Economic peak shale natural gas and oil from yet another bank & Wall Street scam

[ “Shale drillers companies are struggling to pay $235 billion of high-yield, high-risk debt taken on during the past 3 years of the U.S. shale boom. Shale drillers have consistently spent money faster than they’ve made it, even when oil was $100 a barrel.” Bloomberg

It looks like both shale “fracked” oil and natural gas are economically peaking a few years before their geological peaks, both around 2020.  Conventional natural gas, half of it, peaked in 2001.  This is bad news, because electric power increasingly depends on natural gas to balance intermittent wind and solar (coal and nuclear plants can’t do this fast enough), provide peaking and medium and baseload power, while more and more coal and nuclear plants shut down.

There are so many articles about how this came to be, and the financial woes going back for several years, that this posted ended up being a mish-mash of excerpts from some posts, and then a growing list at the bottom. Meanwhile, many house and senate hearings have experts and congressmen bragging about 100 to 250 years of energy independence! They’ll claim they didn’t see this coming I’m sure.

In a presentation at the Ira Sohn Investment Conference on May 4, Greenlight Capital hedge fund manager David Einhorn revealed that:

  • Wall Street and banks are clearly incentivized to enable the frack addicts: they greased the skids by underwriting debt and equity securities that allowed them to garner billions in fees.
  • Large oil frackers spent $80 billion more than they got from selling oil.
  • It’s not clear if investors are furnished a clear analysis of the returns these companies actually generate.
  • Tight oil is not profitable even at oil prices of $100 per barrel.As oil prices rose, frackers should have been drowning in cash. But none of them generated excess cash flow, not even when oil was at $100 a barrel. In fact, the opposite was true.
  • Recently, oil prices have declined. Because the frackers have less revenue, they’ve been forced to cut Capex. Though they will continue to spend more dollars than they take in, production is no longer growing.  A business that burns cash and doesn’t grow isn’t worth anything. On the $36 of revenues per BOE [barrel of oil equivalent], Pioneer Natural Resources spends about $14 on field operating expenses and another $6 on corporate expenses. Subtract the historical $28 of Capex, and they lose $12 for every BOE developed. That’s like using $50 bills to counterfeit $20s.

Energy analyst Art Berman likewise found 25 shale oil  companies with a cumulative negative cash flow of  $67 billion over the last four years.

Rational investors would not buy stock in companies losing so much money with this much debt. But ignorant investors have billions of dollars in large mutual funds (i.e. 401K, IRA, or taxable). Greedy investors in high-yield junk bond funds also keep the bubble going. The public risks losing a lot of their savings in the next financial crash and most of them don’t even know it.

The belief in our “energy independence” has already started a transition from coal to natural gas power generation, increasing numbers of truck fleets running on CNG and LNG, and $95 billion dollars of new petrochemical, fertilizer, and other businesses with plans to relocate from overseas or expand/build new factories in America to benefit from cheap gas prices.

The Congressional record of house and senate committee meetings is full of talk about “energy independence” and ridicule about “peak oil” because of a great deal of testimony is from energy production companies and the Energy Information Administration telling them that we have a 100-year supply of U.S. oil and gas,  and that we should export some of it to Europe to reduce Russian influence.

This has led me to thinking we need an Energy jester. Kings used to have a Fool who was the only person that could tell the King the Truth without having his head cut off.  What we need is an Energy Fool who will tell political leaders that both U.S. and global oil, natural gas, and coal may not be as abundant as they appear.  The fool can even cite peer-reviewed scientific literature.  Since only 1% of political leaders have a scientific background, that wouldn’t make a difference on energy or any other topic, another reason we find ourselves on the edge of a cliff.  Or perhaps already falling like Wily Coyote with legs wheeling in the air as the roadrunner speeds off to safety…

The consumption of this possibly imaginary 100-year supply of natural gas is expected to be 60% higher in 2030 (and more if we export LNG). But wait! That would cut the 100-year supply to 50 years or less (exponential growth is key to understanding the energy crisis).

Many experts (Berman, Hughes, Powers, Heinberg) expect the geological peak of shale oil and gas in 2019 or sooner. Economically it could be now, in 2015, if the enormous debt companies have racked up drives them out of business, lowers production, or stops them from expanding production.

In “Drilling Deeper”, Hughes shows that oil plays decline 60 to 91% the first 3 years and 1400 wells are needed in the Bakken just to keep production FLAT. EVERY YEAR.  From the sweet spots in 4 of 15 counties with the highest amount oil/gas.  Hughes thinks the 2012-2040 total oil production will be 13.9 billion barrels, 72% of the EIA estimate of 19.2 billion barrels.  And that shale gas production will be 39% less than the EIA 2040 prediction, dropping to 33% of the EIA’s forecast production rate in 2040.

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts:  KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity]

June 18, 2015. The Shale Industry Could Be Swallowed By Its Own Debt by Asjylyn Loder. Bloomberg.

Drillers’ debt ballooned to $235 billion at the end of the first quarter, a 16% increase in the past year, even as revenue shrank.

Shale drillers have consistently spent money faster than they’ve made it, even when oil was $100 a barrel.

Credit markets have played a big role in keeping the entire sector alive,” said Amrita Sen, chief oil analyst at Energy Aspects Ltd., a consulting firm in London.

The debt that fueled the U.S. shale boom now threatens to be its undoing. Drillers are devoting more revenue than ever to interest payments. S&P lowered the outlook or downgraded the credit of almost half of the 105 U.S. exploration and production companies that it rates, according to a May report.

Continental Resources Inc., spent almost as much as Exxon Mobil Corp., a company 20 times its size. Continental borrows at cheaper rates than many of its smaller peers because its debt is investment grade. S&P assigns speculative, or junk, ratings to 45 out of the 62 companies in the Bloomberg index.

Interest payments are eating up more than 10% of revenue for 27 of the 62 drillers in the Bloomberg Intelligence North America Independent Exploration and Production Index, up from 12 a year ago. Oil and gas companies accounted for one-third of the 36 corporate-debt defaults worldwide this year, and missed interest payments are the leading cause of default.

The question is, how long do they have that they can get away with this,” said Thomas Watters, an oil and gas credit analyst at Standard & Poor’s in New York. The companies with the lowest credit ratings “are in survival mode,” he said.  The companies in the Bloomberg index spent $4.15 for every dollar earned selling oil and gas in the first quarter, up from $2.25 a year earlier, while pushing U.S. oil production to the highest in more than 30 years.

Almost $20 billion in bonds issued by the 62 companies are trading at distressed levels, with yields more than 10 percentage points above U.S. Treasuries, as investors demand much higher rates to compensate for the risk that obligations won’t be repaid.

Companies have reduced spending to cope with lower prices, but those cuts will eventually lead to production declines, further shrinking revenue, Watters said.

Interest expense can drain a company’s finances. At this time last year, Quicksilver Resources Inc. was spending more than 20% of its revenue on interest. The company missed a debt payment in February and has since filed for bankruptcy. Sabine Oil & Gas LLC missed an interest payment in April and another this month.

Jan 6, 2015. Deep Debt Keeps Oil Firms Pumping Producers Have Increased Their Borrowings by 55% Since 2010 By Erin Ailworth. Wall Street Journal.

American oil and gas companies have gone heavily into debt during the energy boom, increasing their borrowings by 55% since 2010, to almost $200 billion. Their need to service that debt helps explain why U.S. producers plan to continue pumping oil even as crude trades for less than $50 a barrel, down 55% since last June. But signs of strain are building in the oil patch, where revenue growth hasn’t kept pace with borrowing.

March 17, 2015. Quicksilver Resources Files Bankruptcy as Gas Price Drops, by Tiffany Kary, Bloomberg.

Natural gas producer Quicksilver Resources Inc. sought bankruptcy protection $1.21 billion in assets and $2.35 billion in debts, following a February warning that they wouldn’t pay interest on $298 million of bonds maturing in 2019. In addition to the 2019 notes,  the company also has $350 million in notes due 2016, $325 million in notes due 2021, and $200 million in notes due 2019, according to the filing. The notes due 2019 and the notes due 2021 closed at 4 cents in New York, down from $2.49 a year ago.

Dune Energy Inc., an oil and gas explorer, and Cal Dive International Inc., a provider of manned diving services for the offshore oil and gas industry, also filed for bankruptcy protection this month.

May 20, 2015. “Shale-ionaires” Suffering from Wave of Bankrupt Oil Drillers by Kelly Gilblom. Bloomberg

At the height of the U.S. energy boom, Texas landowner John Baen received about $100,000 a month in royalty payments from companies producing oil and natural gas on his property. Now the checks are much smaller, and so far, 4 of the producers sending him checks have caved in to rising debts as oil prices slumped, seeking court protection from their creditors. For many smaller, cash-strapped producers, current prices of almost $60 still aren’t enough to make ends meet compared to the $100-plus prices seen during the boom days.

There have been at least a dozen bankruptcy filings in recent months, and more than a dozen have defaulted on bond payments or warned investors of challenging times ahead, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Royalty payouts from bankrupt operations have shrunk to a fraction of the rates paid before the crash and landowners can be left with no one to take responsibility for abandoned waste, spills and other hazards, say industry experts who have past experience with oil busts.

Many more companies, which make monthly royalty payments to tens of thousands of people, may go bankrupt in the next year, said John Castellano, a managing director at AlixPartners LLC, who focuses on company restructuring.  “We’re seeing highly-levered companies, with high break-even cost requirements, with little ability to generate cash and little access to liquidity — I don’t believe we are near the end of this”.

WBH Energy Partners LLC is typical of companies seeking court relief from debts.

May 4, 2015. Shale Oil Drillers Plunge After Einhorn Slams Fracking Costs by Joe Carroll. Bloomberg

Money manager David Einhorn slammed the shale drilling industry that ushered in a new era of U.S. oil production as wasteful, expensive and a terrible investment. “Pioneer Natural Resources Co., burns cash and isn’t growing, why is the market paying $27 billion for this company?

Einhorn also singled out Concho Resources Inc., Whiting Petroleum Corp., EOG Resurces, and Continental Resources Inc. as examples of shale explorers that spend too much and generate too little cash.

March 31, 2015. Shale Producer Samson Says Bankruptcy May Be Best Option by Bradley Olson. Bloomberg

Samson Resources Corp., an oil and natural gas producer controlled by private equity giant KKR & Co., warned investors that bankruptcy may be its best option. Filing for Chapter 11 protection “may provide the most expeditious manner in which to effect a capital structure solution,” the Tulsa, Oklahoma-based company said Tuesday in its annual report.

Samson told investors it’s at risk of defaulting on its debts, saying its financial condition raises “substantial doubt” that it can continue as a going concern, according to the filing. Samson’s $2.25 billion of 9.75% notes due in February 2020 dropped to a record low of 21.7 cents on the dollar.

Other producers including Dune Energy Inc., BPZ Resources Inc. and Quicksilver Resources Inc. have also sought bankruptcy protection as a rapid decline in oil prices has led banks to rein in lending, drying up cash for drilling across North America.

March 24, 2015. Driller That Skipped First Bond Coupon Said to Start Debt Talks by L. J Keller. Bloomberg 

American Eagle Energy Corp., the Colorado oil producer that missed the first payment on $175 million of bonds it sold last year, has asked creditors to enter confidential debt-restructuring talks and discussed a potential bankruptcy filing as part of the restructuring plan.

American Eagle, is among energy companies now struggling to service $120 billion of high-yield, high-risk debt taken on during the past 3 years amid the U.S. shale boom.

Since oil prices peaked in June, average borrowing costs for the riskiest companies have more than doubled, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

Natural gas driller Quicksilver Resources Inc. and oil explorer BPZ Resources Inc. — two energy companies that missed interest payments this year — filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection earlier this month. Plunging crude prices have also sent offshore contractor Cal Dive International Inc. into bankruptcy court.

The company’s 11% notes due September 2019 have lost more than two-thirds of their value since they were issued, costing investors more than $117 million. The notes last traded March 18 at 32 cents on the dollar. American Eagle’s debt is 1.3 times higher than what its enterprise value suggests the company is worth. American Eagle said it will write down assets by about $79.4 million because of falling energy prices, according to a March 16 regulatory filing.

Also see (from http://shalebubble.org/):

 

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Implications of declining EROI on oil production 2013 by David J. Murphy

[ To “see” declining EROI and the end of cheap energy, check out these photos of The Tallest structure ever moved by Mankind, a Norwegian natural gas offshore platform ]

Murphy, David J. December 2, 2013. The implications of the declining energy return on investment of oil production. Trans. R. Soc. A 2014 372

[This is a great paper on EROI, highly recommended. Without EROI studies, we risk building energy capturing contraptions that end up being useless, consuming more oil than generated, the Easter Island Heads of our former civilization. Alice Friedemann, energyskeptic.com]

Declining production from conventional oil resources has initiated a global transition to unconventional oil, such as tar sands. Unconventional oil is generally harder to extract than conventional oil and is expected to have a (much) lower energy return on (energy) investment (EROI). Recently, there has been a surge in publications estimating the EROI of a number of different sources of oil, and others relating EROI to long-term economic growth, profitability and oil prices. The following points seem clear from a review of the literature: (i) the EROI of global oil production is roughly 17 and declining, while that for the USA is 11 and declining; (ii) the EROI of ultra-deep- water oil and oil sands is below 10; (iii) the relation between the EROI and the price of oil is inverse and exponential; (iv) as EROI declines below 10, a point is reached when the relation between EROI and price becomes highly nonlinear; and (v) the minimum oil price needed to increase the oil supply in the near term is at levels consistent with levels that have induced past economic recessions. From these points, I conclude that, as the EROI of the average barrel of oil declines, long-term economic growth will become harder to achieve and come at an increasingly higher financial, energetic and environmental cost.

Introduction

Today’s oil industry is going through a fundamental change: conventional oil fields are being rapidly depleted and new production is being derived increasingly from unconventional sources, such as tar or oil sands and shale (or tight) oil. Indeed, much of the so-called ‘peak oil debate’ rests on whether or not these sources can be produced at rates comparable to the conventional mega-oil fields of yesterday.

What is less discussed is that the production of unconventional oil most likely has a (much) lower net energy yield than the production of conventional crude oil. Net energy is commonly defined as the difference between the energy acquired from some source and the energy used to obtain and deliver that energy, measured over a full life cycle (net energy=E(out)- E(in)). A related concept is the energy return on investment (EROI), defined as the ratio of the former to the latter (EROI=E(out)/E(in)). The ‘energy used to obtain energy’, E(in), may be measured in a number of different ways. For example, it may include both the energy used directly during the operation of the relevant energy system (e.g. the energy used for water injection in oil wells) as well as the energy used indirectly in various stages of its life cycle (e.g. the energy required to manufacture the oil rig). Owing to these differences, it is necessary to ensure that the EROI estimates have been derived using similar boundaries, i.e. using the same level of specificity for Ein. Murphy et al. [1] suggested a framework for categorizing various EROI estimates, and, where applicable, I will follow this framework in this paper.

Estimates of EROI are important because they provide a measure of the relative ‘efficiency’ of different energy sources and of the energy system as a whole [2,3]. Since it is this net energy that is important for long-term economic growth [3–6], measuring and tracking the changes in EROI over time may allow us to assess the future growth potential of the global economy in ways that data on production and/or prices cannot.

Over the past few years, there has been a surge in research estimating the EROI of a number of different sources of oil, including global oil and gas [7], US oil and gas [8,9], Norwegian oil and gas [10], ultra-deep-water oil and gas [11]and oil shale[12]. In addition, there have been several publications relating EROI to long-term economic growth, firm profitability and oil prices [3, 13–15].

The main objective of this paper is to use this literature to explain the implications that declining EROI may have for long-term economic growth. Specifically, this paper: (i) provides a brief history of the development of EROI and net energy concepts in the academic literature, (ii) summarizes the most recent estimates of the EROI of oil resources, (iii) assesses the importance of EROI and net energy for economic growth and (iv) discusses the implications of these estimates for the future growth of the global economy.

(a) A brief history of energy return on investment

In the late 1960s, Charles Hall studied the energy flows within New Hope Creek, in North Carolina, USA, to understand the migration patterns of the fish within the stream. His conclusions [16] revealed that, by migrating, the fish were able to exploit new sources of food, which, after accounting for the additional energy cost of migration, conferred a large net energy gain upon the fish. In other words, owing to the abundance of food in the new locations, the fish were able to gain enough energy not only to ‘pay’ for the energy expenditure of that migration but also to grow and reproduce. Comparing the energy gained from migration to the energy expended in the migration process was ostensibly the first calculation of EROI.

In the autumn of 1973 the price of oil skyrocketed following the Arab oil embargo (the so-called ‘first oil shock’), which sent most OECD economies tumbling into recession. The apparent vulnerability of OECD nations to spikes in the price of oil led many researchers to focus on the interaction between the economy and energy. Then, in 1974, the journal Energy Policy dedicated a series of articles to the energy costs of production processes. The editor of this series, Peter Chapman, began the series with a paper titled ‘Energy costs: a review of methods’, and observed that ‘this subject is so new and undeveloped that there is no universally agreed label as yet’ [17], and followed up two years later with a second paper [18]. Today this area of research is spread among a number of different disciplines, including, but not limited to, ecological economics, industrial ecology and net energy analysis, and the EROI statistic is just one of many indicators calculated.

Also during this period researchers started using Leontief input–output tables as a way to measure the use of energy within the economy [19–22]. For example, Bullard & Herendeen [23] used a Leontief-type input–output matrix to calculate the energy intensity (in units of joules per dollar) of every major industrial sector of the US economy. Even today this paper serves as a useful model for other net energy analyses [8,24]. In addition, a workshop in Sweden in 1974 and one at Stanford, CA, in 1975 formalized the methodologies and conventions of energy analysis [25,26].

In 1974, the US Congress enacted specific legislation mandating that net energy be accounted for in energy projects. The Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 (NERDA) included a provision stating that ‘the potential for production of net energy by the proposed technology at the stage of commercial application shall be analyzed and considered in evaluating proposals’. Further influential papers by the Colorado Energy Research Institute, Bullardet al.and Herendeen followed this requirement [27–29]. Unfortunately, the net energy provision within the NERDA was never adopted and was eventually dropped.

In 1979, the Iranian revolution led to a cessation of their oil exports (the second oil shock), which precipitated another spike in the price of oil and squeezed an already strained US economy. Responding to this, and in an attempt to control deficits and expenditure, President Reagan of the USA enacted Executive Order 12291 in 1980. This order mandated that ‘regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society from the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society’.

 

In other words, all US regulatory action had to show a net monetary benefit to US society, and the idea of measuring benefits in terms of net energy fell even further from the policy arena.

Net energy analysis remained insignificant in US energy policy debates until the dispute over corn ethanol emerged 25 years later [30,31].

Although the political emphasis had now shifted towards economic analysis, the 1980s still provided useful papers on net energy analysis (e.g. [32]). In 1981, Hall published ‘Energy return on investment for United States petroleum, coal, and uranium’, which marked the first time that the acronym EROI was published in the academic literature [33]. Later that year, Hall & Cleveland [34] published ‘Petroleum drilling and production in the United States: yield per effort and net energy analysis’. This paper analyzed the amount of energy being produced per foot drilled and found that the ratio had been declining steadily for 30 years. Further publications by Hall and colleagues then tested hypotheses relating economic growth to energy use, introduced explicitly the concept of energy return on investment and examined the EROI of most major sources of energy [35,36].

Following growing concern about environmental impacts, climate change and sustainability, documented in the Brundtland Report in 1987 [37], emphasis began to shift from energy analysis to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and life-cycle analysis. Life-cycle analysis (LCA) itself was born out of the process and input–output analyses codified in the aforementioned energy literature of the 1970s and 1980s, and can be used to calculate EROI and other net energy metrics. Beginning around the turn of the century, researchers began to recognize the complementarity between LCA and net energy and began publishing on the matter [38].

There was another surge in publications in net energy analysis in the 2000s, due mainly to a growing global interest in renewable energy, and therefore an interest in metrics that compare renewable energy technologies. The debate about whether or not corn ethanol has an EROI greater than one is a good example [30,31]. There has also been a number of studies using the input–output techniques developed in the 1970s to track emissions production and/or resource consumption across regions [39].

 

Today, research within the field of net energy analysis is expanding rapidly. The main renewable energy options, including, but not limited to, solar photovoltaics, concentrating solar, wind power and biofuels, have each been the focus of studies estimating their net energy yield [31,40,41].

Furthermore, with the expansion of oil production into ultra-deep water, tar sands and other unconventional sources, as well as developments with shale gas, there has been a renewed interest in whether or not these sources of energy have EROI ratios similar to conventional oil and gas, and publications are expected to be forthcoming .

Recent estimates of the energy return on (energy) investment for oil and gas production

There has been a recent resurgence in EROI studies for liquid fuels, beginning with Cleveland [ 8], who estimated the EROI for oil and gas extraction in the US, Gagnon et al. [7], who estimated the same EROI for the whole world, and a number of additional studies that were contained in a 2011 special issue of the journal Sustainability. This section reviews the findings of these papers. Unless otherwise noted, all of the oil EROIs reported here are equivalent to the standard EROI (EROIstnd), as reported in Murphy et al. [1], which means that both the indirect and direct costs of energy extraction are included in the EROI calculation, but costs further downstream, such as transportation and refinement, have been omitted.

Cleveland [ 8]estimated two values for the EROI of US oil and gas that differed in the method of aggregating different types of energy carrier. The first method used thermal-equivalent aggregation, i.e. volumes of natural gas and oil are combined in terms of their heat content in joules. The second method uses a Divisia index, developed by Berndt [42], and uses both energy prices and consumption levels to adjust for the ‘quality’ of each energy carrier. Quality corrections are often used in energy analysis to adjust for the varying economic productivity of different energy carriers—for example, since electricity is more valuable, in terms of potential economic productivity, than coal, it is given more weight in the aggregate measure [43]. Quality-corrected measures better reflect the ability of energy carriers to produce marketable goods and services, so are arguably more useful.

 

The EROI values calculated using the energy quality-corrected data for US oil and gas production are consistently lower than those calculated from the non-quality-corrected data. This reflects the fact that many of the inputs to production are high-quality (i.e. high-priced) energy carriers such as electricity and diesel, while the outputs are unprocessed crude oil and natural gas.

Nevertheless, both estimates show the same trend over time: namely, an increase until the early 1970s, a decline until the mid-1980s, a slight recovery until the mid-1990s, followed again by decline (figure 1).

According to Cleveland, the overall downward trend from the 1970s till the mid-1990s is the result of higher extraction costs due to the depletion of oil in the USA. The up and down fluctuations within this aggregate trend are likely to be linked to changes in oil prices influencing the rate of drilling in the USA, with higher prices encouraging more drilling in less promising areas, which in turn leads to a lower yield and a lower aggregate EROI. Gagnon et al. [7] estimated the EROI for global oil and gas from 1992 to 2006 using the same energy aggregation techniques as Cleveland [8], i.e. both thermal equivalence and Divisia indices. In both cases, the EROI at the wellhead was around 26 in 1992 and increased to 35 in 1999 before declining to 18 in 2006 (figure 1).

It is not surprising that the EROI for global oil and gas is higher than that for the USA considering that oil production peaked in the USA in 1970 due mainly to the depletion of its biggest oil fields, while global production continued to flow and even increase from the mega-oil fields of the Persian Gulf.

US producers are increasingly reliant upon smaller and poorer-quality fields in difficult locations (e.g. deep water) together with the enhanced recovery of oil from existing fields—all of which are relatively energy intensive. In contrast, most OPEC members are still producing oil from high-quality supergiant fields.

The first few years of the Gagnon dataset and the last few years of the Cleveland dataset overlap in the early 1990s and both show a general increasing trend. The results from Gagnon et al. [7] then show that the increase in the early 1990s reaches a maximum in 1999, followed by a monotonic decline through the 2000s. Much like the Cleveland paper, Gagnon et al. assume that the decline is due to the depletion of easy access resources, but, as mentioned earlier, this trend also could be dependent on the trend in oil prices.

In addition to the estimates of Cleveland [ 8] and Gagnon et al. [7], Guilford et al. [9] estimated the non-quality-corrected EROI of conventional oil and gas production for the USA. They found that the EROI of oil production has declined from a peak of 24 in the 1950s to roughly 11 in 2007 (figure 1). By deriving separate estimates for exploration and production, they show how depletion reduces the rate of production from existing fields and gives incentives for increased exploration for new fields, both of which lower the aggregate EROI. They also suggest that natural gas is subsidizing oil production and that the EROI for oil alone is likely to be much lower.

Figure 1. EROI estimates from three sources, Gagnon et al. [7], Cleveland [8] and Guilford et al. [9]. The Gagnon et al. [7] data represent estimates of the EROI for global oil and gas production using aggregation by Divisia indices. The Cleveland [8] data represent the trend in EROI values for US oil and gas production calculated using the Divisia indices to aggregate energy units. The Guilford et al. [9] data represent estimates of the EROI of US oil production from 1919 to 2007

Figure 1. EROI estimates from three sources, Gagnon et al. [7], Cleveland [8] and Guilford et al. [9]. The Gagnon et al. [7] data represent estimates of the EROI for global oil and gas production using aggregation by Divisia indices. The Cleveland [8] data represent the trend in EROI values for US oil and gas production calculated using the Divisia indices to aggregate energy units. The Guilford et al. [9] data represent estimates of the EROI of US oil production from 1919 to 2007

Despite differences in coverage and approach, the results from these three studies are broadly consistent, namely a general increase in EROI until 1970, then a general decline until the early 1980s, an increase through the mid-1990s and then a decline.

 

Grandell et al. [10] estimated the EROI of oil production from Norwegian oilfields to be roughly 20 in

  1. They also note that as the fields deplete they expect the EROI to decline further. Brandt [44] estimatedthattheEROIfromCalifornianoilfieldshasdeclinedfromover50 in the 1950s to under 10 by the mid-2000s. Similarly, Hu et al. [45] estimated that the EROI from the Daqing oil field, the biggest oil field in China, had declined from 10 in 2001 to 6.5 by 2009.

 

Two other recent EROI estimates of particular importance are those of Moerschbaecher & Day [11], who estimated the EROI of ultra-deep-water (depths greater than 1524 m or 5000 feet) production in the Gulf of Mexico, and Cleveland & O’Connor [12], who estimated the EROI of oil shale production.

Moerschbaecher & Day [11] estimated the EROI for deep-water oil production to be between 7 and 22. The range in EROI values is due to a sensitivity analysis performed by the authors that incorporated three different energy intensity values as proxies for the energy intensity of the ultra-deep-water oil industry. They also noted that, owing to the large infrastructure requirements of the deep-water oil industry, the real value is probably closer to the lower end of the range presented.

Cleveland & O’Connor [12] estimated that the EROI for oil shale production using either surface retorting or in situ methods was roughly 1.5, much lower than for other unconventional resources. Oil shale is the production of oil from kerogen found in sedimentary rock and is distinct from ‘shale oil’ or, preferably, ‘tight oil’, which is oil trapped in shale or other impermeable rock. Oil shale is discussed here because the western USA has vast resources of oil shale, but production costs are much higher than for other forms of unconventional oil [46].

The following summarizes the aforementioned studies:

  • EROI 11: average for US oil production today, down from roughly 20 in the early 1970s
  • EROI 17: global average, down from EROI of roughly 30 in 2000
  • EROI 10: ultra-deep-water oil production is probably less than 10
  • EROI 1.5: Oil shale (kerogen), not tight oil (aka ‘shale’ oil)

Energy return on (energy) investment, oil prices, and economic growth

 

The economic crash of 2008 occurred during the same month that oil prices peaked at an all-time high of $147 per barrel, leading to numerous studies that suggested a causal link between the two [47,48]. In addition, other researchers involved in net energy analysis began examining how EROI relates to both the price of oil and economic growth [3,13,15,49–51].

 

Murphy & Hall [3] examined the relation between EROI, oil price and economic growth over the past 40 years and found that economic growth occurred during periods that combined low oil prices with an increasing oil supply. They also found that high oil prices led to an increase in energy expenditures as a share of GDP, which has led historically to recessions. Lastly, they found that oil prices and EROI are inversely related (figure 2), which implies that increasing the oil supply by exploiting unconventional and hence lower EROI sources of oil would require high oil prices. This created what Murphy & Hall called the ‘economic growth paradox: increasing the oil supply to support economic growth will require high oil prices that will undermine that economic growth’.

 

Other researchers have come to similar conclusions to those of Murphy & Hall, most notably economist

James Hamilton [47]. Recently, Kopits [50], and later Nelder & Macdonald [49], reiterated the importance of the relation between oil prices and economic growth in what they describe as a ‘narrow ledge’ of oil prices. This is the idea that the range, or ledge, of oil prices that are profitable for oil producers but not so high as to hinder economic growth is narrowing as newer oil resources require high oil prices for development, and as economies begin to contract due largely to the effects of prolonged periods of high oil prices. In other words, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the oil industry to increase supply at low prices, since most of the new oil being brought online has a low EROI. Therefore, if we can only increase oil supply through low EROI resources, then oil prices must apparently rise to meet the cost, thus restraining economic growth.

Skrebowski [51]provides another interpretation of the relation between oil prices and economic growth in what he calls the ‘effective incremental oil supply cost. It should be noted there are wide divergences in estimates of oil development costs depending on what is included and the treatment of financial costs, profits and overheads. Those used here are estimates of the prices needed to justify a new, large development.’

According to data provided by Skrebowski, developing new unconventional oil production in Canada (i.e. tar sands) requires an oil price between $70 and $90 per barrel. Skrebowski also indicates that new production from ultra-deep-water areas requires prices between $70 and $80 per barrel. In other words, to increase oil production over the next few years from such resources will require oil prices above at least $70 per barrel. These oil prices may seem normal today considering that the market price for reference crude West-Texas Intermediate ranged from $78 to $110 per barrel in 2012 alone, but we should remember that the average oil price during periods of economic growth over the past 40 years was under $40 per barrel, and the average price during economic recessions was under $60 per barrel (dollar values inflation adjusted to 2010) [3]. What these data indicate is that the floor price at which we could increase oil production in the short term would require, at a minimum, prices that are correlated historically with economic recessions.

Heun & de Wit [15] found indicates that the price of oil increases exponentially as EROI declines [equation and explanation snipped, see pdf]. They suggest that the nature of the relation between EROI and the price is such that the effect on price becomes highly nonlinear as EROI declines below 10.

Figure 2. Relationship between oil prices and EROI. (Adapted from Murphy & Hall [3].)

Figure 2. Relationship between oil prices and EROI. (Adapted from Murphy & Hall [3].)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

King & Hall [13] examined the relation between EROI, oil prices and the potential profitability of oil-producing firms, termed energy-producing entities (EPEs). They found that for an EPE to receive a 10% financial rate of return from an energy extraction process, which, for example, has an EROI of 11, would require an oil price of roughly $20 per barrel.3 Alternatively, a 100% financial rate of return for the same extraction project would require $60 per barrel (figure 3). King & Hall also echoed Heun & de Wit, suggesting that the relationship between EROI and profitability becomes nonlinear when the EROI declines below 10.

The pertinent results from the literature summarized in this subsection are as follows:

  • there appears to be a negative exponential relationship between the aggregate EROI of oil production and oil prices;
  • there appears to be a comparable relationship between EROI and the potential profitability of oil-producing firms;
  • the relationship between EROI and profitability appears to become nonlinear as the EROI declines below 10;
  • the minimum oil price needed to increase global oil supply in the near-term is comparable to that which has triggered economic recessions in the past.

Understanding the relationship between energy return on (energy) investment and net energy

The mathematical relation between EROI, net energy and gross energy can be used to explain why, at around an EROI of 10, the relation between EROI and most other variables, such as price, economic growth and profitability, becomes nonlinear. The following equation describes the relation between EROI, gross and net energy [3]:

Equation 3.2 net energy = gross energy (1 – 1/ EROI)

Figure 3. Oil price as a function of EROI. The lines on the figure correspond to various rates of monetary return on investment (MROI). (Adapted from King & Hall [13].)

Figure 3. Oil price as a function of EROI. The lines on the figure correspond to various rates of monetary return on investment (MROI). (Adapted from King & Hall [13].)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Using this equation, we can estimate the net energy provided to society from a particular energy source or (rearranging) the amount of gross energy required to provide a certain amount of net energy [52].

We can interpret equation (3.2) as follows:

  • an EROI of 10 delivers to society 90% (1 – .2 = 90%) of the gross energy extracted as net energy
  • an EROI of 5 will deliver to society 80% (1 – .2 = 80%)
  • an EROI of 2 will deliver only 50% (1 – .5 = 50%).

This exponential relation between gross and net energy means that there is little difference in the net energy provided to society by an energy source with an EROI above 10, whether it is 11 or 100, but a very large difference in the net energy provided to society by an energy source with an EROI of 10 and one with an EROI of 5. This exponential relation between gross and net energy flows has been called the ‘net energy cliff’ [53]and it is the main reason why there is a critical point in the relation between EROI and price at an EROI of about 10 (figure 4).

Figure 4. The 'net energy cliff' graph, showing the relation between net energy and EROI. As EROI declines, the net energy as a percentage of total energy extracted declines exponentially. Note that the x-axis is in reverse order. (Adapted from Mearns [53].)

Figure 4. The ‘net energy cliff’ graph, showing the relation between net energy and EROI. As EROI declines, the net energy as a percentage of total energy extracted declines exponentially. Note that the x-axis is in reverse order. (Adapted from Mearns [53].)

Calculating the minimum energy return on (energy) investment at the point of energy acquisition for a sustainable society

‘The true value of energy to society is the net energy, which is that after the energy costs of getting and concentrating that energy are subtracted.’ H. T. Odum [6]

According to equation (3.2), as EROI declines, the net energy provided to society declines as well, and, at some point, the amount of net energy will be insufficient to meet existing demand.

The point at which the EROI provides just enough net energy to society to sustain current activity represents the minimum EROI for a sustainable society.

But estimating empirically the actual minimum EROI for society is challenging. Hall et al. [24] estimated that the minimum EROI required to sustain the vehicle transportation system of the USA was 3. Since their calculation included only the energy costs of maintaining the transportation system, it is reasonable to expect that the minimum EROI for society as a whole could be much higher.

Exploring the minimum EROI for a sustainable society is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will examine how, in theory, the minimum EROI could be calculated by using some simple models. I will first do this by examining how the idea of net energy grew from analyzing the energy budgets of organisms.

The energy that an organism acquires from its food is its gross energy intake. Let us assume, for simplicity’s sake, that an organism consumed 10 units of gross energy, but to access this food it expended 5 units of energy. Given these parameters, the EROI is 2 (=10/5) and the net energy is 5. It is important to note that the expended energy created an energy deficit (5 units) that must be repaid from the gross energy intake (10 units) before any growth, for example, in the form of building fat reserves or reproduction, can take place.

An economy also must have an influx of net energy to grow. Let us assume that Economy A produces 10,000 units of energy at an EROI of 10, which means that the energy cost of acquisition is 1,000 units and the net energy is 9,000. Like organisms, economies also have energy requirements that must be met before any investments in growth can be made. Indeed, researchers are now measuring the ‘metabolism of society’ by mapping energy consumption and flow patterns over time [54]. For example, economies must invest energy simply to maintain transportation and building infrastructure, to provide food and security, as well as to provide energy for direct consumption in transportation vehicles, households and business, etc. The energy flow to society must first pay all of these metabolic energy costs before enabling growth, such as constructing new buildings, roads, etc.

Building off this idea of societal metabolism, we can gain additional insight into the relationship between EROI and economic growth by differentiating between 3 main uses of energy by society:

  1. Metabolism, which could be described as the energy and material costs associated with the maintenance and replacement of populations and capital depreciation (examples include food consumption, bridge repair or doctor visits)
  2. Consumption: the expenditure of energy that does not increase populations or capital accumulation and is not necessary for metabolism (examples include purchasing movie tickets or plane tickets for vacation; in general, items purchased with disposable income)
  3. Growth, the investment of energy and materials in new populations and capital over and above that necessary for metabolism (examples include building new houses, purchasing new cars, increasing populations).
Figure 5. (a-d) Flow diagrams relating net energy, EROI and gross energy production for a hypothetical Economy A. Each diagram describes the energy flows according to a different EROI, where the EROI is (a) 10, (b) 5, (c) 2 and (d) 1.5

Figure 5. (a-d) Flow diagrams relating net energy, EROI and gross energy production for a hypothetical Economy A. Each diagram describes the energy flows according to a different EROI, where the EROI is (a) 10, (b) 5, (c) 2 and (d) 1.5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 5 (a-d) illustrates how the flows of energy to the three categories change as EROI declines. Let us assume that the metabolism of Economy A requires the consumption of 5000 units of energy per year. So, of the 10,000 units of energy extracted, 1,000 must be reinvested to produce the next 10,000, and another 5,000 are invested to maintain the infrastructure of Economy A. This leaves 4,000 units of net energy that could be invested in either consumption or growth (figure 5a).

As society transitions to lower EROI energy sources, a portion of net energy that was historically used for consumption and/or growth will be transferred to the energy extraction sector. This transfer decreases the growth and consumption potential of the economy. For example, let us assume that, as energy extraction becomes more difficult in Economy A, it requires an additional 1,000 units of energy (2,000 total) to maintain its current production of gross energy, decreasing the EROI from 10 to 5 and the net energy from 9,000 to 8,000. If the metabolism of the economy remains at 5,000 units of energy, Economy A now has only 3,000 units of energy to invest in growth and/or consumption (figure 5b).

If the EROI for society were to decline to 2, the amount of energy that could previously be invested in growth and consumption would be transferred completely to the energy extraction sector. Thus, given the assumed metabolic needs of Economy A in this example, an EROI of 2 would be the minimum EROI needed to provide enough energy to pay for the current infrastructure requirements of Economy A, or, to put it another way, an EROI of 2 would be the minimum EROI for a sustainable Economy A. If the EROI were to decline below 2, for example in some biofuel systems [31], then the net energy provided to society would not be enough to maintain the infrastructure of Economy A, resulting in physical degradation and economic contraction (figure 5d).

There are a few caveats to this discussion of the minimum EROI that need to be addressed. First, it is important to remember that this is a simple example with hypothetical numbers, and, as such, the minimum EROI for our current society is probably, and maybe substantially, higher. Second, over time, efficiency improvements within the economy can mitigate the impact that lower EROI resources have on economic growth by increasing the utility of energy. That said, the exact relation between energy efficiency improvements and declining EROI is yet to be determined. Third, the model assumes that metabolic needs will be met first, then consumption and growth. This may not necessarily be the case.

It is quite possible that there could be growth at the expense of meeting metabolic needs. Likewise, we can consume at the expense of growth or metabolism. Either way, the net energy deficit that results from declining EROI will become apparent in one of the three sectors of energy use.

The gross energy requirement ratio

‘Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.’ The Red Queen, in Through the looking-glass [55,p.15]

Another way to explore the impact that a decline in EROI can have on net energy flows to society is to consider the ‘gross energy requirement ratio’ (GERR). The GERR indicates the proportional increase or decrease in gross energy production that is required to maintain the net energy flow to society given a change in the EROI of the energy acquisition process. The GERR is calculated by dividing the gross energy requirement (GER) of the substitute energy source by the GER of the reference energy source.

The GER is the minimum amount of gross energy production required to produce one unit of net energy.

Both of these equations are outlined below [2]:

 

Equation 5.1 GER(X) = EROI(X) / EROI(X) – 1

Equation 5.2 GERR = GER(X) / GER(REF)

The GERR is most useful when examining how transitioning from high to low EROI energy sources will impact the net energy flow to society. For example, the average barrel of oil in the USA is produced at an EROI of roughly 11 [9]. Using equation (5.1), an EROI of 11 results in a GER of 1.1, i.e. 1.1 units of gross energy must be extracted to deliver 1 unit of net energy to society, with the 0.1 extra being the amount of energy required for the extraction process. For comparison, delivering one unit of net energy from an oil source with an EROI of 5 would require the extraction of 1.25 units of oil. If conventional oil at an EROI of 11 is our reference GER, and our substitute energy resource has an EROI of 5, then the GERR is 1.14. This GERR value indicates that, if society were to transition from an energy source with an EROI of 11 to one with an EROI of 5, then gross energy production would have to increase by 14% simply to maintain the same net energy flow to society. The net effect of declining EROI is to increase the GERR, requiring the extraction of larger quantities of gross energy simply to sustain the same net energy flow to society (figure 6).

Implications for the future of economic growth

The implication of these arguments is that, if we try to pursue growth by using sources of energy of lower EROI, perhaps by transitioning to unconventional fossil fuels, long-term economic growth will become harder to achieve and come at an increasingly higher financial, energetic and environmental cost.

Figure 6. The GERR as a function of declining EROI. In this example, the reference EROI was 11. As such, the GERR value associated with an EROI of 4 represents the proportional increase in gross energy required to deliver one unit of net energy if society transitioned from an energy source with an EROI of 11 to one with an EROI of 4.

Figure 6. The GERR as a function of declining EROI. In this example, the reference EROI was 11. As such, the GERR value associated with an EROI of 4 represents the proportional increase in gross energy required to deliver one unit of net energy if society transitioned from an energy source with an EROI of 11 to one with an EROI of 4.

Revolutionary technological advancement is really the only way in which unconventional oil can be produced with a high EROI, and thus enhance the prospects for long-term economic growth and reduce the associated financial, energetic and environmental costs. This technological advancement would have to increase the energy efficiency of unconventional oil extraction or allow for increased oil recovery from fields discovered already [56]. Alternatively, there could be massive substitution from oil to high EROI renewables such as wind or hydropower [57].

It is difficult to assess directly how much technological progress is being or will be made by an industry, but we can get a glimpse as to how the oil industry is faring by comparing how production is responding to effort. If new technological advancements, such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, represent the types of revolutionary technological breakthroughs that are needed, then we should at least see production increasing relative to effort. The data, however, do not indicate that this is the case. From 1987 to 2000, when the US oil industry increased the number of rigs used to produce oil, there was, as expected, a corresponding increase in the amount of oil produced (figure 7 not shown, see paper). But from 2001 to 2012 the trend shows very little correlation between drilling effort and oil production.

Biofuels are the only currently available non-fossil substitute for oil that is being produced at any sizable scale, but factors such as economic cost, land-use requirements and competition with food production restrict their potential contribution (see [58]). Most importantly, the EROI of most large-scale biofuels5 is between 1 and 3 [30,31], which means that we would be substituting towards a fuel that is even less useful, from a net energy perspective, for long-term economic growth. Others claim that substituting towards renewable electricity is the key; for example, Jacobson & Delucchi [59] argue that wind and solar energy could power global society by 2030. Even if their analysis stands up to scrutiny (and some claim that it does not [60,61]), the high price of oil in the transition period may provide a significant constraint on economic growth. Without high levels of economic growth, the investment capital needed to build, install and operate renewable energy will be hard to acquire.

The other option is to construct coal-to-liquids (CTL) or gas-to-liquids (GTL) operations, but even these solutions have their own difficulties (see [62]). For example, both CTL and GTL operations represent an energy conversion process, not an energy extraction process, which, in terms of EROI, simply adds to the cost of producing the final fuel and lowers the overall EROI. CTL and/or GTL will most probably lead to a significant increase in GHG emissions [63]. For GTL, there is a narrow window of low gas prices and high oil prices in which the GTL process can remain profitable [63]. Achieving profitability is easier in a CTL operation because of cheap coal, but the future availability, quality and cost of that resource is also becoming uncertain [64]. And, again, it will most probably be decades until any sizable portion of global demand for oil is met from a series of GTL or CTL plants, and in the mean-time economies will still be struggling to grow in a high oil price, low oil EROI environment.

Lastly, increasing oil production from low EROI resources is expected to degrade the global environment at an accelerated rate, for two main reasons. First, on average, the environmental impact per unit of energy is larger for unconventional oil than for conventional oil. GHG emissions, for example, are somewhere between 15% and 60% higher for gasoline and diesel produced from tar sands when compared to that produced from conventional petroleum [65,66]. Similarly, the water used per unit of energy produced is also much higher for most low EROI sources of energy [67]. Second, declining EROI increases the GERR. As society switches to lower EROI resources, simply maintaining the flow of net energy to society will require a proportionally larger amount of gross energy extraction, thus increasing the environmental impact associated with that extraction. This evidence indicates that the environmental impacts of energy extraction are most probably related exponentially to EROI, mimicking the relation between EROI and price (figure 8). This relationship holds as long as the flow of net energy to society remains the same or even increases despite a decrease in EROI. The relationship weakens if, when met with lower EROI resources, we simply decrease our effort in energy acquisition, i.e. embrace conservation.

The ecology of societal succession

‘Energy fixed tends to be balanced by the energy cost of maintenance in the mature or “climax” ecosystem.’ E. P. Odum [68]

Societal succession from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution to today mimics ecosystem succession in important and illuminating ways. The early stages of ecosystem development are marked by rapid growth (figure 9a), where the energy fixed through photosynthesis (gross photosynthesis) is greater than the energy consumed through respiration, resulting in a gain of net energy in the ecosystem. This gain in net energy leads to the accumulation of biomass (the energy equivalent of biomass in the context of society is embodied energy). As Odum [68] observed, as succession occurs, the gross photosynthesis of the ecosystem tends to balance with respiration as the steady-state, or ‘climax’, successional stage is reached. In other words, in the climax stage, almost all of the energy fixed by the ecosystem is used in maintenance respiration by the biomass that has accumulated over the years.

The simple diagram of forest succession (figure 9a not shown)is reflected by societal succession (figure 9b not shown)since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution until today. Figure 9 shows how gross photosynthesis is equivalent to humanity’s gross energy production-i.e. the total biomass, coal, oil, natural gas, etc. produced each year. Forest respiration is the equivalent of societal metabolism-i.e. the energy and material costs associated with the maintenance and replacement of populations and capital depreciation. The accumulation of biomass is the equivalent of societal growth-i.e. investments in populations and infrastructure that will increase overall societal metabolism. Lastly, the net energy provided to society is that left after accounting for the metabolic needs of society (i.e. net energy = gross energy production – societal metabolism). Historically, we have simply found and produced more energy as the metabolism (i.e. energy demand) of society grew. Indeed, the exponential increase in global economic output over the past 200 years is highly correlated with the same exponential increase in energy consumption (figure 10).

The question is: can global society continue to produce enough energy to outpace the increased metabolic requirements of a growing, and now very large, built infrastructure? Answering this question for each energy source is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but the answer for oil seems clear, as the production of conventional oil seems to have peaked in 2008 [71], and both unconventional oil and other feasible substitutes have a much lower EROI. Both of these factors are likely to place contractionary pressure on the global economy by decreasing the flow of net energy to society.

The main difference between society and nature, in terms of figure 9, is in the reason for the peak and initial decline in gross energy acquisition. In forests and other natural ecosystems, the amount of gross photosynthesis declines and reaches parity with respiration as the forces of competition and natural selection create a steady-state, or ‘climax’, ecosystem. These forces exist also for society, but they are in the form of declining EROI, geological depletion, environmental degradation, climate change, water pollution, air pollution, land-cover change and such, and all the other factors that are occurring today that make it harder and harder to produce energy easily. In the end, ecosystems are able to successfully transition from a growth-oriented structure to a steady state; it is unclear whether society will be able to do the same.

Figure 10. GDP as a function of energy consumption over the past 200 years. (Adapted from Kremmer [69] and Smil [70].)

Figure 10. GDP as a function of energy consumption over the past 200 years. (Adapted from Kremmer [69] and Smil [70].)

 

Summary

The concept of energy return on investment (EROI) was born out of ecological research in the early 1970s, and has grown over the past 30 years into an area of study that bridges the disciplines of industrial ecology, economics, ecology, geography and geology, just to name a few. The most recent estimates indicate that the EROI of conventional oil is between 10 and 20 globally, with an average of 11 in the USA.

The future of oil production resides in unconventional oil, which has, on average, higher production costs (in terms of both money and energy) than conventional oil, and should prove in time to have a (much) lower EROI than conventional oil. Similar comments apply to other substitutes such as biofuels. The lack of peer-reviewed estimates of the EROI of such resources indicates a clear need for further investigation.

Transitioning to lower EROI energy sources has a number of implications for global society.

  1. It will reallocate energy that was previously destined for society towards the energy industry alone. This will, over the long run, lower the net energy available to society, creating significant headwinds for economic growth.
  2. Transitioning to lower EROI oil means that the price of oil will remain high compared to the past, which will also place contractionary pressure on the economy.
  3. As we try to increase oil supplies from unconventional sources, we will accelerate the resource acquisition rate, and therefore the degradation of our natural environment.

It is important to realize that the problems related to declining EROI are not easily solved. Renewable energy may indeed represent the future of energy development, but renewables are a long time off from displacing oil. Lastly, it seems apparent that the supply-side solutions (more oil, renewable energy, etc.) will not be sufficient to offset the impact that declining EROI has on economic growth. All of this evidence indicates that it is time to re-examine the pursuit of economic growth at all costs, and maybe examine how we can reduce demand for oil while trying to maintain and improve quality of life. A good summary of these problems is also given in Sorrell [72].

For society, we can either dictate our own energy future by enacting smart energy policies that recognize the clear and real limits to our own growth, or we can let those limits be dictated to us by the physical constraints of declining EROI. Either way, both the natural succession of ecosystems on Earth and declining EROI of oil production indicate that we should expect the economic growth rates of the next 100 years to look nothing like those of the last 100 years.

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Posted in EROEI Energy Returned on Energy Invested, Other Experts | 1 Comment

The electric grid, critical interdependencies, vulnerabilities: U.S. House hearing 2003

Preface.  Of course, this website explains why the grid can’t stay up without fossil fuels, so by 2050 the grid will only be up in a few places, perhaps China, the Middle East, and Russia if war hasn’t brought on the end of our fossil fueled civilization.

Related articles:

  • Russian hackers suspected in attack that blacked out parts of Ukraine
  • How the weapon works (pdf): CRASHOVERRIDE Analyzing the Threat to Electric Grid Operations
  • The EMP Commission estimates a nationwide blackout lasting one year could kill up to 9 of 10 Americans through starvation, disease, and societal collapse
  • Electromagnetic pulse threat to infrastructure (U.S. House hearings 2012 & 2014)
  • The Devil’s Scenario – near miss at Fukushima is a warning for U.S.
  • A Nuclear spent fuel fire at Peach Bottom in Pennsylvania could force 18 million people to evacuate
  • The electromagnetic pulse EMP Threat. May 13, 2005 House of Representatives hearing
  • The electric grid, critical interdependencies, vulnerabilities. House of Representatives 2003
  • Electromagnetic Pulse EMP from solar flares or high-altitude nuclear weapon explosion

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts: Practical Prepping, KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity , XX2 report ]

House 108-23. September 4 & 23, 2003. Implications of power blackouts for the nation’s cyber-security and critical infrastructure protection. House of Representatives. 246 pages.

THE ELECTRIC GRID, CRITICAL INTERDEPENDENCIES, VULNERABILITIES, AND READINESS

Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania. The greatest threat would be a low-yield nuclear weapon, which we now know that North Korea has and Iran is trying to obtain, and the ability to put it up into the atmosphere, which we know that both Iran and North Korea have, a low-complexity missile; and by detonating that low-yield nuclear weapon off of the coast in the atmosphere The electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) would fry all the electronic components within a given range within the U.S. In fact, our military has tested this type of capability in the past. In testimony before the Armed Services Committee, we have not hardened our systems. Only our ICBM system is hardened, and almost the entirety of our energy complex in America would be vulnerable to any EMP laydown.

I am familiar with Russian nuclear doctrine. Their first attempt at attacking us would be to lay down an EMP burst off of our coast with a nuclear weapon that would not hurt one person, but would fry all of our electronic components, including our electrical grid system. It would shut down America, including our vehicles, which have chips in them that would stop on the roads. Now, we tested this capability in 1962 when we did four tests at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. We were startled that within 800 miles everything was shut down, streetlights. We stopped cars dead in their tracks, and we fried the major electronic components of our telephone system. We did those tests in 1962. That is not classified. That has been reported in the media, and in fact it was just in a book put out by Dan Verton called ‘‘The Black Ice.’’ In 1999, we in the House held hearings on this phenomenon, not because of 9–11, but because we knew of the implications. Directed energy has become the weapon of choice for the future for nations that want to bring us down or harm us. We are doing research ourselves, and so are other countries on directed energy, let alone the EMP phenomenon.

There is no greater threat to our security and our quality of life than a terrorist using electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and there are now 10 countries that have nuclear capability, and 70 countries with missiles that they could launch off of our coast using low-yield weapons that would not harm one person. 

COFER BLACK, Office of the coordinator for counter terrorism, department of stateThe phrase ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ covers many elements of the modern world. To cite a few examples: the computers we use to transfer financial information from New York to Hong Kong and other cities, the air traffic control systems for international and domestic flights and, of course, the electric grid systems. The global critical infrastructure is both a contributor to, and a result of, the interdependence that exists among nations today. Critical infrastructure essentially means all the physical and virtual ties that bind us together, not only as a society but as a world. Terrorists know this, and they see attacking the very bonds that hold us together as one more way to drive us apart.

Christopher Cox, California, Chairman Select committee on Homeland Security. The blackout shutdown over 100 power plants, including 22 nuclear reactors, cutoff power for 50 million people in 8 states and Canada, including much of the Northeast corridor and the core of the American financial network, and showed just how vulnerable our tightly knit network of generators, transmission lines, and other critical infrastructure is.

Cyber attacks are a real and growing threat. The problem of cyber-security is unique in its complexity and in its rapidly evolving character. Cyber attacks are different from physical attacks since they can be launched from anywhere in the world and be routed through numerous intermediate computers. Cyber attacks require a different skill set to detect and counter, and are not limited to the risks posed from Al-Quaida. They include threats posed by those criminals and hackers who are already attacking our infrastructure for their own amusement or using it to steal information and money. As the most information technology-dependent country in history, we remain uniquely vulnerable to cyber attacks that can disrupt our economy or undermine our national security.

The dependence of major infrastructural systems on the continued supply of electrical energy, and of oil and gas, is well recognized. Telecommunications, information technology, and the Internet, as well as food and water supplies, homes and work sites, are dependent on electricity; numerous commercial and transportation facilities are also dependent on natural gas and refined oil products.

Physical or cyber attacks can amplify the impact of physical attacks on this critical infrastructure, and diminish the effectiveness of emergency responses.

Blackout effects:

  1. Harlem’s sewage treatment plant shut down without power for its pump.
  2. Seven oil refineries in the U.S. and Canada temporarily shut down, worsening an already tight gasoline supply situation.
  3. Many airports were closed because of inoperable systems on the ground. Refueling of aircraft stopped as hydrant systems and fuel farms lacked power.
  4. Nearly all manufacturers in southeast Michigan ground to a halt with the blackout.
  5. The 911 emergency systems in New York and Detroit failed during the blackout.
  6. New York City’s computer-aided dispatch system for its fire department and rescue squad crashed. Water systems in Cleveland and Detroit could not handle the drop in power.
  7. Ohio Governor Bob Taft declared a state of emergency in Cleveland after all four pumping stations that lift water out of Lake Erie went out and residents were ordered to boil their water for days.
  8. The beaches were off limits for swimming after a sewage discharge into Lake Erie and the Cuyahoga River sent bacteria levels soaring.
  9. More than 50 assembly and other plants operated by General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co., DaimlerChrysler, and Honda Motor Co. were idled by the cascading blackout.
  10. NOVA Chemicals shutdown plants in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Ontario, Canada.
  11. Walmart closed 200 stores in Canada and the United States.
  12. Marriott International saw 175 of its hotels in the Northeast lose power at the height of the blackout.
  13. Hundreds of airline flights were cancelled. For many airports throughout the U.S. and Canada, the power failure exposed the risk of fuel supply interruptions from electricity outages, since most hubs in North America are fed by pipeline systems.
  14. Tightened security measures established after 9–11 could not be maintained as power was not available for baggage screening machines.
  • Without railroads to deliver coal, the nation loses 60% of the fuel used to generate electricity.
  • Without electricity, fueling stations cannot pump fuel.
  • Without diesel, the railroads will eventually stop running.
  • When railroads stopped running after 9/11 to guard hazardous materials in only two days the city of Los Angeles was out of chlorine and faced the threat of no drinking water—the railroads began operating again on the third day.

Blackstart of grid – restoring power. Restoring a system from a blackout required a very careful choreography of re-energizing transmission lines from generators that were still online inside the blacked-out area, from systems from outside the blacked-out area, restoring station power to off-line generating units so they could be restarted, synchronizing the generators to the interconnection, and then constantly balancing generation and demand as additional generating units and additional customer demands are restored to service.  Many may not realize it takes days to bring nuclear and coal fired power plants back on-line, so restoring power was done with gas-fired plants normally used for peak periods to cover baseload needs normally coal and nuclear-powered. The diversity of our energy systems proved invaluable.

Robert Liscouski, assistant secretary, Infrastructure protection, Department of homeland security.  While the national focus was primarily on the blackout and its cause, our teams were hard at work assessing the cascading effects into other sectors. Interdependencies among the sectors were again demonstrated by this event. Seven major petroleum refineries suspended operations, many chemical manufacturing plants were shut down, grocery stores lost perishable inventories, air traffic ceased at several major airports, and emergency services capacity was tested. Web sites were shut down. ATMs did not work in the affected areas and the American Stock Exchange did not operate for a period of time. The effect of the blackout highlighted what we already knew at the department. If one infrastructure is affected, many other infrastructures are likely to be impacted as well. Indeed, all the critical infrastructure sectors were affected by this event. Understanding the vulnerabilities and interdependencies associated with cascading events is an area of great importance to the department.

Jim Turner, Texas. This incident demonstrated that there are literally hundreds of thousands of potential targets that terrorists could choose to strike. These include power systems, chemical and nuclear plants, commercial transportation and mass transit, skyscrapers, and sports and concert venues. In addition to physical assets, we also need to protect cyber assets. Recent computer disruptions have had unexpected consequences on nuclear plants and other utilities. Eighty-five percent of our critical infrastructure assets are privately owned. We must, therefore, work in partnership with the private sector to improve our national security. But we can’t rely too heavily on voluntary private action. Companies seeking to maximize profits simply are unlikely to have the economic incentives to voluntarily make the investments necessary to raise security levels to where they need to be.   In the absence of sufficient action by critical infrastructure owners, we have a duty to take the initiative to protect the American people.

Paul H. Gilbert. Gilbert us a member of the National Academy of Engineering and was Chair of the National Research Council Panel responsible for the Chapter on Energy Systems for the NRC Branscomb-Klausner Report, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism

Over the past decade our electric supply system has been tasked to carry ever-increasing loads. It has also undergone a makeover from being a highly regulated, vertically integrated utility to one that is partially deregulated, far less unified, not as robust and resilient as it was. The generation side is essentially deregulated and operating under an open market set of conditions. At the same time the transmission sector remains fully regulated, but under voluntary compliance reliability rules, resulting in diminished investments in maintenance and spare parts and lower reliability. Another concern is that in seeking to reduce operating costs, the operating companies have installed automated cyber-controllers, or SCADA systems, to perform functions that people previously performed. These open architecture cyber units are an invitation for those who would seek to use computer technology to attack the grid.

The in-place electrical utility assets today are typically being operated at close to the limit of available capacity. In this mode another characteristic of such complex systems appears. When operated near their capacity, these systems are fragile, having little reserve within which to handle power or load fluctuations.

When load and capacity are out of balance, shutting down becomes the only way a system element has to protect itself from severe damage. However, the loss of a piece of the grid, let us say a transmission line, does not end the problem. A line down takes down with it the power that it was transmitting. The connected power plant that was producing that power, having no connected load, must also shut down. In these highly integrated grids, more lines have imbalance problems, and more plants sense the capacity limitations and they all shut down. The cascading effect spreads rapidly in many directions, and in seconds an entire sector of the North American grid can be down. And this is what we experienced a few weeks ago from an accident.

The exact same consequences could, however, too easily be produced by a terrorist attack from a small, trained team. This was the scenario assumed in the Making the Nation Safer report, where several critical nodes in the grid were taken out in a well planned and executed terrorist attack. The cascading system failures resulted in region-wide catastrophic consequences.

Recovery was estimated to take weeks or months, not hours or days.

Now, while the report does not speculate in any detail on the extended consequences of such an event. I have been asked to do so here, and so I offer the following as a personal opinion. Based on the critical infrastructure, and because that critical infrastructure is so extensively integrated, with power out beyond a day or two in our cities, both food and water supplies would soon fail.

Transportation systems would come to a standstill. Waste water could not be pumped. And so we would soon have public health problems. Natural gas pressure would decline, and some would lose gas altogether, very bad news in the winter. Nights would become very dark with no lighting, and communications would be spotty or nonexistent. Storage batteries would have been long gone from the stores, if any stores were still open. Work, jobs, employment, business and economic activity would be stopped. Our economy would take a major hit. All in all our cities would not be very nice places to be. Some local power generators such as at hospitals would get back up, and so there would be islands of light in the darkness. Haves and have-nots would get involved. It would not be a very safe place to be either. Martial law would likely follow, along with emergency food and water supply relief. At our core we would rally and find ways to get by while the systems are being repaired. In time the power would start to come back, tentatively at first, with rolling blackouts, and then in all its glory.

Several weeks to months would have passed, and the enormous recovery and clean-up would begin. This is simply one person’s view, but based upon a fairly in-depth understanding of the critical interdependency of our infrastructure.

Our basic infrastructure systems include our electric power, food, and water supplies, waste disposal, natural gas, communications, transportation, petroleum products, shelter, employment, medical support and emergency services, and facilities to meet all our basic needs. These are a highly integrated, mutually dependent, heavily utilized mix of components that provide us with vitally needed services and life support. While all these elements are essential to our economy and our well-being, only one has the unique impact, if lost, of causing all the others to either be seriously degraded or completely lost. And that, of course, is electric power. Our technically advanced society is literally hard wired to a firm, reliable electric supply.

KENNETH C. WATSONPresident & Chairman of the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS), currently the manager of Cisco Systems’ involvement in critical infrastructure

  • We all depend on telecommunications—in fact, when recently asked to list their dependence on other sectors, the sector coordinators rated telecommunications as first or second on their list.
  • Nearly equal to telecommunications was electric power. Without electricity, there is no ‘‘e’’ in e-commerce.
  • However, without railroads to deliver coal, the nation loses 60% of the fuel used to generate electricity.
  • Without diesel, the railroads will stop running.
  • Without water, there is no firefighting, drinking water, or cracking towers to refine petroleum.
  • Without financial services, transactions enabling all these commodity services cannot be cleared.

These are not just one-way dependencies. When the railroads stopped running after 9/11 to guard hazardous material, it only took the city of Los Angeles two days to demand chlorine or face the threat of no drinking water—the railroads began operating again on the third day. Throughout the Northeast, dependencies on electric power were obvious. Some areas had electric water pumps, and they had to boil their drinking water for days after the blackout.

All of our critical infrastructures are interlinked in complex, sometimes little-understood ways. Some dependencies are surprising, contributing to unusual key asset lists.

DENISE SWINK, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ENERGY ASSURANCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

As you know, our energy infrastructure is vast, complex and highly interconnected. It includes power plants, electric transmission and distribution lines, oil and gas production sites, pipelines, storage and port facilities, information and control systems and other assets. Many of these entities own, operate, supply, build or oversee their infrastructure. The private sector owns about 85% of these assets and a host of federal and state agencies regulate energy generation, transport, transmission and use.

We maintain collaborative relationships with [many entities]:

  1. We work closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which leads, integrates, and coordinates critical infrastructure protection activities across the federal government.
  2. To aid this effort, Department of Energy & DHS are working on a plan for collaboration and responsibilities (i.e. critical infrastructure protection of physical and cyber assets, science and technology, and emergency response).
  3. We are also beginning to work with the Coast Guard
  4. With Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
  5. Representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
  6. The National Institute of Standards and Technology to consider options for developing a collaborative National SCADA Program.
  7. We work closely with the Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety
  8. We coordinate with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to avoid redundant efforts with petrochemical facilities.
  9. We partnered with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)),
  10. state regulators,
  11. and industry to assess the implications of a loss of natural gas supply in some regions of the country.
  12. DOE’s new Office of Electric Transmission and Distribution on issues related to the electric grid
  13. The Office of Security to improve the operations of DOE’s Emergency Operation Center.
  14. The Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s regional offices to support our meetings with state energy offices;
  15. The Office of Fossil Energy on new technologies to harden oil and gas pipelines;
  16. The Office of Science on visualization techniques through their Advanced Scientific Computing Research Program;
  17. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance on cyber security protection.

Collaboration with the PRIVATE SECTOR is critical :

  1. American Petroleum Institute (API),
  2. American Gas Association (AGA),
  3. Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA),
  4. Gas Technology Institute (GTI),
  5. National Propane Gas Association (NPRA),
  6. Edison Electric Institute (EEl),
  7. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),
  8. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA),
  9. American Public Power Association (APPA),
  10. North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC).

Collaboration with STATES

  1. National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO),
  2. National Governors Association (NGA),
  3. National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC),
  4. National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)

Colonel Michael C. McDaniel.  Assistant Adjutant General for Homeland Security for the Michigan National Guard, Homeland Security Advisor to Michigan’s Governor, Jennifer M Granholm.

On Thursday, August 14, 2003, at 4:15 p.m., a massive power outage struck the Niagara-Mohawk power grid in the Northeast US and Ontario causing blackouts from New York to Michigan.  Within minutes, much of southeast and mid-Michigan was without power, with 60% of Michigan’s population, over 2.2 million households, affected by the outage

The State of Michigan and local governments spent $20.4 million on emergency measures to save lives, protect public health, and prevent damage to public and private property.

The Emergency Management Division of the Michigan State Police began to immediately monitor conditions around the state, including the state’s nuclear power plants.

Within minutes, the state’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was formally activated, and state agencies began to monitor state and national conditions.

Some of the major complications from the blackout:

  1. Gas stations were unable to supply peoples’ needs for their cars and portable generators, as without electricity the pumps were inoperable
  2. The Detroit Board of Water and Sewers, oversight board of the nation’s second largest water system, reported that its system was not functioning correctly. It issued a boiled water advisory for its entire service area.
  3. There was no system to notify all of the customers of the boiled water advisory, as notification was dependent on the public media. It became clear, on the morning of August 15, that the largest problem was the lack of potable water. Public and private entities delivered hundreds of thousands of gallons of water to those affected sites, but a boiled water advisory was not lifted until Monday, August 18.
  4. Widespread traffic signals not functioning and limited telephone communications.
  5. Marathon Refinery, Michigan’s largest refining facility, lost power and had to shut down. One unit did not shut down properly and began venting partially processed hydrocarbons. Because of the tank’s location, the city of Melvindale (with the assistance of the Michigan State Police) decided to evacuate 30,000 residents and shut down Interstate 75 for several hours until the situation was controlled. The Marathon Refinery was inoperable as a result of the loss of electricity and water, and out of production for approximately 10 days.
  6. The auto industry shut down operations for three days.
  7. A lot of first responders were relying upon cell phones that did not have an adequate radio system, and a number of cell towers did not have backup systems that worked.
  8. Radio and television stations reported broadcasting difficulties, with several small stations not operating at all.
  9. Many facilities lacked sufficient alternative energy sources. Portable generators were needed at hospitals and other public facilities, including the state mental institution.
  10. The Fermi II nuclear plant in Monroe County was shut down as a precaution. It returned to full power production and was reconnected to the power grid late a week later on August 21
  11. The Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, the busiest commercial landport in the United States with 16,000 tractor-trailers crossing daily, was also affected.
  12. Canadian customs lost their computer datalink, and their ability to verify trucking manifests electronically. As a result they were forced to visually and manually inspect the manifests and, if warranted, the freight itself. This resulted in an approximately four-mile backup of traffic for almost 24 hours on the U.S. side.
  13. Many computer systems were not functioning, including the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN).
  14. The Michigan State Police positioned 50 state troopers on stand-by for mobilization, if needed to maintain order in blackout areas . The Michigan National Guard also had troopers ready on stand-by.
  15. Metropolitan Detroit Airport was closed and all flights canceled until midnight on August 14.
  16. A number of public water issues arose from the blackout. Generators need an automatic activation switches and shouldn’t rely on telephone lines
  17. Almost every type of critical infrastructure that should have a generator did have some sort of generator. But no one had not tested those generators under load, so we had a lot of generators that just didn’t work. They might have fired them up before, but they never tested them under a load and actually had them producing electricity. When they did work, they ran out of fuel. We were starting to get calls from both hospitals and some of the utilities wanting to know if we could help them find kerosene diesel for their generators.
  18. A lot of people did not have old-fashioned phones. Everybody’s phone is portable, a hand-held device which requires electricity these days, or a cell device, and not all of those towers worked. So there were a number of instances where the communication systems were more reliant on electricity than we believed that they would be. Again, even those radio and TV stations that had generators, the generators didn’t work because they had never been tested. So they weren’t ready to work under load. They weren’t the right capacity generator. And then the other problem, as I said, was 24 hours later they were staring to run out of power. Both TV and radio, as well as the telephone companies, were calling as well.
  19. This was a very hot day in the summer where the usage on the Detroit water system was almost a billion gallons a day. The system, even after it came back up on generators, could only handle about 400 million gallons per day. If we had had a method, if we had some sort of warning that this was going to happen, and could have gotten out to decrease your electricity, decrease your water use ahead of time, it probably would have made it easier for the system to come back on.

The NIAC Interdependency and Risk Assessment Working Group submitted its final report to NIAC members October 14, 2003. That report included results of a survey of Sector Coordinators and key infrastructure owners and operators regarding their top dependencies. Respondents were asked to list the top three sectors on which they depend, and the top three sectors that depend on them. In terms of short-term dependencies, the overall top three were 1) telecommunications and IT, 2) electricity, and 3) transportation. However, adding long-term impacts broadens the list of critical dependencies. Without financial services, business comes to a grinding halt in a matter of days. Without safe food, clean drinking water, and available health care, public health also reaches a crisis in days. Without emergency police, fire, and medical services, the ability to respond and contain emergencies is severely impacted. Long-term impacts of transportation failures are far more severe than the short term.

Without consideration for what vulnerability analysis is underway and what protective measures are in place, the following sectors present the highest potential risk to national security: Energy Information and Communications Banking and Finance Transportation Postal and Shipping This priority scheme is based on (a) the ease at which problems propagate within the sector, (b) the extent of other sectors’ dependencies on it, and (c) the potential impact of a sector’s loss of crucial functionality.

CHRISTOPHER COX, CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

As a group, the critical infrastructure sectors are backbone services for our nation’s economic engine and produced approximately 31% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the year 2000. The blackout rippled through the economy. The examples are endless, and experience shows us that the blackout is not alone in its capacity to disrupt the economy. The information super highway of the Internet has become a fast lane for computer viruses. A computer virus launched one morning can infect computers around the world in one day. The Slammer virus, launched in January of this year, reportedly infected 100,000 computers in its first ten minutes alone. Because of the SoBig computer virus, some rail routes of CSX were recently shut down on August 20, until a manual backup system started the trains running again.

We know that terrorists have assessed the possibility of attacking our nuclear power plants and our transportation system. Al-Qaida computers seized in Afghanistan in 2001 had logged on to sites offering that offer software and programming instructions for the distributed control systems (DCS) and Supervisory- control and Data-acquisition (SCADA) systems that run power, water, transport and communications grids. All critical infrastructure industries are becoming increasingly dependent on information management and internal telecommunications systems to control and maintain their operations. The U.S. Dept. of Commerce’s National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA) published a study in January 2002 that detailed the myriad of uses the internal wireless communications systems to meet essential operational, management and control functions including two-way emergency restoration and field communications, monitoring power transmission lines and oil and natural gas pipeline functions to instantaneously respond to downed transmission lines or changes in pipeline pressure; sending commands to various remote control switches; inspecting 230,000 miles of rail track; managing wastewater, processing drinking water, and protective relaying. SCADA systems could be attacked simply by overloading a system that, upon failure, causes other systems operations to malfunction as well.

While there is some debate about the ability of a terrorist to successfully launch a cyber attack against a SCADA system, there are several examples of people or groups who have tried. In March 2000 a disgruntled former municipal employee used the Internet, a wireless radio and stolen control software to release up to 1 million liters of sewage into the river and coastal waters of Queensland, Australia. Similarly, NERC reports that over the past two years, there have been a number of ‘‘cyber incidents that have or could have directly impacted the reliable operation of the bulk electric system,’’ including: • In January 2003, When the SQL/Slammer worm caused an electric utility company to lose control of their SCADA system for several hours, forcing the company operations staff to resort to manual operation of their transmission and generation assets until control could be restored. • In September 2001, the Nimda worm compromised the SCADA system of an electric utility, and then propagated itself to the internal project network of a major SCADA vendor via the vendor’s support communications circuit, devastating the vendor’s internal network and launching further attacks against the SCADA networks of the vendor’s other customers. More telling, perhaps, is a report issued in May 2002 by the Defense Department’s Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (CIAP) claiming that there was evidence of a coordinated cyber reconnaissance effort directed against the critical assets of at least two electric utilities participating in the Defense Department sponsored program. The report revealed that the probing appeared to come from the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, and South Korea, with each probe building upon information previously garnered. The blackout is yet another wake-up call to our nation. It demonstrated the fragility of our electric transmission system, and reminds us of the interdependent nature of our infrastructure. Clearly, we need to encourage private industry and government to raise the standards of cyber security, and to further enhance our infrastructure security against attack.

KENNETH C. WATSON.

Some rudimentary research has been done on interdependencies, but it has only been sufficient to illuminate how important this type of modeling and analysis could be. Sandia and other national labs have initiated interdependency studies, looking at intersections with the energy sector. The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) has done similar work, addressing intersections between telecommunications and other sectors. The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) has a current effort to develop policy recommendations on interdependency risk assessments. The sector coordinators are involved in that study, which will become available after delivery to the President in the October timeframe. The PCIS is coordinating with this NIAC working group to ensure that the handbook we develop is in harmony with NIAC policy recommendations.

Network owners already know their key assets and critical nodes—what they don’t know is whether their key assets and critical nodes are in the same geographic vicinity as their competitors’ nodes, or whether underlying or supporting infrastructure is in fact, truly diverse. In highly competitive sectors, such as telecommunications or finance, it would not be unusual to find that each of the major providers has intended to buy diversity and redundancy from numerous entities, only to find that all these entities use the same underground conduit for transport that goes through the same underground tunnel, and they are powered by the same power generation plant. The NSTAC has studied the implications of these types of cross-sector dependencies and has developed a number of programs that the telecommunications sector uses to mitigate these risks. It is time, however to take it to the next level, covering all cross-sector and multisector interdependencies.

One of the challenges will be that much of the data required may be proprietary. To date, the NISAC has centered its modeling efforts on the energy sector. To understand the complexity of this modeling problem, consider the NISAC model of the energy sector as a baseline, and apply it as a level of magnitude to the telecommunications sector. While we do not know the precise amounts, it is our understanding that the current electrical sector modeling cost about $30–40 million to develop and was done over the course of 3 to 8 years. If you assume that the level of detail developed within the electrical sector model is appropriate (and we do not know that to be the case) and simply multiply this $30–40 million times the number of facilities-based networks that comprise the telecommunications sector, then you would conservatively multiply this estimate by a factor of 9 networks (5 wireless + 1 wireline + 2 IXC + 1 paging), resulting in a baseline model for telecommunications in the $270–$360 million range. Even if all $200 million was dedicated to telecommunications modeling, it would take 1 to 2 years of currently allocated funding, and an even longer actual modeling effort, to model telecommunications alone. Multiply that by 12 sectors, and then you can start on the cross-sector interdependency modeling.

I am not sure you can point to a single weak link. Over the last 20 years, all of the infrastructures have become more and more dependent on networks, and they have become more and more interconnected. I think the key that we need to study in research and modeling and exercises is interdependency. Each of the sectors is dependent on each of the others and sometimes we don’t even know what these dependencies are without modeling and exercises.

PETER R. ORSZAG1, PH.D., JOSEPH A. PECHMAN SENIOR FELLOW IN ECONOMIC STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

The blackout of 2003 has underscored concerns about the vulnerability of our nation’s critical infrastructure to both accidents and deliberate attack, providing an immediate connection to the nation’s homeland security efforts. But the blackout may offer a deeper lesson beyond the vulnerability of the nation’s electricity grid to terrorist attack. In particular, a common explanation for the problems facing the electricity system is that private firms have had inadequate incentives to invest in distribution lines.

The important point is that market incentives are extremely powerful. For that very reason, however, it is essential that they be structured properly. As Patrick Wood, chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, has put it: ‘‘We cannot simply let markets work. We must make markets work.’’

Let me give you an example that I think is particularly timely, involving chemical facilities. Let’s say that you have a chemical facility. It is worth a billion dollars. It houses chemicals. There are 123 chemical facilities in the United States that contain chemicals that could injure or kill more than a million people. The value of a million lives can easily exceed, well exceed a billion dollars. You may well have some incentive to make sure that there is some level of security to ensure that your plant is not intruded upon and those chemicals are not dispersed and harm people. But it is not adequate because your financial loss is much smaller than society’s loss that would occur if a successful attack did unfortunately take place. And that kind of example occurs, you know, in a wide array of settings. And I—in my written testimony I provide lots of other types of examples, but I think that might be a particularly timely and compelling one, where any time that private financial losses that you suffer are vastly smaller than the losses that we as a society would suffer, you don’t have enough incentive, bottom line.

In homeland security, private markets do not automatically produce the best result.

We must therefore alter the structure of incentives so that market forces are directed toward reducing the costs of providing a given level of security for the nation, instead of providing a lower level of security than is warranted. Given the significance of the private sector in homeland security settings, structuring incentives properly is critical. To be sure, private firms currently have some incentive to avoid the direct financial losses associated with a terrorist attack on their facilities or operations. In general, however, that incentive is not compelling enough to encourage the appropriate level of security—and should therefore be supplemented with stronger market-based incentives in several sectors. My testimony argues that: • Private markets, by themselves, do not provide adequate incentives to invest in homeland security, and • A mixed system of minimum regulatory standards, insurance, and third-party inspections would better harness the power of private markets to invest in homeland security in a cost-effective manner. Incentives for homeland security in private markets

Private markets by themselves do not generate sufficient incentives for homeland security for seven reasons: • Most broadly, a significant terrorist attack undermines the nation’s sovereignty, just as an invasion of the nation’s territory by enemy armed forces would. The costs associated with a reduction in the nation’s sovereignty or standing in the world may be difficult to quantify, but are nonetheless real. In other words, the costs of the terrorist attack extend well beyond the immediate areas and people affected; the attack imposes costs on the entire nation. In the terminology of economists, such an attack imposes a ‘‘negative externality.’’ The presence of this negative externality means that private markets will undertake less investment in security than would be socially desirable: Individuals or firms deciding how best to protect themselves against terrorism are unlikely to take the external costs of an attack fully into account, and therefore will generally provide an inefficiently low level of security against terrorism on their own.3 Without government involvement, private markets will thus typically under-invest in anti-terrorism measures.4 • Second, a more specific negative externality exists with regard to inputs into terrorist activity. For example, loose security at a chemical facility can provide terrorists with the materials they need for an attack. Similarly, poor security at a biological laboratory can provide terrorists with access to dangerous pathogens. The costs of allowing terrorists to obtain access to such materials are generally not borne by the facilities themselves:

the attacks that use the materials could occur elsewhere. Such a specific negative externality provides a compelling rationale for government intervention to protect highly explosive materials, chemicals, and biological pathogens even if they are stored in private facilities. In particular, preventing access to such materials is likely to reduce the overall risk of catastrophic terrorism, as opposed to merely displacing it from one venue to another. • Third, a related type of externality involves ‘‘contamination effects.’’ Contamination effects arise when a catastrophic risk faced by one firm is determined in part by the behavior of others, and the behavior of these others affects the incentives of the first firm to reduce its exposure to the risk. Such interdependent security problems can arise, for example, in network settings. The problem in these settings is that the risk to any member of a network depends not only on its own security precautions but also on those taken by others. Poor security at one establishment can affect security at others. The result can often be weakened incentives for security precautions.5 For example, once a hacker or virus reaches one computer on a network, the remaining computers can more easily be contaminated. This possibility reduces the incentive for any individual computer operator to protect against outside hackers. Even stringent cyber-security may not be particularly helpful if a hacker has already entered the network through a ‘‘weak link.’’ • A fourth potential motivation for government intervention involves information—in particular, the cost and difficulty of accurately evaluating security measures. For example, one reason that governments promulgate building codes is that it would be too difficult for each individual entering a building to evaluate its structural soundness. Since it would also be difficult for the individual to evaluate how well the building’s air intake system could filter out potential bio-terrorist attacks, the same logic would suggest that the government should set minimum anti-terrorism standards for buildings.

It is also possible, at least in theory, for private firms to invest too much in anti-terrorism security. In particular, visible security measures (such as more uniformed guards) undertaken by one firm may merely displace terrorist attacks onto other firms, without significantly affecting the overall probability of an attack. In such a scenario, the total security precautions undertaken can escalate beyond the socially desirable levels—and government intervention could theoretically improve matters by placing limits on how much security firms would undertake.

Unobservable security precautions (which are difficult for potential terrorists to detect), on the other hand, do not displace vulnerabilities from one firm to another and can at least theoretically reduce the overall level of terrorism activity. For an interesting application of these ideas to the Lojack automobile security system, see Ian Ayres and Steven Levitt, ‘‘Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, no. 1 (February 1998). For further analysis of evaluating public policy in the presence of externalities, see Peter Orszag and Joseph Stiglitz, ‘‘Optimal Fire Departments: Evaluating Public Policy in the Face of Externalities,’’ Brookings Institution Working Paper, January 2002.

It would be possible, but inefficient, for each individual to conduct extensive biological anti-terrorism safety tests on the food that he or she was about to consume. The information costs associated with that type of system, however, make it much less attractive than a system of government regulation of food safety. • The fifth justification for government intervention is that corporate and individual financial exposures to the losses from a major terrorist attack are inherently limited by the bankruptcy laws. For example, assume that there are two types of possible terrorist attacks on a specific firm: A very severe attack and a somewhat more modest one. Under either type of attack, the losses imposed would exceed the firm’s net assets, and the firm would declare bankruptcy—and therefore the extent of the losses beyond that which would bankrupt the firm would be irrelevant to the firm’s owners. Since the outcome for the firm’s owners would not depend on the severity of the attack, the firm would have little or no incentive to reduce the likelihood of the more severe version of the attack even if the required preventive steps were relatively inexpensive. From society’s perspective, however, such security measures may be beneficial—and government intervention can therefore be justified to address catastrophic possibilities in the presence of the bankruptcy laws. • The sixth justification for government intervention is that the private sector may expect the government to bail it out should a terrorist attack occur. The financial assistance to the airline industry provided by the government following the September 11th attacks provides just one example of such bailouts. Such expectations create a ‘‘moral hazard’’ problem: private firms, expecting the government to bail them out should an attack occur, do not undertake as much security as they otherwise would. If the government cannot credibly convince the private sector that no bailouts will occur after an attack, it may have to intervene before an attack to offset the adverse incentives created by the expectation of a bailout. • The final justification for government intervention involves incomplete markets. The most relevant examples involve imperfections in capital and insurance markets. For example, if insurance firms are unable to obtain reinsurance coverage for terrorism risks (that is, if primary insurers are not able to transfer some of the risk from terrorism costs to other insurance firms in the reinsurance market), some government involvement may be warranted. In addition, certain types of activities may require large-scale coordination, which may be possible but difficult to achieve without governmental intervention.

Both the need for government intervention and the potential costs associated with it thus vary from sector to sector, as should the policy response. Government intervention will generally only be warranted in situations in which a terrorist attack could have catastrophic consequences. Nonetheless, the general conclusion is that we can’t just ‘‘leave it up to the market’’ in protecting ourselves against terrorist attacks.

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, TEXAS: An illustration of the disjunct in our infra and super-structure is the television broadcast of the tens of thousands of New Yorkers who had to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge to end their workday. This is vulnerability. Thousands of riders of underground mass transit systems trapped in cars, frugal in their consumption of oxygen and hopeful that their rescue team was near equates to vulnerability. Because we cannot cast blame for this occurrence on a terrorist group means that we are vulnerable to ourselves first and foremost. The Administration must increase our awareness of the status of the areas that are most open to corruption.

 

Posted in Blackouts, Cascading Failure, Congressional Record U.S., CyberAttacks, Interdependencies | Tagged , , , , , | Comments Off on The electric grid, critical interdependencies, vulnerabilities: U.S. House hearing 2003

Barges are more energy efficient than rail and truck

marine highways

 

[After reading two congressional hearings, one in 2008, and another in 2013, about how the inland waterway system was falling apart, and had been for 30 years, I was curious to know why such an important asset would be allowed to fall apart. In the testimony, it was said that more money was collected in fees by the government than doled back out in capital and maintenance expenses (true from 1991 to 2006 (NAS 2015). It was said at the 2013 hearing that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has a set budget, so if the money put into the Inland Waterway Trust Fund was actually given to port and river projects, other USACE projects would not be funded.

So the selection of waterways projects for authorization has a long history of being driven largely by political and local concerns (NAS 2015). Many states got a lot more money than they put in. The NAS report explains in gory detail what an irrational, byzantine mess the approval and funding process is.

National energy policy is not based on energy efficiency–there were no café standards for decades. Instead, massive, polluting gas guzzling vehicles have pummeled the hell out of our bridge and road infrastructure, wasting decades of oil that future generations will be angry about when the permanent oil crisis arrives.

Now that we’re at peak oil, a lot more attention and funding ought to go to the waterway system. 

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com]

Energy Intensity of Barges and other transport

Barges are the second most energy efficient form of transport, next to large container and bulk ships.

Barges being towed down a river will get 953 net ton-miles, but being towed against the flow of the current will drop to 243 (Tolliver) with an overall average of 576 ton-miles, with rail 413, truck 155.

Barge versus rail

Davis reports that rail (294 Btu/ton-mile in 2012) is 40% more energy intensive than barge (210 Btu/ton-mile in 2012), nearly the same percentage difference as reported by Kruse (2013) who found 311 Btu/ton-mile for rail and 223 Btu/ton-mile for inland towing.

Dager (2013) reports even lower energy intensity for inland barge transport on the basis of independent data and fuel use modeling, corresponding to about 196 Btu/ton-mile, or about 60 percent better energy intensity than average rail.

Commodity-specific configurations can do even better. Dager reports  towboats on the Mississippi River between the mouth of the Missouri and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, averaged 867 ton-miles per gallon in 2011 versus the system average of 656. Baumel (2008) reported that unit grain trains moving from Iowa to New Orleans, Louisiana, had route-specific fuel efficiency of 640 ton-miles per gallon, 54% better than energy intensity for an average train.

“24th Annual State of Logistics Report: Is This the New Normal”, by Roz Wilson

Drought effect on barges

There were numerous times when sections of the particularly that Mississippi could travel only in one direction at a time because of the width of the channel would not support a bridge to, despite the fact that the Army Corps of Engineers was providing emergency dredging. Barges were often backed up for days at a time awaiting passage. I one point there were close to 100 vessels run aground and the lower Mississippi.

Shallower channels meant lighter loads, lower speeds and fewer barges, any of which would run up costs. Several harbors were closed at the height of the drought. It is estimated that every inch of drought loss represents thousands of potential products that cannot be moved. And 11 mile stretch of the Mississippi was closed intermittently and August causing queues up to 100 tows. Every single day a towboat is idle, it cost the owners $10,000. No surprise that shipping rates increase close to 25% during that period.

Just to show you how important the waterways really are, take a look at this model comparison chart and look at what you can move on one barge compared to what you can move on railroad, cars or trucks, or in one barge tow.

modal comparison barge rail truck

We should be using the water part of our system a lot more efficiency, I think, than we are. Just to bring it home, look at the time the miles traveled per gallon of fuel based on various modes. Looking at this really makes you want to understand or figure out ways that we can use our waterways more effectively.

most of the lock infrastructure has already exceeded its expected life. We need to fix the aging infrastructure. And then we need to build more landside infrastructure to support containers on barges and for translating the other modes.

Nicholas Kehoe. Oct 17, 2012. An Update on America’s Marine Highway Program

The infrastructure for seaports in our country was developed- much of it goes back to the 1930s, or some of it down in the South goes even later than that- but, the majority of the infrastructure in the country dates back to the 1950s, 60s and 70s. When it was built, it had an expected life cycle of about 50 years.

If you look at the freight network map that we have that has been used now for almost 5 years, not all of those highways connect to all of those ports. A prime section of ports that are missing are the Great Lakes. Look at the map and look at Duluth, which generates a significant amount of tonnage. Duluth supports one of the last US steelmaking plants and does not even have any highways connecting to it on that map. So, we need to work together to make sure that our freight highway system connects to the ports that the freight is flowing to, so that we can have that intermodal connectivity.

The purpose of the Marine Highway program, as legislated, is to mitigate landside congestion. And, we are to encourage the use of short sea or Marine Highway transportation through development and expansion of designated corridors, similar to the highway corridors, but for waterways. We use documented vessels and services, which means US flagged vessels. And, we have to encourage shipper utilization of the program. If the market is not establishing a program on its own, there is reason for that. There are policy disincentives to using marine highways, we are discovering. The system is not made right now to make water very easy. We are lacking purpose-built vessels to carry the freight on the water on the routes that we are identifying.

 

Baumel, C. P. 2008. The Mississippi River System Shallow Draft Barge Market—Perfectly Competitive or Oligopolistic? Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 5–18.

Dager, C. A. 2013. Fuel Tax Report, 2011. Center for Transportation Research, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Davis, S. C., S. W. Diegel, and R. G. Boundy. 2014. Transportation Energy Data Book, 33rd ed. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Kruse, C. J., D. Ellis, A. Protopapas, and N. Norboge. 2013. New Approaches for U.S. Lock and Dam Maintenance and Funding. Texas A&M Transportation Institute, Texas A&M University, College Station.

NAS. 2015. TRB special report 315: funding and managing the U.S. inland waterways system: what policy makers need to know.  Transportation research board, National Academy of Sciences.  157 pages.

Tolliver, D, et al. October 2013. Comparing rail fuel efficiency with truck and waterway. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and environment. volume 24 pp69-75.

 

 

Posted in Ships and Barges | 2 Comments

Trucking and Fracking

September 18, 2013. The Transportation Needs and Impacts of Fracking-Based Energy Extraction. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration

fracking and trucks top image

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

May 16, 2012. Jack Olson. Impacts of Heavy of Oversize Truck Shipments on the U.S. Highway Network

In the early 1990s, these rigs weighed about 90,000 pounds. Today they weigh about 110,000 pounds. This is true for most of the equipment used in the oil industry; it is getting larger. There are many different kinds of equipment necessary to bring an oil well into production, and the number of truckloads that are involved with each of these oil productions is dependent on whether the well is drilled vertically or horizontally. It is also dependent on the depth of the well, the moving efficiencies of the companies that are moving the pieces of equipment, and a variety of other factors that influence the overall figures. A vertical well takes about 400 truckloads one-way, and a horizontal well takes about 1,150 truckloads one-way, or 2,300 truckloads total, inbound outbound.

fracking trucks on the road

Several of the loads that are used to drill a well are oversized or overweight, many of them exceeding the legal loads in North Dakota of 105,500 pounds on most of our highways. The largest of these is the mud pump, which weighs 164,000 pounds. There are two of those that move into each of the sites. Of the 100 or so loads used to move just the drilling rig portion of the operation when bringing a well into production, 40 to 50 feet are overweight, and 3 out of 4 loads are also oversized.

fracking truck overloads in pounds

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Oil is initially transported to rail facilities or pipeline locations by collection pipelines or trucks – almost exclusively by trucks. About 70% of all oil is currently being trucked from wells to pipelines and transfer locations. On average, a typical Bakken well produces about three truckloads of oil/day during its first year production.

Bakken oil wells produce about one barrel of salt water for every three barrels of oil during the first year of production. Salt water is transported by pipelines in some cases, but most of it is trucked to saltwater disposal sites.

Individual wells are the destination of sand or proppants, which are used to maintain the cracks in the formation so the oil can seep to the well bore.Three years ago, Williston, North Dakota was the only location receiving sand for the fracking process. Today, fracking sand and proppants are shipped to several locations by rail and then by trucks for final delivery to the well sites. The same is true of pipe used in the oil drilling phase. Again, it is brought into the state by rail to several different locations and then transported by truck to the drilling site. In addition to the state’s pipeline infrastructure, which is capable of transporting about 535,000 barrels/day, there are 13 rail facilities capable of transporting about 720,000 barrels/day. Unfortunately, rail and pipeline transportation capacity is not always necessarily available relative to the location of oil production. The typical truck, similar to the one used to transport saltwater, can transport about 220 barrels of oil per load.

The EOG Resources Rail Transload Facility near Stanley, North Dakota currently ships 65,000 barrels/day. Every day, 125 truckloads deliver between 20,000 and 25,000 barrels of oil to the facility.Depending on their size, each of the state’s rail transload facilities have similar truck-generating impacts on the system.

Mark Murawski “Transportation Patterns and Impacts from Marcellus Development”

Each well pad typically uses 3 to 5 acres of land per well and 6-8 wells per pad and developed over 4 to 6 week period. We have 5000 tons of aggregate needed which generates 400 truck trips to do that. That there is actual drilling that occurs that requires more equipment, water and cement that generates another 150-200 truck trips over another 4 to 5 week period.

The third stage is the fracking we actually take the natural gas deposits that takes another 800 and 1000 truck trips transporting 3-6 million gallons of water and frack sand over another 1-2 week period. At the end of the day, per pad, you’re looking 2-3 months of development of today 1250-1600 cumulative truck trips over roads that maybe had 100 or 200 vehicles a day on them previously.

Some roads went from 150 to an additional 700 trucks per day and that has been quite a challenge.

So with the look at is two thirds of our road system and Lycoming County is locally owned by different municipalities and not the state of Pennsylvania. The other third is owned by the state. Another concern we have is the accelerated deterioration to our lifecycle payments on roads that are not bonded. So who’s going to pay that bill? In Pennsylvania basically the transportation funding is derived from the gas tax at the state level.   But we have no comprehensive database on the condition of local roads. We do on the state road system.

The railroad impacts have been significant as well. Right not about twenty percent of their rail traffic is gas related and it helps take trucks off the road, but it’s not a substitute but there still needs to be an interface point since the wells are in locations not served by rail, truck traffic still has to happen there. You see a lot of types of Marcellus gas commodities transported by rail such as frack sand and the pipe and other kind of equipment related to make the and they come from a large swath of the United States.

Our main transfer terminal point between rail and truck freight for Marcellus or for anything is the Newberry Rail Yard which is now operating at full capacity

Obviously the siting of the wells being in remote areas that are difficult to access and the trucks going to small communities that have an inadequate capacity to handle all of the sudden traffic at intersections-these have definitely raised public discontent.

 

Dr. Cesar Quiroga Fracking-based Energy Development and Transportation Impacts and Needs

when we looked at the numbers that we look at fifty to sixty percent of the selected segments which were expected to have less than five years of remaining life. So that’s quite significant. One of the things that we did then was to try to estimate the pavement life. We developed a couple of tools to be able to do this. For those of you familiar with the energy development industry you need to dispose of the saltwater using disposal facilities, typically injection wells.

Many of these injection wells are permitted by the number of the maximum barrels they can receive per day. If you look at any number, for example 20,000, you can translate that into the number of truckloads you receive per day or per year and if you are familiar with the design of the different types of facilities can be designed for different types of ESALs. If you assume a rural road and assuming that it is new, at this rate 20,000 barrels a day in the facility may not have more than four years of life assuming that it was new when the process started.

One other thing that we did as an example was the estimate of impact statewide. We produced a high level estimate for the state of about $1 billion per year on state roads. Taking into consideration that local and county roads account for a roughly the same amount of mileage, we came up with an estimate of about $2 billion a year which is quite significant.

There were some assumptions that we had to make regarding the buffer around which we had some impact within the facilities-we didn’t include U.S. highways– So if anything the impact would be higher than the number I just mentioned. Another important part to keep in mind is that you may have overweight loads.

Just to give you an idea how important the overweight factor is if you look at 80,000 pounds is the reference and if you look to increase the overload to 100,000 pounds, an increase in weight is only twenty percent, but the increase in the impact is 240% which is quite significant, and that is something we should not forget.

It has been documented for example here-I live in San Antonio very close to the Eagle Ford and when the increasing of truck traffic became evident, there were also increases in documented crashes and fatalities. You can document this using other commercial data, for example, commercial vehicle violations, but the impact that I mentioned regarding overweight. Well, it turns out that a significant number of violations pertained to exceeding the maximum tandem axle weight as in this case is that of 34,000 pounds and note that energy-related traffic is ranked higher than non-energy-related traffic.

Let me try to summarize some of these issues in terms of things that are happening right now. I think nationwide there is an increasing amount of awareness When you talk to stakeholders and the county officials, it kind of depends. Most of the focus is related to environmental and water issues. One of the needs that I see is to continue to increase awareness about the impact on transportation and infrastructure with the numbers I mentioned earlier.

 

 

 

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Biofuel distribution wastes valuable diesel fuel

Biofuels can’t use the existing refined petroleum distribution pipeline system, by far the cheapest way to move fuel — 17.5 times cheaper than truck, 5 times less than rail, 2.25 times less than barge, on average (Curley), so delivery of biofuels consumes finite, far more energy-dense diesel fuel on rail, truck, and barge to be mixed in gas/diesel storage tanks, most of which aren’t served by rail:

gasoline distribution and consumption

ethanol distribution system

Source: National Commission on Energy Policy’s Task Force on Biofuels Infrastructure. 2008. Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington D.C., U.S., www.energycommission.org 

Notes from May 2011 APEC Biofuel Transportation and Distribution Options

Use of Existing Fuel Products Pipelines for Biofuels

Shipments Ethanol cannot easily be shipped via fuel products pipeline because it is a good solvent and would remove sulfur and other impurities from the pipeline system, resulting in contamination of the shipped ethanol.

Biodiesel is also a good solvent and could remove sulfur and other impurities from the pipeline system, resulting in contamination of the shipped biodiesel. In addition, there is concern regarding traces of biodiesel left over in the pipeline system. There is a possibility that trace methyl ester (biodiesel) could disarm the coalescers in aircraft fuel and potentially compromise the safety of the aircraft.  There is thus a proposal to limit the methyl ester content in the pipeline system in the USA to 5 PPM as a result of this concern.

A national ethanol pipeline?

Obstacles to Ethanol Pipeline Shipments There are 2 types of challenges involved in moving ethanol through a pipeline:
1. Challenges due to the corrosive nature of ethanol.
2. Challenges due to incompatibility with other products and substances within the pipeline.

The obvious challenge is that ethanol behaves so much differently than the refined petroleum products that are typically moved through pipelines.  More work is needed to find ways to overcome ethanol’s effects on the pipe, the valves and the pipeline systems themselves.

A key consideration is whether a new dedicated pipeline should be built, and if built, where it should be located. The other key question is whether long-term prices and demand would be able to support the building of a vast trans-national pipeline. In the United States , even the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)  has stated that it is not certain that a dedicated ethanol pipeline would provide the same transport security as the more traditional barges, rail cars, and trucks.

Ethanol Solvency Issues: Ethanol’s solvent properties pose additional challenges. Over years of use, small quantities of residual sulfur and dirt from petroleum products can build up in existing pipeline systems.  Although these are not soluble in petroleum products, they can be in ethanol, which can lead to discoloration and product contamination.  Ethanol (and biodiesel) can strip lacque rs and deposits from internal pipeline surfaces and carry them as impurities. A dedicated ethanol pipeline would not encounter these issues, because these contaminants/deposits only arise from prior transport of petroleum products.

Materials Compatibility: Compatibility and corrosion issues can arise because of the way ethanol reacts with some materials in the pipeline and associated equipment. Ethanol and biodiesel can also degrade materials used in gaskets, o-rings, and seals used in fuels transportatio n and storage systems. Elastomers can experience swelling, shrinking and cracking when exposed to ethanol or biodiesel . Polymers used for coatings may be degraded by certain b iofuels as well.Corrosion of certain non-ferrous metals used in gauges, meters, valves, and pumps may occur . Any part of the supply system that will be converted to biofuels service needs to be assessed for materials compatibility and refitted with more resistant materials where required.

Stress Corrosion Cracking: Another challenge experienced in ethanol transportation by pipeline is Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) associated with ethanol movement and storage in pipelines and storage tanks. Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) can be defined as the slow growth of cracks along the inside of the pipeline, which are caused by mechanical stress and exposure to a corrosive environment. Research, largely funded by pipeline companies, has made great strides in addressing this problem. Industry/government research by Pipeline Research Council In ternational, Inc. (PRCI) 8 has found that ethanol-gasoline blends containing up to 15 percent ethanol by volume (E-15 and below) can be transported in existing pipelines without any design or operational modifications. PRCI also found that higher ethanol-containing blends (E-20 and above) and fuel-grade ethanol can be transported without SCC when certain commercial inhibitors are added. The efficacy of commercial inhibitors to mitigate SCC must be assessed prior to their use.

Water and Biofuels Fuel Quality: Small amounts of water enter pipeline systems from petroleum fuels, terminals and tank roofs. This is generally not a problem during pipeline transportation of refined petroleum products, because the water can separate in a tank and can be drained off. Unlike petroleum products, ethanol has an affinity for water as it flows through the pipeline network. The water-ethanol mixture has the potential to separate from petroleum products with which it may be mixed, resulting in degraded fuel quality. This can be managed by taking steps to cover tanks and remove excess water at certain points in the supply and distribution system.

Typical Biofuel Transport Modes

Biodiesel and biodiesel blends are transported primarily by dedicated (or washed) tanker trucks and rail cars. I f the truck or railcar was used for diesel shipment in the previous load, no washing is needed, but if another type of petroleum fuel was shipped, the tank must be washed.

Ethanol and ethanol blends are also transported mainly by dedicated (or washed) tanker trucks and rail cars. If the truck or railcar was used for gasoline shipment in a prior load, no washing is needed, but if another type of petroleum fuel was shipped, the tank has to be washed.

Ethanol and ethanol blends are generally not transported via pipeline due to some concerns regarding corrosion and contamination.

Primary terminals (also called “product terminals”) are generally located near major markets and transportation modes. Some terminals are located at refineries, while others are separate tank farms that receive fuel products by pipeline, tanker truck, rail car or marine tanker. Primary termin als are equipped with product delivery and loading racks that vary from one terminal to another. For example, some terminals linked via pipeline will not necessarily have racks that are adapted for other modes of transportation (train or truck). In region s with ample waterways, petroleum products may be transported to primary terminals by marine tankers.  In regions that are essentially land-locked, products are often transported from refineries to terminals by pipeline. For marine shipments of biofuels, there may be additional storage infrastructure required at the marine terminal.  From the marine terminal, the biofuel would be delivered by truck or rail, unless a dedicated biofuels pipeline could be justified. Since primary terminals are designed to provide downstream distribution of finished products, they all have tanker trucks and high-performance fuel injection equipment at the loading rack to prepare fuel blends (i.e., in-line blending).

Pipelines are a key part of the petroleum fuel transportation infrastructure. The petroleum fuels are transported via pipeline to primary or secondary terminals, which then serve as distribution points to nearby retail sites that are supplied by tanker trucks.  It is typically at these terminals that biofuels are blended with petroleum fuel for distribution.  At present, biofuels are usually transported to the blending terminals by truck, since there are no dedicated biofuel pipelines and the terminals are not generally linked to the railway network.

Rail Cars: Biodiesel (B100) or ethanol (E100) could move by rail from the biofuel production plant to destination terminals (mainly primary terminals or, in some cases, secondary terminals equipped with rail spurs). Rail shipment is generally the most cost-effective delivery method for medium-range and longer-range destinations (i.e., 500 to 5,000 km) that are incapable of receiving product by barge, tanker or pipeline. Rail line coverage and access va ry from region to region. Some te rminals lack rail receipt capability, requiring biodiesel (B100) and ethanol (E100) to be transported by truck.  Rail delivery might also prove infeasible in colder climates, unless the rail cars are heated and a heating system is in place at the destination terminal.

Because of the number of railcar units, the smaller volume of biofuel shipped per unit , and the laborious process of cargo unloading and inspection, rail shipments require more effort compared with ocean tankers, for example. The transportation of biodiesel and ethanol via train also requires more complex logistics (availability of heated or dedicated rail cars, delays due to cleaning rail cars in the case of non-dedicated rail cars or heating rail cars at the terminal, etc.). In some cases, installing heating systems or rail spurs adds to the terminal adaptation costs.

Tanker Trucks: In many cases, a tanker truck delivers B100 or E100 directly from the production plant to nearby terminals. In distant markets, tanker trucks may also pick up biofuel blends at primary terminals (that have received biodiesel or ethanol by tanker or rail), for delivery to secondary terminals that either cannot take product other than by truck or that have insufficient tankage for larger quantity deliveries. The redistribution of bi ofuel blends to retail outlets and end-users is also made by trucks.

Typical Blending and Distribution Practices

Ethanol is usually “splash blended into tanker trucks or rail cars that already contain gasoline.  The ethanol blended with the gasoline mixes readily and does not stratify.

Biodiesel is also generally splash blended or blended in tanks near the point of use. In the European Union (EU), blending is primarily done “in line” at refineries. The “splash blending” of biodiesel may result in some shock crystallization,depending on the temperature during blending or the means by which the splash blend is administered.  In-line blending provides contact between the diesel and the biodiesel and mitigates this risk. At primary terminals for ethanol blending, E100 is injection or splash blended into trucks (or rail cars) before being taken to secondary terminals or to retail.  Similarly, at primary terminals for biodiesel blending, the B100 is blended with the diesel by injection (or in some 14 cases splash blending) before being distributed in its blended form B5-B20) to secondary terminals or retail outlets (service stations, card locks, users with their own storage facilities). At this stage, the modes of shipment used no longer have to be insulated and heated.

Existing petroleum distribution terminals usually do not have rail access, creating a distribution infrastructure challenge for biofuels. Petroleum distribution facil ities were generally designed for pipeline distribution of petroleum fuel products. In r emote or smaller petroleum distribution terminals, product receipts were designed around truck receipt and delivery. In most cases, therefore, distribution of E100 or B 100 or blended biofuel product by rail is usually impractical.

From secondary terminals (or depots), blended biofuel product is moved mainly by tanker truck to retail outlets fueling stations–petrol and gasoline stations with direct delivery to end-users. Delivery distance, costs and carbon footprint of distribution may be greater for biofuel blends than for purely petroleum-based fuels due tho the concentration of biofuel feedstocks and refineries in agricultural regions which are remote from m any key urban population centers.

 

The cost of shipping feedstock s greater than 100 miles is generally prohibitive.  In the case of adv anced biofuel feedstocks such as biomass for cellulosic ethanol, even with densification technologies, the transportation costs become prohibitive beyond 100 miles.  Thus, the location of future cellulosic ethanol plants is likely to be dictated by proximity to feedstock as opposed to proximity to market, similar to the current situation with first generation biofuels. This also implies that most feedstocks will be delivered by truck, and that most biofuel production facilit ies will be located in rural areas close to feedstock, rather than close to urban fuel markets. Transportation factors to consider as biofuel production continues to expand include:

  • The capacity of the transportation system to move biofuel, feedstock, and co-products produced from biofuel, especially over long distances to fuel markets.
  • The availability of feedstock close to biofuel plants within 100 miles
  • The proximity of feedstocks and biorefineries to co-product markets.
  • Uncertainty about the size and location of biofuel demand from terminal s which consolidate, trans load, and distribute biofuels for blending.

Government policies towards biofuels may decrease this uncertainty. The lack of excess transportation capacity reduces flexibility in case of sudden changes in transportation demand and distribution patterns. Changes in these patterns brought on by rapidly increasing biofuel production could impact the logistics of rail networks, highway congestion, and marine logistics.

Co-Product Transportation Issues

Ethanol plants that use corn and other grains as feedstock produce a co-product called distillers grains (DDGS dried distillers grains with solubles, WDG-wet distillers grains, and MDG-modified distillers grains).  For every 56-pound bushel of corn, 17.5 p ounds of DDGS and 2.76 gallons of ethanol are produced, on average.  Slightly different yields of DDGS are produced from other grains. Dairy cattle operations and cattle feedlots are the primary domestic users of distilled grains as a protein supplement for the ruminant animals. Research is ongoing for increasing the DDGS use by poultry and hog operations, which currently is limited due to nutritional challenges DDGS present to non-ruminant animals. DDGS are initially marketed locally, and delivered by truc k. However, as production grows, access to wider markets may rely on rail or marine transport. Facilities using grain may also choose to adopt fractionation technologies to extract fibre, protein, starch or sweeteners as co-products. These food-grade co-products would also require transportation infrastructure to deliver these products to market.

Biofuel Infrastructure. Managing in an Uncertain Future. Research and Innovation, Position Paper 03 – 2010

At present, biofuel is first sent to blending terminals through tanker trucks, rail cars, and barges, where they are blended with gasoline or diesel and then sent to consumer filling stations via trucks. In the U.S. 67 percent of the ethanol is transported to blending terminals via trucks, 31 percent by rail cars, and 2 percent by barges. Biofuel is also exported through ships to receiving terminals which then blend them with gasoline and then transport them to filling stations using trucks.

The U.S. passed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which required the creation of a Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program. The U.S. environmental Protection Agency issued revised RFS effective on July 1st 2010 (called RFS2) that for the first contained specific fuel volume requirements (Figure 3)

References

Curley, M. 2008. Can ethanol be transported in a multi-product pipeline? Pipeline & Gas Journal 235:34

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Peak oil in the Congressional record 2013

Peak oil in the Congressional record 2013

Also see: Peak Oil in the Congressional record: Overview

Scorecard from 7 documents: 6 denials, 2 affirmations of peak oil

Denials

  1. United States Secretary of Energy Moniz
  2. House of Representatives David Schweikert, Texas
  3. House Representative Pete Olson, Texas (2 times)
  4. Jeffrey B. Hume, vice chairman, Strategic growth initiatives, Continental Resources, Inc., Oklahoma city, OK
  5. Adam Sieminski, Administrator, Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. Department of Energy
  6. House representative Dana Rohrbacher, California.

Affirmations of Peak Oil

  1. Randy Udall (Read into the record by Senator Tom Udall of New Mexico)
  2. Jefferson Keel, President, National Congress of American Indians

2013/6/18 House Hearing – Department of Energy Science & Technology priorities

Denial by United States Secretary of Energy Moniz & House of Representatives David Schweikert, Texas

House of Representatives David Schweikert, 4 denials in 2014: If I were to hop in the literature right now and go back a dozen years ago, whether it be you or many of the smart people who you hang around with, what would you have written about peak oil?  Small problem is we got it wrong. And we built tax codes here, we built environmental codes, we built regulatory codes, actually even foreign policy based on a premise that was absolutely wrong ().

United States Secretary of Energy Moniz:  Sir, that is exactly along the lines of what I was trying to emphasize, that I think we don’t know the future. We always think of the future as a linear extrapolation of the present, and it is not. And it is those innovations that do so much to change the future. I will just say one thing, however, in terms of peak oil. I have witnesses; I was never a peak oil believer.

Schweikert:  I Googled you and I did not see you pop up. I did see the guys just down the hallway from you at MIT writing huge articles about how, right now, we should be about $200 barrel in oil as of this month.

Moniz: We didn’t even get close. But on peak oil, I mean, our view was always that it is not molecules you run out of; it is at what cost can you get the molecules?  And also just to reinforce your point, in natural gas, of course, it was very recently when major heads of major corporations not only got it wrong but put their money in the wrong place.

Schweikert:  But you have to agree it is a brilliant example of technology is faster-moving and smarter than we are because someone out there is coming up with it. It is—you know, when I hold up the book of—you know, the Population Bomb from 1968, the only thing they got right was the author’s name. Everything in the book got wrong because the arrogance of not knowing what the next breakthrough is.

2013/9/13 REMEMBERING RANDY UDALL

Affirmation of Peak Oil. Excerpts of Obit in the Aspen Times: James “Randy” Udall, a native son of the American West, died June 20, 2013, on the eve of the Summer Solstice, doing what he loved most, hiking in the remote Wind River Mountains. He was 61 years old. In 2005, Randy co-founded the Association for the Study of Peak Oil-USA to track the shifting balance between world oil supply and depletion. Randy Udall told hard truths: “We have been living like gods,” he often said. “Our task now is to learn how to live like humans. Our descent will not be easy”. Randy did not hesitate to go toe-to-toe with oil executives, calling for accountability, when discussing the realities of peak oil (Read into the record by Senator Tom Udall of New Mexico)

2013/7/31 THE ALASKA NATIVE TRIBAL HEALTH CONSORTIUM LAND TRANSFER ACT

Affirmation of Peak Oil. As tribal communities grow, it is essential to look at economic and environmental realities in order to make critical decisions about our future. That means tribal planning must address issues such as climate change, peak oil and food insecurity. Food and energy consume huge portions of tribal economies and must be considered in relation to tribal self-determination. The new millennium is a time when we are facing the joint challenges of an industrial food system and a centralized energy system, both based on fossil fuels, and both of which are dam- aging the health of our peoples and the Earth at an alarming rate. Tribal communities have long supplied the raw materials for nuclear and coal plants, huge dam projects, and oil and gas development. These resources have been exploited to power far-off cities and towns, while many tribes remain deficient in sources of heat or electricity (Jefferson Keel, President, National Congress of American Indians)
.

2013/7/23 OVERVIEW OF THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD (RFS)

Denial. The RFS was designed for a U.S. energy future that no longer exists, that of a peak oil and increasing demand. The RFS mandate will be met this year using most of the older excess credits in the system. In future years, if unchanged, this will be much more difficult. Compliance costs are spiking, especially for small refiners who don’t blend fuels and generate their own credits. The RFS has helped increase corn prices, and that has hit consumers back home, at Kroger’s, at Safeway, Wendy’s …With all due respect to some of the panelists who said that there is not an impact on food prices, RFS does have that impact. Wendy’s came into my office a month ago, wanted to talk about Federal issues. You think they want to talk about Obamacare, increasing taxes, all sorts of things? No. They wanted to talk about RFS corn-based ethanol and how it has increased their cost of doing business (House Representative Pete Olson, Texas)

Jack Gerard,  CEO of the American Petroleum Institute: The cost of pure ethanol has always been higher than a gallon of gasoline. Consumers are figuring this out. That is why even with flex-fuel vehicles, they are not buying E85, even though it is available. In Minnesota they have increased the number of E85 filling stations, but the demand for E85 is going down.

2013/7/16. Gas Prices

Denial. These are truly are exciting times in the energy business. Each day at Continental, we witness the assumptions underlying “peak oil” theories crumble under the power of creative minds and pioneering technology. (Jeffrey B. Hume, vice chairman, Strategic growth initiatives, Continental Resources, Inc., Oklahoma city, OK

2013/6/26 HOUSE Hearing OVERVIEW OF THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD: GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES   

Denial. We owe the American people a thorough review of the RFS for one simple reason: The American energy outlook that drove the creation of ethanol tax subsidies in RFS is in the dustbin of history. Tax preferences for corn-based ethanol were created last century and mutated into RFS this century. Why the spur of government activity? Because we thought we hit peak gas. Meaning that to feed our ever-growing demand for gasoline we had to buy more and more oil from foreign sources that weren’t reliable. Our production was going down every single day. But the American innovator, with new technology, has pushed peak oil back to the next century. And while I think the best solution to this problem is to repeal RFS, my mind is not closed. But it is not empty either (House Representative Pete Olson, Texas)

2013/2/13  HOUSE Hearing – American Energy Outlook: Technology, Market & Policy Drivers

2 Denials from Adam Sieminski, Administrator, Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. Department of Energy and House representative Dana Rohrbacher, California.

ROHRABACHER.  I would like to ask, a few years ago we were gloom and doom about peak oil and how we are going to be energy-wise, things are going to get worse and worse. What about peak oil and gas? Is that just a false alarm?

SIEMINSKI.  The problem that I saw as an energy economist, the problem that I always had with the peak oil hypothesis was that it was entirely geology-based. The view assumes that the resource base is completely known, and once you produce half of it that you inevitably are on a downturn. I think that this Committee particularly understands that there is a role for both prices and technology to dramatically change our understanding of the resource base. And that is what we have seen.

ROHRABACHER. When you talk about price, which is one thing, we heard it earlier about the importance of efficiency. Well, assuming that mandates and regulations are what causes efficiency as compared to price, and when you allow the price to go up, there is going to be a great deal more efficiency. People will turn off their lights. Actually, we found that out in California. If indeed the price of electricity goes up, again, we go back to market-based solutions. Rather than having the government step in to try to mandate what direction we go, quite often, the market-based solutions actually get the job done better.

Also See:

Peak oil in the Congressional record 2015

Peak oil in the Congressional record 2014: 7 denials, 1 affirmation

Posted in Congressional Record U.S. | 1 Comment

Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz in the Congressional Record

As I was researching “peak oil” in the congressional record, I ran across this testimony from current Secretary of Energy Moniz, as well as some of his other points of view on different energy matters, of which I’ve extracted just a few.  Moniz defends climate change quite well in this congressional testimony, despite the challenges from stone age congressmen who disagree.  But his views on Peak Oil are disappointing.

2013/6/26. Overview of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)

House of Representatives David Schweikert: If I were to hop in the literature right now and go back a dozen years ago, whether it be you or many of the smart people who you hang around with, what would you have written about peak oil?  Small problem is we got it wrong. And we built tax codes here, we built environmental codes, we built regulatory codes, actually even foreign policy based on a premise that was absolutely wrong ().

United States Secretary of Energy Moniz:  Sir, that is exactly along the lines of what I was trying to emphasize, that I think we don’t know the future. We always think of the future as a linear extrapolation of the present, and it is not. And it is those innovations that do so much to change the future. I will just say one thing, however, in terms of peak oil. I have witnesses; I was never a peak oil believer.

Schweikert:  I Googled you and I did not see you pop up. I did see the guys just down the hallway from you at MIT writing huge articles about how, right now, we should be about $200 barrel in oil as of this month.

Moniz: We didn’t even get close. But on peak oil, I mean, our view was always that it is not molecules you run out of; it is at what cost can you get the molecules?  And also just to reinforce your point, in natural gas, of course, it was very recently when major heads of major corporations not only got it wrong but put their money in the wrong place.

Schweikert:  But you have to agree it is a brilliant example of technology is faster-moving and smarter than we are because someone out there is coming up with it. It is—you know, when I hold up the book of—you know, the Population Bomb from 1968, the only thing they got right was the author’s name. Everything in the book got wrong because the arrogance of not knowing what the next breakthrough is.

Efficiency

The targets are across-the-board efficiency, where we still have many opportunities that are lifecycle-cost beneficial, whether that is vehicles, buildings of course are an enormous opportunity, industrial processes. Then, we need to go to low-carbon, carbon-free alternatives in the power sector, which is probably the leading sector for getting carbon out of the sector. We have three options: We have nuclear, we have renewables, and we have carbon capture and sequestration. And I believe we need a multipronged approach on all of these, and that is what, in fact, the President’s budget proposes. That is what we are doing

Wind

Mr. BUCSHON. why would private sector venture capital be leaving renewables?

Secretary MONIZ. Certainly, one of the reasons has been the large uncertainties in the wind case around the tax.

Mr. BUCSHON . You may or may not agree that it is because that at this point in our history, they are not economically viable and—without massive Federal Government infusion of cash into those industries, is that true or not true? The question is is are we getting ahead of our- selves by—at this point without R&D showing that these are economically viable, getting ahead of ourselves essentially? When venture capital is leaving those areas of our economy, should the Fed- eral Government, other than R&D in those areas, continue to put this kind of money into those when it is clear that the private sec- tor and venture capital are leaving them because they are not economically viable? That is the bottom line.

Secretary MONIZ [replies several times that wind is competitive]

Fusion

I think fusion and plasma science are an important area for continued DOE support. Plasma science really is another kind of phase of matter and then fusion has a long-term—and it is still long-term possibility as an attractive energy source. So I support the general idea of continuing fusion research.

Mr. KENNEDY. Just because it is a long-term horizon doesn’t mean that we don’t make the in- vestment. Would you agree?

Secretary MONIZ . No, we have to. If you don’t make it today, we won’t have it in the future.

How will DOE spend money this year?

Mr Kennedy: The Fiscal Year 2014 administration budget includes 2.78 billion for the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, which proposes a number of increases to its programs across the board. You also mentioned in your testimony, sir, the ‘‘Race to the Top’’ initiative as part of your larger focus on national energy policy. You touched upon this a little bit earlier, sir, but if there are parts of our across-the-board energy portfolio that are not yet cost- competitive because of barriers to technological advancement, how would you propose going forward to lower those barriers to make the technological advances to make it cost-effective?

Secretary M ONIZ . Well, I think we need a portfolio of instruments. At the foundation is the basic R&D, which gives us, you know, the new possibilities. But then, of course, we have something like ARPA–E, which takes promising but still high-risk technologies and moves them hopefully to the place where they become market-attractive for investors. And I think we are seeing a lot of success now developing there and that the program is still new. I mean it is about 3–1/2 years old, well, going on 4, I guess. So that is very, very encouraging. We also have them in programs and the applied energy programs in selected areas for large-scale demonstrations. The gentleman from North Dakota, for example, mentioned carbon capture and sequestration. That is a place where demonstrating the viability of large-scale storage is just not credible without DOE, without government investment. And then when it comes to deploying or helping the deployment, then we have things like the loan programs

LNG

Mr. WEBER. We have a unique opportunity in the history of the world for America to take the lead, as you heard earlier from one of my colleagues. Are you committed to doing everything you can to get those—that permit process moving forward, especially LNG, natural gas, and making it expeditious so that we can maintain our competitive edge so that we can have that public interest in mind that you yourself talked about?

Secretary MONIZ. Well, again, to clarify, I mean we are not engaged in permitting in terms of production or exploration but in terms of LNG exports certainly.

URANIUM

Mrs. LUMMIS. I want to visit with you about what has been happening with regard to the domestic uranium industry. Sometime ago a 10% cap was negotiated so that DOE would only transfer, sell, or barter their uranium stockpile at a rate below 10% of current domestic uranium demand. And that agreement was abrogated and the price of uranium fell through the floor. And my State, which produces a great deal of uranium—albeit domestic supply only supplies 10% of our uranium for our nuclear power needs—was hurt badly, badly by the DOE’s decision to abrogate the 10% cap. You know, the DOE has the authority, the power to make or break uranium production in this country because of prices and their ability to dump excess product on the market and destroy prices here, thereby making our country actually more reliant on foreign providers of uranium. My next question is about USEC. Over the last 18 months, Dr. Moniz, the taxpayers have been asked to directly subsidize the U.S. Enrichment Corporation to the tune of over $1 billion in cash for uranium and other incentives. I want to understand how big this hook is that the taxpayers are hanging on. Specifically, is it DOE or is it USEC who is financially obligated to safely decommission the enrichment facility in Paducah, Kentucky, and hand it over to DOE? And how much do you anticipate that costing?

Secretary MONIZ . I cannot give you an exact cost estimate right now… There is a sensitivity that currently we have no American origin uranium enrichment technology, and consequently, if and when we need en- riched uranium for military purposes, we will not have the option.

 

 

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Peak oil in the Congressional record 2015

[ I’ve meant to post more but haven’t gotten around to it, but there are quite a few other summaries of house and senate hearings on energy in category Experts/GOVERNMENT/Congressional Record U.S.

Also see: Peak Oil in the Congressional record: Overview

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts:  KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity]

E42. January 9, 2015. Fracking is jeopardizing the environment and the U.S. Economy.  Congressional Record.

House Representative Jim McDermott: I rise today to express my growing concern about the economic issues of fracking. The once booming oil fracking market could be headed for a bust. If a bust in the oil fracking sector does happen, it could create massive losses on Wall Street and for investors on Main Street in 2 ways.

  1. Fracking oil drillers issued massive amounts of debt to construct the necessary wells. With the price of gas falling, many oil fracking drillers now face cash shortfalls. As a result, it is becoming more and more difficult for frackers to meet their debt servicing obligations. If the debt servicing obligations are not met, investors on Main Street and Wall Street could be left holding billions of dollars of worthless bonds.
  2. Many companies took out derivatives contracts against market fluctuation, insuring stable cash flow. Losses are mounting on these contracts as oil prices fall. Wall Street banks that own many of these contracts will have to absorb massive losses. The unexpected shock of falling oil prices may destabilize the balance sheet of these big banks, creating the conditions for another financial crisis.

Below is an article from Truth-out.org that further explains this issue by Ben Ptashnik, Russia blamed, U.S. taxpayers on the hook as fracking boom collapses:

“…When gas fracking first popped onto the scene, grandiose claims were made that the United States had 100 years of gas supply in shale, or 2,560 trillion cubic feet. And Wall Street rode that initial estimate. But in fact, no statistical evidence con- firmed the hyped claims of a 100-year shale gas supply…

By 2013, the U.S. Geological Survey refined that down to 481 trillion cubic feet—less than a 19-year supply based on 2013 rates of production.

Meanwhile oil fracking, which is separate from gas fracking, also needed huge injections of capital, and oil prices to stay at $85 a barrel or higher on average to break even. Many of the shale oil wells that have sucked up a huge amount of investment have also turned out to have short lives and their operators required continued infusions of capital to drill new wells to keep afloat, even as prices tumbled due to the glut they them-selves created.

Falling oil prices will place a huge stress on the world’s junk bond market as energy companies now account for 15% of the outstanding issuance in the non-investment grade bond market. The plunge in the prices of crude could trigger a ‘‘volatility shock large enough to trigger the next wave of defaults,’’ according to Deutsche Bank.

This explains why the Obama administration—with complicity of both congressional Democrats and Republicans—managed in the wee hours of the morning to slip a loophole into the supposedly ‘‘must-pass’’ cliff-hanger omnibus budget bill. This toxic Trojan horse, passed in December 2014, now includes a minor footnote provision that might cause taxpayers to pick up the tab on more than a trillion dollars (yes, trillion) if the energy market bubble implodes, which it must if oil stays at half the price it fetched just six months ago.

After last minute, heavy lobbying on the budget bill by Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and an army of 3,000 Wall Street lobbyists, it appears that once again sufficient insecurity and fear had been spread among the political class regarding destabilization of the financial markets (or withdrawal of campaign financing). They allowed a last minute amendment that killed Dodd-Frank protections, and allowed U.S. taxpayers to be shaken down to cover Wall Street’s shale gambling debacle.

The heavy-handed move by the financial industry has outraged progressives and libertarians alike. It seems that these Wall Street criminal could not resist the easy cash from Ponzi scheme market bubbles, and so they have stuck it to the U.S. public once again: Preposterously huge bonuses, Porsches, pricey call girls, and million-dollar Manhattan condos were at stake. [And why not?] After all, not a single one of those con artists went to jail last time.

Wall Street is now flooded with fracking industry derivatives contracts that protect the profits of oil producers from dramatic swings in the marketplace. Derivatives are essentially insurance policies taken out by the oil industry to guard against fluctuations in the cost of fossil fuel supplies. Dramatic swings rarely happen, but when they do they can be absolutely crippling. Derivatives taken out to ensure prices don’t go down are now creating billions in losses for those who sold such bets on the market; someone is going to have to absorb massive losses created by the sudden drop in oil on the other end of those insurance con- tracts. In many cases, it is the big Wall Street banks, and if the price of oil does not rebound substantially they could be facing colossal losses.

The big Wall Street banks did not expect plunging home prices to implode the mort- gage-backed securities market in 2008, and their current models also don’t have $60 oil prices included in projections. The huge losses may send a shock wave into the entire financial industry. It has been estimated that the 6 largest ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ banks control $3.9 trillion in commodity derivatives contracts, those same gambling instruments that brought us the 2008 housing collapse. And a very large chunk of that amount is made up of oil derivatives. Combined with the huge flood of shale junk bonds on the market, the derivatives could initiate a bubble burst that could turn into a financial market implosion.

2015/6/3 National defense authorization act for fiscal year 2016

Denial. Same as 2014/5/6 A few years ago people were talking about peak oil, as if all of the oil that could be discovered had been discovered in the world; we were running out. Well, obviously, that has proven not to be true (Senator Cornyn, Texas).

Also See:

Peak oil in the Congressional record 2014: 7 denials, 1 affirmation

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Peak oil in the Congressional record 2014: 7 denials, 1 affirmation

Peak oil in the Congressional record 2014 from the U.S. Government Publishing Office by Alice Friedemann, www.energyskeptic.com

  • 7 government documents
  • 7 Denials, 4 from House of representatives David Schweikert of Arizona
  • 1 affirmation of conventional oil peak from James Hansen

Also see: Peak Oil in the Congressional record: Overview

2014/3/13 Keystone XL and the national interest determination.

  • Denial of peak oil – fracked oil will lead to US independence, can be sent to Europe to reduce Putin’s influence, but can’t be done without building the Keystone pipeline (Gen. James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.).
  • Conventional peak near but using tar sands will “screw our children and grandchildren and all the young people in future generations…. This is game over” (James Hansen)

2014/5/6 Energy savings & industrial competitiveness act of 2014. Denial. a few years ago people were talking about peak oil, as if all of the oil that could be discovered had been discovered in the world; we were running out. Well, obviously, that has proven not to be true (Senator Cornyn, Texas)

House of Representatives David Schweikert AZ (4 denials):

  1. 2014/2/11 Ensuring Open Science at EPA. Denial: It was only 10, 12 years ago if you and I sat in this room, we would have been hearing speakers, Members talking about Peak OilWe got it wrong but yet our tax policy, our environmental policy, our military policy was based on that data
  2. 2014/3/12 Science of capture & storage: understanding EPA’s carbon rules. Denial, same as above.
  3. 2014/6/25 Congressional Record H5761. Denial, same as above.
  4. 2014/7/16 Unfunded liabilities, the greatest threat to our future—house. Denial, same as above.

2014/11/18. A roadmap for prosperity—house H8067. Denial. 8 years ago, when President Bush was in, they were talking about something called peak oil theory, where they said we had already discovered all of the recoverable oil and it was going to get lower and lower, and it was going to be harder and harder to recover and that we were at our finite limits. That shows you how wrong science can be, because in the last 5 years we have had the largest oil boom in history right here in the United States (House Rep. Tom Rice, SC)

 

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