Eastern Wind Integration & Transmission study 2011 National Renewable Energy Laboratory

Excerpts from the 242 page Eastern Wind Integration & Transmission study, 2011, EnerNex corporation for National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

Key Findings

  1. Building transmission capacity takes much longer than installing wind plants. It is already starting to limit wind growth in certain areas. This report concludes that a 20% scenario is unlikely to happen with a business-as-usual approach.
  2. Supplying 20% of the electric energy requirements of the U.S. portion of the Eastern Interconnection would call for approximately 225,000 megawatts (MW) of wind generation capacity, which is about a tenfold increase above today’s levels.
  3. To reach 30% energy from wind, the installed capacity would have to rise to 330,000 MW.
  4. Without transmission enhancements, substantial curtailment (shutting down) of wind generation would be required for all the 20% scenarios.
  5. The higher quality winds in the Great Plains have capacity factors that are about 7%–9% higher than onshore wind resources near the high-load urban centers in the East. Offshore equals the Great Plains  but the cost of energy is higher because capital costs are higher.
  6. Wind generation cannot be dispatched to meet peak loads. Unlike conventional generating units, only a small fraction of the nameplate capacity rating of a wind plant can be counted on to be available for serving peak loads.
  7. The existing transmission infrastructure in the Eastern Interconnection has a limited capacity for accommodating additional wind generation; transmission congestion is already an issue in some areas, including those with the potential for tenfold or greater development in wind capacity.
  8. The capital cost of offshore is twice as high as onshore, fixed O&M ($/kW/yr) is 30% higher, and variable O&M ($/MWh) is 3 times higher.
  9. Because it is primarily a source of energy, not capacity, wind generation does not fit well into conventional resource adequacy-based transmission planning processes.
  10. High amounts of wind generation are likely in off-peak hours or seasons that might not be of special interest for reliability issues.
  11. Very large balancing areas with adequate transmission take maximum advantage of diversity in both load and wind generation. By contrast, the Western Interconnection, with the exception of California, comprises smaller, less tightly interconnected balancing areas. Even modest penetrations of wind generation, much smaller than those considered here, can have very significant operational and cost impacts because of the additional requirements they bring for regulation and balancing.
  12. Wind generation generally does not appear on peak and contributes less to serving load on peak than off peak. Wind generation on the peak hour in the Midwest ISO for the last 5 years has been 1.2%, 11.4%, 1.2%, 11.8%, and 56%, respectively.

It is important to note that the scenario definitions result in some areas being self-sufficient in wind capacity (wind energy requirements being met with local wind energy production) but others require support from wind located in external regions. Areas that meet the target energy on a regional basis, by scenario, are as follows:

  1. Scenario 1: Midwest ISO, MAPP, SPP
  2. Scenario 2: Midwest ISO, MAPP, SPP, New England ISO (ISO-NE), New York ISO (NYISO)
  3. Scenario 3: MAPP, SPP, PJM, ISO-NE, NYISO
  4. Scenario 4: Midwest ISO, MAPP, SPP, PJM, ISO-NE, NYISO
ISO-NE = New England Independent System Operator, MISO = Midwest ISO, NYISO = New York ISO, PJM = PJM Interconnection, SERC = Southeastern Electric Reliability Council, SPP = Southwest Power Pool, TVA – Tennessee Valley Authority

Areas with less than the target amounts by scenario include the following:

Scenario 1: ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM, Southeastern Electric Reliability Council (SERC), TVA, Entergy (operated as part of SERC)

Scenario 2: SERC, TVA, PJM, Entergy

Scenario 3: Midwest ISO, SERC, TVA, Entergy

Scenario 4: SERC, TVA, Entergy

Scenario 4 is 30% wind penetration and requires expensive offshore wind power to meet that goal.

Note that New England, New York, the South East, and Tennessee region have particularly low wind resources. 

Just a few years ago, 5% wind energy penetration was a lofty goal, and to some the idea of integrating 20% wind by 2024 might seem a bit optimistic. And yet, we know from the European experience—where some countries have already reached wind energy penetrations of 10% or higher in a short period of time—that change can occur rapidly and that planning for that change is critically important.

Planning for the expansion of the electrical grid is a process that requires an immense amount of study, dialogue among regional organizations, development of technical methodologies, and communication and coordination among a multitude of important stakeholders. Keeping abreast of the changes is challenging because there are so many different developments, ideas, and viewpoints.

The 20% Report states that although significant costs, challenges, and impacts are associated with a 20% wind scenario, substantial benefits can be shown to overcome the costs.

The growth of domestic wind generation over the past decade has sharpened the focus on two questions: Can the electrical grid accommodate very high amounts of wind energy without jeopardizing security or degrading reliability? And, given that the nation’s current transmission infrastructure is already constraining further development of wind generation in some regions, how could significantly larger amounts of wind energy be developed?

The Eastern Interconnection is one of the 3 synchronous grids covering the lower 48 U.S. states. It extends roughly from the western borders of the Plains states through to the Atlantic coast, excluding most of the state of Texas.

PAGE 23 Figure 1. NERC synchronous interconnections

Page 26: the 4 scenarios by iso authority

The Eastern Wind Data Study. A precursor to EWITS known as the Eastern Wind Data Study (AWS Truewind 2009) identified more than 700 GW of potential future wind plant sites for the eastern United States. All the major analytical elements of EWITS relied on the time series wind generation production data synthesized in this earlier effort. The data cover three historical years—2004, 2005, and 2006—at high spatial (2- km) and temporal (10-minute) resolution. On- and offshore resources are included, along with wind resources for all states.

  1. Scenario 1, 20% penetration – High Capacity Factor, Onshore: Utilizes high-quality wind resources in the Great Plains, with other development in the eastern United States where good wind resources exist.
  2. Scenario 2, 20% penetration – Hybrid with Offshore: Some wind generation in the Great Plains is moved east. Some East Coast offshore development is included.
  3. Scenario 3, 20% penetration – Local with Aggressive Offshore: More wind generation is moved east toward load centers, necessitating broader use of offshore resources. The offshore wind assumptions represent an uppermost limit of what could be developed by 2024 under an aggressive technology-push scenario.
  4. Scenario 4, 30% penetration – Aggressive On- and Offshore: Meeting the 30% energy penetration level uses a substantial amount of the higher quality wind resource in the NREL database. A large amount of offshore generation is needed to reach the target energy level.

By the mid-1990s, independent system operators (ISOs) and regional transmission operators (RTOs) began forming to support the introduction of competition in wholesale power markets. Today, two-thirds of the population of the United States and more than one-half of the population of Canada obtain their electricity from transmission systems and organized wholesale electricity markets run by ISOs or RTOs.

The study shows the following:

High penetrations of wind generation—20% to 30% of the electrical energy requirements of the Eastern Interconnection—are technically feasible with significant expansion of the transmission infrastructure.

New transmission will be required for all the future wind scenarios in the Eastern Interconnection, including the Reference Case. Planning for this transmission, then, is imperative because it takes longer to build new transmission capacity than it does to build new wind plants.

Interconnection-wide costs for integrating large amounts of wind generation are manageable with large regional operating pools and significant market, tariff, and operational changes.

Transmission helps reduce the impacts of the variability of the wind, which reduces wind integration costs, increases reliability of the electrical grid, and helps make more efficient use of the available generation resources. Although costs for aggressive expansions of the existing grid are significant, they make up a relatively small portion of the total annualized costs in any of the scenarios studied.

With significant wind generation, forecasting will play a key role in keeping energy markets efficient and reducing the amount of reserves carried while maintaining system security. Large operating areas—in terms of load, generating units, and geography—combined with adequate transmission, are the most effective measures for managing wind generation.

Figure 3. Comparison of scenario costs Although production-related costs constitute a large fraction of the total costs for all scenarios, these decline as the amount of wind generation increases. In scenarios 3 and 4, capital costs for wind generation increase because of slightly lower capacity factors and the much higher capital cost of offshore construction. page 30. It appears scenario 4 is about 175 billion dollars

Transmission costs are a relatively small fraction for all scenarios, with only a small absolute difference seen across the 20% cases. Wind integration costs are measurable but very small relative to the other factors.

The project team also assumed that operations in each area would conform to the same structure. For example, on the day before the operating day, all generating units bid competitively to serve load, and after market clearing, operators perform a security-constrained unit commitment to ensure that adequate capacity will be available to meet forecast load. During the operating day, generators are dispatched frequently to follow short-term demand trends under a fast, subhourly market structure. A competitive ancillary services market supplies regulation, balancing, and unused generation capacity to cover large events such as the loss of major generating facilities.

Wind generation was assigned a firm capacity value of 20%.

The conceptual transmission overlays, shown in Figure 8, consist of multiple 800-kilovolt (kV) high-voltage direct current (HVDC) and extra-high voltage (EHV) AC lines with similar levels of new transmission and common elements for all four scenarios. Tapping the most high-quality wind resources for all three 20% scenarios, the project team arrived at a transmission overlay for Scenario 1 that consists of nine 800-kV HVDC lines and one 400-kV HVDC line. As more wind generation is moved toward the east and more offshore resources are used in Scenario 3, the resulting transmission overlay has the fewest number of HVDC lines, with a total number of five 800-kV HVDC lines and one 400-kV HVDC line. To accommodate the aggressive 30% wind target and deliver a significant amount of offshore wind along the East Coast in Scenario 4, the overlay must be expanded to include ten 800-kV HVDC lines and one 400-kV HVDC line.

The total AC line costs include a 25% margin to approximate the costs of substations and transformers. In addition, the total HVDC line costs include those for terminals, communications, and DC lines. Costs associated with an offshore wind collector system and those for some necessary regional transmission upgrades are not included in the total estimated cost and would increase total transmission costs. With approximately 22,697 miles of new EHV transmission lines, the transmission overlay for Scenario 1 has the highest estimated total cost at $93 billion (US$2009).

The 800-kV HVDC and EHV AC lines are preferred, if not required, because of the volumes of energy that must be transported across and around the interconnection, as well as the distances involved. Similar levels of new transmission are needed across the four scenarios, and certain major facilities appear in all the scenarios.

Modeling indicates that significant wind generation can be accommodated as long as adequate transmission capacity is available and market/operational rules facilitate close cooperation among the operating regions.

Sufficient amounts of wind generation increase the variability and uncertainty in demand that power system operators face from day to day or even from minute to minute. Quantifying how the amounts of wind generation in each of the study scenarios would affect daily operations of the bulk system and estimating the costs of those effects were major components of EWITS.

RESERVE REQUIREMENTS. With large amounts of wind generation, additional operating reserves are needed to support interconnection frequency and maintain balance between generation and load. Because the amounts of wind generation in any of the operating areas, for any of the scenarios, dramatically exceed the levels for which appreciable operating experience exists, the study team conducted statistical and mathematical analyses of the wind generation and load profile. Types of reserves:

  1. Contingency Reserves. Reserves to mitigate a “contingency,” which is defined as the unexpected failure or outage of a system component, such as a generator, a transmission line, a circuit breaker, a switch, or another electrical element.
  2. Operating Reserves. That capability above firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, forced and scheduled equipment outages, and local area protection. This type of reserve consists of both generation synchronized to the grid and generation that can be synchronized and made capable of serving load within a specified period of time. In the production simulations
  3. Regulating Reserves. An amount of reserve that is responsive to automatic generation control (AGC) and is sufficient to provide normal regulating margin. Regulating reserves are the primary tool for maintaining the frequency of the bulk electric system at 60 Hz.
  4. Spinning Reserves. The portion of operating reserve consisting of (1) generation synchronized to the system and fully available to serve load within the disturbance recovery period that follows a contingency event; or (2) load fully removable from the system within the disturbance recovery period after a contingency event. The levels of wind generation considered in EWITS increase the amount of operating reserves required to support interconnection frequency and balance the system in real time.

Contingency reserves are not directly affected, but the amount of spinning reserves assigned to regulation duty must increase because of the additional variability and short-term uncertainty of the balancing area demand.

The assumption of large balancing areas does reduce the requirement, however. Under the current operational structure in the Eastern Interconnection, the total amount of regulation that would need to be carried would be dramatically higher.

Figure 9. Regulating reserve requirements by region and scenario. The incremental amount resulting from wind generation is the difference between the scenario number and the load-only value. page 42   quite a bit of extra spinning reserve required.

The fastest changes in balancing area demand—on time scales from a few to tens of seconds—are dominated by load, even with very large amounts of wind generation.

Incremental regulating reserve requirements are driven by errors in short-term (e.g., 10 to 20 minutes ahead) wind generation forecasts.

Because wind is variable and results in ramping, it is important to understand these ramp rates and maintain reserves to cover them as needed.

Wind generation cannot be dispatched to meet peak loads. Unlike conventional generating units, only a small fraction of the nameplate capacity rating of a wind plant can be counted on to be available for serving peak loads. With the amounts of wind generation considered in EWITS, though—more than 200,000 MW—understanding the small fraction in quantitative detail is important because it equates to billions of dollars of capital investment.

Transmission overlay enhancement: As described earlier, the analytical methodology was based on a single pass through what is considered to be an iterative process. Further analysis of the existing results could be used to refine the transmission

Because new transmission will most likely be necessary for much of the future wind power that will be installed in the United States, it is imperative to plan for this transmission. The lead times for building transmission are significantly longer than those for building wind plants.

The Eastern Wind Data Study (AWS Truewind 2009), a precursor to this study, identified more than 700 gigawatts (GW) of potential future wind plant sites for the eastern United States. Wind generation is approaching 30 GW in the United States

The existing transmission infrastructure in the Eastern Interconnection has a limited capacity for accommodating additional wind generation; transmission congestion is already an issue in some areas, including those with the potential for tenfold or greater development in wind capacity. Consequently, evaluating transmission needs was also a major aspect of this study.

1,325 separate wind production plants, most hypothetical and others corresponding to the locations of existing operating wind plants. These plants are aggregations of the 2-kilometer (km) wind simulation grid data from meteorological simulations done by AWS Truewind (2009). The nameplate capacity of these plants varies from 100 megawatts (MW) to greater than 1,400 MW. The total installed nameplate capacity is approximately 700 gigawatts (GW).

The wind data calculated for this study are roughly distributed according to the geographic quality of the wind resources across the eastern United States. Some heavier weighting was given to eastern states because high-capacity wind resources are concentrated in the western states. States like Nebraska and Minnesota have large amounts of high-quality wind; states like New Jersey, Maryland, and Ohio have relatively small amounts.

The plants with the lowest costs typically have the highest capacity factor.

Offshore wind plants tend to have the highest LCOE because of their high capital and maintenance costs—even though their capacity factors are generally quite high. The data in Figure 2-1 reflect approximately 580 GW of onshore wind nameplate capacity and about 100 GW of offshore wind nameplate capacity in the Great Lakes and off the eastern seaboard. Offshore wind is located in waters up to 30 meters (m) deep.

TABLE 2-1. LCOE ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS (US $2009) ASSUMPTION ONSHORE OFFSHORE

Another useful way to look at the overall data is in terms of capacity factor versus cumulative nameplate capacity. Capacity factor can be seen as a reasonable proxy for return on construction, carrying, and operations costs.

[The US consumes 4,000 TWh, eastern conn is 70% of popu so 2,800 needed]

SCENARIO 1 In general, this scenario exploits the onshore wind resources with high capacity factors across the interconnection. Consequently, it has the largest Great Plains wind capacity of the three 20% scenarios and takes advantage of the best onshore resources in the East. Table 2-4 shows capacity by operating region. Locations and sizes of individual plants are shown in Figure 2-8.

SCENARIO 2 In Scenario 2, some of the wind generation from the Great Plains is moved eastward. In addition, a modest amount of offshore development is assumed off the East Coast.

SCENARIO 3 To create a contrast with Scenario 1, a large amount of wind generation is moved from the Great Plains nearer to the East Coast load centers. To bring about this shift, a large amount of offshore wind generation is required.

SCENARIO 4 Reaching 30% energy penetration requires more than 300 GW of wind generation, and therefore uses a significant portion of the higher quality wind resources in the NREL database. A large amount of offshore wind is required, and the amounts in the Great Plains are comparable to Scenario 1.

EGEAS has five primary alternatives for region expansion: coal-fired steam turbines, natural-gas-fired combined cycles, natural-gas-fired combustion turbines, nuclear facilities, and wind facilities. Before using the capacity expansion model, the project team eliminated other alternatives such as integrated gasification and combined cycle (IGCC) units with sequestration, biomass, and hydro facilities as options because they were not economically competitive with the conventional resources under the assumptions applied to the analysis.

Wind is given a 20% capacity credit against the required planning margin; all other units produce 100% of available capacity at peak system hours

The amounts of wind generation defined for study in this project exceed the current installed capacity by nearly an order of magnitude. Transmission issues are already limiting wind energy development in some regions, so it is a near certainty that significant new transmission would be necessary to accommodate the much higher amounts of wind generation represented in the Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study (EWITS) scenarios.

BACKGROUND The transmission facilities that make up today’s Eastern Interconnection were developed through a planning process that had two basic objectives: (1) to connect specific new generating units to load, and (2) to maintain or enhance the reliability of the bulk power system in the face of growing demand. By building transmission facilities to interconnect with neighbors, capacity resources could be shared in emergencies, reducing the amount of excess capacity an individual utility must maintain to serve load reliably. Opportunities for economic exchanges of energy under nonemergency conditions were a side benefit— though not usually the driver—of the process.

Because it is primarily a source of energy, not capacity, wind generation does not fit well into conventional resource adequacy-based transmission planning processes. In conventional planning, the focus will typically be concentrated on certain system conditions—peak or minimum load hours, or operation of the system with a major facility out of service. The status of conventional generating units during these periods is usually a given. With large amounts of wind generation, the disposition of other conventional generating units may not be so easily ascertained; in addition, high amounts of wind generation are likely in off-peak hours or seasons that might not be of special interest for reliability issues.

Wind generation is accounted for by assigning an estimated capacity value, which is the fractional amount of nameplate rating that can be considered firm capacity for planning purposes.

All of the overlays are structured to allow a general west-to-east energy transfer. There are several reasons for such a bias. First, in all the scenarios, the western part of the interconnection has large amounts of wind generation and minimal load. Second, issues with loop flows in portions of the existing transmission system in roughly the geographical center of the interconnection favor west-to-east lines over more north-south orientations of long-distance facilities.

Canada has significant wind energy potential in addition to hydroelectric resources, and its proximity to the northeastern U.S. load centers in particular offers the northeastern portion of the United States access to wind generation that is relatively local compared to wind generation in the Great Plains. The TRC recommended that such a scenario be considered in the future, if and when compatible wind data are available for those provinces.

Tables 4-3 through 4-5 summarize the EWITS transmission construction cost-per-mile assumptions by voltage level and region, the estimated total line miles by voltage level, and the estimated cost in millions of US$2024 for the four wind scenario conceptual overlays. In Table 4-5, the total AC line costs include a 25% adder to approximate the costs of substations and transformers; the total HVDC line costs include terminals, communications, and DC line costs. The costs associated with an offshore wind collector system or some subregional transmission upgrades that would be required, which could be substantial, are not included in the total estimated cost. With approximately 21,666 miles of new EHV transmission, the transmission overlay for Scenario 4 has the highest estimated total cost at $158 billion.

The renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) is the primary federal incentive to encourage wind power development.

To accommodate increasingly high wind penetration levels, regional transmission infrastructure is needed to deliver substantial amounts of high quality wind energy to remote load centers. Without new transmission corridors to access the wind resources, large amounts of wind curtailment would occur.

SECTION 5: POWER SYSTEM REGULATION AND BALANCING WITH SIGNIFICANT WIND GENERATION Matching the supply of electrical energy to the demand for electricity, over time frames ranging from seconds to decades, is a fundamental building block for maintaining resource adequacy in the bulk power system. Wind generation adds additional variability and uncertainty that make the general task more challenging.

operating reserve to be specifically evaluated are as follows: • Regulating reserve: Generation responsive to automatic generation control (AGC) that is adjusted to support the frequency of the interconnection and compensate for errors in short-term forecasts of balancing area demand. • Contingency reserve: The unloaded capacity carried to guard against major system disruptions such as the sudden loss of a large generating unit or major transmission facility. • Contingency reserve—spinning: That portion of the contingency reserves that is synchronized to the system and fully available to serve load within the time specified by the NERC Disturbance Control Standard (DCS). • Contingency reserve—supplemental: That portion of the contingency reserve consisting of generation that is either synchronized to the system or capable of being synchronized to the system within a specified window of time that is fully available to serve load within the time specified by the NERC DCS.

OPERATING RESERVE— SPINNING DEFINITION Those services necessary to support the transmission of capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the transmission service provider’s transmission system in accordance with good utility practice. The provision of capacity deployed by the balancing authority to meet the DCS and other NERC and regional reliability organization contingency requirements. That capability above firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, forced and scheduled equipment outages, and local area protection. Consists of spinning and nonspinning reserve. The portion of operating reserve that consists of • Generation synchronized to the system and fully available to serve load within the disturbance recovery period that follows the contingency event • Load that can be fully removed from the system within the disturbance recovery period after the contingency event. OPERATING RESERVE— SUPPLEMENTAL The portion of operating reserve that consists of • Generation (synchronized or capable of being synchronized to the system) that is fully available to serve load within the disturbance recovery period that follows the contingency event • Load that can be fully removed from the system within the disturbance recovery period after the contingency event. REGULATING RESERVE SPINNING RESERVE An amount of reserve that is responsive to AGC, which is sufficient to provide normal regulating margin. Synchronized unloaded generation that is ready to serve additional demand. a Adapted from

MANAGING VARIABILITY Each BAA must assist the larger interconnection with maintaining frequency at the target level (usually 60 hertz [Hz]) and must maintain scheduled energy flows to the BAAs with which it is interconnected. Balancing real power supply with real power demand is the means by which frequency is maintained. Regulation and load following are mechanisms for achieving this control under normal operating conditions.

Variations in the aggregate electric demand are continuous, and can be roughly separated into two components: • Fast variations, nearly random in nature, that result from a great number (millions) of individual decisions or actions like flipping light switches • Slower trends that are relatively predictable, such as the rising load in the morning and the falling load through the evening into nighttime.

Generation units on regulation duty are adjusted to compensate for random or sudden changes in demand. These adjustments take place automatically through AGC and occur, depending on the characteristics of the balancing area, over tens of seconds to a minute. Regulation movements both up and down are required, and the amount of net energy over a period is small because the movements tend to cancel each other. To offer regulation, therefore, a generating unit must reserve capacity and operate below its maximum (to reserve room for upward movement) and above its minimum (for downward movement). In addition, only generating units that meet the balancing authority’s requirements for providing regulation and frequency service can participate in the regulation market.

Contingency reserve is the conventional name for the spare generating capacity that can be called on in system emergencies. The spinning portion of the contingency reserve is synchronized with the grid and ready to respond immediately; off-line capacity that can be called on, started, and synchronized within a defined period of time (10 minutes or 30 minutes) makes up the non-spinning or supplemental contingency reserve. Unlike reserves for regulation, which are for supporting normal system operations within applicable reliability criteria, contingency reserves that are spinning are not dispatched continuously by AGC in response to ACE and are held in reserves for system emergencies. They are also unidirectional, in that the ability to move upward—serve more load—is counted as contingency reserve. Currently, the basis for the required contingency reserves varies across the interconnection. The need is usually defined by the magnitude of the top one or two largest loss-of-source events, which could result from a single contingency. For example, in an operating region where the largest plant is a 900-MW nuclear unit, enough additional generation must be available to cover the sudden loss of this large unit, assuming it normally operates at its rated output. In many reliability regions, a substantial portion of this additional generation must be synchronized with the grid (i.e., spinning). The required fraction of contingency reserves that must be spinning is often about 50% of total contingency reserves. As soon as a large 900 MW nuclear generator is lost, system frequency would begin to decline because the amount of load now exceeds the available supply. As frequency declines governors on all generating units, whether they are regulating units, units participating in the energy market, or operating reserve units, would detect the abnormal low frequency. If the deviation is large enough or exceeds a defined deadband, the governors would increase the mechanical power inputs to the generators. The system operator would use the operating reserves to replace the loss of generation. The NERC DCS requires balancing authorities to rebalance their systems within 15 minutes of a major disturbance and to restore the deployed contingency reserves within 105 minutes.

EFFECTS OF WIND GENERATION ON POWER SYSTEM CONTROL Actions to support frequency and maintain scheduled interchanges in a BAA are driven by the variety of errors in the generation and load balance. As a result, the effects of wind generation’s variability and uncertainty on the net variability and uncertainty of the BAA’s aggregate demand defines how a given amount of wind generation affects power system control. Measurable impacts would be manifested in increased requirements for regulation capacity and load-following capability. Wind plants typically do not affect contingency reserve requirements because the individual generators are relatively small.

Changes in wind generation over other time frames must also be factored into operational practices. Large drops in wind energy production could be as large as the contingency for which operating reserves are carried, but there would be a significant difference in the event duration. The nuclear unit described earlier could be lost in an instant, producing 900 MW 1 minute and going off line the next. Large reductions in aggregate wind generation do not occur suddenly— instead they can evolve over several hours. This is caused by the many individual turbines, the large geographic area over which they are installed, and the time it takes for major meteorological phenomena such as fronts to propagate.

Smaller, but more frequent, changes in wind generation over 1 to 4 hours are also operationally important. On these time scales, uncertainty about how much wind generation will be available becomes more important than variability. Because of the short lead time, replacement capacity for forecast wind generation that does not materialize in this time frame must be found. This replacement capacity can come from units already committed, regulating reserves (until economic replacement energy can be committed), units with quick-start capability if insufficient regulating reserves are available, or a neighboring balancing authority.

it was necessary to define requirements for contingency reserves on another basis. Where no information was available from current practice, the total contingency reserve requirement was defined as 1.5 times the single largest hazard (SLH) in the operating area. At least half of this requirement was required to be spinning.

REGULATION AND LOAD FOLLOWING The approach for calculating the incremental regulation and load-following capacity required to maintain control performance in each study BAA was based on observations from current market operations and experience from previous studies. The minute-to-minute variability of wind generation, relative to that of the aggregate load, is very small. Because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s (NREL) mesoscale data only goes down to a 10-minute resolution, actual wind data collected by NREL (Wan 2004) and others was used for the analysis in the quicker time frames. Those measurement data show that the standard deviation of the minute-to-minute variability—faster than that which can be dealt with by the subhourly energy market or subhourly scheduling— is about 1 MW for a 100-MW wind plant, based on separating the fastest variations from longer term trends using a 20-minute rolling average window.

Very-short-term aggregate forecasts of large amounts of load can be quite accurate. For wind generation, the variations over these same time periods are less so. Errors in the short-term forecast of wind generation will therefore increase the requirement for regulation.

The persistence forecast for wind generation performs reasonably well, but the variations at 10-minute intervals for even this large amount of wind generation exhibit more volatility than is observed in the aggregate load. Consequently, the errors in wind generation forecasts dominate the net error, as Figure 5-8 shows.

In summary, for regulating reserves with no wind generation, the amount of regulation capacity carried is equal to 1% of the hourly load. The total spinning reserve carried forward to the production simulations is the regulation amount plus the spinning part of the contingency reserve defined earlier:

With wind generation, the regulation reserve is augmented to account for the short-term wind generation forecast errors

Reductions in next-hour wind generation output—which, given the persistence forecast assumption, is equivalent to the forecast being more than what actually is delivered—could possibly be covered by quick-start (non-spinning) generation. For EWITS, the study team assumed that some additional spinning reserve would be held to cover next-hour forecast errors, which are expected to be frequent (once or more per day). The amount of additional spinning reserve was set at one standard deviation of the expected error. Additional supplemental or non-spinning reserve was also allocated to cover the larger but less frequent forecast errors. An amount equivalent to twice the standard deviation of the expected next-hour wind generation forecast error was used here.

The penetrations of wind generation considered in EWITS are well beyond what experience can speak to definitively; further analysis is certainly warranted.

SCENARIO CHARACTERISTICS After considering various locations of wind resources and different wind penetration levels, four wind scenarios were developed: three 20% wind energy scenarios and one 30% wind energy scenario. Figure 6-1 summarizes the wind penetration levels by region and scenario. Among the three 20% wind scenarios, Scenario 1 has the highest penetration levels in the western regions because it uses the most high-quality wind resources in the Great Plains. Because wind is moved eastward and more offshore wind is used in Scenarios 2 and 3, the penetration levels increase in the PJM Interconnection, the New York ISO (NYISO), and the New England ISO (ISO-NE) as the levels drop in the western regions. To meet the 30% wind mandate, Scenario 4 uses a significant amount of good-quality wind across the footprint and offshore wind along the East Coast with the highest wind penetration levels in almost all the regions. Based on wind quality and availability, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Southeastern Electric Reliability Council (SERC) have very little installed wind capacity and are the primary wind import regions. Conversely, the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) has very high wind penetration levels for all four scenarios. Because of the unique characteristics of the wind resource, additional reserve requirements are required to regulate the wind and maintain system reliability. The incremental reserve for each region is an hourly profile and varies hourly with the amount of wind generation at that particular hour. Figure 6-2 shows the annual, average, variable spinning reserves by region and scenario. As the figure shows, the level of required operating reserves increases with wind penetration levels, as expected. Figure 6-1.

Wind energy penetration levels by region using 2004 hourly profiles

Figure 6-2. Annual average variable spinning reserve using

SPP, MISO, and MAPP are the primary export regions and SERC is the predominant import region because of low wind availability in all the scenarios. | Added on Tuesday, February 10, 2015 7:46:18 AM

TOTAL COSTS Each EWITS scenario created for 2024 results in a picture of the Eastern Interconnection that is substantially different from what is in place today. The changes made include adding very large amounts of wind, regional and overlay transmission, and conventional generation. As described earlier, the top-down method leads to a snapshot of 2024; it does not consider the evolution of today’s power system through time to get to 2024. After refining each scenario through additional iterations of the study process, more conventional planning methods would be employed to fill in the details of the evolution over time, along with even further refinement.

Currently, wind generation in the Midwest ISO area is concentrated in a small geographic area in southwestern Minnesota and northern Iowa. Wind generation potential exists in much of the Midwest

 

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Peak fossil fuels limits climate change to low-to-medium outcomes in IPCC report

Excerpts from 24 page:  Höök, M., Tang, X. 2013. Depletion of fossil fuels and anthropogenic climate change: a review. Energy Policy, 52: 797-809

Conclusion of paper:

Fossil fuel constraints will limit anthropogenic climate impact towards the low-medium outcomes presented by the IPCC reports.

There are several feedback and climate mechanisms that can potentially cause severe changes in the climate at lower CO2 concentrations than expected by the IPCC (2007). Consequently, the peaking of fossil fuels should not be seen as something that automatically solves the issue of anthropogenic climate change. Availability and future production paths will, however, put a limit on mankind’s ability to emit GHGs and this must be factored into the climate change projections. The current situation, where climate models largely rely on emission scenarios detached from the reality of supply and its inherent problems is problematic. In fact, it may even mislead planners and politicians into making decisions that mitigate one problem but make the other one worse. It is important to understand that the fossil energy problem and the anthropogenic climate change problem are tightly connected and need to be treated as two interwoven challenges necessitating a holistic solution.

Rest of paper:

Scenario probabilities in SRES (2000) presents 40 scenarios with different developments for the global energy system and the manmade greenhouse gas emissions. These scenarios are founded on literature reviews, development of emission narratives, and quantification of the narratives with the help of six integrated models from different countries. Four specific drivers for CO2 emissions, namely population; economic activity (gross domestic product or GDP) per capita; energy intensity (primary energy consumption per unit of GDP); and carbon intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of energy) are identified by the IPCC (Pielke et al. 2008). SRES illustrates that future emissions, even in the absence of any explicit environmental policies, very much depend how economies and technologies are structured, the energy sources that are preferred and how people use available land area as well as the choices that people make. IPCC claim that the scenarios “represent pertinent, plausible, alternative futures” and derive from a descriptive and open-ended methodology that aims to explore alternative futures (SRES, 2000). The emission scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts, even though they are commonly used as such. In addition, no probabilities or likelihoods are assigned to any of scenarios since and all of them are considered equally plausible. This condition was a requirement made by the Terms of Reference (SRES, 2000). The absence of likelihoods in SRES triggered critique (Schneider, 2001; 2002; Webster et al., 2002) highlighting that decision-makers and policy analysts necessitate probability estimates to be able to assess the risks of climate change impacts resulting from these scenarios. The SRES team (Grübler and Nakicenovic, 2001) countered by claiming that social systems (important in emission scenarios) are fundamentally different from natural science systems and are largely dependent on the choices people make. Morgan and Keith (2008) reviewed available findings on scenario analyses and uncertainty and found that the “equal probability”-approach often lead to systematic overconfidence and bias. Jones (2001) concluded that equally valid scenarios cannot be realistic, since the range is due to a combination of component ranges of uncertainty, and thus the extremes of this range must be less probable than the central estimate. It has also been argued that the equal probability of each emission scenario is a rather odd postulation and even may be seen as an attempt to assign unjustifiably high weight to extreme outcomes (Höök et al., 2010a; Patzek and Croft, 2010).

Fossil fuels in the global energy system

Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, fossil fuels have been the driving force behind the industrialized world and its economic growth. Fossil energy has grown from insignificant levels in 1800 to an annual output of nearly 10 000 million tons of oil equivalents (Figure 2). At present, about 80% of all primary energy in the world is derived from fossil fuels with oil accounting for 32.8%, coal for 27.2% and natural gas for 20.9% (IEA, 2011). Combustible biomass and waste (10.2%), nuclear power (5.8%) and hydroelectric dams (2.3%) are the largest contributors to the global energy system after fossil energy, but they account for only a minor share of the global primary energy supply (IEA, 2011). Only 0.8% of the world’s primary energy is derived from geothermal, wind, solar or other alternative energy sources. More specifically, wind power accounted for only 0.2% of the global primary energy supply with its 23 Mtoe contribution in while direct solar energy accounted for 0.1% with a 12 Mtoe output (SRREN, 2011).

Importance of future energy systems for emissions

Fossil fuels will remain the backbone of the world’s energy system for all foreseeable time, given their present dominance. Furthermore, global reliance on fossil energy brings about an associated problem, namely associated emissions. In fact, energy production is the dominating source of CO2 and other GHGs. Roughly 70% of all anthropogenic GHG emissions derive from the energy sector (Figure 3), with the largest contribution made by CO2 from fossil fuel combustion. In 2008, nearly 30 billion tons of CO2 were emitted from fossil fuel consumption and this has doubled since 1970 (Figure 4). Global warming and climate change caused by GHG emissions are strongly linked to fossil energy production and utilization. Consequently, examining likely and possible trajectories of the future energy systems are vital for understanding future climate change caused by mankind.

Despite alertness about fossil fuel depletion as well as understanding about the finite supply of oil, gas and coal, the issue of physical resource availability has not been widely discussed in long-term outlooks used to assess the risk of anthropogenic climate change. In fact, energy is often seen as a limitless exogenous input to economic planning with the result that energy demand is well defined, but disconnected from the physical and logistical realities of supply (Nel and Cooper, 2009). As a result, SRES (2000) contains a set of scenarios not compatible with the possibility that the implied recoverable volumes and extraction rates of fossil fuels are physically unreasonable or even unachievable. Peak oil and fossil fuel depletion have received little attention from the climate change debate, despite its relevance for future anthropogenic emissions (Kharecha and Hansen, 2008; Crúcz et al., 2010).

Extreme climate change projections are commonly built on the assumption that there will be essentially no issue at all with future supply of fossil energy.

Fossil fuels are the dominating GHG source and, consequently, assumed availability and future production paths are vital for projecting man-made changes to atmospheric concentration of CO2 and climate. However, the underlying assumptions and data sources in SRES (2000) are old or even outdated. This has chiefly to do with the one-sided view on fossil fuel availability expressed by the works that SRES relies on, chiefly relying on economic models rather than geological and technical estimates (Höök et al., 2010a).

Rogner (1997) and Gregory and Rogner (1998) are the main sources for details regarding fossil fuel availability for SRES (2000). Rogner (1997) draws his conclusions from compiling a number of hydrocarbon resource estimates prior to 1997, derived from sources such BP, World Energy Council, German Federal Institute of Geosciences as well as academic studies. Especially, additional occurrences beyond the common resource base, so called “unconventional hydrocarbons” such as tar sands and gas hydrates, are seen as important by Rogner (1997). These occurrences are claimed to be capable of making fossil fuels appear as an almost unlimited energy source, under the caveat that economic and technological development are favorable.

Rogner (1997), and thereby SRES (2000), conveys the notion that “the sheer size of the fossil resource base makes fossil sources an energy supply option for many centuries to come.” More specifically, the low long-term costs are worth mentioning, as the fossil energy cost is assumed to be not significantly higher than typical 1990s market price (i.e. spot prices of around 17 dollars/barrel). It is worth noticing that Gregory and Rogner (1998) specifically mention the “pessimistic” view on ultimate recoverable resources, represented by geologists such as Campbell. This is contrasted by the “optimistic” side, headed by economists. However, limits to future supply is quickly dismissed by Gregory and Rogner (1997) as new technologies and changing economic conditions could – in theory – make enormous amount of hydrocarbon molecules available in the Earth’s crust available for utilization. In essence, IPCC and SRES has chosen to disregard the issues of resource depletion and the concept of physical limits based on little more than economic beliefs (Höök et al., 2010a; Valero and Valero, 2011).

Background to hydrocarbon depletion

All deposits of fossil fuels are limited either physically or economically, thus making them finite and non-renewable natural resources. This originates from the simple fact that it takes millions of years for fossil fuels to accumulate while the deposits are extracted rapidly, making it impossible for the rate of creation to keep up with the rate of extraction. More generally, if the extraction rate is faster than replenishment rate the resource will be finite in the sense that it will eventually be depleted (Höök et al., 2010c).

Possible limits to growth and how it would affect society were explored through system dynamics by the Club of Rome in the infamous report entitled “The Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al., 1972). In retrospect, 30 years of reality actually coincides well with the “standard run” scenario (Turner, 2008). However, sustained false statements – mainly from economists – discredited the report in the public debate. Its call for sustainability and fundamental policy changes simply went by relatively unnoticed (Turner, 2008). As life after the oil crisis of the 1970s returned to normal many of the issues raised concerning resource depletion were simply forgotten.

In the late 1990s, Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrere, two petroleum geologists formerly working in the oil industry, examined reported reserves and extrapolated discovery curves (Campbell and Laherrere, 1998). Their results indicated that the world was running out of cheap and abundant oil and that a maximum production rate of oil could occur somewhere around 2010. Many subsequent studies have pointed to similar time intervals (Bentley and Boyle, 2007). Aleklett and Campbell (2003) covered more issues and created an updated model for oil depletion along with a first expansion into natural gas. The issue of peak gas and peak coal was also raised in the wake of the peak oil debate. Once again, these works became targets for doomsday accusations and claims of undue pessimism, mostly from economists.

Fossil fuel production outlooks in SRES

Total primary energy production from fossil fuels in the SRES outlooks range from a mere 50% increase from year 2010 in the B1 family to over 400% in the A1 family (Figure 6–9). The individual SRES projections for oil, gas and coal can be found in Höök et al. (2010a), while this study only presents aggregated fossil energy production trajectories. By 2100, most of the ultimate reserves of conventional oil, gas and coal will be depleted (Höök et al, 2010a). What happens after 2100 is not discussed in SRES (2000) and several scenarios simply end with high production levels. Altogether, not a single one of all 40 scenarios in SRES (2000) is envisioning a future society with remarkably less fossil fuel dependence than at present.

One can also make some important observations from the arithmetic of growth. Every time a growing production doubles it takes more than all that has been used in all the preceding growth (Bartlett, 1993; 1999; 2004). Taking the average fossil energy production of A1 as an example (Figure 6), it is projected that the global production of fossil energy in 2040 will be approximately twice as much as in 2010. In other words, it is stated that during these 30 years the world will produce and consume more fossil energy than the total that has been consumed since the dawn of the industrialized age. This is actually quite mind-bending when stated in this way as opposed to the simplistic long-terms trends with an exponential growth of a mere percent or so annually. The amount of miners, equipment, permits, investments, regional issues and social acceptance needed to achieve this huge task is not discussed in SRES in any detail as everything is just aggregated into four large world regions.

Resources are irrelevant for production, unless they cannot be transformed to reserves and commercially exploited. Vast resources have little to do with the likelihood of significant future exploitation, as this is dependent on more factors than just geological availability. It is the flow of fossil energy resources, i.e. production flows, that is demanded and society can only use the amounts that can be exploited and recovered. The size of the tank – the resource base – is of secondary importance as it is the tap that governs flow rate and practical availability for the civilization.

Vast amounts of unconventional hydrocarbons are pointless for preventing the coming of a production peak if they cannot be developed fast enough. The world may indeed be awash in hydrocarbon resources as claimed in SRES (2000), but this is simply no guarantee for high production levels in the future.

One of the first to detect the optimistic production paths were Laherrere (2001; 2002). He compared technical industry data with the SRES projections, thus finding the emission scenarios to be excessively optimistic on future oil and gas supply. This was true for both conventional and unconventional resources. By 2100, the A1G scenarios consume around 14 times more natural gas than in 2000 and Laherrere (2001) even described this as “pure fantasy”. He concluded that the IPCC assumptions about abundant volumes of cheap oil and gas were in dire need of revision.

Similar ideas was expressed by Campbell and Aleklett (Coghlan, 2003), who earlier had questioned the longevity of the world’s oil and gas endowment (Aleklett and Campbell, 2003). Sivertsson (2004), who had updated the results of Aleklett and Campbell (2003), later showed a major discrepancy between all 40 SRES scenarios and expected future production and discoveries of gas and oil. The authors of SRES responded to this by claiming that the findings were too “conservative” and claimed that there was still plenty of coal to exploit. Thus, the question was largely shifted over to coal.

The investigation of SRES was expanded to include coal by Rutledge (2007). However, the conclusion still indicated that cumulative energy production and CO2 emissions from coal, oil and gas would be less than any of the IPCC emission scenarios. Different coal production forecasts later indicated that reasonable production profiles were going to be lower than projected in the SRES (Energywatch Group, 2007; Mohr and Evans, 2009; Höök et al., 2010b; Patzek and Croft, 2010).

In hindsight, empirical observations show that nearly 60 countries have already passed their maximum production levels of oil (Sorrell et al., 2010). A most comprehensive summary of over 500 peer-reviewed studies on oil concluded that a global peak before 2030 appears likely and there is a significant risk of peaking before 2020 (UKERC, 2009). Sorrell et al. (2010) also found that forecasts that delay the peak of conventional oil production until after 2030 rest upon several assumptions that are at best optimistic and at worst implausible. Clearly, the risks associated with future oil supply and how it impacts the global energy system should be given serious consideration.

Another inadequacy in SRES is the lack of discussion surrounding details. For oil, the world has a significant dependence on roughly 300 giant oil fields, accounting for 60% of world oil production (Höök et al., 2009). In comparison, there are 50–70 000 oil fields in the world.

Likewise, a significant fraction of the world oil supply is derived from relatively few countries, such as countries around the Persian Gulf.

Optimistic assumptions are also placed on gas in SRES (2000). To achieve the projected ten-fold increases in global gas production, astronomical investment must be made but this appears unlikely from available long-term policies and planning documents. For gas, methane hydrates are identified as the important long-term supplier in SRES as earlier mentioned. In reality, exploitation of gas hydrates is still far from commercially feasible. Beauchamp (2004) points out that, by any standard, gas hydrates will not come cheap – economically, energetically or environmentally.

Currently, IPCC and SRES (2000) seem far more optimistic about future oil production than the petroleum industry itself. This indeed is a peculiar standpoint.

Coal production

For coal, the geographical distribution of reserves and resources is very uneven. About 90% of known geological occurrences, both commercially feasible and infeasible, are concentrated to just six countries. In addition, global production is also focused in an only few countries (China alone made up approximately 50% of global coal output in 2011). Studies have also found that the peaking of Chinese coal production might occur relatively soon (Tao and Li, 2007; Mohr and Evans, 2009; Lin and Liu, 2010). It is safe to say that the SRES coal projections would put significant expectations on just a few countries, but detailed studies of the most important coal nations do not indicate that such outlooks are reasonable (Höök et al., 2010b).

Coal-to-liquids (CTL) is assumed to be widely applicable and available at low costs – typically below 30 dollars/barrel and even as little as 16 dollar/barrel in some cases (SRES, 2000). Such assumptions seem rather unsound compared to more recent and updated assessments, which end up around 48-75 US$/barrel (Vallentin, 2009). For example, The B2 MESSAGE scenario projects a CTL production of 32 Mb/d by 2100, which is also higher than global oil production at the same time. Such CTL-capacities would require approximately 10,000 Mt of coal per year – more than current global coal output (Höök and Aleklett, 2010). No details on conversion ratios and other important factors are given in SRES (2000), except for statements on the technological possibilities.

SRES (2000) also portrays the importance of unconventional fossil hydrocarbons, justified by Rogner (1997) and Gregory and Rogner (1998). As an example, the B1 family assumes that massive unconventional oil and gas supplies have a geographic distribution widely different from conventional resources and that will have a major impact on future fuel supply and trade flows. The transition from conventional to unconventional oil and gas is assumed to be smooth in SRES (2000) as new technology allows tar sands, gas hydrates and similar fuels to be exploited. This is justified without quantitative assessments.

A question of development pace

A smooth energy transition requires that alternative energy sources are developed fast enough to offset the expected shortfall of fossil energy due to hydrocarbon depletion. To better understand the scope of this challenge, it is important to have a grasp of how fast conventional hydrocarbons may be declining. Taking conventional oil as an example, existing production has been found to decline at around 6% annually and this is a commonly accepted numbers derived by several studies (Höök et al., 2009; Sorrell et al., 2012). This decrease can be quantified into required new annual production addition of 3 to 7 Mb/d – roughly a new North Sea per year – and this puts some real numbers on what is required just to offset the decline in existing production. Even though unconventional hydrocarbons are available, the important question is what kind of flow rates they can provide.

The attenuation of the peak oil decline requires a sustained growth of more than 10% for unconventional oil production over at least the next 20 years (de Castro et al., 2009). Such sustained growth rates have not been seen for any of the global energy systems in history and are not expected by either of the dominating forecasting agencies, i.e. the IEA or the EIA. Also, Mohr and Evans (2010) found that projected unconventional oil production could not mitigate the peak of conventional oil. Even the BGR (2008), the main data source of Rogner (1997), states that: “after peak oil, the nonconventional oil production will rather modify the decline in oil supply than close the gap between demand and supply.

The development pace of unconventional hydrocarbons are essential in offsetting the lost production flows due to peaking of conventional ones. Even if vast amounts of unconventional fossil fuels are available in theory, they must still be developed fast enough to smoothly offset the decline of conventional flows. It is essentially a question of flows, not the size of available resources as society demands and only can use the amounts that are producible.

Fantazzini et al. (2011) also highlight some energy transition risks and pointed to the fact that for the last 150 years society has not transitioned from previous fuel sources to new ones — just adding them to the total supply. Fouquet (2010) investigated energy transitions seen in history and found that the whole innovation chain took more than 100 years and the diffusion phase nearly 50 years for new energy sources. Furthermore, the contribution to global energy supply from new energy systems will be marginal at best – even if their development mimics the most extreme growth rates seen in history (Höök et al., 2012). Consequently, quantitative studies indicate that transitions to unconventional hydrocarbons or renewable/alternative energy will be slow and likely not able to smoothly fill the resulting gap as conventional fossil fuels become depleted.

Bardi (2007) showed that resource scarcity frequently increases price oscillations, which often slow an energy source transition. Likewise, Reynolds and Baek (2012) show that peak oil and the theory surrounding oil depletion are important determinants for oil prices. Hamilton (2011) points out 11 of the 12 US Recessions since World War II were preceded by an increase in oil prices. The combination of declining oil production (and thus oil priced high enough to cause recessions), high taxes, austerity measures, more restrictive credit conditions and demographic shifts have the potential to severely constrain the financial resources required for a transition to alternative energy sources. It is also likely that this combination of forces triggers the contraction of the world economy (Hamilton, 2009b; Dargay and Gately, 2010).

Lutz et al. (2012) explored the macroeconomic consequences of peak oil and found that sharp increases in oil prices due to the nature of the oil market in the short/medium term. The global macroeconomic effects of an increase of the oil price as high as modeled here are comparable to the effects of the financial and economic crises of 2008/2009. Oil exporting countries gained importance in the globalized economy, while importance of oil importing economies decreases. Both Lutz et al. (2012) and Kerschner and Hubacek (2009) found that the transport sector would be firstly and strongly effected, but all other sectors were subjected to indirect impacts through global supply chains.

Interdependencies between fossil fuel production activities also complicate the situation. At present over 95% of the energy in the transportation sector is derived from petroleum (IPCC, 2007). Lin and Liu (2010) note that transportation could account for over 50% of the total coal cost for a consumer. Consequently, increasing oil prices are likely to give increasing coal costs. The globalized supply chains used by virtually all energy technologies are dependent on transports. After peak oil distance will, once again, become increasingly expensive, and oil price may begin to act as a trade barrier for products and implementation of new energy sources (Fantazzini et al., 2011).

To conclude, society may become caught in a struggle with alternating circumstances of insufficient cash flow to handle price spikes and plummeting prices that do not cover cost structures. Fantazzini et al. (2011) and Tverberg (2012) found indications that oil supply problems would be likely to trigger financial problems, thus making substitutions even harder.

Energy-return on investment

Another factor worth considering is the energy-return-on-investment (EROI) simply referring to the ratio of energy output and the required energy input for an arbitrary energy source. It is only the net energy produced that can be used for non-energy activities in society.

Growth rates of global energy systems have also been shown to correlate to EROI, where energy sources with high EROI tend to grow faster. This could possibly imply that the growth rates seen for fossil fuels in history will not be easily matched by future alternative or renewable energy sources (Höök et al., 2012).

Future GDP-growth requires net energy inputs, hence net energy consumption will grow roughly in parallel. However, depletion of fossil fuels implies that the EROI will diminish. This has already been seen in history (Gagnon et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2010; Grandell et al., 2011). To counter decreasing EROI, gross production of fossil fuels and corresponding CO2 emissions must grow even faster. Moriarty and Honnery (2010) discuss the ambiguous effects and show that fossil fuel depletion may either help or hinder CO2 reductions depending on society’s response. Finally, Heun and de Wit (2012) found highly non-linear oil price and production cost movements when EROI declined below 10, indicating the underlying connection to economic consequences of switching to alternative fuels with lower EROI.

Sociopolitical consequences

Others have shown that peak oil is likely to reduce mobility for individuals as well as disrupting urban freight movements (Aftabuzzaman and Mazloumi, 2011). Krumdieck et al. (2010) found that people living in low-density sprawled urban forms with very few work or resource destinations accessible by public transport, biking or walking, are at a higher risk than people living in concentrated activity areas with integrated land use and transport modes and with closer access to production and work activities. As a result, peak oil could hit certain groups in society harder and lead to increased social tensions.

Increasing oil prices due to depletion will increase the amount of oil- related income flowing into autocratic and weakly institutionalized states. Colgan (2012) notes that such states are the most likely sites of future revolutionary governments and highlight that such regimes and large oil incomes are a toxic combination for international peace and security. Consequently, the world might expect further turbulence and political violence in oil-producing regions in the future. It is feasible to assume that increased conflicts will be an obstacle for energy transitions.

Nothing is guaranteeing that the relatively peaceful period currently experienced by the developed nations that is favorable to rapid energy source transitions will continue much longer.

Friedrich (2010) gave examples illustrating that peak oil can throw countries into sociological trajectories not prone to easy energy transitions.

Sometimes it is claimed that peaking of conventional hydrocarbons would be disastrous for the environment. This is motivated by the established fact that unconventional fossil fuels have much larger emission footprints (Brandt and Farrell, 2007). However, this is only valid if, and only if, unconventional hydrocarbon production becomes a major part of the future energy system. Once again, vast unconventional resources do not “automagically” imply high production rates as future exploitation is dependent on more factors than just geological occurrences.

Smil (2008) also pointed out how the scenarios ignored several key facts about global energy and its future, more specifically the Jevons paradox (Jevons, 1856) which has implied that for the last 150 years all energy efficiency improvements have actually been translated into higher energy use. Finally, Smil (2000) and Bezdek and Wendling (2002) pinpoint that long range energy forecasters have made many inaccurate projections, mostly as overestimations. The smooth energy transition assumptions built into SRES (2000) are debatable or even questionable. Such idealized substitution mechanisms are likely to oversimplify the complexity of energy transitions, in particular when supply of the dominant energy source (i.e. oil) is declining.

Climate impact assessments from fossil fuel constraints

Fossil fuel depletion limits the maximum extent of anthropogenic global warming, although this is challenging to handle in a holistic manner. Energy constraints pose a threat to the economy (Nel and Cooper, 2009), and similarly changes in human energy-related behaviors can lead to a broad range of effects on natural ecosystems (Czúcz et al., 2010). Energy, economy and ecology are seldom seen as three interconnected problems. The lack of widely accepted benchmarks for energy constraints in long-term planning has been a problem often forcing analysts to overlook this factor or oversimplify it into exogenous inputs disconnected from the reality of supply. Consequently, only a relatively limited set of analyses have been investigating the climate changes that limited future production of fossil fuels may have. This review attempts to identify all published papers dealing with this issue.

Doose (2004) discussed fossil fuel limits and how they would impact future anthropogenic climate change. He used a simplistic carbon sink model and a basic Hubbert-type production model and found that it would be unlikely that future atmospheric CO2 concentrations would rise higher than 650 ppm before falling to 450 ppm by 2150.

Brecha (2008) highlighted that there are both geologic and economic reasons to expect limits in future production and made simplified emission scenarios to explore the consequences. He found that CO2 concentrations would end up somewhere between 500 and 600 ppm, corresponding to a 2–3° C temperature increase. This is still above the proposed 2° C climate ceiling, but far less than the large temperature increases generated by the more extreme scenarios in SRES.

Kharecha and Hansen (2008) used a Bern carbon cycle model and a set of peak oil and gas compatible emission scenarios to explore the implications of peak oil for climate change. It should be noted that they considered coal to be abundant and capable of increasing production up to 2100 in a business-as-usual outlook, resulting in 550 ppm CO2 in the atmosphere. Four other scenarios had more constrained coal production profiles, somewhat more compatible with published peak coal projections (Mohr and Evans, 2009; Höök et al., 2010b; Patzek and Croft, 2010: Rutledge, 2011). The CO2 concentration ended up around 450 ppm for these scenarios and they were found to be largely consistent with current assessments of the cumulative 21st century emissions needed to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm even after factoring in carbon cycle feedbacks.

Nel and Cooper (2009) made a complete treatment of fossil energy to better understand its impact on the economy and climate. The emissions were projected to a peak at 11 GtC by 2020 before diminishing to around 6 GtC by 2100. Climate responses were examined with three carbon cycle models, where the Bern model reached atmospheric CO2-levels of ~540 ppm by 2100 compared to the other models that gave lower atmospheric concentrations. The model with the best fit to historical data peaked at around 430 ppm by 2060 before slowly decreasing. The consequent warming would be limited to about 1° C above the 2000 level.

The three studies reached somewhat different results and a lot of this can primarily be attributed to different assumptions about climate sensitivity. Zecca and Chiari (2010) criticized Nel and Cooper (2009) for underestimating future warming, but Ward and Nel (2011) defended their position. Zecca and Chiari (2011a) used a simplistic carbon cycle/climate sensitivity model to transform 10 recent fossil fuel forecasts into temperature projections under “realistic” fossil fuel production trajectories. It was found that CO2 concentration could increase up to 445–540 pm with a corresponding temperature increase of 0.9–1.6° C with respect to year 2000. Nel (2011) evaluated

SRES scenarios against fossil fuel depletion models and proposed attainable trajectories for emissions.

In addition, a new parametric carbon feedback model was developed and found to be consistent with empirical data. A radiative feedback model was used for sensitivity analysis to establish a range of reasonable global warming outcomes. Finally, Nel (2011) predicted a maximum atmospheric concentration of CO2 in the range of 500-560 ppm and a maximum global mean surface temperature increase of 1.5–2°C relative to year 2000.

Ward et al. (2012) stochastically modeled future emissions and found that high emissions are unlikely to be sustained through the second half of this century, even with the addition of shale oil and other unconventional hydrocarbons. The most frequently occurring model runs typically yielded an overall peak in emissions somewhere between 2040 and 2050, with a corresponding peak emissions rate of 60–70 GtCO2/year. However, these results were not converted into expected temperature increases or average CO2 concentrations.

Another study by Zecca and Chiari (2011b) expanded the discussion of carbon cycle models, but also found that despite methodological differences analysts arrived to the same important conclusion: it is likely that fossil fuel depletion will limit the atmospheric CO2 concentration at levels lower than the ones derived from SRES and normally presented in the anthropogenic climate change debate. Even though there is still a considerable debate regarding the detailed climate response from fossil fuel limits, one can identify an emerging unity that it will be vital limit for mankind’s ability to cause climate change. Whether or not dangerous climate change will occur due to mankind’s GHG emissions is still an open question and depends on climate sensitivity and feedback mechanisms as well as fossil fuel availability and future energy trends. The issue is complex and more intra-disciplinary studies are encouraged.

Concluding discussions

Peak oil and related limits to future fossil energy extraction are nearly absent in the climate change debate (Kharecha and Hansen, 2008). It is certainly about time to change this and stop seeing anthropogenic release of CO2 as something detached from future energy supply questions. Energy cannot be seen as a limitless input to economic/climate models and remain disconnected from the physical and logistical realities of supply (Nel and Cooper, 2009).

Vernon et al. (2011) found that supply-side constraints may dominate and that scenarios which disregarded such limits are too narrow. The current set of scenarios, SRES (2000), is perforated by optimistic expectations on future fossil fuel production that are improbable and some of the scenarios can even be ruled out as clearly unrealistic. Several scenarios also agree poorly with reality over the recent years and some can even be ruled out due to this mismatch. It can be argued that several SRES scenarios are in need of revision – generally downward – regarding production expectations from fossil fuels. The utopian thinking in SRES (Hjerpe and Linnér, 2009), is unsubstantiated in the light of recent developments and there are serious issues with the future production modelling. Extraction of fossil energy is dependent on much more than just geological availability. Some scenarios would also place unreasonable expectations on just a few countries or regions. Is it reasonable to expect that China would increase their coal production by a factor of 8 over the next 90 years, as implied by the A1C-scenarios? More detailed studies on China has actually placed the likelihood of a peaking in Chinese production relatively soon (Tao and Li, 2007; Mohr and Evans, 2009; Lin and Liu, 2010). Energy forecasting on a global perspective sometimes overlooks constraints which occur on a smaller geographical level, necessitating more detailed models to better capture the reality of the world’s fossil fuel production. Especially a better handling of coal is crucial, as it accounts for both the largest amounts of remaining fossil fuels as well as the largest CO2 emissions.

SRES (2000) also appears to have missed the growing body of evidence that supports an imminent peaking of world oil production (UKERC, 2009). Needless to say, many of the assumptions used in the IPCC emission scenarios are outdated and in dire need of re-evaluation. The current stance, where SRES (2000) is much more optimistic about future oil supply than the oil industry and other agencies attempting to forecast future oil supply with high levels of accuracy puts the IPCC in a rather odd or even awkward position.

The extreme scenarios with high temperature increases can only be obtained by disregarding supply constraints and projecting continued exponential growth in fossil fuel extraction until 2100. The validity of the climate change projections obtained from climate models can be no more than the soundness of the input, i.e. the emission scenarios, that was used to derive those estimates. It can only be stated that the golden rule of modelling – “garbage in – garbage out” – should always be held dear. The extent and timing of peak oil and other impending peaks are not clear, but it is obvious that these events will have a significant impact on mankind’s future release of CO2 given the importance of fossil fuels as a source of anthropogenic emissions.

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Can wind power be scaled up to 24 TW by 2050?

[Below are excerpts from this 22 page paper. Alice Friedemann]

Davidsson, S., et al. (2014) Growth curves and sustained commissioning modelling of renewable energy: Investigating resource constraints for wind energy. Energy Policy.

Although the wind itself is a type of renewable energy, the wind turbines converting the kinetic energy in the wind into electrical energy are not renewable and are built using a wide range of non-renewable resources.

Several recent studies have proposed fast transitions to energy systems based on renewable energy technology. Many of them dismiss potential physical constraints and issues with natural resource supply, and do not consider the growth rates of the individual technologies needed or how the energy systems are to be sustained over longer time frames. A case study is presented modelling potential growth rates of the wind energy required to reach installed capacities proposed in other studies, taking into account the expected service life of wind turbines.

The annual installation and related resource requirements to reach proposed wind capacity are quantified and it is concluded that these factors should be considered when assessing the feasibility, and even the sustainability, of fast energy transitions. Even a sustained commissioning scenario would require significant resource flows, for the transition as well as for sustaining the system, indefinitely. Recent studies that claim there are no potential natural resource barriers or other physical constraints to fast transitions to renewable energy appear inadequate in ruling out these concerns.

A few recent peer reviewed studies stand out by proposing future energy systems almost completely based on energy from the wind and the sun, claimed to be achievable as soon as the year 2050, or even more rapidly by 2030 (García- Olivares et al., 2012; Jacobson and Delucchi, 2009; Kleijn and van der Voet, 2010).

Substituting the entire current energy system based on fossil fuels with renewable energy technologies involves up-scaling a disparate set of small scale industries, and the time-frame to do this within only a couple of decades, can appear optimistic. The implications of the fast growth of the renewable energy technologies needed to do this are often not adequately addressed in the studies proposing future energy systems based on renewable energy. The question of how these energy systems are then to be sustained over a longer time scale are usually not considered.

This study aims to add the perspectives of time and scale to evaluating the feasibility of fast energy transitions by taking account of annual growth rates needed to reach proposed future energy systems as well as investigating how an energy system based on renewable energy technologies could be sustained in the long run. This is mainly done by modelling growth patterns needed to reach the installed capacities of wind energy proposed in other studies, taking account of the life expectancies and need for replacement of technology, using wind energy as an example. The requirement of natural resources for the construction of wind energy is quantified on an annual basis to examine the impact on views of potential material constraints.

The growth of renewable energy technologies needed for an energy transition must inevitably come with the growth of an industry capable of manufacturing and installing that technology, capital to finance these investments, as well as an increased demand for certain natural resources.

Renewable energy technologies such as wind and solar energy are more metal intensive than current energy sources and a transition to renewable energy would increase demand for many different metals (Kleijn et al., 2011). Several different critical metals have been identified as potential bottlenecks in the deployment of “low-carbon energy technologies” (Moss et al., 2011). It has also been argued that a shift to an energy system based on renewable energy would inevitably be largely driven by fossil fuels, and a fast growth of renewables would actually add new fossil fuel demand to current demand during a transition period (Moriarty and Honnery, 2009).

The concept of “energy return on investment” (EROI) appears lower for renewable energy technologies than many conventional fossil fuels we currently rely on for our energy supply (Hall et al., 2013). Concerning solar photovoltaics (PV), it has been suggested that high energy input for the production of crystalline silicon solar cells could be a constraint for the growth of this technology, while current thin film technologies could never reach significant production levels due to the use of scarce materials (Tao et al., 2011). Dale and Benson (2013) even claim that the solar PV industry has not yet paid back any net energy to society, partly due to its high relative growth rates, and concludes that both the timing and magnitude of energy inputs and outputs are important factors in determining an energy balance for the solar industry.

Others raise issues with the variable production of electrical energy from wind and solar energy as well as the large amount of capital needed for investment in new energy production as potential constraints on this development (Trainer, 2013, 2012).

Installed wind capacity Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) describe an energy system consisting of 51% wind energy and 40% solar energy that is “technically possible” to achieve before 2030. This scenario is further elaborated on in Jacobson and Delucchi (2011) and Delucchi and Jacobson (2011), where the time frame is postponed due to difficulties in implementing the necessary policies by 2030, but it is still said to be technically feasible to achieve by 2030. Kleijn and Van der Voet (2010) present a similar scenario, with slightly more wind energy but many times more solar PV, since the total energy demand is assumed to be much larger. García-Olivares et al. (2012) propose an energy mix similar to the Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) scenario, but state that solar PV is unlikely to be able to reach these levels due to constraints induced by scarce materials used for solar PV technology and propose using concentrating solar power (CSP) instead. Table 1 summarizes the main features of these three studies as well as the current situation as of 2012.

The studies described in Table 1 all propose energy systems completely based on renewable energy technology, with wind and solar energy making up almost the entire global energy supply by 2030 or 2050. Although important differences occur between the different studies, some interesting similarities exist. While the solar energy contributions vary greatly both in size and technologies chosen, the assumed contribution from wind is very similar between the studies, with suggested installed capacities ranging from 18 to 24 TW. All three studies discuss potential constraints caused by natural resources and conclude that this factor will likely not constrain the development towards the proposed energy future. The growth patterns needed for the individual technologies is not given much attention, and when growth rates of technologies are mentioned it appears as if exponential growth rates are assumed, or at least deemed feasible.

This study investigates the implications of fulfilling these growth patterns by letting wind energy grow exponentially reaching 19 TW by 2030 and 24 TW by 2050. Although not specified in the studies, these capacities are then assumed to be sustained to the year 2100, to be able to investigate the implications of sustaining this capacity.

Laxson et al. (2006) describes a sustained manufacturing model, where installed capacity of wind energy grows to reach 1 %, 20% and 30% of U.S. electricity demand by 2020 or 2030. After 25 years the capacity installed 25 years earlier are replaced (repowered). The need to replace the capacity after the end of the service life of the wind turbines affects the desired manufacturing capacity of the wind industry. If the installed capacity of wind is to be sustained over a longer time frame, an industry capable of replacing the capacity taken out of use must exist. If the growth trajectory is too slow to reach a manufacturing capacity large enough to replace the old turbines in the future, the actual wind capacity in use can in fact see a drop after the initial goal is reached. On the other hand, if the manufacturing capacity is expanded too fast, the demand for new turbines will drop and leave manufacturing capacity idle.

The sustained commissioning model in this study builds upon the ideas proposed by Laxson et al. (2006), with some modifications. The use of the word commissioning instead of manufacturing is proposed to highlight the fact that taking wind capacity into use is not only about physically producing wind turbines, but requires an entire industry of getting the right materials, manufacturing parts, permission to install wind farms, assembling and installing turbines, as well as getting the wind farms connected to an electrical grid capable of transporting the power to consumers.

Höök et al. (2012) reviewed historical growth rates of energy output from the six energy resources considered as global energy systems, defined as energy sources contributing over 100 Mtoe, or supplying about 1% of global annual primary energy. These include oil, gas, coal, biomass, hydropower and nuclear power. Generic growth behavior for these six energy systems was found, with growth rates decreasing as the energy output increased. It is stated that none of the fossil fuels have grown at more than 10% over longer time periods, and not even the “oil boom” showed sustained growth rates of more than around 7%. The growth rates for nuclear and hydropower show similar behavior as those seen for fossil fuels, despite fundamental differences in technology, suggesting that similar growth patterns could be expected for other energy technologies as well.

Technology can be taken out of use for several different reasons, making the assumption of expected service life somewhat difficult to estimate. However, it must be considered certain that they will not last forever. In the case of wind turbines, the end-of-life can be reached due to technical failure or fatigue, or when the turbine no longer satisfies the need or expectations of the user, when a wind farm is either decommissioned or repowered, where the individual turbines are replaced with new ones (Ortegon et al., 2013). The assumed service life will have a significant impact on annual installations needed in the models in this study.

The question then is what a reasonable estimate of service life for a wind turbine is. Ortegon et al. (2013) state that the designed life expectancy for a wind turbine is 20-30 years, but assumes a service life of 20 years. Laxson et al. (2006) state that the design service life of a wind farm is 20 to 30 years but use a 25 year service life in the models. Within the life cycle assessment (LCA) community it appears to be somewhat of a standard to assume a 20 year service life. Kubiszewski et al. (2010) presents a meta-analysis of 119 different turbines from 50 different analyses between 1977 and 2006, where a vast majority assumed a 20-year life span. Davidsson et al. (2012) looked at ten more recent LCAs of wind turbines and found similar tendencies. Dolan and Heath (2012) reviewed and harmonized 72 LCAs on wind turbines and concluded that 20 years was the most commonly cited lifetime estimate as well as a common design life for modern wind turbines. Basically, a 20 year service life appears to be the most reasonable assumption based on current literature.

One of the first countries to build large quantities of wind energy was Denmark, and data on both commissioned and decommissioned facilities exist all the way back to 1977 (Energistyrelsen, 2014). Using the assumption that the wind turbines will be in use for 20 years it is then possible to compare how much capacity that should be decommissioned 20 years after its construction with the actual numbers on decommissioning. Figure 1 shows these theoretical numbers on decommissioning as well as actual historical decommissioned capacity. Although they do not correlate exactly, especially since a large amount of turbines was taken out of use in the year 2002, they appear to follow a similar pattern, and the total cumulative decommissioned capacity of 431 MW comes remarkably close to the theoretical number of 468 MW.

Figure 1. Historically decommissioned wind capacity in Denmark as well as capacity that should theoretically have been decommissioned when taking account for an estimated service life of 20 years. Data from Energistyrelsen (2014).

Figure 1. Historically decommissioned wind capacity in Denmark as well as capacity that should theoretically have been decommissioned when taking account for an estimated service life of 20 years. Data from Energistyrelsen (2014).

Including an assumption on service life for a technology can have large impacts on the annual installation need for the growth period, but also for the energy system in a longer time frame. Looking at a scenario for 2050, assuming a 20 year service live of wind turbines, only turbines built after 2030 will even be in use at that time. Turbines built between now and 2030 will only be in service during the transition and for scaling up the industry. After 2050 the old turbines will need to be replaced, so an industry capable of sustaining this level of production needs to be in place.

Wind turbines can roughly be divided into two categories: geared turbines and gearless turbines. The turbines can operate with either a fixed speed or limited variable speed concept, both cases using a three-stage gearbox. Turbines operating with variable speed can use either a gearbox or a direct drive train concept. Some concepts use significant amounts of scarce materials in their design. For instance, permanent magnet synchronous generators (PMSG), which is a widely used generator concept with a direct drive train, uses significant amounts of rare earth elements (REEs). These generators often operate without gears, which can be beneficial since the gearbox often needs maintenance. There are other direct drive concepts that do not use these materials, such as induction generators and exited synchronous generators (EESG). The need for rare earth elements is estimated to be 160-200 kg/MW for generators used in direct drive concepts, while PMSG designs used in combination with a gearbox the need for REE is reduced to about 30 kg/MW (Buchert, 2011).

As a constraint for a total expansion of wind energy on a global scale the significance of these materials are often dismissed since designs not relying on them would likely arise if the supply of these materials becomes increasingly limited.

Wind turbines require large amounts of other materials, such as steel and copper as well, and these materials are quantified in the case study as an example of resource requirements. This study uses the assumption that 1 MW of wind capacity requires 140 tons of iron and steel and 2 tons of copper, as described by Kleijn and Van der Voet (2010).

Figure 2a presents the cumulative growth curves of wind capacity enabling 19 TW by 2030 and 24 TW by 2050 with exponential growth profiles. Figure 2b shows the resulting annual commissioning required to reach 19 TW wind capacity by 2030, as well as what is required to sustain this capacity in the future. It can be seen that not only the cumulative installations, but also the annual installations grow exponentially, leading to quite extreme annual installations at the end of the growth period. Reaching 19 TW by 2030 with exponential growth means that 21 % of all installed capacity would be installed in the final year, and 68 % would be installed in the last 5 years. Reaching 24 TW by 2050 with exponential growth means that 11% of all the capacity would be installed in the final year, and 45% would be installed in the last 5 years (Figure 2c). Sustaining these capacities will require an annual commissioning growing exponentially in a kind of cyclic behavior.

Similar results were found by Honnery and Moriarty (2011) who used 3 different exponential growth rates reaching 2 different installed capacities of wind power and found that these growth rates leads to “boom and bust cycles” in equipment manufacture as well as net energy output from the system.

Assuming double digit exponential growth of energy technologies for decades after reaching significant contributions to the global energy system can simply not be considered realistic since the pure arithmetic of such growth patterns leads to unreasonable expectations on annual installation rates. Further discussions on the nature of exponential growth can be found in other studies (Bartlett, 1993; Meadows et al., 1972).

cumulative installed capacity of 24 TW by 2050

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 2. a) Cumulative installed capacity of wind power reaching 19 TW by 2030 and 24 TW by 2050 with exponential growth. b) Annual commissioning of wind capacity required for reaching 19 TW by 2030 and sustaining this capacity. c) Annual commissioning of wind capacity required for reaching 24 TW by 2050 and sustaining this capacity.

Reaching 24 TW by 2050 alone is modeled using a logistic function. Figure 3a describes a logistic growth curve fitted to the historic data and constrained at 24 TW wind capacity. This appears to be a more realistic growth pattern than exponential growth, but what is not always considered is that the annual additions needed will not only be installing new turbines, but also replacing old turbines at the end of their service life. Assuming a 20 year service life for a wind turbine, the annual requirements of replacing old turbines can be modeled with a second logistic curve with a 20 year time lag. Figure 3b shows the annual commissioned capacity needed both for the net growth as well as replacing old capacity taken out of use.

Figure 3. a) Cumulative installed capacity of wind energy described by a logistic curve fitted to historical data reaching 24TW by 2050. b) Annually commissioned wind capacity required to reach 24TW by 2050 taking account for replacing decommissioned turbines.

Figure 3. a) Cumulative installed capacity of wind energy described by a logistic curve fitted to historical data reaching 24TW by 2050. b) Annually commissioned wind capacity required to reach 24TW by 2050 taking account for replacing decommissioned turbines.

 

The maximum annual installations needed for logistic growth is much lower than the exponential case, but reaching 24 TW still requires significant numbers. Also, as can be seen in Figure 3b, assuming logistic growth of cumulative installed capacity in this case means that the total annual installations needed when taking account for replacing old turbines creates a dip in annual installation need before rising again. This type of pulsing behavior is commonly seen in nature (Odum, 2007), and might not be an unrealistic scenario. However, it might not be optimal, since this would create an industry capable of installing more wind capacity in a year than is needed to sustain this in the long run.

Figure 4. a) A sustained commissioning growth pattern reaching 24 TW of installed capacity wind energy by 2050, where cumulative installed capacity grows exponentially with 26 % annually until reaching an annual installation rate needed to sustain this installed capacity. b) The associated annual commissioning of wind energy required to reach the same level of capacity.

Figure 4. a) A sustained commissioning growth pattern reaching 24 TW of installed capacity wind energy by 2050, where cumulative installed capacity grows exponentially with 26 % annually until reaching an annual installation rate needed to sustain this installed capacity. b) The associated annual commissioning of wind energy required to reach the same level of capacity.

 

Less scarce materials are commonly ruled out as constraints based on quite simple arguments, but for a complete transition to a renewable energy system even common materials have been mentioned as potentially problematic. Kleijn and van der Voet (2010) suggest that the sheer size of the proposed transition would challenge production even for “bulk materials” such as steel and copper.

Constructing the wind capacity of 24 TW would only demand a few per cent of global iron ore and copper reserves. However, using the growth patterns from the case study, this total resource requirement can be spread out over the time period leading up to the proposed realization year and be translated into annual requirements for the different resources. These annual quantities can then be compared with projections for future production of these resources. It could also be useful to take account for competing demand from other uses for a more complete systems view.

The quantities presented in Table 2 could give an indication of the size of the annual resource requirements for building these quantities of wind capacity. Table 2 describes the resulting maximum annual installations

Even in the sustained commissioning model, the annual installation of 1.2 TW needed to sustain the 24 TW wind capacity leads to significant annual requirements for copper and steel.

Under these assumptions, only sustaining the 24 TW of wind energy, assumed to provide 15% of global energy demand by Kleijn and Van der Voet (2010), would need the equivalent of 11% of total global steel production and 14% of global copper production (based on 2012 rates of production).

This means that reaching and sustaining this installed wind capacity would require quantities of steel that is similar to the current automotive industry, that used 12% of the steel produced in 2011, while the entire sector of electrical equipment used only around 3% (World Steel Association, 2012). The amount of copper needed for the turbines is comparable to what is used for making electric motors, of around 12% of the global copper production, while the electric energy transmission sector use about 26% (Achzet et al., 2011).

This study makes no attempt to project what the future energy systems might look like, neither on the demand nor the supply side. Instead, the assumptions of future installed capacity of wind energy for the case study is taken directly from these other studies, and translated into possible growth patterns. It should be mentioned that the works used in this case study are quite extreme when it comes to proposed installed capacities of wind and solar energy compared to most other studies proposing similar energy transitions. However, they are still considered relevant since they are widely cited in peer reviewed scientific journal articles.

During the growth phase this demand would be additional to current demand and must be assumed to come from supplementary production, and even if the replacement of turbines in the future would be based on recycling old turbines, a similar sized commissioning industry would be needed, as well as an industry capable of recycling the materials and making them available for new turbines. The pure scale of creating and sustaining this type of energy system is simply massive.

In the case of wind energy, metals considered somewhat scarce, such as neodymium, are sometimes mentioned as a potential issue, but “bulk” materials such as steel and copper are usually dismissed as potential constraints. However, none of them pay much attention to assumed growth rates or what resource flows that would be needed to sustain the growth or to sustain the proposed energy system in the future.

Three common ways to evaluate natural resource constraints in other studies have been found. First, the “Reserve-to-production ratio” (R/P ratio), comparing the current annual production to reserve estimates is a very common method. Secondly, simply comparing the total demand incurred by the proposed energy system to reserve estimates is a frequently used method. Thirdly, simply stating that the materials used are theoretically recyclable is sometimes used as an argument that no natural resource constraints will occur. All three of these arguments have their merits and can be used to make fast and easy estimates of natural resource constraints, but using any of them to completely dismiss potential problems with natural resource supply appears questionable.

An example of R/P ratio being used to disregard natural resource constraints can be found in Jacobson and Delucchi (2011), where it is stated that the world have “somewhat limited reserves” of iron ore, which is claimed to last for 100-200 years at current production. However, this assumes that annual production remains constant and global steel production is currently increasing rapidly, and realizing the Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) scenario would mean a significant increase of an already expanding demand for steel. Comparing current production to reserve estimates could give a first indication of potential constraints, but it appears insufficient to motivate a total dismissal of problems that might occur. Bartlett (2006) describes several problems with using the R/P ratio for a resource under growing production, and states that it gives rise to unwarranted optimism.

The method of comparing the total requirements of a resource for reaching a future energy system to estimated reserves can be found in García-Olivares et al. (2012), where it is stated that the complete power system needed for the energy system described would need 40% of total estimated copper reserves. Adding assumptions of the copper needed from the demand side of the transport sector García-Olivares et al. (2012) reach a total of 60% of global copper reserves. This method has the potential of indicating if the quantities needed could be a problem. For instance, the claim that realizing the energy system proposed in García-Olivares et al. (2012) could demand 60% of the current copper reserves appear like extraordinary quantities, although reserve estimates can change with time.

This method does not say anything about what resource flows would be needed and how fast the materials could be brought to market.

The third common argument to dismiss potential resource constraints is using the simple fact that some materials are recyclable. Jacobson and Delucchi (2011) argue that some rare resources, such as neodymium for electric motors and generators, platinum for fuel cells and lithium will have to be recycled or replaced with less scarce materials to reach a 100% renewable energy system, unless additional resources are located. Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) claim that there are indications that there are not enough economically recoverable lithium to build “anyway near the number of batteries needed in a global electric- vehicle economy”, but at the same time state that recycling could change this equation. There is no doubt that recycling would be important for sustaining a “sustainable” energy system in the future, but this does not mean that recycling will change the total amount of materials needed in the system at a given moment in time. The same atoms simply cannot both be in use and recycled to build other technology at the same time. The minimum amount of a resource needed to sustain the system simply does not change because of recycling. A more comprehensive discussion on recycling using the case of lithium is available in Vikström et al. (2013).

The end of life recycling rate (EOL-RR) appears to be around 70-90% for iron and steel, but since the steel demand is growing and is commonly used for long lived uses, the recycled content (RC) in new material is lower at around 32-52%, while the same factors for copper has been estimated to be between 43-53% and 22-37% respectively (Graedel et al., 2011).

While some expect that the recycling rates for metals used in electricity generation technologies will be higher due to expected high collection rates (Elshkaki and Graedel, 2013), others mentions different situations that could lead to materials not being recycled (Davidsson et al., 2012).

For some materials, recycling can even be technically problematic. In the case of REEs, such as neodymium, recycling is commonly mentioned as being important for a sustainable energy system, but at the moment no infrastructure for recycling of REEs from the permanent magnets exists and the end-of-life recycling rate is estimated to be less than 1% (Buchert, 2011).

One important problem with recycling rare earth elements is the fact that the metals oxidize quickly and disappear in the slag (Buchert et al., 2009). However, it could be technically possible to reach recycling rates of more than 90% for both neodymium and dysprosium (Schüler et al., 2011). A sustainable energy system would have to recycle as much as possible of the materials after the end of the service life, but even if recycling rates would eventually come close to 100%, the industry for replacing old technologies would still demand large resource flows indefinitely. The case study culminating in 24 TW of installed wind capacity demands an equivalent of over 10% of current (2012) global annual demand of bulk materials such as copper and steel. Even if these turbines were to be recycled at the end of their life and built using only recycled materials, it would still mean large material flows.

Another important perspective is the fact that this study only includes the material demands for constructing wind energy,

An energy system completely based on renewable energy technology would likely need more of these technologies, but also energy storage and transmission capable of creating a functioning energy system. For instance, Barnhart and Benson (2013) investigates energy and material requirements for different energy storage technologies and concludes that building an energy storage capacity that could be required in the future require amounts of materials and energy that are comparable to current annual production values.

An industry growing too fast can mean that the industry consumes more energy than it produces on an annual basis (Honnery).

There are many other examples of potential constraints on the growth of renewable energy technology, many of which are discussed by others. IEA (2013b) mentions costs, grid integration issues and permit issues as obstacles to a goal of 18% of global electricity from wind energy by 2050.

For wind energy, constructing the wind turbine and the connected capital costs constitute the majority of the total cost, with 76 – 85% of the total cost being capital cost (Timilsina et al., 2013). Financing for this cost needs to be in place before the wind capacity can be commissioned. Jacobson and Delucchi (2009) state that the construction of the proposed energy system would cost around 100 trillion USD over 20 years (not including transmission), which will be paid back by the sale of electricity and energy. Trainer (2012) interprets this as an investment of 5 trillion USD annually would be needed, which is said to be around 11 times the early 2000s annual investments in energy of around 450 billion USD. However, as discussed in this paper, this type of growth pattern is not very realistic.

The variability of production and grid integration is commonly suggested as the main barriers for implementation of renewable energy and it has even been suggested that this factor limits penetration rates of wind energy to 2 % of electricity production (Lenzen, 2010). These factors are discussed in more detail in other studies (Trainer, 2013, 2012).

The fact that energy production from renewable energy technologies is intermittent and non-dispatchable can also be argued to add to the total costs due to the need for backup power (Larsson et al., 2014).

The grid improvements and backup power requirements have to be in place before the variable energy production is taken into use, so the estimated growth curves can prove important for these aspects as well.

Although these technologies are likely more sustainable than fossil fuels, they are not without environmental impacts and are built using non-renewable resources. They should therefore not automatically be considered sustainable. A rapid growth in these technologies will even increase demand for a variety of different resources. Suitable growth rates of energy technologies, as well as how an energy system can be sustained over a longer time frame, should be considered when discussing sustainable energy systems for the future.

References

Achzet B., Reller A., Zepf V., University of Augsburg, Rennie C., BP, Ashfield M. and Simmons J., ON Communication, 2011. Materials critical to the energy industry. An introduction. http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/sustainability/group- reports/Materials_March2012.pdf Ang, B.W., Ng, T.T., 1992. The use

Bartlett, A.A., 2006. A Depletion Protocol for Non-Renewable Natural Resources: Australia as an Example. Natural Resources Research 15, 151–164.

Buchert, M., 2011. Rare Earths – a Bottleneck for future Wind Turbine Technologies? Presented at Wind Turbine Supply Chain & Logistics, Berlin, 29 August 2011. Available from: http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1296/2011-421-en.pdf

Dale, M., Benson, S.M., 2013. Energy Balance of the Global Photovoltaic (PV) Industry – Is the PV Industry a Net Electricity Producer? Environ. Sci. Technol. 47, 3482–3489.

Elshkaki, A., et al., 2013. Dynamic analysis of the global metals flows and stocks in electricity generation technologies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 59, 260-273.

Graedel, T. E., et al., 2011. Recycling rates of metals: A status report. Journal of Industrial Ecology. 15(3), 355-366.

Larsson, S., et a;., 2014. Reviewing electricity production cost assessments. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 30, 170–183.

Laxson, A., Hand, M.M., Blair, N., 2006. High Wind Penetration Impact on U.S. Wind Manufacturing Capacity and Critical Resources. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Report No. NREL/TP 500-40482.

Lenzen, M.,2010. Current State of Development of Electricity-Generating Technologies: A Literature Review. Energies 3, 462–591. Lund, H., 2007. Renewable energy strategies for sustainable development. Energy 32, 912–919.

Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., Behrens III, W.W., 1972. The Limits to Growth. Earth Island Limited, London.

Tao, C.S., Jiang, J., Tao, M., 2011. Natural resource limitations to terawatt- scale solar cells. Solar Energy Materials and Solar Cells 95, 3176–3180.

Trainer, T., 2012. A critique of Jacobson and Delucchi’s proposals for a world renewable energy supply. Energy Policy 44, 476–481.

Trainer, T., 2013. 100% Renewable supply? Comments on the reply by Jacobson and Delucchi to the critique by Trainer. Energy Policy 57, 634–640.

USGS, 2013. 2011 Mineral Yearbook: Rare Earths [Advanced Release]. Available from: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/myb1-2011-raree.pdf

Vikström, H., Davidsson, S., Höök, M., 2013. Lithium availability and future production outlooks. Applied Energy 110, 252–266. Wilson, C., Grubler, A., Bauer, N., Krey, V., Riahi, K., 2013. Future capacity growth of energy technologies: are scenarios consistent with historical evidence? Climatic Change 118, 381–395. 395. 67-8

 

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Demand reduction of electricity to balance the electric grid

Demand reduction of electricity to balance the electric grid by Alice Friedemann

By the time a smart grid is integrated into all the existing computer systems, wasting electricity with each round-trip of information, (rolling) blackouts are likely to be occurring due to lack of energy, especially for natural gas power plants.

Also, PG&E found that most customers weren’t able to program their thermostats, many had teenagers or other members of the family who secretly turned up the air-conditioning or heat, overriding the smart-grid demand reduction, and so on. Restaurants and other businesses were unwilling to drive customers away by reducing energy use, and large businesses had so many different computer systems running their many kinds of thermostats that writing software interfaces between the utility and buildings to automatically raise or lower temperatures was going to cost more and take more time than expected.

So instead, PG&E is lowering demand by sending an email and leaving a phone message a day ahead of when peak demand is likely, and customers are given lower rates year-round in exchange for limiting electricity use the next day between 2 and 7 pm for about 15 to 20 days of the year.

It’s far more likely that demand will be lowered because of declining energy will shrink the economy, making unemployment rise. Between unaffordable energy prices (even low ones in a deflationary crash will be too high for the unemployed to pay), and eventually rationing if the plutocracy allows it, will be how electricity is limited.

There is only so much demand that can be limited

Domestic and commercial sectors only use 16% of electricity. These domains can limit their heating and cooling, but that only gets about 10% of total energy saved. The most energy-intensive industrial processes such as ammonia (fertilizer) and cement manufacture could only postpone using energy by shutting down for periods of low energy availability, wasting expensive capital. Energy-intense kilns and furnaces can’t switch on and off to match short solar and wind peaks (Trainer).

Trainer, T., 2012. A critique of Jacobson and Delucchi’s proposals for a world renewable energy supply. Energy Policy 44, 476–481.

Posted in Demand Reduction | Comments Off on Demand reduction of electricity to balance the electric grid

Jacobson and Delucchi energy dreams are irresponsible fairy tales

Jacobson and Delucchi energy dreams are irresponsible fairy tales by Alice Friedemann

Jacobson & Delucchi are like religious preachers who tell people what they want to hear.  Energyskeptic has hundreds of articles from peer-reviewed sources that explain why their ideas are absolutely crazy.  Here are just a few of the problems off the top of my head, other critiques follow:

  • They promote solutions that are far from commercial, and are unlikely to ever be commercial (hydrogen, wave and tidal power, flywheels,  electric vehicle-to-grid)
  • They are totally unaware of energy returned on energy invested concepts that have been around for decades and propose solutions with too low  an EROI to sustain society (i.e. solar PV)
  • Do not address the many issues of wind power
  • Don’t take into account the fossil fuel energy to replace billions of existing diesel engines that last up to 40 or more years that power trucks, trains, ships, and other equipment, or explain how we could possibly electrify them
  • Quantify how much fossil fuel energy it will take to make the alternative energy contraptions  which typically last only half as long as fossil plants — about 20 years for onshore wind and solar, 15 years for offshore wind due to corrosion, battering by waves, etc.
  • Don’t understand how powerful oil is and why it’s so hard to replace
  • Is unaware of  how the electric grid works (not his field) and the need to balance intermittent energy with generation that can ramp up and down quickly to balance intermittent, unpredictable, and unreliable wind, solar, and wave power (the only renewable that can do that is biomass which he rejects for it’s greenhouse gas contributions, though he ought to be rejecting biomass for the tremendous ecological harm and negative EROEI).
  • Above all, energy storage is needed, mainly utility-scale batteries for which there isn’t enough material or energy to construct because there aren’t enough (pumped) hydro storage or compressed air energy storage locations. Geothermal is baseload and can’t ramp up and down to balance wind and solar.  The idea of hydrogen storage is so preposterous that it ought to make any reasonable person question his other “solutions” as well.

Vaclav Smil in 2010 “Energy Myths and Realities”:

Smil (2018) has a great takedown of Jacobson within this paper as well:

EYE ON THE MARKET • ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018 Pascal’s Wager
http://vaclavsmil.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/JPM2018.pdf

Jacobson and Delucchi propose to convert all of the world’s energy supply to sustainable energy in just two decades by following the WWs (wind, water, and sunlight) path. Given the fact that most of the contemplated capacity in large hydrostations is already in place, their grandiose plan rests on installing 3.8 million large (each with 5 MW capacity) wind turbines and 89,000 photovoltaic and concentrated solar power plants (averaging 300 MW). They estimate the cost of all this (not including new transmission lines) as about $100 trillion dollars.

This lightning-fast extravaganza would require abandoning (except for hydro dams and HV lines) all of the world’s existing energy infrastructure and erecting a new one by 2030. The average annual cost of this enterprise-taking into account its authors’ estimate and adding the cost of extensive new transmission grids, lost capital value of the suddenly abandoned fossil-energy industries, and forgone revenue from their terminated operations—would be easily equal to the total value of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) or close to a quarter of global GDP.

My verdict concerning this project’s feasibility has been shared by many other life-long students of energy and could not be expressed better than by quitting just two of many scathing comments submitted to the editors of Scientific American, in which the Jacobson and Delucchi proposal appeared.

Michael Briggs wrote: “as a physicist focused on energy research, I find this paper so absurdly poorly done that it is borderline irresponsible. There are so many mistakes, it would take hours of typing to point out all of the problems. the fact that Scientific American publishes something so poorly done does not speak well of the journal.

Seth Dayal added “This paper is an irresponsible piece of nonsense that would generally be found for order in the back pages of some pulp fiction magazine. The sad part is the editors for some reason chose to not only publish the claptrap but to endorse it”.

It is one thing when a former politician endorses an unrealistic project to boost his media presence or when an astute businessman pushes a scheme that would eventually benefit his investments—but it is an entirely different matter when one of the world’s oldest science magazines lends its pages to fairy tales that any seasoned engineer and any responsible student of energy systems find grotesquely immature.

Roman playwright Terence wrote 2100 years ago “Men believe what they want to”. It may be true, but it is hardly the best foundation for rational energy or any other policies.

More critiques:

Critique of the 100 Percent Renewable Energy for New York Plan by Edward Dodge

A Critique of Jacobson and Delucchi’s Proposals for a World Renewable Energy Supply by Ted Trainer

Not enough wind, solar, geothermal to replace fossil and nuclear power in the 11 western states of the WECC.   California, Oregon, Utah, and Washington have already developed most (if not all) of their prime-quality in-state resources by Alice Friedemann

U.S. Renewable Energy Technical Potentials: A GIS-Based Analysis by Anthony Lopez, National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

My comment: this document shows that the solutions for New York state in Jacobson’s 2013 paper “Examining the feasibility of converting New York State’s  all-purpose energy infrastructure to one using wind, water ,and sunlight” in Energy Policy is physically impossible because New York does not have enough Solar PV, Solar CSP, geothermal, hydropower, or wind power/capacity/potential. Nor do any of the other 36 states in the Eastern Interconnection

Comments on Jacobson et al.’s proposal for a wind, water, and solar energy future for New York State by Nathaniel Gilbraith et al.  

A Reality Check on a Plan for a Swift Post-Fossil Path for New York By Andrew C. Revkin, New York Times

 

Posted in Alternative Energy, Vaclav Smil | 3 Comments

Peak Coal in China likely to be around 2024

Mohr, S. H., et al. February 1, 2015. Projection of world fossil fuels by country. Fuel volume 141: 120-135.

We model world fossil fuel production by country including unconventional sources.

Scenarios suggest coal production peaks before 2025 due to China.

Results suggest lack of fossil fuels to deliver high IPCC scenarios: A1Fl, RCP8.5
Four countries, China, USA, Canada and Australia modeled by state/province level.
Three ultimately recoverable resources applied, that range from 48.4 to 121.5 ZJ.

Abstract.   Detailed projections of world fossil fuel production including unconventional sources were created by country and fuel type to estimate possible future fossil fuel production. Four critical countries (China, USA, Canada and Australia) were examined in detail with projections made on the state/province level. Ultimately Recoverable Resources (URR) for fossil fuels were estimated for three scenarios: Low = 48.4 ZJ, Best Guess (BG) = 75.7 ZJ, High = 121.5 ZJ. The scenarios were developed using Geologic Resources Supply-Demand Model (GeRS-DeMo). The Low and Best Guess (BG) scenarios suggest that world fossil fuel production may peak before 2025 and decline rapidly thereafter. The High scenario indicates that fossil fuels may have a strong growth till 2025 followed by a plateau lasting approximately 50 years before declining. All three scenarios suggest that world coal production may peak before 2025 due to peaking Chinese production and that only natural gas could have strong growth in the future. In addition, by converting the fossil fuel projections to greenhouse gas emissions, the projections were compared to IPCC scenarios which indicated that based on current estimates of URR there are insufficient fossil fuels to deliver the higher emission IPCC scenarios A1Fl and RCP8.5.

Wang, J. September 4, 2013. Chinese coal supply and future production outlooks. Energy 60: 204-214.

[below are excerpts, go to original article above to see all of it]

ABSTRACT

China’s energy supply is dominated by coal, making projections of future coal production in China important. Recent forecasts suggest that Chinese coal production may reach a peak in 2010-2039 but with widely differing peak production levels. The estimated URR (ultimately recoverable resources) influence these projections significantly, however, widely different URR-values were used due to poor understanding of the various Chinese coal classification schemes. To mitigate these shortcomings, a comprehensive investigation of this system and an analysis of the historical evaluation of resources and reporting issues are performed. A more plausible URR is derived, which indicates that many analysts underestimate volumes available for exploitation.

Projections based on the updated URR using a modified curve fitting model indicate that Chinese coal production could peak as early as 2024 at a maximum annual production of 4.1 Gt.

By considering other potential constraints, it can be concluded that peak coal in China appears inevitable and immediate. This event can be expected to have significant impact on the Chinese economy, energy strategies and GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions reduction strategies.

INTRODUCTION

Chinese energy supplies are completely dominated by coal and in 2010, China produced 3.24 billion metric tons (Gt) of coal, constituting 76.5% of total Chinese energy production, furthermore, China consumed 3.39 Gt coal, equal to 68.0% of its energy consumption [1]. In the foreseeable future coal will remain the dominating fuel and its demand is set to increase [2,3]. Therefore, reasonable analysis of future Chinese coal production trajectories would prove helpful and necessary for national planning purposes.

An investigation of current literature indicates that the quality of URR data used by most studies is unfortunately poor. There are two main reasons. The first is poor understanding of the Chinese coal classification system due to its complexity and inconsistency with more internationally established frameworks. The second is use of available information, so that in many cases analysts choose to rely on the reported data presented by certain international institutions or energy companies, such as WEC (World Energy Council) or BP [4,6]. It is apparent that these are poor sources when we note that Chinese coal reserves have remained constant since 1992 despite rapid production increases. These problems require illumination, discussion and attention to better address the Chinese coal question and its importance.

The Chinese classification system for mineral reserves and resources is derived from the framework originally used by the FSU (Former Soviet Union). In 1954 the NMRC (National Mineral Reserve Committee of China) reprinted the Solid Mineral Reserve Classification Standards of FSU as the main reference for the Chinese classification systems. In April 1959, the first formal Chinese standard of Provisional Specifications for Mineral Reserve Classification (General Principles) was issued. Thereafter, China has made several modifications of its classification systems in June 1977, December 1992, June 1997, June 1999, August 2002, July 2009, and November 2010.

Before 1999, the Soviet and the Chinese classification systems were similar with both countries using centrally planned economic systems. As a result, the main purpose of exploration activities was to identify the quantities of mineral resources available for the central government and these systems are based primarily on geological and technological conditions, with little attention being paid to economic factors. The old framework made comparison with other countries using more market-oriented classification systems difficult.

As China reformed and developed, revision of this old system became an urgent task to better address the requirements of new economic policy. An improved foundation for exploitation of Chinese mineral resources was created and the new framework called Classification for Resources/Reserves of Solid Fuels and Mineral Commodities (GB/T 17766-1999) was adopted as a national standard in June 1999 to mitigate the shortcomings of the earlier system. The new system was based on the United Nations International Framework Classification for Reserves/Resources (ENERGY/WP.1/R.70) and Principles of a Resource/Reserve Classification for Minerals.

November 2010, when Specification for Comprehensive Exploration and Evaluation of Mineral Resources (GB/T 25283-2010) was presented as a complement to 2002 with additional guidelines for implementing the classification system of GB/T 17766-1999. Currently, GB/T 17766-1999 is the first consistent framework that evaluates Chinese coal resources based on expected economics of extraction as well as geology and technological feasibility. It divides resources into 3 major categories: reserves, basic reserves and resources: Reserves are the minable part of basic reserves on which the factors such as economic, mining, metallurgical, environmental, legal, marketing, social and governmental has been considered and corresponding modification has been made during the feasibility study, pre-feasibility study and preparation of the annual mining plan. The results demonstrate that this part is economically minable; it is expressed by actual minable tonnage or volume, from which the losses of designing and mining have been deducted. Basic Reserves are a part of total identified mineral resources, which can satisfy the index (includes grade, quality, thickness and technical conditions for mining, etc.) requirements of current mining, and is expressed in terms of tonnage or volume, in which the losses of designing and mining have not been deducted. It is located in the measured and indicated reserve extending area, in which detail exploration or general exploration and feasibility study or pre-feasibility study have been done, and the results demonstrate economic or marginal economic benefits. Resources consist of a part of the total identified mineral resources and the undiscovered resources. The former includes resources for which mining is not economically viable or technologically feasible at the time by feasibility study or prefeasibility study; the resources upon which some kinds of exploration or prospecting have been done, but for which feasibility or pre- feasibility studies have not been carried out, are also included. The latter belongs to undiscovered mineral resources, upon which only reconnaissance has been done.

In 1998 the central government abandoned the MCI and no further studies have been made since. Table 1 describes the results of the 3 Chinese coal resources/reserves assessments made by the MCI. It should be noted that all of these studies were prepared prior to 1999, utilizing the old classification systems with little attention paid to economic factors, and reporting 3 categories: coal reserves (similar to total identified mineral resources 1999), prognostic resource (similar to undiscovered resources in GB/T 17766-1999 in Fig. 1) and total coal resources (i.e. total resources in GB/T 17766-1999).

WEC and BGR have also reported estimations for total coal resources in China (Table 2), but their estimations differ significantly to the assessments made by the MCI. A possible reason for this may be that these institutes overlooked the complexity of the Chinese classification systems and its development over time, leading to misinterpretation of the available statistics. MCI (Table 1) and data from WEC and BGR (Table 2) differ significantly.

These differences illustrate the challenges faced in estimating the size of Chinese coal resources, as the availability of data and subsequent interpretation appear to be dogged by erroneous assumptions and misunderstanding.

Estimations of identified coal resources (i.e. coal reserves before 1999) are important since this category, together with annual discoveries of identified coal resources, are the only information that have always been reported to the public besides basic reserves after 2000. Estimates published by CNCA (China National Coal Association), NBSC (National Bureau of Statistics of China) and MLR (Ministry of Land and Resources of China) are reasonably consistent, except for a time lag for NBSC and minor statistical differences (Table 3), but differ when compared to MCI assessments. There are also considerable differences among reported annual discoveries (Table 4). For example, CNCA [35] reports discoveries in 1978 as 25.1 Gt, compared to only 8 Gt in the Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 1978 National Economic and Social Development reported by NBSC (Table 4). In 2006, reported discoveries by NBSC is 36.7 Gt, while 122.4 Gt is claimed by MLR.

There are also inconsistencies within publications made by the MLR. The 2010 edition of the Gazette of China’s Land and Natural Resource reports discoveries of 211.5 Gt for that year. However, this value was revised to 57.51 Gt in the 2011 edition of the same report (Table 4). Adding further to the confusion, MLR also reports discoveries of 71.16 Gt for 2010 in the 2011 China Mineral Resources (Table 4). Such differences are obvious and easy to find, but no explanations are given by the MLR. In conclusion, it is hard to know the accuracy of reported data for Chinese coal as significant differences existing among, and even within, published estimates from various agencies. Furthermore, it is also challenging to connect annual discoveries to total identified coal resources.

WEC and BGR report different reserve numbers (Table 6). Most striking is the constant reserve figures reported by WEC since 1992, as more recent Chinese updates, for unclear reasons, have been excluded. However, this data is still is widely utilized and frequently surfaces in worldwide statistics. In contrast, BGR data after 2006 appears closer to Chinese figures, but still lacks annual updates.

An alternative approach to get the URR is to rely on other techniques, such as LPT (Logit-probit Transforms) and HL (Hubbert Linearization) shown in Table 7 [5,44]. These techniques have their merits, provided that the trends used are consistent. However, there are also drawbacks as described in Ref. [53]. Chinese URR appears to display a linear trend from 1970 to 2002, which then breaks down with the URR value becoming sensitive to the length of the time series used for extrapolation (Fig. 4). The LPT-technique demonstrates similar problems because the Chinese data does not show any stable trend, unlike, for instance, Pennsylvania anthracite production (Fig. 5). The use of these techniques for URR estimation appears problematic for China and will likely give URR estimates with large variations depending upon the time period used. Consequently, it is recommended that such techniques cannot be viewed as reasonable approaches for the Chinese case before production trends have stabilized.

A higher URR appears to result in a lower depletion rate, one of the reasons it appears unlikely that China, with its vast coal deposits, would reach depletion rates of the same magnitude as Japan and Belgium. Therefore, a maximum depletion rate of 5% per year is used as an upper bound in this study to avoid mathematically optimal curve fits that would give projections reaching implausibly high depletion rates.

The results of the modelling are presented in Fig. 7. The depletion rate constraint gives a flatter peak and a somewhat slower decline rate afterward. Without such a constraint, the production peak becomes sharper followed by a more rapid decline. The recommended result in this paper shows that Chinese coal production will peak around 2024 at a peak production of approximately 4.1 Gt.

For maximum depletion rates, Höök and Aleklett investigated and concluded that for American coal production the highest depletion rates were at most around 3% per year in relatively small regions, such as Pennsylvania anthracite, while most others are significantly lower [59]. This study also investigated several smaller post-peak coal producing countries, including Japan, France, Table 7 Investigation of URR estimates in the literature.

Table 8 shows that even a doubling in Chinese coal URR only delays the peak year, with or without depletion rate constraint, by 16.1 years and 13.7 years respectively. Regardless, the peak would still arrive before 2040.

There are major differences in the forecasts for Chinese coal production in published studies (Fig. 9). Peak production levels span from 2.3 to 6.1 Gt (mean value is 3.7 Gt), while corresponding peak year ranges from 2010 to 2039 (mean year is 2024).

Several reasons contribute to the diverging outcomes. The URR and the model used are the most important reasons, which we have shown in the previous section of this article (for example Section 3.3). Besides those factors, the applied time series can also affect the results. For example, both this paper and Lin and Liu use similar models with nearly identical URR values, but still reach different peak production levels, possibly due to the different length of historical production data (the historical data period used in this paper and is 1949-2010 and 1949-2006, respectively). In the end, it appears likely that Chinese coal production will reach a maximum before 2040, with expected peak year in 2024.

Energy politics, environmental concern, future demand and price trends, technological development, and social acceptance can also affect coal production. What matters is recoverability and this is a complex parameter affected by both geotechnical factors and socioeconomic parameters [59]. If future production is dependent on more factors than just geology then it is important to consider a depletion rate constraint to avoid extremely high production rates resulting from curve fits only considering the geological availability of coal. In future the following factors may also constrain the increase of coal production in China.

One factor that might negatively influence future production capabilities is water availability. Chinese coal industry is water intensive, and this holds true for coal consuming sectors like power generation and the chemical industry with Pan et al. estimating that more than half of the industrial use of water in China is by the coal sector. Significant decreases in groundwater table levels can be seen in some mining areas. For example, groundwater level has decreased from 105 m of 1952 to 71 m in 1993 in Jiaozuo coal mining area in Henan province.

China is already facing a serious problem with water resource scarcity due to rapid industrialization and urbanization. For coal mining, 71% of 96 key state-owned mines are somewhat short of water, and 40% of them suffer from serious water shortages. Chinese water resources are largely located in South China, while most coal lies in the north.

For example, Shanxi province possesses 31% of coal reserves, while only accounting for 0.3% of total water resources. Water constraints will most likely mainly affect possible annual production rates, and some studies have found that coal production will not exceed 3.8 Gt annually for this reason [66,68]. The fact that water shortages could become a major barrier for coal industry development.

Another possible limiting factor for production rates is transport capacity. Most coal mining occurs in northern and north-western China, while demand is concentrated to eastern and south-eastern regions.

About 50% of all coal is transported via railways and insufficient capacity has already become a bottleneck affecting the coal market.

Long distance transportation by highway is not practical either, effectively limiting China to railroads for domestic coal transport.

It is crucial to expand transport capacity and related infrastructure to sustain increased coal production, but this problem is often overlooked.

Land subsidence is another issue as nearly 95% of Chinese coal production originates from underground mining and every mined Mt of coal has been estimated to result in 20 hectares (49 acres) of subsiding land. Pollution of groundwater yet another problem. Xie et al. found that 2.2 billion m3 of groundwater resources are polluted annually due to coal mining. Furthermore, the volume of methane emission from coal mining in China is estimated to reach 20 billion m3 in 2008, six times that of the United States. Comprehensive discussions on mining waste disposal, landscape change and air pollution from coal mining have been made by others.

Therefore, a supply shortage can be expected due to an unforeseen peak coal event and is likely to threaten further growth of the Chinese economy.

The coming of peak coal will also affect the current energy policies or strategies that rely on the assumption of abundant URR and adequate supply of coal. To meet rapidly increasing demand for oil and gas, and relieve import pressures (since nearly 60% Chinese oil demand and about 30% of gas demand is met through imports), a strategy, with relevant policy support, of replacing oil and gas with coal has been implemented for years. In 2009, the capacity of CTL (coal to liquids) projects reached 1.6 million metric tons (Mt) and has been planned to increase further to 12 Mt by 2015 and 50 Mt by 2020. Plenty of coal resources would need to be exhausted to achieve this target because producing one barrel of liquids (i.e. about 0.136 metric ton) needs to consume 1-2 metric tons coal. Besides, China also established coal to gas projects, such as underground coal gasification and plans to expand the scale of operation over the coming years. All of these strategies or polices face a dilemma in the near future: a significant investment in infrastructure and techniques, but without the necessary coal to feed these changes. As shown in this paper, China should take more measures to replace its coal with oil, gas or other alternative energy resources.

The coming of peak coal is good news for China’s environment, especially for reduction of GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions. Climate change has been seen as the biggest environmental threat in the present and future development of human society, and anthropogenic GHG emissions, especially CO2 emissions mainly due to the usage of fossil fuels, have been considered as the dominant cause of the observed change in global climate.

A possible Chinese future coal production scenario is estimated using a modified Hubbert model, combining the previously mentioned URR and a constrained depletion rate, suggesting that Chinese coal production could reach its peak by around 2024, with a peak production of approximately 4.1 Gt. It is possible for China to increase its coal’s URR, however, peak timing proves to be insensitive to changes in URR, even with a doubling of URR, so Chinese coal production will still peak before 2040. A comprehensive conclusion for the date for peak coal in China is before 2040, with a very likely year of 2024.

Other potential constraints on Chinese coal production are also presented here and indicate that it is very difficult to increase Chinese coal production further even if coal reserves were abundant. The coming of peak coal is inevitable and immediate. Due to the importance of coal to Chinese economy, it can be expected that the coming of peak coal will threaten further growth in Chinese GDP, and energy strategies or policies based on abundant coal reserves and adequate coal supply must be adjusted as soon as possible to minimize its negative influence.

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DOE 2014 Wind vision a new era for wind power in the United States

DOE 2014 Wind vision a new era for wind power in the United States

Many potential sites with high quality wind energy resources have minimal or no access to electrical transmission facilities.

From the perspective of planning reserves, wind power’s aggregated capacity value in the Study Scenario was about 10–15% in 2050 (with lower marginal capacity value), thereby reducing the ability of wind compared to other generators to contribute to increases in peak planning reserve requirements. In addition, the uncertainty introduced by wind in the Study Scenario increased the level of operating reserves that must be maintained by the system.

Transmission constraints result in average curtailment of 2–3% of wind generation,

With wind penetration increasing to the levels envisioned under the Study Scenario, the fossil fleet’s role to provide energy declines while its role to provide reserves increases.

At the end of 2013, out of a global 318 GW wind power capacity,  offshore wind was 2.2% (7 GW), mainly in Europe, with a small amount installed  in Asia.

Wind power is capital intensive, which makes costs for wind highly sensitive to the cost of capital. In the United States, the weighted average cost of capital available to wind project sponsors is artificially inflated by the fact that federal incentives for wind power development are delivered through the tax code.

Figure 2-8. Components of installed capital cost for a land-based, utility-scale reference wind turbine. Source: Tegen, S.et al. 2013. Cost of Wind Energy Review. National Renewable Energy Laboratory

Figure 2-8. Components of installed capital cost for a land-based, utility-scale reference wind turbine. Source: Tegen, S.et al. 2013. Cost of Wind Energy Review. National Renewable Energy Laboratory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Costs

Market data on actual project-level O&M costs are not widely available. [My translation of what that means? This is why it’s hard to know the real EROI and cost of wind projects, since these are kept secret so that wind subsidies and investment money can be found].

O&M costs are an important component of the overall cost of wind power and can vary substantially among projects. Anecdotal evidence and analysis suggest that unscheduled maintenance and premature component failure in particular challenge the wind power industry.  O&M costs generally increase as projects age.

a recent report found U.S. wind O&M costs comprise scheduled maintenance (20.5%), unscheduled maintenance (47.7%), and balance of system (31.9%).

O&M is around 25% of lifetime turbine costs and levelized replacement costs are 30% of O&M.

Low Natural Gas prices  have pushed demand for wind power down

The increase in natural gas reserves enabled by advances in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has been among the more important energy supply-side developments impacting wind power. In response to this new supply (along with tepid demand from a sluggish economy), natural gas prices have fallen dramatically from their peak in mid-2008, prompting a considerable amount of fuel-switching in the power sector. The share of natural gas-fired generation in the U.S. power mix increased from 21% in 2008 to 27% in 2013, while coal-fired generation declined from 48% to 37% over this same period. Though coal prices have remained relatively steady, these developments with natural gas have pushed wholesale power prices down from the highs seen in 2008, resulting in increased competitive pressures for wind power.

Posted in Wind | Tagged | Comments Off on DOE 2014 Wind vision a new era for wind power in the United States

Mined Oil sands EROI 5, in-situ 2.9, or 1 if refinement, transportation, & environmental costs included

Nuwer, R. Feb 19, 2013. Oil Sands Mining Uses Up Almost as Much Energy as It Produces. InsideClimate News.

EROI SURFACE MINED oil sands (20% of reserves)

EROI 5  according to J. David Hughes research released Tuesday.

EROI 5.5 to  6 (Brandt)

EROI in-situ Steam Injected oil sands (80% of reserves)

EROI 2.9 : 1 — In-situ Steam injected tar sands, which comprise 80% of tar sands. These are gotten from deeper below the earth than mined oil sands, with an EROI of just 2.9 : 1, or 1 unit of natural gas to create 2.9 units of oil.

EROI 3.5 to 4 (Brandt)

Or perhaps an EROI of only 1?

Hall, who wasn’t involved in Hughes’ study, thinks the EROI for oil sands would be 1:1 if the tar sands’ full life cycle—including transportation, refinement into higher quality products, end use efficiency and environmental costs—was taken into account.

Brandt’s figures may be too high because he doesn’t account for the energy to convert oil sands to synthetic fuels, the transport of pentanes and other diluents to thin the tar for pipeline transport to refineries, the energy to refine them, and deliver to customers.

Compared to the EROI of 25 for conventional oil, this is barely a viable operation.

EROI is about to go down even lower. Hughes based his calculations on the highest quality 25.6 billion barrels of Canadian tar sands oil that are currently under active development. The143 billion barrels of oil sands under Alberta’s boreal forests are low quality, and only 8% are accessible with surface mining.

“Those EROI numbers are going to go down as we move away from the highest quality to the lesser quality parts of the resource. I’d expect that downward shift to probably start about now.” Hughes said.

“They have to use a lot of natural gas to upgrade this heavy, sticky, gooky almost tar-like stuff to make it fluid enough to use,” said Charles Hall, a professor at the State University of New York’s College of Environmental Science and Forestry. Hydrogen from gas heats the tar sands so the viscous form of petroleum it contains, known as bitumen, can be liquefied and pumped out of the ground. That’s how gas helps turn tar sands “into something a bit closer to what we call oil.”

With most of the world’s highest quality resources already exhausted, companies are turning to formerly undesirable alternatives such as tar sands oil, which come with higher energetic price tags yet lower returns.

“We built our nation, economy and civilization on cheap energy—that’s where this incredible growth of the U.S. economy has come from,” said Hall, who coined the term EROI in 1979. “But that characteristic high energy return on investment fuel from much of the last century is no longer here.”

Hughes’ figures include the energy it takes to mine bitumen as well as to upgrade it to synthetic oil that can be put into a refinery. It also includes the liquefied natural gas used to turn it into dilbit (diluted bitumen) so it can flow through pipelines.

Both Hughes and Hall think the new data should be factored into the debate over Canada’s tar sands reserves, which cover an area about the size of Florida.

What isn’t often mentioned, Hughes said, is the energy required to extract the oil, or the rate at which it can feasibly be recovered.

“Unless we talk about all 3 metrics—size of the resource, net energy and rate of supply—we’re not getting the full story,” he said.

If you accept the fact that fossil fuels are finite—and I think most people would—then using a lot more fossil fuels for recovering energy as opposed to doing actual work basically uses them up quicker with no net payback in terms of useful work,” Hughes said. “It’s an issue of diminishing returns.”

Canada is touted as having the third largest oil reserves in the world. But its supply of conventional oil is shrinking, and oil sands extraction has been growing fast in the past decade, from about 700,000 barrels per day in 2000 to 1.7 million today.

While no rigorous studies have been conducted on the association between diminishing EROI values and increased greenhouse gas emissions, Hughes thinks “it’s a pretty safe assumption to make” that they are linked.

Those emissions are only going to increase as Canada ramps up to the 5 million barrels per day already approved for extraction, said Simon Dyer, policy director for the Pembina Institute, a Canadian non-profit focused on developing sustainable energy solutions.

Whether mining tar sands oil makes sense financially, depends on the world market price of oil—and on whether a company has already paid off its infrastructure costs or is building a new mine.

With the current price of synthetic crude oil sometimes dipping as low as $30 per barrel, a company that has paid off its infrastructure can still make a profit. For a company that’s still building, however, the market price would have to be about $100 per barrel in order to justify construction, Hughes said.

“Cost-wise, this is the most expensive oil being produced today,” Dyer said. “It’s a pretty clear indicator that our solution to energy needs is not chasing lower and lower quality fossil fuel resources that come with higher impacts.”

If oil sands oil eventually finds an easy outlet to the Gulf Coast—perhaps through the proposed Keystone XL pipeline project—the price for upgraded synthetic oil will likely rise to reflect the world market value, currently $110 per barrel.

Profitability aside, the development of Canada’s oil sands reserves will never offset declines in crude oil. At the world’s current rate of oil consumption—32.2 billion barrels per year—Canada’s tar sands oil reserves remain at a finite 168.6 billion barrels, enough to keep the world fueled for less than six years.

Brandt A.R., J. Englander and S. Bharadwaj (2013). The energy efficiency of oil sands extraction: Energy return ratios from 1970 to 2010. Energy.

Posted in EROEI Energy Returned on Energy Invested, Tar Sands (Oil Sands) | Comments Off on Mined Oil sands EROI 5, in-situ 2.9, or 1 if refinement, transportation, & environmental costs included

New Threat to Oil sand Projects

Newfound Threat to Oilsand Projects

Researchers discover ancient salt formation key factor in Alberta steam fracking disasters.

By Andrew Nikiforuk, 28 Jul 2014, TheTyee.ca

Also See: Next Oil sands Threat: Cracking Caprock

A new study suggests that naturally occurring upward flow of groundwater in the oilsands region is creating fractures and weaknesses that may explain a series of catastrophic events for the controversial mining industry.  The findings were published in a PhD thesis last year and soon will appear in a paper for the American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin.

These findings have significant implications for worker safety, groundwater protection, the security of massive industrial wastewater disposal in the region as well as the economics and placement of more than 100 steam plants and mines.

Recent eruptions of steam, bitumen and groundwater at oilsands operations may all represent an industrial collision with a natural process that drives salty groundwater into bitumen-bearing reservoirs where it fractures and weakens the rock near and above bitumen deposits.

These calamities cost the industry tens of millions of dollars. The disasters also required large-scale cleanup efforts or resulted in project abandonment.

Ancient groundwater channels can carve holes in cap rock (a shale/sandstone layer that purportedly seals bitumen formations from other rock layers). In addition this protective cap rock thins or erodes to nothing in many places in the tarsands.

In other words, no geological seal exists to prevent industry made fractures caused by high-pressurized steam injections or waste water injection from erupting to the surface.

Breaking the Cap Rock

Approximately 80 per cent of Alberta’s bitumen deposits lie deeper than 75 metres and cannot be mined. As a consequence, these deep deposits, all capped by rock, are currently being heated to as high as 300 degrees Celsius with highly pressurized steam.

Given that there are more than 100 steam plant facilities poking thousands of holes into irregular layers of bitumen, there is “a need to improve the collective capabilities of operators, service providers and regulatory bodies in the area of caprock integrity management,” noted the event’s organizers.

Industry uses either a steaming tool called steam-assisted gravity drainage or cyclic steam stimulation to melt a resource as hard as a hockey puck.

The overlaying caprock acts as a primary but not always impermeable seal that keeps steamed bitumen from seeping into aquifers, neighbouring industry wellbores and other geological formations, as well as the forest floor and lakes.

In general, industry tries to keep the pressure significantly low enough to ensure the caprock does not break — but high enough to push the melted bitumen out.

It is a very fine line. In 2006, French multinational company Total blew a 300-metre crater in the forest while trying to steam up a shallow formation of bitumen.

Although regulatory reports on the event weren’t published until four years later, the “catastrophic event” put caprock integrity on the agenda and forced Total to abandon its project.

Ever since then, all steam-based bitumen operations, the industry’s most energy-intensive facilities, report yearly on caprock integrity. The Society of Petroleum Engineers devoted a sold-out workshop on the subject last spring in Banff.

Half of all bitumen now produced from the oilsands relies on a form of oil production that injects highly pressurized steam into deep deposits of cold bitumen.

Harvard researcher and University of Calgary graduate Benjamin Cowie traces four significant and costly events in the tarsands to a newly identified geohazard: the erosion of salt formations underneath bitumen deposits by the movement of groundwater.

Echos of fracking

Recent studies by petroleum scientists as well as annual industry progress reports to the Alberta Energy Regulator show that the technologies used to steam deep bitumen deposits have created the same sort of problems now plaguing the hydraulic fracturing of unconventional oil and gas resources across North America.

Both technologies inject highly-pressurized fluids into formations where the resulting pressure can crack or fracture overlying rock and well casings in unpredictable ways. These fractures can bring fluids or gases to the surface, contaminate groundwater or connect with other existing wells.

The end result for both technologies are the same: hydrocarbons go where regulators don’t want them or industry can’t control them.

Alberta regulators described the Total blow-out as a fracking issue in a 2011 presentation. “Given ongoing caprock integrity concerns associated with fracturing and hydro-fracking in the subsurface to initiate production, these findings will have relevance to other shallow thermal and non-thermal operations, including in-situ bitumen/extra-heavy oil operations, and production of other emerging unconventional commodities such as tight oil and shale gas.”

The problem seems most pronounced at cyclic steam operations such as those run by Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. and Imperial Oil, where steam is injected into the ground for weeks at a time from pads that typically contain as many as 20 wells. After a soaking period, melted bitumen is brought to the surface.

Cowie suspects that fractures and faults created by the new hazard have collided with industrial activity along the eastern fringes of bitumen mining in northeastern Alberta.

1. In 2009 bitumen seeped to surface at CNRL’s Primrose operation in Cold Lake. Four more seeps appeared in 2013 resulting in a $50-million cleanup operation. CNRL eventually excavated 82,508 tonnes of impacted earth and drained an entire lake. The fourth largest oil spill in Alberta history is still under investigation.

2. In 2010 Shell’s Muskeg River mine hit a gusher of sulfate-rich and salty groundwater connected to the Devonian while excavating a tailing pond. It took more than a year to contain a rupture that spurted 2,000 cubic metres of salt water an hour. It cost millions of dollars to plug the leak. Researchers say that “it is almost certain that more conduits exist throughout the oilsands region, and that this will not be the last incident of brine discharge in an oilsands system.”

3. In 2006 Total blasted a 75 by 125 metre surface crater in the boreal forest at its Joslyn Creek steam plant resulting in the abandonment of the project. The event rendered nearly 30 million barrels of bitumen unrecoverable. Alberta regulators, which didn’t report on the event for four years, later compared the Total blowout to an uncontrolled frack job in a 2011 presentation. “Given ongoing cap rock integrity concerns associated with fracturing and hydro-fracking in the subsurface to initiate production, these findings will have relevance to other shallow thermal and non-thermal operations, including in-situ bitumen/extra-heavy oil operations, and production of other emerging unconventional commodities such as tight oil and shale gas.”

4. In the 1980s Texaco created a geyser of bitumen and salt water outside of Fort McMurray. There is little literature on the blowout. But it may have connected to a Devonian aquifer too. —Andrew Nikiforuk

The events include the massive 12,000 barrel bitumen seepage to the surface by Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. (CNRL); a huge blowout at Total’s Joslyn steam plant project in 2006; and a large groundwater gusher at Shell’s Muskeg River mine.

That 2010 disaster turned a newly created dam for mining waste into a lake full of 7-billion litres worth of highly saline water.

Harvard researcher Benjamin Cowie, who recently presented his findings to industry, now argues that all of the events share one geological feature: they occurred along the edge of an ancient salt formation that runs in a northwest to southeast direction through the Athabasca and Cold Lake oilsands deposits.

Geologists call it the Prairie Evaporite and it is part of the Devonian formation that lies underneath the tarsand deposits.  But based on the chemistry of water samples collected by industry from the region, Cowie believes that ancient glacial water is not only eating away the rock but creating new weaknesses under these bitumen layers targeted by industry.

In some places the highly saline water has erupted into bitumen formations where industry has recorded the sudden appearance of sinkholes or seeps of highly saline water. Many of these naturally occurring seeps run directly into the Athabasca river.

In addition Cowie suspects that that aquifers with high salt content have dissolved and weakened the rock infrastructure beneath bitumen deposits and in some places created vertical fractures as the highly pressurized salty water rises toward the surface.

At this point industry-made fractures created by oilsands mining and steaming operations then collide with these up swells of water or connect to metre scale fractures created by the dissolution of salt by the groundwater movement.

“This is a big regional process and an entirely new environmental risk for the oilsands,” Cowie said in an exclusive Tyee interview.

Underground saltwater can destroy seal of cap rock

The Alberta Energy Regulator (AER), which is mapping the area to identify geological factors that may affect cap rock seals, now supports Cowie’s findings.

A 2013 paper presented to the American Rock Mechanics Association in San Francisco said that the regulator had identified “a complex sub-Cretaceous structure created by salt dissolution and collapse, which has implications for cap rock integrity and also for the disposal of produced and process water into Devonian strata.”

The paper also warned that ancient groundwater channels can carve holes in cap rock (a shale/sandstone layer that purportedly seals bitumen formations from other rock layers). In addition this protective cap rock thins or erodes to nothing in many places in the tarsands.

In other words, no geological seal exists to prevent industry made fractures caused by high-pressurized steam injections or waste water injection from erupting to the surface.

Earlier this year the AER abruptly suspended proposed shallow steam plant operations over a large area of the tarsands, worth billions of dollars, due to concerns about punching holes through the cap rock and polluting groundwater.

New clues to Cold Lake disaster

The regulator’s San Francisco presentation also revealed that large science gaps now exist on the issue. Stress regimes below 350 metres in the region are “not well understood and there is very little publicly available data.” Nor has groundwater been properly mapped or monitored in the region.

A June 2014 preliminary report by CNRL on its large bitumen seepage in Cold Lake also underscores how poorly industry understands the complexity of rock structures in the region.

The company’s first report on the causes of the headline-making event blames industry made rock fractures that allowed bitumen and steam to break through a shale barrier and then travel by natural fractures, faults or badly cemented wellbores to the surface.

Since 2009 CNRL Primrose East steam operation in Cold Lake has leaked thousands of barrels of bitumen and steam to the surface in as many as five identified distinct ground fractures contaminating both surface and groundwater.

However, the CNRL report does not mention the possibility that the erosion of a salt formation underlying its Primrose East field may also play a role in weakening local geology by inducing fractures and faults.

Nor does the CNRL’s report make any reference to the 2013 AER study or Cowie’s work.

But an independent technical panel, which reviewed CNRL’s causation work, flags the novel geological hazard as a major concern.

The panel noted, for example, that the geological weaknesses created by dissolving unique salt formations under the bitumen deposits in Primrose East “could influence shale integrity.”

Salt-related subsidence could also result in changes in rock stress and fractures that damage bitumen bearing zones, adds the technical report. “Clearly identifying these potential geologic hazards” is imperative, adds the report.

New factor in assessing risk

Some bitumen miners, however, have quietly recognized the new geohazard and have recently set up agreements to share data on what’s happening in the Devonian formation and how these events might compromise industrial activity.

One recent industry presentation, for example, noted that the dramatic erosion of salt deposits by glacial waters in the eastern portion of the Athabasca tarsands deposit “has created additional complexity” for steam plant operations.

Another 2014 presentation warned, “the presence of a highly transmissive aquifer in the ‘Intact’ Prairie Evaporite Formation will need to be considered as part of their risk analysis and, as needed, risk mitigation plans.”

Bernhard Mayer, a University of Calgary hydrologist who supervised Cowie’s PhD thesis, says the government and industry need to do a “more detailed investigation of the nature of these localized pathways between the McMurray formation and underlying Devonian units.”

They also need to study “the integrity of cap rocks overlying the bitumen-containing units and assess the cap rock integrity in view of the stress regime and the pressures associated with steaming operations.”

Cowie adds that there is little information about the complex geological phenomena.

“The extent of recent rock dissolution beneath the oilsands region is unknown and I think the absence of information poses a real risk to oilsands producers.”

By linking all these serious events to one mechanism Cowie hopes that regulators and industry “will pay more attention to it” and perform better regional mapping to study the risks.

During the catastrophic Joslyn steam blowout and the bursting of the previously unknown saline aquifer at Shell’s Muskeg mine, bitumen workers could have been seriously injured near the discharge sites, says Cowie.

The geohazard could also significantly affect economics by “requiring more detailed geological characterization to truly identify what’s happening with groundwater in these systems, or in the worst case, substantial and expensive cleanup efforts would be required if a leak does occur.”

David Schindler, a world famous water researcher and long-time critic of rapid bitumen development, called Cowie’s research clear and significant and urged provincial authorities to change how projects are approved and monitored.

“Once again, the scientific homework is done after the assignment is due. When will the Alberta government ever learn?”

 

 

 

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Global oil risks in the early 21st century, Energy Policy 2011

[This is a large excerpt from an excellent 18-page paper I think predicts how the future will unfold as well as a good overview of our predicament. Alice Friedemann]

Fantazzini, Dean; Höök, Mikael; Angelantoni, André. 2011. Global oil risks in the early 21st century. Energy Policy, Vol. 39, Issue 12: 7865-7873

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.035

The Deepwater Horizon incident demonstrated that most of the oil left is deep offshore or in other difficult to reach locations. Moreover, obtaining the oil remaining in currently producing reservoirs requires additional equipment and technology that comes at a higher price in both capital and energy. In this regard, the physical limitations on producing ever-increasing quantities of oil are highlighted as well as the possibility of the peak of production occurring this decade. The economics of oil supply and demand are also briefly discussed showing why the available supply is basically fixed in the short to medium term. Also, an alarm bell for economic recessions is shown to be when energy takes a disproportionate amount of total consumer expenditures. In this context, risk mitigation practices in government and business are called for. As for the former, early education of the citizenry of the risk of economic contraction is a prudent policy to minimize potential future social discord. As for the latter, all business operations should be examined with the aim of building in resilience and preparing for a scenario in which capital and energy are much more expensive than in the business-as-usual one.

An economy needs energy to produce goods and deliver services and the size of an economy is highly correlated with how much energy it uses (Brown et al., 2010a, Warr and Ayers, 2010). Oil has been a key element of the growing economy. Since 1845, oil production has increased from virtually nothing to approximately 86 million barrels per day (Mb/d) today (IEA, 2010), which has permitted living standards to increase around the world. In 2004 oil production growth stopped while energy hungry and growing countries like China and India continued increasing their demand. A global price spike was the result, which was closely followed by a price crash. Since 2004 world oil production has remained within 5% of its peak despite historically high prices (see Figure 1).

The combination of increasingly difficult-to-extract conventional oil combined with depleting super-giant and giant oil fields, some of which have been producing for 7 decades, has led the International Energy Agency (IEA) to declare in late 2010 that the peak of conventional oil production occurred in 2006 (IEA, 2010). Conventional crude oil makes up the largest share of all liquids commonly counted as “oil” and refers to reservoirs that primarily allow oil to be recovered as a free-flowing dark to light-colored liquid (Speight, 2007). The peak of conventional oil production is an important turning point for the world energy system because many difficult questions remain unanswered. For instance: how long will conventional oil production stay on its current production plateau? Can unconventional oil production make up for the decline of conventional oil? What are the consequences to the world economy when overall oil production declines, as it eventually must? What are the steps businesses and governments can take now to prepare? In this paper we pay particular attention to oil for several reasons. First, most alternative energy sources are not replacements for oil. Many of these alternatives (wind, solar, geothermal, etc.) produce electricity— not liquid fuel. Consequently the world transportation fleet is at high risk of suffering from oil price shocks and oil shortages as conventional oil production declines. Though substitute liquid fuel production, like coal-to-liquids, will increase over the next two or three decades, it is not clear that it can completely make up for the decline of oil production. Second, oil contributes the largest share to the total primary energy supply, approximately 34%. Changes to its price and availability will have worldwide impact especially because alternative sources currently contribute so little to the world energy system (IEA, 2010).

Oil is particularly important because of its unique role in the global energy system and the global economy. Oil supplies over 90% of the energy for world transportation (Sorrell et al., 2009). Its energy density and portability have allowed many other systems, from mineral extraction to deep-sea fishing (two sectors particularly dependent on diesel fuel but sectors by no means unique in their dependence on oil), to operate on a global scale. Oil is also the lynchpin of the remainder of the energy system. Without it, mining coal and uranium, drilling for natural gas and even manufacturing and distributing alternative energy systems like solar panels would be significantly more difficult and expensive. Thus, oil could be considered an “enabling” resource.

Oil enables us to obtain all the other resources required to run our modern civilization.

Peak oil is the result of a complex set of forces that includes geology, reservoir physics, economics, government policies and politics.

There are a number of physical depletion mechanisms that affect oil production (Satter et al., 2008). Depletion-driven decline occurs during the primary recovery phase when decreasing reservoir pressure leads to reduced flow rates. Investment in water injection, the secondary recovery phase, can maintain or increase pressure but eventually increasingly more water and less oil is recovered over time (i.e. increasing water cut). Additional equipment and technology can be used to enhance oil recovery in the tertiary recovery phase but it comes at a higher price in terms of both invested capital and energy to maintain production.

The situation is similar to squeezing water out of a soaked sponge. It is easy at first but increasingly more effort is required for diminishing returns. At some point, it is no longer worth squeezing either the sponge or the oil basin and production is abandoned.

Another way to explain peaking oil production is in terms of predator-prey behavior, as Bardi and Lavacchi (2009) have done. Their idea is that, initially, the extraction of “easy oil” leads to increasing profit and investments in further extraction capacity. Gradually the easiest (and typically the largest) resources are depleted. Extraction costs in both energy and monetary terms rise as production moves to lower quality deposits. Eventually, investments cannot keep pace with these rising costs, declining production from mature fields cannot be overcome and total production begins to fall.

Hubbert (1982) wrote: There is a different and more fundamental cost that is independent of the monetary price. That is the energy cost of exploration and production. So long as oil is used as a source of energy, when the energy cost of recovering a barrel of oil becomes greater than the energy content of the oil, production will cease no matter what the monetary price may be.

Currently, around 60 countries have passed “peak oil” (Sorrell et al., 2009)— their point of maximum production. In most cases this is due to physical depletion of the available resources (e.g. USA, the UK, Norway, etc.) while in a few cases socioeconomic factors limit production (e.g. Iraq).

Attempts to disprove peak oil that focus solely on the amount of oil available in all its forms demonstrate a fundamental, and unfortunately common, confusion between how much oil remains versus how quickly it can be produced. Although until recently oil appears to be more economically available than ever before (Watkins, 2006), others have shown this to be an artifact of statistical reporting (Bentley et al., 2007). Further, it is far less important how much oil is left if demand is, for instance, 90 Mb/d but only 80 Mb/d can be produced. Still, the most realistic reserve estimates indicate a near-term resource-limited production peak (Meng and Bentley, 2008; Owen et al., 2010).

Total oil production is comprised of conventional oil, which is liquid crude that is easy and relatively cheap to pump, and unconventional oil, which is expensive and often difficult to produce. It is vital to understand that new oil is increasingly coming from unconventional sources like polar, deep water and tar sands. Almost all the oil left to us is in politically dangerous or remote regions, is trapped in challenging geology or is not even in liquid form.

Today, over 60% of the world production originates from a few hundred giant fields. The number of giant oil field discoveries peaked in the early 60s and has been dwindling since then (Höök et al., 2009). This is similar to picking strawberries in a field. We picked the biggest and best strawberries first (just like big oil fields they are easier to find) and left the small ones for later. Only 25 fields account for one quarter of global production and 100 fields account for half of production. Just 500 fields account for two-thirds of all the production (Sorrell et al., 2009).

As the IEA (2008) points out, it is far from certain that the oil industry will be able to muster the capital to tap enough of the remaining, low-return fields fast enough to make up for the decline in production from current fields.

Oil sources are not equally easy to exploit. It takes far less energy to pump oil from a reservoir still under natural pressure than to recover the bitumen from tar sands and convert it to synthetic crude. The energy obtained from an extraction process divided by the energy expended during the process is the Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI).

Since giant and super giant oil fields dominate current production, they are good indicators for the point of peak production (Robelius, 2007; Höök et al., 2009). There is now broad agreement among analysts that the decline in existing production is between 4-8% annually (Höök et al., 2009). In terms of capacity, this means that roughly a new North Sea (~5 Mb/d) has to come on stream every year just to keep the present output constant.

Peak oil is the point in time where production flows are unable to increase. It is not just underinvestment, political gamesmanship or remote locations that make oil production increasingly difficult. The physical depletion mechanisms (increasing water cut, falling reservoir pressure, etc.) will unavoidably affect production by imposing restrictions and even limitations on the future production of liquid crude oil. No amount of technology or capital can overcome this fact.

Some consequences of having extracted much of the easy oil are the following:

  1. It takes significantly more time once a field is discovered to start production. Maugeri (2010) estimates it now takes between 8 and 12 years for new projects to produce first oil. Difficult development conditions can delay the start of production considerably. In the case of Kashagan, the world’s largest oil discovery in 30 years, production has been delayed by almost ten years due to difficult environmental conditions.
  2. In mature regions, an increased drilling effort usually results in little increase in oil production because the largest fields were found and produced first (Höök and Aleklett, 2008; Höök et al., 2009).
  3. Because the cost of extracting the remaining oil is much higher than easy-to-extract OPEC or other conventional oil, if the market price remains lower than the marginal cost for long enough producers will cut production to avoid financial losses. See Figure 3.
  4. Uncertainty about future economic growth heightens concerns for executing these riskier projects. This delays or often cancels projects (Figure 4).
  5. Most remaining oil reserves are in the hands of governments. They tend to under-invest compared to private companies (Deutsche Bank, 2009).
  6. Possible scarcity rents have to be taken into account. Hotelling (1931) showed that in the case of a depletable resource, price should exceed marginal cost even if the oil market were perfectly competitive (the resulting difference is called scarcity rent).

If this were not the case, it would be more profitable to leave the oil in the ground, waiting to produce it until the price has risen. Hamilton (2009a, 2009b) noted that while in the 1990s the scarcity rent was negligible relative to costs of extraction, the strong demand growth from developing countries in the last decade together with limits to expanding production could in principle account for a sudden shift to a regime in which the scarcity rent is positive and quite important. In this regard, the Reuters news service reported on April 13, 2008 that Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah said he had ordered some new oil discoveries left untapped to preserve oil wealth in the world’s top exporter for future generations, the official Saudi Press Agency (SPA) reported. Therefore, a possible intertemporal calculation considering scarcity rents may have already influenced (i.e. limited) current production. Although the sudden fall of prices at the end of 2008 is difficult to reconcile with scarcity rents, the following quick price recovery to the 70$-120$ range during the enduring global financial crisis indicates that this aspect cannot be dismissed. This is despite the assertion by Reynolds and Baek (2011) that the Hotelling principle “… is not a powerful determinant of nonrenewable resources prices,” and that “…the Hubbert curve and the theory surrounding the Hubbert curve is an important determinant of oil prices.” We agree that the Hubbert curve, which defines the depletion curve of a non-renewable resource, may be the prime determinant of oil price but it is not the only one.

Figure 3. Global marginal cost of production 2008. Source: LCM Research based on Booz Allen/IEA data (Morse, 2009).

Figure 3. Global marginal cost of production 2008. Source: LCM Research based on Booz Allen/IEA data (Morse, 2009).

 

 

After 2014, it appears that global oil production will begin its decline (See the second report of the UK Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil and Energy Security (UK ITPOES, 2010), Lloyd’s (2010), Deutsche Bank (2009, 2010), the report by the UK Energy Research Centre (Sorrell et al., 2009a) and the 2010 World Energy Outlook by the IEA (2010).)

Deutsche Bank (2009) asserts that for American consumers this point is when energy represents 7.5% of gross domestic product. This value is close to the one calculated by Hamilton (2009b) but is based on monthly data and uses a different methodology. In a more recent report, Deutsche Bank (2010) lowered this threshold to 6.5% because “…the last shock set in motion major behavioral and policy changes that will facilitate rapid behavioral changes when the next one comes and underemployment and weak wage growth has increased sensitivity to gasoline prices. Last time it took $4.50/gal gasoline to finally tip demand, this time it might only take $3.75/gal to $4.00/gal to do it.” However, they also highlighted that “Americans have become comfortable with paying more for gasoline, and it may take higher prices to force behavior change”.

Hamilton (2011) highlighted that 11 of the 12 U.S. Recessions since World War II were preceded by an increase in oil prices. Unfortunately, there is no clear alternative source of energy able to fully substitute for oil (see, for example, Maugeri (2010) for a recent nontechnical review of the limits of alternative sources of energy with respect to oil). It possesses a combination of energy density, portability and historically very high EROEI that is difficult for alternatives to match. 4. A timely energy system transformation not assured. As oil production declines, significant changes to the currently oil-dependent economy in the medium term are likely to be needed. However, it isn’t clear that there will the financial means to implement such a change. For example, Deutsche Bank (2009, 2010) suggested that the widespread use of electric cars in the second part of this decade will be the disruptive technology that will finally destroy oil demand. Apart from technology and resource constraints (lithium necessary for electrical batteries is quite abundant in nature but production is currently very limited), the availability of sufficient financial resources to transition the entire vehicle fleet seems dubious. As Hamilton (2009b) demonstrates, tightened credit follows high oil prices and most vehicles are purchased on credit. Others suggest that natural gas is the next energy paradigm. Again, will be there sufficient financial resources to switch to it as oil production declines? Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2010) found that historically, after a banking crisis, the government debt on average almost doubles (86% increase) to bail out the banks and to stimulate the economy. They also showed that a sovereign debt crisis usually follows, not surprisingly as we saw Iceland, Greece, Ireland, Hungary and Portugal turning to the EU/ECB and/or the IMF for financial help to refinance their public debts to avoid default. The need to switch to alternative energy sources with the enormous financial investments that such a task would require— and the simultaneous presence of large public and private debts — may well form a perfect storm.

Demography will also be extremely important in the next decade as well. Europe and the United States have aging populations and their baby boomers are entering pension age. China faces a similar demographic problem due to their one child policy, too.

The combination of declining oil production (and thus oil priced high enough to cause recessions), high taxes, austerity measures, more restrictive credit conditions and demographic shifts have the potential to severely constrain the financial resources needed to move the economy away from oil and to alternative energy sources. Another consequence of this combination of forces is the likely contraction of the world economy (Hamilton, 2009b; Dargay and Gately, 2010).

Businesses and governments struggle with alternating circumstances of insufficient cash flow to handle price spikes and plummeting prices that don’t cover their cost structure. Long term planning in this ever-changing environment becomes extremely difficult and investment — even highly needed investment — can drop precipitously.

Friedrichs (2010) also cautions that after peak oil countries have several sociological trajectories available to them: they can follow predatory militarism like Japan before WWII, totalitarian retrenchment like North Korea, or, ideally, socioeconomic adaptation like Cuba after the fall of the Soviet Union. Given the recent century of conflict and the extensive weapon stocks and militaries held by modern nations (especially the United States, which spends on its military almost as much as the remaining countries of the world combined (SIPRI, 2011), there is simply no guarantee that the relatively peaceful period currently experienced by developed nations that is conducive to rapid energy source transitions will continue much longer.

A further challenge is that, strictly speaking, for the last 150 years we have not transitioned from previous fuel sources to new ones — we have been adding them to the total supply. We are currently using all significant sources (coal, oil, gas and uranium) at high rates. Thus, it’s common but incorrect to say that we moved from coal to oil. In fact, we are using more coal now than we ever have (IEA, 2010). We never left the coal age. The challenge of moving to alternative energy sources while a particularly important source is declining, in this case oil, should not be underestimated.

Brown et al. (2010b) show how significant the squeeze of declining gross production and increasing producer country consumption can be, which they have named the Export Land Model. Increasing producer country consumption due to population growth acts as a strong magnification factor that removes oil very quickly from the export market. Using the top five exporting countries from 2005 (Saudi Arabia, Russia, Norway, Iran and United Arab Emirates), they construct a scenario in which combined production declines at a very slight 0.5% per year over a ten year period for a total of 5%. Internal oil consumption for these exporters continues to grow at its current rate (2010). In this scenario net oil exports decline by 9.6%, almost double the rate oil production declines.

This accelerated loss of exportable oil can be seen in many producer countries that have passed their peak. Indonesia has withdrawn from OPEC because they have no more exportable oil to offer the world market. Egypt is already incurring a public debt and is on the cusp of becoming a net oil importer, which will exacerbate already stretched public finances. As producer countries continue to grow their oil use even modestly and production declines (again, even modestly), there is an extremely high risk that net exportable oil will decline much faster than most observers are currently expecting.

Other mitigation efforts like increased solar, wind and geothermal production may not be prioritized since they do not help the situation — they produce electricity and the world’s 800 million transportation, food production (i.e. tractors and harvesters) and distribution vehicles require liquid fuel.

A contracting economy presents governments with a host of problems that are not easy to resolve. Promises made to the citizenry, some in the form of social welfare programs, pensions and public union contracts, will be impossible to keep as the energy base of the economy declines. Downward wage pressure and reduced business activity will lower tax revenue. With lower revenues and greater demands in the form of social welfare support by an increasingly poorer citizenry, it is difficult to see how the accumulated (and growing) government debt can be paid back without rampant inflation. Though it is still unclear whether the government response will be hyperinflation (to minimize the debts) or extensive and massive debt defaults (deflation) — or both — it is not likely that business as usual will continue as oil production declines.

Some governments may also have to contend with food and fuel riots as they did in 2007 and 2008. Other forms of crowd behavior, namely hoarding of fuel and food, may exacerbate the situation and governments should prepare accordingly.

Supply Chains

Manufacturers in particular will have to contend with increased difficulties making and delivering products as oil production declines (Hirsch et al., 2005). It will prove imperative that business addresses this Schumpetarian shock (a structural change to industry that can alter what is strategically relevant) in a timely fashion (Barney, 1991).  A significant benefit of cheap oil was that distance was relatively inexpensive. It is possible now to manufacture goods using far-flung operations. However, as oil declines, distance will, once again, become increasingly expensive, and oil price may begin to act as a trade barrier for many productsAnother risk as oil production declines is the possibility of oil supply disruptions. If this should occur, much modern manufacturing may be impacted. Just-in-time manufacturing systems in which warehoused parts are minimized through the frequent replenishment of parts by parts suppliers — sometimes with multiple deliveries a day— have little tolerance for delivery delays.  To prepare for this risk requires more than the drive for manufacturing efficiency that has generally characterized business. Supply chains should be examined with the aim of building in resilience and greater agility (Bunce and Gould, 1996; Krishnamurthy 2007), implying the loosening of tight and often brittle couplings between suppliers and manufacturers (Christopher 2000; Towill 2001, Mitch Leppo ). With little or no slack in the system (fewer warehoused parts, etc.), just one supplier failing to deliver a part or supplier hoarding can shut down a production process.

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