Enough minerals for a solar, wind, & battery transition from fossil fuels?

Preface.  The transition could require as much as $173 trillion in energy supply and infrastructure investment over the next three decades. One HELL of a lot of metals needed – questionable if possible in in three decades, especially with China dominating these technologies and minerals. As you read this, consider that the U.S. generates over 4 million terawatt hours (TWH) of electricity a year.

  • Solar panels with the power capacity of ONE GW need about 18.5 tons of silver, 3,380 tons of polysilicon and 10,252 tons of aluminum. If they generated electricity 4 hours a day, 365 days of the year, it would take 273,000 of these solar farms
  • Wind turbines and infrastructure with the power capacity of ONE GW need about 387 tons of aluminum, 2,866 tons of copper and 154,352 tons of steel. If the average wind capacity is 33% (wind blows a third of the time) every day of the year then 138,000 wind farms would be needed
  • Lithium-ion batteries able to store ONE GW hour of energy require 729 tons of lithium, 1,202 tons of aluminum and 1,731 tons of copper

And then decommissioned, taken to a recycling center, though far more likely to a landfill, every 10 years (battery lifetime) or 20 years (wind turbine lifespan) or 18-25 years (solar panels). We aren’t recycling many today or designing them to be recycled.  If you still think there are enough minerals, read: Limits to Growth? 2016 United Nations report provides best evidence yet

And as Irena Slave points out below, the cost of metals is rising which makes solar, wind, batteries and other renewables cost more.

And will cost even more when oil shortages begin. Wind and solar depend on fossils for every step of their life cycle, for mining, transporting and crushing ores, smelting the metal out, fabrication and transportation of parts and materials to the assembly factory, and final delivery to the solar or wind site.

No wonder Trump wants to buy Greenland with its potential rare earths, cobalt, copper, graphite, and nickel. Due to melting ice, 1600 kilometers of new coastline has emerged.  But this new land is unconsolidated, not cemented with ice or permafrost, so it erodes easily.  In narrow fjords glacier ice keeps sloping cliffs in place, but when it melts these slopes can collapse and trigger tsunamis. Indeed, this happened in 2023 when a landslide in a narrow fjord triggered a 200-meter-high tsunami. So mining and drilling for oil and gas will be risky and destroy the infrastructure set up to exploit resources (Kavan 2025 New coasts emerging from the retreat of Northern Hemisphere marine-terminating glaciers in the twenty-first century. Nature Climate Change).

Because world oil production peaked in 2018, and mining is very dependent on diesel fuel, the peak year for many minerals will surely happen sooner, since they require oil, coal, and natural gas energy to blast, dig, haul, crush, grind, smelt, refine, transport, and manufacture the metals and minerals into final products.

Calvo G et al (2017) Assessing maximum production peak and resource availability of non-fuel mineral resources: Analyzing the influence of extractable global resources. Resources, conservation & Recycling 125: 208-217.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Friedemann A (2025) Showstoppers to Electrifying the World: Peak Everything and Running out of Time (my book, still in progress)

It is not just copper likely to run short, so are many other metals (Calvo 2022, Valero 2018). The amount of energy return on invested (EROI) of the renewables constructed would be far too low to sustain civilization, have huge environmental impacts, and deplete mineral reserves of tellurium, indium, tin, silver, and gallium (Capellán-Pérez 2019). Antimony, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, copper, indium, molybdenum, nickel, silver, and zinc will have bottlenecks within two decades, and all materials eventually be severely critical (Lundaev 2023).  Michaux (2024) goes to great lengths to calculate exactly how many tons of minerals would be needed for EV, battery energy storage, wind, solar, nuclear, geothermal, and more, and found a dozen that would make it difficult to reach IPCC 2050 goals (and his renewables only replace about a quarter of total energy consumed in the world, the goal is “net zero”, not replacing fossil fuels entirely.

Slav I (2022) The Era of Cheap Renewables Grinds To A Halt. oilprice.com

  • Raw material shortages, notably in metals and minerals and polysilicon are impacting the renewable energy industry
  • The cost of solar panels, wind turbines, and EV batteries is climbing after years of declines
  • Solar panel prices had surged by more than 50% in the past 12 months alone. The price of wind turbines is up 13% and battery prices are rising for the first time ever

The continual decline in production cost for wind, solar, and EV batteries was touted as the driver of their growing adoption and ultimate takeover of the global grid. Up until two years ago, there was no other scenario on the table—even though inflation was as much a reality then as it is now. Only now, it has become a lot more pronounced.

At a recent metals and mining conference in Riyadh, several attendees noted that the mining industry had fallen out of favor with lenders because it was deemed as damaging for the environment as oil and gas. Yet now, it is becoming abundantly clear that without the mining industry, there can literally be no energy transition. Solar panels, wind turbines, transmission lines, and EVs all depend on metals and minerals in sufficient quantities. These quantities are already problematic. During the pandemic, supply chain disruptions wreaked havoc across industries that resulted in various raw material shortages, notably in metals and minerals and polysilicon.

Shortages typically lead to higher prices, and this is exactly what happened here. As a result, the cost of solar panels, wind turbines, and EV batteries started climbing—a development that virtually no renewable energy forecaster had anticipated. Bloomberg reported this month that solar panel prices had surged by more than 50% in the past 12 months alone. The price of wind turbines is up 13% and battery prices are rising for the first time ever, the report noted.

Of course, all this could be dismissed as a temporary glitch because of those pesky supply chain disruptions; once those are dealt with, prices should return to normal. Unfortunately, this argument does not hold water because the demand projections for all those metals and minerals called critical precisely because the energy transition hinges on them are invariably bullish. Put another way, the world will need a huge amount of copper, lithium, nickel, manganese, and cobalt, among others, to continue with the energy transition. And they are not coming fast.

That lending problem for the mining industry as well as oversupply in some segments of the metals market led to lower investments in new mines in recent years. That added to an already existing problem of falling ore grades: now, a miner needs to dig out a lot more ore to find the same amount of copper, for instance, than they had to 20 years ago.

This means that the extraction of a ton of copper has become costlier even without the rising demand. With the rising demand projections, the outlook for copper and other critical metals is definitely bullish. But a bullish outlook for copper means higher prices for windmills and solar farms, and for EVs as well.

This is not all, either, because there is also the issue of new supply. Banks are now definitely more interested in investing in the mining industry, what with those critical metals and minerals, but their shareholders—and governments—are insisting in these metals and minerals being mined responsibly—that is, in compliance with certain ESG requirements. A recent report by Metal Bulletin notes that carmakers are now putting their mineral suppliers through a vetting process to ensure they were mined responsibly. That’s more additional costs piled on, too.

And this is not all, either, because new metal and minerals supply will be vital for the energy transition. And one of the key characteristics of the mining industry is long lead times. There is no way around it. It takes about a decade to turn a prospective deposit into an operating mine, even with the most modern technology. To sum up, then, the current trend for higher prices in the low-carbon energy sphere may very well be just the beginning of an extensive rally that could last for decades.

Janes A, Stringer D, Leung A (2021) There’s a Fortune to Be Made in the Obscure Metals Behind Clean Power. Bloomberg.

The era-defining shift from fossil fuels to clean energy will deliver an unprecedented new boom for commodities—and an opportunity for investors—as a range of relatively obscure materials become essential to delivering emissions-free power, transport and heavy industry.

The transition could require as much as $173 trillion in energy supply and infrastructure investment over the next three decades, according to research provider BloombergNEF, and will reverberate from lithium-rich salt flats in Chile to polysilicon plants in China’s Xinjiang region.

As electric vehicles supplant gas guzzlers, and solar panels and wind turbines replace coal and oil as the world’s most important energy sources, metals like lithium, cobalt and rare earths are on the brink of rapidly accelerating demand, along with more familiar industrial materials like steel and copper. Efforts to lift supplies of key raw materials—which can require years of exploration and construction—must begin now to keep pace with future requirements.

Failing to act fast enough could even risk an economic shock comparable to the oil crises of the 1970s, said Robert Johnston, an adjunct senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University in New York. Concerns about future bottlenecks are reflected in the eye-watering gains of some green stocks. “I don’t see an easy solution because these supply chains don’t magically appear overnight,” he said.

By 2030, demand for cobalt, used in many battery types, will jump by about 70%, while consumption of lithium and nickel by the battery sector will be at least five times higher, according to BNEF. There’ll be a need for more manganese, iron, phosphorus and graphite, while copper, needed in clean energy technologies and to expand electricity grids, will also be a major beneficiary. Four key components of the energy transition—solar panels, wind turbines, lithium-ion batteries, and EV charging units—show the complexity of supply chains required to help the world quit fossil fuels, and how the need for vast quantities of crucial metals should spur prices higher.

SOLAR PANELS:

KEY METALS AND MATERIALS: Steel Aluminum Polysilicon Copper Silver

Solar panels with the power capacity of a gigawatt need about 18.5 tons of silver, 3,380 tons of polysilicon and 10,252 tons of aluminum

WIND TURBINES

Wind turbines and infrastructure with the power capacity of a gigawatt need about 387 tons of aluminum, 2,866 tons of copper and 154,352 tons of steel

KEY METALS AND MATERIALS: Concrete Steel Glass fiber reinforced plastic Electronic scrap Copper Aluminum Carbon fiber reinforced polymers

LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES

Lithium-ion batteries able to store 1 gigawatt hour of energy require about 729 tons of lithium, 1,202 tons of aluminum and 1,731 tons of copper

KEY METALS AND MATERIALS: Copper Aluminum Lithium (LCE) Nickel Cobalt Manganese

Limited availability of other materials is already threatening the battery sector’s ability to keep pace with the EV boom, said Yang Hongxin, general manager of SVolt Energy Technology Co.

EV CHARGERS

CHARGER TYPE: Home Work Public (slow) Public (fast) Bus & Truck (Public) Bus & Truck (Depot)

A fast, public electric vehicle charger typically needs 25 kilograms of copper, while a smaller charger to use at home needs around 2 kilograms of copper.

“It doesn’t matter what battery chemistry you have, lithium is needed across all of them, and nickel is needed in many of them,” she said. “If it’s solar or wind or EV charging units, you need copper to connect it all together—that’s why we like looking at these commodities.”

Posted in Mining, Peak Critical Elements, Recycle, Recycling | Tagged , , , , , | Comments Off on Enough minerals for a solar, wind, & battery transition from fossil fuels?

Natural Gas & Coal essential for energy storage

Preface.  The U.S. Department of energy has stated a renewable grid is not possible without long-duration energy storage (Colthorpe 2022). Another report  explains why around-the-clock renewables and decarbonization will not be possible without it (McKinsey 2022). 

This post explains why natural gas is the only energy storage that can keep the electric grid up if it mainly depends on wind and solar (most plans assume 70 to 90%). In China and India, with limited natural gas reserves, coal is being used instead. To see why other energy storage mediums will not be possible (compressed air, pumped hydro, hydrogen, batteries etc), see my energy storage posts here.

The bigger problem is that natural gas is finite, just like oil and coal.  Yet more and more will be used to power EV, data centers, and the endless growth of population and GDP.  Meanwhile, renewable energy is NOT replacing fossil fuels, which are still 80% of primary energy use, and have been for over 60 years, so we are likely to need even more natural gas (and coal) plants to balance wind and solar, seasonal hydropower (Thombs 2025)

Continue reading

Posted in Blackouts, Energy Storage, Natural Gas, Natural Gas Energy Storage | Tagged , , , , , , | 8 Comments

When will gold production peak?

Figure 1. Mine production of gold worldwide from 2010 to 2024 (in metric tons). Source: USGS – Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025, page 83

Preface.  Ores are decreasing in gold concentrations, and found in deeper and more remote places, requiring more energy to process.  Where will this energy come from? Kerr (2012) below asked “Is the World Tottering on the Precipice of Peak Gold?”

From the latest data (figure 1) it would appear production is tottering. If there were gobs of gold to be found, now would be the time to mine it with prices at $3315 today (May 23, 2025), up from under $500 in 1995, yet production appears to be on a plateau (figure 1). So while gold has not peaked yet, it appears to have reached limits to growth.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Harper J (2020) How much gold is there left to mine in the world? BBC.

Discoveries of large deposits are becoming increasingly rare, experts say. As a result, most gold production currently comes from older mines that have been in use for decades. There are relatively few unexplored regions left for gold-mining, although possibly the most promising are in some of the more unstable parts of the world, such as in West Africa.

Gold is a finite resource, and there will eventually come a stage when there is none left to be mined. Some believe we may have already reached that point. Gold mine production totaled 3,531 tonnes in 2019, 1% lower than in 2018, according to the World Gold Council. This is the first annual decline in production since 2008.

The below-ground stock of gold reserves is currently estimated to be around 50,000 tonnes, according to the US Geological Survey. To put that in perspective, around 190,000 tonnes of gold has been mined in total.

***

Kerr, R. A. March 2, 2012. Is the World Tottering on the Precipice of Peak Gold? Science Vol. 335: pp. 1038-1039.

$1700 per ounce gold is driving a mining frenzy, but analysts are concerned that miners can’t extract gold any faster than they have the past decade.

Gold miners are worried. In the past 40 years, they’ve seen a slew of developments favoring their business. Gold’s price has risen so that on average it’s been worth several times what it was. Investment in the search for new gold deposits doubled and then doubled again, making gold more intensively sought after than any other metal or mineral group. Technologists have come up with better and cheaper ways to find and extract gold. And gold mining has spread throughout the planet.

And yet worldwide, production of the glittering element has hardly budged in the past decade. It’s not for lack of demand. Gold may not fuel economies the way oil does, but gold for jewelry—its primary use—has been much in demand, and that demand will likely increase. Investors’ interest could be intense for years longer. But to judge by the mining industry’s modest success of late in finding new deposits of gold, production will not be much higher in the next decade.

Miners and analysts agree that most of the easy-to-find, easy-to-develop gold has been found. To discover still-hidden deposits and at least maintain production, let alone increase it, miners will need continued high or even higher gold prices, revolutionary new technology, and the cooperation of often reluctant host countries.

Resource geochemist Stephen Kesler of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, says this  “is an issue of considerable concern” because no one wants to see the world’s first mineral resource peak anytime soon.

A golden age

Demand for gold jewelry and for gold as an investment has driven up prices and fueled exploration.

In 1971, governments stopped fixing their currencies to gold at a price of $35 an ounce ($185 in 2009 dollars). As the unleashed gold price rose through the 1970s toward a 1980 peak above $1500 an ounce, so too did investment in exploration for gold. Exploration expenditures soared in the 1980s by an order of magnitude, never again falling below double the spending of the 1970s.

Technical and scientific breakthroughs fed gold mining fever as well. Recognition of new types of gold deposits—such as the Carlin deposits of Nevada, which have no visible gold grains—aided exploration. So did new technology, from more-sensitive sample analyses that detect low levels of gold to orbiting satellites that use spectra to map promising mineral terrains. New, cheaper gold-extraction techniques—such as leaching gold from heaps of ore with a cyanide solution—made ores worth mining even when they contained less than a gram of gold per ton of rock.

By the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, those changes greatly broadened the gold mining club. They made the United States, Australia, and China major producers in a business previously dominated by South Africa. They also drew in more than a dozen new countries. And production soared. From a low of 1200 metric tons of gold in 1975, the industry’s output more than doubled to 2600 tons in 2001.

End of an age

The exuberance of the 1980s and ’90s has definitely cooled, and now it is tinged with anxiety. Production immediately began dropping from its 2001 record high to a low of 2260 tons in 2008. Miners have since clawed their way back to record-equaling production, spurred by gold prices rocketing to the (inflation-adjusted) levels of 1980.

That resurgence isn’t heartening gold miners much, though, because their best indicator of future production—the amount of gold discovered in the past 10 years or so—is showing no signs of life. As he reported at the 2011 NewGenGold Conference in Perth last November (http://www.minexconsulting.com/publications/nov2011b.html), Schodde has compiled reports of the amounts of gold discovered per year from 1950 to 2010 (see figure). Using history as a guide, he increased the size of recent discoveries to account for the inevitable growth in the apparent size of a newly discovered deposit as geologists explore it.

By Schodde’s reckoning, gold discoveries peaked in the 1980s. That presumably led to the 2001 production peak. Since the 1980s, discoveries have been something like 20% lower. Is that enough to sustain production over the next decade or two? “Yes,” Schodde says, “but it’s a struggle, it really is.” A bolstered exploration effort has been yielding meager returns; the average gold content of ore mined has steadily fallen by a factor of 4 since 1979. So to produce an ounce of gold, four times the tonnage of rock has to be moved and processed.

The golden age seems to be over. “It’s becoming harder and harder to find” gold, concludes minerals analyst Michael Chender, CEO of Metals Economics Group in Halifax, Canada. “There’s a general sense that most of what’s easily available has been found and picked up.” Andrew Lloyd agrees; the industry “has increased exploration, but they’re not finding a lot of new deposits, especially the large ones,” says the spokesperson for the world’s largest gold mining company, Barrick Gold Corp., headquartered in Toronto, Canada. “The industry as a whole is really struggling to keep up with demand.”

Pause or peak?

Applying a standard peaking analysis to the history of gold production, retired oil geologist Jean Laherrère concluded in 2009 that 2001 was the peak and that production would soon plummet.

Gold plateauists tend to see greater challenges in gold production now than ever before, but no good solutions in the offing. For example, all the exploration innovations of the past 50 years have not let geologists find deposits any deeper in Earth’s crust. Hot, briny solutions deposited gold not at the surface but several kilometers below it. But Schodde finds that the depth to gold deposits discovered in virgin territory has averaged a mere 30 meters in each of the past 5 decades. In every decade, almost half of those discoveries were deposits now exposed at the surface by erosion. Even the generally optimistic Kesler “cannot think of any major processing, mining, or exploration method that is very recent in appearance” that could help out anytime soon.

Litigation further stretches out the development process and increases costs. The gold mining industry produces hundreds of millions of tons of waste rock a year and uses tons of cyanide. The mass of potential pollution is already increasing as the grade of gold ores has declined.

Gold, mined as it has been for 6000 years, may be a harbinger of production challenges in other metal industries. Analysts often mention economically essential copper as another element encountering mining constraints. But trends in mineral discovery in general suggest to Kesler that “we are approaching some sort of wall in materials to support our way of life.”

Laherrere, J. Nov 25 & Dec 9. Peak gold, easier to model than peak oil? theoildrum Europe.

Geologist Jean Laherrere estimated in 2009 that less than 100 ktons of extractable gold remained to be mined worldwide and would soon enter a permanent decline, with most countries peaking by 2025

[FYI, Gold requires a great deal of energy to melt. It needs a temperature slightly over 1,000 Centigrade (1832 Fahrenheit), hotter than an open fire].

References

EIA (2020) International Energy Statistics. Petroleum and other liquids. Data Options. U.S. Energy Information  Administration. Select crude oil including lease condensate to see data past 2017.

IEA (2018) International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2018, page 45, figures 1.19 and 3.13. International Energy Agency.

Posted in Mining, Peak Precious Elements | Tagged | Comments Off on When will gold production peak?

Palm Oil biofuels destroy rain forests

Preface. This is a book review of “Planet Palm: How Palm Oil Ended Up in Everything-and Endangered the World.”  I am mainly interested in the use of palm oil for biofuels, but it also harms health, which much of the book is about.

Despite pledges to not cut rainforests down for palm oil, rainforests continue to be cut down. In the coming decade, the majority of growth in global consumption of palm oil will likely be for biofuels. A 2020 report published by Rainforest Foundation Norway predicted that the result of such expansion could be as many as 13 million acres of additional forest loss—nearly twice the size of Belgium—including some 7 million acres of peatland.

By 2017, oil palm  made up 31% of biofuels, today 36% of biodiesel feedstock.

This book reports about land grabs and large-scale territorial acquisitions by outsiders. The phenomenon, which had come to the world’s attention in the aftermath of the financial and food crises of 2008, entails investment banks, pension funds, land-poor countries, and agribusiness seizing vast swathes of fertile ground in places like Ethiopia and Madagascar—places where traditional land rights are easy to exploit.  Much of the land grabbing is for palm oil.

In my book “Life After Fossil Fuels” and energyskeptic.com post “Peak Soil” I record the many ways energy crops are destructive to biodiversity, pesticide pollution, fertilizer runoff, topsoil erosion, aquifer depletion, and climate change.  Palm oil releases enormous amounts of CO2 because rainforests are clear-cut to grow them in peat soils.

The next big biofuel hopium is renewable diesel a drop-in fuel that can replace petroleum diesel, and increasingly replacing biodiesel, which many engine makers do not allow at all, or at most in concentrations between 5 and 20%.

Renewable biodiesel is made from restaurant grease, animal fat, and soybean or other oil seeds, and although it is not supposed to be made from palm oil, it still gets in, through loopholes, used restaurant cooking oil, and mislabeled imports.

In the SF Bay Area, hundreds of diesel trucks drive to hundreds of restaurants to collect grease and then 30 miles or so to two former petroleum refineries that now make renewable diesel. Probably for a negative energy return, but who cares, the government subsidizes it. And California gets about 99% from other states and the world, because the state has an additional subsidy.

What follows are some of my kindle notes.

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Financial Sense, UCSC, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Zuckerman JC (2021) Planet Palm: How Palm Oil Ended Up in Everything-and Endangered the World. The New Press.

HARM

Liberia proved a rude awakening. The violence on display there extended beyond the destruction of the landscape to the Liberians themselves. In one village, a scattering of mud-block and thatch houses located inside an oil-palm concession run by a Singapore-based company, a 50-year-old father of seven described how the outsiders had shown up and bulldozed the town in which he’d spent his entire life. Others talked of how the company had destroyed their crops and gravesites, polluted their streams, and run them out of their homes. “What I’ve lost is plenty,” a 53-year-old woman told me through tears. “We can’t plant plantains. We can’t plant rice. We can’t plant peppers.

“The guy who was a respected farmer,” he said, “has now become a slave laborer.” The company responsible for the changes had been in operation in Sinoe for just 13. It had signed an 865,000-acre lease good for 65 years, with an option for a 33-year extension. In was just getting started.

Indonesia is home to Earth’s largest concentration of tropical peatlands—soils formed over thousands of years through the accumulation of organic matter—and when farmers and palm oil companies drain and burn that land as a precursor to planting, massive quantities of carbon dioxide escape into the atmosphere.

Though many companies have signed zero-deforestation commitments and otherwise pledged to protect the environment, in Sumatra fruit grown illegally on peatlands and other protected areas routinely makes its way to their mills and, ultimately, to our own kitchens, bathrooms, and fuel tanks.

Today, palm oil stands center stage in what The Lancet has termed the Global Syndemic: the combined twenty-first-century crises of obesity, malnutrition, and climate change.

IT’S IN EVERYTHING

I discovered that the landscape overhaul taking place in Liberia was already well underway in Southeast Asia, and that the result of this agricultural revolution is literally everywhere. In the space of just a few decades, palm oil has quietly insinuated itself into every facet of our lives, with roughly half of all products in U.S. grocery stores now containing some part of the plant. (Though the commodity in question is palm oil, the plant from which it derives—it’s not technically a tree—is called the oil palm.) Palm oil alone now counts for one-third of total global vegetable-oil consumption.

Palm oil in toothpaste, soap, shampoo, conditioner, moisturizer, mascara, and lipstick. It’s in doughnuts, baby formula, dog food, Nutella, crackers, ice cream, snickers, and the feed consumed by cows, pigs, sheep, and chickens.

STATISTICS

India, now the world’s number-one importer of palm oil, went from buying 30,000 metric tons in 1992 to 9.2 million in 2019. China saw an increase from 800,000 metric tons to 6.4 million over the same period. Worldwide, production of palm oil has more than doubled in just the last 15 years; oil-palm plantations now cover more than 104,000 square miles—an area larger than New Zealand. With producers running out of land in Indonesia and Malaysia, which together account for some 85% of today’s global palm oil supply, they’re expanding to Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands, and farther afield to Latin America, as well as, obviously, to Africa. Last year, global consumption reached nearly 72 million metric tons—that’s roughly 20 pounds of palm oil for every person on the planet.

Palm oil imports to the United States have increased from 29,000 metric tons to more than 1.5 million.

In the last 15 years, imports to the U.S. have risen a whopping 263%, thanks in part to the Food and Drug Administration’s ban on trans fats. Semi-solid at room temperature, palm oil emerged as the ideal swap-in for the partially hydrogenated oils formerly used to enhance the texture and extend the shelf life of products like cookies and crackers. In addition to its widespread presence in processed foods, cosmetics, and personal-care products, palm oil is used in all sorts of industrial materials and, increasingly, as a biofuel.

THE PLANT

The plant’s shiny fruits provide two oils—one from the tangerine-colored pulp and another from the central kernel—each of which lends itself to numerous applications. The plants begin bearing fruit at about three years old and have an economic life of 25 years. They are quite productive, yielding considerably more oil per acre than either soy or rapeseed. With the trees reaching as high as 90 feet, falls can be fatal. Using a machete, he then hacks at the desired bunch until it goes hurtling to the ground.

Women “sweat” the fruits under a mat to loosen them from the spiky husks and then boil them in metal drums to soften the fruit and slow the development of free fatty acids, which lead to rancidity. The steamed fruit then gets dumped into a vat to be stomped on, old-world-winemaker style, or to a mill powered by humans, animals, or machines for crushing. After the nuts are removed, and cracked later to get at the kernels inside, the resulting mustard-colored mash is transferred to a trough filled with water, where the oil floats to the surface to be skimmed off. After a final pass over the flames, the oil is poured through a basket or other filter to remove remaining fibers, leaving a brick-hued product.

African American culinary historian Jessica Harris notes that after standing for a few days, palm wine, made from the sap of the plant, has the kick of the proverbial country mule and becomes western Africa’s form of white lightning.

History

The oil-palm plant, Elaeis guineensis, is native to West and Central Africa and has spiky brown bunches cradling hundreds of plum-sized, bright-orange fruits. Archaeological findings suggest that the Egyptians were trading palm oil as early as 3,000 B.C.; in the fifth century B.C.

By the 1890s, the era in which Achebe’s novel takes place, a thriving international trade in palm oil was under way along the continent’s western coast. Its heart, at the mouth of the Niger River, in today’s southern Nigeria, became known as the Oil Rivers—a curious foreshadowing of the role that the Delta would play a century later as the troubled trading ground for a different sort of oil. Europeans originally sourced the oils for lighting their lamps, but the two substances would eventually find their way into soaps and candles, and into the lubricants required by the age’s shiny new machinery.

Eventually, tins made with the oils would conserve Europeans’ food, palm kernels would nourish their dairy cows, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, palm kernel oil would make its way into the faux butter they were spreading on their toast.

Whereas in 1870 more than 80% of Africa south of the Sahara was ruled by indigenous chiefs and kings, by 1910, all that had changed, with the region a patchwork of colonies, protectorates, and territories overseen by white newcomers.  The fruit went across the Atlantic on slave-bearing vessels destined for the sugar and tobacco plantations established by the Portuguese in Brazil. En route, palm oil was used for feeding the captives, and the kernels eventually found their way into the New World dirt,

Escaped and freed slaves built communities along the coast amid those groves, adapting the culinary and spiritual traditions of their African forbears as a form of resistance and a way of preserving their identity. Today, dendê, as the oil is known in Brazil, features prominently not just in the region’s traditional dishes, but in its religious ceremonies and in much of its art.

Though Parliament outlawed the slave trade in 1807, the institution was foundational to Britain’s commercial empire. Between 1750 and 1780, for example, some 70 percent of the government’s total income came from taxes derived from its slave-powered colonies. (No one ever asks where all those young men looking for wives in Jane Austen novels got their money, a Ugandan friend noted recently.) The Niger Delta, in particular, spreading some two hundred seventy miles along the coast from Lagos to the Cameroonian border, had proven a lucrative hunting ground.

With the Second Industrial Revolution transforming life back home in England, vegetable oil was suddenly in hot demand as a lubricant for the era’s new railroads and machines. Palm oil also proved ideal as a tinning flux, and it was the basis for most of the candles being made at the time. By 1850, Liverpool was producing some thirty thousand tons of palm oil–based soaps every year.

The value of palm oil exports rivaled that of the slave trade at its peak, with the Niger Delta ground zero for the boom.

The kings of the countries where the palm tree grows find that the labor of their subjects, in collecting the fruit and extracting the oil, is far more remunerative to them than the selling of these subjects into slavery. Over the years, the leading Delta middlemen had built up corporation-like entities known as “houses” by acquiring people, both slave and free, through a complicated political system involving routine skirmishes with neighbors and rivals. The more “clients” a middleman could claim, the more expansive his geographical domain and the greater his potential to source oil. While the smaller houses numbered in the hundreds. Competition among the houses was fierce, with ongoing clashes leading to the buildup of military fleets: canoes mounted with cannons and large-caliber guns would glide through the creeks alongside those ferrying oil.

As the slave ships neared port, palm oil would have been slathered into the captives’ skin with an aim toward hiding their wounds and scars and enhancing their attractiveness to buyers.

Lever Brothers Ltd., dedicated exclusively to the production and sale of soap. Plenty of others were making similar products at the time, but Lever didn’t intend to get lost in the crowd. He experimented until he’d found the right blend of ingredients for the ideal lather and rinse—including some 41.9 percent palm-kernel or coconut oil—and took to selling his bars as single units. (Most grocers at the time sliced off portions from long bars and priced them by the pound.) He began wrapping his soaps in parchment to avoid the sweating then plaguing other brands, and tucked them into colorful cardboard boxes. He also spent lavishly on advertising, emphasizing the quality and purity of Sunlight and introducing slogans and giveaway campaigns, tactics he’d picked up from monitoring marketing trends in the United States.  The average British citizen was plowing through 17 pounds of soap every year.

In 1914, Lever diversified from soap into margarine, a product whose origins dated to a few decades earlier, when—just before the siege

France’s Napoleon III had put out a call for a cheap butter substitute to feed the country’s military and underclasses.

With the Brits now churning out margarine, and the Dutch having entered the soap market, competition for West Africa’s palm oil and kernels began to heat up.

In 1911, Lever signed a contract on concessions totaling 1.8 million acres for cultivating and harvesting oil palm in the Belgian Congo,

Harvesting oil-palm bunches from natural groves was at least as grueling as—and arguably more dangerous than—gathering latex, and HCB’s expat staff had been struggling to find men to do the job.

Scrambling to fill the growing demand back home for oil and kernels, the Congo’s colonial administrators and Lever’s agents began pressuring the local chiefs to sign up more of their constituents for work. HCB managers eventually convinced the Belgian government to re-introduce a head tax, and by 1914, all Congolese men were required to pay the impôt indigène, with supplemental charges levied on wives. (The latter provision was aimed at the chiefs, who, as polygamists, would be forced to recruit multiple laborers or to send their own slaves to work off their considerable debts.)

As in Leopold’s day, local agents took to raiding villages, often wielding the dreaded chicotte. It wasn’t long before they were being met by flying arrows. The recruiters began traveling with military reinforcements and, with the coerced help of handsomely compensated local chiefs, forcing entire villages to relocate closer to Lever’s plantations and mills.

With the outbreak of war in 1914, Lever’s German market collapsed, and the British government began imposing restrictions on all commerce with Holland. “The trade that has taken us nearly thirty years to build up,” Lever seethed, “is being wrecked.” In fact, he would profit handsomely from the conflict. In addition to providing munitions makers with glycerine, a by-product of soap manufacturing required for the production of cordite, a gunpowder substitute, he supplied the government with soap and margarine, using cut-price oil and kernels diverted from Germany by the blockade.

Between 1914 and 1918, British margarine production rose from 78,000 to 238,000 tons a year, leading Lever to build a new factory devoted expressly to its manufacture. The wartime demand for oil and kernels saw their value skyrocket—palm oil shot from 29 pounds a ton in 1914 to 41 pounds in 1915—eventually prompting the British government to impose ceilings on both.

The model garden city of Port Sunlight, meanwhile, would also turn out to be something of a mirage. Fewer than half of Lever’s employees and their families actually lived in its houses, and those who did often weren’t very pleased about it. “No man of an independent turn of mind can breathe for long the atmosphere of Port Sunlight,” wrote the secretary of the Bolton branch of the Engineers’ union in a 1919 letter to Lever. “That might be news to your Lordship, but we have tried it. The profit-sharing system not only enslaves and degrades the workers, it tends to make them servile and sycophant, it lowers them to the level of machines tending machines.

PROCESSING PALM OIL

The Sapi Oil Palm Mill is located in a place called Beluran, a two-hour drive west of Sandakan. The mill processes 30,000 tons of palm oil every year. A dozen dump trucks piled high with spiky bunches sat lined up outside, with a smell that brought to mind burnt molasses. Still more bunches lay mounded on the ground, their fruits gleaming tangerine and crimson in the sun. It was mid-October, the height of a harvest season here, so the action at Sapi, one of more than 450 mills now dotting the country—oil-palm plantations cover some 14 million acres of Malaysian land—extended around the clock. Ready for processing at the Sapi Oil Palm Mill, in Malaysian Borneo. One by one, the trucks drove onto a pair of weighbridges, where agents in air-conditioned booths punched numbers into computers. The drivers then dumped their loads into a series of metal rail cars that progressed along tracks to a pressure cooker–like device that both sterilized the fruits (halting the development of free fatty acids) and loosened them from their husks. Back inside the building, where the roaring, whooshing, clanking machines reduced my technician-guide to shouting, the individual fruits got stripped from their bunches and threshed around in a drum, emerging with the look of charred dates. Operating like a slow-speed blender, a digester then loosened the flesh from the nuts and heated the whole mass, readying it for the press, which expelled a thick, blackish sludge of oily fiber and nuts. The sludge was then fed into a centrifuge, which separated it into a deep-brown “decanter cake” and an oil that, once clarified, got funneled into steel tanks, ready for transport to the refinery. The kernel-containing nuts, meanwhile, sporting a stringy beige fringe that gave them the look of tiny coconuts, would get trucked off to different facilities to be crushed and their kernels extracted.

Treatment with phosphoric acid, they explained, at temperatures ranging from 90 to 110 degrees Celsius, served to de-gum the thick crude oil, after which it got bleached, cooled, and filtered. Finally, it would be “steam stripped,” at temperatures of up to 270 degrees, to remove free fatty acids and volatile compounds, a process known as neutralizing and deodorizing. The resulting “RBD,” or “refined, bleached, and deodorized” oil, makes up much of what gets sold on commodities markets worldwide.

Some of the bigger refineries further “fractionate” the oil into solid and liquid forms, known as stearin and olein, respectively. Much of the former gets shipped off to oleo-chemical plants, where it’s further manipulated and broken down into various fatty acids, fatty alcohols, esters, and glycerines, which in turn are sold to detergent and cosmetics manufacturers, and to the chemical industry. Almost all of the olein ends up with the food industry, to be sold as cooking oil or used in processed foods. Palm kernel oil, having also undergone bleaching and deodorizing, eventually moves on to oleo-chemical companies, which fractionate it for use in cosmetics and personal-care products. (The palm kernel meal that remains, known as expeller, mostly ends up with the livestock industry, which prizes it as a cheap source of protein.) At this point, the palm oil has very little in common with the traditional foodstuff native to West Africa and Bahia, Brazil. It’s gone through so much processing, in fact, that it can turn up in products listed under any of some two hundred names.

In 2019, thanks to decades of development and aggressive marketing, Malaysia’s palm oil industry produced a record 20.5 million metric tons of oil, worth some $9 billion. But in the last two decades, the country has lost no less than 20 million acres of tree cover.

By the time I arrived in northern Sumatra, poachers’ guns were just the latest threat facing the region’s storied birdlife. Since the days of Adrien Hallet, tens of thousands of square miles of rainforest have fallen here to make way for oil-palm cultivation. As the forests have disappeared, hornbills, as well as orangutans and other creatures, have found themselves squeezed into ever-tinier patches of suitable habitat. Today more than 75 percent of Sumatra’s 102 lowland forest–dependent bird species are considered globally threatened.

At the same time, plantations and the new roads that go with them render what’s left of the forests that much more accessible to poachers like these guys, who kill the helmeted hornbills for their casques, solid-keratin enlargements on the upper part of their bills. Long prized by the Chinese for sculpting into snuff bottles and jewelry and grinding into traditional medicines, the casques have taken on new status in recent years, thanks in part to the growing difficulty of procuring elephant tusks.

communist sympathy was surging: by the early 1960s, the PKI had become the largest party in the country, claiming a membership of some 20 million. In October of 1965, the country’s long-simmering social tensions came to a devastating head when an alleged coup attempt served as impetus for the Indonesian army and its related paramilitary groups to slaughter between 500,000 and one million members of the PKI and its purported associates. Over the course of five months, grisly massacres played out across the archipelago, with death squads moving from village to village and murdering every supposed communist, trade unionist, and peasant in their paths. Also targeted were Chinese immigrants,

Among the main settings of the atrocity, which the CIA called “one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century,” were the oil-palm and rubber plantations that stretched across northern Sumatra. (Documentary evidence of the CIA’s own complicity in the event has since been widely acknowledged.)

By 1967, when a general named Suharto was named acting president, the Indonesian population wasn’t just traumatized—it was also deathly poor, with 60 percent of its citizens surviving on less than a dollar a day. Over the next two decades, the World Bank would advise Suharto to expand the palm oil sector as a way to engage its rural poor,

Transmigration, another World Bank–backed scheme, which entailed the forced resettlement of millions of Indonesians from the archipelago’s crowded islands to less-populated ones like Sumatra and Borneo, where they were encouraged to cultivate the crop. In subsequent years, the government would launch campaigns aimed at promoting domestic consumption of palm oil. Whereas in 1965 it accounted for just 2 percent of Indonesians’ cooking-oil usage, by 2010 that figure had soared to 94 percent. The World Bank also underwrote Suharto’s forest policy, under which more than half of the country’s rainforests were logged and converted to plantations. The folks on the receiving end of those lucrative logging and oil-palm concessions? The president’s family, friends, and fellow military officers. In 2004, Transparency International ranked Suharto the most corrupt leader of all time.

Transmigration entailed the clearing of massive amounts of land and the displacement of the peoples who had lived and hunted there for generations. In the last few decades, Sumatra’s semi-nomadic Orang Rimba and Batin Sembilan tribes have lost tens of thousands of acres of forest to the palm oil industry.

the sort of land grabbing that I’d gone to investigate in Liberia is here largely perpetrated by the state itself

The 2019 U.N. report I mentioned in the prologue found that as many as one million species of plants and animals are today threatened with extinction. The situation is particularly bleak for tropical forests, which, recall, house more than half of the world’s biodiversity. The demise of individual species can lead to the collapse of entire ecosystems,

A violent thirty-year separatist insurgency had long spared Aceh the grim environmental fate of the rest of Sumatra, but the signing of a 2005 peace accord put an end to that. Since then, the palm oil industry has set its sights on something called the Leuser Ecosystem, a 5.6-million-acre expanse of lowland and mountainous rainforest that spreads across the bottom half of the province. Home to 382 bird, 105 mammal, and 95 reptile and amphibian species, the butterfly-shaped Leuser is a UNESCO-designated World Heritage site and ranks among the most biologically diverse places on Earth. (The poachers live at its heart, in a hamlet called Tamiang.) The Leuser, one-third of which forms Gunung Leuser National Park, is the last place on the planet where there is terrain of sufficient size and quality to support viable populations of Sumatran tigers, elephants, and rhinos, and of orangutans, clouded leopards, and sun bears. In addition to its helmeted, rhinoceros, and other hornbill populations, the Ecosystem is alive with the calls of the tan-breasted partridge, the salvadori’s pheasant, various laughing thrush, and the critically endangered Rück’s blue-flycatcher.

its forests provide a steady, clean water supply to more than four million Acehnese—the Leuser is technically safeguarded under Indonesian law. Still, the past decade and a half have seen roughly five thousand acres of its park converted to oil-palm plantations. Today, only 4.5 million acres of the Ecosystem remain forested. Here as elsewhere in Indonesia, palm oil companies have secured permits through backroom deals with local officials or have simply paid others to clear the land illegally.

In addition to diminishing the habitat of Indonesia’s hornbills, the incursions have impacted the particular living requirements of the birds. Known as the “farmers of the forest” for the critical role they play in dispersing seeds, hornbills need dense habitat and a steady supply of fruit. Their unique nesting habits depend on the sort of old-growth trees that tend to fall first to developers.

Sumatra’s once-sheltered rhinos, like the hornbills, increasingly were being squeezed out of the Leuser’s forests. Along with its elephants and orangutans, they had begun encroaching on local communities as a result. Farmers and plantation workers, annoyed by the beasts’ habit of knocking down homes and trampling through crops, had been responding by setting out traps or potassium cyanide–laced pineapples, or by shooting the animals with pellet guns. Once widespread across Southeast Asia, Sumatran rhinos were now down to an unimaginable eighty individuals.

By 2009, Putra, who still accompanies his rangers on 15-day patrols each month, had begun taking chainsaws to northern Sumatra’s illegal oil-palm plantings. A stand of trees in a 2,600-acre plot on the eastern fringe of the Leuser. Trailed by a handful of curious kids and accompanied by 11 local guys toting banana, durian, and other seedlings—they sow native crops on the sites where they’ve downed the oil palms. Putra, who at that point had dismantled 26 illegal plantations—some 7,500 acres of oil palm—said that confrontations are a part of the job.

The primates—orangutan means “people of the forest” in Malay—live only in Southeast Asia: here on Sumatra and in the rainforests of neighboring Borneo. In 2008, the Sumatran orangutan was declared critically endangered by the IUCN. Today, its numbers are down to just 14,000, 85 percent of whom make the Leuser their home. The orangutans of Borneo, where the forest has shrunk by 55 percent in just two decades, were deemed critically endangered in 2016. (In 2017, scientists determined that some of the orangutans of North Sumatra in fact comprise a separate species. With an estimated population of fewer than eight hundred, the Tapanuli orangutan, Pongo tapanuliensis, is the rarest great ape species in the world.)

you’ve got some people who actually consider they own bits of the land, because it was cleared by their great-grandparents, but they don’t have any paperwork. So you get a company then from Jakarta or somewhere who comes in and just evicts everybody. ‘Fuck off.’ ‘Hey, that’s my land!’ ‘Paperwork? Sorry, mate.’ So they’re kicked off. And then the company offers such shitty wages that none of these people want to work for it. They don’t like the company anyway; they’ve just been evicted. So then they get labor cheaper from offshore islands. And they come and live in shitty conditions. Then the company chops all the forest down. So you annihilate everything that lives there, including ants and termites and funguses. Incinerate the whole fucking thing. Then you dig canals, because in order to grow oil palm you need at least a meter of dry peat to plant the thing. And then the river levels go down, the fisheries disappear, so you’ve got all these people who used to make their living, and water supplies, and protein source, all of a sudden have got fuck-all. And they’re surrounded by plantations. So even if they did have any money, they can’t grow any vegetables or fruits.

They’ve got nothing. And then, some company—or some guy in Jakarta who’s probably never even been there—his bank account is going up and up and up and up, for twenty-five or thirty years. The fortunes of the “twenty or thirty families” that rule Indonesia today, he added, are all based on the country’s natural resources, oil palm prominent among them.

Beginning in the 1940s, in part as a hedge against the Panama blight then ravaging its banana crop, United Fruit undertook modest oil-palm plantings in Honduras and Costa Rica. Also in the 1960s, United Fruit acquired a Costa Rica–based vegetable-oil concern, called the Numar Company, and founded Grupo Numar, specializing in oils and fats. In 1995—United Fruit having by then changed its name to Chiquita Brands International—it sold off Grupo Numar, which merged with another operation to form Grupo Jaremar, the parent of Walter Banegas employer Agroguay.

Traffickers to begin funneling their cocaine shipments through Honduras and neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador. A 2017 study published in Environmental Research Letters found that roughly 86 percent of the cocaine trafficked globally now moves through these Central American countries. The six or so billion dollars in illegal profits made every year need to be laundered somewhere, and the criminals involved have found that oil-palm plantations work quite nicely. Much of the contraband passes through northern Guatemala’s Peten region, where oil palm also has supplanted smallholder farms.

The chemicals handled by Agroguay workers and that accumulate in the undergrowth are known to be extremely dangerous. Among them is an insecticide called Lorsban, the commercial name for chlorpyrifos. An organophosphate belonging to the same class of chemicals as those developed by the Nazis for use as a nerve gas, chlorpyrifos has been linked to a range of medical conditions, including brain damage in children, Parkinson’s disease, and cancer.

Though Agroguay workers charged with applying fertilizers and pesticides were provided gloves and face masks, said the workers, the masks fogged up in the heat, rendering them useless.

And though the WHO recommends that workers dealing with toxic chemicals wash immediately afterward to prevent “hazardous contamination,” there are no bathing facilities on the Agroguay plantation. It takes most of the company’s workers at least thirty minutes to get home by bicycle

Gramoxone is the commercial name for an agricultural chemical called paraquat. Despite having been linked to kidney, lung, and liver damage, and, like chlorpyrifos, to Parkinson’s disease—it’s banned in at least 46 countries—paraquat continues to be used on oil-palm plantations throughout the world.

Though most palm oil companies have vowed to stop using paraquat, the evidence suggests that few have actually done so.

After being forced to march for days through the jungle, the captives finally arrived in southern Malaysia, where they were put to work on an oil-palm plantation run by Felda Global Ventures Holdings Berhad (FGV), the commercial arm of the Federal Land Development Authority, or FELDA, introduced in Chapter 4. Today, the state-owned company, which ranks among the largest producers of palm oil in the world, employs some thirty thousand migrants on its Malaysian plantations. Rubel told the reporter that he had worked on FGV’s plantations seven days a week without being paid a single ringgit. Another Bangladeshi said that he’d been shunted among three labor contractors over the course of six months in Malaysia, also without receiving any pay. “They buy and sell us like cattle,” he said. In the five years since the Journal published its exposé, FGV has done little, if anything, to address the abuses. In 2019, in fact, a group of United States–based labor, environmental, and justice organizations filed a complaint with U.S. Customs and Border Protection seeking to stop the importation of palm oil products produced by the company.

Palm oil produced by FGV gets traded by such American companies as Cargill and ADM, and it ends up in the products of Nestlé, Colgate-Palmolive, Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble, Kellogg’s, Mars, PepsiCo, and L’Oréal.

A 2017 study in the New England Journal of Medicine found that the global prevalence of obesity and overweight had skyrocketed over the previous twenty-five years, with more than 10 percent of the world’s population now considered obese. Some of the highest increases had occurred in developing countries, many of which were also confronting epidemics of under-nutrition. In India, non-communicable diseases such as diabetes recently overtook infectious ones such as diarrhea and tuberculosis to become the leading killers. Today, India has more patients with Type 2 diabetes than any other country in the world. (Yes, it also has more people than most, but those with diabetes form a disproportionately high percentage of its population.) The Journal researchers pointed to the “increased availability, accessibility, and affordability” of high-calorie foods to explain the worldwide packing on of pounds. “We have more processed food, more energy-dense food, more intense marketing of food products,” Dr. Ashkan Afshin, the study’s lead author, said upon its publication.

We also have more palm oil. During the years looked at by the researchers, 1980 to 2015, global production of the commodity increased more than twelve-fold, from 5 million to more than 62 million metric tons. The growth in production of palm oil has surpassed even that seen in wheat during the transformative period of the mid-twentieth century known as the Green Revolution. What happens to all that oil? Some 70 percent of it ends up in just the sorts of processed and “energy-dense” foods cited by Dr. Afshin.

It is expected that 45 of every 100 additional calories in the period up to 2030 may come from oil crops,” Carl Bek-Nielsen, the model-pretty Dane who now leads United Plantations, told an audience of industry executives in 2012. “Oil palm’s contribution as a stabilizing crop to global food security is now undisputed.

Well, not exactly. While it’s true that many of the world’s people could use more calories—and certainly we all need some fat in our diets—the global glut of palm oil is in fact diminishing food security, in a fairly drastic way. It’s common to blame sugar for the world’s weight problems, but in the last half-century, refined vegetable oils have added far more calories to the global diet than has any other food group. Between 1961 and 2009, for example, the availability of palm oil worldwide went up a staggering 206 percent. Over the same period, the availability of sugar and sweeteners increased by just 20%. More recently, in the decades from 1991 to 2011, the global supply of food energy increased by 278 calories per person, with more than a quarter of that increase coming from vegetable oils.

In South Asia, the oils accounted for 32 percent of the increase in consumed calories. But it isn’t just the oils themselves. Part of the problem is the sort of nutrient-deficient, heavily processed junk that all of this cheap oil enables. And land planted with oil palm, of course, is land not being used to grow healthful foods such as fruits, vegetables, and legumes.

ultra-processed foods for which palm oil is ideally suited. Just as farm policies in the United States led to the overproduction of corn and subsequent rivers of high-fructose corn syrup and endless conveyor belts of fast food in this country, so have international trade patterns abetted the palm oil bonanza, bequeathing a global landscape saturated in deep-fried snacks and fast and processed foods. The implications for public health are enormous. Over the past decade, large-scale studies from France, Brazil, the United States, and Spain have echoed the Lancet in finding that the high consumption of ultra-processed foods is associated with higher rates of obesity. When eaten in large amounts, they have also been linked to depression, asthma, heart disease, and gastrointestinal disorders. In 2018, a study published in The BMJ (formerly British Medical Journal) found that a 10% increase in the proportion of ultra-processed foods in the diet led to an increase of more than 10% in the overall risk of developing cancer.

That said, the oil itself does raise some concerns. Part of what makes palm oil so useful to these brands is the fact that it is 50% saturated, which helps with both providing the desired “mouth feel” and prolonging the shelf life of products. As explained previously, palm oil’s high smoke point makes it ideal for frying up chicken nuggets, French fries, cheese curls, and doughnuts—as well as such Indian staples as samosas and poori. Palm kernel oil, at 80% saturated fat, tends to be used more by the makers of chocolates and other confectionery, who prize its hard texture, among other qualities.)

Diets rich in palm oil, which contains minimal amounts of omega-3 and omega-6 fatty acids, both of which have health benefits, lead to a higher risk of heart disease than those heavy in such unsaturated fats as olive or soybean oils. Trans fats carry a bigger risk per gram than saturated fats,” explained Barry Popkin, a professor of nutrition at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, “but the volume of palm oil being consumed is so much greater.” When it comes to the overall health effects, he said, palm oil may have a much more harmful impact.

This is the case particularly in the developing world, where palm oil continues to supplant other oils thanks to its low price. India, for instance, has seen palm oil, at $694 a metric ton, displace more traditionally used oils, including sunflower (currently $832 a ton), rape-seed ($890), and groundnut ($1,876), especially by the food industry,

Latin America. After the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 1994, a flood of direct investment flowed into the region’s food-processing industry, with sales of junk food in Mexico, for instance, growing by 5 to 10 percent annually between 1995 and 2003. Today, the country is one of the ten biggest producers of processed foods in the world. The companies behind its popular junk foods, including such usual suspects as Nestlé, Unilever, PepsiCo, and Yum!, as well as Mexico’s own Grupo Bimbo, are among the world’s top purchasers of palm oil. Since 1995, palm oil imports to Mexico have increased more than five-fold, from 103,000 metric tons to 565,000.

Today Mexico has some of the highest rates of obesity and high blood pressure in the world, with 29% of its children between the ages of 5 and 11 overweight, as well as 35% of kids between 11 and 19.

“The people who can afford it can buy products with less palm oil or no palm oil,

In Sumatra, I spent time with indigenous Orang Rimba and Batin Sembilan communities who said that the diets they had relied on for generations were simply no longer available. Staples including cassava, sago (the palm starch that had originally lured Fauconnier east), wild boar, deer, squirrel, snails, mushrooms, ferns, fruits, and caterpillars—wild foods rich in vitamins and micronutrients like iron and calcium—had disappeared when the forests fell. These days, the communities rely on instant noodles (containing some 20 percent palm oil) and government-issued rice to survive.

In the early 2000s, the Indonesian government passed a number of reforms aimed at replacing its previous system of centralized power—never a great fit for a country of some seventeen thousand islands—and devolving political authority to the provincial and county levels. Since then, the ability to award logging and plantation licenses has rested with county governors, known as bupatis. A few years later, the convergence of high global prices for fossil fuels and sagging ones for agricultural commodities had led governments around the world to begin focusing on biofuels.

The palm oil industry in Southeast Asia received news of the mandates with glee. Having long lobbied Western politicians to introduce biofuels measures, plantation companies immediately set about expanding their production capacity even more. Indonesia announced that it would convert an additional 13 million acres of forest—nearly the size of West Virginia—to oil-palm cultivation. By 2011, imports of the commodity to the European Union had soared by 15 percent, followed by 19 percent the year after that. (Today the EU is the second-largest importer of palm oil, after India.)

By 2017, oil palm was accounting for 31% of biofuels feedstock worldwide.

Securing the permits necessary for all that expansion now meant cozying up to the newly empowered bupatis. Bribes became central to the process, with politicians green-lighting projects involving friends, relatives, and anyone else willing to pony up the cash. (That dead journalist? He had been investigating a company owned by the nephew of a local bupati.) Often the arrangements involved skipping right past the required environmental and social-impact assessments, including the mandated consultations with communities likely to be impacted by the deals. When the consultations did take place, they tended to involve deception, with villagers signing over land rights in exchange for farming plots that never materialized and promised payments that never arrived.

The rampant illegality eventually led to the founding of something called the Corruption Eradication Commission, or KPK, the existence of which pushed the bupatis to engage in still more elaborate schemes. It became common for those in power to issue licenses to shell companies established by their acquaintances. Those friends would then turn around and sell the “shadow companies” to plantation firms, generally for hundreds of thousands of dollars, with much of that cash ultimately flowing back to the bupatis. One governor on Borneo set up no fewer than eighteen shell companies in the names of his relatives and cronies and then granted all of them licenses to establish large plantations. Those companies were quickly sold to the likes of Wilmar and other established firms.

I figured that if anyone had a handle on the hidden forces at play, they would be the ones. The investigators for Eyes on the Forest, or EoF, spend weeks at a time in the remote regions of Indonesia where so much of the deforestation takes place. Deploying drones, satellite imagery, and finely honed undercover skills, they document how illicit oil-palm fruit makes its way to local mills and refineries and ultimately into our own kitchens, bathrooms, and fuel tanks. They’d agreed to show me how it was done.

The convergence of biofuels fever in the West and a newly decentralized Indonesia would eventually yield the proverbial perfect storm. Between 2000 and 2012, the country lost more than 15 million acres of natural forest, with its annual deforestation rate surpassing that of Brazil for the first time.

Some three-quarters of Indonesia’s current palm oil production has come online since 2000, with most of the growth happening here on Sumatra and on once-heavily-forested Borneo. Plantation firms now control more than eighty thousand square miles of Indonesian land—12 percent of the country. (In 2006, Indonesia once again overtook Malaysia as the world’s number-one producer of palm oil, a title that it’s held ever since.) “You once had just Suharto and his cronies stealing the country’s natural resources,” Glenn Hurowitz, chief executive officer of the Washington, DC–based non-governmental organization (NGO) Mighty Earth, told me. “There’s only so much that one person can steal. Now you have five hundred little Suhartos stealing Indonesia’s natural resources.

Over the years, the corruption has become increasingly intertwined with the country’s elections. These days, running for even the most local office requires putting up hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars, first to secure a place on the ballot and then to underwrite the campaign. Would-be candidates strike deals with the region’s entrenched political parties—known locally as the “land mafia” for their intimate connections to the palm oil and other extractive industries—who help them get elected in exchange for lucrative contracts, jobs, and other benefits on the other side. Working through middlemen, they routinely buy the support of village chiefs, religious leaders, and other local powerbrokers and underwrite rallies, concerts, and other events, where they often hand out free meals.

That land mafia, which is based in Medan, is composed of a handful of powerful families closely associated with paramilitary organizations, including the Pemuda Pancasila, the members of which are featured in Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing, recounting the murders they’d committed during the 1965 atrocity. Renowned for its ruthlessness, the group has branches in villages across North Sumatra and functions as a sort of gang, operating under the guise of civil service.

A lot of what they do is ‘security,’” a New Zealander expat explained. “From themselves. As in, ‘Nothing’s happened this month; pay us, or something will happen next month.’

If the industry flouted environmental laws before, the biofuels craze made things even worse. With demand for palm oil rising, everything, including the country’s carbon-rich peatlands, had become fair game for development. As explained by Ian Singleton, this dense, waterlogged terrain comprises layer upon layer of dead organic matter built up over thousands of years. To ready it for planting, the palm oil companies dig deep trenches and then bring in machinery to fell the trees. Fires set to clear any remaining vegetation can continue to smolder for years. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that the carbon dioxide released from peatlands—which in Sumatra and Borneo can run as deep as sixty feet—amounts to some two and a half times that released from cutting down an average (already-carbon-dense) tropical rainforest.

“it’s not just about saving the orangutans or this frog or that plant species. This is a global issue. You destroy all of Indonesia’s peat swamps, Planet Earth becomes uninhabitable. It’s that serious. It’s not fucking around.

And yet destroying Indonesia’s peat swamps is exactly what was now happening, to the growing dismay of the international community.

In 2011, partly as a response to the outcry over its ballooning carbon emissions, the Indonesian president announced a moratorium on new permits for clearing primary forests and peatlands for plantations and logging. The process involved a massive surveying effort, under which millions of acres were designated as protected peatland. But the mapping, too, eventually fell prey to the shenanigans of politics and the industry. A six-month review process put in place enabled bupatis to rezone areas from “forest estate” to “non-forest estate,” thereby qualifying them for previously off-limits development. New maps routinely materialized in which borders had been inexplicably redrawn so as to redefine peatland as forest suited to “other use,” including clearing for oil-palm plantations.

A 2018 Greenpeace analysis found that in the years since the moratorium went into effect, no fewer than 17,400 square miles of forest and peatlands had been removed from its original maps.

the summer and fall of 2015 saw fires traced to oil-palm plantations across Sumatra and Borneo burning more than 6 million acres of forest, an area larger than the state of Vermont. Blanketing an expanse of Southeast Asia in haze for weeks, they sickened hundreds of thousands of people. A study published in Scientific Reports found that the carbon emissions released by the fires in September and October of that year were higher than those of the entire European Union over the same period. More than one quarter of the area that burned was located on land once included in the moratorium.

As proof of their sustainability bona fides, companies with NDPE policies will often assert that their palm oil supply is “traceable to the mill.” The idea is that, given the perishability of the fruit, which we know begins to degrade within forty-eight hours, whatever arrives at a facility must have come from within a certain geographical radius.

But the model is ripe for abuse. As EoF reports have documented, drivers carrying fruit from illegal plantations will routinely race through the night to reach mills outside of their expected ranges. Sometimes they’ll change license plates along the way. And we saw in Wawan’s video what happens when

Though it’s generally assumed that plantation companies are the ones responsible for clearing the forests, as the population on Sumatra has increased and arable land become more scarce, individual farmers also are venturing farther into marginal areas, including peatlands. If those farmers set fires to clear the land for oil palm, they do so in the knowledge that whatever fruit they eventually harvest will find a ready market—regardless of how or where it’s been cultivated

growing oil palm isn’t like growing basil. Significant cash is required up front to pay for things like fertilizers and pesticides, and the fruit isn’t ready to harvest for at least three years. Cash-poor farmers looking to cultivate the crop often are compelled to sign on with landowners, generally absentee, who may promise to bequeath them small parcels of land in exchange for years of working a larger plot. Often the laborers—including those two guys on the platform—have no idea that they’re cultivating on illegal land.

Though the industry makes repeated reference to the fact that “40 percent” of Indonesia’s oil palm is cultivated by smallholder farmers, the KPK has found that the actual figure is closer to 25 percent.

And even those tend to be closely tied to big industry players.

Given the shell companies, backroom deals, and looming threat of violence, tracking Indonesia’s land transactions is no simple enterprise. Wawan and his colleague Wari will generally spend two or three weeks at a time on the road, often traveling by motorbike, and will pose variously as fishermen, birdwatchers, students, or land-scouting businessmen depending on the situation. Instances like the one with the guys on the platform, where they’re hanging out with the very folks they’re investigating, are not uncommon, and in extremely remote areas they may end up spending the night on such suspected criminals’ floors.

The job involves some next-level improvisation. Wawan will routinely instruct the driver to pull over so that he can chat up some trucker idling by the road or loading oil-palm bunches onto his rig. At one point, positioned in the middle of a plantation so as to monitor the trucks rumbling past, Wari had propped open our hood. Should anybody ask, we had broken down and were waiting for a friend to arrive with a spare part. Some years back, while eavesdropping in a rural lunch spot, Wawan had heard people referencing the businessmen behind the local deforestation and had recorded their names in the squares of a prop crossword puzzle.

During our weeklong trip, the guys spent most mornings bent over their laptops, studying truck routes and comparing satellite images captured over time. In addition to being badass spies, they are unapologetic tech nerds, conversant in the likes of GIS and eCognition and engaged in, among other international collaborations, a years-long mapping project with Google. (EoF, which was established in 2005, grew out of the Forest Crimes Unit of the WWF, or World Wildlife Fund, with which it remains closely affiliated.) One of the investigators, a physics grad named Jojo, builds his own drones and travels with a 3D printer for fabricating broken bits on the fly.

In recent years, it’s become clear to legislators in the United States, as in Europe, that their biofuels initiatives were perhaps not the win-win-win scenarios that they’d initially imagined them to be.

(In 2012, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had determined that palm oil did not qualify as a sustainable fuel stock under the guidelines of the Renewable Fuel Standard.) That meant finding more land on which to grow those crops or comparable ones. Only the United States didn’t have that land.

If the plants used to make those fuels are grown on previously cleared land, then the math behind the carbon lifecycle involved might balance out, with vegetable oil–based biofuels releasing less carbon into the atmosphere than petroleum fuels overall. (The equation incorporates everything from emissions that result from the fertilizers used to grow the crops to those emitted by the trucks used to transport them.) But if in order to grow those crops you must first clear the land of the trees that are now on it, you must also include in your tally whatever carbon was previously sequestered in the biomass and the soils that you’ve now disturbed. If the land happens to be tropical rainforest, you’ll be adding massive amounts of additional carbon. And if it’s tropical peat forests, your added emissions will be off the charts. Draining a single hectare (2.5 acres) of tropical peat emits an average of 55,000 tons of carbon dioxide every year, roughly the same as burning more than 6,000 gallons of gasoline. The Nairobi-based World Agroforestry Centre has found that peatland-based biodiesels may in fact produce nearly four times the emissions of petroleum diesel.

In March of 2019, the European Union, reflecting its more thorough understanding of the carbon lifecycle of palm oil–based biofuels, passed legislation aimed at phasing out their use by 2030. (Despite much back and forth by the Trump administration, the U.S. policy on biofuels remains roughly the same, at least for now.)

Back at the office, Wari’s photos would be combined with GPS coordinates, export data, and complicated chain-of-custody charts in a report that would get sent to the companies sourcing from the mill, including, ultimately, such American brands as Kellogg’s, Mars, PepsiCo, and Colgate-Palmolive, and a massive Singapore-based refinery that ships biodiesel to countries around the world.

In anticipation of the reduced exports to the EU, his government began instituting aggressive biofuels mandates of its own. Having introduced a 20% blending rule for domestic fuels in 2016, he now raised it to 40%, and added another mandate for power generation from palm oil. Malaysia, too, introduced a mandate to manufacture biofuels with a 20% palm oil component, with a plan to raise it to 30% soon after. In addition, the two countries moved to expand their biofuels exports, in particular to India and China, and to grow their biofuels processing capacities. And they began eyeing the aviation industry as another potentially significant buyer for palm oil–based fuels.

Experts believe that in the coming decade, the majority of growth in global consumption of palm oil will likely be for biofuels. A 2020 report published by Rainforest Foundation Norway predicted that the result of such expansion could be as many as 13 million acres of additional forest loss—nearly twice the size of Belgium—including some 7 million acres of peatland.

And so the industry blazes ahead, expanding to Indonesia’s other islands—“The next threat is Papua,” Jojo told me. “I went there and—whoa. They’re cutting down all the trees”—and, as we know, overseas to Latin America and Africa, the latter home to a massive deposit of peat situated at precisely the latitude best suited to growing oil palm.

American consumers and their health is our concern, and they are telling us they don’t want [tropical oils],” a spokesman for the Keebler Company told the Times in 1989. “We are getting piles of mail every day, from everywhere.” By that time, Keebler, General Mills, Quaker Oats, Pepperidge Farm, Pillsbury, and others had vowed to eliminate tropical oils from their products. The replacement for those 2-billion-some pounds of oil then lurking on U.S. grocery-store shelves? Hydrogenated oils, mostly soy. And though it took a while—thanks largely to the strong-armed tactics of yet another lobbying group, the Institute of Shortening and Edible Oils—the negative health impacts of the trans fats that resulted from hydrogenation eventually became undeniable. (As explained in Chapter 7, the FDA announced labeling requirements for trans fats in 2006 and eventually called for their elimination from the food supply altogether.) Back to the tropical oils!

In 2010, 12 of the world’s leading scientists, including the former director of the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew and the biodiversity adviser to the president of the World Bank, became so incensed by the misinformation being promulgated by Southeast Asia’s palm oil and logging interests that they wrote an open letter to The Guardian and other prominent news outlets. In it, they accused a Melbourne-based consultancy called International Trade Strategies Global, or ITS, of “distortions, misrepresentations, or misinterpretations of fact” in its writings about rainforests, logging, and oil-palm plantations. While ITS claimed to be independent, the scientists pointed out its close association with a handful of politically conservative think tanks based in Washington, DC, notably the American Enterprise Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Heritage Foundation.

The Independent later reported that FBC had been paid $21 million by the Malaysian government and companies including Sime Darby to develop a “global strategic communications campaign” aimed at convincing “more than 400 million viewers” to support the palm oil industry. FBC promised to include interviews with other key MPOC figures, “complemented by supporting interviews with … industry leaders and Western third-party champions,” and to “put a particular focus on small farm holders” in order to minimize the idea that the industry was dominated by “large corporate interests.” (Among the FBC’s “third-party champions” was the Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs.

 

At the end of 2015, however, the European Food Safety Authority released a report confirming findings from the Italian health ministry that commercial versions of palm oil likely contained carcinogenic pollutants—a result of processing at high temperatures—prompting companies across the continent to begin adding “palm oil free” labels to their products.

More recently, as the European Union has deliberated over the final shape of its biofuels legislation, the lobbying battle has reached a fever pitch. Indonesia and Malaysia have threatened to restrict European imports and to undertake other trade reprisals. The new Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, sent a letter to French president Emmanuel Macron suggesting that he would suspend trade talks and be forced to inflict “regrettable economic and trade consequences” for £6 billion ($6.5 billion) worth of French exports as a result of the “de facto ban” on palm oil.

The country’s primary industries minister, Teresa Kok, decreed the biofuels decision “discriminatory against the economies of developing nations in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America” and said it was “designed to hurt the livelihoods of millions of small farmers.

Most telling of all may be the fact that, 17 years into its existence, the RSPO has currently certified just 19% of the global palm oil supply. Only a tiny percentage of consumer goods bear the organization’s logo, and most Americans wouldn’t recognize it anyway. “I don’t think the RSPO has played much or any role in reducing deforestation in the palm oil industry,” Glenn Hurowitz told me. “It’s provided a green-washing tool for major consumer companies.

Though Brownell managed to escape with his life, many who have stood up to the global palm oil industry haven’t been as lucky. Over the years, as plantation companies have swallowed up ever greater swathes of the planet’s fertile land, incidences of violence against those who would stand in their path have continued to mount. In 2020, Global Witness found that 212 land and environmental defenders had been reported killed in 2019—an average of more than four a week. The agribusiness sector, palm oil interests prominent within it, ranked second only to mining as the deadliest focus for activists.

BlackRocky is the largest American investor in palm oil, managing nearly $600 million in the commodity, including through investments in Golden Agri-Resources and Sime Darby. At the time of Brownell’s protest, the two controlled a combined 1.5 million acres in Liberia.

PepsiCo vowed to ensure that none of the oil it sourced would be linked to deforestation, peat-land destruction, or human-rights or labor abuses. [ OK great but you can’t trust the certification program, Indonesian or other governments with palm oil plantations ]

We now devote half of the world’s habitable land to agriculture,

Tropical deforestation alone is responsible for some 8% of the world’s annual greenhouse gas emissions—more than those of the European Union.

[ There is still no cellulosic ethanol in 2024, plants evolved not to be eaten and it is still to energy and monetarily expensive to break down the (ligno)cellulose, this isn’t going to work, and the crisis is peak diesel – these engines cannot burn ethanol or they will be ruined ]

Xylome was awarded a Small Business Innovation Research grant from the National Science Foundation for its proposal to create a palm oil equivalent for use in biodiesel using waste generated by ethanol plants. More recently, the company had received a three-year grant from the Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Lab, for which it aims to develop an energy-dense biodiesel using corn stover (the cobs, husks, leaves, and stalks left in the field after the harvest) and cellulose as a feedstock. Not only is stover more efficient at converting energy from the sun than is the cornstarch normally used for ethanol, it has the advantage of not also being a food source. Jeffries and Kelleher have been collaborating with ethanol producers, among them a biofuels giant called POET, which is based in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on a plan to use the waste generated by ethanol plants as a nutrient source for Xylome’s oil-producing yeast. Their ultimate vision is for a bioreactor to be sited at every ethanol plant in the country, cooking up net-carbon-neutral fuel. The trucks that today haul in corn for processing into ethanol could also deliver the stover needed to nourish their yeast, and the rail cars that cart the ethanol away could increasingly transport palm oil biodiesel.

PROTESTS

In the mid-2000s, the United States and Europe put in place energy policies that failed to anticipate the devastating knock-on effects they would have on the other side of the globe.

Those who’ve dared to speak out against the industry, whether laborers, peasant farmers, environmental activists, or investigative journalists, often have been met with violence. While writing this book, I fielded email and WhatsApp messages from folks in Sierra Leone, Honduras, Cameroon, Guatemala, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru, Colombia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Malaysia with updates on various protests, strikes, imprisonments, and murders, all of them related to palm oil.

COMPANIES GREEN-WASHING TODAY

Based in London, Unilever makes all manner of personal-care and food products, and it still ranks among the top purchasers of palm oil and kernels globally. The company makes a point of touting its sustainability bona fides; on the homepage of its website, the slogan “Brands with Purpose” flashes across gauzy images of thriving farm fields and multicultural models. Lever House, the main office building at Port Sunlight, stands as a grand testament to the early days, with parquet floors, vaulted ceilings, stained-glass domes, and marble busts perched on pedestals.

Unilever flagship products like Persil dish cleaner and Dove soap sit inside glass boxes like royal jewels in a museum, as archival stills from the company’s past play across a TV screen with captions like “Being Healthy” and “Being Inclusive.

 

Posted in Agriculture, Biofuels, CO2 and Methane | Tagged , , , , | Comments Off on Palm Oil biofuels destroy rain forests

Why carbon capture contraptions are absurd

Preface.  At the first USA peak oil conference in Denver (ASPO 2005), many of the attendees speculated renewable energy would be the last chance for Wall Street to make money from government subsidies and “dumb money” investors before limits to growth and energy shortages crashed the stock market.

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is not new. Carbon has been captured and stored for over 50 years, with 73% of it injected into the ground to push up more oil. No wonder most CCS projects globally are led or heavily funded by major oil and gas companies (GMI 2025)

The much ballyhooed company Comeworks in Iceland has capture just 105 tons of CO2 of the 36,000 tons promised, less than their own climate footprint (Alexandersson 2025). 

Continue reading

Posted in Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS), CO2 and Methane | Tagged , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Why carbon capture contraptions are absurd

Will California’s high-speed rail go off the tracks?

Preface.  Way down below is the original post, a 2014 U.S. House hearing I summarized that revealed so many flaws with the California high-speed rail project I was sure funding would end. It is so bad, so flawed, that in Flyvbjerg’s book about why big projects fail, high-speed rail is one of his favorite projects to kick.

Originally the project was going to run high speed rail between San Francisco and Los Angeles for $33 billion. By 2014 the cost had risen to $55 billion. In 2020 to $100 billion (Vartabedian 2021), 2022 to $105 billion (Ronayne 2022), and now $128 billion. In 2019, Gov. Gavin Newsom simplified the project to a 171-mile segment in the Central Valley to finish by 2030 and cost $22.8 billion. Now it is over $35 billion.

Continue reading

Posted in Railroads, U.S. Congress Transportation | Tagged | 3 Comments

Why do leaders & the public deny peak oil & limits to growth?

Preface.  It’s strange that we’re on the cusp of Peak Oil, and yet the only existential threat you ever hear about is Climate Change. The New York Times has mentioned climate change over 15,000 times the past 5 years, and “peak oil” just nine, mostly to say it didn’t happen and never will.  What about biodiversity, topsoil erosion, freshwater depletion, pollution and more?

Congress and the military are  aware of the energy crisis.  For example, here are a few posts from congressional house and senate hearings and the military. But the vast majority of leaders have said nothing, or even deny peak oil and other future calamities.  Why?

Related posts:

 

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Financial Sense, UCSC, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

1) Political and economic leaders actually believe economists who say that higher oil prices will result in more supplies.  This is a core belief of capitalism. Energy and resources are nowhere to be found in neoclassical economics. Somehow money, which you can’t burn in your gas tank, is the fountain of endless growth, and implies an infinite planet, and when backed against a wall, economists say we’ll go to other planets and bring back stuff. Since that’s obviously not true, I suspect the goal is to justify looting the earth of as many valuables as possible.

2) As a German military peak oil study stated (BTC 2010),when investors realize Peak Oil is upon us, global stock markets will crash since it will be obvious that growth is no longer possible and investors will never get their money back.

A whistleblower at the IEA alleged that oil reserves had been overstated, and that the IEA had downplayed the lowering rates of production because it feared panic could spread on the financial markets if the figures were brought down further.

‘Politicians are terrified of mentioning peak oil,’ says Chris Skrebowski, director of Peak Oil Consulting and former editor of industry magazine Petroleum Review. ‘They are frightened of the social and financial reactions. Peak oil has been placed on the pile marked “too difficult” (Rowe).

Steven Chu, former Secretary of Energy and director of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, “knows all about peak oil, but he can’t talk about it. If the government announced that peak oil was threatening our economy, Wall Street would crash. He just can’t say anything about it,” according to David Fridley, who used to work for him (Bland 2009).

3) Political (and religious) leaders gain votes, wealth, and power by telling people what they want to hear.  Several politicians have told me privately that people like to hear good news and that politicians who bring bad news don’t get re-elected.  “Don’t worry, be happy” is a vote getter.  A sure -fire way to not get elected is discussing carrying capacity, exponential growth, die-off, extinction, or population control with the electorate. There’s only a minority of intelligent, college-educated people who are scientifically literate.  And the issue isn’t a sound-bite. Convincing the minority would take hours, if not weeks of time about a topic too grim for most people to want to pay attention to.

4) As Richard Heinberg has pointed out, there’s a national survival interest in being the Last Nation Standing.  He wrote:  “I thought that world leaders would want to keep their nations from collapsing. They must be working hard to prevent currency collapse, financial system collapse, food system collapse, social collapse, environmental collapse, and the onset of general, overwhelming misery—right? But no, that’s not what the evidence suggests. Increasingly I am forced to conclude that the object of the game that world leaders are actually playing is not to avoid collapse; it’s simply to postpone it a while so as to be the last nation to go down, so yours can have the chance to pick the others’ carcasses before it meets the same fate.”   February 2010.  China or the U.S.: Which Will Be the Last Nation Standing?

5) It would be political suicide to bring up the real problem of Peak Oil and have no solution to offer besides conservation and consuming less.

I first became aware of this in 2006 when the city and county of San Francisco published a peak oil resolution and later a peak oil task force report in 2009. David Fridley, Dennis Brumm, and others in our peak oil group (started in 2004 in Oakland) worked with the board of supervisors on this.  At some point SF supervisor Ross Mirkarimi said “Wait. You’re telling me that there are no solutions to fix peak oil? I can’t run for office with that!”

Kjell Aleklett, professor of Professor of Physics at Uppsala University in Sweden, points out that one of the failures of democracy is that “It is very difficult for any politician to admit that something is wrong, and that we might need to do something about it. If they were to do this, another politician would come along and say, ‘There’s no problem; vote for me and we can carry on as we are’.”

The “solution” of both parties is Endless Growth, or  “Shop Until You Drop” and “Drill, Baby, Drill” to get out of the current economic and energy crises.  Capitalism ends when growth is no longer possible, all that our leaders can do is try to keep the gain going as long as possible, and not end while they’re in office.  Since golden parachutes and astronomical pay regardless of performance typifies most corporations, there’s less at stake for CEO’s and other economic “leaders”.

There’s also the risk of creating a panic and social disorder if the situation were made utterly clear — that the carrying capacity of the United States is somewhere between 100 million (Pimentel) and 250 million (Smil) without fossil fuels, like the Onion’s parody “Scientists: One-Third Of The Human Race Has To Die For Civilization To Be Sustainable, So How Do We Want To Do This?

There’s no solution to peak oil, except to consume less in all areas of life, limit immigration, and above all, encourage women to have zero or one child, which is not acceptable to political leaders or corporations, who depend on growth for their survival.

Meanwhile, too many problems are getting out of hand on a daily basis at local, state, and national levels.  All that matters to politicians is the next election.  So who’s going to work on a future problem with no solution?  Jimmy Carter is perceived as having lost partly due to asking Americans to sacrifice for the future (i.e. put on a sweater).

I first became aware of the intersection of politics and peak oil at the Denver 2005 Association for the Study of Peak Oil conference.  Denver Mayor Hickenlooper, now governor of Colorado, pointed out that one of his predecessors lost the mayoral election because he didn’t keep the snow plows running after a heavy snow storm.  He worried about how he’d keep snow plows, garbage collection, and a host of other city services running as energy declined.

A Boulder city council member at this conference told us he had hundreds of issues and constituents to deal with on a daily basis, no way did he have time to spend on an issue beyond the next election.

Finally, Congressman Roscoe Bartlett, head of the peak oil caucus in the House of Representatives, told us that there was no solution, and he was angry that we’d blown 25 years even though the government knew peak was coming.  His plan was to relentlessly reduce our energy demand by 5% per year, to stay under the depletion rate of declining oil.  But he didn’t believe in  efficiency as a solution, which doesn’t work due to Jevons paradox.

The only solution that would mitigate suffering is to mandate that women bear only one child.  Fat chance of that ever happening when even birth control is controversial, and Catholics are outraged that all health care plans are now required to cover the cost of birth control pills.  Congressman Bartlett, in a small group discussion after his talk, told us that population was the main problem, but that he and other politicians didn’t dare mention it.  He said that exponential growth would undo any reduction in demand we could make, and gave this example:  if we have 250 years left of reserves in coal, and we turn to coal to replace oil, increasing our use by 2% a year — a very modest rate of growth considering what a huge amount is needed to replace oil — then the reserve would only last 85 years.  If we liquefy it, then it would only last 50 years, because it takes a lot of energy to do that.

Bartlett was speaking about 250 years of coal reserves back in 2005.  Now we know that the global energy from coal may have peaked last year, in 2011 (Patzek) or will soon in 2015 (Zittel). Other estimates range as far as 2029 to 2043.  Heinberg and Fridley say that “we believe that it is unlikely that world energy supplies can continue to meet projected demand beyond 2020.” (Heinberg).

6) Everyone who understands the situation is hoping The Scientists Will Come up With Something.  Including the Scientists. 

And even many of the science-educated don’t have a clue — natural resources, ecology, and energy was not their field of study. I didn’t want to ruin anyone’s vacation on a rafting trip down the Tatshenshini-Alsek river in 2003, but on  the last day of the trip I explained the situation to an astronomer, and he said in great shock, “But there has to be an alternative to oil!”  It had never occurred to him that solar, wind, geothermal, and so on couldn’t replace oil.  Which doesn’t shock me, it didn’t occur to me either in college because the alternate technology group and engineering students fooled around with wind, solar, and so on.

Scientists would like to win a Nobel prize and need funding.  But researchers in energy resources know what’s at stake with climate change and peak oil and are as scared as the rest of us.  U.C.Berkeley scientists are also aware of the negative environmental impacts of biofuels, and have chosen to concentrate on a politically feasible strategy of emphasizing lack of water to prevent large programs in this from being funded (Fingerman).  They’re also working hard to prevent coal fired power plants from supplying electricity to California by recommending natural gas replacement plants instead, as well as expanding the grid, taxing carbon, energy efficiency, nuclear power, geothermal, wind, and so on — see http://rael.berkeley.edu/projects for what else some of UCB’s RAEL program is up to.  Until a miracle happens, scientists and some enlightened policy makers are trying to extend the age of oil, reduce greenhouse gases, and so on.  But with the downside of Hubbert’s curve so close, and the financial system liable to crash again soon given the debt and lack of reforms, I don’t know how long anyone can stretch things out.

Alan Overton of the American Mining Congress said that “the American people have forgotten one important fact: It takes stuff to make things.” The basic problem is that even scientists cannot create something out of nothing. Minerals and fossil energy resources on which we are so dependent, do not reproduce themselves. They do not grow. But human population does. There must be raw material with which to work. The idea that science will come to the rescue in some fashion is a popular public placebo.”

7) The 1% can’t justify their wealth or the current economic system once the pie stops expanding and starts to shrink. The financial crisis will be a handy way to explain why people are getting poorer on the down side of peak oil too, delaying panic perhaps.

Other evidence that politicians know how serious the situation is, but aren’t saying anything, are Congressman Roscoe Bartlett’s youtube videos (Urban Danger).  He’s the Chairman of the peak oil caucus in the House of Representatives, and he’s saying “get out of dodge” to those in the know.  He’s educated all of the representatives in the House, but he says that peak oil “won’t be on their front burner until there’s an oil shock”.

8) Less than one percent of our elected leaders have degrees in science.  They don’t have a clue — they studied law, economics, history, political science and other soft subjects, but know very little about ecology, laws of physics and thermodynamics, biodiversity, and so on. Nor do they have time to read since they’re so busy fund raising. The vast majority of political and economic leaders don’t have a clue.

9) Politicians and corporate leaders probably didn’t get as far as they did without being (techno) optimists, and really do believe the Scientists Will Come Up With Something.   I fear that scientists are going to take a lot of the blame as things head South, even though there’s nothing they can do to change the laws of physics and thermodynamics.

Barrack Obama’s energy plan in 2008 depended on a mix of wind, solar, and biofuels to make us independent of foreign oil. In his third presidential debate in Hempstead, NY, on October 15,2008 he said:  “I think that in 10 years we can reduce our dependence so that we no longer have to import oil from the Middle East or Venezuela. I think that’s a realistic time frame.” In 2009, Al Gore declared that we can produce, “100 percent of electricity from renewable and truly clean carbon-free sources within 10 years.”

Chris Nelder says that “We trust narratives that fit our emotions, associations and experiences, rather than actively assessing the evidence. This is why the peak-oil story gained currency in the press in 2008, when prices for oil and gasoline shot up — it fitted in with our experiences. When prices fell, the story faded. Similarly, extreme weather events such as hurricanes and tornadoes capture the public’s attention in a way that decades of warnings about global warming have failed to do”. (Nelder)

10) But most of them probably do know actually, at least that’s my impression from reading House and Senate hearings.  They’re greatly concerned about energy security, and I bet it keeps some of them awake at night.  Many of our leaders have known since the 1970s energy crises that there’s no comparable alternative energy ready to replace fossil fuels.

Here’s an excerpt from President Jimmy Carter’s speech in 1977 — why didn’t  we listen to him?  “Tonight I want to have an unpleasant talk with you about a problem unprecedented in our history. With the exception of preventing war, this is the greatest challenge our country will face during our lifetimes. The energy crisis has not yet overwhelmed us, but it will if we do not act quickly. It is a problem we will not solve in the next few years, and it is likely to get progressively worse through the rest of this century. We must not be selfish or timid if we hope to have a decent world for our children and grandchildren…. This difficult effort will be the “moral equivalent of war” — except that we will be uniting our efforts to build and not destroy…. The world has not prepared for the future. During the 1950s, people used twice as much oil as during the 1940s. During the 1960s, we used twice as much as during the 1950s. And in each of those decades, more oil was consumed than in all of mankind’s previous history…. Now we have a choice. But if we wait, we will live in fear of embargoes. We could endanger our freedom as a sovereign nation to act in foreign affairs. Within ten years we would not be able to import enough oil — from any country, at any acceptable price. We will not be ready to keep our transportation system running with smaller, more efficient cars and a better network of buses, trains and public transportation. We will feel mounting pressure to plunder the environment. We will have a crash program to build more nuclear plants, strip-mine and burn more coal, and drill more offshore wells than we will need if we begin to conserve now. Inflation will soar, production will go down, people will lose their jobs. Intense competition will build up among nations and among the different regions within our own country….”

To extend the oil age as long as possible, the USA went the military path rather than a “Manhattan Project” of research and building up grid infrastructure, railroads, sustainable agriculture, increasing home and car fuel efficiency, tax incentives to have fewer children, lower immigration levels, and other obvious actions. I believe that’s because Project Independence showed there were no replacements, as has every study commissioned since then.

The Presidents of the United States know about the Peak Oil and other resources.  Representative Roscoe Barlett, mentioned above, formed a Peak Oil Caucus in the House of Representatives that educated congressional members.  First secretary of energy James R. Schlesinger, Matt Simmons, Department of Energy 2005 “Peak Oil” study, Robert L. Hirsch, current science advisor John Holdren, and many other scientists have informed Presidents Bush and Obama about peak oil and the implications.  Since they don’t have a solution and announcing the problem would bring on an instant Great Depression as the stock market crashed and people panicked — why on earth would they say anything?  It’s like shouting “Fire” in a crowded theater.

Instead, we’ve spent trillions of dollars on defense and the military to keep the oil flowing, the Straits of Hormuz open, and invade oil-producing countries.  Being so much further than Europe, China, and Russia from the Middle East, where there’s not only the most remaining oil, but the easiest oil to get out at the lowest cost ($20-22 OPEC vs $60-80 rest-of-world per barrel), is a huge disadvantage.  I think the military route was chosen in the 70s to maintain our access to Middle East oil and prevent challenges from other nations.  Plus everyone benefits by our policing the world and keeping the lid on a world war over energy resources, perhaps that’s why central banks keep lending us money.

Van Jones once said “People say that I am hard core about some of this stuff because I have been to Davos, and I’ve sat with Bill Clinton, Bill Gates, Tony Blair, and Nancy Pelosi. I’ve sat with all these people who we think are in charge, and they don’t know what to do. Take that in: they don’t know what to do! You think you’re scared? You think you’re terrified? They have the Pentagon’s intelligence, they have every major corporation’s input; Shell Oil that has done this survey and study around the peak oil problem. You think we’ve got to get on the Internet and say, “Peak oil!” because the system doesn’t know about it? They know, and they don’t know what to do. And they are terrified that if they do anything they’ll loose their positions. So they keep juggling chickens and chainsaws and hope it works out just like most of us everyday at work.” (Van Jones)

11) If the public were convinced climate change were real and demanded alternative energy, it would become clear pretty quickly that we didn’t have any alternatives.  Already Californians are seeing public television shows and newspaper articles about why it’s so difficult to build enough wind, solar, and so on to meet the mandated 33% renewable energy sources by 2020.

For example, last night I saw a PBS program on the obstacles to wind power in Marin county, on the other side of the Golden Gate bridge. Difficulties cited were lack of storage for electricity, NIMBYism, opposition from the Audubon society over bird kills, wind blows at night when least needed, the grid needs expansion, and most wind is not near enough to the grid to be connected to it.  But there was no mention of Energy Returned on Energy Invested (EROEI) or the scale of how many windmills you’d need to have.  So you could be left with the impression that these problems with wind could be overcome.

I don’t see any signs of the general public losing optimism yet.  I gave my “Peak Soil” talk to a group recently of very educated people, and to my great surprise realized they weren’t worried until my talk, partly because so they weren’t aware of the Hirsch 2005 “liquid fuels” crisis concept, nor the scale of what fossil fuels do for us.   I felt really bad, I’ve never spoken to a group before that wasn’t aware of the problem. I wished I were a counselor as well.  The only thing I could think of to console them was to say that running out of fossil fuels was a good thing — we will soon be forced by geological shortages and consequent political unrest to stop burning so much fossil fuel, which means better odds we and many other species won’t be driven extinct from climate change.

12) Since peak oil began in 2005 –we’ve been on a plateau since then — there’s less urgency to do something about climate change for many leaders, because they assume, or hope, that the remaining fossil fuels won’t trigger a runaway greenhouse. But it might – changes can be abrupt and non-linear.  There’s are no carbon free alternative liquid fuels, let alone a liquid fuel we can burn in our existing combustion engines, which were designed to use very specific oil recipes (i.e. diesel #2).  There’s no time left to build an electric transportation system, which would not work for reasons explained in my book “When Trains Stop running”.  And since electricity generation from windmills, solar, nuclear, etc., depends on oil from mineral extraction to final delivery, these contraptions will not outlast the age of oil.  Batteries are too expensive for all vehicles, and too large and heavy for trucks or locomotives, and require a revolutionary breakthrough that may never happen.

13) Some hope that denying climate change dill divert attention from the more immediate threat of peak oil.   I’m guessing their motivation is to keep our oil-based nation going as long as possible by preventing a stock market crash, panic, social disorder, maintaining a military to protect us and intervene in the Middle East to keep the oil flowing as long as possible, and so on so that we’re the Last Nation Standing (#4)

14) Richard Heinberg writes “Peakists within the oil industry are usually technical staff (usually geologists, seldom economists, and never PR professionals) and are only free to speak out on the subject once they’ve retired. The industry has two big reasons to hate peak oil. First, company stock prices are tied to the value of booked oil reserves; if the public (and government regulators) were to become convinced that those reserves were problematic, the companies’ ability to raise money would be seriously compromised—and oil companies need to raise lots of money these days to find and produce ever-lower-quality resources. It’s thus in the interest of companies to maintain an impression of (at least potential) abundance.”

And as Gail Tverberg often points out in her blog ourfiniteworld.com, low oil prices prevent oil companies from drilling or even looking for more oil. So they definitely don’t want peakists driving their stock prices down by talking about this.  Yet even when oil prices go high, it doesn’t last, and the economy collapses and drives oil prices low again. She believes that this is how peak oil collapse may play out — with low oil prices, not high prices as everyone expects (Tverberg 2018).

15) There’s plenty of misinformation out there, plenty of rosy, cornucopian “we’ve got plenty of oil” projections from all kinds of experts.  Why wouldn’t you believe them?  If I hadn’t joined peak oil forums, it’s unlikely I would have ever stumbled on the information to counter the Wall Street economic view of the world (see my book list and energy topics). People who understand the problem of limited resources are labeled “pessimists”, not realists.  Daniel Yergin, of Cambridge Associates (CERA), is the poster boy for calming worries about energy supplies.

16)  Tariel Morrigan, in “Peak Energy, Climate Change, and the Collapse of Global Civilization” puts the problem this way: “Announcing peak oil may be akin to shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater, except that the burning theater has no exits”. Morrigan says a government announcing peak oil threatens the economy, not only risking a market crash, but the panic that would follow would cause social and political unrest. What a moral dilemma – not warning people isn’t fair, but warning people will make an economic crash and social unrest happen sooner and does nothing to help to make a transition.

In addition, announcing peak oil will make many lose confidence in their government because they’ll feel they were deceived since this has been known since at least the 1950s when M. King Hubbert gave his famours peak oil presentation.  The publc will feel that the government failed to protect them, or was incompetent, corrupt, and colluded with private interests (especially oil companies and the institutions involved with wide-scale economic fraud and recklessness).

17) A story must be positive or a problem must have a solution to be picked up by the media as an ongoing theme.  This is even more true for getting a book published.  Although this book appears to be quite doomer: Scatter, Adapt, and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction, it has a “happy” solution — we’ll just migrate to the Moon and Mars!  Hello! The only method of propulsion we have to escape the planet is fossil fuels, and they don’t come anywhere near to getting us to the speed of light necessary to get to the closest star. Nor will a space elevator do that — even if it could be built, it’s absolutely ridiculous to think we could survive on the Moon or Mars. Biosphere II was a failure, and that was right here on Earth. The idea of abandoning Earth is absurd, sad — pure science-fiction. But you can’t get a book published about how we face extinction if you don’t offer some hope.

18) Sometimes I wonder if some of our smartest energy scientists, who know that fossil fuels can’t be replaced with alternative and/or renewable energy resources, are playing a long game. Perhaps they’re trying to steer society away from war and social unrest by promising the public that renewable energy can work, with the added carrot that they’ll be doing something good for the planet and their grandchildren by slowing or stopping climate change.  They can’t ever be honest, or their long game won’t work.

If people knew that solar, wind, biomass, and so on wouldn’t work, they’d be very keen on building more coal or nuclear plants (also a disaster because we still have no way of getting rid of nuclear waste and there isn’t enough uranium left to do that), drilling for oil in the arctic (a disaster for salmon and other sea life after inevitable oil spills), and so on.

Most scientists see extinction from climate change as humanities biggest threat, especially burning coal or the dirty tar sands in Canada and heavy oils of Venezuela.   Far better to throw societies remaining energy resources into distributed energy — at least that way, as the grid flutters and dies from lack of coal and natural gas, the wealthiest people who were able to buy both solar panels and batteries could still cook, heat, and cool their homes until they broke.

19) Why bother to tell people when they won’t believe you?  James Howard Kunstler has an excellent book called “Too Much Magic: Wishful Thinking, Technology, and the Fate of the Nation” that goes into the Disneyesque, happy-ending mentality of the American public.  Most people — even scientists — believe we can overcome any limits with our ingenuity and technical know-how.  It is impossible for most people to accept, or even consider, that we might be limited by forces beyond our control, mainly limited fossil fuels and the impossibility of wind, solar, nuclear, and other low-net energy, high fossil-fuel dependent “solutions” to replace oil, coal, and natural gas.

Here he explains (May 5, 2014) the situation in his own inimitable language: “Despite its Valley Girl origins, the simple term clueless turns out to be the most accurate descriptor for America’s degenerate zeitgeist. Nobody gets it — the “it” being a rather hefty bundle of issues ranging from our energy bind to the official mismanagement of money, the manipulation of markets, the crimes in banking, the blundering foreign misadventures, the revolving door corruption in governance, the abandonment of the rule-of-law, the ominous wind-down of the Happy Motoring fiasco and the related tragedy of obsolete suburbia, the contemptuous disregard for the futures of young people, the immersive Kardashian celebrity twerking sleaze, the downward spiral of the floundering classes into pizza and Pepsi induced obesity, methedrine psychosis, and tattooed savagery, and the thick patina of public relations dishonesty that coats all of it like some toxic bacterial overgrowth. The dwindling life of our nation, where anything goes and nothing matters”.

20) The IPCC has greatly exaggerated the amount of fossil fuels.  Although they invite scientists from many fields, they don’t invite geologists.  IPCC estimates of fossil fuel reserves are crazy, unjustified, and flat out wrong. That’s why their charts of CO2 continue to go up to the 21st century.  And the IPCC never says what they assume fossil reserves are, but it can be backwards calculated by their projections, which is basically that we can burn all the reserves and the resources.  Several geologists have published peer-reviewed papers that question these reserve figures (see posts here).  Tad Patzek has looked at fossil reserves and concluded that at worst, only the lowest four IPCC projections might come to pass.  It is a well-established fact that conventional oil, 90% of our oil, peaked in 2005 world-wide.  Oil-based vehicles and equipment are essential for obtaining, delivering, and maintaining the vast energy infrastructure for coal and natural gas production, so peak oil also means peak coal and natural gas — and everything else since oil is the master resources that makes all goods possible.

So peak energy and resources are going to blind-side most people, we haven’t been preparing at all for the emergency looming within 20 or so years.  And since climate change is locked in for hundreds of years, the survivors will be knocked flat again by sea-level rise, crazy weather reducing crop yields, heat waves and droughts.

I doubt the IPCC will ever change their fossil reserve figures because that would lessen the urgency of their message.

21) Politicians can’t get re-elected if they cause their constituents to suffer economic pain

Here are another six reasons from Robert L. Hirsch’s book “The Impending World Energy Mess” (and his slideshow):

22) Incompetence for all the reasons it exists (Hirsch)

23) Intellectual rigidity. People are so tied to history and their training they don’t see other technologies require different thinking (Hirsch)

24) Self-interest, often connected to a person’s job. If realities were publicly understood then a company or environmental organization might suffer, so self-interest leads to less than full disclosure and smoke screen lobbying (Hirsch)

25) Conspiracy among people and organizations to protect their common turf, which leads to all of them working to obscure inconvenient truths (Hirsch)

26) It’s not obvious that a civilization changing problem is at hand to decision makers or the public (Hirsch)

27) Decision makers want clarity, a clear path before taking action. When oil prices dropped, it was back again to “don’t worry”

28) The situation is unprecedented: The world has never faced a problem like the decline in world oil production. No action will be taken until the public is aware of the problem and can’t deny it.  By then it will be too late to avoid serious consequences. (Hirsch)

29) Why the media doesn’t explain the situation to the public: Editors don’t understand it. The story is too complicated. The public is not interested, especially since it’s a bad news story.  The public is confused by reported quantities of oil and gas in the ground: Resources are not Reserves which are not Supply; only a small percentage of reported Resources will ever be produced and added to our usable Supply.

Why aren’t contemporary ecologists and economists addressing resource and energy scarcity, as Charles A. S. Hall, in the 26 September 2013 journal Ecological Engineering, asked: Given the growing evidence that the interrelated problems of energy and resource scarcity will lead to grave problems for society, why is it that universities/science/funding agencies are generally ignoring these questions?

30) One possibility is that peak oil predictions were wrong. But the evidence shows that this is not the case. In fact, many of the earlier predictions have been shown to be correct with regard to peak oil (Brandt, 2007), peaking of global conventional oil production (Aleklett, 2012; Hallock et al., 2014), and many other resources (Heinberg, 2007), no substitutes for oil have been developed or even foreseeably might be developed on anything like the scale required, and most are very poor net energy performers. Renewable fuels remain less than 1% of world energy production, and most have low EROI (Hall and Day, 2009; Palmer, 2013).

31) Another possibility is that most were unaware of peak oil predictions. Although these predictions have had relatively little impact on public and private policy, their information has been widely disseminated over the past several decades in scientific articles, newspapers, magazines, and on the web. But universities, intellectual leaders, government, and media have largely ignored the constraintists’ information developed over the past half century.

32) Ecologists generally are no longer trained to think that resource constraints are important or within their purview and there is increasing academic fragmentation due to specialization. Our own graduate education was greatly influenced by broadly thinking ecologists who spoke loudly and often eloquently about global resource issues and the future of humanity and nature. There seem to be very few such leaders today, and there is little support from the current teachers of ecologists that these are even issues that their students should be considering. Ecologists, ideally the most integrative and interdisciplinary of scientists, have mostly taken up residence in biology departments so that ecology, which should be a broadly integrated science, is now mostly about biology. This is in part due to the present tenure system that discourages young faculty from taking on broad, systems oriented problems. Similar things can be said about our funding agencies that appear oblivious to issues such as peak oil, declining net yield of major fuels, and, more generally, the issues raised four decades ago that can be broadly characterized as “limits to growth”. Part of the reason is that these resource/population problems do not fit comfortably within any academic discipline

33) Lack of awareness. Publications on peak oil in “mainline” scientific journals are rare.  Few people stumble upon the plethora of books that do exist which are directed toward a more general audience and explained  resource, population, exponential growth implications, energy scarcity issues and other topics which make the crisis fully understandable, such as Kunstler, 2005; Heinberg, 2007; Deffeyes, 2005; Dilworth, 2009; Aleklett, 2012, and others.  I used to haunt the book stores in Berkeley, especially Cody’s and Moe’s, but Walter Youngquist’s outstanding “Geodestinies” and dozens of other books in my booklist never appeared on the shelves, and are still rarely found in the few brick and mortar book stores left standing.

34) Peter Thiel, co-founder of Paypal, major owner of Facebook and other enterprises, encouraged the scientists at Stanford’s April 2015 Net Energy Conference not to be too optimistic or too pessimistic about the energy crisis and resource shortages, because at either extreme, people will not feel they need to, or can do anything.  He recommended mild optimism or pessimism to motivate others.  Surely many others have come to the same conclusion and refrained from fully explaining the actual situation to the public.

35) NOT ON MY WATCH. The goal of a politician is to keep Business As Usual going with whatever resources can be found.  Since GROWTH is what matters to MARKET, there is no talk in the Congressional Record about conserving our supposed 100-year supply of natural gas and oil. Quite the opposite, the goal is to use it as quickly as possible. $95 billion dollars of new business are being planned according to Dow Chemical CEO  Andrew N Liveris (2013-2-12. Natural gas resources S. Hrg. 113-1. United States Senate. 188 pages.)  If this sort of exponential growth does occur, then a 100 year supply becomes 50 years, or perhaps 25 as transportation and utilities also increase their use of natural gas.

36) DRINKING THE KOOL-AID.  Leaders represent the businesses of their state or city and have to keep their personal opinions to themselves.  Some of them literally drink the Kool-aid, Governor Hickenlooper said “, I’m not sure how this happened, but the new frack fluid is made with food additives, and somehow we all took a swig of the new frack fluid, and it was not terribly tasty”. Senator Lisa Murkowski reported that “The really great thing was when someone dipped a graham cracker into the LNG and passed it around for the rest of us to eat. Senator Wyden waited for me to take the first bite to make sure I didn’t die. It was like a Thin Mint from the freezer. So I think we demystified some of the concerns about LNG” (Mufson).  They are both leaders in energy-producing states and have to promote those industries. I find it especially ironic to hear Hickenlooper say what he does now in the Congressional record, because he was a host and speaker at the Association for the Study of Peak Oil conference in 2005 when he was Mayor of Denver.

37) Above all, the crazy irrationality of both the public and the Republican leaders they elect as is well-documented in Chris Mooney’s 2012 book:  “The Republican Brain. The Science of Why They Deny Science—and Reality”. Of course Democrats get things wrong too, but the way conservative brains are wired to want certainty and closure so are both less likely to seek out new information or change their beliefs when they encounter ideas contrary to what they’ve already decided to believe in, the many Republicans who believe in a literal translation of the Bible which thus excludes scientific evidence from consideration, and so on, which is explained at length in Mooney’s introduction and my review of his book.

38) Political leaders want more certainty about peak oil before acting on it. Robert Hirsch testified at a Congressional Hearing titled “Understanding the Peak Oil Theory” in 2005, where he said:

The era of plentiful, low-cost petroleum is approaching an end. Oil is the lifeblood of modern civilization. It fuels most transportation worldwide and is a feedstock for pharmaceuticals, agriculture, plastics and a myriad of other products used in everyday life. The earth has been generous in yielding copious quantities of oil to fuel world economic growth for over a century, but that period of plenty is changing. The world has never confronted a problem like Peak Oil. Oil peaking represents a liquid fuels problem, not an energy crisis in the sense that that term has been used. Motor vehicles, aircrafts, trucks, and ships have no ready alternative to liquid fuels, certainly not the large existing capital stock. And that capital stock has lifetimes measured in decades. Solar, wind, and nuclear power produce electricity not liquid fuels; their widespread use in transportation is at least 30 to 50 years away.

We would all like to believe that the optimists are right about peak oil, but the risks, again the risks of them being wrong, are beyond anything that we have experienced, the risks of error are beyond imagination.

Risk minimization mandates the massive implementation of mitigation well before the onset of the problem. Since we do not know when peaking is going to occur, that makes a tough problem for you folks as decision makers because if you are going to start 20 years ahead of something that is indeterminate, you have a tough time making the arguments. Mustering support is going to be difficult.

Before embarking on a massive multi-trillion dollar oil-mitigation program 20 years ahead of time to build liquefied coal plants, increase oil sand production, and other measures Hirsch recommends in his 2005 report for the Department of Energy, Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts, mitigation, & risk management,  Congress wants to be damn sure that peak is 20 years or less away.  If they start too soon, a huge amount of money, energy, and time would be wasted.

Although many of the scientists at the hearing are saying peak may have happened and at best is very likely to peak within the next 15 years,  techno-optimist Mr. Ellis of Cambridge Energy Research Associates testifies at this hearing that “CERA does not recognize a peak in oil capacity until at least 2030.”

So Congress has done very little since then, and now there are “experts” testifying before Congress that the U.S. has 100 years of energy independence in both oil and gas.

And since this 2005 hearing, none of the peak oil geologists have been invited back.

Perhaps Congressional leaders worry too much about how they’ll be perceived by historians in the future, and by only inviting techno-optimists to testify after this hearing, they will have plausible deniability that they knew world oil production would peak so soon (House).

39) People are so clever we’ll invent new technology to cope with shortages.  This is the favorite argument of the “No limits to growth” politicians (who have to promise endless growth to get elected) and economists.  When it comes to energy, it’s often pointed out that we’ve invented fracking, tar sands, biodiesel, and ethanol.  What they don’t know is that all of these were invented a long time ago. Ethanol in ancient Egypt if not earlier (Otera 1993), Fracking was already being done late in the 19th century (Francis 2006), directional drilling in the 1930s and horizontal drilling in the 1960s (Hashash 2011).  Tar sands were already under way in 1967 (Pitts 2012).

40) If we run out of something we’ll substitute something else.  Substitution has problems as well. Even when possible, it’s usually not easy and often more energy intensive.  If we had to use something other than copper in electrical conducting apparatus aluminum could replace it – but aluminum is brittle, oxidizes easily, doesn’t conduct electricity as well, thin aluminum wires can catch on fire if heated, and aluminum production needs four times as energy as copper. Using titanium for chromium also requires more energy.

41) Scientists are too focused on their narrow field of interest by necessity, but that means that they are unable to make the wider interconnections between their area and other fields to see how much energy and resource depletion impact politics and economies of different societies.  Our education system needs to teach generalized systems (Ahmed 2017).

42) Media ownership is dominated by fossil fuel-centric interests which has led to consistently inaccurate reporting on energy issues and their relationships with economic, food, and climate crises, as well as many conflicts, especially in the Middle East.  The media usually neglects to point out that the increasing conflict and instability world-wide is caused by fossil energy decline and the inevitable transition to a post-carbon future toward an inevitable post-carbon future. (Ahmed 2017).

43) Almost all the news about energy comes from press releases about breakthroughs and are written by non-science writers, who always make it sound like now, at last, we have the improvement to save civilization.  They do not write about the hurdles that remain, or the downside of the breakthrough – yes the energy density is greater, but the battery is more likely to explode or has a lesser number of charges, the solar panel will have a shorter lifespan, and so on.

44) “Admitting peak oil will also have geopolitical consequences. Oil producing nations might lose geopolitical power, if the international community realizes that they will no longer be reliable suppliers due to declining production rates. Private investment might also decline as investors look elsewhere to make their investments. Nations with resources may become targets of new political and economic alliances and/or resource competition and wars. Considering that a rapid reduction in the global population may occur in response to oil and energy scarcity and economic decline post-peak oil, a public warning about peak oil may cause a general panic as individuals, communities, and nations react to protect and secure their lives, livelihoods, and resources against a potential dieoff event and upheaval.”

“it is clear that there is insufficient time to mitigate and prepare for peak oil and economic decline. Even if a government or industry surprised the world and released previously undisclosed new energy resources and/or technologies overnight, it would likely take years or decades and trillions of dollars to implement it on a commercial scale and to change the global energy infrastructure and economy. Therefore, it seems that a peak oil shock will be unavoidable and will come without much public warning.”(Morrigan 2010).

45) The oil industry certainly doesn’t want peak oil to be known. According to Richard Heinberg “The industry has two big reasons to hate peak oil. First, company stock prices are tied to the value of booked oil reserves; if the public (and government regulators) were to become convinced that those reserves were problematic, the companies’ ability to raise money would be seriously compromised—and oil companies need to raise lots of money these days to find and produce ever-lower-quality resources. It’s thus in the interest of companies to maintain an impression of (at least potential) abundance.”

46)  Richard Heinberg: “Some policy wonks buy “it’s all about energy” but are jittery about “renewables are the future” and won’t go anywhere near “growth is over.” A few of these folks like to think of themselves as environmentalists (sometimes calling themselves “bright green”)—including the Breakthrough Institute and writers like Stewart Brand and Mark Lynas. A majority of government officials are effectively in the same camp, viewing nuclear power, natural gas, carbon capture and storage (“clean coal”), and further technological innovation as pathways to solving the climate crisis without any need to curtail economic growth.

Other environment-friendly folks buy “it’s all about energy” and “renewables are the future” but still remain allergic to the notion that “growth is over.” They say we can transition to 100% renewable power with no sacrifice in terms of economic growth, comfort, or convenience. Stanford professor Mark Jacobson3 and Amory Lovins of Rocky Mountain Institute are leaders of this chorus. Theirs is a reassuring message, but if it doesn’t happen to be factually true (and there are many energy experts who argue persuasively that it isn’t), then it’s of limited helpfulness because it fails to recommend the kinds or degrees of change in energy usage that are essential to a successful transition.

The general public tends to listen to one or another of these groups, all of which agree that the climate and energy challenge of the 21st century can be met without sacrificing economic growth. This widespread aversion to the “growth is over” conclusion is entirely understandable: during the last century, the economies of industrial nations were engineered to require continual growth in order to produce jobs, returns on investments, and increasing tax revenues to fund government services.”

“Anyone who questions whether growth can continue is deeply subversive. Nearly everyone has an incentive to ignore or avoid it. It’s not only objectionable to economic conservatives; it is also abhorrent to many progressives who believe economies must continue to grow so that the working class can get a larger piece of the proverbial pie, and the “underdeveloped” world can improve standards of living. But ignoring uncomfortable facts seldom makes them go away. Often it just makes matters worse. “

47) Optimists versus Pessimists.  There needs to be a third category: Realists.

It has been said that “optimists have more fun in life, but pessimists may be right.” The late Congresswoman Claire Booth Luce from Connecticut said, “The difference between optimists and pessimists is that the pessimists are better informed.” Scientists are frequently labeled as pessimists because the reality they have shown in experiments results in many conclustoins thtat aren’t cheerful.  Unfortunately, factual current information about the environment and energy resource availability is not good. And that is a fact. Why not call such people realists instead of pessimists. People discount pessimists, but they might listento people called realists. Though perhaps not, the general public prefers good news, true or not.

48) People often only change their ways in a crisis.

Who likes to read a magazine or journal with ominous statements? Cheerful news sells, and editors are always glad to use it. Frequently, people with little or no background in a subject write such articles. Political agendas are notably short-term. Responding to a problem that is here and now is far more politically feasible than calling upon the public to change and sacrifice its current lifestyle to solve a problem certain to occur, but that may be years away. People in the industrial world do not want to make lifestyle changes for objectives that appear relatively remote. For the most part, changes are made only when a crisis has clearly arrived. By then it may be too late to allow for a smooth transition to new circumstances.

49) People, especially “conservatives” are wired to hate change (Mooney “The Republican Brain”).  Walter Youngquist (1997) write that “Americans want from government is to keep things as they are. They want to maintain their relatively pleasant lifestyle without major changes. The inevitability of change is not part of the public consciousness. The public is in a state of denial in this regard. Congress spends most of its time on current issues. The most fundamental relationship, that of resources and population, and the continuing destruction of the environment that is the basis for human existence, are low on the agenda. They are not pleasant topics to discuss, because resolving these problems ultimately requires a change in current levels of consumption. It would disturb the voters, and, therefore, these basic trends are ignored. Only when public awareness of the importance of these matters rises and is conveyed to Congress, will the agenda be revised.

Unfortunately, it is hard to convince the public to adopt different lifestyles and make other difficult and inconvenient choices that have no discernible immediate effect, but which, however, have long-term value. Thus in legislative forums and political agendas, the “tyranny of the moment” prevails.”

OTHER EXPERTS OPINIONS ON WHY TOO LITTLE ACTION IS TAKING PLACE

James Schlesinger First Secretary of Energy, 1977-1979, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, US Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Below is from “James Schlesinger on peak oil In a candid 2012 interview, America’s first Secretary of Energy spoke about looming oil supply problems” by Mason Inman and Nov 1, 2010 Dr. James Schlesinger: “The Peak Oil Debate is Over” at ASPO-USA Conference.

Q: What is your hope with giving speeches in which you try to warn people? Do you think that even if there’s not a big shift, at least it will help a little bit?

Maybe, but they tend to brush it off. I don’t know whether you saw the speech I gave to the National Academy of Sciences. It was some years ago. I brought this all up, and basically they kind of shrugged it off. You know, that’s the National Academy of Sciences. That’s not the generality of American voters. I also gave a talk to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which I raised all this, and did not get a very good response.

And I think the reason for that is complex. It’s not because they’re sucking up to the American public’s views on this. It’s because the industry really does not want to publicize the fact that oil production is not going to be available in the future the way it has been in the past. Even if we don’t have a peak, we have a plateau at some point. And a plateau, with the Chinese and Indians using more and more oil, and other developing nations using more oil, there will be less oil for the developed nations. So, the consequence is that you’re going to have to get by with less, even if you have a plateau.

Q: So what do you think is the answer to that? Does it require a grassroots effort to get the politicians to change?

Well, if the public changed, the politicians would change. The problem is the public. The public does not want to hear about this—because this is an acknowledgement that prices are going to go up, and that they’re going to have more problems running their automobiles than they want…. The political process is very sensitive to telling the people what they want to hear, right? The political order responds to what the public believes today, not to what it may come to believe tomorrow. It is also resistant to any action that inflicts pain, or sacrifice, or those who vote. The payoff in politics comes from reassurance.  Jimmy Carter was kind of an exception to that, if I may say so—and few politicians want to emulate him.  But he kept trying to say things that were true.   I was an optimist in the ‘70s…. I’m a child of the World War II. And I had this nonsensical belief that if the American President called on people to react, they would. That was true in World War II—but we had the help of the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor to get public attention….   Anyway, it turned out that the public was less responsive to the President [Carter] than I had anticipated.  Well, you can do that if you’re Winston Churchill, you know. And Winston Churchill was very unpopular in Britain, right until the outbreak of the war, when what he had been saying came true….  It’s particularly tough in this country, because the Americans pride themselves on optimism, which means that you don’t really wish to acknowledge unpleasant prospective news.

one must remember one of the sagest of political comments, from Senator Russell Long, who basically represented the Louisiana oil interests. He once said: “The first duty of a politician is to get elected. And his second duty is to get reelected.  And remember that, in the case of President, you’re dealing with four years or possibly eight years of term. Maybe it will come after the election of my successor, but it’s not going to be a problem for me….

Q: Do you have much hope that Americans might plan ahead for these problems you’ve been warning about the past several years?

No, nothing’s going to happen until reality hits them between the eyes like a two-by-four.

On why journalists don’t cover Peak Oil: Well, one has to remember that the American boy has been raised on his love of the automobile, and, you know, tinkering with a car was a preoccupation of young American males. And what this is saying is, “Hey, that was great fun while it lasted, but it’s not going to last forever, and you’ll have to learn to do something else than tinkering with automobiles.” And that’s bad news. That doesn’t bring in votes.

Peter Maas in the NYT on why oil companies aren’t eager to talk about peak oil:

34) In the political and corporate realms of the oil world, there are few incentives to be forthright. Executives of major oil companies have been reluctant to raise alarms; the mere mention of scarce supplies could alienate the governments that hand out lucrative exploration contracts and also send a message to investors that oil companies, though wildly profitable at the moment, have a Malthusian long-term future.   Peter Maass. The Breaking Point.  Aug 21, 2005 The New York Times.

Not on My Watch

35) Since there’s nothing that can be done, and it’s both hard and expensive  to keep up with the growing number of wars over oil, infrastructure falling apart, still massive unemployment and thousands of other problems, the goal now, and perhaps always has been, is just keeping it all duct-taped together while you’re in office.

Geologist Dr. Richard G. Miller’s explanation:

36) Policy makers are only in there for the short haul.  Policy makers answer to politicians and politicians answer to the electorate, and the electorate votes its pocketbook.  Politicians have to say whatever’s going to keep them in power, to get them re-elected; only when re-elected can they “do something useful” for the country.  To be re-elected, they have to grow the economy.  In the UK today that’s why whenever there’s a conflict between the Dept. of the Environment and the Treasury, the Treasury wins.  That’s also why the government wants to go fracking in the UK.  They will do anything to try to reduce the price of energy because that will help the economy to grow.  All of which means they cannot acknowledge the longer term problems.

The Chinese are more rational.  They get peak oil and they get climate change.  But they also get that they have to finish hooking up their far-flung populations to electricity supplies and to create a bit more personal mobility.  Without that they have civil unrest, with people still flooding in from the countryside where they might become useless and uncontrollable.  So their bigger problem for now is also growing their economy.

It’s just a mess.  Bottom line: we don’t have a shortage of resources, we have a longage of people and a serious longage of their expectations.

The worst case scenario is that we keep desperately trying to find and produce more oil such that it brings us to a sharp peak.  If we get a sharp peak, we would get civil unrest and collapse, maybe in the space of a couple of years because that’s how quickly it could be.  A loss of 5+% of global supply in two years would just be awful.  But if we have a long slow decline in production with slowly rising prices—a bit like being in a war situation—none of the price change points would be sufficient to cause riots in the streets.  So, that’s what I hope.

Miller joined BP as a geochemist in 1985. He’s studied peak oil for BP since 1991.  Most recently, Dr. Miller co-authored The Future of Oil Supply, which was published by The Royal Society, in a thematic issue of Philosophical Transactions entirely devoted to future world oil supply.

Nate Hagens, on why scientists don’t speak out (march 15, 2014 private communication):

A very famous ecologist Nate spoke with recently told him that his colleagues were afraid to speak about important issues like climate change because they feared being ostracized or losing status. The ecologist called his (very famous) university ‘little more than a well-painted whore’, given how the professors only focus on what they get funding for — funding that comes from government or corporations who are growth oriented and Business-As-Usual. [my comment: I assume this means talking about “Limits to Growth” is likely to lead to no funding].

Nate Hagens on why extremely wealthy people think alternative energy resources can replace fossil fuels:

After the meeting with the ecologist, Nate went to a fundraiser where the attendees were worth tens to hundreds of millions of dollars. Nate said the president of a top 5 environmental organization spoke there on behalf of climate urgency.  He said we have the technology and ability to entirely cease coal fired electricity and oil production within 5-10 years, and replace them with renewables at a 1-2% higher cost.  He suggested that  billionaires could get together and raise $50 billion, the current market cap of United States coal companies, and shut the plants down  (Kramer).

Nate summarizes why scientists, the rich, and famous are unable to see the coming energy crisis:

  • EVERYONE believes in their own world view.
  • The more power/influence one has, the less likely ones views will change. Ever.
  • Very few people can think in systems terms. They are experts in their one area.
  • People defer to the most respected, influential person in the room — a natural ape instinct.  And since the people at the top are techno-optimists who think fossil fuels can be replaced with renewables at little cost, everyone below blindly believes likewise.

Finally there’s the huge topic of the public not believing in an energy crisis. Studies have shown that at least a third of Americans are prone to believing conspiracy theories and would refuse to believe it.  Evangelical Christians are afraid that somehow science will prove God doesn’t exist, this is one of the reasons Republicans deny climate change.  Many will lay the blame Hillary Clinton. Most will be outraged and sputter that of course renewables can replace fossil fuels. Clearly the energy crisis is fake news – a scheme for oil companies to make more money and stop renewables.

Besides, there are solutions!  An internet search gets 17 million hits on breakthrough hydrogen, 23.7 million for breakthrough battery, 24.9 million breakthrough solar, and 21.4 million breakthrough wind (in March 2022). It’s bop-a-mole even if you convince someone that one of these doesn’t scale up, costs too much, needs limited metals and minerals. Don’t worry, there are other options.  In fact, that’s exactly how I reacted when I first heard about peak oil in 2000 (called Hubbert’s curve back then) on internet energy forums like energyresources and set out to prove them wrong, spending years of intense research at University of California libraries on the many alternatives.

And this article about why Christians hate science because they fear it will prove God doesn’t exist is quite good:

From Darwin to COVID the church has been wrong. It’s really about fear among the Christian faithful when they turn away from science. Even scientific theory is dismissed out of hand by the church because of a fear that somehow science will prove that God does not exist. This is why it has been so difficult to get evangelicals to accept things proven by the scientific community. You have probably noticed that many Republicans still will not confirm that climate change is even a thing. They almost certainly know better but are spineless, too afraid to alienate their hardcore Christian constituency, despite the clear ignorance behind the evangelical understanding of the climate crisis.

Understand that for many people of faith it has become very challenging to hold onto that faith. Christians are asked to believe in an invisible being in the sky who keeps score of all our sins, and in the literal truth of a giant book put together over thousands of years that describes people rising from the dead, seas parting and water becoming wine. Because of this intense insecurity, which they cannot admit, some Christians cannot tolerate any information that weakens the case for the existence of God.

When science becomes the enemy, something like a vaccine cannot be trusted — because it was created by the same people that are trying to destroy God.

If Darwin is correct, then Adam and Eve never existed. If Adam and Eve never existed, then the lineage from Adam to King David (of David and Goliath fame), and then to Jesus Christ must be questioned. Many Christians simply do not want to ask those difficult and complicated questions. If dinosaurs were real then God never created anything in six days and then rested on the seventh. Science has proven that the earth is a few billion years old, instead of just a few thousand years old as the Bible would indicate. Science appears to the evangelical Christian to be a relentless hunter of their faith.

But science is just science. It has no agenda except to discover the truth. That is precisely the problem it presents for the faithful. To a person of faith, at least in the evangelical or fundamentalist tradition, only God is truth. Only God can be trusted. There is no theory or scientific method to discovering one’s faith. A person either decides to accept the truth of God’s existence or reject it and be condemned.

The scientific evidence around the climate crisis has become a threat to many evangelicals because it suggests that God’s ultimate plan for his creation is not working. You see, according to the evangelical reading of the Bible, after the time of Christ there is a distinct calendar of events that follows, culminating in Armageddon. Evangelicals are usually pretty excited about this idea. Those nasty non-believers finally get what’s coming to them and the good Christians get to win the battle against evil. In that context, a warming planet cannot be understood as a real concern. Potentially, it is even a signal of the return of Christ — why would a true believer do anything to stop that?

This brings us to the COVID vaccines and the fact that evangelicals have a culture and a long history of rejecting science. Somehow this vaccine has become a symbol of government overreach, but what’s even more important to evangelicals is the idea that science is telling people of faith what is true. No matter how many evangelical leaders encourage their followers to get the vaccine, this rejection of scientific data is completely ingrained in the church, dating as far back as Galileo. It is and has always been about the fear of losing their faith.

Conclusion

We need government plans or strategies at all levels to let the air out of the tires of civilization as slowly as possible to prevent panic and sudden discontinuities.

Given history, I can’t imagine the 1% giving up their wealth (especially land, 85% of which is concentrated among 3% of owners). I’m sure they’re hoping the current system maintains its legitimacy as long as possible, even as the vast majority of us sink into 3rd world poverty beyond what we can imagine, and then are too poor and hungry to do anything but find our next meal.

Until there are oil shocks and governments at all levels are forced to “do something”, it’s up to those of us aware of what’s going on to gain skills that will be useful in the future, work to build community locally, and live more simply.  Towns or regions that  already have or know how to implement a local currency fast will be able to cope better with discontinuities in oil supplies and financial crashes than areas that don’t.

The best possible solution is de-industrialization, starting with Heinberg’s 50 million farmers, while also limiting immigration, instituting high taxes and other disincentives to encourage people to not have more than one child so we can get under the maximum carrying capacity as soon as possible.

Hirsch recommended preparing for peak 20 years ahead of time, and we didn’t do that.  So many of the essential preparations need to be at a local, state, and federal level, they can’t be done at an individual level.  Denial and inaction now are likely to lead to millions of unnecessary deaths in the future.  Actions such as upgrading infrastructure essential to life, like water delivery and treatment systems (up to 100 years old in much of America and rusting apart), sewage treatment, bridges, and so on.  After peak, oil will be scarce and devoted to growing and delivering food, with the remaining energy trickling down to other essential services — probably not enough to build new infrastructure, or even maintain what we have.

I wish it were possible for scientists and other leaders to explain what’s going on to the public, but I think scientists know it wouldn’t do any good given American’s low scientific literacy, and leaders see the vast majority of the public as big blubbering spoiled babies, like the spaceship characters on floating chairs in Wall-E, who expect, no demand, happy Hollywood endings.

Also read:

Robert Hirsch’s May 16, 2012 Why oil companies deny peak oil

If you want an article to send to a denier you know, it would be hard to do better than Donald Prothero’s “How We Know Global Warming is Real and Human Caused“.

Aleklett, Kjell. 10 June 2013. Peak oil: preparing for the extinction of ‘petroleum man’. scienceomega.com

Bland, A. 2009. Cheer Up, It’s Going to Get Worse. Bohemian.com.

BTC. November 2010.  Armed Forces, Capabilities and Technologies in the 21st Century Environmental Dimensions of Security. Sub-study 1. PEAK OIL Security policy implications of scarce resources. Bundeswehr Transformation Centre, Future Analysis Branch.

EIA. 2020. International Energy Statistics. Petroleum and other liquids. Data Options. U.S. Energy Information  Administration. Select crude oil including lease condensate to see data past 2017.

Fingerman, Kevin. 2010. Accounting for the water impacts of ethanol production.  Environmental Research Letters.

Francis, D. December 28, 2006. Torpedo Tales. E&P magazine.

Hashash, Y., et al. 2011. Evaluation of horizontal directional drilling. Civil Engineering studies, Illinois center for transportation series no.11-095.

Heinberg, R and Fridley, D. 18 Nov 2010. The end of cheap coal.  New forecasts suggest that coal reserves will run out faster than many believe. Energy policies relying on cheap coal have no future. Nature, vol 468, pp 367-69.

Heinberg, R. 2015. Afterburn: Society Beyond Fossil Fuels. New Society Publishers.

Hirsch, Robert L. 2010. “The Impending World Energy Mess. What it is and what it means to YOU!”  with co-authors Roger H. Bezdek & Robert Wendling (forward by Dr. James R. Schlesinger, 1st U.S. Secretary of Energy)

Hirsch, Robert L. July 10, 2012 slide show “Peak Oil Guru Robert Hirsch Gives A Dire Outlook For The Future”.

House. December 7, 2005. Understanding the Peak Oil theory. House of Representatives hearing. Subcommittee on Energy & Air Quality. Serial No. 109-41. 95 pages.

IEA. 2018. International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2018, figures 1.19 and 3.13. International Energy Agency.

Kramer, Felix. March 11, 2014. Deal of the century: buy out the US coal industry for $50bn What if Bloomberg, Branson and Grantham came together to buy out the coal industry, close and clean up the mines, retrain workers and accelerate the expansion of renewable energy? TheGuardian.com

Morrigan, T. 2010. Peak energy, climate change, and the collapse of global civilization. University of California, Santa Barbara.

Mufson, S. Feb 9, 2013. Q&A: Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska on her ‘20/20’ vision for energy policy. Washington Post

Nelder, Chris. 20 Jun 2013. Positive energy To change attitudes towards energy scarcity and climate change, focus on transitions and solutions, not danger and loss. Nature. Vol 498, pp 293-5.

Otera, J. 1993. Transesterification. Chemical Reviews 93 no. e: 1449-70

Patzek, t. W. & Croft, G. D. 2010. A global coal production forecast with multi-Hubbert cycle analysis. Energy 35, 3109–3122.

Pimentel, D. et al. 1991. Land, Energy, and Water.  The Constraints Governing Ideal U.S. Population Size. Negative Population Growth.

Pitts, G. August 25, 2012. The man who saw gold in Alberta’s oil sands. Globe and Mail, Toronto.

Rowe, Mark. July 2010. When will the oil flow slow? Oil is becoming more difficult to obtain, and research suggests that it won’t be long before we’re unable to meet global demand. Geographical magazine.

Smil, V. 2000. Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and the Transformation of World Food Production.  MIT Press.

Tverberg, G. 2018. Low Oil Prices: An Indication of Major Problems Ahead? ourfiniteworld.com  https://ourfiniteworld.com/2018/11/28/low-oil-prices-an-indication-of-major-problems-ahead/

Urban Danger. Congressman Roscoe Bartlett youtube videos:

  • Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGE1omIaRMI
  • Part 2: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBiTrQuZuUQ&feature=related
  • Part 3: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BGJHwzsPdpY&feature=related

Van Jones. 2 Sep 2007. Van Jones: Spiritually Fulfilling, Ecologically Sustainable AND Socially Just?  Pachamama Alliance Awakening the Dreamer Global Community Gathering.

Zittel, W. & schindler, J. energy Watch Group, Paper no. 1/07 (2007); available at http:// go.nature.com/jngfsa

APPENDIX: Additional writing on this topic

Feb 16, 2006 Why the US Political System Is Unable to React to Peak Oil: Institutions Posted by Prof. Goose at theoildrum.com

I’ve been thinking a lot since the open thread Tuesday about political change in the United States, as well as they Deffeyes date set a couple of posts down. Many of us would argue that the evidence is there, “why isn’t the government reacting?”

I thought I would bring some pieces of the political puzzle together into a post on why I believe the US, at least at the federal level, will be overly slow to react to the problems of peak oil in both the short and long term.  This is the first piece in a series of a few, the first has to do with the institutions of American government.  More of my argument under the fold…

I think it is safe to say that we can assume politicians are self-interested actors, wishing to keep their job and doing whatever they can, most of the time within reason, to keep it.

These politicians, once holding power, play the political game inside a set of institutions.  These institutions are basically sets of rules and norms that produce public policy, the outputs of government.

It is important to understand that only those politicians in “safe” districts (where the MoC (Member of Congress) gets a large percentage (usually defined as over 55%) of the vote (an increasingly common occurence with the use of GIS tools to draw lines come redistricting time) with no ambitions for higher office take real political risks and try to change the system (e.g., Roscoe Bartlett, but this is even more true of safe members of the party out of power).

The institutions (and the rules governing the “game” of politics) of the United States incentivize this behavior, because they were designed from the founding of the country to be deliberative and slow, if not glacial; they were designed do all they can to perpetuate the status quo. I think understanding the American government’s response to peak oil or any crisis requires an understanding of the theory behind the institutions, an analysis of why they are they way they are and what it will take for them to actually change.

Remember that the US does not have a “social” (like many in Europe) democracy, we have a “liberal” democracy.  Part of why this distinction exists has to do with institutions (two party/separation of powers/presidential system) that are set up to not be at all reactive but overly slow to change and deliberative.

Separation of powers is an important component that you have heard of many times, I am sure. What it means is that power in America is distributed across many actors or sets of actors, and those actors often hold responsibilities and interests set in opposition by the rules of the game. The president’s roles and constituencies in our politics are quite different from those of Congress or the courts; even though we can say that the Republican Party has basic control of the three branches of government, they do not march in lockstep; this will especially be the case if there are electoral gains made by the Democrats in 2006.

Take Britain for example, which has a “responsible party” socially democratic government with a different set of rules and institutions. The Labour Party holds power there. The prime minister, Tony Blair, (caveat: there’s more to this story, but this is the simple explanation.) was elected by his party to be the prime minister of parliament, not by the populace like in our system.

The party’s ability to be “responsible” (staying on the same page legislatively) is even more important in the British case; for instance, if the Labour Party ever actually loses an important (called a “party” vote) parliamentary vote, then elections would usually not be far behind. This can happen in many parliamentary systems quite quickly.

Still the point is that executive and legislative power are more consolidated in Britain than in the US, meaning that there is more incentive for the sides to maintain “responsibility” and stay on the same partisan page.

Let’s say we lived in a parliamentary/social democracy here in the US, pretending the rules of the game were different. Let’s also imagine that tne party is in control of (responsible for) government and policy and it screws up. With recent salient circumstances in the US, we could see how new elections could have been called countless numbers of times over the past few years and a change of leadership would have resulted.  Instead, here in the US, we have a predictable election cycle that allows for manipulation of resources and “the game,” which allows those in office to maintain office; we call this the “incumbency” advantage. (Let’s also be clear, this is not an anti-Bush rant, the same thing could have happened in 1978 or 1994, where power would have changed hand completely between the party in power and the out-party…the point is that change could/should have happened and did not).

Also, over 93% of incumbents in the House win reelection with a little lower proportion in the Senate, meaning new people with new ideas rarely make into the legislature, let alone hold positions of power.

here’s wikis on presidential and parliamentary systems for contrast:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidential_system http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliamentary

The other part of the equation that people need to understand is that our two party system is part of the problem and is likely to never change. For the most part, that too is constructed because of the way our institutions are set up, because many of our elections only have one winner (as opposed to a parliamentary system, where if you get a percentage of the vote, you are assured representation), therefore it incentivizes third, fourth, and fifth place actors, if they want power, to work with the loser of the election…over time that sorts itself out into the ideologically coherent, but polarized party system that we have presently. Here’s a wiki with more on why we have a two party system… http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_party_system

Uncommon, unconventional ideas and ideologies remain non-influential, so policies and governments do not change rapidly. (Others dispute whether such innate conservatism provides advantages. While smaller parties find this exceptionally frustrating, proponents of the two-party system suggest that it enhances stability while eventually allowing for ideas that gain favor to become politically influential.)

(These systems all turn out this way because of Duverger’s Law (my field’s only “law”…and it ain’t really a law: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law)

In my courses, I often describe the social democracy/parliamentary system as an ideological speedboat, it can react, zigging and zagging back and forth quickly, but it can also flip over and kill you.

I describe the our presidential/two party/first past the post system as a very very large cruise ship.  It is overly stable.

However, I think we also all have heard of the event/seen the movie where the crewman saw the iceberg, threw the wheel hard over, and the ship didn’t turn in time.

Simply put, both systems have weaknesses, but one is more responsive than the other.

In better words, my point is that those same institutions that have maintained the stability of the United States over the times of plenty are exactly the institutions that will keep us from reacting, as a country, in time to avoid most catastrophes. The federal systems are not designed to be proactive, as at the founding of the country, that’s not what they wanted.  At least that’s my feel for it.

This is why most of the efforts to react to peak oil are occurring at local levels of government (e.g., relocalization movements, etc.) or from the grass roots. However, those groups rarely have the power to shift resources or incentivize behaviors to the scale that the federal government could, if it would just react.

We need to reorganize our political culture at the federal level; but in order to do that, we would need a new Constitution, a new set of rules, but that would require a public outcry or political instability heretofore unseen in the US, as well as a lot of time to implement.

As I said somewhere else already today, I didn’t see anyone outside with a sandwich board today clamoring for change…so obviously, we ain’t there yet.

In my next post on this, I will discuss another set of actors, the linkages between the mass politic and these institutions that further clog the system of change and maintain the status quo.

“Peak oil” is very much a “bad-news” story.  Voters tend to punish those who first bring them the bad news.  So, wait for some other politician to open his/her mouth first.

Also, as with global warming, doubt persists, manufactured or otherwise.  Most people will avoid a hard task if they are uncertain of the benefit.  Self-interested actors need only promote uncertainty to stall action.

Continue reading

Posted in 2) Overshoot, Alternative Energy, An Overview, Critical Thinking, GOVERNMENT, Limits To Growth, Other Experts | Tagged , , , , , | 6 Comments

Vaclav Smil on why there will be no energy transition

Preface. This post has excerpts from energy expert Vaclav Smil‘s 2024 free paper “Halfway between Kyoto and 2050“. Smil’s book is free, here. Below is a shortened, reworded article from Scientific American in 2014 written by Smil on this topic as well. Another post of Smil’s on an energy transition from 2010 is here with yet more insights on other topics.

The best book of all on this topic, and quite a fun read, is More and More and More: An All-Consuming History of Energy by Jean-Baptiste Fressoz

Alice Friedemann  www.energyskeptic.com  Author of Life After Fossil Fuels: A Reality Check on Alternative Energy; When Trucks Stop Running: Energy and the Future of Transportation”, Barriers to Making Algal Biofuels, & “Crunch! Whole Grain Artisan Chips and Crackers”.  Women in ecology  Podcasts: WGBH, Financial Sense, UCSC, Jore, Planet: Critical, Crazy Town, Collapse Chronicles, Derrick Jensen, Practical Prepping, Kunstler 253 &278, Peak Prosperity,  Index of best energyskeptic posts

***

Smil V (2024) Halfway between Kyoto and 2050. Zero carbon is a highly unlikely outcome. Fraser Institute.

The most obvious way to start assessing the progress of the required energy transition is to look at what has been accomplished during the past generation when the concerns about global decarbonization assumed a new urgency and prominence. Contrary to common impressions, there has been no absolute worldwide decarbonization. In fact, the very opposite is the case. The world has become much more reliant on fossil carbon (even as its relative share has declined a bit). We are now halfway between 1997 (27 years ago) when delegates of nearly 200 nations met in Kyoto to agree on commitments to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases, and 2050; the world has 27 years left to achieve the goal of decarbonizing the global energy system,

All we have managed to do halfway through the intended grand global energy transition is a small relative decline in the share of fossil fuel in the world’s primary energy consumption—from nearly 86% in 1997 to about 82% in 2022But this marginal relative retreat has been accompanied by a massive absolute increase in fossil fuel combustion: in 2022 the world consumed nearly 55% more energy locked in fossil carbon than it did in 1997 

By 2023 the absolute reliance on fossil carbon rose by 54% worldwide since the Kyoto commitment. In that quarter century, the world has substantially increased its dependence on fossil carbon.

Despite international agreements, government spending and regulations, and technological advancements, global fossil fuel consumption surged by 55% between 1997 and 2023. And the share of fossil fuels in global energy consumption has only decreased from nearly 86 percent in 1997 to approximately 82% in 2022.

The first global energy transition, from traditional biomass fuels such as wood and charcoal to fossil fuels, started more than two centuries ago and unfolded gradually. That transition remains incomplete, as billions of people still rely on traditional biomass energies for cooking and heating.

Converting energy-intensive processes (e.g., iron smelting, cement, and plastics) to non-fossil alternatives requires solutions not yet available for largescale use.

The energy transition imposes unprecedented demands for minerals including copper and lithium, which require substantial time to locate and develop mines.

Globally, coal and oil surpassed wood as the leading energy sources just before the end of the nineteenth century, and hence for the past 125 years we have been a predominantly fossil-fueled civilization (Smil, 2017).

CCUS By 2023 there were about 40 relatively small projects in operation capturing a total of about 45 million tons globally, or a bit more than 0.1 percent of all annual emissions from energy use (IEA, 2023a).

Geothermal generation also goes back more than a century

Notice that the post-1958 rise has been uninterrupted: average annual concentrations show a steady rise that continued even during the years when global CO2 emissions had temporarily declined: even in 2020, when COVID restrictions cut the emissions by 2 percent, the Mauna Loa level rose by 2.56 ppm.

Complex interactions of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere and unknown levels of future greenhouse gas emissions make it impossible to pinpoint the degree of global warming that will be experienced by 2050.

When the world began to undergo its first energy transition during the 19th century, it had to replace about 1.5 billion tons of mostly locally cut and burned wood with coal and, after the 1860s, also with hydrocarbons (Smil, 2016a). In 2022 the world produced nearly 8.2 billion tons of coal, almost 4.5 billion tons of crude oil, and 2.8 billion tons of natural gas, all extracted very efficiently and mostly in a highly concentrated manner from large mines and from enormous hydrocarbon fields on every continent

In terms of final energy uses and specific energy converters, the unfolding transition would have to replace more than 4 terawatts (TW) of electricity-generating capacity now installed in large coal- and gas-fired stations by converting to non-carbon sources; to substitute nearly 1.5 billion combustion (gasoline and diesel) engines in road and off-road vehicles; to convert all agricultural and crop processing machinery (including about 50 million tractors and more than 100 million irrigation pumps) to electric drive or to non-fossil fuels; to find new sources of heat, hot air, and hot water used in a wide variety of industrial processes (from iron smelting and cement and glass making to chemical syntheses and food preservation) that now consume close to 30% of all final uses of fossil fuels; to replace more than half a billion natural gas furnaces now heating houses and industrial, institutional, and commercial places with heat pumps or other sources of heat; and to find new ways to power nearly 120,000 merchant fleet vessels (bulk carriers of ores, cement, fertilizers, wood and grain, and container ships, the largest one with capacities of some 24,000 units, now running mostly on heavy fuel oil and diesel fuel) and nearly 25,000 active jetliners that form the foundation of global long-distance transportation (fueled by kerosene) (Hedges and Company, 2023; Ener8, 2023; CH-Aviation, 2022).

On the face of it, and even without performing any informed technical and economic analyses, this seems to be an impossible task given that:

  • we have only a single generation (about 25 years) to do it;
  • we still have not deployed any zero-carbon large-scale commercial processes to produce essential materials; and
  • the electrification has, at the end of 2022, converted only about 2% of passenger vehicles (more than 40 million) to different varieties of battery-powered cars and that decarbonization is yet to affect heavy road transport, shipping, and flying (IEA, 2023c).

Coal surpassed global wood combustion only in 1900, and its share of energy supply peaked only in the mid-1960s.

Oil began to supply more than 25% of all fossil fuels only during the late 1950s, nearly a century after its first modern commercial extraction, and natural gas began to contribute more than 25 percent of fossil energy supply just before the end of the 20th century, after some 130 years of the industry’s development (Smil, 2016).

Nearly 3 billion people (in Africa, monsoonal Asia, and Latin America) still depend, mainly for cooking, some also for heating, on traditional biomass energies: fuel wood (and charcoal made from it), straw, and dried dung still supplied about 5 percent of the world’s primary energy in 2020.5

In the past, replacing wood stoves with coal stoves, waterwheels and wind mills with steam engines, teams of horses with diesel engines, and oil and gas lamps with electric lights required new, extensive, and complicated infrastructures. They were needed to extract (coal mines, oil and gas fields, and dams), prepare (coal sorting and cleaning, crude oil refining, and natural gas processing), transport (railways, pipelines, ships, trucks, and high-voltage transmission lines), and convert (steam engines, steam and gas turbines, furnaces, boilers, turbogenerators, transformers, and electric motors) new forms of energy.

The unfolding energy transition requires not just very large numbers of new wind turbines and photovoltaic panels to generate “green” electricity. Renewable generation also needs expanded high-voltage transmission lines (overhead wires and undersea cables from offshore wind sites) to bring the electricity from the windiest and sunniest places to often distant cities and industrial areas.

We would need substantial quantities of solid and liquid fossil carbon even in the zero-carbon world for paving (asphalt) and for industrial and commercial lubricants.

What I have called the four pillars of modern civilization—cement, primary iron, plastics, and ammonia—now depends on fossil fuels, and replacing them with alternatives will require the development of new mass-scale industries and distribution networks ranging from green hydrogen (made by electrolysis of water by green electricity) and ethanol to new synthetic fuels

Annual use is now more than 110 million tons of asphalt and more than 40 million tons of lubricants derived from crude refining (Venditti and Fortin, 2023, May 13; Shah, Woydt, and Aragon, 2020).

The unfolding transition thus relies on techniques that are not (as yet) compellingly and across-the-board cheaper, more reliable, and more than the conversion they are replacing. Moreover, some of them (above all, new reactors and mass-scale electricity storage) will require a great deal of further expensive development.

The best available battery has a gravimetric density of 500 watt-hours per kilogram (Wh/kg) (Amprius, 2023). Gasoline rates 12,200 Wh/kg, which is a 24.4 times greater energy density.

The absolute cuts in carbon emissions that took place in large economies such as the EU (-23 percent) and the US (-9 percent) were far surpassed by massive absolute increases in emissions from the world’s two largest industrializing nations, China (whose emissions rose 3.3 times), and India (whose emissions rose three-fold). Emissions also rose for Middle Eastern hydrocarbon producers (Saudi Arabia’s about 2.3 times) and among other smaller emitters.

Between 1997 and 2022 annual emissions of CO2 from the fossil fuel energy sector (CO2 from fuel combustion and processing, the CO2 equivalent of CH 4from extraction, flaring, and pipeline leakage) rose from about 25.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) to about 39.3 billion tons (a 54 percent rise) (Energy Institute, 2023c).

After cutting our relative dependence on fossil fuels by just 4% during the first half of the prescribed post-Kyoto period, even if there was no further increase in CO2 emissions we would have to cut it by 82% by 2050.

After increasing our dependence on fossil fuels by almost 180 exajoules since 1997, to reach zero carbon in 2050 we would have to eliminate almost 500 EJ (that is equivalent to about 12 billion tons of crude oil)—even if there were no further consumption increases.

But non-carbon energies would have to replace not only all of today’s carbon fuels, but also cover all the additional increase in global energy use anticipated by 2050. As expected, long-range forecasts differ, but global energy demand (reduced by higher conversion efficiencies) is set to grow by at least 10 to 15 percent by 2050.9

Nuclear electricity generation has been only 33% efficient (and no imminent breakthroughs are expected).

One kilogram of the hydrogen is equivalent to about 33 kWh of electricity but its production by electrolysis of water needs about 50 kWh/kg (US EIA, 2023a; Marouani et al., 2023).

Primary electricity (hydro, nuclear, wind, solar, and a small contribution by geothermal plants) accounted for no more than about 18% of the world’s primary energy consumption, which means that fossil fuels still provided about 82% of the world’s primary energy supply in 2022.

The endless announcements of new wind farms and the sight of large areas covered by PV cells make most people believe that we have gone much further toward renewably electrifying everything.

Despite decades of promises that the arrival of large numbers of small modular reactors (SMRs, up to 300 MW) was imminent, and that they would resurrect stagnating electricity generation by nuclear fission, and despite some 80 different designs, in 2023 not a single SMR was operating anywhere in the West. China has only a single test prototype (IAEA, 2023).

Steel is, and it will remain, modern civilization’s dominant metal, indispensable for all infrastructure, housing, transportation, agriculture, and industrial production (Smil, 2016b).

In 2022, the output of this primary BF-BOF steel reached 1.4 billion tons. The forecasts are that no less than 2.6 billion tons of the metal will be needed in 2050. Even with raising the EAF steel share to 35%, demand would require roughly 1.7 billion tons of green iron (World Steel Association, 2023; ArcelorMittal, 2023). Instead of reducing iron ores with carbon (and emitting CO2), in the zero-carbon world we would have to reduce them with hydrogen (Fe2O3 + 3H2? 2Fe + 3H2O). This means that by 2050 the annual output of 1.7 billion tons of green steel would need about 91 million tons of green hydrogen

Ammonia is an even more important product: about 85% of its annual production is used to make synthetic nitrogenous fertilizers without whose continuing applications about half of today’s world population could not survive (Smil, 2022a).  In 2022 the annual output of ammonia reached about 150 million tons; forecasts are that at least 200 million tons will be needed by 2050. The fossil carbon-free Haber-Bosch ammonia synthesis process would need about 44 million tons of green hydrogen by 2050.

These two key material processes, the making of steel and ammonia, would need an annual production capacity of some 135 million tons of green hydrogen by 2050. Depending on additional needs for transportation and heating, from industries (from glassmaking to food preservation), and for peak electricity generation, the total demand for green hydrogen could be easily as high as 500 million tons by 2050.

Electrolytic production of green hydrogen needs about 50 MWh/ton: making 500 million tons of green hydrogen by 2050 would thus require about 25 PWh of green electricity, the total equal to about 86% of the 2022 global electricity use (IRENA, 2023). To repeat, this renewably generated electricity would be dedicated to the production of green hydrogen alone!

A typical electric vehicle contains more than five times the amount of copper (80 versus 15 kg) of an internal combustion car engine. The take-over of EVs by 2040 would need more than 40 times as much lithium as is currently mined, and up to 25 times the amount of graphite, cobalt, and nickel (IEA, 2021c).

Copper offers a stunning example of these environmental externalities. The metal content of exploited copper ores from Chile, the world’s leading source of the metal, has declined from 1.41% in 1999 to 0.6% in 2023, and further quality deterioration is inevitable (see figure 7) (Lazenby, 2018, November 19; Jamasmie, 2018, April 25; IEA, 2021c).

Using the mean richness of 0.6 percent means that the extraction of additional 600 million tons of metal would require the removal, processing, and deposition of nearly 100 billion tons of waste rock (mining and processing spoils), which is about twice as much as the current annual total of global material extracted including harvested biomass, all fossil fuels, ores and industrial minerals, and all bulk construction materials.10

Extracting and dumping such enormous masses of waste material exacts a very high energy and environmental price as it puts new, supposedly “green” energy uses even further from the goal of maximized material recycling. Moreover, copper’s production is dominated by just a few countries (Chile, Peru, China, and Congo), and China alone refines 40% of the world’s supply. China processes even more of the other minerals required for green energy conversion: nearly 60% of lithium, 65% of cobalt, and close to 90% of rare earths (IEA, 2021d; Castillo and Purdy, 2022).

That makes OPEC’s grip on crude oil (now 40% of global production) a relatively restrained affair!

Further, when countries from Canada to Germany find it impossible to construct enough basic housing for their populations, it is obvious that any accelerated installation of green energy projects and infrastructure will be restricted by shortages of experienced labor. Germany, thanks to its Energiewende (energy transition) is the EU’s leader in the pursuit of greenness and it is already affected: in 2023 the country lacked about 216,000 skilled workers to expand solar and wind power, and the now mandatory installation of heat pumps needs another 80,000 technicians (KOFA, 2022; Smarter Europe, 2023). Similarly, the US is finding that labor shortages will slow down any radical plans it has for green energy transitions (Colman, 2023, February 27).

We do not know either the eventual magnitudes and shares of specific energies that would enable the carbon-free world to be a reality or the extent of their global infrastructures. These realities cannot be determined decades ahead; they will be formed gradually and, to a significant degree, unpredictably. This makes any overall cost estimates questionable.

More importantly, wind and solar are intermittent (variable) modes of generation that need back-up when nights, cloudiness, and calm (or winds too strong to operate wind turbines) intervene (BloombergNEF, 2023, June 7). As long as solar and wind supply relatively low shares of total electricity generation, such needs are readily covered by existing base-load coal-fired or nuclear generation, by near-instantly available gas turbines, or by imports from neighboring countries.12 Once the intermittent sources become dominant and all gas-turbines are gone, they will need either extensive high-voltage interconnections to bring electricity from more distant regions or substantial capacities of longer term electricity storage.

the IEA has estimated that meeting the global decarbonization goals would require adding or refurbishing more 80 million kilometres of transmission grids by 2040. That is the equivalent of the entire existing global grid in 2023 and one predicated on the further mass-scale mobilization of steel, aluminum, copper, and cement (Appunn, 2021, April 29; IEA, 2023f).

And, so far, only pumped hydro storage (requiring specific terrain configuration and impossible in lowlands) can provide as much as a gigawatt of power for many consecutive hours. But renewably electrified megacities of the 2040s in monsoonal Asia might need (during a typhoon day) storage of many gigawatts (5 to 20 GW) for 10 to 20 hours (rating up to 400 GWh), while today’s largest lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery energy storage (Moss Landing in California) is rated at 750 MW/3 GWh, two orders of magnitude lower.

Nobody can offer a reliable estimate of the eventual cost of a worldwide energy transition by 2050 though a recent (and almost certainly highly conservative) total suggested by McKinsey’s Global Institute makes it clear that comparing this effort to any former dedicated government-funded projects is another serious category mistake. Their estimate of $275 trillion between 2021 and 2050

In reality, the real burden would be far higher for two reasons. First, it cannot be expected that low-income countries could sustain such a diversion of their limited resources and hence this global endeavor could not succeed unless the world’s high-income nations annually spend sums equal to 15 to 20 percent of their GDP. More importantly, this ultimate global transformation project would face enormous cost overruns. As the world’s most comprehensive study of cost overruns (more than 16,000 projects in 16 countries and in 20 categories, from airports to nuclear stations) shows, 91.5 percent of projects worth more than $1 billion have run over the initial estimate, with the mean overrun being 62 percent (Flyvbjerg and Gardner, 2023). Applying a 60% correction would raise McKinsey’s estimate of the cost of global decarbonization to $440 trillion, or nearly $15 trillion a year for three decades,

China is now responsible for 31 percent of global emissions from energy use, the US for 14 percent, the EU for 11 percent, India for 8 percent, Russia for 4 percent, and Saudi Arabia and Indonesia each for about 2 percent. What are the chances that this Big Seven will move harmoniously and steadfastly for the next 27 years toward the common goal of zero carbon by 2050?

What incentives does Russia have—being in a de facto state of war with EU/US in Ukraine—to join the West in decarbonizing when hydrocarbon exports are the foundation of its otherwise weak economy? How eager will China be to work with India (there is still no peace treaty between the two nations) and with the US, bent as it is on a newly embraced decoupling? Why would India, now trying to replicate (at least to some degree) China’s post-1990 economic ascent, forgo the use of its coal when China has quadrupled its extraction during the past 30 years?

Denmark, with half of its electricity now coming from wind, is often pointed out as a particular decarbonization success: since 1995 it cut its energy-related emissions by 56 percent (compared to the EU average of about 22 percent)—but, unlike its neighbors, the country does not produce any major metals (aluminum, copper, iron, or steel), it does not make any float glass or paper, does not synthesize any ammonia, and it does not even assemble any cars. All these products are energy-intensive, and transferring the emissions associated with their production to other countries creates an undeservedly green reputation for the country doing the transferring.

Modern forecasting in general and the anticipation of energy advances in particular have an unmistakable tendency toward excessive optimism, exaggeration, and outright hype (Smil, 2023b).

During the 1970s many people believed that by the year 2000 all electricity would come not just from fission, but from fast breeder reactors, and soon afterwards came the promises of “soft energy” taking over (Smil, 2000).

“Even if we were to replace just 60 percent of today’s fossil fuel consumption, we should be investing about six times more, or about $13 trillion a year, to reach zero carbon by 2050. Making it $15-17 trillion a year (to account for expected cost over-runs) seems hardly excessive, and it takes us, once again, to a grand total of $400-460 trillion by the year 2050, good confirmation of a previously derived value.

Vaclav Smil. January 2014. The Long Slow Rise of Solar and Wind. Scientific America.

  • The major global energy transitions—from wood to coal to oil—have each taken 50 to 60 years. The current move to natural gas will also take a long time.
  • There is no reason to believe that a change to renewable energy sources will be exceptionally fast. In rich countries, “old” renewables such as hydroelectricity are maxed out, so growth will have to come from new renewables such as wind, solar and biofuels, which provided only 3.35 percent of the U.S. supply in 2011.

Most people think that the 19th century was dominated by coal and the 20th century by oil and that the 21st will belong to renewable energy.  But it isn’t true.

Even with the rise of industrial machines, the 19th century wasn’t run on coal. It ran on wood, charcoal, and crop residues (mostly cereal straw) which provided 85% of all energy worldwide.

Coal didn’t provide 5% of energy until 1840, and didn’t reach 50% until 1900. This rise from five to 50% took about 60 years.  It wasn’t until 1885 when fossil energy (mostly coal, some crude oil, and a tiny amount of natural gas) surpassed the energy provided by wood and charcoal in the United States, in France this occurred in 1875, Japan 1901, and the U.S.S.R 1930, China 1965, and India the late 1970s.

Likewise, in the 20th century the biggest energy source was coal, not oil.  Crude oil didn’t surpass coal until 1964.

And yet because GDP and populations were growing exponentially, coal continued to be used in such huge amounts that it ended up being the 20th century’s most important fuel, contributing 5.3 yottajoules (YJ — 24 zeros) compared to oil’s 4 YJ.

Although natural gas is seen as the bridge to the future, only the USSR and UK use more gas than oil.

If wood to coal and coal to oil took roughly 50 to 75 years for each transition, the same can’t be extrapolated to renewable energy. First, consider the scale – about 450 exajoules (18 zeros) of fossil energy is used by the world, 20 times more than during the 1890s.  Generating this much energy without fossil fuels is daunting.

Second, wind and solar are intermittent, yet society needs a reliable, uninterrupted supply of electricity around the clock.

My comment to expand on Smil’s second point: In the United States in 2014, electricity was generated with 66% fossils, 20% nuclear, 6.3% hydropower, 1.6% biomass, 0.4% geothermal, 4.4% wind, and 0.5% solar.  Wind and solar will not only need to replace fossil fuels, but nuclear power as well, since far more plants are closing than being built.  If there were a way to store excess solar and wind energy renewables might have a chance of replacing fossil fuels, but there are no large scale energy storage systems that are even close to being commercial, except hydropower with very few places to put more dams, and compressed air energy storage where there are even fewer places to put them (only one exists in America), and not enough materials on earth to build a battery that could store just 12 hours of worldwide generated power (Barnhart 2013).

Third, again my comment: electricity is only 18.7% of the overall energy consumed by society. Oil powers most transportation, oil and gas are used in 500,000 products made with fossils as both feedstock and the energy source to make products — especially the natural gas fertilizers that feed 4 billion of us, and some processes and nearly all transportation involved in manufacturing, industry, mining, and agriculture.  Overall fossils provide 80% of all energy consumption, and have for many decades. Renewables are growing far too slowly to replace this energy, and will always depend on natural gas to be balanced and as a backup.

Fourth (again my comment) we don’t have an electric way to run for heavy duty trucks, neither batteries or overhead wires that can scale up, and certainly not before fossils start to decline, yet their production for every step of their life cycle depends on fossils, nor do we have electric ways to make cement, steel and many other products except for very small batches.

Fifth, and finally back to Vaclav Smil, “the final factor that will lead to a prolonged shift to renewables is the size and cost of the existing infrastructure.” Even if renewables were free, it would be economically unthinkable for nations, corporations, or municipalities to abandon the enormous investments already made in the fossil fuel system, from coal mines, oil wells, gas pipelines, refineries, and hundreds of thousands of filling stations — infrastructure worth at least $20 trillion (Smil left out the existing billions of cars, trucks, and equipment that runs on combustion engines and much more). China has spent half a trillion dollars for 300 gigawatts of coal generation from just 2001 to 2010, and expects those plants to run for at least 30 years.

Smil suggests that the only way to speed up a transition is to use less energy.

 

Barnhart, C., et al. 2013. On the importance of reducing the energetic and material demands of electrical energy storage. Energy Environment Science 2013(6): 1083–1092.

 

Posted in Alternative Energy, Energy Books, Mining, Vaclav Smil | Tagged , , , , , , | Comments Off on Vaclav Smil on why there will be no energy transition

Republicans Brains are wired to deny science & reality

Preface. This is my book review of Chris Mooney’s 2012 “The Republican Brain. The Science of Why They Deny Science—and Reality”.

This has grown from a review of this book (far below) to more recent science and writing on the conservative mind.  People who want certainty and do not like change or changing their mind have been with us since humans evolved. This is why they are under-represented in higher education — you have to be able to change your mind, to understand why evolution and not God created live on earth.

Another post discussing the difference between people who fear change and those who are curious and exploring is: Garcia, H. 2019. Sex, Power, and Partisanship. How evolutionary science makes sense of our political divide. This is a more profound and apt way of comparison to go beyond political labels of “liberals” and “conservatives” to show how these mindsets  have been around since we evolved 300,000 years ago. Both are necessary for survival. For example, curious liberals open to change and revising what they think may be more likely to migrate to greener pastures and die, while the stay-at-home “conservatives” survived. Or vice versa.

Continue reading

Posted in Evolution, Human Nature | Tagged , , , , , | 7 Comments

If oil is being created all the time, we will never run out

 

Preface. The theory that oil is always being created underground is known as abiotic, or Gold’s theory. This post consists of excerpts from the best paper I’ve found on why this is nonsense. Even if abiotic processes are happening, it is too slow to matter. More oil has been consumed than discovered since 1975. Petroleum took from tens to hundreds of millions of years to create and was made on an Earth under conditions not likely to ever happen again (read the excellent “Goliath’s Curse” to learn more on that).

If this process is occurring, most likely it would produce very simple hydrocarbon chains of natural gas (methane CH4), not crude oil. For more on that see the 2024 15 minute youtube video: “Fossil Fuels Don’t Come From Fossils? Tucker Carlson Fact Check” 3 minutes in for  6 minutes.

Continue reading

Posted in Oil, Ugo Bardi | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment