Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz in the Congressional Record

As I was researching “peak oil” in the congressional record, I ran across this testimony from current Secretary of Energy Moniz, as well as some of his other points of view on different energy matters, of which I’ve extracted just a few.  Moniz defends climate change quite well in this congressional testimony, despite the challenges from stone age congressmen who disagree.  But his views on Peak Oil are disappointing.

2013/6/26. Overview of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)

House of Representatives David Schweikert: If I were to hop in the literature right now and go back a dozen years ago, whether it be you or many of the smart people who you hang around with, what would you have written about peak oil?  Small problem is we got it wrong. And we built tax codes here, we built environmental codes, we built regulatory codes, actually even foreign policy based on a premise that was absolutely wrong ().

United States Secretary of Energy Moniz:  Sir, that is exactly along the lines of what I was trying to emphasize, that I think we don’t know the future. We always think of the future as a linear extrapolation of the present, and it is not. And it is those innovations that do so much to change the future. I will just say one thing, however, in terms of peak oil. I have witnesses; I was never a peak oil believer.

Schweikert:  I Googled you and I did not see you pop up. I did see the guys just down the hallway from you at MIT writing huge articles about how, right now, we should be about $200 barrel in oil as of this month.

Moniz: We didn’t even get close. But on peak oil, I mean, our view was always that it is not molecules you run out of; it is at what cost can you get the molecules?  And also just to reinforce your point, in natural gas, of course, it was very recently when major heads of major corporations not only got it wrong but put their money in the wrong place.

Schweikert:  But you have to agree it is a brilliant example of technology is faster-moving and smarter than we are because someone out there is coming up with it. It is—you know, when I hold up the book of—you know, the Population Bomb from 1968, the only thing they got right was the author’s name. Everything in the book got wrong because the arrogance of not knowing what the next breakthrough is.

Efficiency

The targets are across-the-board efficiency, where we still have many opportunities that are lifecycle-cost beneficial, whether that is vehicles, buildings of course are an enormous opportunity, industrial processes. Then, we need to go to low-carbon, carbon-free alternatives in the power sector, which is probably the leading sector for getting carbon out of the sector. We have three options: We have nuclear, we have renewables, and we have carbon capture and sequestration. And I believe we need a multipronged approach on all of these, and that is what, in fact, the President’s budget proposes. That is what we are doing

Wind

Mr. BUCSHON. why would private sector venture capital be leaving renewables?

Secretary MONIZ. Certainly, one of the reasons has been the large uncertainties in the wind case around the tax.

Mr. BUCSHON . You may or may not agree that it is because that at this point in our history, they are not economically viable and—without massive Federal Government infusion of cash into those industries, is that true or not true? The question is is are we getting ahead of our- selves by—at this point without R&D showing that these are economically viable, getting ahead of ourselves essentially? When venture capital is leaving those areas of our economy, should the Fed- eral Government, other than R&D in those areas, continue to put this kind of money into those when it is clear that the private sec- tor and venture capital are leaving them because they are not economically viable? That is the bottom line.

Secretary MONIZ [replies several times that wind is competitive]

Fusion

I think fusion and plasma science are an important area for continued DOE support. Plasma science really is another kind of phase of matter and then fusion has a long-term—and it is still long-term possibility as an attractive energy source. So I support the general idea of continuing fusion research.

Mr. KENNEDY. Just because it is a long-term horizon doesn’t mean that we don’t make the in- vestment. Would you agree?

Secretary MONIZ . No, we have to. If you don’t make it today, we won’t have it in the future.

How will DOE spend money this year?

Mr Kennedy: The Fiscal Year 2014 administration budget includes 2.78 billion for the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, which proposes a number of increases to its programs across the board. You also mentioned in your testimony, sir, the ‘‘Race to the Top’’ initiative as part of your larger focus on national energy policy. You touched upon this a little bit earlier, sir, but if there are parts of our across-the-board energy portfolio that are not yet cost- competitive because of barriers to technological advancement, how would you propose going forward to lower those barriers to make the technological advances to make it cost-effective?

Secretary M ONIZ . Well, I think we need a portfolio of instruments. At the foundation is the basic R&D, which gives us, you know, the new possibilities. But then, of course, we have something like ARPA–E, which takes promising but still high-risk technologies and moves them hopefully to the place where they become market-attractive for investors. And I think we are seeing a lot of success now developing there and that the program is still new. I mean it is about 3–1/2 years old, well, going on 4, I guess. So that is very, very encouraging. We also have them in programs and the applied energy programs in selected areas for large-scale demonstrations. The gentleman from North Dakota, for example, mentioned carbon capture and sequestration. That is a place where demonstrating the viability of large-scale storage is just not credible without DOE, without government investment. And then when it comes to deploying or helping the deployment, then we have things like the loan programs

LNG

Mr. WEBER. We have a unique opportunity in the history of the world for America to take the lead, as you heard earlier from one of my colleagues. Are you committed to doing everything you can to get those—that permit process moving forward, especially LNG, natural gas, and making it expeditious so that we can maintain our competitive edge so that we can have that public interest in mind that you yourself talked about?

Secretary MONIZ. Well, again, to clarify, I mean we are not engaged in permitting in terms of production or exploration but in terms of LNG exports certainly.

URANIUM

Mrs. LUMMIS. I want to visit with you about what has been happening with regard to the domestic uranium industry. Sometime ago a 10% cap was negotiated so that DOE would only transfer, sell, or barter their uranium stockpile at a rate below 10% of current domestic uranium demand. And that agreement was abrogated and the price of uranium fell through the floor. And my State, which produces a great deal of uranium—albeit domestic supply only supplies 10% of our uranium for our nuclear power needs—was hurt badly, badly by the DOE’s decision to abrogate the 10% cap. You know, the DOE has the authority, the power to make or break uranium production in this country because of prices and their ability to dump excess product on the market and destroy prices here, thereby making our country actually more reliant on foreign providers of uranium. My next question is about USEC. Over the last 18 months, Dr. Moniz, the taxpayers have been asked to directly subsidize the U.S. Enrichment Corporation to the tune of over $1 billion in cash for uranium and other incentives. I want to understand how big this hook is that the taxpayers are hanging on. Specifically, is it DOE or is it USEC who is financially obligated to safely decommission the enrichment facility in Paducah, Kentucky, and hand it over to DOE? And how much do you anticipate that costing?

Secretary MONIZ . I cannot give you an exact cost estimate right now… There is a sensitivity that currently we have no American origin uranium enrichment technology, and consequently, if and when we need en- riched uranium for military purposes, we will not have the option.

 

 

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Peak oil in the Congressional record 2015

[ I’ve meant to post more but haven’t gotten around to it, but there are quite a few other summaries of house and senate hearings on energy in category Experts/GOVERNMENT/Congressional Record U.S.

Also see: Peak Oil in the Congressional record: Overview

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer and “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”. Podcasts:  KunstlerCast 253, KunstlerCast278, Peak Prosperity]

E42. January 9, 2015. Fracking is jeopardizing the environment and the U.S. Economy.  Congressional Record.

House Representative Jim McDermott: I rise today to express my growing concern about the economic issues of fracking. The once booming oil fracking market could be headed for a bust. If a bust in the oil fracking sector does happen, it could create massive losses on Wall Street and for investors on Main Street in 2 ways.

  1. Fracking oil drillers issued massive amounts of debt to construct the necessary wells. With the price of gas falling, many oil fracking drillers now face cash shortfalls. As a result, it is becoming more and more difficult for frackers to meet their debt servicing obligations. If the debt servicing obligations are not met, investors on Main Street and Wall Street could be left holding billions of dollars of worthless bonds.
  2. Many companies took out derivatives contracts against market fluctuation, insuring stable cash flow. Losses are mounting on these contracts as oil prices fall. Wall Street banks that own many of these contracts will have to absorb massive losses. The unexpected shock of falling oil prices may destabilize the balance sheet of these big banks, creating the conditions for another financial crisis.

Below is an article from Truth-out.org that further explains this issue by Ben Ptashnik, Russia blamed, U.S. taxpayers on the hook as fracking boom collapses:

“…When gas fracking first popped onto the scene, grandiose claims were made that the United States had 100 years of gas supply in shale, or 2,560 trillion cubic feet. And Wall Street rode that initial estimate. But in fact, no statistical evidence con- firmed the hyped claims of a 100-year shale gas supply…

By 2013, the U.S. Geological Survey refined that down to 481 trillion cubic feet—less than a 19-year supply based on 2013 rates of production.

Meanwhile oil fracking, which is separate from gas fracking, also needed huge injections of capital, and oil prices to stay at $85 a barrel or higher on average to break even. Many of the shale oil wells that have sucked up a huge amount of investment have also turned out to have short lives and their operators required continued infusions of capital to drill new wells to keep afloat, even as prices tumbled due to the glut they them-selves created.

Falling oil prices will place a huge stress on the world’s junk bond market as energy companies now account for 15% of the outstanding issuance in the non-investment grade bond market. The plunge in the prices of crude could trigger a ‘‘volatility shock large enough to trigger the next wave of defaults,’’ according to Deutsche Bank.

This explains why the Obama administration—with complicity of both congressional Democrats and Republicans—managed in the wee hours of the morning to slip a loophole into the supposedly ‘‘must-pass’’ cliff-hanger omnibus budget bill. This toxic Trojan horse, passed in December 2014, now includes a minor footnote provision that might cause taxpayers to pick up the tab on more than a trillion dollars (yes, trillion) if the energy market bubble implodes, which it must if oil stays at half the price it fetched just six months ago.

After last minute, heavy lobbying on the budget bill by Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and an army of 3,000 Wall Street lobbyists, it appears that once again sufficient insecurity and fear had been spread among the political class regarding destabilization of the financial markets (or withdrawal of campaign financing). They allowed a last minute amendment that killed Dodd-Frank protections, and allowed U.S. taxpayers to be shaken down to cover Wall Street’s shale gambling debacle.

The heavy-handed move by the financial industry has outraged progressives and libertarians alike. It seems that these Wall Street criminal could not resist the easy cash from Ponzi scheme market bubbles, and so they have stuck it to the U.S. public once again: Preposterously huge bonuses, Porsches, pricey call girls, and million-dollar Manhattan condos were at stake. [And why not?] After all, not a single one of those con artists went to jail last time.

Wall Street is now flooded with fracking industry derivatives contracts that protect the profits of oil producers from dramatic swings in the marketplace. Derivatives are essentially insurance policies taken out by the oil industry to guard against fluctuations in the cost of fossil fuel supplies. Dramatic swings rarely happen, but when they do they can be absolutely crippling. Derivatives taken out to ensure prices don’t go down are now creating billions in losses for those who sold such bets on the market; someone is going to have to absorb massive losses created by the sudden drop in oil on the other end of those insurance con- tracts. In many cases, it is the big Wall Street banks, and if the price of oil does not rebound substantially they could be facing colossal losses.

The big Wall Street banks did not expect plunging home prices to implode the mort- gage-backed securities market in 2008, and their current models also don’t have $60 oil prices included in projections. The huge losses may send a shock wave into the entire financial industry. It has been estimated that the 6 largest ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ banks control $3.9 trillion in commodity derivatives contracts, those same gambling instruments that brought us the 2008 housing collapse. And a very large chunk of that amount is made up of oil derivatives. Combined with the huge flood of shale junk bonds on the market, the derivatives could initiate a bubble burst that could turn into a financial market implosion.

2015/6/3 National defense authorization act for fiscal year 2016

Denial. Same as 2014/5/6 A few years ago people were talking about peak oil, as if all of the oil that could be discovered had been discovered in the world; we were running out. Well, obviously, that has proven not to be true (Senator Cornyn, Texas).

Also See:

Peak oil in the Congressional record 2014: 7 denials, 1 affirmation

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Peak oil in the Congressional record 2014: 7 denials, 1 affirmation

Peak oil in the Congressional record 2014 from the U.S. Government Publishing Office by Alice Friedemann, www.energyskeptic.com

  • 7 government documents
  • 7 Denials, 4 from House of representatives David Schweikert of Arizona
  • 1 affirmation of conventional oil peak from James Hansen

Also see: Peak Oil in the Congressional record: Overview

2014/3/13 Keystone XL and the national interest determination.

  • Denial of peak oil – fracked oil will lead to US independence, can be sent to Europe to reduce Putin’s influence, but can’t be done without building the Keystone pipeline (Gen. James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.).
  • Conventional peak near but using tar sands will “screw our children and grandchildren and all the young people in future generations…. This is game over” (James Hansen)

2014/5/6 Energy savings & industrial competitiveness act of 2014. Denial. a few years ago people were talking about peak oil, as if all of the oil that could be discovered had been discovered in the world; we were running out. Well, obviously, that has proven not to be true (Senator Cornyn, Texas)

House of Representatives David Schweikert AZ (4 denials):

  1. 2014/2/11 Ensuring Open Science at EPA. Denial: It was only 10, 12 years ago if you and I sat in this room, we would have been hearing speakers, Members talking about Peak OilWe got it wrong but yet our tax policy, our environmental policy, our military policy was based on that data
  2. 2014/3/12 Science of capture & storage: understanding EPA’s carbon rules. Denial, same as above.
  3. 2014/6/25 Congressional Record H5761. Denial, same as above.
  4. 2014/7/16 Unfunded liabilities, the greatest threat to our future—house. Denial, same as above.

2014/11/18. A roadmap for prosperity—house H8067. Denial. 8 years ago, when President Bush was in, they were talking about something called peak oil theory, where they said we had already discovered all of the recoverable oil and it was going to get lower and lower, and it was going to be harder and harder to recover and that we were at our finite limits. That shows you how wrong science can be, because in the last 5 years we have had the largest oil boom in history right here in the United States (House Rep. Tom Rice, SC)

 

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Oil Infrastructure – pipelines, refineries, terminals

Sider, A. and Friedman, N. November 2, 2016. More than half of U.S. Pipelines are at least 46 years old. Building new systems has become harder amid opposition from landowners and environmental groups. Wall Street Journal.

More than 60% of U.S. fuel pipelines were built before 1970, according to federal figures. Recent disruptions on Colonial Pipeline Co.’s fuel artery running up the East Coast show why some energy observers worry that this is a problem.  Carl Weimer, executive director of the advocacy group Pipeline Safety Trust, said fuel pipeline systems can operate safely for decades if they are well maintained. But after 40 or 50 years, problems like corrosion increase.

U.S. OIL Pipelines 2013 (US DOT/RITA reports 49,974 miles of crude and 87,452 miles of refined product pipelines in Table 1-10: U.S. Oil and Gas Pipeline)

  • Transmission liquids pipelines delivered 8,305,840,173 billion barrels of crude oil
  • Transmission liquids pipelines delivered 6,642,068,030 billion barrels of refined products (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, etc and natural gas liquids (propane, ethane, butane, etc) to terminals
  • In total,  transmission pipelines delivered 14.948 billion barrels of crude oil and petroleum products
  • Pipeline operators reported 192,396 miles of liquids pipeline in operation in the United States, with 60,911 miles devoted to crude oil, 63,532 miles transporting refined petroleum products (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, etc), and 62,742 miles delivering natural gas liquids (propane, ethane, butane,etc)
Figure 11-30. Total Petroleum Product Movement

Figure 11-30. Total Petroleum Product Movement

Figure 11-26. Major U.S. Product Terminals with gas, diesel, jet fuel, etc for delivery to 160,000 service stations

Figure 11-26. Major U.S. Product Terminals with gas, diesel, jet fuel, etc for delivery to 160,000 service stations

Source: http://www.api.org/~/media/files/oil-and-natural-gas/pipeline/us-pipeline-map-api-website3.pdf

Source: http://www.api.org/~/media/files/oil-and-natural-gas/pipeline/us-pipeline-map-api-website3.pdf

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The difference between depletion and decline rate in oil fields

Notes from 26 page: Höök, M., Davidsson, S., Johansson, S., Tang, X. 2014. Decline and depletion rates of oil production: a comprehensive investigation. Philosophical Transactions. Series A: Mathematical, physical, and engineering science, 372

Depletion rate is the rate that the oil reserves are reducing

Decline rate is the rate that production is declining 

A database of 880 post-peak fields is analyzed to determine typical depletion levels, depletion rates, and decline rates. We found the size of oil fields has a significant influence on decline and depletion rates, with generally high values for small fields and relatively low values for larger fields.

Introduction

Non-renewable fossil fuels provide around 81% of the global primary energy supply and oil remains the single largest primary fuel, satisfying 33% of the world’s energy needs in 2009 (IEA, 2011). Given the high reliance on oil, particularly within the transportation sector, it is evident that policymakers and the public need reliable forecasts of future oil supply.

Two of the most fundamental concepts in the current debate about future oil supply are oil field decline rates and depletion rates. These concepts are related, but not identical. However, analysts and laymen alike tend to get these concepts mixed up, leading to misunderstandings and flawed conclusions.

In addition, the definition of depletion rates can vary.

The term decline rate refers to the annual reduction in the rate of production from an individual field or a group of fields, after a peak in production. Detailed empirical analyses of decline rates have been produced for well over 50 years and most studies tend to agree on the typical decline rates for different categories of field, despite some differences in details (Höök et al., 2009a, b). Possible causes of observed decline rates are debated. Some propose that the observed decline rates are mainly caused by underinvestment while others argue that the reason is simply physical limits to production rates.

Depletion rates refer to the rate at which oil is produced in a field or region expressed as a fraction of either the ultimate recoverable resources (URR) or the remaining reserves.

Depletion rates have been studied since the late 1970s (Flower, 1978) and the concept has become prominent in the peak oil debate due largely to the work of Campbell (1992; 1996; 2006; Campbell & Heapes, 2008) – although he is far from alone in using depletion rates. However, the definition of depletion rate and the methodology for estimating them has varied over time and has never been as standardized as is the case for decline rates. Perplexing terminology, inconsistent theory, lack of clear methodology, and different definitions have contributed to a confusion surrounding depletion rates.

Fundamentals of oil production

Conventional oil accumulates through long geological processes in underground formations known as reservoirs. Typical reservoirs consist of porous rocks, such as sandstone or carbonates, where petroleum resides in the tiny void spaces between the rock grains. An oil field may consist of one or several reservoirs reachable from the surface by drilling. Current global oil production is predominantly derived from conventional oil fields with minor contributions coming from natural gas liquids (NGL – ethane, propane, butane and pentane), unconventional oil, and other liquids. For historical reasons, oil is commonly measured in barrels corresponding to a volume of 42 US gallons or approximately 159 liters. An oil field may contain anything from less than a million barrels (Mb) to many billion barrels (Gb).

Robelius (2007) estimated the number of identified oil fields in the world to be around 47,500.

IEA (2008) estimated there are around 70,000 fields, but also notes that the exact number depends on how specific fields are delineated and highlights data discrepancies. However, the importance of individual fields to global oil supply varies widely, with around 25 fields accounting for one quarter of global oil production and a few hundred ‘giant’ fields (> 500 million barrels) accounting for approximately one half of global production (Höök et al., 2009b). All fields share similar overall behavior, although the magnitude of production can differ significantly. An oil field typically exhibits the production profile seen in Figure 1. However, significant deviations can be caused by development history, changes in technology or oil price, accidents, political decisions, sabotage, and similar factors. Some fields have short plateau periods, more resembling a single peak, while others (especially large fields) may keep production relatively constant for many decades. But at some point, all fields will reach the onset of decline and begin to experience decreasing production.

Figure 1. Idealized production behaviour of an oil field. Source: Höök et al (2009a).

Figure 1. Idealized production behaviour of an oil field. Source: Höök et al (2009a).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The extraction of oil from a reservoir is commonly divided into 3 production methods: primary, secondary and tertiary recovery. Several factors control the production flows in most oil fields. A basic understanding of these is necessary for better understanding of decline and depletion behavior. Physically, oil recovery is about fluid flows through the porous material that make up the oil field. Fluid movements in a reservoir depend on the following factors that are explained more comprehensively by Satter et al. (2008):

  • Depletion (leading to a decrease in reservoir pressure)
  • Compressibility of the rock/fluid system
  • Dissolution of the gas phase into the liquid
  • Formation dip
  • Capillary rise through microscopic pores
  • Additional energy provided from the underlying aquifer or the overlying gas cap
  • External fluid injection
  • Thermal, or other, manipulation of fluid properties

Fluid flow fundamentals

The extraction of oil is to a large extent decided by physical properties related to the geological formation of the reservoir in question and the fluid characteristics of the petroleum it contains. Variations in these characteristics cause production rates to vary from field to field. An oil reservoir carries its fluid in small microscopic pores within the rock, and the term porosity refers to the fraction of the pore volume compared to the total bulk volume. The larger the porosity, the better the rock is at storing fluids. The pores serve both as storage and as a transmission network for fluid flows. The French physicist Henry Darcy (1856) studied fluid flow through a bed of packed sand and derived an elegant expression to describe the behavior of the fluid, known as Darcy’s law (Equation 1). The expression involves important physical properties such as the ability of the porous medium (rock in case of oil reservoirs) to permit fluid flow, its permeability, and the degree of internal resistance to flow of the fluid, its viscosity. Viscous forces tend to influence reservoir flows of both produced and injected fluids in reservoirs under normal oil field conditions to a greater extent than gravity/capillary forces. This implies that fluids flow through porous media in parallel layers with few disruptions (i.e. laminar flow conditions) and the flow rate is proportional to the existing pressure gradient in the reservoir (Satter et al., 2008).

Generally horizontal flow is greater than vertical flow due to directional differences in permeability (Selley, 1998), but this must be seen as a simplification of the real conditions in an oil field. Nevertheless it is relevant because it expresses the physical limits to the possible production rate, or defines a “best case-scenario” of production from a homogenous reservoir where the pressure gradient is the sole drive mechanism.

Darcy’s Law states that a fluid with high viscosity will have a low flow rate; that if the rock permeability is high there will be a high flow rate; and that there must be a pressure gradient in order to have any fluid flow.

Primary recovery uses naturally occurring energy, such as buoyancy (Archimedes principle) and reservoir pressure, to drive oil flows to the surface. Oil is simply allowed to flow under its own pressure, unless fluids are injected into the reservoir. However, the pressure gradient drops as oil is extracted and this will limit the rate of production according to Darcy´s law (Abrams and Wiener, 2010). This results in a depletion-driven decline in the rate of production as depletion of the reservoir reduces pressure and hence fluid flows. Reservoir and fluid properties can greatly influence the outcome and lead to significant differences in the percentage of ‘oil in place’ that is recovered (i.e. recovery factor). Typically, about 10–30% of the oil in place can be extracted during primary recovery (Kjärstad and Johnsson, 2009).

Secondary recovery focuses on artificial pressure maintenance (APM), where injection of fluids maintains reservoir pressure. In most oil fields, especially those of significant size, secondary recovery accounts for the largest proportion of total recovery (Amit, 1986; Hyne, 2001). The most common method for maintaining pressure during secondary recovery is water flooding, where water is injected to maintain reservoir pressure. When this works well the water forms a water bank that moves through the pores and presses the oil towards the producing wells. The injection of water is generally intended to give a fairly constant pressure at the entry to a well pipe (i.e. downhole pressure), but eventually injected fluids will break through and mix with the oil. Conservation of mass (i.e. material balance) in oil reservoirs requires that the extracted volume of fluid is relatively constant throughout the lifetime (Satter et al., 2008), but the water share (or ‘water cut’) will increase with time. As oil is extracted from the reservoir, an increased water cut will cause a decline of the oil production flow despite high reservoir pressure.

Water-flooding presents numerous engineering challenges that vary with the rock and fluid properties, reservoir heterogeneities and the physical differences between the oil in place and the injected water (Satter et al., 2008). One example is when the oil is much more viscous than the injected water causing so called “fingering”, where water moves in thin irregular ‘fingers’ instead of as a unified front. This bypasses significant volumes of recoverable oil and can cause premature breakthrough of water into production wells.

The properties of the oil compared to water are so important for oil extraction that the American Petroleum Institute has constructed a measure of the density of the oil compared to water, defined as API gravity = (141.5/specific gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit) – 131.5.

API > 10° the oil is lighter and floats on fresh water, while if API < 10° it is denser and sinks. Water flooding is possible when the oil API > 25° and the viscosity is rather low (< 30 centipoise), and works best in homogenous reservoirs. Consequently, secondary recovery is not always effective, even though a majority of the world’s oil producing fields attempt secondary recovery.

Primary and secondary recovery combined can usually extract 30–50% of the oil in place and nearly all reservoirs that can benefit from APM are using it (Kjärstad and Johnsson, 2009).

Figure 2. Production of oil and water for the giant Jay field in Florida, USA. The water cut reached over 90% of total produced fluids in the mid-1980s and is now at 97%. In 2010, the field produced 2,500 barrels of oil and 94,000 barrels of water per day. Data source: Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2012)

Figure 2. Production of oil and water for the giant Jay field in Florida, USA. The water cut reached over 90% of total produced fluids in the mid-1980s and is now at 97%. In 2010, the field produced 2,500 barrels of oil and 94,000 barrels of water per day. Data source: Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2012)

Tertiary recovery or enhanced oil recovery (EOR), involves more complex ways of influencing rock and fluid properties. The feasibility of EOR, together with the appropriate approach to EOR, will vary with the fluid properties and geological characteristics of the reservoir. According to Darcy’s Law, the ability of oil to move in a reservoir can be increased by decreasing its viscosity. This leads to four main approaches to EOR, namely thermal, chemical, miscible and microbial methods.

  1. Thermal methods are the most commonly used approach and make up nearly half of all worldwide EOR projects. Thermal EOR involves changing oil viscosity by thermal means, such as steam flooding, hot-water flooding or in-situ combustion, where the bottom of the reservoir is ignited and heat is generated by burning a part of the oil in place.
  2. Miscible methods account for about 41% of worldwide EOR projects and focus on injection of a gas or solvent that is miscible with the oil, resulting in improved recovery. Miscibility increases the mobility of the oil, but also greatly adds to the complexity of the process. Carbon dioxide injection is widely applicable to many reservoirs at lower miscibility pressures than other methods. Part of the carbon dioxide is soluble in oils and swells the net volume and reduces viscosity. As miscibility develops, both CO2 and oil can flow together because of the low interfacial tension. If available, light hydrocarbons (primarily natural gas) can also be injected to generate miscibility, decrease the viscosity of the oil and increase oil volume via swelling. Nitrogen, or even flue gas, is an alternative in high permeability reservoirs containing light oil (Bath, 1989). These gases are usually rather inexpensive, but inferior to CO2 or hydrocarbons from an oil recovery perspective (Satter et al., 2008). Nitrogen has poor solubility in oil and requires much higher pressures to develop miscibility.
  3. Chemical flooding uses the injection of polymer, surfactants, and caustic alkaline or other chemicals. At present, it makes up about 11% of global EOR projects. This technique requires conditions favorable for water-flooding as it is a modification of water-flooding. Polymers can be used to augment water-flooding by changing water viscosity and mobility. More oil will be produced in the early life of the water flood and this is the primary economic advantage, as ultimate recovery is generally the same for as for conventional water-flooding. Surfactants recover additional oil by enhancing mobility and solubility of oil and emulsification of oil and water. Caustic alkaline injection involves the injection of sodium compounds that can react with organic petroleum acids in certain oils to create surfactants in situ. Injected chemicals can also react with reservoir rocks to change wettability and thereby improve recovery. Sheng (2011) reviewed these methods.
  4. The final form of EOR uses microbes to improve oil recovery. It is a rarely used approach and only makes up 0.6% of worldwide EOR projects . Injected microbes can generate gas within the reservoir, thus increasing reservoir pressure and reducing oil viscosity. Alternatively microbes can generate bio-surfactants that can reduce interfacial tension and improve recovery by favourably changing wettability (Adasani and Bai, 2011).

Under favorable conditions, the combination of primary and secondary recovery can extract between one third and one half of the original oil in place. The average recovery from petroleum reservoirs around the world is estimated to be approximately 35%. If a large part of the oil remains after both primary and secondary recovery, operators may implement a suitable EOR technique. However, only a small percentage of all oil fields are using EOR due to high costs and technology requirements.

Since 1959, only 652 EOR projects have been pursued and enhanced production corresponded to ~1.8 Mb/d in 2010, or 1.5% of total global production.

Defining decline and depletion rates

The concept of depletion is intuitive as it is something of which we all have every-day experience. For example, if we have a fixed amount of beer in a bottle, and drink some of it, the beer in the bottle is unavoidably depleted. Any resource that is extracted faster than it is produced is subject to depletion – which means that depletion is not restricted to nonrenewable resources. For example, wood can be considered renewable, but if deforestation is faster than reproduction the resource is depleted within the time-span considered. A resource can only be considered as renewable if the rate of extraction is less than or equal to the rate of increment of the resource.

Fossil fuels are only reproduced on geological timescales, making depletion of these resources irreversible. While the concept of depletion is the same for all resources, there may also be limits on the rate of depletion of a resource. This is an important consideration for oil resources, where the rate of depletion is constrained by geological conditions and the physical laws of fluid flow in porous media, together with economic and technological factors.

Fundamental definitions for oil depletion

A fundamental parameter concerning oil production is the size of recoverable resources remaining for exploitation. Multiple classification schemes for resources and reserves make it difficult to compare and combine data from different sources.

Revisions to URR estimates may occur at any time as a consequence of changing market conditions, increased geological knowledge, and improved technology and so on. This makes URR a time varying quantity, although it is not as fluctuating as other reserve estimates. URR may also be expressed as the remaining recoverable resource plus cumulative production at an arbitrary point in time. Depletion levels can vary from 0 to 1 (i.e. 0–100%) and indicate what proportion of the estimated URR remains. Returning to the beer bottle analogy, we note that a half-full bottle would have a depletion level of 50%.

Depletion rates

Conceptually, the depletion rate is the ratio of annual production to some estimate of recoverable resources, where the latter can be defined as 1P or 2P reserves, remaining recoverable resources or the URR.

A lack of standardized use has resulted in several studies using depletion rates based on very different definitions of recoverable resources and this has added to the confusion surrounding the concept.

In practice, a depletion rate can refer to two possible things.

  1. It can relate to the rate of change of the depletion level at time t.
  2. Or it could also refer to the rate at which remaining recoverable resources are being produced.

Decline rates

The rate of decline, Y, is equal to the difference in the rate of production from one period to the next (change in production rate/production rate) and is commonly expressed on an annual or monthly basis. Changes can be both positive and negative, but are generally negative after a field has passed its peak of production.

A disadvantage of decline rate studies is that they do not necessarily relate to the physical factors driving oil depletion (decreasing reservoir pressure, increasing water cut, etc.). Observed decline may also arise from non-physical factors such as underinvestment, politics, production quotas, damage or sabotage. In essence, decline rates easily provide ambiguous signals for unwary analysts. Usually, decline of production is the result of complex interactions between reservoir physics, technology, economics and decision-making. Many factors influence production rates and one must be careful in extrapolating decline into the future. Decline and disruption caused by socioeconomic events are often termed ‘aboveground’ constraints, and may be resolved if proper measures are taken. On the other hand, depletion-driven decline is the result of intrinsic, below- ground physical constraints and is difficult to alleviate.

Empirical study

This study relies on the Uppsala giant oil field database. The database was initiated by Robelius (2007) and later updated by Höök et al. (2009a, b). It contains ~350 giant oil fields worldwide accounting for an URR of over 1100 Gb. For the purpose of this study, complementary data on hundreds of smaller oil fields all over the world have been combined with the giant oil field data. From this combined database, some 880 individual oilfields were selected. They were chosen to reflect the wide array of field sizes, production strategies, and socioeconomic conditions seen over the globe. The size distribution is given in Table 2, and in general an equal number of fields in each size category have been chosen. However, due to the limited number of post-peak fields larger than 1 billion barrels (Gb), this size category contains fewer fields (N=130) than the other categories (N=150). However, this difference is assumed to be negligible when identifying the general patterns of behavior.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample of fields studied. The distribution is highly skewed with most resources concentrated in relatively few giant fields.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample of fields studied. The distribution is highly
skewed with most resources concentrated in relatively few giant fields.

 

 

 

 

Table 3. Observed annual decline rates in percent sorted by field size.

Table 3. Observed annual decline rates in percent sorted by field size.

Table 5. Estimated depletion levels at peak production sorted by field size.

Table 5. Estimated depletion levels at peak production sorted by field size.

Table 6. Estimated depletion rates of ultimately recoverable resources at onset of decline, sorted by field size.

Table 6. Estimated depletion rates of ultimately recoverable resources at onset of decline, sorted by field size.

Table 7. Estimated depletion rates of remaining recoverable resources sorted by field size.

Table 7. Estimated depletion rates of remaining recoverable resources sorted by field size.

Data considerations

To assess depletion and decline rate behavior, data for individual fields is essential. Some data on production and recoverable resources is available in the public domain or can be obtained from companies (IHS, Rystad Energy, etc.), agencies or governments. Some regions, such as the North Sea, provide excellent openly accessible data while others, such as OPEC, are characterized by generally poor data access.

Figure 5. The relation between field size and maximum production level.

Figure 5. The relation between field size and maximum production level.

Annual or monthly production data is comparatively easy to acquire and can commonly be obtained from operators, agencies or third-party sources such as business magazines, trade journals, etc. Recoverable resources, reserve estimates, and related data are more problematic to acquire and are generally less reliable. The multiple classification schemes for resources and reserves make it difficult to compare and combine data from different sources (UKERC, 2009a).

Naturally, there are shortcomings in the available data. For example, different definitions among reporting agencies, changing classifications over time, terrorist strikes, major accidents (Piper Alpha, Deepwater Horizon, etc.), and political decisions can all influence both production trends and data quality. Fields with severely disturbed behavior or otherwise dubious properties were, as far as possible, omitted from this analysis. Some fields exhibit a clear peak, commonly quite early in the field’s life, followed a decline phase. Other fields can have long plateau phases, possibly ranging for decades, which are followed by the onset of decline.

This study focuses on fields that have “peaked” and left the plateau stage. Consequently, fields that are in the build-up phase or haven’t reached the onset of decline are excluded from the study. For fields with a plateau, “peaking” was defined as the point where production is judged to clearly leave a 4% fluctuation band around the plateau level, as earlier used by Höök et al. (2009b). The data show a strong correlation (R2 = 0.98) between estimated URR and peak/plateau production levels (a power fit indicates a strong correlation valid over several magnitudes as seen in figure 5). This is hardly surprising, since high daily production levels are generally only possible in fields with significant URR.

For some fields, official estimates of URR or equivalent were available. For others, the URR was estimated by adding cumulative production to recent (no older than 2005) industry estimates of 2P (proven+probable) reserves. Bentley et al. (2007) discuss industry 2P data in more detail and suggest that they provide a median estimate of remaining recoverable resources (i.e. there is a 50% probability that recoverable resources are higher or lower). Thus it is equally likely that cumulative production over the remaining life-time of the field will be greater or lower than the 2P figure. However, reserve estimates tend to increase over time, a phenomenon known as reserve growth (Sorrell et al., 2012). Factors such as increased investment, technology and knowledge are also acknowledged and known to increase reserves over time, making it probable that URR estimates based upon current 2P reserves will underestimate the actual field size, and the fact of reserves growth must also be acknowledged even in 2P data. For the remainder where no 2P data or official URR estimates were available, more traditional curve-fitting methods were used to estimate the URR.

In our aggregated dataset, the URR of some fields are surely overestimated, while others may be underestimated. We assume here that these effects cancel each other out when combined. For the sake of simplicity we assume here that a field’s URR remains fixed over time. Changed URR values will not affect decline rates of any of the fields used in this study, and neither will it affect the peak production points. However, increases in the estimated URR reduce the estimated depletion level and depletion rate.

Decline rates seen in real fields can vary significantly. In this dataset, annual decline rates ranged from less than 1% to more than 70%, although the range decreases with increasing field size (Figure 6). The average decline rates for the entire data set can be derived, although such a figure can be misleading due to the underlying size dependence. Closer analysis shows major differences among decline rates and implies that decline rates of small fields may differ significantly from those of large fields (Table 3).

Giant fields of over 1 Gb have by far the lowest decline rates and there is a clear trend towards more rapid decline with decreasing field size (Table 3). Production-weighted (PW) average values also show that fields with high production levels tend to decline somewhat faster than the arithmetic average for small fields (<0.1 Gb), while the opposite was true for semi-giant and giant oil fields. Partly this can be explained by a large share of OPEC control among the larger fields and the fact that OPEC producers tend to aim for long and stable production profiles rather than rapid return on investment. Secondly, these patterns can arise from the economically rational behavior of a price- taking producer who maximizes profit subject to technical and physical constraints (Jakobsson et al., 2012).

Table 3. Observed annual decline rates in percent sorted by field size.

Earlier studies have also shown that technological development such as EOR can result in more rapid declines. Gowdy and Julia (2007) initially highlighted this problem for two North Sea giant fields. Later, Höök et al. (2009a, b) elaborated on this and found a general tendency towards higher decline rates for giant fields as new technology and modern production strategies allowed the extension of plateau production at the expense of higher subsequent decline rates.

Table 4 compares the results of three studies that provide estimates of average decline rates from a globally representative sample of post-peak giant fields. Despite differences in data sets, definitions and weighting methods, the results are in broad agreement that the decline in the existing production is between 4–8% annually (Höök et al., 2009b). Expressed in production capacity, this means that roughly a new North Sea (~5 Mb/d) has to come on stream every year just to keep the present output constant (Fantazzini et al., 2011). This implies that nearly 5 new Saudi-Arabias would be needed by 2030 just to offset the decline in existing production (Aleklett et al., 2010).

Höök et al. (2009b) provides additional data on the time evolution of giant oil field decline rates and finds the average decline rate has increased by around 0.15% per year since mid-1960s – a trend that is expected to continue. From Table 3, it can be also seen that decline rates are higher for smaller fields and as future production becomes more reliant on non-giant fields it is reasonable that average decline in existing production will increase. The Increasing decline rate is seldom discussed – even though it can lead to additional capacity requirements of as much as 7 Mb/d by 2030 (Aleklett et al., 2010).

Figure 6. Scatter plot of observed decline rates seen the data set. Significant differences occur, but generally decrease with increasing field size.

Table 4. Average decline rates for post-peak giant fields found by recent studies. Source: Höök et al. (2009b) Parameter Höök et al. IEA CERA Average decline

Depletion level behavior

Earlier studies have shown that it is common for giant oil fields to reach the onset of decline when less than half of the URR has been produced (Höök et al., 2009a). In this study, this analysis is expanded to include smaller fields. Figure 7 provides a scatter plot of the estimated depletion level at the onset of decline, while Figure 8 provides a corresponding frequency histogram.

A significant spread can be seen among the fields studied with some reaching an estimated depletion level of over 80% before the onset of decline, while others peak at depletion levels as low as 10%. However, there is a clear trend towards higher depletion levels at peak with increasing field size (Table 5). Some of the fields with the highest depletion levels at peak, especially in the >100 Mb size category, are old American fields that were extensively redeveloped around the 1980s when new technology/investments allowed larger fractions of the oil- in-place to be recovered. Production-weighted figures indicate that fields with high annual production rates are usually developed in such a way that the depletion level is relatively high at the onset of decline.

Interestingly, there is virtually no correlation (linear correlation coefficient = -0.07) between the estimated depletion levels at peak and the subsequent decline rates in oil fields. This indicates that depletion levels have restricted relevance for analyzing production flows.

It should also be noted that any future reserve growth in the studied fields will reduce the estimated depletion levels. If a significant portion of the URR figures used in this study are underestimates, the depletion levels derived here will be overestimates. If so, this would reinforce the conclusion that most fields begin to decline well before half of their URR is produced.

Figure 7. Scatter plot of estimated depletion levels at peak production (onset of decline).

The theory described above predicts that maximum depletion rates should occur when the onset of decline is reached. This may also be referred to as the depletion rate at peak and effectively marks the point where depletion-driven decline begins to dominate over other variables and leads to the onset of production decline. Estimated annual depletion rates of URR at the onset of decline are plotted in Figure 9. A few small fields reach depletion rates of 30% or more before peaking, but most have significantly lower depletion rates at peak production. The histogram (Figure 10) shows a skewed distribution with the largest number of fields having values of 10% or less, leading to an overall mean of 10.3% and a production-weighted mean of 4.9%. The figure also demonstrates a clear trend towards lower depletion rates at peak with increasing field size (Table 6).

The general behavior is similar for depletion rates of remaining recoverable resources (RRR) as seen in Figure 11. The distribution histogram (Figure 12) shows a skewed structure with only a small number of fields capable of depleting more than 20% of the remaining recoverable resources per year at peak production. Depletion rate differences diminish with increasing field size, indicating a narrowing interval of possible depletion rates. Höök et al. (2009a) expanded on this correlation by comparing onshore, offshore, OPEC, and non-OPEC giant oil fields.

High depletion rates are only common in small oil fields, and are increasingly exceptional with increasing field size. As noted earlier, an oil-producing region consists of a sum of individual oil fields, with their individual peak points distributed in time. From the theory described in Section 3.4, it follows that the regional depletion rate must be somewhere between the minimum and maximum depletion rates of its components. Maximum depletion rates can only be reached if all fields peak simultaneously, which is extremely unlikely. According to our analysis of field data, regional depletion rates are likely to be constrained to less than 20% if they are assumed to follow patterns seen in history. Given the dominance of larger fields in total regional production, the regional depletion rates are even lower in reality. Aleklett et al. (2010) estimates that the typical regional depletion rates of remaining recoverable resources are of the order of 2–5%, and argue that projections of future global oil production by the IEA (2008) are based upon unrealistic assumptions about depletion rates that are not explicitly discussed. Miller (2011) agrees with the findings of Aleklett et al. (2010) and notes the persistent optimism of the IEA projections.

Depletion rates can be directly calculated from production data and URR estimates during both the build-up and plateau stages in an oil field’s life, even before the field has peaked.

In contrast, decline rates can only be estimated after the onset of decline.

However, the strong correlation between the concepts makes it possible to use depletion rates to estimate future average decline rates reasonably well. This has already been used to forecast future production profiles for fields that have yet to reach the onset of decline (Höök et al., 2010b). When combined with reliable URR estimates, depletion rate analysis offers a simple tool for making educated estimates of future production decline rates.

Decline and depletion rates are important to understand and give significant depth to the peak oil debate. However, it is essential to understand that these two concepts are fundamentally different. Decline rates can be measured directly from production data, while depletion rates depend upon estimates of recoverable resources. Changes in recoverability will affect depletion levels and depletion rates, while decline rates are unaffected. Different data sources and resource estimates done at different times are likely to give diverging results.

Oil field size is a key variable, with generally high values for most parameters in small fields and comparatively low values for larger fields. The data shows clearly that most fields tend to peak with much less than half of their ultimately recoverable resources produced, typically around 30% (Table 5).

Peak production generally appears well before the glass is half empty.

Depletion levels of giant oilfields are a noteworthy detail, since giant fields tend to reach the onset of decline with higher depletion levels than small fields. This could be explained by the way most giant fields are developed, as they usually start production at far lower depletion rates than smaller fields due to requirements related to production equipment, pipelines, etc. As a result, giant fields can maintain production plateau by continually drilling into new parts of the reservoir to supplement declining production from older sections and this can probably lead to comparatively higher depletion levels at peak. However, this could also be an effect of underestimated URR and might possibly change if significant future reserve growth occurs.

The theoretical framework summarized here is well supported by the empirical evidence. The existence of maximum depletion rates prior to the onset of production decline is of particular importance. Furthermore, the strong correlation between depletion rates at peak and subsequent decline rates can be used in supply forecasting and for estimating future decline rates before the plateau phase ends. Depletion rate analysis has been around for some time, but the underlying methodology has never been clearly presented.

Much confusion surrounds the concept of depletion rates, even though it is relatively simple idea once properly understood. Maugeri (2012) is a recent example of how terminology is mixed up and how exceptionally low decline rates are used without any solid justification.

Another example is how the EIA used a depletion rate model in a flawed way to reach misleading conclusions (Jakobsson et al., 2009). Similarly, the IEA’s influential projections of global oil supply are based upon highly unrealistic assumptions about the depletion rates of various categories of resources (UKERC, 2009a; Aleklett et al., 2010; Miller, 2011). Once more realistic assumptions are made; the future supply outlook looks much bleaker.

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Energy generation water consumption

[ Notice how much water biofuels use, especially soybeans for biodiesel

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, 2015, Springer]

Notes from “Working Document of the NPC Future Transportation Fuels Study. Topic Paper #31 Water Usage“. July 17, 2012 by John Wind and Ray Dums, 21 pages.

Figure 3. Well-­‐to-­‐Tank (WTT) Hydrocarbon Transportation Fuel Pathways – Fresh Water Consumption (Gal/MMBTU)

Figure 3. Well-­to-­Tank (WTT) Hydrocarbon Transportation Fuel Pathways – Fresh Water Consumption (Gal/MMBTU)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 4. Power Generation Pathways – Life Cycle Water Consumption (gal/MWh)

Figure 4. Power Generation Pathways – Life Cycle Water Consumption (gal/MWh)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 6. Well-to--Tank (WTT) Water Consumption for Various Biofuel Pathways

Figure 6. Well-to–Tank (WTT) Water Consumption for Various Biofuel Pathways

 

 

Figure 7. Well-to-Wheels (WTW) Water Consumption for Fuel-Vehicle Systems

Figure 7. Well-to-Wheels (WTW) Water Consumption for Fuel-Vehicle Systems

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Water is used in significant quantities for producing energy. It is an essential part of the fuel lifecycle, from feedstock production to conversion to final fuels and power. Because water is a limited resource essential for sustaining life, an understanding of water requirements for different fuel options is required. In order to understand the relative impacts of water use in the production of transportation fuels, it is first important to place this use within the context of total global and U.S. water supply and dispositions.

Water resource use is generally described by two measures: volumes withdrawn and volumes consumed.

Water consumption, a subset of total water withdrawn, is the more appropriate measure for resource utilization as this represents water that is removed from the watershed and thus made unavailable for future use. Consumption happens when water evaporates or is contaminated to the point of being unusable. In industrial and thermo-electric applications, for example, this is typically due to evaporative losses in cooling processes. Waste water discharges of fresh water to oceans or disposal to saline aquifers also represent losses of water from a watershed because the freshwater is no longer available for use.

In addition to quantifying volumes of water, the quality of water is an important concern. Fresh water is the most significant since it represents a small fraction of the total global water resource and is critical for sustaining life. Processes that consume fresh water are highly scrutinized and must be evaluated to determine if the use of water resources is prudent.

Figure 1 provides the breakdown between fresh water withdrawn and consumed in the U.S., along with primary end users of that water. In total, approximately 100 billion gallons of fresh water is consumed per day, whereas the total withdrawals are 345 billion gallons per day.

Irrigation for agriculture is the dominant consumer of fresh water in the U.S.

Thermo-electric power generation withdraws about a third but consumes less than a 20th of water resource.

Industrial processes and mining, which includes extraction and processing of fossil hydrocarbon fuels, account for a small fraction of fresh water use.

Freshwater Withdrawals/Consumption (2005 data)

  • Domestic  1%/7%  Public Supply 13%    Thermoelectric 41%/4%       Irrigation 37%/81%
  • Mining    1%/1%  Industrial 5%/3%       Aquaculture       3%        Livestock 1%/3%

Figure 1. U.S. Freshwater Withdrawals and consumption. Source: USDOE, Energy Demands on Water Resources. Report to Congress on the Interdependency of Energy and Water, 2006. http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1344/pdf/c1344.pdf Kenny, J.F., et al. Estimated Use of Water in the United States in 2005. Circular 1344. USGS, U.S. Department of the Interior. Reston, Virginia. 2009. 2 Wu, Consumptive Water Use in the Production of Ethanol and Petroleum Gasoline, Argonne National Laboratory, 2009. ANL/ESD/09–1

Fossil Fuels

Water use associated with transportation fuel production varies greatly between fuel types and is dependent upon the method of extraction and refining. Crude to fuel pathways discussed here include the refining of crudes from conventional, water flood, CO2 flood, and steam flood recovery mechanisms.

Pathways using unconventional resources are oil sands (in situ and mining) and the FT (Fischer–Tropsch) coal-to-liquids and gas-to-liquids processes. Literature values for the water use in gallons per MMBTU fuel produced are given as ranges for each pathway and pathway components (upstream versus downstream). In this report, upstream denotes all processes prior to refining and/or conversion, and downstream denotes processes from refining to distribution. Upstream processes consume more water than their downstream counterparts in the crude oil pathways. All pathways are shown in Figure 3.

Care must be taken when interpreting the water consumption ranges for the different pathways. The broad ranges can be based on regional differences in reservoir characteristics and how the water is recycled, re-used, or treated. Moreover, oil and gas field production characteristics change significantly over time, so the water requirements for a given production technology depend on the site–specific reservoir characteristics, which are a function of the age and production history of the field.

Crude Oil and Natural Gas Pathways

Petroleum extraction consumes relatively little fresh water. Fresh water is used for well construction processes such as drilling and completion in oil and gas resource development. Primary oil and natural gas production, which uses natural reservoir pressure to flow fluids to the wellbore, requires little water.

Secondary methods of recovery, such as water flooding, require increasing amounts, as fresh water may sometimes be required to augment the volume of saline produced water that is re– injected back into the reservoir for pressure support. According to a study of U.S. oil production, the majority of the produced water (approximately 70%), is re–injected to maintain reservoir pressures. The remainder is either cleaned and discharged, or injected into disposal wells.3

Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) methods, such as CO2 or steam injection consume varying amounts of fresh water depending on the process.

Unconventional sources of petroleum such as Canadian oil sands consume varying amounts of water depending on the recovery process. A recent analysis estimates the range of well-to- tank fresh water consumption for crude oil produced onshore in the U.S. is between 22 and 53 gallons per MMBTU, with a technology weighted average of 34 gallons per MMBTU.4 Combining offshore production (as primary recovery with no water consumption) with the onshore production provides a range of fresh water consumption for all U.S. crude oil between 17 and 40 gallons per MMBTU, with a technology weighted average of 27 gallons per MMBTU, including downstream refining.

Crude oil refining consumes fresh water for cooling, boiler feed water, crude desalting, and other processes. This requires refineries to be located in areas with access to stable supplies of water. Refineries typically have extensive water treating facilities and discharge processed/cleaned excess water to surface streams or lakes.

Natural Gas

Conventional natural gas production requires very small (assumed to be negligible) amounts of water for well drilling and completion. Natural gas processing plants use water for cooling and power generation.

The development of shale gas resources requires water for hydraulic fracturing of the shale formations to increase the permeability and enable gas to flow to the producing wells. Over the life of a shale gas well, the water consumption is surprisingly small, though significant volumes are needed over short time periods for hydraulic fracturing. Producers are reusing more of the flow-back water at subsequent fracking sites. The requirements for water quality for the fracture fluids are still being optimized, moving towards higher limits on total dissolved solids (salinity), thus enabling greater reuse of flow-back water. More detail on shale gas production is provided in a recent NPC report.5

Hydrogen from Natural Gas

Natural gas is the feedstock for the primary method of hydrogen production used in petroleum refining, and potentially for use as a transportation fuel. For hydrogen production by steam methane reforming (SMR), the greatest water consumption is in the production of high–pressure steam and, to a lesser extent, the reforming and water gas shift reactions.7 Typically it takes 40-50 gallons of water to produce an MMBTU of H2 fuel. 8,9

Electricity

Thermo-electric generation is one of the major users of fresh water in the U.S. Although it comprises over 33% of all water withdrawals, it only accounts for 4% of fresh water consumption

Biofuels

The United States’ Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) mandates significantly increased production and use of first-generation and advanced biofuels. Water is intimately tied to the major components of the biofuel production chain –used directly during feedstock production and conversion, and impacted by erosion, runoff, and industrial discharges. Existing demands and impacts on fresh water resources will be increased by the biofuel production mandated by the RFS.

The projected increase in production of biofuel feedstocks between 2006 and 2030 is expected to result in an additional 6.4 billion gallons per day of water withdrawals in the United States. Associated with this withdrawal will be an increase of 5.2 billion gallons per day of water consumption, an increase of over 5% from current total U.S. water consumption (see Figure 1). Compared to the water needed to grow the feedstock, water withdrawals and consumption related to feedstock processing are minor, as they increase from 0.09 to 0.5 and from 0.07 to 0.4 billion gallons per day, respectively.20 Water consumption increases will vary by region and may represent a significant impact on water supplies in areas that are already water-supply stressed.

Biofuel Consumptive Water Use

Water consumption in the biofuel value chain is caused by evaporated and transpired irrigation water, pollution, and water lost during industrial processes within biorefineries. Evaporation during cooling is the primary source of water consumption in biorefining. Water use in biorefineries may also include feedstock cleaning, fermentation, and other processes. A typical biofuel water balance is shown in Figure 5.

Feedstock Production

With the complete implementation of RFS2 in 2022, cellulosic feedstock and corn production for biofuel is expected to approximately double water use compared with biofuel water use in 2006. The increase is likely to be caused by the future production and processing of cellulosic feedstocks.

Corn ethanol production is not likely to contribute to the increased water demands as most corn acreage that would be brought into production for ethanol is already irrigated for other uses. Any feedstock (cellulosic biomass or corn) which is dependent on precipitation rather than irrigation will be advantaged from a water resources perspective.23

Production of the same feedstock in different climates results in a range of water consumption profile values for each crop. For example, water consumption for corn production in three areas of the Midwest with different water balances is shown in Table 2.24 In production regions that are more arid, farmers rely more on irrigation.

Though precipitation is not the only determining variable, this general relationship between precipitation and irrigation requirements applies to most crops.

Table 2. Precipitation and Irrigation Needs (Wu 2009)

Region                  Precipitation ……..Irrigation

………………………………(inches)……… (gal per MMBTU Ethanol)

  • Lower Midwest…. .. 37.8..…………. 93
  • Upper Midwest… ….29.5….……… 183
  • Western Midwest ..21.7…….. 4,218

Thermo-chemical and biodiesel conversion pathways have lower water requirements than fermentation pathways. The FAME process of biodiesel production and the hydroprocessing of bio-oils require very small water inputs due to the nature of the conversion processes.

Water Consumption Ranges for Selected Biofuel Pathways

While the amount of water (precipitation and irrigation) needed to grow biomass feedstocks dwarfs the amount of water used during conversion, certain feedstocks do not require irrigation (i.e., forest residues and dedicated feedstocks grown in regions with enough precipitation to meet the demands of growth). In these instances, the biomass conversion component of the value chain will be the dominant factor in determining total water consumption.

Water Availability

Biofuel production will have to compete with industrial and power generation requirements, municipalities, and other demands for limited water resources. In general, surface and ground water resources experience regional pressure in most areas of intensive agriculture in the U.S.32 Since annual precipitation and groundwater recharge are finite in all places, increased agricultural consumption associated with feedstock production should be carefully evaluated. Water withdrawals and environmental discharges associated with biorefineries should also be considered. Geographies with stressed water resources can be severely impacted if total water requirements are not thoughtfully considered. Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, Texas, the Dakotas, eastern Washington and Oregon have stressed or unbalanced water resources (more consumption than recharge) and rely primarily on irrigation for crop production. During periods of drought in any geography, biofuel crops require additional irrigation support to maintain yields. Depleted water resources (Ogallala aquifer, etc.) may not satisfy demand, which will limit the productivity a and sustainability of biofuel production.33

FROM OTHER SOURCES: ENERGY USED IN DRINKING AND SEWAGE TREATMENT

According to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 4% of America’s electricity is used on drinking water and sewer treatment facilities. In the past, gravity moved water and sewage.  Our modern systems use so  much energy because 85% of the electricity goes to the pumps that lift and move water and sewage along, often upwards against the flow of gravity, especially in cities that use groundwater.  Although the initial groundwater may be shallow, over time as typical unsustainable use grows, the wells need to be drilled deeper and deeper, requiring more and more electricity to pump up.

The most extreme example of this is California’s pumping of water 2,000 feet up from the central valley over the Tehachapi mountains, perhaps the most energy-intensive water supply in the world, and uses 20% of all of California’s electricity generation to do so.

Electricity is also needed to pressurize water to get it to flow through a massive underground pipe network at pressures high enough to guarantee the water will flow to faucets on higher floors of buildings and be strong enough to fight fires.  In the past, water flowed out at street level to shared fountains.  Since the water infrastructure is falling apart, a great deal of water is lost through leaks, further increasing the amount of electricity that must be used.

Sewage treatment plants are always at the lowest elevations, but even so, electricity is used for pressurized force mains to get sewage over hills, or to flow faster so it doesn’t back up in flat areas.

Climate change in the East and Midwest is likely to cause 30% more sewer overflows and consequent pollution problems.

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Hirsch, R.L. Mitigation of maximum world oil production: shortage scenarios

Notes from: Hirsch, R.L., 2008. Mitigation of maximum world oil production: Shortage scenarios. Energy Policy, 36(2): 881–889. 

World GDP Growth & World Oil Production Growth Have Tracked For Decades:world GDP and oil prd match

 

A 1% change in current world oil production equates to over 800,000 barrels per day (bpd).

To save that level of consumption through increases in the efficiency of the world’s light duty vehicle fleet (automobiles and light trucks) would require more than a decade, assuming crash program implementation.

Production of 800,000 bpd of substitute liquid fuels would require coal-to-liquids (CTL) plants costing $100 billion and over a decade under the best of conditions.

Thus, small percentages of world oil production and demand represent large economic impacts and very large levels of mitigation hardware and investment.

As a limiting case for decline rates, giant fields were examined, and decline rates of 8-16% were evident after plateaus in well-managed cases. Actual oil production from Europe and North America demonstrated significant periods of relatively flat oil production (plateaus). However, before entering its plateau period, North American oil production went through a sharp peak and steep decline. Examination of a number of future world oil production forecasts showed multi-year rollover / roll-down periods, which represent pseudo plateaus.

Potentially overwhelming all else, considerations of resource nationalism posits an Oil Exporter Withholding Scenario, hastening the onset of decline and exaggerating world supply decline rates.

Oil Exporter Withholding Scenario

Peak Oil & Exporter Strategies
Peak oil is not yet real to most people & countries
When realized (likely sudden), panic could cause shortages & oil prices to rise rapidly (1973 & 1979)
For oil exporters: Another large windfall

Some exporters will likely reduce exports
Less need for income due to their new windfall
Internal oil consumption rising
Realization that national oil resources are finite
Conserving for the future makes good sense

oil exporter withholding scenario

Oil Shockwave: A scenario analysis of multiyear oil supply disruptions on the U.S. economy.

  • 4% global oil shortfall lead to an oil price to ~$160 / bbl.
  • U.S. economy goes into recession / millions of jobs lost.

Participants:  Carol Browner, Robert Gates , Richard Haass, General P.X. Kelley, Franklin Kramer , Don Nichols, Gene Sperling, Linda Stuntz & James Woolsey

Decline Rates in Selected Giant Oil Fields 8-16%

Decline Rates in Selected Giant Oil Fields 8-16%

Posted in Peak Oil, Robert Hirsch | Comments Off on Hirsch, R.L. Mitigation of maximum world oil production: shortage scenarios

Coal-to-liquids (CTL) can not compensate for declining oil & natural gas production

Notes from 23 page: Höök, M. & Aleklett, K. 2010. A review on coal-to-liquid fuels & its coal consumption. International journal of energy research Vol. 34 10:848-864

Annual decline in existing crude oil production is around 4-8%, equivalent to an annual production decrease of 3-7 Million barrels per day (Mb/d) [14].

If 10% of world coal production were diverted to CTL, only a few Mb/d could be produced.

This prevents CTL from becoming a viable mitigation plan for liquid fuel shortages on a global scale, and therefore unrealistic to claim CTL provides a feasible solution to liquid fossil fuel shortages created by peak oil when it can only be a minor contributor.

Sasol in South Africa gets one barrel of CTL synthetic fuel per 0.73- 1.04 tons of bituminous coal, i.e. a conversion ratio of 1-1.4 barrels/ton coal. This puts a strict limitation on future CTL capacity imposed by future coal production volumes.

Water will also limit volumes of CTL produced: Water is a vital part of the process, either as hot steam or as a feedstock for hydrogen production. Water for cooling and the boiler must also be provided, and for a larger plant the amount of water consumed can be very large. The water consumption for a 50,000 b/d facility with American coal would be in the region of 40,000 to 50,000 cubic meters per day [36]. In addition, the grinding of coal and mixing it with water will consume both water and energy.

Capital will also limit CTL plants, which are very expensive [40]

  • 20,000 b/d      $ 1.5-$ 4 billion
  • 80,000 b/d      $ 6-  $24 billion
  • 1,000,000 b/d $60-$160 billion

Liquid hydrocarbon fuels can be obtained from various feedstocks, ranging from solids to gases. Coal-to-Liquids (CTL) is a technology based on the liquefaction of coal using three basic approaches; pyrolysis, direct coal liquefaction (DCL) and indirect coal liquefaction (ICL) [6]. Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) and Biomass- toLiquids (BTL) are related options, based on feedstock other than coal. Generally, synthetic fuel properties can be made almost identical to conventional petroleum fuels.

South Africa developed CTL-technology in the 1950s during an oil blockade and CTL now plays a vital part in South Africa’s national economy, providing over 30% of their fuel demand [10].

The annual decline in existing crude oil production has been determined as 3-7 Mb/d [14]. Similar production volumes would be challenging to offset, either partially or in full, by new CTL-projects.

Pyrolysis

The oldest method for obtaining liquids from coal is high temperature pyrolysis. Typically, coal is heated to around 950° C in a closed container. The heat causes decomposition and the volatile matter is driven away, increasing carbon content. This is similar to the coke-making process and accompanying tar-like liquid is mostly a side product. The process results in very low liquid yields and upgrading costs are relatively high. Coal tar is not traditionally used as a fuel in the transportation sector. However, it is used worldwide for manufacturing roofing, waterproofing and insulation products and as a raw material for various dyes, drugs and paints. Mild temperature pyrolysis uses temperatures of 450-650 °C. Much of the volatile matter is driven off and other compounds are formed through thermal decomposition. Liquid yields are higher than for high temperature pyrolysis, but reach a maximum at 20% [21]. The main product is char, semi-coke and coke (all smokeless solid fuels). This technique has mostly been used to upgrade low-rank coals, by increasing calorific value and reducing Sulphur content.

Pyrolysis provides low liquid yields and has inherently low efficiency. Furthermore, the resulting liquids require further treatment before they can be used in existing vehicles. A demonstration plant for coal upgrading was built in the USA and was operational between 1992 and 1997 [21]. However, there is little possibility that this process will yield economically viable volumes of liquid fuel. Consequently, further investigation and analysis of coal pyrolysis is not undertaken.

Direct coal liquefaction (DCL)

This process is built around the Bergius-process (Formula 4), where the basic process dissolves coal at high temperature and pressure. Addition of hydrogen and a catalyst causes “hydro-cracking”, rupturing long carbon chains into shorter, liquid parts. The added hydrogen also improves the H/C-ratio of the product. Liquid yields can be in excess of 70% of the dry weight coal, with overall thermal efficiencies of 60-70% [22, 23]. The resulting liquids are of much higher quality, compared to pyrolysis, and can be used unblended in power generation or other chemical processes as a synthetic crude oil (syncrude). However, further treatment is needed before they are usable as a transport fuel and refining stages are needed in the full process chain. Refining can be done directly at the CTL-facility or by sending the synthetic crude oil to a conventional refinery. A mix of many gasoline-like and diesel- like products, as well as propane, butane and other products can be recovered from the refined syncrude.

Indirect coal liquefaction (ICL)

This approach involves a complete breakdown of coal into other compounds by gasification. Resulting syngas is modified to obtain the required balance of hydrogen and carbon monoxide. Later, the syngas is cleaned, removing sulfur and other impurities capable of disturbing further reactions. Finally, the syngas is reacted over a catalyst to provide the desired product using FT-reactions (Formula 1).

In general, there are two types of FT-synthesis, a high temperature version primarily yielding a gasoline-like fuel and a low temperature version, mainly providing a diesel-like fuel [26]. More details on FT-synthesis via ICL- technology have been discussed by others [6, 26].

The main candidates for future CTL-technology are DCL and ICL. In essence, DCL strives to make coal liquefaction and refining as similar to ordinary crude oil processing as possible by creating a synthetic crude oil. By sidestepping the complete breakdown of coal, some efficiency can be gained and the required amount of liquefaction equipment is reduced. Coal includes a large number of different substances in various amounts, several unwanted or even toxic. Some substances can poison catalysts or be passed on to the resulting synthetic crude oil. Ever-changing environmental regulations may force adjustment in the DCL process, requiring it to meet new regulatory mandates, just as crude oil processing has to be overhauled when new environmental protocols are introduced.

In comparison, ICL uses a “designer fuel strategy”. A set of criteria for the desired fuel are set up and pursued, using products that can be made in FT synthesis. Many of the various processes will yield hydrocarbon fuels superior to conventional oil derived-products. Eliminating inherent noxious materials in coals is not just an option; it is a must to protect the synthesis reactor catalysts. Far from all ICL-derived products are better than their petroleum- derived counterparts when it comes to energy content or other characteristics. Comprehensive comparison between DCL and ICL has been performed by other studies [22, 29-30]. In general, it is not easy to compare them directly, as DCL yields unrefined syncrude while ICL usually results in final products.

ICL has a long history of commercial performance, while DCL has not. Consequently, the economic behavior of a DCL-facility has only been estimated while ICL-analyses can rely on actual experience.

System efficiency. It is widely believed that DCL is more energy-efficient for making liquid fuels than ICL, justified by the simplicity of DCL’s partial breakdown compared to the complete coal reconstruction used in ICL. Several other features, like environmental impact, flexibility and reliability of process, should also be taken into account for a more complete systematic view of the technology options. The estimated overall efficiency of the DCL-process is 73% [31]. Other groups have estimated the thermal efficiency between 60-70% [21, 30].

SHELL estimated the theoretical maximum thermal efficiency of ICL to 60% [32, 33]. The overall efficiency of ICL (making methanol or di-methyl-ether) is 58.3% and 55.1% [30]. Tijmensen et al. [34] give an overall energy efficiency of ICL of about 33-50% using various biomass blends. Typical overall efficiencies for ICL are around 50%. Detailed well-to-wheel analysis of energy flows for ICL diesel has been done by van Vliet et al. [35] Caution must be exercised in making efficiency comparisons, because DCL efficiencies are usually for making unrefined syncrude, which requires more refining before utilization, and ICL efficiencies are often for making final products. If the refining of DCL products is taken into account, some ICL-derived fuels can be produced with higher final end-use efficiency than their DCL-counterparts [30]. It is also sometimes unclear, whether the extra energy needed for process heat, hydrogen production, and process power is included in the analyses, making efficiency comparisons even more delicate.

Process requirements

CTL requires more than coal to produce usable fuel. Heat, energy, catalysts and other chemicals are necessary to maintain functioning production. Water is a vital part of the process, either as hot steam or as a feedstock for hydrogen production. Water for cooling and the boiler must also be provided, and for a larger plant the amount of water consumed can be very large indeed. Water consumption is approximately equivalent for DCL and ICL. The water consumption for a 50,000 b/d facility with American coal would be in the region of 40,000 to 50,000 cubic meters per day [36]. Therefore, water availability is an essential factor to be considered during placement of CTL-facilities. Grinding of coal and mixing it with water will consume energy and water.

DCL or ICL refining and product upgrading requires additional heat, energy and hydrogen. This extra energy requirement is up to 10% of the energy content of the syncrude and can also be provided by coal. Additional energy must be also provided to reduce GHG and other emissions, if environmental concerns are to be taken in to account.

System costs. The capital cost of a facility is usually the largest cost, with operation/management costs coming second. The coal costs are usually around 10-20%, varying due to local supply, quality etc.

Using 40 Mt as a lower limit and 57 Mt as an upper limit for Sasol coal consumption, one can compute that one barrel of synthetic fuel consumes 0.73- 1.04 tons of bituminous coal, i.e. a conversion ratio of 1-1.4 barrels/ton coal. This agrees with the estimates of other studies, but tends to be in the lower range. Differences between technical and Sasol-derived estimates reflect disparities between theory and practice. Suboptimal conditions, losses, leaks and similar are unavoidable parts of reality, especially when performed on a large industrial scale. Including coal quality issues, refining and further treatment, also makes it reasonable to expect lower yields. Hence, the empirical Sasol conversion ratios are deemed reasonable. Similar conversion efficiencies are also realistic for future large scale CTL-industries, especially since ICL is the more likely future CTL-technology development path.

Outlooks that present CTL as a mitigation or even a solution to the problem of declining conventional oil supply will be closely inspected. For instance, the National Petroleum Council [8] presents a number of production forecasts, where the main message is that peak oil can be partially solved by substantial CTL- development in the USA. We intend to quantify what required coal volumes are needed to offset decline in existing crude oil production. This sheds some new light on the discussion of future CTL potentials and requirements. Furthermore, it is also useful information for policy makers when planning for the future, as the achievability of replacing oil with derivatives of another finite resource on a large scale can be disputed if sustainable development is the ambition.

Hirsch et al. [7] assumed annual future construction of 5 CTL-plants, each with a capacity of 100,000 b/d. No coal consumption figures or conversion ratios are given. Using Sasol experience, corresponding increase of annual coal consumption is 133-190 Mt. This is equivalent to ~2.5% the world production of coal for 2007 [64]. This is a significant increase, but probably doable if proper investments are forthcoming. The National Coal Council [64], also mentioned in [8], foresees a production of 2.7 Mb/d by 2025 and presents 430 Mt as the corresponding coal consumption, which equals a conversion ratio of 2.3 barrels/ton coal. Using Sasol experience, coal requirement would be 700-1000 Mt, almost twice as much as the National Coal Council assumes.

In conclusion, the National Coal Council’s estimate is optimistic when compared to actual experience, and will probably require a dramatic increase in process efficiency and improved technology or use of high quality coals with excellent liquefaction properties. The National Petroleum Council [8] also present a CTL forecast of 5.5 Mb/d by 2030 with corresponding coal consumption of 1439 Mt, originally performed by the Southern States Energy Board [65]. The conversion ratio is 1.4 barrels/ton, in agreement with Sasol experience, but it should be noted that the consumption figure from Southern States Energy Board [65] is leaning toward the optimistic side. Using the Sasol model, estimated coal consumption becomes 1466-2100 Mt, which is more than the entire current coal production of the US [63]. This CTL forecast is entirely unrealistic, since it is not feasible to divert all coal to new CTL facilities, or to double the US coal output in 20 years [66, 67].

The Annual Energy Outlook 2007 (AEO2007) Reference Scenario features a CTL production of 2.4 Mb/d globally and 0.8 Mb/d in the USA [68]. No coal consumption figures are provided for global CTL production, but the USA CTL industry is estimated to consume 112 Mt, which equals conversion ratio of 2.6 barrels/ton coal. It should also be noted that coal consumption for CTL has decreased 50% in AEO2007 compared to 304 Mt, which is twice as much as the EIA assumes. It should be remembered that a significant share of American coal is subbituminous coal, i.e. more low-ranking than the South African coals that Sasol utilize. In essence, the EIA must be assuming that future American CTL- industry will be twice as efficient as Sasol. Given the fact that Sasol is a world leading CTL-enterprise, the EIA assumption seems very optimistic. The Annual Energy Outlook 2009 (AEO2009) has reduced US CTL production in the Reference Scenario to only 0.26 Mb/d by 2030 [69]. The coal consumption presented is only 24.6 Mt, which would equal a conversion ratio of 2.9 barrels/ton. Corresponding coal usage would be 68-95 Mt, using the Sasol model. Although the expected CTL capacity has been reduced, the conversion ratio has increased compared to earlier estimates and is even further away from the real numbers. We can only conclude that the conversion ratios used by EIA seem extremely high and lack any real counterpart. The EIA seems to be using purely theoretical values, rather than sound numbers derived from practical experience. AEO2007 [68] foresees a global CTL-production of 2.4 Mb/d in the reference case, and this would annually consume 640-912 Mt of coal. This is equivalent to around 12% of the current world production of coal. AEO2009 [69] has lowered the global CTL/GTL-production to only 1.6 Mb/d, without showing individual contributions to this figure. The reduction is justified by concern for CO2 emissions. The global CTL production in AEO2009 would require something in the range of 400-500 Mt coal annually, using the Sasol model.

Annual decline in existing crude oil production is around 4-8%, equivalent to an annual production decrease of 3-7 Mb/d [14].

Such massive volumes are theoretically possible to produce, but would require astronomical investments regardless of the chosen technology. Related coal usage would be 782-2555 Mt, using the Sasol model. Such vast volumes of coal cannot be realistically liquefied just to offset a single years decline in existing world oil production. Consequently, it must be asked whether the investment and the coal itself can be used more efficiently in ways other than CTL and if other mitigation strategies should be preferred.

These findings also have repercussions for future climate policies, as several of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emission scenarios [70], used for projections of temperature increases and anthropogenic emissions, depict significant contribution from CTL in the future. In the dynamic technology scenario group (A1T), liquid fuels from coal are assumed to be readily available at less than US$30/barrel with prices falling even further. The environmentally B2 scenario family sees CTL production costs decline from US$43/barrel to US$16/barrel. Details on conversion ratios are not given, nor related coal consumption volumes. As an example, the B2 Message scenario gives a global CTL production of 32 Mb/d (71.8 EJ) in 2100, which is more than the 23.2 Mb/d (52 EJ) derived from oil production in the same year. Equivalent coal consumption would be 8342-11680 Mt, using Sasol conversion ratios, and still very extensive even if better efficiencies were reached in the future. The world coal production is given as 300 EJ in 2100, meaning that 24% goes to CTL. Can so much coal be really produced and diverted to CTL in a realistic case or should some emission scenarios be revised? Either way, more details should be shown regarding assumed conversion rations, technologies and other factors. In summary, we find that many forecasts or scenarios do not discuss CTL coal consumption or conversion ratios in any detail.

The US has the world’s largest coal reserves and has been subjected to many CTL feasibility studies and projects. In 1980, Perry [71] pointed out that the construction of a synthetic fuels industry will be very costly and will provide only a small amount of increased energy independence. This situation has obviously not changed as Couch [22] states that replacing only 10% of the US transport fuel consumption with CTL would require over US$70 billion in capital investments and about a 250 Mt of annual coal production increase. Achieving required increases in coal production has been deemed questionable by other studies [66, 67]. Correspondingly, Milici [61] concluded that the US coal industry only could handle liquefaction of 54-64 Mt coal annually without premature depletion of the coal reserves, and states that attempts to replace all oil imports would deplete the national coal reserves by 2100. The resulting volumes of synthetic fuels are insignificant compared to the present and expected demand.

World oil production currently stands at more than 80 Mb/d [63]. The total cost for replacing a significant amount of the world’s oil production by CTL would be astronomical, regardless of the chosen system approach. Necessary investments for a large CTL industry are evidently colossal, but the greatest issue lies perhaps in coal consumption. Coal will account for a large part of the costs, and with the required volumes being vast, accompanying changes in coal price and additional costs of increasing coal feedstock production will greatly affect the future economics of CTL. This is a topic that deserves more attention in future studies. In addition, the social and environmental impacts of large scale development of CTL must be considered. The political challenge of becoming very reliant on such a carbon dioxide-intensive fuel as coal is a major obstacle for many countries where greenhouse gas emissions are an important issue. Even if CCS and/or low emission CTL technologies are implemented, the vast required coal amounts will create serious environmental impact due to mining. Obtaining public acceptance, and later political acceptance, for CTL might become challenging because of its unavoidable environmental impact. 40% of the world coal production is required (Table 4). Clearly, this cannot be regarded as feasible in any realistic case. Even if technical efficiencies were achieved, significant shares of world coal would disappear into CTL-plants for a relatively modest contribution to world oil supply. If a 10% share of world coal production could be diverted, it would limit the CTL-production to only a few Mb/d at most. Consequently, it is unrealistic to claim that CTL provides a feasible solution to liquid fuels shortages created by peak oil. For the most part, it can only be a minor contributor and must be combined with other strategies.

References

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[2] Campbell, C., Laherrere, J., The End of Cheap Oil, Scientific American 1998, March issue
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Critique of LCA & EROI Wind research

[This paper criticizes  LCA and EROI wind studies]

Notes from 22 page: Davidsson, S., Höök, M., Wall, G. 2012. A review of life cycle assessments on wind energy systems. The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment.

Figure 1. Short term (0-5 years) and medium term (5-15 years) outlook and risk for neodymium and other elements for clean energy as identified by US Department of Energy (2010).

Figure 1. Short term (0-5 years) and medium term (5-15 years) outlook and risk for neodymium and other elements for clean energy as identified by US Department of Energy (2010).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Energy systems based on wind, as well as other renewable energy sources, are often automatically assumed to be sustainable and environmental-friendly sources of energy in much of the mainstream debate. However, all systems for converting energy into usable forms have various environmental impacts, not to mention a requirement of natural resources. It is essential to have consistent evaluation methods for analyzing all aspects of a given energy source.

Without such methods, it is difficult to compare them and make the right decisions when planning and investing in energy systems for the future.

Future growth of any new energy systems, in this case wind power, will require energy, as well as other resources during the expansion phase, and these implications need to be considered when planning future developments. A need for meticulous environmental impact assessments and energy performance evaluations can be seen here.

It could be questioned how certain it is that the materials will in fact be recycled in 20 years, or more. For some materials making up large parts of a wind turbine, i.e. steel, copper, aluminum and other metals, it is highly likely that the materials will be recycled in the future, but it is not certain. The economics of recycling scrapped wind plants are also uncertain and it is entirely possible that the cost of dismantling and extracting the recyclable parts will be prohibitively high in the future, especially for wind farms located in remote or off-shore areas. For example, the Tehachapi Pass in California contains “bone yards” of abandoned wind turbine hardware that has been lying around without being recycled (Pasqualetti et al., 2002).

Even if decommission is usually mandatory in operating permits, the total costs of decommissioning may not be covered due to price inflation, low capacity, unexpected circumstances (e.g., hurricane destruction), or a combination of such events (Kaiser and Snyder, 2012). It is possible that recycling can become uneconomic compared to abandonment under certain conditions, which is important to remember as decommissioning is dependent on a number of highly uncertain parameters that can have significant direct or indirect impacts on cost.

Material recovery at the end of the life cycle cannot be guaranteed as expressed by Crawford (2009), who also stresses that the environmental credit should rather be given to products using the recycled material.

Jacobson and Delucci (2011) states that Earth has somewhat limited reserves of economically recoverable iron ore, over a 100–200 year perspective at current recovery rates, but also mention that most of the steel will be recycled. What is not mentioned is that the steel consumption is already rising fast. ESTP (2009) projects the global steel consumption to be over 2000 Mt by 2050, compared to just below 1400 Mt in 2010. This growth, coupled with the fact that recyclable steel has often been held up for many decades before finally being recycled, makes the total part of steel production coming from recycled steel is fairly low, only around 45% in Europe (ESTP, 2009).

Such real world recycling shares appears to be in significant disagreement with some of the very high recycling percentages used in the reviewed studies.

Kubiszewski et al. (2010) compiled 50 EROI studies and found values ranging from 1.0 to 125.8 with an average of approximately 18.

It is difficult to see how the higher figures could be using the same concepts and parameters as the lower ones. It should be added that many of the results in these studies are old, and that LCA methodology has evolved since they were done. However, a large spread in results is still seen in the fairly new studies reviewed in this paper (Table 3).

Improving the treatment of energy

There is significant problem that EROI or EPBT is sometimes presented as primary energy using thermal equivalents, and sometimes using direct equivalents, making comparisons very difficult, especially since is sometimes difficult to even interpret if the conversion were done. As an example, Lee et al. (2006) and Lee and Tzeng (2008) presents an EPBT of 1.3 months – equivalent an EROI of 185 – far superior to all other reviewed studies. It seems like they use direct energy payback time without any conversion to thermal equivalents, but still compare their result to Schleisner (2000), who converts produced electricity to primary energy. It is quite odd that an energy performance many times better than Schleisner (2000) – and literally all other previous LCAs on wind energy –is not reflected upon. Instead, it is claimed that performance of wind power systems implemented in Taiwan is among the best in the world (Lee et al. 2006). Drawing these conclusions without analyzing other reasons for the variations, such as methodological differences, should be considered highly questionable.

This is just one of example how a LCA study can make flawed and even misleading comparisons and conclusions.

Regarding energy use during the life cycle, we find no consensus on how different energy carriers should be treated. How this is done is generally not clearly described in published studies either. The total amount of primary energy used is often presented, and in some cases this is also divided into different energy carriers. However, energy carriers used varies between studies making comparisons difficult. For electricity, national generation mixes are typically used, if anything is mentioned at all. How much of the total energy used was originally electrical energy is not plainly presented in any of the reviewed studies, making it difficult to investigate the impact of using of different electricity mixes. Guezuraga et al. (2012) showed that switching generation mix could alter the results by around 50%, indicating the importance of this factor.

Improved handling of non-energy resources

The need for non-energy resources does not seem to be seen as an important factor in most studies, and is usually not considered or discussed in any detail. When they are, intricate impact methods expressing resource depletion in antimony equivalents per kg is sometimes used even though this likely will be challenging to grasp for laymen and planners. Material resource use is a trivial issue for LCA according to Weidema (2000). In contrast, Finnveden (2005) suggests that resource use, although it should not be included as an impact factor in the LCIA, could be included in the LCA and states that LCA potentially can be a useful tool for discussing both environmental and resource aspects of products. Another significant problem is the use of end-of-life recycling crediting. It can be argued, for many reasons, that environmental effects of recycling that may occur in 20 years should not be credited the environmental impacts apparent today. However, most of the reviewed studies credit future recycling in some way. The implications of the recycling crediting on the results are often difficult to interpret, but for some of the results, the effect appears to be significant. For instance, energy use in Guezuraga et al. (2012) is increased by 43.3% when no recycling of materials is considered.

Final recommendations

The most troublesome part we found is the lack of transparency regarding fundamental and underlying assumptions, calculations and conversions done in the reviewed LCAs. Mitigating this issue will not only improve clarity, but is also likely to strengthen the credibility of LCA methodology. The LCA society should clearly strive for better agreement on which methods are to be used for evaluating renewable energy resources. This is not just desirable, but crucial, to be able to accurately evaluate and present the environmental performance of wind energy. Also, the use of natural resources, like REEs, should be clearly mentioned in the assessments to enable evaluating of possible bottlenecks in future production.

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Would Tesla, SolarCity or SpaceX exist without $4.9 billion in government subsidies?

[ Tesla has made no new battery breakthroughs. Batteries aren’t much better today than they were 200 years ago.  All Tesla did was build a better battery management system (BMS) by stringing tiny batteries together — thousands of them.  But the BMS sucks up half the energy keeping the batteries from degrading from cold, heat, overcharging, exploding, plus the electricity needed in the car for lights, heating, cooling, GPS, and radio/music.

I think anyone invested in Tesla will lose their money some day.

Since batteries are never likely to be cheap or powerful enough to move autos, it is hard to imagine how Elon Musk will NOT default on his loans in the future.  Here ares some articles about why Tesla may not be a good investment:

When it comes to Superchargers, Tesla (NASDAQ:TSLA) has never disclosed exactly how much they cost to build and operate. This can lead to confusion. The company’s statements could make an investor (or any reader, really) believe that the feature costs about $500 per car, but that is not the case at all: When you actually do the math, you discover the real cost is thousands of dollars per car. Since Tesla seems unwilling to clear up the misunderstanding, I will. All the numbers and charts used in this article can be seen in this Excel….

Alice Friedemann   www.energyskeptic.com  author of “When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation, 2015, Springer]

April 13, 2017. Excerpt from the SRSRocco report:

For those who are enamored by the wonderful “High-tech” stuff going on at Tesla Motors, please read the following article by Wolfstreet, What Tesla’s “Inexplicable” “Ponzi Scheme” Valuation Says about the Stock Market:

Tesla shares rose to $313.38 this morning, giving the company a market capitalization of about $51 billion, surpassing GM for a moment as the most valuable American automaker. This left some industry insiders wondering about tulip bulbs.

However, unlike GM, Tesla hasn’t gone bankrupt despite its massive losses and negative cash flows. Why? Because Tesla is able to extract new money from investors and lenders. So it won’t run out of money. As it burns that cash, it gets more cash so that it won’t have to go bankrupt. Companies only go bankrupt when investors and lenders, trying to cut their losses, say, “no more.” Then the money-losing companies cannot fund their operations any longer and instead hire bankruptcy lawyers.

…. In comparison with GM, Tesla is ludicrously overvalued. But it’s not “inexplicable.” It’s perfectly explicable by the wondrously Fed-engineered stock market that has long ago abandoned any pretext of valuing companies on a rational basis. And it’s explicable by the hype – the “research” – issued by Wall Street investment banks that hope to get fat fees from Tesla’s next offerings of shares or convertible debt.

Hopefully with a little more work on that technology, Tesla Motors will finally become profitable at some time in the future.  However, I wouldn’t hold my breath on that one.  This stock is a perfect indicator of what is fundamentally wrong with the broader markets.  And that is…… they are totally INSANE.

Hirsch, J. May 31, 2015. Elon Musk’s growing empire is fueled by $4.9 billion in government subsidies. Los Angeles Times.

Tesla, SolarCity and SpaceX have collected or received a commitment for $4.9 billion in government support A looming question: Can Elon Musk’s companies slash development costs before public largesse ends?

Los Angeles entrepreneur Elon Musk has built a multibillion-dollar fortune running companies that make electric cars, sell solar panels and launch rockets into space.

And he’s built those companies with the help of billions in government subsidies.

Tesla Motors Inc., SolarCity Corp. and Space Exploration Technologies Corp., known as SpaceX, together have benefited from an estimated $4.9 billion in government support, according to data compiled by The Times. The figure underscores a common theme running through his emerging empire: a public-private financing model underpinning long-shot start-ups.

“He definitely goes where there is government money,” said Dan Dolev, an analyst at Jefferies Equity Research. “That’s a great strategy, but the government will cut you off one day.”

The figure compiled by The Times comprises a variety of government incentives, including grants, tax breaks, factory construction, discounted loans and environmental credits that Tesla can sell. It also includes tax credits and rebates to buyers of solar panels and electric cars.

A looming question is whether the companies are moving toward self-sufficiency — as Dolev believes — and whether they can slash development costs before the public largesse ends.

Tesla and SolarCity continue to report net losses after a decade in business, but the stocks of both companies have soared on their potential; Musk’s stake in the firms alone is worth about $10 billion. (SpaceX, a private company, does not publicly report financial performance.)

Musk and his companies’ investors enjoy most of the financial upside of the government support, while taxpayers shoulder the cost.

The payoff for the public would come in the form of major pollution reductions, but only if solar panels and electric cars break through as viable mass-market products. For now, both remain niche products for mostly well-heeled customers.

Musk declined repeated requests for an interview through Tesla spokespeople, and officials at all three companies declined to comment.

The subsidies have generally been disclosed in public records and company filings. But the full scope of the public assistance hasn’t been tallied because it has been granted over time from different levels of government.

New York state is spending $750 million to build a solar panel factory in Buffalo for SolarCity. The San Mateo, Calif.-based company will lease the plant for $1 a year. It will not pay property taxes for a decade, which would otherwise total an estimated $260 million.

The federal government also provides grants or tax credits to cover 30% of the cost of solar installations. SolarCity reported receiving $497.5 million in direct grants from the Treasury Department.
That figure, however, doesn’t capture the full value of the government’s support.

Since 2006, SolarCity has installed systems for 217,595 customers, according to a corporate filing. If each paid the current average price for a residential system — about $23,000, according to the Union of Concerned Scientists — the cost to the government would total about $1.5 billion, which would include the Treasury grants paid to SolarCity.

Nevada has agreed to provide Tesla with $1.3 billion in incentives to help build a massive battery factory near Reno.

The Palo Alto company has also collected more than $517 million from competing automakers by selling environmental credits. In a regulatory system pioneered by California and adopted by nine other states, automakers must buy the credits if they fail to sell enough zero-emissions cars to meet mandates. The tally also includes some federal environmental credits.

On a smaller scale, SpaceX, Musk’s rocket company, cut a deal for about $20 million in economic development subsidies from Texas to construct a launch facility there. (Separate from incentives, SpaceX has won more than $5.5 billion in government contracts from NASA and the U.S. Air Force.)

Subsidies are handed out in all kinds of industries, with U.S. corporations collecting tens of billions of dollars each year, according to Good Jobs First, a nonprofit that tracks government subsidies. And the incentives for solar panels and electric cars are available to all companies that sell them.

Musk and his investors have also put large sums of private capital into the companies.

But public subsidies for Musk’s companies stand out both for the amount, relative to the size of the companies, and for their dependence on them. 

“Government support is a theme of all three of these companies, and without it none of them would be around,” said Mark Spiegel, a hedge fund manager for Stanphyl Capital Partners who is shorting Tesla’s stock, a bet that pays off if Tesla shares fall.

Tesla stock has risen 157%, to $250.80 as of Friday’s close, over the last two years.

Musk has proved so adept at landing incentives that states now compete to give him money, said Ashlee Vance, author of “Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future,” a recently published biography.

“As his star has risen, every state wants a piece of Elon Musk,” Vance said.

Before his current ventures, he made a substantial sum from EBay Inc.’s $1.5-billion purchase of PayPal, the electronic payment system in which Musk held an 11% stake.

Soon after, he founded SpaceX in 2002 with money from that sale, and he made major investments and took leadership posts at Tesla and Solar City.

Musk is now the chief executive of both Tesla and SpaceX and the chairman of SolarCity, and holds big stakes in all three, including 27% of Tesla and 23% of SolarCity, according to recent regulatory filings. The ventures employ about 23,000 people nationwide, and they operate or are building factories and facilities in California, Michigan, New York, Nevada and Texas.

Tense talks

The $1.3 billion in benefits for Tesla’s Nevada battery factory resulted from a year of hardball negotiations.

Late in 2013, Tesla summoned economic development officials from seven states to its auto factory in Fremont, Calif. After a tour, they gathered in a conference room, where Tesla executives explained their plan to build the biggest lithium-ion battery factory in the world — then asked the states to bid for the project.

Nevada at first offered its standard package of incentives, in this case worth $600 million to $700 million, said Steve Hill, Nevada’s executive director of the Governor’s Office of Economic Development.

Tesla negotiators wanted far more. The automaker at first sought a $500-million upfront payment, among other enticements, Hill said. Nevada pushed back, in sometimes tense talks punctuated by raised voices.

“It would have amounted to Nevada writing a series of checks during the first couple of years,” said Hill, calling it an unacceptable risk.

With the deal imperiled, Hill flew to Palo Alto in August to meet with Tesla’s business development chief, Diarmuid O’Connell, a former State Department official who is the automaker’s lead negotiator.

They shored up the deal with an agreement to give Tesla $195 million in transferable tax credits, which the automaker could sell for upfront cash. To make room in its budget, Nevada reduced incentives for filming in the state and killed a tax break for insurance companies.

Nevada Gov. Brian Sandoval and Musk sealed the agreement in a Labor Day phone conversation. Hill said it was worth it, pointing to the 6,000 jobs he expects the factory to eventually create. Elon Musk’s companies benefit from subsidies SpaceX, Elon Musk’s rocket company, cut a deal for about $20 million in subsidies from Texas to build a launch facility there. (Brian van der Brug / Los Angeles Times)

The state commissioned an analysis estimating the economic impact from the project at $100 billion over two decades, but some economists called that figure deeply flawed. It counted every Tesla employee as if they would otherwise have been unemployed, for instance, and it made no allowance for increased government spending to serve the influx of thousands of local residents.

A $750-million factory

Musk has similar success with getting subsidies for a SolarCity plant in Buffalo, N.Y. The company currently buys many of its solar panels from China, but it will soon become its own supplier with a new and heavily subsidized factory.

An affiliate of New York’s College of Nanoscale Science and Engineering in Albany will spend $750 million to build a solar panel factory on state land. SolarCity estimated in a corporate filing that it will spend an additional $150 million to get the factory operating. lRelated Elon Musk unveils Hyperloop design

When finished in 2017, the 1.2-million-square-foot facility will be the largest solar panel factory in the Western Hemisphere. New York officials see the subsidy as a worthy investment because they expect that it will create 3,000 jobs. The plant will replace a long-closed steel factory.

“The SolarCity facility will bring extensive benefits and value to this formerly dormant brownfield that provided zero benefit to the city and region,” said Peter Cutler, spokesman for Empire State Development, New York’s economic development agency.

SpaceX, though it depends far more on government contracts than subsidies, received an incentive package in Texas for a commercial rocket launch facility. The state put up more than $15 million in subsidies and infrastructure spending to help SpaceX build a launch pad in rural Cameron County at the southern tip of Texas. Local governments contributed an additional $5 million.

Included in the local subsidies is a 15-year property tax break from the local school district worth $3.1 million to SpaceX. Officials say the development still will bring in about $5 million more over that period than the local school district otherwise would have collected.

“That’s $5 million more than we have ever seen from that property,” said Dr. Lisa Garcia, superintendent of the Point Isabel Independent School District. “It is remote…. It is just sand dunes.”

Crucial aid

The public money for Tesla and SolarCity factories is crucial to both companies’ efforts to lower development and manufacturing costs.

The task is made more urgent by the impending expiration of some of their biggest subsidies. The federal government’s 30% tax credit for solar installations gets slashed to 10% in 2017 for commercial customers and ends completely for homeowners.

Tesla buyers also get a $7,500 federal income tax credit and a $2,500 rebate from the state of California. The federal government has capped the $7,500 credit at a total of 200,000 vehicles per manufacturer; Tesla is about a quarter of the way to that limit. In all, Tesla buyers have qualified for an estimated $284 million in federal tax incentives and collected more than $38 million in California rebates.

California legislators recently passed a law, which has not yet taken effect, calling for income limits on electric car buyers seeking the state’s $2,500 subsidy. Tesla owners have an average household income of about $320,000, according to Strategic Visions, an auto industry research firm.

Competition could also eat into Tesla’s public support. If major automakers build more zero-emission cars, they won’t have to buy as many government-awarded environmental credits from Tesla. Five takeaways from Elon Musk’s conversation with analysts Five takeaways from Elon Musk’s conversation with analysts

In the big picture, the government supports electric cars and solar panels in the hope of promoting widespread adoption and, ultimately, slashing carbon emissions. In the early days at Tesla — when the company first produced an expensive electric sports car, which it no longer sells — Musk promised more rapid development of electric cars for the masses.

In a 2008 blog post, Musk laid out a plan: After the sports car, Tesla would produce a sedan costing “half the $89k price point of the Tesla Roadster and the third model will be even more affordable.”

In fact, the second model now typically sells for $100,000, and the much-delayed third model, the Model X sport utility, is expected to sell for a similar price. Timing on a less expensive model — maybe $35,000 or $40,000, after subsidies — remains uncertain.

“Some may question whether this actually does any good for the world,” Musk wrote in 2008. “Are we really in need of another high-performance sports car? Will it actually make a difference to global carbon emissions? Well, the answers are no and not much…. When someone buys the Tesla Roadster sports car, they are actually helping to pay for the development of the low-cost family car.”

Now Musk is moving into a new industry: energy storage. Last month, he starred in a typically dramatic announcement of Tesla Energy-branded batteries for homes and businesses. On a concert-like stage, backed by pulsating music, Musk declared that the batteries would someday render the world’s energy grid obsolete.

“We are talking about trying to change the fundamental energy infrastructure of the world,” he said.

Musk laid out a vision of affordable clean energy in the remote villages of underdeveloped countries and homeowners in industrial nations severing themselves from utility grids. The Nevada factory will churn out the batteries alongside those for Tesla cars.

What he didn’t say: Tesla has already secured a commitment of $126 million in California subsidies to companies developing energy storage technology.

jerry.hirsch@latimes.com

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