economy—for creating new jobs and new technology, very exciting new jobs, and also for removing ourselves from the constraint of foreigners, who now control a major portion of the decisions made in foreign policy and who endanger our security.’’ So, the totality is the answer to your question. You’ve got to do it all together in order to meet these individual special interest groups’ pressure that will try to preserve a tiny portion of it that’s better from them and, one by one, they’ll nibble the whole thing away.

I think that the fact that this Foreign Relations Committee is addressing this is extremely important, not just the Environmental Committee or the Energy Committee, but Foreign Relations, because it has so much to do with our interrelationship with almost every other country on Earth.

I would say this is about the only issue that I thought had to be treated comprehensively. It took me an entire 4 years. And I made so many speeches to the American people—fireside chats, and so forth—that the American people finally got sick of it, of my talking. [Laughter.] And the Congress was—the Senate and the House were very reluctant to take this up the second year, but I kept on the pressure, and I would say that it was costly, politically, just to harp on this issue repetitively. Anyway, I think, in general, comprehensive legislation may not be good, but, in this case, I think it’s absolutely necessary.

 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

For the better part of 50 or 60 years, our foreign policy had been deeply entwined with oil, in one form or another. Despite past campaigns for energy independence and the steady improvement in energy intensity per dollar of GDP, we are more dependent on oil imports today than we were during the oil shocks of the 1970s.

Now, we could have made a case for bringing democracy and human rights and education for children, and so forth, to a number of countries, but some would say, ‘‘This is, at best, sort of a second or third order of rationalization as to why you were there to begin with and what sort of wars you engendered by your physical presence.’’ And why were we there? Well, in large part because we were attempting, as President Carter expressed in the Carter Doctrine, to make certain we cannot be displaced from oil sources that were vital to our economy throughout that period of time.

We put people in harm’s way to make sure that all of those vital things occurred, did the best we could to rationalize that we were doing a lot of other good things while we were in the area. And that still is the case.

 

FREDERICK W. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT & CEO, FEDEX Corp., CO-CHAIRMAN, Energy Security Leadership Council, Washington, D.C. 

FedEx delivers more than 6 million packages and shipments per day to over 220 countries and territories. In a 24-hour period, our fleet of aircraft flies the equivalent of 500,000 miles, and our couriers travel 2.5 million miles. We accomplish this with more than 275,000 dedicated employees, 670 aircraft, and some 70,000 motorized vehicles worldwide. FedEx’s reliance on oil reflects the reliance of the wider transportation sector, and indeed the entire U.S. economy.

Oil is the lifeblood of a mobile, global economy. We are all dependent upon it, and that dependence brings with it inherent and serious risks. The danger is clear, and our sense of urgency must match it.

I understand that this may seem contradictory. We talk about ending our dependence on oil, and in the next sentence about drilling for more oil. But the reason for this is simple: Our safety and our security must be protected throughout the entire process. It would be ideal if we could simply snap our fingers and stop using petroleum today. But that is a pipe dream, not a policy. There are no silver bullets, and we cannot allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good—especially when faced with very real dangers to our economic and national security.

Energy and climate change are related issues. That said, it is important to emphasize that the fundamental goal of reducing oil intensity is a distinct one that needs to be considered based on its own merits and the very real dangers of inaction. Put simply, pricing carbon as a stand-alone policy, whether through a tax or a cap-and-trade system, will not allow us to reach that goal. Carbon pricing will almost automatically target the power industry in general and coal in particular. The power industry, however, is responsible for a fairly small percentage of the petroleum we consume as a nation. So pricing carbon will not meaningfully affect the price of oil, the demand for oil, and therefore oil dependence.

All you have to do is to watch the nightly news and look at the enormous human cost and the cost in national wealth of prosecuting these wars in the Middle East. And any way you slice it, in large measures they are related to our dependence on foreign petroleum. There are other issues, to be sure; but, just as Alan Greenspan said in his book, ‘‘neat,’’ you know, the situation was about oil. And if we continue along the road we’ve been on these last 40 years, we’re going to get into a major national security confrontation that makes these things that we’ve been in, here the last few years, pale in comparison. So, I think every American can understand that issue by just simply relating to what we’ve been involved in, the last few years, and watching the enormous human cost of these involvements that we have in areas of the world which we wouldn’t necessarily be involved in if we weren’t as dependent on foreign petroleum. We have other issues and other interests, but I think they would not require the level of boots on the ground that we’ve been forced to get into there in these last two wars.

GEN. CHARLES F. WALD, U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.), MEMBER, ENERGY SECURITY LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

Energy security, to me, has been an important issue for the last at least two decades in my career; and, ironically, the first time it really became apparent to me, I think, in a big way, was when I was in War College in 1990, here in Washington, DC. And at that time, we were talking about strategy, which plenty of us thought we knew what it was, but we were learning. And the Carter Doctrine came up. And, at that time, I think, even then, 10 years after President Carter declared his doctrine, it was, I think, a surprise to many people that President Carter had been the first one to say that we would use military force to ensure the free flow of oil in the Middle East. That’s 38 years ago. Since then, I personally have spent years in the Persian Gulf, for example, and at least 16 years of my career overseas, much of it defending resources that are important to, not only us, but the rest of the global economy. And energy is, I think, paramount in that effort today and will continue to be. Our national security is definitely threatened by the fact that we are dependent upon oil and energy from places that don’t like who we are and what we do. Independence is not in the cards, necessarily, but becoming less dependent on places that don’t like us are certainly in the cards.

As you are all acutely aware, our country is now confronting a range of pressing challenges, both at home and abroad. The financial crisis, health care reform, and climate change are all serious issues that demand leadership and careful attention.

But based on my career and professional experience, I can think of no more pressing threat, no greater vulnerability, than America’s heavy dependence on a global petroleum market that is unpredictable, to say the least.

In 2006, I retired from the United States Air Force after 35 years of service. In my final assignment, I served as the Deputy Commander of United States European Command. Currently, EUCOM’s jurisdiction covers more than 50 countries and over 20 million square miles spanning the region north of the Middle East and subcontinent from the North Sea all the way to the Bering Strait. Though EUCOM is no longer responsible for Africa, it included that continent during my tenure.

During my tenure at EUCOM, I saw firsthand the dangers posed by our Nation’s dependence on oil. And those dangers have only become more acute in the time since.

The implicit strategic and tactical demands of protecting the global oil trade have been recognized by national security officials for decades, but it took the Carter Doctrine of 1980, proclaimed in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, to formalize this critical military commitment. In short, it committed the United States to defending the Persian Gulf against aggression by any ‘‘outside force.’’

President Reagan built on this foundation by creating a military command in the gulf and ordering the U.S. Navy to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq war.

The gulf war of 1991, which saw the United States lead a coalition of nations in ousting Iraq from Kuwait, was an expression of an implicit corollary of the Carter Doctrine: the United States would not allow Persian Gulf oil to be dominated by a radical regime—even an ‘‘inside force’’—that posed a dangerous threat to the international order.

The United States military has been extraordinarily successful in fulfilling its energy security missions, and it continues to carry out those duties with great professionalism and courage. But, ironically, this very success may have weakened the Nation’s strategic posture by allowing America’s political leaders and the American public to believe that energy security can be achieved by military means alone.

In the case of our oil dependence problem, however, military responses are by no means the only effective security measures, and in some case are no help at all.

The United States now consumes nearly 20 million barrels of petroleum a day. About 11 million barrels—or 60% of the total—are imported. In 2008, we sent $386 billion overseas to pay for oil. Our oil and refined product, in fact, accounted for 57% of the entire U.S. trade deficit. This is an unprecedented and unsustainable transfer of wealth to other nations.

Our transportation system accounts for 70% of the petroleum we consume, and 97% of all fuel used for transport is derived from oil. In other words, we have built a transportation system that is nearly 100% reliant on a fuel that we are forced to import and whose highly volatile price is subject to geopolitical events far beyond our control.

In my time as a military leader, I labored to develop a proactive risk-mitigation strategy for just those kinds of geopolitical events. It was an unwieldy challenge. Petroleum facilities in the Niger Delta were subject to terrorist attacks, kidnappings and sabotage on a routine basis—just as they are today. Export routes in the Gulf of Guinea were plagued by piracy, just as routes in the Gulf of Aden have been more recently. We can share intelligence and train security forces, but our military reach is limited by cost, logistics, and national sovereignty.

In 2008, the 1-million-barrel-per-day BTC pipeline—which runs from the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan—was knocked offline for 3 weeks after Turkish separatists detonated explosives near a pumping station, despite the best efforts of local security forces. The pipeline spewed fire and oil for days. The following week, Russian forces launched a month-long incursion into the Republic of Georgia during which the pipeline was reportedly targeted a number of times.

And sitting in the heart of the Middle East is the greatest strategic challenge facing the United States at the dawn of a new century: The regime in Tehran. We cannot talk about energy security, national security, or economic security without discussing Iran. From nuclear proliferation to support for Hezbollah, oil revenue has essentially created today’s Iranian problem. I recently participated in a study group sponsored by the Bipartisan Policy Center that produced a report titled, ‘‘Meeting the Challenge: U.S Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development. It is entirely possible that events related to Iran could produce an unprecedented oil price spike in the future, a spike that—given the fragility of the domestic and global economy—could very well be catastrophic.

With 90% of global oil and gas reserves held by state-run oil companies, the marketplace alone will not act preemptively to mitigate the enormous damage that would be inflicted by a serious and sudden increase in the price of oil. What is required is a more fundamental, long-term change in the way we use oil to drive our economy.

In the military, you learn that force protection isn’t just about protecting weak spots; it’s about reducing vulnerabilities before you get into harm’s way. That’s why reducing America’s oil dependence is so important. If we can lessen the oil intensity of our economy, making each dollar of GDP less dependent on petroleum, we would be less vulnerable if and when our enemies do manage to successfully attack elements of the global oil infrastructure. The best ways to reduce oil intensity are to bring to bear a diversity of fuels in the transportation sector.

The United States needs a comprehensive policy for achieving genuine energy security. This policy should include (1) increases in oil and natural gas production in places like the Outer Continental Shelf along with strict new environmental protections; (2) implementing fuel efficiency standards for all on-road transport that were signed into law last year;

One of the major issues in Afghanistan today is resupplying the troops with fuel. And it’s ironic that in Iraq we have ready access to readily available fuel out of Saudi Arabia. Today, there is no fuel whatsoever made in Afghanistan, there’s no pipelines that go in there. So, our troops have to be resupplied by convoy, which is problematic. You’ve seen what’s happened there. And then we fly in with airplanes that aren’t able to refuel; they can fly it back to Baku, so now we’re dependent on Azerbaijan, for example, or other places. So, that, in itself, is a huge strategic issue for us.

I think the biggest threat we face today, personally, in America is the Iranian situation, and I think that’s a difficult wild card. And if that situation goes in a direction that we don’t want it to be, we are going to be in a significant problem here in America, from an economic standpoint, as well as a security standpoint. So, I think there is a way for people to articulate this problem, and I think every time we seem to go someplace and talk about this, it resonates. So, I—frankly, I believe it starts right here in Washington. And I don’t think we should overly frighten people, but they need to be aware of the fact that we are severely threatened today and vulnerable.

 

Posted in Congressional Record U.S., Dependence on Oil, Energy Policy & Politicians, President Jimmy Carter | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on Former President Carter on U.S. energy security & policy now and in the past

Renewable subsidies in Spain, Germany, Italy, and the UK

HRG. 113-623. 2014-7-22. U.S. Security implications of international energy and climate policies and issues. U.S. Senate 113th congress 

MARY HUTZLER, Distinguished senior fellow, Institute for Energy Research, Berlin, MD

RENEWABLE SUBSIDIES IN EUROPE

Spain (Also see Spain’s Photovoltaic Revolution)

In order to enhance renewable energy sources in Spain, the Government enacted legislation to reach 20% of electric production from qualified renewable energy by 2010. To meet this target, the government found it needed to provide incentives to ensure the market penetration of renewable energy, including providing above-market rates for renewable-generated electricity and requiring that electric utility companies purchase all renewable energy produced. In 1994, Spain implemented feed-in tariffs to jump start its renewable industry by providing long-term contracts that pay the owners of renewable projects above- market rates for the electricity produced.18

Because renewable technologies generally cost more than conventional fossil fuel technologies, the government guaranteed that renewable firms would get a higher cost for their technologies. But, because the true costs of renewable energy were never passed on to the consumers of electricity in Spain, the government needed to find a way to make renewable power payments and electricity revenues meet. Since 2000, Spain provided renewable producers $41 billion more for their power than it received from its consumers. 19 (For reference, Spain’s economy is about one-twelfth the size of the U.S. economy.) In 2012, the discrepancy between utility payments to renewable power producers and the revenue they collected from customers was 5.6 billion euros ($7.3 billion), despite the introduction of a 7% on generation. 20 The 2012 gap represented a 46% increase over the previous year’s shortfall.

A massive rate deficit should not come as a surprise. For 5 years, IER has warned of this problem beginning when Dr. Gabriel Calzada released his paper on the situation in Spain and testified before Congress.21 He found that Spain’s ‘‘green jobs’’ agenda resulted in job losses elsewhere in the country’s economy. For each ‘‘green’’ megawatt installed, 5.28 jobs on average were lost in the Spanish economy; for each megawatt of wind energy installed, 4.27 jobs were lost; and for each megawatt of solar installed, 12.7 jobs were lost. Although solar energy may appear to employ many workers in the plant’s construction, in reality it consumes a large amount of capital that would have created many more jobs in other parts of the economy. The study also found that 9 out of 10 jobs in the renewable industry were temporary. 22, 23

Spain’s unemployment rate has more than doubled between 2008 and 2013. In January 2013, Spain’s unemployment rate was 26% the highest among EU member states.24 Spain’s youth unemployment (under the age of 25) reached 57.7% in November 2013, surpassing Greece’s youth unemployment rate of 54.8% in September 2013. 25

The Spanish Government did not believe Dr. Calzada 5 years ago, but they have now been hit in the face with reality. To recover the lost revenues from the extravagant subsidies, the Spanish Government ended its feed-in tariff program for renewables, which paid the renewable owners an extremely high guaranteed price for their power as can be seen by the deficit. Currently, renewable power in Spain gets the market price plus a subsidy which the country deems more ‘‘reasonable.’’ Companies’ profits are capped at a 7.4% return, after which renewable owners must sell their power at market rates. The measure is retroactive to when the renewable plant was first built.26 Therefore, some renewable plants, if they have already received the 7.4% return, are receiving only the market price for their electricity.

 

Wind projects built before 2005 will no longer receive any form of subsidy, which affects more than a third of Spain’s wind projects. As a consequence of the government’s actions to rein in their subsidies and supports, Spain’s wind sector is estimated to have laid off 20,000 workers.

The Spanish Government also slashed subsidies to solar power, subsidizing just 500 megawatts of new solar projects, down from 2,400 megawatts in 2008.27 Its solar sector, which once employed 60,000 workers, now employs just 5,000. In 2013, solar investment in Spain dropped by 90 percent from its 2011 level of $10 billion.

Spain’s 20% renewable energy share of generation from wind and solar power has come at a very high cost to the nation.

Germany

In Germany, as part of the country’s ‘‘Energiewende,’’ or ‘‘energy transformation,’’ electric utilities have been ordered to generate 35% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020, 50% by 2030, 65% by 2040, and 80% by 2050. To encourage production of renewable energy, the German government instituted a feed-in tariff early, even before Spain.

In 1991, Germany established the Electricity Feed-in Act, which mandated that renewables ‘‘have priority on the grid and that investors in renewables must receive sufficient compensation to provide a return on their investment irrespective of electricity prices on the power exchange.’’ 28 In other words, utilities are required to purchase electricity from renewable sources they may not want or need at above-market rates. For example, solar photovoltaics had a feed-in tariff of 43 euro cents per kilowatt hour ($0.59 U.S. per kilowatt hour), over 8 times the wholesale price of electricity and over 4 times the feed-in tariff for onshore wind power. A subsequent law passed in 2000, the Renewable Energy Act (EEG), extended feed-in tariffs for 20 years.29 Originally, to allow for wind and solar generation technologies to mature into competitive industries, Germany planned to extend the operating lives of its existing nuclear fleet by an average of 12 years. But, the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan caused by a tsunami changed Germany’s plans and the country quickly shuttered 8 nuclear reactors and is phasing out its other 9 reactors by 2022, leaving the country’s future electricity production mostly to renewable energy and coal. 30

Coal consumption in Germany in 2012 was the highest it has been since 2008, and electricity from brown coal (lignite) in 2013 reached the highest level since 1990 when East Germany’s Soviet-era coal plants began to be shut down. German electricity generation from coal increased to compensate for the loss of the hastily shuttered nuclear facilities. Germany is now building new coal capacity at a rapid rate, approving 10 new coal plants to come on line within the next 2 years to deal with expensive natural gas generation and the high costs and unreliability of renewable energy.31 As a result, carbon dioxide emissions are increasing.

While the United States is using low cost domestic natural gas to lower coal-fired generation, in Germany, the cost of natural gas is high since it is purchased at rates competitive with oil. Also, Germany is worried about its natural gas supplies since it gets a sizable amount from Russia. While domestic shale gas resources are an alternative, particularly since the Germans are hydraulic fracturing pioneers and have used the technology to extract tight gas since the 1960s, Germany’s Environment Minister has proposed a prohibition on hydraulic fracturing until 2021 in response to opposition from the Green Party.33 According to the Energy Information Administration, Germany has 17 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable shale gas resources.34

Germany has some of the highest costs of electricity in Europe and its consumers are becoming energy poor. In 2012, the average price of electricity in Germany was 36.25 cents per kilowatt hour,35 compared to just 11.88 cents for U.S. households, triple the U.S. average residential price.36 These prices led Germany’s Energy Minister to recently caution that they risk the ‘‘deindustrialization’’ of the economy.

In addition to high electricity prices, Germans are paying higher taxes to subsidize expensive green energy. The surcharge for Germany’s Renewable Energy Levy that taxes households to subsidize renewable energy production increased by 50 percent between 2012 and 2013—from 4.97 U.S. cents to 6.7 cents per kilowatt hour, costing a German family of 4 about $324 US per year, including sales tax.37 The German Government raised the surcharge again at the start of this year by 18% to 8.61 US cents per kilowatt hour representing about a fifth of residential utility bills,38 making the total feed-in tariff support for 2014 equal to $29.6 billion US.39 As a result, 80 German utilities had to raise electricity rates by 4%, on average, in February, March, and April of this year.

The poor suffer disproportionately from higher energy costs because they spend a higher percentage of their income on energy. As many as 800,000 Germans have had their power cut off because of an inability to pay for rising energy costs, including 200,000 of Germany’s long-term unemployed.40

Adding to this is a further disaster. Large offshore wind farms have been built in Germany’s less populated north and the electricity must be transported to consumers in the south. But, 30 wind turbines off the North Sea island of Borkum are operating without being connected to the grid because the connection cable is not expected to be completed until sometime later this year. Further, the seafloor must be swept for abandoned World War II ordnance before a cable can be run to shore. The delay will add $27 million to the $608 million cost of the wind park. And, in order to keep the turbines from rusting, the turbines are being run with diesel. 41 42

Germany’s power has been strained by new wind and solar projects both on and offshore, making the government invest up to $27 billion over the next decade to build about 1,700 miles of high-capacity power lines and to upgrade existing lines. The reality is that not only is renewable energy more expensive, but it also requires expensive transmission investments that existing sources do not, thus compounding the impact on consumers and businesses.

Germany knows reforms are necessary. On January 29, the German Cabinet backed a plan for new commercial and industrial renewable power generators to pay a charge on the electricity they consume. As part of the reform of the Renewable Energy Sources Act, the proposal would charge self-generators 70% of the renewable subsidy surcharge, (i.e. the 6.24 cents per kilowatt hour). Under the proposal, the first 10 megawatt hours would be exempt for owners of solar photovoltaic projects that are less than 10 kilowatts. According to the German Solar Energy Industry Association, about 83% of solar self-generators would be subject to the new charge. Another reform being considered is a reduction in the feed-in tariff from the current average of 23.47 U.S. cents per kilowatt hour to 16.56 U.S. cents per kilowatt hour.43 On July 11, Germany’s upper House of Parliament passed changes to the Renewable Energy Sources Act, which will take effect as planned on August 1. The law lowers subsidies for new green power plants and spreads the power-price surcharge more equally among businesses.44

United Kingdom

Unlike Spain and Germany, the United Kingdom (U.K.) started its feed-in-tariff program to incentivize renewable energy relatively late, in 2010.45 Hydroelectric, solar, and wind units all have specified tariffs that electric utilities must pay for their energy, which are above market rates. Like the other countries, the U.K. has a mandate for renewable energy. The United Kingdom is targeting a 15% share of energy generated from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption and a 31% share of electricity demand from electricity generated from renewable sources by 2020.46 The U.K. generates about 12% of its electricity from renewable energy today. The increased renewable power will cost consumers 120 pounds a year (about $200) above their current average energy bill of 1,420 pounds ($2,362). 47 The U.K. is closing coal-fired power plants to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in favor of renewable energy. In the U.K., 8,200 MW of coal-fired power plants have been shuttered, with an additional 13,000 MW at risk over the next 5 years, according to the Confederation of U.K. Coal Producers. 48 The U.K.’s energy regulator is worried that the amount of capacity over-peak demand this winter will be under 2%—a very low, scary amount for those charged with keeping the lights on—and the lowest in Western Europe.

Beginning in January 2016, the European Union will require electric utilities to add further emission reduction equipment to plants or close them by either 2023 or when they have run for 17,500 hours. Because the equipment is expensive, costing over 100 million pounds ($167 million) per gigawatt of capacity, only one U.K. electricity producer has chosen to install the required technology. Most of the existing coal-fired plants are expected to be shuttered since only one coal-fired power plant has been built in the U.K. since the early 1970s.

To deal with the reliability issue, the U.K. Government is hosting an auction for backup power, but it is unclear how it will work. According to the Department for Energy and Climate Change, electricity producers will be able to bid in an auction to take place this December to provide backup power for 2018. The program, called a capacity market, is expected to ensure sufficient capacity and security of supply. The Department estimates that the U.K. power industry needs around 110 billion pounds ($184 billion) of investment over the next 10 years. The Renewable Energy Foundation (REF) estimates that consumers currently pay more than £1 billion ($1.66 billion) a year in subsidies to renewable energy producers—twice the wholesale cost of electricity. Those subsidies are expected to increase to £6 billion ($10 billion) a year by 2020 to meet a 30% target of providing electricity from renewable energy. 49 As a result, a growing number of U.K. households are in energy poverty. In 2003, roughly 6% of the United Kingdom’s population was in energy poverty; a decade later, nearly one-fifth of the nation’s population is in energy poverty.

As a result, the government has proposed that renewable companies sell their electricity to the national grid under a competitive bidding system. The new proposal limits the total amount of subsidies available for green energy, which were previously effectively limitless. The reduction in subsidies has led to renewable developers scrapping plans amid claims that the proposal will make future renewable development unprofitable.50

The U.K. is both cutting the level of their feed-in tariffs and the length of time they are available. Effective July 1, 2013, the feed-in tariff for solar generated electricity was reduced from 15.44 pence (24 cents U.S.) to 14.90 pence per kilowatt hour. In October 2011, it was 43.3 pence (67.5 cents U.S.) per kilowatt hour—almost three times the reduced level.51 Also, the length of time for the subsidy entitlement is being reduced—for example, it will be 15 years instead of 20 years for wind farms built after 2017.

The reductions indicate that the original subsidies were overgenerous and that wind turbines are unlikely to have an economic life of 20 years. 52

But, according to the Climate Change Committee (CCC), without tougher action, Britain will miss its 31% target of cutting emissions, managing only a 21% reduction instead, which will hinder meeting its commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 80% of 1990 levels by 2050. The CCC called for more progress on insulating homes, promoting the uptake of ground source and air source heat pumps,

Italy

Similar to Germany and Spain, Italy also used feed-in tariffs to spur renewable development, and found it too costly. In 2005, Italy introduced its solar subsidy plan, providing solar power with premiums ranging from Euro 0.445 ($0.60 U.S.) per kilowatt hour to euro 0.490 ($0.66 U.S.) per kilowatt hour. 54 That subsidy resulted in the construction of more than 17,000 megawatts of solar capacity. In 2011, Italy’s solar market was the world’s largest, but that market has slowed due to the removal of subsidies. Italy ceased granting feed-in tariffs for new installations after July 6, 2013, because its subsidy program had reached its budget cap—a limit of 6.7 billion euros ($8.9 billion) as of June 6, 2013. The law restricts above-market rates for solar energy a month after the threshold is reached. Without tariffs, the Italian solar market will need to depend on net metering (where consumers can sell the power they generate themselves to the grid) and income tax deductions for support.55

Italy also undertook other measures. In 2012, the government charged all solar producers a 5-cent tax per kilowatt hour on all self-consumed energy. The government also curtailed purchasing power from solar self-generators when their output exceeded the amount the system needed. Those provisions were followed in 2013 by the government instituting a ‘‘Robin Hood tax’’ of 10.5% to renewable energy producers with more than $4.14 million US in revenue and income greater than $414,000 US. 56 According to Italy’s solar industry, the result of these and other changes has been a surge in bankruptcies and a massive decrease in solar investment.

References

18 Institute for Building Efficiency, Feed-In Tariffs: A Brief History.

19 Financial Post, Governments Rip Up Renewable Contracts, March 19, 2014.

20 Bloomberg, Spain’s Power Deficit Widens by 46 Percent as Steps to Close Gap Founder, April 25, 2014.

21 Institute for Energy Research, August 6, 2009.

22 Study of the effects on employment of public aid to renewable energy sources, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, March 2009.

23 Eagle Tribune, Cap-and-trade bill is an economy-killer, June 28, 2009.

24 The Failure of Global Carbon Policies, June 11, 2014.

25 Spain Youth Unemployment Rises to Record 57.7 Percent, Surpasses Greece, January 8, 2014.

26 Financial Post, Governments Rip Up Renewable Contracts, March 19, 2014.

27 Wall Street Journal, ‘‘Darker Times for Solar-Power Industry,’’ May 11, 2009.

28 Heinrich Bo¨ll Foundation, Energy Transition: The German Energiewende.

29 Institute for Building Efficiency, Feed-In Tariffs: A Brief History, Aug. 2010.

30 German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.

31 Forbes, ‘‘Germany’s Energy Goes Kaput, Threatening Economic Stability,’’ December 30, 2013.

32 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014. 33Wall Street Journal, Germany’s fracking follies, July 7, 2014.

34 Energy Information Administration, Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, June 2013.

35 Europe’s Energy Portal Germany Energy Prices Report.

36 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review.

37 Tree Hugger, German Electricity Tax Rises 50 Percent to Support Renewable Energy, October 17, 2012.

38 Reuters, Five million German families faced with higher power bills, February 24, 2014.

39 Frontier Economics, German renewable energy levy will rise in 2014.

40 The Australian, Europe Pulls the Plug on its Green Energy Future, August 10, 2013.

41 New York Times, Germany’s Effort at Clean Energy Proves Complex, September 18, 2013.

42 Renewables International, First municipal offshore wind farm awaits grid connection, June 25, 2014.

43 Bloomberg, Germany moots levy on renewable power use, February 4, 2014.

44 Wall Street Journal, Germany’s Upper House Passes Renewable Energy Law, July 11, 2014.

45 Institute for Building Efficiency, Feed-In Tariffs: A Brief History, Aug. 2010.

46 International Energy Agency, Global Renewable Energy, National Renewable Energy Action Plan.

47 Bloomberg, Green Rules Shuttering Power Plants Threaten UK Shortage, March 19, 2014.

48 Bloomberg, Green Rules Shuttering Power Plants Threaten UK Shortage, March 19, 2014.

49 The Telegraph, Wind farms subsidies cut by 25 percent, July 14, 2013.

50 The Telegraph, Wind farm plans in tatters after subsidy rethink, March 2, 2014.

51 Mail Online, Solar panel payments are about to fall again but the cost of buying them is falling too—so is it still worth investing?, June 14, 2013.

52 The Telegraph, Wind farms subsidies cut by 25 percent, July 14, 2013.

53 The Global Warming Policy Foundation, Proposals to Step up Unilateral Climate Policy Will Trigger ‘‘Astronomical Costs,’’ Peiser Warns, July 15, 2014.

54 International Energy Agency, Global Renewable Energy, ‘‘Old’’ Feed In Premium for Photovoltaic Systems.

55 Bloomberg, Italy Set to Cease Granting Tariffs for New Solar Projects, June 11, 2013.

56 Financial Post, Governments Rip Up Renewable Contracts, March 18, 2014.

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